The Importance of Special Operations Forces Today and Going Forward Steven P

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The Importance of Special Operations Forces Today and Going Forward Steven P THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION The Importance of Special Operations Forces Today and Going Forward Steven P. Bucci, PhD n the post-9/11 period of war and subsequent security conditions that can minimize the need for military drawdown, Special Operations Forces larger deployments of conventional military forces. I(SOF) appear likely to grow in numbers, fund- Getting this balance right is the key challenge for the ing, and importance—but not necessarily in gen- military and policymakers. eral understanding. One of the most flexible and This essay will address numerous issues regard- useful instruments in America’s national security ing Special Operations Forces while attempting to toolbox, SOF are regularly referred to incorrectly, answer several questions, including: incompletely, and with little depth of knowledge by policymakers. l How SOF serve as a tool of U.S. military efforts, SOF are neither a panacea nor an insignificant oddity. If utilized correctly, they bring great bene- l How SOF provide strategic warning and prepare fit to the nation; used poorly, their capabilities and the environment, sometimes their lives are wasted. How, then, should this nation think about these compelling and often l How SOF enable hard power by providing conven- mythologized warriors and their role in supporting tional forces a “warm start” and create options America’s vital national interests? not otherwise possible, and During times of austerity, the government often looks for ways to get “more bang for the buck.”1 l How SOF amplify the effectiveness of hard power When this budgetary philosophy is applied to the by doing things like leveraging infrastructure and military, SOF, with their reputation for doing great using their ability to exploit actions/successes. things with fewer troops and resources than large conventional forces, seem like a bargain. This vision Finally, this essay will review SOF’s potential as of a “surgical” capability that is made up of mature, a bridging capability during this time of strained “hard” professionals who make the right choices at resources. SOF will be a key part of America’s abil- the right time and that avoids the need to deploy ity to meet the challenges of an increasingly wor- larger formations of citizen soldiers at great expense risome threat environment while its conventional can be very compelling. forces are in decline. Although they are not a sub- Given America’s current fiscal difficulties, there stitute for other capabilities in the U.S. military, is a growing danger of overutilizing or misapplying SOF can mitigate risk by helping to set the operat- SOF, but this is not to say that SOF should not be ing environment in the most advantageous man- used. In fact, SOF can and should be a major enabler ner possible. for other elements of power as well as a shaper of 47 2015 INDEX OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH Special Operations: A Primer U.S. Special Operations Command. The par- The term “Special Operations Forces (SOF)” is ent command of all SOF is U.S. Special Operations the only correct generic term for the organizations Command (USSOCOM), which is headquartered at being discussed. It includes certain designated units MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.4 Estab- of all services and all capabilities. First and fore- lished in 1987, USSOCOM is responsible for man- most, SOF are the men and women that make up ning, training, and equipping all SOF units. It does the units. They are, for the most part, mature and this in conjunction with the four services, which also highly trained. A typical special operator (regard- provide the troops to the SOF units. Although not a less of service or specialty) is married with a family; service branch, USSOCOM has certain service-like averages 29–34 years old; has at least eight years on responsibilities including the procurement of SOF- active duty in the general purpose forces (GPF); has specific items as needed. some cultural and language training (most are mas- SOCOM has had some disagreements with the ters of cross-cultural communication); has attended services over funding, authorities, and which units numerous advanced-skills schools; and has at least get assigned to USSOCOM; it also has sparred with some college education, if not multiple degrees (this the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) includes the enlisted ranks).2 over the authority to direct SOF missions. Currently, SOF competently operate a great deal of highly USSOCOM enjoys the widest operational mandate advanced U.S military equipment and are also profi- it has ever had and is seen by both the services and cient with the equipment of other services and coun- the GCCs as a very positive contributor to national tries. They are valued for their out-of-the-box thinking, security. USSOCOM maintains manning, training, imagination, and initiative. SOF can and do operate and equipping responsibilities for deployed forc- with a small footprint and can survive and thrive es through the Theater Special Operations Com- with a very