Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme FINAL Report
www.communities.gov.uk community, opportunity, prosperity
Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme FINAL Report
NERA Economic Consulting Stéphane Gros, Emily Bulman , Helen Webb, Oliver Vanden-Eynde, Michael Spackman
October 2009 Department for Communities and Local Government: London Acknowledgments and Disclaimer We would like to acknowledge the valuable help we have received from individuals who have spent time with us discussing the New Dimension Programme. Information furnished by others, upon which all or portions of this report are based, is believed to be reliable but has not been verified. No warranty is given as to the accuracy of such information but we alone are responsible for its interpretation. Public information and industry and statistical data are from sources we deem to be reliable; however, we make no representation as to the accuracy or completeness of such information and have accepted the information without further verification.
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October 2009
Product Code: 09RSD06069
ISBN: 978 1 4098 1786 4 Contents | 3
Contents
Executive Summary 9
Chapter 1 Introduction 18 1.1 The New Dimension Programme 18 1.2 The study 19 1.3 Structure of this report 19
Chapter 2 New Dimension Capabilities 21 2.1 Urban search and rescue 21 2.2 Water 23 2.3 Mass decontamination 24 2.4 Command and control 26
Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) 28 3.1 Qualitative assessment of impacts 28 3.1.1 Urban search and rescue 28 3.1.2 Water 29 3.1.3 Mass decontamination 30 3.1.4 Command and control 31 3.1.5 Qualitative assessment of efficiency savings and cost impacts 32 3.2 Review of available data 34 3.2.1 Overview 34 3.2.2 FRS input and output data 35 3.2.3 Data on incidents 36 3.2.4 Reports of individual incidents 37 3.3 Quantifying efficiencies: Options considered 38 3.3.1 Approach 1 – assess efficiency across FRSs and time 38 3.3.2 Approach 2 – assess efficiency of incidents 39 3.3.3 Approach 3 – assessing incidents within select FRSs 39 3.3.4 Approach 4 – Bottom-up approach 40 3.3.5 Selection of options 41 3.4 Efficiency analysis using fire incident data 42 3.4.1 Introduction 42 3.4.2 Fire incident data 42 3.4.3 “New Dimension Incidents” 42 3.4.4 Performance indicators 43 3.4.5 Definition of the control group 44 3.4.6 Results 45 3.4.7 Conclusions 46 3.5 Quantitative assessment of assets utilisation and efficiency gains 47 3.5.1 Mobilisation of New Dimension equipment 47 3.5.2 Measurement of efficiency gains 55 4 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) 65 4.1 Methodological framework 65 4.1.1 Identification of performance indicators 66 4.1.2 Use of experts opinion to establish the counterfactual 67 4.1.3 Estimation and monetisation of benefits 68 4.1.4 Extrapolation of incident level benefits 70 4.1.5 Presentation of findings 70 4.2 Buncefield oil storage depot disaster 71 4.2.1 Incident overview 71 4.2.2 FRS response 71 4.2.3 Damage estimates 73 4.2.4 Benefits of New Dimension 74 4.3 Summer 2007 flooding incidents 82 4.3.1 Incident overview 82 4.3.2 FRS response 83 4.3.3 Damage estimates 84 4.3.4 Benefits of New Dimension 85 4.4 Smaller incidents 94 4.4.1 Kent white powder incident 94 4.4.2 Kensal Rise tornado 96 4.4.3 Milton Keynes scaffolding collapse 99 4.4.4 Heat wave at Waddington Air Show 102 4.4.5 Westminster building collapse 104 4.4.6 Whitechapel building collapse 106 4.4.7 Sample of other incidents reported in the CLG business benefits and operational incidents forms 108 4.4.8 Outcome benefits: Summary of evidence from smaller incidents 109
Chapter 5 Summary of findings and conclusions 117 5.1 How New Dimension equipment is mobilised 117 5.2 FRS efficiency gains 117 5.2.1 Qualitative assessment of efficiency benefits 117 5.2.2 Top-down assessment of efficiency benefits 118 5.2.3 Bottom-up assessment of efficiency benefits 119 5.3 Outcome benefits 120 5.3.1 The estimation carried out for this study 121 5.3.2 Summary of outcome benefit estimates 122 5.4 Recommendations for future valuation 124 5.4.1 Systematic recording of quantitative information on special services incidents 124 5.4.2 Recoding and restructuring of the New Dimension mobilisation database 127 5.4.3 Systematic recording of quantitative information on the use and impact of New Dimension assets 128 5.4.4 Enhanced departmental guidance on the monetisation of benefits 130 Contents | 5
Appendix A Meetings, interviews and communications 132 A.1 Stage 1 Meetings and interviews 132 A.2 Stage 2 Interviews and communications 133
Appendix B Survey questionnaires used in the assessment of outcome benefits 134 B.1 Buncefield oil storage depot disaster 134 B.2 Summer 2007 flooding incidents in Gloucestershire 138 B.3 Smaller incidents 144
Appendix C Monetisation assumptions 146 C.1 Material damage from fires or floods 146 C.1.1 Loss of agricultural land 147 C.1.2 Business interruptions 147 C.1.3 Inventory losses 149 C.2 Air quality damage 150 C.3 Human costs 151 C.3.1 Casualties 151 C.3.2 Emotional suffering 151 C.4 Value of a school day 152 C.5 Disruption to essential services 152 C.6 Road and railway closure 153 C.7 Values of time for road users 154 C.8 Cost of Ambulance Services 155 C.9 Cost of Police Services 155
Appendix D Performance indicator summary tables 156
Appendix E Summary of selected business benefits and operational incidents forms 161
Appendix F Glossary 167
Appendix G References and Data Sources 168 G.1 Background information on stage 2 ncidents 168 G.1.1 Buncefield oil storage depot disaster 168 G.1.2 Summer 2007 flooding incidents 170 G.1.3 Kent white powder incident 171 G.1.4 Kensal Rise tornado 171 G.1.5 Milton Keynes scaffolding collapse 171 G.1.6 Heat wave at Waddington Air Show 172 G.1.7 Westminster building collapse 172 G.1.8 Whitechapel building collapse 172 G.2 Economic valuation 172 6 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
