An Exploration of Remedies
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A Report Commissioned by BERSIH 2.0 HOW TO DETER PARTY HOPPING in MALAYSIA? An Exploration of Remedies by Wong Chin Huat HOW TO DETER PARTY HOPPING in MALAYSIA? An Exploration of Remedies by Wong Chin Huat 4 January 2021 All rights reserved © 2021 The Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (BERSIH 2.0) The copyright of this research report belongs to The Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (BERSIH 2.0). All or any part of this research report may be reproduced provided acknowledgement of source is made or with BERSIH 2.0 permission. BERSIH 2.0 assumes no responsibility, warranty and liability, expressed or implied by the reproduction of this publication done without BERSIH 2.0 permission. This report may be cited as Wong, C.H. (2021). How to deter party hopping in Malaysia? An exploration of remedies. Bersih 2.0. https://www.bersih.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/01/Bersih-Policy-Research-Party-Hopping-In-Malaysia-An-Exploration- of-Remedies.pdf Published by: Bersih & Adil Network Sdn Bhd A-2-8 Pusat Perniagaan 8 Avenue Jalan Sungai Jernih 8/1 46050, Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel: 03-76280371 Fax: 03-76280372 Email: [email protected] Website: www.bersih.org Written by: Wong Chin Huat Research assistance by: Wo Chang Xi Graphic and layout: Shahrin bin Abdul Samad Contents Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................................. 1 1 Party-hopping ..................................................................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Definition ................................................................................................................................................... 7 1.2 The Malaysian Context .............................................................................................................................. 8 1.3 Issues and Implications ............................................................................................................................. 9 1.3.1 Argument for Freedom to Defect ................................................................................................... 9 1.3.2 Arguments against Freedom to Defect ........................................................................................ 10 1.3.3 Objectives and Goals ................................................................................................................... 11 1.4 Remedies ................................................................................................................................................. 12 1.4.1 Anti-Hopping Law (AHL) ............................................................................................................. 12 1.4.2 Recall Election Law (REL) ............................................................................................................ 14 1.4.3 Electoral Mandate for Parties ...................................................................................................... 14 1.4.4 Confidence and Supply Agreement (CSA) ................................................................................... 14 1.4.5 Empowerment of Opposition Lawmakers and Government Backbenchers ................................. 15 2 Anti-Hopping law (AHL) – Comparative Experiences ....................................................................................... 16 2.1 India ......................................................................................................................................................... 16 2.2 South Africa ............................................................................................................................................. 18 2.3 New Zealand ............................................................................................................................................ 20 2.4 Taiwan ..................................................................................................................................................... 21 3 Recall Election Law (REL) – Comparative Experiences ..................................................................................... 23 3.1 Taiwan ..................................................................................................................................................... 23 3.2 California, United States .......................................................................................................................... 25 3.3 United Kingdom ....................................................................................................................................... 28 4 Issues with Anti-Hopping Remedies in Malaysia .............................................................................................. 31 4.1 Anti-Hopping Law (AHL) .......................................................................................................................... 31 4.1.1 Ban on Recontesting after Resignation ....................................................................................... 31 4.1.2 Four State-Level AHLs in Malaysia .............................................................................................. 32 4.1.3 Legal Obstacle at Both the Federal and State Levels .................................................................. 35 4.1.4 Coalitional Realignment .............................................................................................................. 36 4.1.5 More Controlled Lawmakers and Weakened Legislatures ........................................................... 37 4.2 Recall Election Law (REL) ........................................................................................................................ 37 4.2.1 Constitutional Hurdle Only at the Federal Level .......................................................................... 37 4.2.2 Multiple Purposes ........................................................................................................................ 38 4.2.3 Protecting Voters’ Mandate Without Strengthening Parties ........................................................ 39 4.2.4 Longer Process and Higher Cost ................................................................................................. 38 4.3 Sabah 2020 – Where Both AHL and REL would have Failed ................................................................... 40 4.4 Electoral Mandate for Parties .................................................................................................................. 42 i How To Deter Party Hopping in Malaysia? An Exploration of Remedies Contents 4.5 Confidence and Supply Agreement .......................................................................................................... 43 4.6 Empowerment of Opposition Lawmakers and Government Backbenchers ............................................. 43 4.6.1 Legislative Reform ....................................................................................................................... 44 4.6.2 Limiting “Expanded Payroll Vote” ................................................................................................ 45 4.6.3 Equitable Constituency Development Fund (CDF) ....................................................................... 48 4.6.4 Decentralisation and local democracy ........................................................................................ 49 4.6.5 Equality before the Law and State Apparatus .............................................................................. 50 5 Recommendations for Malaysia ........................................................................................................................ 52 5.1 Objectives and Goals ............................................................................................................................... 52 5.2 Specific Recommendations ..................................................................................................................... 52 5.2.1 Recall Election Law (REL) under FPTP ........................................................................................ 52 5.2.2 Anti-Hopping Law (AHL) for CLPR Lawmakers in Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) .............. 55 5.2.3 Freedom to Recontest after Resignation ..................................................................................... 57 5.2.4 Confidence and Supply Agreement (CSA) ................................................................................... 58 5.2.5 Legislative Reform to Empower Non-Executive Lawmakers ....................................................... 58 5.2.6 Limiting ‘Expanded Payroll Vote’ ................................................................................................. 58 5.2.7 Equitable Constituency Development Fund (CDF) ....................................................................... 59 5.2.8 Decentralisation and Elected Local Governments ....................................................................... 59 5.2.9 Equality before the law and state apparatus ............................................................................... 59 5.3 Options and Actors at a Glance ............................................................................................................... 60 Acknowledgement: This paper benefits greatly from the excellent research assistance provided by Mr. Wo Chang