And C.R.E. of 1 Cdn Inf Div Jointly Laid ~0Wn the Requirements: Until The
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- 86 - and C.R.E. of 1 Cdn Inf Div jointly laid ~0wn the requirements: (a) In conjunction with th~ artl11~ry, to form a smok~ b~x aroun~ the ~re~arej brl~g6beads until the assaultino tr~ops w~re firm on the ground. (b) To prot~ct briAJln~ operations and subsequent traffic ov~r the brld6e from observed enemy fire after the fire-plan outlined In "a" had stopped. (~EF: 45/Flrst Cdn hrmy/RCk/C/F, Docket III, Vol 1, Report on Sm~ke Screens Carried out by First Cdn krmy, 15 Ju1 45) For 2 Cdn Corps this was thE first time that artillery and generator smoke had been useJ tOGether to form the one screen, and only very close co-opernti~n between the two branchesx could make n success of it. The necessary close liaison was achieved by having, a cf.Ernical warfare o.fflcer at headquarters R.C.k. (Ibid) kRMvURED nND ~RTILLBRY SUPP"RT 191. The fire-plan devise} by C.R.tl. 1 Cdn Inf Div, in consultstion w~th the co~nnders of 2 and 3 Cdn Int Bdes, provided for a series vf concentrations. These were to be fired at known Jef~nce positions whose locatl~ns had Deen establlshej from a~rial photo~r~phs or by our Intelligence. The artillery's share in the smoke screen was to besin at H- 30, and at H- 10 a bail of high explosive was to start falling on the far side Jf the river. ht H- bour this was to be replaced by concentrations fired 0n the enemy poslt1ons further back. The suns of 1 Cdn Inf Div haJ b6en placed in support of 7 Cdn Inf B1e on 7 hpr and at that time the detachments had their first experience ~f bUilding gun pits instead of digging the~J for 1n the aodlen soil of this part of Holland any hole s~on fillej with watar. (nEF: ~5/1 Cdn Inf D,v/C/F, Docket • III: folio 8: 1 Cdn Inf Div, "::peratlon lICJ~NN,",NSH... T". vutllne ':"ccount of susp"rtin 2 i-..rms and Servtces, p. 1). Air support was proviJed y "Cab Rank" fi£hter b.:>mbers, on call. J,.rmed reconnaissance was provlJed to make life miseraole for German road traffic, and to ensure that adequate informeti~n came back. There vms also an aerial counter battery programme by medium bomb~rs. They would enbage known enemy batteries from H-hour onwards. H hour wes s~t at 1630 hours 11 dpr 45. (Ibid, Docket III: folio I, h~PX I, 1 Cjn Inr Div, 0p Order No:-T, :",p "CkNN..:.'NSH ..... Tll) 1 CON INF DIV McVES UP T. ";:';",T THE ENEMY, 3-10 "PR 45" 192. 0n 3 anJ 4 hpr 1 Cdn Inf Div h~d moved from its concentration area outside Brussels tc the Reichswald, where it J( R.C.h. and chemical v/arI"are. xx Reference maps: hS for para 186. - 87 - cnme unJer co~nand of 2 Cdn Corps. Tho men of the division were once more allowed tu put up their red patches and units f1& shes, which had bL6n removej from their battledress as a security measure durin; their journey from Italy. vn 7 kpr the Glvislon moveJ ucr~ss thb Rhine, and on 9 J..pr Maj-Oen Foster, who now co~nan~oj the division, brought his men 1~to a concontatlon ar~~ nvrth-east of Zutphen. lm the afternoon of the 10 Apr, when 7 Cjn Inf Bda took Deventer, the stage was set for 1 Cdn Inf Div to mak~ its ~ebut 1n North-w6st Europe. (hEF: 45/1 Cdn Inf Div/CIF, ~0cket III, folio I, uperation nCANN ... l\:SH0T" .£E. 01t) . .:..1 though the Gorman tr.:>ops now facin,:; east from across the Ijssel were a vory mixe1 lot, there was no reason to look forwar1 to the carnine battle with too much complacancy: ll l~lthough the terms "hodsa-podge", "odds and sods , ll II s crap1ng , ate., are acceptej ap1 thets for such an order of battle as ne now discloses on ~ur front the skill and fi~htin~ spirit of individual units has ~ften been up to the standard of elit~ tr~~ps. ~ven thoubh the soldiers ere often youths from tho trainln6 centres, they are fana.tical sn1 brave. .... ffl cer Instruct ors frvm training units have prvvlJed the hiGhest standard of leadershlp. (fiEF: 45/2 Cdn Corps/L/F, Docket I: 2 Cdn Corps Int Summ.