List of Tables Table 2.1 Deliverables for the Urban Search and Rescue capability (England) 22 Table 2.2 Deliverables for the Water capability (England) 23 Table 2.3 Deliverables for the Mass Decontamination capability (England) 25 Table 3.1 Potential FRS efficiency gains delivered by the NDP: Urban Search and Rescue 33 Table 3.2 Potential FRS efficiency gains delivered by the NDP: Water 34 Table 3.3 Potential FRS efficiency gains delivered by the NDP: Mass Decontamination 34 Table 3.4 Cross-border mobilisations (by FRS) 55 Table 3.5 Categories of mobilisations used for efficiency analysis 57 Table 3.6 Estimated proportions of ND incidents that are additional to those responded to prior to NDP 58 Table 3.7 Estimated ND efficiency gains from small incidents (England) 62 Table 3.8 Estimated ND efficiency gains from small incidents (London) 63 Table 3.9 Estimated ND efficiency gains from small incidents (England, excluding London) 63 Table 3.10 Sensitivity analysis of efficiency gains (England) 64 Table 4.1 Mobilisation of ND assets at Buncefield 72 Table 4.2 Summary of responses to the Buncefield questionnaire 76 Table 4.3 Benefits associated with shorter burn of fire 79 Table 4.4 Economic benefits associated with reduced fuel losses 80 Table 4.5 Environmental benefits associated with reduced fuel losses 81 Table 4.6 Economic benefits associated with reduced spread of fire 81 Table 4.7 Estimated benefits from the use of ND equipment, procedures and training at the Buncefield oil storage depot disaster, summary 82 Table 4.8 Overview of the summer 2007 flooding incidents 83 Table 4.9 Mobilisation of ND assets during the 2007 flooding incidents 84 Table 4.10 Summary of responses to the flooding questionnaire 87 Table 4.11 Benefits associated with the enhanced protection, or faster recovery of significant infrastructure 90 Table 4.12 Benefits associated with the accelerated clearing of flooded properties 92 Table 4.13 Estimated benefits from the use of ND equipment, procedures and training during the summer 2007 flooding in Gloucestershire, summary 93 Table 4.14 Estimation of outcome benefits for smaller incidents 110 Table 4.15 Summary of estimated outcome benefits for smaller incidents 112 Table 4.16 Distribution of incidents by incident type and number of mobilisations 113 Table 4.17 Distribution of incidents by incident type and equipment mobilised 114 Table 4.18 Extrapolation of outcome benefits from evidence on smaller incidents 115 Table 5.1 Estimated efficiency gains from small incidents (England) 120 Table 5.2 Estimated outcome benefits (England) 123 Table 5.3 Recording of quantitative information on the impacts of ND, recommended template 130 Contents | 7
Table A.1 Meetings and Telephone Interviews for Stage 1 132 Table A.2 Telephone Interviews and Email Communications for Stage 2 133 Table C.1 Monetisation of material damage 146 Table C.2 Average cost of lost business per incident 147 Table C.3 Number of enterprises, employment and turnover in the private sector at the start of 2007, by industry section and government office region / country 148 Table C.4 Number of enterprises, employment and turnover in the private sector at the start of 2007, by size of enterprise and industry section in London 149 Table C.5 Spot prices for petroleum products 150 Table C.6 Air quality damage costs 150 Table C.7 Cost of fatalities and injuries 151 Table C.8 Values of time for road users 154 Table D.1 Performance indicators for the Buncefield oil storage depot disaster 156 Table D.2 Performance indicators for the summer 2007 flooding in Gloucestershire 159 Table E.1 Summary of selected operational incidents forms 161
List of Boxes Box 4.1 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the April 2004 white powder incident in Kent 96 Box 4.2 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the Kensal Rise tornado incident 99 Box 4.3 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the Milton Keynes scaffolding collapse incident 101 Box 4.4 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the Waddington air show incident 104 Box 4.5 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the Westminster building collapse incident 106 Box 4.6 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the Whitechapel building collapse incident 108 8 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme Executive Summary | 9
Executive Summary
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Government strengthened the UK’s ability to detect, prevent and respond to major emergencies. As well as changing the legislative base underpinning civil protection and resilience, 1 it established the Capabilities Programme, “the core framework through which the Government is seeking to build resilience across all parts of the UK” .2 The Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) established the New Dimension Programme (NDP) as part of its contribution to the Capabilities Programme.
The overarching aim of the NDP is “ to improve the response capability of the UK Fire and Rescue Service to large scale and catastrophic incidents to protect the welfare of the public and the security of the nation ”.
The NDP provides the fire and rescue services (FRSs) 3 in England with additional equipment, training and procedures to deal better with a range of threats, including the following: 4
• chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents
• industrial and domestic accidents
• chemical spills and collapsed buildings and
• natural disasters, including floods and earthquakes
The NDP functional capabilities are:
• mass decontamination (MD)
• urban search and rescue (USAR)
• water and
• command and control
The introduction of the New Dimension (ND) assets is nearly complete and the Government capital expenditure on the NDP up to June 2008 is over £200m set up costs, and around £100m ongoing cost. 5
1 Civil Contingencies Act (2004) 2 http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/ukgovernment/capabilities.aspx 3 In this report, the term ‘FRS’ (singular) is used sometimes for individual FRSs, and sometimes for all FRSs collectively. 4 CLG, Fire and resilience, Introduction to the New Dimension programme , http://www.communities.gov.uk/fire/resilienceresponse/newdimensionequipping/introduction/ 5 Bob Speel, Fire and Resilience Directorate, CLG. 10 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
This study
The aim of this study is to develop and implement an approach for assessing the benefits realised thus far by the NDP. This involves two stages of evaluation:
• stage 1: estimate the efficiency gains realised by FRSs as a result of the NDP and
• stage 2: estimate the net economic, social and environmental value of the NDP
Stage 1 entails estimation of the budgetary and non-budgetary savings realised in the day-to-day operations of the FRS, resulting from the provision of specialist ND equipment, procedures and training (i.e. relative to a base case where ND assets would not have been available). Stage 2 entails estimation of the benefits to society resulting from improvements in the effectiveness of FRS responses to emergencies; they consist primarily of damage cost savings including, possibly, reductions in casualties, property damage, environmental damage, emotional suffering or lost output. 6
This is a combined report for stage 1 and stage 2 of the study.
