THEROMANLABOR MARKET Journalof Interdisciplinary History, xxxiv:4 (Spring,2004), 513– 538.
Peter Temin The LaborMarket ofthe EarlyRoman Empire Ancient Romewas a slavesociety. Hopkins wasthe rstto assert thatRome was one of only veslavesocieties in recordedhistory, aviewadopted quickly byFinley. This characterizationis impor- tantbecause slavery is usedas a sign of anon-marketeconomy, which, in turn, is aclassication within the Gemeinschaftund Gesellschaft conception of history asthe account of progressfrom one totheother. Theformer is theinformal economy of families andvillages where social rules andobligations aredominant inuences on behavior.The latter is theeconomy characteristicof modern, urbansocieties. In theclassic viewof Tönnies, “aperiod of Gesellschaft follows aperiodof Gemeinschaft. ”Tönnies, citing Marx,described the mechanism behindthis progress“ asaprocess of increasing urbanization.”Marx and Tö nnies weretrying to makesense of changes in nineteenth-centurysociety, in which the dramaticrise of urbanization loomed large. 1 Polanyi, in TheGreat Transformation, locatedthe center of this transition in thelabor market. He arguedthat labor markets in the modernsense did not existbefore the Industrial Revolution and thePoor Lawsthat accompanied it in England. This viewis con- sonant with Weber’s judgmentthat a criticalcomponent of capi- talism wasfree labor. One way to identifya periodof Gesellschaft is theprevalence of urbanlife, butan evenmore important key is
PeterTemin is Elisha Gray II Professor ofEconomics, Massachusetts Instituteof Technology. Heis theauthor of “EvolutionaryHistory,” Journalof InterdisciplinaryHistory, XXVIII (1998), 405–415; editor of AnEconomic History of NewEngland (Cambridge, Mass., 2000). Theauthor would like to thank Roger Bagnall, Alan Bowman, Richard Duncan- Jones,Peter Garnsey, Keith Hopkins, Herbert Klein,Sheilagh Ogilvie, Dominic Rathbone, and Joshua Sosinfor help and advice. Healso thanks theWarden and Fellowsof Nuf eld College,University of Oxford, and theSimon R. GuggenheimFoundation for research sup- port. ©2004by theMassachusetts Instituteof Technology and TheJournal of Interdisciplinary History, Inc.
KeithHopkins, Conquerorsand Slaves (Cambridge, 1978);Moses Finley, AncientSlavery andModern Ideology (London,1980); Ferdinand Tönnies (trans. Charles P. Loomis), Commu- nityand Society (East Lansing,1957), 231– 233 (orig. pub. as Gemeinschaftund Gesellschaft [Leip- zig,1887]); KarlMarx (trans. SamuelMoore and Edwar Aveling), Capital (London,1970; orig.pub. Hamburg, 1867),I, 352. 514 | PETER TEMIN thepresence of alabormarket in which theservices of laborcan bebought andsold, which, Polanyi argued,emerged only two centuries ago. 2 Thewidespread use of slaveryin Romeis takenas asign that Gemeinschaft dominatedthe life of theRoman republicand the earlyRoman empire.Finley, andothers following his lead,argued thatancient economies werenot marketeconomies, butan alter- nate,even primitive, form oforganization. Finley stated,“ In early societies, freehired labor (though widelydocumented) was spas- modic, casual, marginal.”According to Hopkins, theearly Ro- man empirewas “ asociety which hadno labormarket.” Hopkins speculatedas aresult, “In asociety without amarketin freelabor, recruitmentby force (i.e. slavery)was probably the only method of securing largenumbers of full-time dependentswith particular skills.”3 This viewis mistaken.A varietyof evidenceindicates that Romehad a functioning labormarket and a unied labor force. Wagedispersion in theearly Roman empire,to theextent that we know it, is indistinguishable from thatin pre-industrialEurope. Roman laborcontracts havea distinctly modernallocation of risks andrewards. In addition, Roman slaverywas so differentfrom modernslavery that it did not indicatethe presence of non- market,traditional actions. Instead,ancient Roman slaverywas an integralpart of alaborforce that shares many characteristicswith laborforces in otheradvanced agricultural societies. Contraryto Finley, who asserted,“ [A]ncient slavery. ..co-existedwith other
2KarlPolanyi, TheGreat Transformation (NewYork, 1944);Max Weber (trans. TalcottPar- sons), TheProtestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (NewYork, 1930;orig. pub. inGerman 1905).More recent views rejectthe opposition of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in favor of a more complexview that sees bothideal types as present ina wide varietyof societies.This view,which also derives fromTö nnies, questions whichform of society is dominant,not ubiquitous, interpretinghistory as theshifting balance between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft rather thana totaltransition from one to the other. A societymight be regarded as dominated by onemode ortheother, but thesense that progress has eliminated Gemeinschaft is gone. See Thomas Bender, Communityand Social Change in America (NewBrunswick, N.J.,1978). 3Ian Morris, “Foreword,”in Moses I. Finley, TheAncient Economy (Berkeley,1999; orig. pub. 1973),1– 37, 68. Finley, AncientSlavery, 68.In “Further Thoughts,”Finley reaf rmed his positions, with“ nuancing,”that “ freehired labor was casual and seasonal”and that“ therewas nogenuine competition . ..betweenslave and freelaborers” (185– 186). Following Brunt, he acknowledgedabundant freelaborers inthe largest cities, but heinsisted thattheir employ - mentwas “strictlyspeaking casual”(Finley, “ Further Thoughts,”in idem,Ancient Economy, 177–207); P. A.Brunt,“ Free Labor and Public Works atRome,” Journalof RomanStudies, LXX(1980), 81–100; Hopkins, Conquerorsand Slaves, 14, 111. THEROMANLABORMARKET | 515 forms of dependentlabor, not with freewage-labor,” and Schiavone, who addedrecently that “ slavery. ..ledto theeven- tual stagnation of the[Roman economic] system, blocking off otherpaths,” the analysis herein nds thatfree hired labor waswidespread and that ancient slaverywas part of aunied laborforce in theearly Roman empire,not abarrierto economic progress.4 theroman labor market Afunctioning labormarket couples a labordemand with alaborsupply. Two conditions must belled, atleastpartially: Workers must befree to change theireconomic activityand/ or theirlocation, andthey must bepaid something commensurate with theirlabor productivity to indicateto them which kindof workto choose. Contemporarystudies maintain thatlabor needs to bemobile enough tobringwages for work of equalskill nearequality. Although this stipulation doesnot mean thateveryone has to change jobswith greatfrequency, enough peoplemust beableand willing todoso to keeppayments to labor from beingexcessively higher or lowerthan thewages of compa- rablework in otherlocations or activities.Even in theUnited Statestoday, which contains themost exiblelabor market in his- tory, wagesfor comparable jobs arenot completelyequalized. 5 When theseconditions arenot fullled, there is no labormar- ket,or perhapsonly local, isolatedlabor markets. People might not beable to change theireconomic activitiesdue to hereditary or guild restrictions. Theymight berestricted in whatthey can earnor beentitledto income forreasons unrelatedto theirwork. Wages,in thesense of areturnfor labor services might be“spas- modic, casual, marginal.”The choice betweenthese two alterna- tivesis importantbecause the nature of thelabor market is an importantcomponent to thenature of theeconomy asa whole. With afunctioning labormarket, an economy can respondto ex- ternalin uences likemarket economies dotoday.Labor can move
