38269 2581

TO

Of FRIDAY, the 2$rd of APRIL, 1948 by

Registered as a newspaper

MONDAY, 26 APRIL, 1948 NAVAL OPERATIONS IN RAMREE ISLAND AREA JANUARY TO 22ND FEBRUARY, 1945 The following Despatch was submitted to the himself on divisional level with Major-General Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on Lomax at Kyaukpyu and to render all the 2nd May, 1945, by Vice- Sir assistance to that officer in his task of clearing ARTHUR J. POWER, K.C.B., C.V.O., the enemy off Ramree Island. Though this -in-Chief, East Indies Station. step meant that my Chief Staff Officer was divorced from me from 24th January to 24th East Indies Station. February, I am of the opinion that the results 2nd May, 1945. obtained justified it. The accompanying reports by Flag Officer, 3. As will be seen from the report the naval Force " W " on naval operations in the Ramree operations were of a unique kind, calling for Island area between I9th January and 22nd resourcefulness, determination and professional February, 1945, are forwarded for the experience, and Bush rose to the information of Their Lordships. occasion in the able manner I expected him to, 2. I concur in the conclusions of the Senior and I consider that the success of the naval Officer Advanced Force " W ", and in the operations at Ramree was due to this officer's remarks of Flag Officer, Force " W " Con- efforts siderable ingenuity and resourcefulness were 4. I fully concur with paragraph 36 et seq. shown by all the Commanding Officers in this of the report operation, and the endurance and determina- tion of the crews of small craft during Operation (Signed) B C. S. MARTIN, " Block " were most creditable. The Royal Rear-Admiral. Indian Navy landing craft crews demonstrated again the zeal and efficiency which have Enclosure 2. formed a notable contribution to the success of all the combined operations on the Arakan Office of Senior Officer, Coast. Advanced Force " W "f (Signed) ARTHUR POWER, Kyaukpyu, Ramree Island. Vice-Admiral. 22nd February, 1945. Enclosure I. I have the honour to submit the following Report on Naval Operations in the Ramree Office of Flag Officer Force " W " Island Area from igth January to 22nd 20th March, 1945. February, 1945. These operations formed part REPORT ON NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE RAMREE of the strategic advance of the I5th Indian ISLAND AREA. Corps down the Arakan coast with a view to securing the airfields on Ramree Island from The attached report on the Naval Operations which Fourteenth Army could be supplied on at Ramree Island is forwarded. their advance on Rangoon, and operations 2. As stated in paragraph 7 of the report I could be mounted for the capture of that port instructed my Chief Staff Officer, Captain by sea should it become necessary, and which E. W. Bush, D.S.O , D.S.C., R.N., to place 1 in fact did prove the case. 2582 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 APRIL, 1948

Introduction. 10. The advance of the 7ist Indian Infantry 2. The initial assault (Operation "Matador") Brigade was supported by and by the 26th Indian Infantry Division, Major- sloops. General C. E. N. Lomax, C.B., C.B E , D.S.O., M.C., and troops under his command, 11. It was expected that the Japanese would had taken place at 0942 on 2ist January, 1945, fight a strong delaying action near Mount Peter after preliminary bombardment by the a,ir and Black Hill, to enable their reinforcements forces. to reach the Leiktaung area where a narrow defile, through which our troops must pass, 3. The Assaulting Brigade, the 71 st Indian offered a natural defensive position. Infantry Brigade, Brigadier R. C Cottrell-Hill, 12. As events transpired, determined *e^st- O.B.E , M.C., and the " Follow Up " ance in the Mount Peter—Black Hill area was Brigade, the 4th Indian Infantry Brigade, •not as protracted as expected and after some Brigadier J. F. R Forman, had been landed brisk fighting our troops drove the enemy off under cover of R A.F. aircraft and guns of the and passed quickly through the Leiktaung Fleet without meeting with much opposition Gap and reached the Yan Bauk Chaung* on On 26th January they were joined by the 36th 26th January, where they were brought to a Indian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier L. C halt by a strong Japanese force entrenched on .Thomas, D.S.O , O.B.E., M.C. the south bank of the Chaung. 4. By 23rd January a firm bridgehead had 13. In the meantime Force WELLINGTON been established at the north west extremity consisting of Royal Marines from the East of Ramree Island. The Naval Officer in Charge, Indies Fleet, with naval support under com- -Commander G W. S. Goss, mand of Rear-Admiral A. D. Read, Flag R.N.V.R, with Port Party Number 31 had Officer Force 65, had occupied Cheduba Island set up his Headquarters on shore, and on the 26th January (Operation "Sankey ") Kyaukpyu harbour was in the process of being without meeting any opposition. developed, as an anchorage. Moored mines had been found in the inner harbour on D day 14. On 30th January, Force WELLINGTON and were being swept by B.Y.M.S.