Besides improving the efficiency of the FRS and reducing the consequential costs of incidents, the ND programme is likely to have produced an intangible ‘ex- ante’ value to society, of having the FRS ready to respond in the case of an emergency. 7 This value is independent of any incident actually occurring ex-post, during the evaluation period. It would be reflected in society’s willingness to pay for the programme, again independently of any threat actually eventuating.
The present study does not seek to measure this benefit . It focuses on the direct benefits actually delivered by the programme, in day-to-day FRS operations (efficiency savings), and in responding to incidents (averted consequential costs) and depends on the number of incidents having occurred since the programme’s inception. This is an important factor to keep in mind when interpreting the results presented in this report.
How New Dimension equipment is mobilised 8
New Dimension equipment in recent months has been mobilised in England around 200 to 300 times per quarter. For smaller incidents, this may increase a little in the future as FRSs gain greater awareness of urban search and rescue capabilities, for example, and the remaining equipment is delivered. To date, mobilisations peaked in mid 2007, at over 400 mobilisations per quarter, as FRSs responded to widespread flooding.
6 Examples provided in the statement of requirement for this study. 7 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Measurement of Output and Productivity of the Fire and Rescue Service , March 2005, page 18. 8 Source: NERA analysis of FRSNCC mobilisation data Executive Summary | 11
We estimate that of all incidents to which the FRS respond, only around 0.1 per cent are those to which ND equipment is mobilised.
More than 75 per cent of ND equipment mobilisations are of a single piece of ND equipment. A large proportion of such mobilisations are of Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) vehicles, 9 responding to incidents involving unidentified hazardous material. Around 85 per cent of all ND mobilisations are for incidents within the same FRS area as that in which the ND equipment is held. This is consistent with ND equipment being deployed most frequently for smaller scale incidents.
Less than 15 per cent of ND mobilisations are for incidents involving fires. Most incidents with ND mobilisations are classified as “special services”.
Almost half of all mobilisations have been for incidents within Greater London.
FRS efficiency gains
ND capabilities have the potential to deliver savings to FRSs in a number of areas. These primarily take the form of:
• reduction of the time required to carry out a rescue or to respond to an incident (such as a flood, where a rescue may not be required)
• reduction in the number of appliances required and
• safer FRS operation, lowering the risk of injury to FRS members and risk of damage to FRS equipment
The capabilities can increase FRS costs, however, in that the FRS is now able to respond to incidents where previously other public bodies may have taken responsibility, or where rescues may not have been attempted, for example on safety grounds. 10
Examples of important efficiency gains include:
• high volume pumps (HVP), 11 sometimes pumping water over relatively large distances, replacing several fire appliances when responding to large fires or to floods
• DIM vehicles identifying suspect material more quickly, allowing rescues to proceed more rapidly and
• USAR equipment speeding up searches for casualties
9 Equipment delivered as part of the mass decontamination capability 10 For example, without appropriate shoring equipment, firefighters may be prevented from entering a collapsed building. 11 Equipment delivered as part of the water capability 12 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
We sought to estimate the impact of the NDP on FRS efficiencies and costs using a bottom-up approach, extrapolating assumptions concerning efficiency gains for individual incidents on the basis of mobilisation data.
Even though we spoke to a number of people within CLG and the FRS with excellent knowledge of the NDP, we were able to obtain very little information to value cost savings that result from using ND capabilities. We understand that valuation is difficult because:
• first, the NDP provides new capabilities, which means that the FRS is now being deployed in areas that would previously have been dealt with by the police, ambulance services or contractors. The FRS is therefore not familiar with all the capabilities the NDP has replaced
• second, many FRSs had some capabilities with respect to hazardous material, USAR, high volume pumps, or cutting that overlap with those provided by the NDP, but these capabilities varied and still do vary, by FRS. The no NDP, “before” case can therefore not readily be defined in general terms
Given this situation, we have not been able to prepare a robust estimate of the efficiency saving of the NDP. Instead, we have computed the potential cost saving by extrapolating savings that we are able to estimate to areas where we do not have information. The result provides an indication of the order of magnitude of likely cost savings of the NDP for day-to-day incidents.
Tables ES-1 and ES-2 below show the results of this bottom-up assessment of the potential impact of ND capabilities on savings in staff and conventional fire appliances, for London (ES-1) and for the rest of England (ES-2).
Results in the tables are expressed in terms of numbers of conventional fire appliances and staff saved. The latter are broken down into firefighters 12 and staff that use the ND equipment. In the final column these two are netted off, to determine the impact on FRS staff. The results include ND staff time spent responding to incidents that, prior to the NDP, and under our counterfactual, would not have been dealt with by the FRS.
As we have not been able to determine estimates of savings for around a quarter of all mobilisations, for illustrative purposes we have assumed that, on average, the efficiency per mobilisation is the same as that for the mobilisations that we have quantified. This allows us to give an estimate for total fire appliance and firefighters saved.
12 Where we have assumed a ratio of 28 firefighters per fire appliance Executive Summary | 13
Table ES-1 Estimated efficiency gains from small incidents (London)
Numbers saved Proportion of Fire Mobilisation type mobilisations appliances Firefighters ND Staff All Staff A B = A x 28 C D = B + C Unidentified hazardous material 65% 0.9 24 -2 22 Decontamination 1% 0.0 000 Flooding required HVP 1% 0.2 5 -1 4 USAR module 4 8% 0.1 2 -1 1 Major fire requiring HVP 1% 0.0 101 Fire involving hazardous materials 4% 0.4 10 0 10 Total, quantified 80% 1.5 42 -4 38 Road traffic collision 1% Infrastructure collapse 12% Fire involving structural problems 0% Miscellaneous 7% Total, all mobilisations 100% 2 57 -5 52
Source: NERA analysis, based on various sources, and simplifying assumptions
Table ES-2 Estimated efficiency gains from small incidents (England, excluding London)
Numbers saved Proportion of Fire Mobilisation type mobilisations appliances Firefighters ND Staff All Staff A B = A x 28 C D = B + C Unidentified hazardous material 20% 0.3 7 -1 6 Decontamination 6% 0.0 000 Flooding required HVP 16% 2.5 69 -8 61 USAR module 4 11% 0.1 3 -1 2 Major fire requiring HVP 9% 0.2 7 -2 5 Fire involving hazardous materials 4% 0.3 909 Total, quantified 66% 3.4 95 -12 83 Road traffic collision 7% Infrastructure collapse 8% Fire involving structural problems 3% Miscellaneous 15% Total, all mobilisations 100% 5 138 -17 121
Source: NERA analysis, based on various sources, and simplifying assumptions
We tested the sensitivity of the results by varying some of our assumptions, primarily with regard to flooding and use of DIM vehicles, which have been the main source of potential efficiency savings. The results of these tests for England as a whole are summarised in Table ES-3. 14 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Table ES-3 Sensitivity analysis of efficiency gains (England)
Main Case Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Fire appliances saved 7495 Firefighters saved (net) 172 94 231 127
Source: NERA analysis, based on various sources, and simplifying assumptions
The range of results given for these sensitivity tests reinforce our view that the results should be taken as an order of magnitude indication only of possible cost savings to FRSs with respect to day-to-day incidents.