4 Finley, AncientSlavery, 68,127; Aldo Schiavone, TheEndof thePast: AncientRome andthe ModernWorld (Cambridge, Mass., 2000),156. 5 Laborproductivity hereinmeans theoutput of goods orservices thatresults froma worker’s employment,not the average labor productivity ofallworkers. In economicsjargon, it is the marginalproduct oflabor. GeorgeJ. Borhas, “Does Immigration Grease theWheels of the Labor Market?” BrookingsPapers on Economic Activity, I(2001), 71:“ Thereexist sizable wage differencesacross regionsor states inthe United States, even for workers withparticular skills lookingfor similar jobs." 516 | PETER TEMIN totakean advantageof atechnical change thatmakes an activity morepro table or adiscoverythat provides an economic oppor- tunity in anewplace. In alocal, non–labor market, labor would not beable to respondto changes in theexternal environment. Theeconomy insteadwould continue to actin traditionalways, perhapswith asmall gesturetoward the new opportunities. The economy would bedominated by Gemeinschaft, not Gesellschaft. Thetask of distinguishing thesetwo conditions in theearly Roman empireis rendereddif cult, asalways,by the absence of comprehensiveevidence. The chief evidencefor the absence of a labormarket in theearly Roman empirehas beenthe mere pres- enceof slaves.The question is not how many slaveswere present, however,but rather how slaveryoperated. Slaves in theAmerican South beforethe Civil Warwere not partof aunied American labormarket because their activities and incomes wereso re- strictedthat they had no incentiveto seekbetter working condi- tions. Slavesin theearly Roman empiredid not sufferunder the samerestrictions, butdespite Rome’ s use of slavery,free hired la- borwas the rule, not theexception, in therest of theearly Roman empire. Theabstract conditions thatde ne alabormarket typically arerelated to labormarkets in industrial economies; theyneed modication to applyto labormarkets in agricultural economies. Most of theworkers in such aneconomy arerural, working either in agricultureor in associatedcrafts and services; they rarely change occupations or residenceswithout strong pressure.A rural labormarket exists when enough of themare free to movein re- sponse to economic stimuli, therebykeeping rural wages at a moderatelyuniform levelbut also allowing forsubstantial geo- graphicalvariation in both thelevel and the rate of change of rural wages.For example,migration andwages interacted in earlymod- ernBritain to keepwages similar, butby no means equal. Onepossible move for a substantial fraction of ruralworkers in advancedagricultural economies is to acity. Itis rare,both in pastand current agricultural economies, forrural and urban wages tobeequalized by migration. Economists do not regardthis dis- crepancyas negating theexistence of aunied labormarket; they explainthe difference by noting thatnew urban workers often are unemployed andthat only theexpected wage (that is, wage 3 probabilityof earning it) should beequalizedby migration. Living THEROMANLABORMARKET | 517 costs arealso typicallyhigher in cities; urbanwages can exceedru- ralwages for this reason alone. Urbanwages that are double rural wagesdo not strainthe ability of thesefactors to account forthe discrepancy. 6 Wagesvary in alabormarket by skill aswell as by location. Almost all workershave skills, basicskills of agricultureand often moreadvanced skills aswell. Economists call theseskills human capital.Most ancient workershad few skills, including theability toread,that is, littlehuman capital.Craftsmen and some agricul- turalworkers had competencies that did not dependon literacy andwould receivea higher wagein arurallabor market for them. But theseskills would not earnmuch, if anything, in urbanareas. Although wetendto know moreabout literate workers— despite therelative paucity of them—than aboutless-skilled workers be- causeof theliterary bias of our sources, thegreat mass of workers in theearly Roman empirewere illiterate and— by modernstan- dards—unskilled. Recentscholarship has revealedthe existence of many market pricesand wages in ancient Rome, suggesting thatthe Roman economy wasnot substantially differentfrom morerecent agrarian economies. Theabstract conditions thatde ne alabormarket in modernanalyses, however,need modi cation to applyto labor marketsin agricultural economies. Steinfeldhas shown thatwork- erswere not freeto change jobsat will until nearthe end of the nineteenth century. Evenin theUnited States and Britain, twoof themost market-orientedcountries thatthe world has ever known, therights of workerswere sharply restricted. Both urban andrural workers were subject to prosecution ifthey left a job without theiremployers’ permission. Steinfeldargued that work in theseadvanced economies wasdirected by amixtureof mone- taryand other incentives. This contextpermits no sharpdistinc- tion betweenfree and unfree labor, only acontinuum along which various economies, or evenactivities within an economy, can beplaced.In his words,“ Practicallyall laboris elicitedby con- fronting workerswith achoice betweenwork and a setof moreor less disagreeablealternatives to work.”7
6JohnR. Harris and MichaelP .Todaro, “Migration,Unemployment and Development: ATwo-SectorAnalysis,” AmericanEconomic Review, LX(1970), 126–142. 7Hans-Joachim Drexhage, Preise,Mieten/ Pachten,Kosten undLö hne im Rö mischen Ä gypten biszum RegierungsantrittDiokletians (St.Katharinen, 1991); Dominic Rathbone,“ Prices and 518 | PETER TEMIN Steinfeld’s scenario is thestandard against which to evaluate Roman labormarkets. Wages were an importanttool forthe allo- cation of laborin eighteenth-centuryEngland, buttheir use was limitedby therestrictions on labormobility. Wagesin such asys- temwould not reachequality for similar skills, andmost workers would not feelfree to look around fora morelucrative activity. Freeurban workers in theearly Roman empirewere paid for theirwork and were able to change theireconomic activities.He- reditarybarriers were nonexistent, andRoman guilds do not ap- pearto havebeen restrictive. Workers in largeenterprises, like mines andgalleys, werepaid wages, as in moremodern labor mar- kets.Workers engaged in moreskilled and complex tasksreceived moreelaborate compensation, probablyfor longer units of time than those doing wagelabor, again asin moremodern labor mar- kets,even though explicitlong-term contracts werenot yetestab- lished. Theforce of competition underthose circumstances probablybrought wagesand labor productivity into thesame ball- park.8 Some of thework in theearly Roman empirewas done for wagesand some underthe duress of slavery.The early Roman empireeven had salaried long-term free workers in Egypt.Crafts- men sold theirwares in cities andalso suppliedthem to ruraland urbanpatrons in returnfor long-term economic andsocial sup- port.Similarly, peoplewho workedfor, or supplied,senators and equestriansoften worked for long-term rewardsand advancement. Theepisodic nature of monumental building in Rome, accom- plishedlargely by free laborers, gives evidence of amobile labor forcethat could bediverted from one activityto another. Free workers,freedmen, and slaves worked in all kinds of activities; contemporariessaw the ranges of jobsand of freedomas sepa-
Price Formation inRoman Egypt,” Economieantique: Prix et formatin des prixdans les economies antiques (Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges, 1997),183– 244; Temin, “ AMarket Economyin the EarlyRoman Empire,” Journalof RomanStudies, XCI (2001), 169–181; Robert J. Steinfeld, TheInvention of FreeLabor: T heEmployment Relation in English and American Law and Culture, 1350–1879 (Chapel Hill,1991), 26. See also idem,Coercion, Contract and Free Labor in theNine- teenthCentury (Cambridge, 2001).Labor mobilitywas reduced furtherin continentalEurope by guildsand otherrestrictions. SeeSheilagh Ogilvie, StateCorporatism and Proto-Industry: T he Württemberg Black Forest, 1580–1797 (Cambridge, 1997),for a description oflabor conditionsin earlyGermany. 8TenneyFrank, EconomicSurvey of AncientRome (1940), V,248– 252; Russell Meiggs, Ro- man Ostia (Oxford, 1973),314. THEROMANLABORMARKET | 519 rate—even orthogonal. Inparticular,rural slaves hardly comprised anundifferentiatedgang of laborers;certain lists ofruralslave jobs areas varied as the known rangeof urbanor household “slave” jobs. Some rurallaborers received piece rates and others, daily wages.Cicero, anticipating Marx,con ated legal and economic relations byequating wages with servitude. 9 Alabormarket in theearly Roman empirewould have tendedto equalizereal wages in differentparts of theempire. Sug- gestively,Cuvigny found equalwages of miners in Egyptand Daciain EasternEurope. Nominal wagesof unskilled workers wereunequal in Romeand Egypt, but the price of wheatand othergoods differedas well. Realwages— the buying powerof wagesin wheat—were close, however;the hypothesis of equality cannot berejected. These scraps of dataprovide evidence of a well-functioning labormarket. Only theability and willingness of workersto change jobsin responseto wagedifferentials would producesuch uniformity. 10 Moreover,in afunctioning labormarket, wages increase as thenumber of laborersdecreases because of thecompetition to hirethem; workersare more productive when fewerof themare availableto work.It is hardto know of small changes in Roman laborsupplies, butplagues led to rapid,large falls in thepool of availablelabor. Egyptian wages doubled after the major Antonine plagueof 165–175 c.e. This clearlyis thestandard labor-market responseto asharpdecrease in thesupply of labor.It demonstrates thatwages in theearly Roman empiremoved to clearmarkets, in this caseto allocatenewly scarcelabor. 11 Employment contracts also giveevidence of labor-marketac- tivityin which workerscould choose theirjobs. Themodern divi- sion betweenwages and salaries nds its analog in Roman Egypt: “Asageneralrule permanent employees of theAppianus and re-
