A I

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

NOTES ON SITUATION IN

In February, 19S>6, Premier Mollet, under the pressure of passionate opposition on the part of Algeria's French population, gave up his original two-pronged plan (military control and the pur- suit of political reforms) for the pacification of Algeria as a first step. As a result, a purely military test of strength ia raging in Algeria, in which the traditionally anti-colonialist left- of-center forces of have been compelled to follow the mili- tarist-nationalist policies of the generals and the settlers. The implications of this Algerian policy probably also led the Mollet cabinet into the armed intervention at Suez which, from the point of view of Socialist principles, represented an ideological, and -- at least in terms of its outcome — another grave political error. Mr. Lacoste, the French pro-consul, has kept promising victory for a year and a half. In practice, however, the huge and costly military effort of France has not only failed to bring about pacifi- cation, but has transformed the struggle into an uncompromising and cruel all-out conflict, in which the Algerians insist on full inde- pendence and the French act on the theory that Algeria is an insep- arable a part of France as Normandy itself. Outside of France, this situation does serious damage to the moral and political prestige of France and confronts that country with increasing international complications. Basically, the fall of the Mollet regime reveals the great domestic uncertainty about the Algerian policies of France. - 2 -

In Algeria itself, the fight has degenerated into tmrestrained atrocity and mass brutality, without a sign of relaxation or the possibility of negotiations and compromise. As a result, an atmosphere of terror pervades Algeria, in which the Jewish population of 200,000 is exposed to unpredictable dangers* For them, the conflict means much more than the political dilemma of taking sides between French rule and Algerian independence, un- tested as it is from the point of view of their security and welfare. As compared with the situation of Moroccan or Tunisian Jewries even at the height of their crises, the problem of Algerian Jews is much more complicated and critical. In and the French resistance to the ultimate independence of these countries was much less determined than in Algeria, where it has a marked "last-ditch" character. Conversely, Moroccan and Tunisian nationalist leaders were much more inclined to play along with the theory of "independence within interdependence," and thereby to pave the way toward: an agreed settlement. In Algeria, today the sense of a deadlock and the spirit of fighting to the bitter end prevails on both sides, with dehumanizing psychological consequences. The recent butchery at Melousa indicates the nature of the hazards that may befall, and have already occasionally befallen, a small minority population which finds itself defenseless between two relentless forces.