The analysis suggests that the ND capabilities deliver a saving to FRSs across England for day-to-day incidents in the region of £4.5m to £11m a year. 13 Approximately 30 per cent of the saving is associated with incidents in London.
Outcome benefits
In many cases, the NDP also improves outcomes, such as reductions in the number of casualties or the severity of injuries. To identify and value these we have conducted detailed case-study work on two major incidents and six “smaller” incidents:
• the Buncefield oil storage depot explosion and fire of 11 December 2005
• the summer 2007 flooding incidents in Gloucestershire and
• for the “smaller” incidents:
– a white powder incident in Kent (23 April 2004)
– the Kensal Rise tornado (7 December 2006)
– a scaffolding collapse in Milton Keynes (11 April 2006)
– extreme weather conditions at the Waddington air show (1–2 July 2006)
– a building collapse in Westminster (12 June 2007) and
– another building collapse, in Whitechapel (14 February 2007)
For each of these incidents, we have researched the available evidence and conducted in-depth interviews with FRS personnel and other subject matter experts to obtain additional information on the incidents, determine which ND assets were used, and understand what effects the use of these resources might have had on the nature and magnitude of the damage.
13 Derived by assuming full time equivalent firefighter costs, including pension, allowance and variable overheads, of £44,000 a year, and conventional fire appliance total costs of £100,000 a year, and taking account of sensitivity analysis Executive Summary | 15
To the extent possible, the benefits of the programme were calculated as the difference between the actual, observed damage and the damage that would have occurred in the absence of the specialist ND equipment, procedures and training (the ‘counterfactual’). Where valuation was not possible, we prepared a qualitative assessment of benefits, including a brief description of impacts and comments on their relative importance. For those benefits that could be valued, we first estimated benefits associated with each incident, individually. We then extrapolated the incident-level estimates to the entire programme using data on mobilisations by incident type, and a number of simplifying assumptions.
The outcome benefits estimated in the course of this study are summarised in Table ES-4 below; they amount to a total of between £21m to £106m. 14 The extremely wide range reflects the very considerable uncertainties.
Table ES-4 Estimated outcome benefits (England)
Benefit estimates, £ million low high Buncefield oil storage depot disaster, December 2005 £8.7 £61.4 Summer 2007 flooding incidents in Gloucestershire £11.5 £30.9 Extrapolation from “smaller incident” case studies £0.3 £4.9 Other incidents £0.6 £8.5 Total outcome benefits £21.1 £105.8
Source: NERA analysis, based on various sources, and simplifying assumptions
The estimates presented in Table ES-4 are of benefits in the following broad categories:
• reduced incident duration, and associated reductions in business interruptions, traffic disruptions, or damage to the site (in the case of large fires and, to a lesser extent, flooding), as the use of ND equipment, procedures or training, typically enhances the effectiveness of FRS responses. For example, in our case studies, we found that the NDP allowed:
– a shorter burn of fire at Buncefield, through the use of HVPs
– faster search and rescue operation at the site of the Westminster building collapse, through the use of cameras and listening equipment and
– faster assessment of structural damage, following the Kensal Rise Tornado, made possible by USAR training
14 Total estimated for England, over the period August 2005 to June 2008; in current year-of-incident pounds, undiscounted. 16 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
• reduced risk of injury to FRS personnel, as the ND assets generally offer a safer means of attending to an incident site; for example in our case studies:
– safer search and rescue operations at the site of the Whitechapel building collapse, through the use of shoring equipment and search dogs
• reduced health risk to the general public, as ND offers capabilities for the treatment or decontamination of large numbers of people, in situ ; for example:
– ability to treat heat wave casualties within a Mass Decontamination structure at the July 2006 Waddington Air Show and
– safer evacuation procedures in the aftermath of the Kensal Rise Tornado, owing to USAR training
We have also identified a number of other areas where benefits are thought to be important, but could not be valued, including the community reassurance value of specialist assets; reduced emotional distress associated with faster incident resolution; preservation of dignity in particular in the context of decontamination procedures; and enhanced FRS reputation from miscellaneous improvements in effectiveness.
On the other hand, we have found no unambiguous evidence indicating that the NDP has saved lives, and were unable to demonstrate strong environmental value. This of course might be due to the specific incidents we have examined and from which (in the case of smaller incidents) we have extrapolated.
Overall, we have found very limited scope for the valuation of ND benefits, given the nature and quality of the information currently available. As demonstrated in this report, valuation remains possible for some incidents and for a few benefit categories, but only at a very high cost of background research and assumptions .
Recommendations for future valuation of ND impacts
We believe the following would be desirable:
• systematic recording of quantitative information on special services incidents, on the context within which these incidents arise, the nature and extent of the damage, and the effectiveness of the FRS response
• systematic recording of quantitative information on the impacts of ND, possibly through a series of predetermined performance indicators or grading scales (e.g. intervals of possible values for the percent change in incident duration) Executive Summary | 17
• recoding and restructuring of the mobilisation database, with detailed information on the equipment actually used, and a clear and consistent coding of incident types; along with a link to the augmented incident recording system for easy referencing (we understand that this revised database architecture is under development, or already in place)
• enhanced departmental guidelines on the economic and environmental costs associated with special services incidents, and standardised values (assumptions) for use in the monetisation of benefits
Each of these recommendations is described at length in the report. 18 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 The New Dimension Programme
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Government strengthened the UK’s ability to detect, prevent and respond to major emergencies. As well as changing the legislative base underpinning civil protection and resilience, 15 it established the Capabilities Programme, “the core framework through which the Government is seeking to build resilience across all parts of the UK” .16 The Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) established the New Dimension Programme (NDP) as part of its contribution to the Capabilities Programme.