9 Rathbone, EconomicRationalism and Rural Society in Third Century A.D Egypt (Cam- bridge, 1991),91– 147, 166; Brunt, “ Free Labor”; KeithR. Bradley, Slaveryand Society at Rome (Cambridge, 1994),59– 65; Marcus TulliusCicero (trans. WalterMiller), de Of ciis (London, 1913;orig. pub. 45–44 b.c.), XXI,1.150– 151; Hé lè ne Cuvigny,“ TheAmount of Wages Paid tothe Quarry-Workers atMons Claudianus,” Journalof RomanStudies, LXXXVI(1996), 139– 145. 10Temin, “ EstimatingRoman GDP,” paper prepared fora conferenceon ancient history, “Innovazióne tecnicae progresso economiconel mondo romano,”Capri, April 14–16, 2003. 11R. P. Duncan-Jones, “TheImpact oftheAntonine Plague,” Journalof RomanArcheology, IX(1996), 108–136; Walter Scheidel, “ AModelof Demographic and EconomicChange in RomanEgypt after the Antonine Plague,” ibid., XV(2002), 97–114. 520 | PETER TEMIN latedestates can bedistinguished bytheirreceipt of opsonion (sal- ary),a xedmonthly allowance of cash andwheat and sometimes vegetableoil, whereasoccasional employeesreceived misthos, that is ‘wages.’” some of these“ free”workers were tied to theestate forlife, likethose subjectto themore modern worker contracts studiedby Steinfeld,but others werefree to leavewhen theirjobs were done.12 Miners andapprentices had employment contracts. Onedat- ing from 164 c.e. shows thatworkers were paid only forwork done andthat they had more right to quitthan thenineteenth- century workersdescribed by Steinfeld:
Inthe consulship of Macrinus and Celsus, May20. I,Flavius Secundinus,at therequest of Memmius, sonof Asceplius, have here recordedthe fact that he declaredthat he hadlet, andhe didin factlet, his laborin the gold mine toAurelius Adjutor from this day toNovember 13next for seventy denarii andboard. He shall be entitledto receive his wages ininstallments. He shall berequiredto renderhealthy and vigorous labor to the above-mentioned em- ployer.If he wantsto quitor stopworking against theemployer’ s wishes, heshall have topay ve sesterces foreach day, deducted fromhis totalwages. Ifa oodhinders operations, he shall bere- quiredto prorate accordingly. If the employer delays paymentof thewage whenthe time is up,he shall besubjectto the same pen- alty after three days ofgrace. 13
Most freeworkers were farmers, many of themtenant farm- ers,although employmentcategories in thecountryside were uid. Roman tenancycontracts allocatedrisks between landown- ersandtenants in much thesame way as analogous contracts didin eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Britain. Majorrisks were borneby the landowners asevents beyond the tenants’ control, whereasminor riskswere borne by tenants in returnfor the op- portunity to earnmore and keep their earnings: “Forcemajeure ought not causeloss to thetenant, if the crops have been damaged beyondwhat is sustainable. But thetenant ought to bearloss which is moderatewith equanimity, just ashe doesnot haveto giveup pro ts which areimmoderate. It will beobvious thatwe
12Rathbone, EconomicRationalism, 91–92. 13CIL III, translated inNaftali Lewis and MeyerReinhold (eds.), RomanCivilization: Se- lectedReadings (NewYork, 1990;orig. pub. 1951),II, 948. THEROMANLABORMARKET | 521 arespeaking here of thetenant who paysrent in money; fora share-cropper (partiarus colonus) sharesloss andpro t with the landlord, asit were by law of partnership.”14 Weknow alot moreabout wages in England beforeindustri - alization than in theRoman empire.Wages for comparable work weresimilar throughout England, butthey were not uniform. Ag- riculture wasmoreprosperous in theSouth than in theNorth, and wageswere higher in theeighteenth century. (This patternwas re- versedin thenineteenth century when theNorth industrialized.) Substantialvariation was evident within regions, dueto theim- mobility of thepopulation. Arecentsummary of theEnglish data shows dailywinter wages in theNorth to beonly half of what theywere in theSouth in 1700. Theyapproached each other graduallyduring thenext century anda half. 15 England is much smallerthan theRoman empirewas. If we use Roman datafrom Egyptand Dacia, a moresuitable compari- son is pre-industrialEurope. Clearly, labor had even less mobility betweencountries than within England, andwages varied more, though theydid remain at the same general level. Allen demon- stratedthat wages within Europebegan to divergein thesixteenth andseventeenth centuries. By1700, thereal wages of masons in London andAntwerp were more than doublethose in other Europeancities. 16 Basedon this moremodern evidence, we do not expectto ndwages that are equal in distantplaces except by coincidence, butwe expectwages to besimilar. Iftheearly Roman empirehad alabormarket that functioned aboutas wellas thelabor market in pre-industrialEurope, then wagesin theearly Roman empire would havebeen approximately equal. Real wages for similar tasks might havevaried by afactorof twoor three,as realwages did in eighteenth-centuryEurope, but they were not differentorders of
14Peter Garnsey, Cities,Peasants andFood inClassical Antiquity (Cambridge, 1998),139; DennisP. Kehoe, Investment,Pro t, and Tenancy: The Juristsand the Roman Agrarian Economy (Ann Arbor, 1997);Gaius, as represented in TheDigest of Justinian,D. 19.2.25.6,quoted in David Johnston, RomanLaw in Context (Cambridge, 1999),64. 15Donald Woodward, Menat Work:Laborers and Building Craftsmen in the Towns of Northern England,1 450–1750 (Cambridge, 1995);Gregory Clark, “Farm Wagesand LivingStandards inthe Industrial Revolution:England, 1670– 1850,” EconomicHistory Review, LIV (2001), 485.xxxxx 16Robert Allen,“ TheGreat Divergence:Wages and Prices inEurope fromthe Middle Ages tothe First World War,” Explorationsin Economic History, XXXVIII (2001), 411–447. 522 | PETER TEMIN magnitude. Asjust described,this presumption is consistent with thefragmentary evidence about wages in thePrincipate. Thearmy must bedistinguished from theprivate sphere, as in moderneconomies. Peacetimearmies are often voluntary, re- cruitedvia the standard organizational lures—favorable wages and working conditions. Wartimearmies, by contrast, oftenrely on conscription, which is anon-marketprocess. Actions within ar- mies aredirected by commands, not bymarket transactions. Armiestherefore represent at besta partialapproximation to afree labormarket and typically an exceptionto it. Since armies,unhap- pily, arepresent in almost all societies, weplacethis exceptionto thegeneral rule to one side. Thewages of theRoman army,which wasstaffed by amix- tureof attractionand conscription, stayedconstant formany dec- adesat atime.When thearmy was not ghting, which wasmost of thetime, soldiers hadto besettasks to keepthem tandout of trouble,like building roadsand public monuments. This construc- tion workdid not interferewith thelabor market in Romeor elsewherein thecenter of theempire since thearmy was stationed atthe frontiers. 