=..ry No. 153, 6 h.pr 45) 193. ~ben the division ~oved into the area from wbich it was to assault, 7 Cdn Recce RS3t of :3 Cdn Inf Div was placed under cOuwand to watch th~ river line fro~ Zutpben to Deventer. ~t this time, the division's ~wn reconnaissance regiment, 4 P.L.D.G. was in process of bein3 reconverted from infantry to reconnaissance. (Ibid). Men of 1 Cdn Inr Div had already been across the river; as early as thE evening of 8 Apr & small reconnaissance croup from L. Edwn R., con sisting of the scout officer, two scouts anj two Dutch civilians, had been acr0SS und determined that the enemy held many well-dug-in positions slons the wostern dyke. (AEF: 45/1 Cdn Inf Div/C/F, Docket III, 2 Cdn Inf 8de, Report on Ops 11 hpr 45 - 23 hpr 45: The Loyal Edmonton Regiment, Report of Ops, ? hpr 45 - 23 hpr 45) 194. At the same time as 1 Cdn Inf Div was prepariD8 to cross the Ijssel, unjer General Simonds' direction, 1 Cdn Corps was itself p1annlnb the assault on Arnhem. The original proposal for the capture of krnhem involved an attack from the south-west across the Neder Rijn. This plan had tc be revise~, mainly because it was a~preclate~ thct the roads across the "island" between th~ rivers t~ thv north of Nijmegen were only likely to bear the woight of heavy traffic at the cost of intensivG effort on the part of the sappers. It was decided, therefore, to attack across the upper Ijssel from the south east, where the apprQaches were more favoura~le. hccordinely, under cover of a smoke screen, 49 (W.R.) Inf Div was relieved on the "island" by tfjostmr R. (Mot) with some Belgian troops under command, an~ shifted to the east of the pannerdensch Canal with orders to cross the River on 12 Apr.¥. (hEF: 45/1 Cdn Corps/C/F: Draft ,utline of ups of 1 Cdn Corps in Clearing of Western Holland, ~pril 1945) x This operation, whicfi was carrle~ out unjer 1 Odn Corps, 1s described in a sU~3equent report. - 88 - THE SITU~TI.N "F' S:"C, NIl BRIT ,.RMY, 10-11 "PR 45" 195. The ~osslbl11tles of pro3ress in this part of the Netnerlands, hOW6Vtr, were 11mlt~d by tte bxtent and adv~~c~s requirements of the great beln J msje elsewhere along the front of 21 rlrmy Gr0up. Second Brit Army had c~nsiderably expondej the winss of its thrust between the Ems and Weser Rivers. ...n the left, flankln_ the Canadians, Lt Gan Horrock'8 30 Brit Corps, whose ~bjectlve was the city of Bremen, had r:laJo s10w l/roLress. By 9 ..... pr c;r";'s Armd D1 v and 43 (W.) Int Div had after some severe fiGhting reached the areas of Furstenau (9635) enl Haselunne (8353) resp~ctlvely, but against well orbanizej cyposltion, craters, an~ road blocks, Boh1nd them 51 (H.) Div had the task of holding the area of Lingen, which had been handed ov~r to them by 3 Brit Inf Div ~n its transfer t~ Lt-Gen Ritcni~'s 12 Corps ~n 8 Apr. The urmoured an~ infantry ~jvance went on thr~ughout 10 rtpr, and on the followin~ day 51 (R.) Div was brJught for ward with orders to capture Quakenbr.ck. (1542), while -1.3 (W.) Inf Div t""k Cloppenbur". (J.EF: 45/8econd Brit "rmy/C/D, Dock6t I; also First Cdn l~rmy Liaison ..... fficers Reports, 1116201.) 196. In the centre of 12 Brit Corys' sector much greater progress had been ma~&, mostly by 7 nrmd Div with under command 155 Inf Bde (52 (L.) Div), 9 Inf Bde (3 Brit Inf Di v), and 160 Inf Bd. of 53 (:1.) Inf D1 v». The town of H0ya on the west bo.nl< of Vleser was captured by 22 J..rrnd Bde on 8 Apr, While to th~ north-west more of the arC!l,)ur advancing up from Dicpholz secured Bassum. FUr to the rear, on the left flank of 12 Corps, 52 (L.) Div (less 155 Inf Bde) was still heving trou01e on the axis Brnmsche (1624) Diepholz (4346), north-west of tho Dummer Zoe, while 3 Brit Inf Div looked after th~ bsse of the flank farther back, thus freeing 53 (~.) Div t~ follow up thE ~rm~ur now driving on with th~ object of seizinG D61menhcrst (6095). Pr~gress north-west of the road Bremen - Dlepholz was slow however, and on 10 J..pr 131 Inf 3de to~k over the attack from 22 Armd Bde. Meanwhile 160 Inf Bde slid over toe Wes6r at Hoya and firmed up a bridseheed from which 53 (~.) Inf Div was "rdered to expand eastwards first, towards Reth~m, then up between the ~ivers Aller and Weser to Verden (0182), then south to Nienburg (0050). For this oporation 4 Brit J.rmd Bde, which had been operating with 52 (L.) Div, came forward t~ assist 53 (W.) Inf Div.