The overarching aim of the NDP is “ to improve the response capability of the UK Fire and Rescue Service to large scale and catastrophic incidents to protect the welfare of the public and the security of the nation ”.
The NDP provides the Fire and Rescue Services (FRSs) in England with equipment, training and procedures to deal with a range of threats, including the following: 17
• chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents
• industrial and domestic accidents
• chemical spills and collapsed building and
• natural disasters, including floods and earthquakes
The NDP functional capabilities are:
• mass decontamination
• urban search and rescue (USAR)
• water and
• command and control
15 Civil Contingencies Act (2004) 16 http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/ukgovernment/capabilities.aspx 17 CLG, Fire and resilience, Introduction to the New Dimension programme , http://www.communities.gov.uk/fire/resilienceresponse/newdimensionequipping/introduction/ Chapter 1 Introduction | 19
The introduction of the New Dimension (ND) assets is nearly complete and the Government capital expenditure on the NDP up to June 2008 is over £200m set up costs, and around £100m ongoing cost. 18 1.2 The study
The aim of this study is to develop and implement an approach for assessing the benefits realised thus far by the NDP.
This involves two stages of evaluation:
• stage 1: estimate the efficiency gains realised by FRSs as a result of the NDP and
• stage 2: estimate the economic, social and environmental value of the NDP to society
Under stage 1, CLG requires that:
“A comprehensive list of cashable and non-cashable … efficiency savings should be identified. Where possible these should be quantified and valued. Where it is not possible to quantify or value benefits, they should still be considered in detail and included within the analysis. Efficiencies should be categorised according to the 4 functional capabilities…, cross- cutting efficiencies should also be identified. ” 19
Under stage 2, CLG requires that:
“The research should identify and list all the benefits to society which would not have been realised without the specialist ND equipment. These benefits should be quantified and valued where possible. Where it is not possible to quantify or value benefits, they should still be considered in detail and included within the analysis.” 20
This is a combined final report of stage 1 and stage 2 of the study. 1.3 Structure of this report
Section 2 gives an overview of the capabilities of the New Dimension programme.
Stage 1 benefits are examined in Section 3. In Section 3.1 we discuss how the NDP capabilities have had an impact on day-to-day operations in the FRS. This includes a discussion of how ND capabilities are used for non-national incidents,
18 Bob Speel, Fire and Resilience Directorate, CLG. 19 Source: CLG Statement of Requirements 20 Source: CLG Statement of Requirements 20 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
how these incidents were dealt with before ND, and a qualitative description of how ND capabilities have affected efficiency and costs. Section 3.2 reviews data that are available for possible use in efficiency analysis. Then, drawing on the review of data, in Section 3.3 we set out options for measuring the day-to-day impacts of the NDP. Section 3.4 reports on analysis we conducted using a CLG fire database, where we seek to assess impacts of ND capabilities on FRS outputs and outcomes. In Section 3.5 we examine in detail how ND capabilities have been deployed, using a database of equipment mobilisation, and then develop a methodology for quantifying the cost savings brought about by deployment of the equipment.
Stage 2 benefits are explored in Section 4. Section 4.1 provides an overview of our approach to stage 2, including the identification of ‘performance’ indicators, data collection, monetisation, and model development. Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 present the results of our case studies. In Section 4.2 we present our case study of the Buncefield oil storage depot disaster. Section 4.3 focuses on flooding in Gloucestershire in summer 2007. Section 4.4 covers a number of smaller incidents.
A summary of our findings and conclusions for both stages is given in Section 5.
We have prepared this report on the basis of reviewing documents, analysing data and conducting interviews with FRS and CLG officials, as well as with other organisations.
The individuals and organisations we have contacted for this study are identified in Appendix A. Our questionnaires for the stage 2 incident case studies are included as Appendix B. Appendix C summarises the assumptions we have made for the monetisation of stage 2 benefits.
Summary tables for the indicators retained in the analysis of the major incidents are provided in Appendix D; and further supporting tables can be found in Appendix E.
A glossary of acronyms is given in Appendix F. And references and data sources can be found in Appendix G. Chapter 2 New Dimension Capabilities | 21
Chapter 2 New Dimension Capabilities
In this section we provide an overview of the New Dimension Programme’s (NDP) functional capabilities, categorised as follows:
• urban search and rescue
• water
• mass decontamination and
• command and control
This section has been compiled largely on the basis of the New Dimension Programme National Seminar Briefing, FRS newsletters and through discussions with members of CLG and the FRS (listed in ). 2.1 Urban search and rescue
The urban search and rescue (USAR) capability has been developed to allow the FRSs to respond to any incident that involves unstable or collapsed structures, or to major transport incidents. These may be incidents arising from any cause, natural, accidental, or deliberate.
The capability allows the FRS to perform a number of tasks including:
• searching for, identifying and locating entrapped casualties
• rescuing entrapped casualties
• providing safe systems of work for USAR operations and
• allowing safe entry and exit in unstable or collapsed structures
ND has delivered equipment for 19 USAR teams and a strategic reserve. Each set of USAR equipment consists of three prime movers, 21 one of each of five different module types and canine support (currently being trained). The modules contain the following equipment: technical search cameras; listening devices; cutting, drilling and breaking devices; propping and shoring equipment; lighting and power generation; hand tools and heavy capacity airbags.
The deliverables are summarised in Table 2.1.
21 Prime movers are vehicles that carry equipment. 22 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Table 2.1 Deliverables for the urban search and rescue capability (England)
Deliverables Date delivered Capability Description Module 1 1 per unit (20 units) 2006 Prime mover plus module for initial response to structural collapse, and technical search Module 2 1 per unit (20 units) 2007/08 Heavy transport incident hydraulic equipment Module 3 1 per unit (20 units) 2007/08 USAR support module Module 4 1 per unit (20 units) 2006 Prime mover plus drop side module containing multi purpose vehicle Module 5 1 per unit (20 units) 2006 Flat bed unit containing timber and wedges for shoring Canine support 1 dog per unit (20 units) Currently being trained
Source: CLG and FRSNCC
The USAR equipment is located across the country, primarily in large urban areas. There is at least one unit in each region.