17 Slavesappear to belike soldiers in thatthey are subject to command, butsuch wasnot necessarilythe case in theearly Roman empire,especially in cities. Unlike Americanslaves, Roman slaveswere able to participatein thelabor market in al- most thesame way as freelaborers. Although theyoften started at anextremelylow point, particularlythose who wereuneducated, many wereable to advanceby merit. Freedmen started from a betterposition, andtheir ability to progresswas almost limitless, despitesome prominent restrictions. Theseconditions created powerfulpositive work incentives forslaves in theearly Roman empire. roman slavery Theprevalence of slaveryin ancient Romehas stood in theway of comparisons with morerecent labor markets since it seemedto indicatethat a largesegment of theRoman laborforce was outside themarket. Classicists haveused evidence of modernAmerican slavery to illuminate conditions in ancient Rome. Bradley,for example, opened his bookon slaverebellions 17Brunt, “ Conscription and Volunteeringin the Roman Imperial Army,” ScriptaClassica Israelica, I(1974), 90–115; George R. Watson, TheRoman Soldier (Ithaca, 1969),45. THEROMANLABORMARKET | 523 with achapteron slaveryin theNew World. Although Bradley andHopkins emphasizedthe complexity of Roman slavery,their use of modernevidence implicitly assumedthat slave economies separatedby two millennia wereessentially thesame. Slavery, however,is not alwaysand everywhere the same. Roman slavery wasat theopposite extreme from slaveryin thesouthern United States;many Roman slaves—like free workers— responded to marketincentives. 18 Slaveryhas twodimensions. In the rstdimension, which derivesfrom anthropology, slaveryvaries between open and closed. Openslavery describes a systemwhereby slaves can win theirfreedom and enter into generalsociety. In anthropological terms,freedmen and women areaccepted into kinship groups and intermarryfreely with otherfree persons. Closed slaverydenies slavesacceptance into generalsociety andforbids them to marry among thegeneral population, evenwhen freed.Roman slavery conformed to theopen model. Freedmenwere Roman citizens, andmarriages of widowswith freedmenwere common. Bycon- trast,“ Americanslavery [was] perhapsthe most closed andcaste- likeof any [slave]system known.” Relative to otherworkers, Roman slaveswere not in thesame predicament as modern Americanslaves. 19 Thesecond dimension along which slaverycan varyis the frequencyof manumission. Frequentmanumission wasa dis- tinguishing featureof Roman slavery;slaves in theearly Roman empirecould anticipatefreedom if theyworked hard and demon- stratedskill or accumulateda peculium with which to purchaseit. Oncefreed, they were accepted into Roman society farmore completelythan thefreedmen in closed systems of slavery.The promiseof manumission wasmost apparentfor urban, skilled,lit- erateslaves, but it pervaded Roman society. 20
18 Bradley, Slaveryand Rebellion in the Roman World, 1 40B.C.–70 B.C. Bloomington, 1989).xxxxx 19James L.Watson,“ Slaveryas anInstitution, Open and Closed Systems,”in idem (ed.), Asianand African Systems of Slavery (Oxford, 1980),7. This classication differs from that in WilliamV. Harris, “Demography,Geography and theSources of RomanSlaves,” Journal of RomanStudies, LXXXIX(1999), 62–75, which classi ed aslave system as openif slaves were imported and closed ifnot. 20Compare Edward Gibbon’s magisterialpronouncement early in TheDecline and Fall of theRoman Empire (NewYork, 1961),36: “ Hope, thebest comfortof our imperfect condition, was notdenied totheRoman slave; and ifhe had anyopportunity of renderinghimself either 524 | PETER TEMIN The veslave societies notedby Hopkins can beclassi ed according tothesetwo dimensions. Theclassi cation can beseen easilyin atwo-by-twomatrix, as shown in Table1, wherethe ve societies areplaced in theappropriate boxes. Rome, asan open systemof slaverywith frequentmanumission, is in theupper left- hand box. Thesouthern UnitedStates and the Caribbean, as a closed systemwith almost no manumission, appearin thelower right-handbox. Theslavery in ancient Greeceand in modern Brazilwere intermediate cases. Manumission wascommon, but freedslaves were segregated from thelarger population. There- maining possibility, an open systemof slaverywith no regular manumission, nds no instance in these vesocieties. Fewpeople would choose to bea slave;almost all Roman slaveswere forced into slaveryas captives,children of slaves,aban- donedchildren, or debtbondage. A Roman slavewas subject to morecruelty in theearly Roman empirethan freepeople were. But evenif many slaveswere at, or near,the bottom of society andthe economy, itmakes sense to askhow hopeless wastheir position. All people,even slaves, need to haveincentives to work.Free peoplemay work to increasetheir income; slavesmay require otherincentives— positive incentives, or “carrots”(rewards for hardor good work),and negative incentives, or “sticks”(punish- mentfor slacking offor not cooperating). Thereis alargelitera- tureon theincentive structures of modernAmerican slavery, possibly becauseits emotional content makesconsensus elusive. But while disagreementsremain on many points, most scholars agreethat negative incentives dominatedthe lives of modern slavesin theAmericas. Positive incentives weremore important than negativein motivating Roman slaves.Sticks can getpeople to work,but not toperformskilled tasks that require independent action. Itis hard to distinguish poor performancefrom backluck when workis complex, andcarrots are far more effective than sticks in motivat- ing hardwork. Consider amanagerialjob, likea vilicus (super- visor). Aslavein such aposition motivatedby negativeincentives could claim thatadverse outcomes werenot his fault. Beatinghim usefulor agreeable,he might very naturally expect that the diligence and delityof a few years wouldbe rewarded withthe inestimable gift of freedom.” THEROMANLABORMARKET | 525 Table 1 Varieties ofSlavery inthe Five Slave Societies onlyexceptional frequentmanumission manumission Opensystems early Romanempire Closedsystems classical Greece, nineteenth- southernUnited States, century Brazil theCaribbean or exactingworse punishment would leadto resentmentrather than cooperation and—one might condently expect— more “ bad luck.”A vilicus motivatedby positiveincentives would anticipate sharing success; he would workto makeit happen. The effort of an ordinary eldhand, however,could beobserved directly and easily; slackerscould bepunished straightaway. Since eldhands typicallywork in agroup, positiveincentives thatmotivate indi- vidualsto betterefforts are hard to design. 21 Thecruelty in ancient slavery,as in earlymodern indenture, has beendescribed often because it contrasts sharplywith our modernsense of individual autonomy. Crueltywas a hallmarkof theearly Roman empire,as ithas beenof most nonindustrial soci- eties.Imperial Rome appeared particularly to celebrateits cruelty probablybecause of its militaryorientation; ancient crueltywas by no means reservedfor slaves. The vivid examples of violence to- wardslaves, however, do not offsetthe many competing stories of morebenevolent slave conditions. Themiserable condition of slavesworking in thebakery overseen by Apuleius’golden ass do not so much illustratethe harsh conditions of Roman slaveryas thedismal conditions of ordinarylabor in pre-industrialecono- mies. IntheseMalthusian economies, greaterproductivity resulted in largerpopulations ratherthan gains in working conditions or realwages. Almost all workersbefore the industrial revolution and thedemographic transition livednear what economists call subsis- tence,which wasnot necessarilythe edge of starvation,but the limit of endurance.Slaves were not theonly ones to dothedan- gerous workin Roman mines; convicts andwage earners suffered there, too.22 21Stefano Fenoaltea, “ Slaveryand Supervision inComparative Perspective: AModel,” Journalof EconomicHistory, XLIV(1984), 635–668. 