light support tail. These SOF are seen as mands (TSOCs) that are under the operational con- the consummate military professionals and as such trol of each GCC. The GCCs operationally manage are “detached from Main Street” in ways that the the TSOCs, but USSOCOM’s worldwide situational 18–22- year-olds in the general-purpose forces are not. awareness allows them to synchronize operations The Department of Defense defines Special Oper- across GCC boundaries. ations (SO) as operations that: There are five major subcomponents to USSO- COM: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Require unique modes of employment, tactical (USASOC); Navy Special Warfare Command techniques, equipment, and training often con- (NSW); Air Force Special Operations Command ducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive (AFSOC); Marine Corps Forces Special Operations environments and characterized by one or more Command (MARSOC); and Joint Special Opera- of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low tions Command (JSOC)—one for each service visibility, conducted with and/or through indig- with an additional multiservice special mission enous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/ command. Each of these organizations contrib- or a high degree of risk.3 utes something unique to the special operations community. They have different roles and tend There are some who claim that conventional forc- to specialize in certain types of missions or areas es can and do handle tasks that SOF handle. Yet SOF of operation. are often entrusted to perform missions that exceed the authority given to conventional military units, Direct vs. Indirect Approaches such as operating in “politically sensitive envi- SOF operations fall broadly into two catego- ronments” or executing tasks that require special ries: direct and indirect. The direct approach con- legal authorities. sists of SOF raids and other operations that direct- ly target the enemy, such as an operation executed Organizational Structure by Navy SEALs to free American and Danish aid To appreciate how SOF are “special,” one must workers held by Somali pirates.5 According to understand how these forces are organized and how Admiral William H. McRaven, former Command- they operate. er of SOCOM: 48 THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION The direct approach is characterized by techno- more commonly known as Green Berets.9 They have logically-enabled small-unit precision lethality, five active-duty groups. Each is traditionally ori- focused intelligence, and interagency coopera- ented on a region, but this has been stretched by tion integrated on a digitally-networked battle- the wars of the past decade, which required all the field…. Extreme in risk, precise in execution and SF units to rotate into the fight: Pacific (1st Group); able to deliver a high payoff, the impacts of the Africa (3rd Group); the Middle East (5th Group); direct approach are immediate, visible to [the] Latin America (7th Group); and Europe (10th Group, public and have had tremendous effects on our Fort Carson, Colorado).10 There are also two Nation- enemies’ networks throughout the decade.6 al Guard Groups (19th and 20th), which augment their active-duty counterparts. Such missions are typically brief (even if plan- SF units are generally older and more experi- ning for them can be extensive) and usually carry a enced than their fellow SOF. They are specialists in higher potential for the use of weapons; to use a pop- working with foreign militaries. Green Berets, for ular description, they tend to be more “kinetic.” example, perform both direct missions and indi- The indirect approach is characterized by long- rect tasks (discussed further below). They operate term commitments of SOF to help enable and aid in 12-man teams, often remote in relation to other other nations to improve their own military forces American forces. and security. McRaven explains: The 75th Ranger Regiment is another element of USASOC. It is headquartered at Fort Benning, Geor- The indirect approach includes empowering host gia, and commands three battalions of what are con- nation forces, providing appropriate assistance sidered the finest special light infantry troops in the to humanitarian agencies, and engaging key pop- world.11 While they are organized much as other light ulations. These long-term efforts increase part- infantry units are organized, the Rangers’ level of ner capabilities to generate sufficient security training, readiness, and deployability exceeds that and rule of law, address local needs, and advance of their non-SOF counterparts. Although they are ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of vio- often used in small elements (squad, platoon, or com- lent extremism.7 pany), the full weight of the Rangers is demonstrat- ed when they perform battalion-level assaults and While the direct approach is focused on address- raids. They operate primarily as a direct action force. ing immediate situations such as disrupting terror- The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment ist operations, the indirect approach is longer-term (SOAR) has a variety of highly modified rotary- and seeks to prevent threatening situations from wing platforms.
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