For a major incident all five modules are used. However, for smaller incidents modules 1, 3 and 4 are usually sent initially. Module 1 is designed to support USAR operations over the initial hours of an incident. It contains equipment for scene assessment and technical search. Module 3 supports module 1 by providing timber shoring and breach and break equipment. Module 4 contains a multi-purpose vehicle that can be used for carrying equipment over rough terrain, or clearing rubble.
For larger incidents, modules 2 and 5 are also used. Module 2 contains heavy cutting and lifting equipment and is used in major transport-related incidents. Module 5 contains timber for shoring.
The canine support will be able to conduct wide searches to locate people trapped in collapsed structures. This will also allow searching to take place when it is too dangerous for humans to enter.
The NDP sent 408 firefighters to Texas, USA, to attend the ‘Disaster City’ course on collapsed structures. An additional 96 personnel from London attended, financed by the London Fire Brigade. Courses are now provided at the Fire Service College (FSC), based on the initial Texas training, funded by government. These courses are developed on an ongoing basis, as are procedures. The FSC training covers both hands-on skills, using training rigs, and command roles. Chapter 2 New Dimension Capabilities | 23
2.2 Water
The water capability in the NDP allows the FRS to move large volumes of water over long distances. It was designed to ensure that the FRS has the capability to respond to a number of water-based scenarios including natural flooding and fire fighting duties. 22
Table 2.2 shows the equipment delivered as part of the water capability of the NDP.
Table 2.2 Deliverables for the water capability (England)
Deliverables Date delivered Capability Description High volume pumps 46 2005/06 Prime mover, one hydrosub and 1km of hose Hose box modules 46 2005/06 One double hose box containing 2km of hose
Source: CLG and FRSNCC
High Volume Pumps (HVPs) have been allocated on the basis of planning for a level 4 incident (i.e. of national significance), using a risk assessment approach based on socio-economic impact analysis. The Key Performance Indicators for HVP require that 44 always be available, and that 23 can be mobilised to areas with a high concentration of risk within two hours. In practice, this means that most FRSs have an HVP, and that HVPs tend to be located close to urban areas within fluvial flood plains or close to large reservoirs.
High volume pumps are to some extent substitutes to pumps on traditional appliances. The main differences are as follows:
• the HVP capacity is 7,000 litres per minute over relatively long distances, compared to 2,250 litres per minute over short distances for traditional fire appliances
• the HVP hose length is 1km, and can be laid automatically compared to 25m length hoses that need to be laid manually for a traditional fire appliance; a HVP and hose box together contain 3km of hose; a traditional appliance may carry 20 lengths of hose, totalling 500m
• a HVP can pump for up to 3km, compared to 250m for a traditional fire appliance and
• the HVP crews are provided with safety equipment that enables them to work in or near flood waters more safely
22 The New Dimension Programme National Seminar Briefing (section A4) states that the NDP is not intended to support the existing water rescue capability of the FRS. 24 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Both HVP and traditional fire appliances ordinarily have a crew of five firefighters; they would consist of a watch of seven firefighters, to allow for time off for leave, sickness and training.
Training is provided as part of the NDP. The NDP is working with the Chief Fire Officers’ Association to develop a training and capability programme for working with water. 2.3 Mass decontamination 23
The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) Order 2007, made under the Fire and Rescue Services Act (2004), gave fire and rescue authorities (FRAs) new responsibilities for mass decontamination. This order made it mandatory for FRAs to make provision for decontamination of people in the event of a chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear (CBRN) emergency. It required containment of water, with consideration of preventing harm to the environment. There is also a requirement for an FRA to provide specialist assistance outside its own area in the event of an emergency, where this is reasonable. The mass decontamination capability within the NDP is the major initiative developed to satisfy these new statutory requirements.
The purpose of the mass decontamination project is to deliver the ability to:
• detect, identify and monitor contaminants
• mitigate the effects of contamination on FRS responders and the public
• provide responder protection in contaminated environments and
• provide continued support to other agencies through the recovery phase 24
The equipment designed to deliver these capabilities is set out in Table 2.3.
23 This section was prepared using material from a variety of sources including FRS21 (www.frsonline.fire.gov.uk), the NDP National Seminar Briefing and a discussion with Sean Booth, Greater Manchester FRS. 24 New Dimension Programme National Seminar Briefing, section A2. Chapter 2 New Dimension Capabilities | 25
Table 2.3 Deliverables for the mass decontamination capability (England)
Deliverables Date delivered Capability Description Detection, Identification 18 2006/07 1 van containing DIM equipment and & Monitoring (DIM) Personal Protective Equipment for operators Incident Response Units 73 2003/04 Two mass decontamination structures, (IRUs) one firefighter decontamination unit, associated ancillary equipment, disrobe and rerobe packs Disrobe module 33 2006 1 prime mover, 1 module containing 1600 disrobe packs and 1 MD4 unit Rerobe module 13 2006 1 prime mover, 1 module containing 1500 re-robe packs and 1 MD4 unit
Source: CLG and FRSNCC
The Detection Identification and Monitoring (DIM) units are strategically located across England to provide a rapid response to major national incidents involving actual or potential chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material, or hazardous materials.
Each van contains a suite of detection, identification and monitoring equipment. It also has robust communication systems including satellite telephones and data transfer equipment. They also have an anemometer to determine local wind conditions.
Each DIM team has an average of 12 officers trained to use the full suite of equipment.
The Incident Response Unit (IRU) has two mass decontamination structures (MD1). These are large tents where people to be decontaminated can shower and redress under cover. There is also capacity for stretcher-borne casualties to be decontaminated. Each person to go through the MD1 requires a disrobe and a rerobe pack. The disrobe pack consists of a lined and hooded cloak under which a person can undress. They then move through the showers, before redressing using a rerobe pack consisting of a jumpsuit, sanitary products and shoes. 300 disrobe and rerobe packs are carried on the IRU but extra packs are provided in the disrobe and rerobe modules.
The IRU also contains a firefighter decontamination unit (MD4) for the decontamination of firefighters wearing gas-tight suits and powered respirator protective suits. In addition, a variety of supporting equipment is carried including pumps, water heaters, containment dams, gas-tight suits, powered respirator protective suits, lighting, hoses and detection and monitoring equipment.