22Slave revolts do notgive evidence of predominantly negative incentives. The attested slave revoltswere concentrated in ashort span duringthe late republic, atimeof greatsocial 526 | PETER TEMIN Some poor peopleregarded the life of aslaveas better than thatof afreeman. Ambitious poor peoplesold themselvesinto long-termslavery that promised, however uncertainly, moread- vancementthan thelife of thefree poor. Such achoice, however rarein theearly Roman empire,would havebeen inconceivable in aclosed systemof slaverybuilt on negativeincentives. Itwas morelike the process of apprenticeshipin earlymodern Europe, revealingthe integration of Roman slaverywith theoverall labor market.23 Theseobservations relate mostly to urbanslaves. We do not know how largea shareof Roman slaveswas urban, butit was substantial. Conventional estimatesplace the population of Italyin thePrincipate at around 6million, 1million of whom livedin Romeitself. Slaves are estimated to haveconstituted asmuch as one-thirdof Italy’s population andone-half of Rome’s. Thesees- timatesimply thatone-quarter or less of theItalian slaves lived in Rome; therest lived in smallercities andthe countryside— where theywere less than one-thirdof therural labor force. If so, slaves werenot thedominant laborforce either in thecity or thecoun- trysideof theearly Roman empire.Slaves in Egyptappear from surviving census returnsto havecomposed about10 percentof thepopulation, spreadthinly among thehouseholds. Two-thirds of thelisted slaves were women, most likelyworking in house- holds ratherthan elds.All of theseeducated guesses arehighly uncertain.24 Manumission into Roman citizenship playedan important partin urbanRoman slaves’, andsome ruralslaves’ , incentives. Manumission wascommon, butnot universal. Thestate set rules formanumission butleft the decision of which slavesto freein the hands of individual slaveowners, who could use itto encourage themost co-operativeand productive slaves. Slaves were often upheaval.See Bradley, Slaveryand Rebellion. LuciusApuleius (trans. J. Arthur Hanson), Meta- morphoses (“TheGolden Ass” ) (Cambridge, Mass., 1989;orig. pub. 2d century),II, 9.2; Garnsey and Richard Saller, TheRoman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture (Berkeley,1987), 119,use this example to show theconditions of Romanslaves. Oliver Davies, RomanMines in Europe (Oxford, 1935),14– 16. 23Jacques Ramin and PaulVeyne, “ Droit Romainet Socié té ; lesHommes Libres qui Passent pour Ésclaves etl’ É sclavageVolontaire,” Historia, XXX(1981), 496. 24 Hopkins, Conquerorsand Slaves, 101;Roger S. Bagnalland BruceW. Frier, TheDemogra- phyof RomanEgypt (Cambridge, 1994),48– 49, 71; Scheidel, “ Progress and Problems inRo- man Demography,”in idem (ed.), DebatingRoman Demography (Leiden,2001), 49– 61. THEROMANLABORMARKET | 527 ableto purchasefreedom if theycould earnthe necessary funds in a peculium, which servedas atangiblemeasure of slaveproductiv- ity. Theright of slavesto accumulate andretain assets was an im- portantpart of theincentive structure. Slaves who weresold or freedkept their peculium, eventhough theytechnically could not own property.Slaves even owned slaves. 25 Hopkins asked,“ Why didRoman mastersfree so many slaves?”His answerwas complex. Onone hand, he notedthat the promiseof freedomwas a powerfulincentive: “Theslave’ s desire tobuy his freedomwas the master’ s protectionagainst laziness and shoddy work.”Thus didhe distinguish Roman slaveryfrom that in thesouthern UnitedStates. On theother hand, however,he emphasizedthe similarity of thesetwo types of slavery,emphasiz- ing therole of crueltyand negative incentives. Hedevotedmore spaceto slaves’resistance and rebellions than totheirachievement andcooperation. Although he perceivedthe apparent sharp line betweenslavery and freedom as only partof acontinuum oflabor conditions, he failedto breakaway from theprevalent view of Americanslavery at the time of his writing. This imperfectanal- ogy still haunts the eld;when Bradleywanted to explainwhy Roman slavesrebelled, he quotedthe accounts of modernAmeri- can slaves.26 Garnsey’s argumentthat ancient slaverywas less harsh than slaveryin thesouthern UnitedStates appeared near the end of an intellectual history of ancient Greeceand Rome that did not em- phasizeRoman slaveryas adistinct laborsystem. Garnseynoted, “Theprospect of manumission gave[Roman] slavesan incentive to workand behave well.” He drew out theimplications of this proposition forthe idea of slavery,particularly for Christians. This articledraws implications forthe economic roleof Roman slavery in theRoman laborforce. 27 Bradleydevoted a chapterto manumission in his studyof Roman slavery,but he minimized its roleas anincentive. Stressing theuncertainty in thelives of slaves,he concluded, “Aboveall,
25John A. Crook, Lawand Life of Rome (London,1967), 187– 191. If a slave used his peculium topurchase his freedom,his formerowner acquired possession ofthe slave’ s earnings. 26 Hopkins, Conquerorsand Slaves, 115–132; Bradley, Slaveryand Rebellion. 27 Garnsey, Ideasof Slaveryfrom Aristotle to Augustine (Cambridge, 1996),87, 97; Ronald Findlay,“ Slavery,Incentives, and Manumission: ATheoreticalModel,” Journalof Political Economy, LXXXIII (1975), 923–934, determined theoptimal timing of manumission fora prot-maximizing owner. 528 | PETER TEMIN therefore,it is this absenceof psychological andemotional security in slavelife which offersthe key to thecontinuing abilityof Ro- man slave-ownersto control andkeep in subjection theirslaves.” Heconfused therandom partof Roman life, to which all Romans weresubject to alargedegree, with thesystematic part that moti- vatesbehavior. After all, eventhough gettingan education carries alot of riskeven today, we urgeour children to getan education to improvetheir chances of living agood life. 28 TheRoman incentivemechanism operatedwith consider- ableuncertainty. Some valuableRoman slavesreceived their freedomwithout having to payfor it, asa rewardfor special achievementor fornoneconomic reasons. Manumission in the earlyRoman empirewas not unlike startinga newcompany to- day.Success is aproductof both skill andluck; thelatter can be themore important factor. Yet, success only comes to those who try,that is, those who arewilling totakerisks. Manumission rep- resentedthe same kind of opportunity forRoman slaves.If a slave tried,both skill andluck would playa partin his eventualsuccess or failure.The risks inherent in theprocess would not necessarily havediscouraged many slaves. 29 Freedmenwere granted Roman citizenship on an almost equalbasis. Thewell-known association of freedmenwith former mastersworked to theirmutual benet. When peopleengaged in tradeor madearrangements for production, theyneeded to know with whom theywere dealing. Information aboutbuyers and sell- erswas scarce. It was mitigated partially by identifying possible customers or vendorsas membersof known families. Slaves,com- ing to freedomwithout afamily, naturally associatedwith their formerowners’ families. Becausethey retained the names of, and connections with, theirformer owners, theycould beassociated with theirowners’ family. Thus wereformer slaves able to integrateinto theeconomy. Moreover,a productivefreeman re- turnedthe favor by increasing thereputation and income of his
28 Bradley, Slaves andMasters inthe Roman Empire (Brussels, 1984),143. 29This argumentcan be viewed as anexpansion of remarks inJohnR. Hicks, A Theory of EconomicHistory (Oxford, 1969):“ Thereare twoways inwhich labor may be anarticle of trade. Eitherthe laborer may be sold outright,which is slavery;or his services onlymay be hired, whichis wage-payment”(123). Hicks acknowledgedthat slavery typicallyis acruel, brutal institution,but hesoftened this indictment when slaves havepersonal relationswith theirowners and cantake economicinitiative, as inthe early Roman empire. “Perhaps it shouldbe said whenthis point is reached, theslave is onlya semi-slave”(126n.). THEROMANLABORMARKET | 529 formerowner. Freedmenof course could marryother Roman citizens, andtheir free children wereaccepted fully into Roman society. Many widowsmarried freed slaves to carryon abusiness activity.30 Freedmenprobably identi ed themselves as such on their tombstones fortwo reasons. First, theywere still partof their formerowners’ business family, and,second, theywere proud of having shown theambition andability to win theirfreedom. Like today’s self-mademan, thefreed slave worked for what he achieved;he wasnot therecipient of inheritedwealth. This op- portunity is thehallmark of open slaveryand a functioning labor market.31 Thecontinuum