* under was relieved by the 2 AJMER Battalion command of Commander E. J. C Edwards, Group from the 4th Indian Infantry Brigade D.S.C., RN.V.R, Commander M/S, Bay of (Force CACTUS). On the same day, the Bengal. Sweeping operations were concluded 8/i3th Frontier Force Rifles Battalion Group on 24th January and the harbour declared clear of the 36th Indian Infantry Brigade (Force of mines. MARTIN), occupied Sagu Kyun (Operation " Pendant ") also without opposition, under 5. Captain E. T. Cooper, D.S.O., R N., had, cover of naval and air bombardment. The on Brigade level, carried out the duties of task of this Force was to establish a Naval Senior • Officer Assault Group during the land- Landing Craft Base as a springboard for' com- ings and remained in charge of the build up bined landings on South Ramree Island. and Ferry Service. 15. On ist February a company of the 6. The Commander, 26th Indian Division, 8/i3th Frontier Force Rifles from Force General Lomax, had disembarked on 2ist MARTIN landed without casualties on the January, with his staff and taken over control south tip of Ramree Island, under cover of of military operations, which had passed from naval and air bombardment. The task of this a Brigade Operation to a Battle on Divisional company was to guard the entrance to the Scale. Kalemgdaung River. 16. It was the original intention of the Com- 7. In compliance with verbal instructions mander I5th Indian Corps, Lieutenant-General received from Rear-Admiral B. C. S. Martin, Sir A. F. Philip Christison, Bart , K.B.E , C.B.E., D.S.O , Flag Officer Force " W ", I C.B , D S.O., M.C., to capture only as much joined General Lomax at Kyaukpyu on the of Ramree Island as was* necessary for the morning of 26th January, with a small Naval development of airfields to supply the i4th Staff, and with the title of Senior Officer, Army during the monsoon, and to launch at Advanced Force " W ". Here in a " tumble- an early date a major operation against the down " house, formerly occupied by the mainland in the Taungup area mounted from Japanese Military Staff, we were joined by Kyaukpyu. Wing-Commander R Smith, Royal Air Force, and established a Combined Headquarters. 17. On the 4th February, however, a directive was received from the Joint Force Narrative to the effect that the main- tenance difficulties precluded the major opera- 8. The Japanese had developed a strong tion against the mainland ,and the following defensive position guarding the beaches near operations were to be undertaken in lieu: — Thames Point. Their main body was estab- lished near Ramree Town. A landing a: fa) The whole of Ramree Island to be , Kyaukpyu was unexpected and tactical sur- captured. prise was achieved. (6) Raids and such minor landings as could be supported administratively to be 9 As soon as our bridgehead was consoli- carried out on the- mainland between dated, the 7ist Indian Infantry Brigade was Taungup and An Chaung with a view to ordered to advance rapidly southward down facilitating the eventual capture of Taungup the west coast road, leaving the 4th Indian itself. Infantry Brigade in defence of the Kyaukpyu Area. *Admiralty footnote —Chaung = the local' name for the innumerable narrow tidal channels or water- *Admiralty footnote —rB Y.M S = British Yacbf ways intersecting the low lying, jungle-covered, Minesweeper. Burmese coastal plain SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 APRIL, 1948 2583 18. Further attempts by the yist Indian In- the north east had for some time been the sub- fantry Brigade to cross the Yan Bauk Chaung, ject of close study by the Combined Staffs. paragraph 12, met -with no success, in spite of The conclusion reached was that with the use heavy gun support from destroyers and from of destroyers and all B.Y.M.S., M.Ls. of Force 65. It was, therefore, neces- L.C.S.(M) and L C.A ,* the Navy could block sary to review the situation in the light of the effectively the Chaung exits from the Taraung Joint Force Commanders' directive, and to Chaung to the Pakseik Taungmaw River in devise another plan for defeating the enemy. the east, and exits into the Mingaung Chaung and Pakseik Taungmaw River in the north 19. The possibility of an amphibious land- east. The Army must look after the ing on the beaches on the south of the Yan remainder. Bauk Chaung was considered first of all The idea, however, was rejected on the grounds that 28. The Combined Operation which followed, the beaches were strongly defended and known as Operation " Block," commenced on believed to be mined." Surf conditions on the 8th February, and was concluded on the 22nd beaches were an added objection. February. 