The majority of individual FRSs have one IRU, with a minority having either two or three. The London Fire Brigade has ten IRUs. IRUs were delivered in 2003-04. 26 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
The government funds training for the IRUs and mass decontamination units. FRS staff have received training at the Fire Service College, and general training in FRSs has also been provided using a variety of media including CD-ROMS, videos and other materials. 2.4 Command and control
The scope of the command and control capability is: 25
• to provide the national infrastructure to deploy and coordinate New Dimension resources in response to a large scale deployment as a result of a catastrophic or major incident
• regionally based vehicles to provide communications and co-ordination capability as part of the national co-ordination arrangements
The FRS National Coordination Centre (FRSNCC) is directed at satisfying the first of these two requirements. It is responsible for managing the use of ND equipment and vehicles. The FRSNCC principally tracks equipment as follows:
• it maintains a live database of equipment that is ‘on the run’, i.e. equipment that has been delivered, is in working order, and can be mobilised
• it maintains a database of equipment (principally vehicle / module) mobilisation. The database records, amongst other things, the time of the mobilisation and the time that the mobilisation ceased so that the equipment became available again. It also records certain information about the incident for which the mobilisation occurred
The FRSNCC maintains these databases on the basis of information provided by individual FRSs.
In the event that a FRS needs to mobilise equipment held in other FRS areas, the FRSNCC can help to facilitate this, though typically for small incidents mobilisation of equipment to neighbouring FRSs would be arranged on a bilateral basis. The FRSNCC works with the CLG Emergency Room in a national incident to coordinate mobilisation of ND resources.
The second requirement, regionally based vehicles to provide communications and co-ordination capability, is being met through the delivery of Enhanced Command Support (ECS) vehicles. These will provide command, control, coordination and communication capabilities at incidents. They contain telephone, satellite and radio equipment to provide a resilient communications capability. The ECS vehicles will also meet the requirements of the new Firelink wide-area radio system for the FRS.
25 CLG New Dimension Programme – Business Benefits Plan , version 5, 18/01/2006 Chapter 2 New Dimension Capabilities | 27
Nine of these vehicles are currently being delivered to strategic locations across England.
Training has so far taken place in four of the nine services that will have ECS vehicles. There will be initial and ongoing training for all crews. Members of the national team train at the Fire Service College, but it is possible to train at FRS locations, as specialist training rigs are not required.
The training will develop command capabilities in the event of a catastrophic incident. There are a number of skills required including mapping, supporting incident command and booking people in and out.
It is envisaged that the ECS vehicles will be mobilised for major incidents. Units will be located in strategic holding areas and will coordinate movements of ND resources (vehicles and staff). This will support the management of large incidents. The ECS vehicles are capable of taking over from a control room if this becomes necessary.
There is also an advisory framework within the command and control capability. This currently consists of capability advisors at two levels. We understand from the Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA) that there are proposals to increase this to three levels, as follows:
1 National Strategic Advisor – the advisor would have a thorough understanding of ND capabilities and how to run incidents.
2 National Resilience Advisory Team (NRAT) – the team would have a general understanding of the capabilities and would work alongside local FRS commanders (who would not be ND specialists). NRAT is automatically mobilised for a national incident.
3 Subject matter advisors – providing technical advice. Local commanders can decide if they require subject matter advisors and this is coordinated by the FRSNCC. 28 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1)
3.1 Qualitative assessment of impacts
In this section we discuss how the ND capabilities have been used for non- national incidents, how these incidents were dealt with before the ND programme began, and qualitatively, how ND capabilities have affected efficiency and effectiveness.
This section has been compiled largely on the basis of the New Dimension Programme National Seminar Briefing, FRS newsletters and through discussions with members of CLG and the FRS (listed in ).
3.1.1 Urban search and rescue
The urban search and rescue (USAR) capability has been used to date in a number of non-national incidents. An example of a large incident where the equipment has been used is a structural collapse of a warehouse in Warwickshire in November 2007. However, the equipment is also used on a day-to-day basis to varying degrees. The USAR equipment can be used to establish the presence and location of individuals within a collapsed building and can increase the speed and safety of rescue.
Before the NDP, large incidents were more likely to have required the use of demolition contractors if the FRS lacked the capability to deal with the incident. The support of specialist contractors may also have been required for some road traffic collisions (RTCs) where heavy lifting or hot cutting equipment may be needed.
The equipment used by FRSs before the NDP varied by FRS. Some FRSs had special appliances that contained equipment for RTC or, to a limited extent, USAR, for example an emergency tender or emergency support unit.
More specifically, the individual USAR modules have different benefits. These include:
• module 1 provides equipment that saves time and resources by replacing the use of manual labour (e.g. with hammer and chisel for breaking up)
• module 2 allows the lifting of larger vehicles than was previously possible by the FRS. Time and resources are saved in cases where previously a crane may have been deployed Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 29
• module 3 allows shoring to take place in an incident, providing firefighters with a safer working environment and allowing earlier entry into collapsed or unstable structures. The training for this module gives firefighters the expertise to predict and prevent further structural collapses, increasing safety and possibly reducing the potential severity of the incident
• the multi-purpose vehicle in module 4 has a number of impacts on operations. It allows rubble to be moved more rapidly than if the FRS were to do this manually, or spend time arranging for a contractor to conduct the work. And it can transport materials over rough terrain. For a fire involving collapse it may decrease the time taken to extinguish the fire by improving access
• module 5 has similar shoring benefits to module 3 but is used in larger incidents
• canine support has large benefits by greatly decreasing the time taken to establish whether there are live casualties in a collapsed area
This capability has affected efficiency through the decrease in time taken to clear buildings and establish there are no people inside. This can lead to cost savings. Time savings also result from less time spent waiting for outside agencies or contractors to perform tasks for which the FRS previously had no capability.
The use of USAR equipment improves effectiveness of FRS operations by reducing risk of injury or death for casualties and members of the FRS. This occurs through the ability to shore up buildings, and also through the reduction in time taken to resolve incidents due to increased speed in detecting, locating and rescuing casualties.
The benefits of the USAR capability vary by FRS. This is because prior to the ND programme, different FRSs had different capabilities in terms of search and rescue. In addition, incidents requiring USAR tend to be concentrated in larger urban areas. Therefore, the change in capability is variable, and so are the benefits.
3.1.2 Water
The water capability consists of the high volume pumps (HVPs) and hose laying modules. These greatly increase the FRS’s capacity to pump water, particularly over long distances. HVPs are regularly used in large fires, which require great volumes of water, and also to alleviate flooding.