of incentives rangesfrom all negative,as in aNazi concentration campor theSoviet gulag, toall positive,as in aprogressiveschool whereno child is criticizedand all children arewinners. Most working conditions fallsomewhere between thesetwo extremes. Modern jobs clearly are near, but not at,the positiveend; non-performance carries its penalties.American slav- erywas near the opposite end; the threat of punishment wasubiq- uitous, whereasrewards for good servicewere rare. Roman slavery,by contrast, wasfar closer to thepositive end, although hardlyas close asmodern jobs. Thelives of rural, illiterate,un- skilledslaves in theearly Roman empirewere like those in Ameri- can slavery.The working conditions of educated,urban slaves maywell have approached those of freemen. Hence, most Ro- man slaves,particularly urban slaves, participated in aunied Ro- man labormarket. comparisons withother systems of slavery Table 1 com- paresmanumission ratesand the conditions of freedmenin differ- entsocieties. Theunique position of Roman slavesis clearfrom theavailability of education forthem, which resultedfrom thein- centivestructure of theRoman systemand led to theintegration of Roman slavesinto theoverall labor market. A fewexamples of
30See Garnsey, Cities,Peasants andFood, 30–37. 31Lilly Ross Taylor,“ Freedmen and Freeborn inthe Epitaphs ofImperial Rome,” Ameri- canJournal of Philology, LXXXII(1961), 113–132: “ Manyfreedmen are knownfrom their names alone,but weknow ofso manyof them because theywanted tomemorialise theirlife and achievementsin the same wayas more augustsenators and knights,erecting tombstones thathave survived untiltoday.” 530 | PETER TEMIN ancient working conditions, forboth freeand slave workers, illus- tratethe operation of this unied labor market. ModernAmerican slavery was a closed system. TheNew Worldslaves did not enterEurocentric Americansociety on easy terms;their opportunities wereseverely limited. Theirdescen- dantsin theUnited States are still awaitingcomplete integration into society. Thedescendants of formerAfrican slaves have fared much betterin Brazil, wheremanumission wasmore frequent. Evenin Brazil, however,slaves only beganto befreed with any regularityin thenineteenth century when pressurefor the aboli- tion of slaveryrose. Yet,since freedslaves were still excludedby formerEuropeans, fewpositive incentives wereavailable to them.32 Thefrequency with which Greekslaves were set free is un- known, butfreed slaves in Athens didnot becomemembers of Greeksociety. Theyinhabited “ alimbo worldin which full politi- caland economic membershipof thecommunity wasdenied them.”Unlike Athenian citizenship, Roman citizenship wasin- clusive. This fundamentaldifference between the two may have determinedhow eachsociety interpretedslavery. In any case,the prevalenceand visibility of manumission among Roman slaves madeRoman slaveryfar different than slaveryin Athens. 33 Bythe time of thePrincipate, most slaveswere probably slavesfrom infancy, eitheras the children of slavesor unwanted children of freeparents, since captiveswere few by then. Adebate aboutwhether slaves were replenished through reproductionor maintainedthrough foundlings andthe slave trade persists, but most scholars agreethat the supply of captiveshad dwindled.
32Roman slavery shared attributes withanother modern institution,indentured service. Poor Englishmenwho wanted toemigrate to North America intheeighteenth century but couldnot afford it often mortgaged their future labor topay fortheir passage. Indentures lasted axed number ofyears, oftenfewer than ve,and immigrants wereable to resume life withoutstigma aftertheir indenture was nished.While indentured, however, immigrants couldnot move, choose occupations, or evendetermine the certain particulars oftheircir- cumscribed lives.They were, in a descriptive oxymoron,short-term slaves. David W. Galenson, WhiteServitude in Colonial America (Cambridge, 1981). 33 Garnsey, Ideasof Slavery, 7.A fewolder ancient historians notedthe comparatively be- nignquality of ancientslavery, although without referring to manumission and withoutdis- tinguishingbetween Greek and Romanslavery. If Greek slavery was more similar toRoman thanto modern slavery,featuring reduced positive incentivesof an open slave system, therea- sonis by nomeans obvious. SeeAlfred Zimmern, “Was Greek CivilizationBased onSlave Labor?” SociologicalReview, II(1909), 1–19, 159– 176 (repr. in idem,Solon andCroesus [London, 1928]); A.H.M.Jones, “TheEconomics ofSlavery in the Ancient World,” EconomicHistory Review, IX(1956), 185–204. THEROMANLABORMARKET | 531 Rules formanumission becameexplicit. Augustus enacteda law (lex Fua Caninia) restrictingthe proportion of slavesthat a slave ownercould manumit athis deathbut also preservingthe struc- tureof incentives byforcing owners to decidewhich of their slavesto setfree. Rights of freedmenwere expanded. The incen- tivefor slaves to actwell became clear. Freedmen moved into skilledand well-rewarded trades and other activities, and their children born aftermanumission enteredsociety with all of their rights.34 Manumission wascommon andwell known in theearly Roman empire.Livy recounted a legendabout a slavewho was freed in 509 b.c.e.,the rstyear of therepublic, as a rewardfor faithful service,albeit of apolitical ratherthan an economic na- ture.Although Livycould not haveknown whetherthe story was true,he therebyrevealed attitudes in his own time.A legalprinci- pleof theera dealt with thestatus of achild born to awoman who conceivedwhile aslave,was freed, and then enslavedagain beforegiving birth.For this tohavebeen an interestingquestion, theboundary between slavery and freedom must havebeen permeable.35 No counts of Roman manumission exist, butthe myriad referencesto manumission andfreedmen in thesurviving records attestto its frequency.Scheidel assumed that 10 percent of slavesin theearly Roman empirewere freed every veyears, starting at agetwenty- ve in ademographicexercise. Some of Scheidel’s as- sumptions haveattracted vigorous rebuttal,but not this one. Theseestimates and opinions applyto thetotality of urbanand ru- ralRoman slaves.In thejudgment of amodernobserver, “ Most urbanslaves of averageintelligence andapplication had a reason- ableexpectation of earlymanumission andoften of continued as- sociation with theirpatron.” In thejudgment of another, “Roman slavery,viewed as alegalinstitution, makessense on theassump- tion thatslaves could reasonablyaspire to beingfreed, and hence to becoming Roman citizens.”36
34Scheidel, “ Quantifyingthe Source of Slavesin the Early Roman Empire,” Journalof Ro- manStudies, LXXXVII(1997), 157–169; Harris, “Demography.”Bradley, Slaveryand Society, 10,asserted thatthe intent ofAugustus’ law was torestrict manumission onlyto those slaves whohad proved thatthey deserved freedom. 35Titus Livius(trans. B.O. Foster), History (London,1919; orig. pub. 27 b.c.), I, 2.3–5; Ernst Levy(ed.), Paulisententiae (Ithaca, 1945),II, 24.3. 36Scheidel’ s estimateof 10% was anintermediate one; the actual level could have been higheror lower(“ Quantifying,”160). Harris, “Demography”; PaulR. C. Weaver, Familia 532 | PETER TEMIN TheEgyptian census listedno maleslaves older than thirty- two. Since thecensus counted household slavesonly, this age truncation suggests widespreadmanumission ratherthan excep- tionally high slavemortality. Femaleslaves generally were freed if theyhad more than threechildren, which maynot havebeen un- common in anagewithout family planning. Manumission on this scalemust havebeen apparent to all slaves,certainly to all urban slaves,and a powerfulincentive for them to cooperatewith their owners andto excelat their work. 37 Slaveconditions in thesouthern UnitedStates were com - pletelydifferent. Manumission wasthe exception rather than the rule; Americanslaves could not anticipatefreedom with any condence. Manumission requiredcourt action in Louisiana, an onerous processthat left traces in thehistorical record.An exhaus- tivecount of Louisiana’s manumissions showedthat the rate in the earlynineteenth-century was about 1 percentin each ve-year period,an orderof magnitudeless than Scheidelassumed for theearly Roman empire.Many of those freedwere children underten, andthe majority of theadults freed were women— presumablythe children’ s mothers. Fogel andEngerman, champi- ons of positiveincentives in Americanslavery, reported even lowermanumission ratesat mid-century: “ Census dataindicate thatin 1850the rate of manumission wasjust 0.45 perthousand slaves”— thatis, .045 per100 slaves or 0.2 percentin ave-year period,two orders of magnitudelower than Scheidel’s reasonable guess forRome. Americanslaves, and particularly male slaves, had littleanticipation of freedomand little incentive to cooperatein thehope of freedom. 38