20. A solution was found in a decision to The Army covered the Chaung exits south of order the 7ist (Indian Infantry Brigade to the Taraung Chaung by an advance north from "advance north east towards Sane and outflank Kyauknimaw with the 36th Indian Infantry the Japanese positions south of the Yan Bauk Brigade, they also occupied Kalebon to guard Chaung, and then to attack Ramree Town from the Japanese escape routes north between Sane .the north west. To implement this decision, and the Mingaung Chaung. R.A.F Fighters part pf the 4th Indian Infantry Brigade were straffed boat concentrations and provided cover. ordered south into the Yan Bauk Chaung area. Thus the Army and R A.F. drove the Japanese off the Island into the mangrove swamps where 21 This new move had Naval implications. they were successfully dealt with by the Navy. While the yist Indian Infantry' Brigade had been operating near the coast, it had been pos- 29. The Navy established their blocks as sible to give them all the naval gun support described in paragraph 27 by placing the they required. But now that the advance had Landing Craft . (L C.A. and LCS.(M)), turned inland, the enemy would soon pass out camouflaged as far as possible with foliage, in of range of H.M. Ships lying off the west coast ambush at the mouth of the Chaungs, while of Ramree Island. the M Ls. and B.Y.M.S. were used as back stops. Initially there were two Naval blocks 22 The Gates at the entrance to the known as the North Block (along the course of Kalemgdaung River had already been opened the Mingaung Chaung and the Pakseik by elements from the 36th Indian Infantry Taungmaw River) and the South Block (from Brigade in their occupation of Sagu Kyun and Tan Chaung to the Taraung Chaung) the south tip of Ramree Island (paragraphs 14 and 15). A survey of the river had already 30. As operations developed and more been started in anticipation of a requirement intelligence of the enemy's intentions was to send destroyers into the river to give naval received the South Block was moved to form gun support to our troops advancing on Ram- an East Block (from the lower Zareik Chaung ree Town to the upper Didokbank) and later again moved 23 On 4th February, reinforcements of to form the Thanzit Block (from the Wonkpit 8/i3fch Frontier Force Rifles were landed on Chaung to the Awlebyin River). In the later the southern end of Ramree Island, this time stages the Chaungs were illuminated at night at Kyaukmmaw, (Operation " Mike "), and and'a greater degree of mobility of craft was on the same day two destroyers, preceded by introduced minesweepers, entered the Kaleingdaung River 31 The frontage covered in these operations and took up bombarding positions off the was considerable. Exits from the mangroves Taraung and Ramree Chaungs were not confined to those shown on the maps. 24 By yth February the outflanking move- Hundreds of Chaungs and waterways were ment of the yist Indian Infantry Brigade had found to be in existence, all suitable for native caused the Japanese to withdraw from their boats. Trees with thick foliage growing down dominating position on the south bank of the to the water's edge provided ample cover for a Yan Bauk Chaung allowing the 4th Indian small boat At high water much of the man- Infantry Brigade to cross the Chaung without grove was flooded, allowing lateral movement difficulty, and advance in pursuit from one' Chaung to another. The rise and fall of the tide, accentuated by conditions.of shallow 25. It was not long before Sane fell to the water and mud near the banks, made conceal- 7ist Indian Infantry Brigade, and on the 8th ment of Landing Craft difficult. When the February Ramree Town was captured Chaung blocking started the moon was in its 26 A glance at the map in Appendix I will first quarter and the tide approaching springs. show that an interesting situation had Ail these conditions were to the advantage of developed. The bulk of the Japanese who sur- the enemy vived the battles were now to the eastward of 32. Disadvantages to the Japanese lay in the a line drawn between Sane and Ramree with indescribable horrors of the mangrove swamps. remnants probably still in the southern part of Dark during the day as well as during the night, the Island f To the Japanese there remained only two alternatives, to stand and fight or to acres of thick impenetrable forest; miles of escape from the island by water They chose deep black mud, mosquitoes, scorpions, flies the latter alternative and in so doing met with and weird insects by the billion and—worst of disaster. ^Admiralty footnote — ML = Motor Launch 27. The best method of preventing the L C S (M) = Landing Craft Support, medium size Japanese from escaping by boat to the east and L C A = Landing Craft Assault 2584 SUPPLEMENT TO xto LONDON GAZETTE, 26 APRIL, 1948 all—crocodiles. No food, no drinking waler to together under the same roof, used the same be obtained anywhere. It can hardly be