The difference between the situation of Jews in Algeria and in the other two North African countries is further accentuated by the fact that Tunisia and Morocco, during their fight for independence, had seasoned, organized and responsible political leaderships, jealous of the prestige of their movements. In Algeria moderate and - 3 - responsible elements are subject to persecution and political murder, and the leadership of the Algerian Liberation Front is known, if at all, only as an element driven by fanaticism and violence„ As a further complication, the Jews of Algeria are potentially caught not merely between two but four fires: between the millstones of French rule and Algerian resistance, and also between the additional potential threats represented by the militant and often anti-Semitic Frenoh settlers on the one hand, and the hostility between the Algerian Liberation Front and the Algerian National Move- ment, on the other. It is thus actually from four different direction; that Jews in Algeria are exposed to different degrees of pressure, intimidation and threats of dire consequences of non-compliance — manifestly a situation in which all choices, including the choice of neutrality, are increasingly dangerous. Whatever they do or omit doing, wherever they turn or fail to turn, Jews in Algeria become "traitors" and "enemies" in the eyes of one or the other side, and face hostility without the assurance of protection. For them, there appears to be no way out of the trap. Refusal or temporizing by the Federation of Jewish Communities in Algeria on the Liberation Front demand that they collectively declare Algerian Jewry in favor of liberation may expose the community collectively to the charge of treason to the cause of Algerian independence. Compliance with the demand may expose them to French military repression as parties to the revolt, France expects the Jews of Algeria to consider and to conduct themselves as citizens of France. The nationalists even condemn them for having accepted French citizen- ship under the Cremieux , Any contact between Jews and - h - nationalists is an act of hostility in the eyes of local French power, on whose sense of responsibility the very security of Jews depends. While in Morocco and Tunisia Jews could find at least temporary political shelter with more moderate nationalist groups, in Algeria any such move is anathema not only to the French authori- ties and the Liberation Front, but also to the French colons, the unfriendly next-door neighbors of Jews in the cities. To date, French power in Algeria has abstained from applying its own open counter-pressures for a one-sided, collective Jewish pledge of allegiance, and only elements of the Liberation Front have reacted with direct outbursts of terrorism against the "neutrality" of Jews. These often murderous acts of terrorism have already had grave con- sequences, in driving thousands of defenseless Jews from the hinter- land to the cities, causing additional problems of human misery and pressures for emigration. With the increasing ruthlessness of the struggle between the two armed camps, this nationalist terrorism against Jews is certain to grow, no matter what the Jewish leadership may do or avoid doing. Any continuing public insistence by the Algerian Liberation Front upon an open and collective Jewish declaration of allegiance to it is certain to cost the lives of many Jews. To prevent such an eventuality is the responsibility of the Algerian Liberation Front. There can be no doubt that anti*Jewish outbreaks in Algeria would seriously damage their own cause. Their agitation for collective Jewish support must be brought to a halt. In this respect, the Algerians must follow in the footsteps of Bourguiba, under whose leadership in Tunisia no such blackmailing stranglehold was applied on the Jewish community. Animated by the desire to strengthen his liberation movement, Mr. Bourguiba did appeal to Jews as individuals for support, and occasionally the nationalist press openly called for such support. But Tunisia recognized the right of the individual, Jew or non-Jew alike, to make up his own mind, without imposing upon the Jewish community leadership the impossible obligation to commit the entire Jewish population politically. Tunisia has no reason to regret this wise policy of restraint. The Jewish community is no political party or movement, it has no political authority and cannot impose political decisions on anyone. This principle must be respected in Algeria as well, all the more so as similar pressures for a collective Jewish front can be applied by the French at any time, against the movement of Algerian liberation, and with the same disastrous consequences for the Jewish population. In addition, conspicuous wrongs inflicted by Algerians upon the Jewish population may easily serve as ocoasions for special retaliatory measures by

French power. The only way of freeing the Jews of Algeria from this dilemma is

to put an end to the Liberation Front's dangerously mistaken approach

to the problem. Since at this stage no direct approach to the

leadership of the Front in Algeria is possible for the AJC, the only

avenue to an effective solution of the problem appears to be a

suggestion for a friendly intercession in Algeria by Prime Minister

Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia. His enlightened statesmanship and

great influence with the Algerian nationalist leadership are the best

and perhaps only promise for a satisfactory solution of a problem - 6 - which otherwise must endanger the security of Jews in Algeria, The situation also calls for representations by the AJC delega- tion to the competent French authorities in , concerning the critical position of Jews in Algeria, the past shortcomings of the French attitude to the problem, the continuing responsibility of France for Jewish security in Algeria and the need for more consistent policies and protective measures on the part of France.

The American position on the Algerian problem is in increasingly uncomfortable suspense. On March 20, 1956, C. Douglas Dillon, then U.S, ambassador to France, stated that Algeria was "primarily a French affair" on which the wished to keep silent. But he added that France had "the wholehearted support of the U.S. government in her search for liberal solutions to insure the continu- ance of the French presence in North Africa." On February 6, 1957, Ambassador Lodge urged the U.N. to put an end to violence so that the people of Algeria may select representa- tives to work out with France a solution "satisfying the aspirations of all the people of Algeria." But the embarrassment of Washington was given expression by Mr, Dulles in mid-May when he said: "The situation (in Algeria) does not seem to be clarifying." While the United States appears to continue its hands-off policy, the deadlock in Algeria is increasingly considered as a serious complication which may imperil the viability of the Eisenhower Doctrine in the Near East,

EH/a June 6, 1957