Caesaris:A SocialStudy of theEmperor’ s Freedmenand Slaves (Cambridge, 1972),1: Alan Wat- son, RomanSlave Law (Baltimore,1987), 23. 37Bagnall and Frier, Demography, 71,342– 343; Lucius Junius Moderatus Columella(trans. H. B. Ash), OnAgriculture (Cambridge, Mass., 1934;orig. pub. 1 st century a.d.),I, 1.8.19.Ap- parently,slave womenhad tohave undergone either three live births or had tohavethree liv- ingchildren at the time of thenext birth. Thestipulation is clearerin Theodor Mommsen and PaulKrueger (eds.), TheDigest of Justinian (Philadelphia, 1985;orig. pub. 553),1.5.15, which deals withthe disposition oftriplets under awillthat freed the mother at the birth ofthe third child. 38Slaves in Baltimore had slightlymore hopethan others; they were freed with more fre- quency,although the interval between the decision tomanumitand actualfreedom was often long.Stephen Whitman, “ Diverse Good Causes: Manumission and theTransformation of Urban Slavery, SocialScience History, XIX(1995), 333–370. Gwendolyn Hall, Databases forthe Studyof Afro-LouisianaHistory and Genealogy, 1 699–1860 (NewOrleans, 2000);Shawn Cole, THEROMANLABORMARKET | 533 In theabsence of evidencethat the prospects for slaves in an- cient Greecewere as bleak as those in theUnited States, the as- sumption herein is thatthe Greeks freed slaves with some regularity.Slavery in theCaribbean, by contrast, wasmore like thatin theUnited States. In fact,given the tiny numberof slave owners in theCaribbean, the probability of manumission may havebeen even lower than in theUnited States. In Brazil, manumission beganroughly attheoutset of slavery, although many legaland circumstantial barriersprevented it from becoming amatterof course. Itspace was slow beforethe nine- teenthcentury, butit accelerated rapidly during thelast decades of Brazilian slavery.Rio deJaneiro contained 80,000 freedslaves in a totalurban population of 200,000 in 1849. Brazilas awhole con- tained1.1 million slavesand 2.8 million “freemen”in 1823and 1.5 million slavesand 8.4 “freemen”in 1872. Non-white freeper- sons hadbecome a majorityof thepopulation in Salvadorby 1872. Brazilian slavesoften could earnenough topurchasetheir wives’ freedom,although theyfrequently did not haveenough toobtain theirown. Asin Louisiana, two-thirdsof thefreed slaves in Brazil andin Rio deJaneiro werewomen. Arecentstudy of earlynine- teenth-centurycensuses in Sao Paulo conrmed the Brazilian predilectionto manumit women ratherthan men—125 men for each100 women among Brazilian slavesin 1836, butonly 87 men foreach 100 women among freecoloreds. Any effectthat manu- mission might havehad on Brazilian slaveworkers as anincentive wasdiminished bythe clear Brazilian patternof freeingslave women ratherthan slavemen. 39 Successful freedmenintensify theincentive for manumission thatmerges the work of slavesand free workers. Even freedmen living amarginal existencecan serveas models forslaves, since
“Capitalism and Freedom: Slaveryand Manumission inLouisiana, 1770– 1820,” paper pre- sentedat the National Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute,Cambridge, Mass., July17, 2003; Robert W.Fogel and StanleyL. Engerman, Timeon the Cross: TheEconomics of AmericanNegro Slavery (Boston,1974), I, 150. 39Stuart B. Schwartz,“ TheManumission ofSlaves in Colonial Brazil, 1684– 1745,” His- panicAmerican Historical Review, LIV(1974), 603–635; Katia M. de Queiros Mattoso, To Be a SlaveIn Brazil, 1 550–1888 (NewBrunswick, N.J.,1986), 50, 164; Mary C. Karasch, Slave Life inRiode Janeiro, 1 808–1850 (Princeton,1987), 66, 346; Meikoi Nishida, “Manumission and Ethnicityin Urban Slavery:Salvador, Brazil,1808– 1888,” HispanicAmerican Historical Review, LXXIII (1993), 365,376; Francisco Vidal Lunaand Herbert S.Klein, Slaveryand the Economy of Sao Paulo,1 750–1850 (Stanford, 2003),162– 163. 534 | PETER TEMIN freedomis desirable,whatever the economic cost. But its attrac- tion undoubtedly increasesto theextent that freedmen are ac- cepted,even prominent, in freesociety. Unlike in otherslave societies, freedmenin theearly Roman empirewere citizens. In fact,they were ubiquitous in thelate republic and early empire, engagedin all kinds of activities,including administration and economic enterprise.The number of men who identied them- selvesas freedon thetombstones during this periodis astonishing. Theymay not haveascended to high Roman society, buttheir children borelittle or no stigma. Theirsuccess wascommon knowledge.Seneca ridiculed a rich man byremarkingthat he had thebank account andbrains of afreedman.In Finley’s words, “Thecontrast with themodern free Negro is evident.”40 Why werefreedmen so prominent? Theprocess of manumis- sion separatedthe more able from theothers. Theprospect of manumission wasan incentivefor all slaves,but the most active, ambitious, andeducated slaves were more like to gain theirfree- dom asarewardfor good behavioror bypurchase.The system did not workperfectly; many slaveswere freed for eleemosynary mo- tivesor attheir owner’ s death.But, forthe most part,freedmen wereaccomplished individuals. Itwas good policy to dealwith andhire them, andit makes sense to sayso only becauseRome hada functioning labormarket. Contrast this scenario with thatof freedslaves in theantebellum United States, where the infamous DredScott decision of theSupreme Court decreedin 1857that freedslaves could not becitizens and“ hadno rights which the whiteman wasbound to respect.”41 Freedslaves in Brazillived a similarly marginal existence,not bound butnot fully freeeither. Known as libertos, theyand their children wereclearly isolated from themain society andwere not prosperous. Census materialand related data always indicated to which group afreeperson belonged. Even though freedslaves wereBrazilian citizens, theirlegal rights were“ quitelimited.” Libertos “continued tooweobedience, humility, andloyalty to the powerful.”The physical appearanceof freedslaves in Brazilmade
40Arnold M.Duff, Freedmenin the Early Roman Empire (Oxford, 1928);Susan Treggiari, RomanFreedmen during the Late Republic (Oxford, 1969);Lucius Annaeus Seneca (trans. John W. Basore), EpistulaeMorales (London,1932; orig. pub. 1 st century),27.5; Finley, AncientSlav- ery, 98. 41Society became more rigid duringthe late empire. As opportunitiesfor advancement in urban activitiesdiminished, so did theincentive of manumission. Slaverybegan to evolve into adifferentinstitution. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60U.S. 393, 407 (1857). THEROMANLABORMARKET | 535 themeasy to distinguish. Themarginalization of freedpersons in North andSouth Americademonstrates that slavery in theseareas wasa largelyclosed system—although Brazilwas not asclosed astheUnited States— in contrastto theopen systemof theearly Roman empire. 42 Education is akeyto thenature of Roman servitude.Ameri- can slaveowners reliedon negativeincentives anddiscouraged the education of slavesbecause they were afraid of slaverevolts led by educatedslaves. Ancient slaveowners usedpositive incentives, al- lowing, andeven encouraging, slavesto beeducatedand perform responsibleeconomic roles. Education increasedthe value of slave laborto theowner, andit increased the probability that a slave’s children would befreed.Educated slaves had the skills toaccumu- late a peculium, andthey would begood business associatesof their formerowners. Most freedmenworked in commercial centers, which providedan opportunity foradvancement. Educatedslaves are markedly associated with positiveincen- tivesand uneducated slaves with negativeincentives. Many edu- catedRoman slaveswere administrators, agents, and authors— for example,Q. Remmius Palaemon, who waseducated in the rst century c.e. ostensibly “asaresultof escorting his owner’s son to andfrom school,”but probably had more direct exposure than simply acting asa paedagogus. In theRepublic, Cato educated slavesfor a year,in asort of primitivebusiness school, andthen sold them. Anyone enacting such aplanwith Americanslaves would not havebeen celebrated; he would havebeen ostracized, jailedand ned.The Virginia Codeof 1848extended to freedmen aswellas slaves:“ Everyassemblage of Negroesfor the purpose of instruction in readingor writing shall beanunlawful assembly.. .. Ifa whiteperson assemble with Negroesfor the purpose of instructing themto reador write,he shall becon ned to jail not exceedingsix months and nednot exceedingone hundred dollars.”43