pos- mess, and shared the same camp. General sible that m their decision to quit the Island Lomax and his staff were always most co- the Japanese could have been full,y (aware of operative and often visited ships and craft the appalling conditions which prevailed It employed in support of the Army. The R.A.F. proved to be beyond even their endurance to also co-operated fully and effectively. exist for more than a few days. v Prisoners 39. This satisfactory state of affairs is taken out of the mangroves during the opera- reflected in the following signal received from tions were found to be semi-dehydrated and in General Christison, the I5th Corps Commander, a very low physical condition. on occasion of Ramree Island being declared 33. The Minor Landing Craft crews with A rmy free of enemy organised resistance: — machine gun units embarked also had a iiard " Congratulations to you all and especially time. It was found possible to relieve the Army 7ist Indian Infantry Brigade and Naval personnel about every four days but, owing Forces on liquidation of the Garrison of to shortage of spare crews, many of the Royal Ramree. Marines and Sailors had to remain in their craft for the whole 14 days of this operation. I have been most impressed by the sound- ness of your joint planning and the gallant 34. The provision of these widespread units show by all ranks and ratings m execution. with food, water, cigarettes, etc., and their Well done." craft with fuel and repair facilities, presented a formidable administrative problem. Largely The following congratulatory message was by the allocation of a B.Y.M.S.. or an also received from General Christison: — L.C.I.(L) as a " Mother Ship " to each block " Hearty congratulations to all officers and and by the co-operation of the Army " Q " ratings'on the splendid success of Blocking Staff, these difficulties were overcome and after Operations. You have done good work.' the first few days the standard of rations 40. The contribution made by destroyers in became, on'the whole, quite acceptable. support of the Army was an important factor 35. Thus concluded the operations for the in the operations. A total of 64 shoots were capture of Ramree (Island. Of the 1,200 to earned out, 35 with F.O.B. observation in 1,500 Japanese in occupation on the day of direct support of the leading Infantry, and landing, only a few escaped. The remainder seven with Air O.P. observation. Communica- were either killed in battle or drowned in the tions with the F.O.Bs. were good throughout, mangrove swamps. Only twenty prisoners and in addition to the engagement of targets, a were taken in spite of all efforts of persuasion great deal of valuable information was passed towards the close of Operation " Block," when back in a steady stream from F.O.Bs. via the many Japanese troops, without hope of relief destroyers, to Combined Headquarters at or escape, had reached the final stages of Kyaukpyu. exhaustion. 41. The standard of gunnery in destroyers Conclusion. was high. Great credit is especially due to H.M.S. PATHFINDER, Lieutenant-Com- 36. The Naval " set-up " on Ramree Island mander J. F. Hallifax, , for their was very satisfactory. Senior Officer Ad- excellent shooting and overall contribution to vanced Force " W " and Staff devoted their the success of the Operations. attentions to the Planning of Operations, the control of H.M. Ships and Craft, and to co- 42. Commander R. W. W. Ashby, D.S C., operation with the Army and the R.A F. The R.N.V.R., Senior Officer Arakan Coastal Senior Officer Assault Group, Captain E. T. Forces deserves recognition for his share in the Cooper, D.S.O., Royal Navy, and his Staff very fine performance put up by his M.Ls. were fully employed in the execution of the Also Commander E. J. C. Edwards, D S.C., Operations, the maintenance of craft, and the R.N.V.R., Commander M/S, Bay of Bengal, training and supervision of their crews. for leadership and devotion to duty in com- mand of the B.Y.M.S. 37. Co-operation with the 26th Indian In- fantry Division, under the able leadership of 43. Special mention should be made of General Lomax, worked very well indeed. It Captain E T. Cooper, D.S.O., Royal Navy, is no exaggeration to say that throughout the who, as Senior Officer Assault Group, was period of our stay on the Island -no moves in responsible for the successful execution of all battle were ordered by General Lomax without the Combined Operations described in this the knowledge of the Naval Staff. Similarry, report. the proper employment of H.M. Ships and 44. On the Staff side, the work of Lieutenant- Craft was often the subject of joint Commander R. M. P. Williamson, Royal Navy, consideration. in particular, was very valuable. 38. This excellent co-operation was made (Signed) ERIC BUSH, easy by the fact that all three Services worked Captain, Royal Navy.-

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