42 Mattoso, ToBe aSlave, 179–183. See also Schwartz, “ Manumission”; Karasch, Slave Life, 362;Sidney Chalhoub, “ Slaves,Freedmen and thePolitics of Freedom inBrazil:The Experi- enceof Blacks inthe City of Rio,” Slaveryand Abolition, X(1989), 64–84; Nishido, “ Manu- mission”; DouglasCole Libby and ClotildeAndrade Paiva, “Manumission Practices ina Late Eighteenth-CenturyBrazilian Slave Parish: São Joséd’ El Rey in 1795,” Slaveryand Abolition, XXI(2000), 96–127. Brazilian freedmen were represented inmany occupations, but they wereconcentrated at the lower end of theeconomic and socialscale. Vidal Lunaand Klein, Slavery, 172. 43 Bradley, Slaveryand Society, 35;Plutarch (trans. BernadottePerrin), “Marcus Cato,” Par- 536 | PETER TEMIN Many Roman slaves,educated or not, competedwith freed- men andother free workers in aunied labormarket. Various oc- cupations emergedto meetthe demands of urbanresidents, particularlyrich ones. Skilledslaves were valuable to merchants andwealthy citizens becausethey could serveas their agents, in themuch thesame way as their sons could: “Whateverchildren in our powerand slaves in our possession receiveby manicipatio or obtain bydelivery, and whatever rights theystipulate for or ac- quireby any othertitle, they acquire for us.” Watson expressed surprisethat the Romans didnot developa lawof agency, butthe Romans didhave a lawof agency—the law of slavery(and sons). AsHicks noted, slaverywas the most common formal, legallyen- forceablelong-term labor contract in theearly Roman empire.A personwith along-term relation toaprincipalwould behis or her most responsiblerepresentative. Slaves were more valuable than freemen in thatrespect. Witness thefrequent references to liter- ate,skilled slave agents in thesurviving sources. 44 Columella (1.8.1-2) aptlyexposed the difference between ancient andmodern slavery: “ So my adviceat the start is not to appointan overseerfrom thatsort of slaveswho arephysically at- tractiveand certainly not from thatclass which has busieditself with thevoluptuous occupations of thecity.” This warning would not, andcould not, applyto modernslavery, both becausemodern slavescould not indulge in “voluptuous occupations”like Columella’s list of theater,gambling, restaurants,etc., and because amodernslave could not havebeen appointed as manager of a substantial estate. 45 Implicitin Columella’s adviceis theease with which slaves could change jobs. For example,when Horacewas given an estate allel Lives (London,1914; orig. pub. early2d century),II, 21; Va. Code [1848], 747–748. Edu- cationdoes noteven appear inthe index to Fogeland Engerman, Timeon the Cross. So few Braziliansof anysort wereeducated thatno contrast betweenslaves and freeworkers inthis contextis possible. 44Gaius (trans. W.M. Gordon and O. F. Robinson), Institutiones (Ithaca, 1988;orig. pub. c.161), 2.87; Watson, RomanSlave Law, 107; Hicks, Theory. SeeAndrew Lintott,“ Freedmen and Slavesin the Light of Legal Documents from First-Century A.D. Campania,” Classical Quarterly, LII (2002), 555–565, for a vivid description ofslaves and freedmenas agentsin the records ofa commercial housein Puteoli. Free peoplewere also agents. Roman jurists began tocorrect thelegal discrepancy betweenthem and slave agentsin the Principate (Johnston, Roman Law, 106). 45Columella, 1.8.1-2: “ Igiturpraemoneo ne vilicum ex eo genere servorum, qui corpore placuerunt,instituamus, ne ex eo quidem ordine,qui urbanes ac delicatesartes exercuerit.” THEROMANLABORMARKET | 537 on which he employed vefreetenants and nine household slaves, he chose a vilicus from anurbanhousehold with no apparenttrain- ing in agriculture. Themobility of labormust havebeen even morepronounced forfree labor. The demand for unskilled and semiskilledlabor for particular tasks varied widely over time in both thecountry andthe city. Agricultural demandvaried season- ally; in thelate republic and undoubtedly atothertimes, thepeak ruraldemand for labor was satis ed bythetemporary employment of freeworkers. Urban labor demand varied less frequently,but possibly morewidely. Public building activityin thePrincipate wassporadic; workers must havebeen attracted to theseprojects in one wayor another. Thepresumption among classicists is that freeworkers were hired for them, luredby the wages offered. If so, theyalso must havehad ways to supportthemselves and their families when public building activitywas low. 46 Slavewages are not widelydocumented, despite the fact that some slavesmust haveearned wages to accumulate a peculium. The precedingdiscussion, however,indicates that slaves were inter- changeablewith freewage laborers in many situations. Although theevidence for monthly andannual wagescomes largelyfrom Egypt,and the information aboutslaves comes mostly from Italy, Roman slavesappear to tHicks’view of slavesas long-term em- ployees.The analysis of slavemotivation andthe wide distribution of slaveoccupations suggest thatslaves were part of an integrated laborforce in theearly Roman empire. 47
Workersin theuni ed labor market of theearly Roman empire could change jobsin responseto market-drivenrewards. As in all agricultural economies, thelabor market worked better in cities than in thecountryside. Slavesparticipated in this systemto alarge extent.The restrictions on labormobility mayhave been no more severethan therestrictions on labormobility in earlymodern Europe.Education wasthe key to thegood lifein theearly Roman empire,as it is today.Roman workersappear to have receivedwages and other payments commensurate with their productivity,and they were able to respond,at leastas fully asin
46Jean-Jacques Aubert, Business Managersin Early Roman Empire (Leiden,1994), 133; Garnsey, Cities,Peasants andFood, 143–145; Brunt, “ Free Labor”; M.K.Thorntonand R.L. Thornton, Julio-ClaudianBuilding Programs (Wauconda, Il.,1989). 47 Hicks, Theory. 538 | PETER TEMIN moremodern agrarian societies, totheincentives createdby these payments. Marxand Tö nnies mayhave been half right. Theywere not correctto assertthat functioning labormarkets, the hallmark of Gesellschaft, werenew in thenineteenth century. Not only were labormarkets present earlier in modernEuropean history; they also werepresent in theearly Roman empire.But, asthey sur- mised, functioning labormarkets were associated with urbaniza- tion. Romewas an urbansociety to anextentnot duplicatedagain until thenineteenth century. Itsconnection with alabormarket, however,can only besuggested speculatively herein, though the evidenceis compelling. “TheRoman lawyerGaius wrotethat the fundamental social division wasthat between slave and free.” The fundamental eco- nomic division in theearly Roman empire,however, was be- tweeneducated and uneducated— skilled and unskilled— not betweenslave and free. Saller summarized this viewsuccinctly: “Thedisproportionately high representationof freedmenamong thefunerary inscriptions from Italiancities reects the fact that ex- slaveswere better placed to makea success of themselvesin theur- baneconomy than thefreeborn poor: upon manumission many of theex-slaves started with skills anda business.”48 48 Garnsey, Cities,Peasants andFood, 134,citing Gaius, Institutiones, 1.9;Saller, “ Statusand Patronage,”in Alan K. Bowman,Garnsey, and Rathbone(eds.), TheCambridge Ancient His- tory. XI. The HighEmpire, A.D. 7 0–192 (Cambridge, 2000),835.