Before the NDP, in most cases equivalent fire incidents would have been dealt with using traditional fire appliances. The equipment, however, varied by FRS. We understand, for example, that Shropshire FRS’s use of HVP precedes the NDP. 30 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
The FRS does not have a specific statutory duty to respond to floods, but respond under their discretionary powers. Our understanding is that prior to the NDP equivalent flooding incidents may not have been dealt with by the FRS to the same degree as they are now. Indeed, traditional fire appliances may not have been able to provide the same functionality as the HVPs, even in large numbers.
For flooding incidents and other incidents requiring large volumes of water or water transported over long distances, HVPs have increased FRS efficiency in terms of the number of appliances and firefighters required. They can require more planning and require greater involvement of other agencies, however. There are several elements to this.
• HVPs often require greater planning in advance of the set up than conventional fire pumps because they typically necessitate road closures, requiring liaison with the police and local authority or Highways Agency. Pumps from conventional fire appliances, whilst carrying less water also take up less road space and, as the hoses can if necessary be driven over, tend to cause less disruption to traffic access 26
• over longer distances, HVP can be laid out much more rapidly than conventional pumps (not least because they are 1km length compared to 25m)
• once the equipment has been set up, HVPs have greater pumping capability (7,000 litres per minute for short distances, compared to 2,250 litres per minute), and so are equivalent to three or more conventional appliances, depending on the distance involved
• if pumping is required over long distances, HVPs are much more efficient, because traditional pumps require additional fire appliances to boost pumping every 250m, compared to every 3 km for HVPs
• HVPs require some additional supervision by the police to reduce the risk of vandalism or theft. Conventional fire appliances and pumps are supervised by firefighters
HVPs also improve effectiveness by limiting damage and improving business continuity, allowing critical national infrastructure to be protected.
3.1.3 Mass decontamination
The mass decontamination (MD) capability consists of a number of pieces of equipment, and these have been used to varying degrees in day-to-day operations.
26 When operating at full capacity, an HVP is a substitute for several conventional appliances, and in such circumstances may not necessarily occupy more road space. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 31
• the DIM units are mobilised frequently. They have been used to respond to white powder incidents, noxious smells and carbon monoxide monitoring
• the firefighter decontamination unit (MD4) is used by some FRSs after hazardous materials (HAZMAT) incidents
• other modules with the IRUs have been used relatively little to date with respect to smaller incidents. In addition to their capability with respect to mass decontamination, they have been mobilised to exploit their superior lighting capability, and to shower people during extreme weather events, for example heat waves
The MD capability has filled a new gap resulting from a change in threat assessment and a new statutory requirement for the FRS to decontaminate members of the public.
Before the NDP, with the principal exception of the Metropolitan Police and the London Fire Brigade, there was very little capability in the area of detection, identification and monitoring within the FRS, though other responders have some capability in this area. Samples would have been dispatched for testing, for example to laboratories at Porton Down, and it may have been necessary to cordon off the area around the incident for several days, under police supervision.
For firefighter decontamination, a variety of methods have traditionally been used including bucket and sponge and deluge shower systems. The new capability means that firefighters can have warm, rather than cold, showers – a significant benefit during winter months. In addition, the run-off water is contained, thereby mitigating the risk of pollution to the public drainage system.
Prior to the NDP, the capability for mass decontamination did not exist. The Ambulance Service is able to decontaminate members of the public. Their decontamination units typically have a throughput of eight persons per hour, compared to in excess of 150 persons per hour for an IRU, though it must be noted that the ambulance provision is geared to cope with non-ambulant casualties. In addition, some fire appliances have warm water shower systems that allow the decontamination of small numbers of casualties.
3.1.4 Command and control
The Command and control capability is primarily designed to help deal with large, national incidents. However for smaller incidents, for example a four, five or six pump fire, the Enhanced Command Support (ECS) vehicles could be deployed as a standard command vehicle.
Before the NDP, existing command and control equipment differed between FRSs. The ECS vehicle is an improved version of existing equipment, with new technology that facilitates linked decision-making. For example, the new equipment replaces whiteboards and radios. 32 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
The ECS vehicles are expected to improve effectiveness of operations, rather than deliver direct cost savings. However, as an ECS vehicle can be used at a smaller incident instead of an existing command unit it could for example eliminate the cost to the FRS of replacing a command unit. 27
ECS vehicles are currently being delivered and have yet to be widely deployed. As this study concerns an assessment of NDP benefits to date, we are not formally assessing the benefits of the ECS vehicles as part of this work.
3.1.5 Qualitative assessment of efficiency savings and cost impacts
In this project we are required to identify:
“A comprehensive list of cashable and non-cashable efficiency savings” 28
An efficiency gain can be achieved by one or more of the following:
(1) reducing inputs (money, people, assets etc) for the same outputs
(2) reducing prices (procurement, labour costs etc) for the same outputs
(3) getting greater outputs or improved quality (extra services, productivity etc) for the same inputs
(4) improved ratios of outputs per unit cost of inputs 29
The NDP has a number of effects on FRS efficiency. With respect to actual or potential cost savings, they tend to fall into the following main categories:
• reduction of the time required to carry out a rescue or to respond to an incident (such as a flood, where a rescue may not be required)
• reduction in the number of appliances required and
• safer FRS operation, lowering the risk of injury to FRS members and risk of damage to FRS equipment
In many cases, the NDP increases the effectiveness of outputs, and thereby has important impacts on outcomes, such as reductions in the number of casualties and severity of injuries. We do not consider this effect here. Outcomes are considered in stage 2 of the study (and presented in Section 4 of this report).
We understand CLG’s interest in this study also relates to how the NDP may impact on FRS inputs and costs, because this feeds into FRS target efficiency gains.
27 Source: Roy Wilsher, CFOA lead for Command and Control and Enhanced Command Support 28 CLG Statement of Requirements 29 These are widely understood definitions of efficiencies, though are taken from Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (the predecessor of CLG) Efficiency Technical Note for ODPM Central (December 2005). Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 33
We therefore note that the NDP capabilities shift some responsibilities between the FRS and other authorities, either as the result of statutory change (for example the responsibility for mass decontamination specified in the Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) Order 2007 under the 2004 Fire Services Act), or as a pragmatic response to a complex incident. This may not necessarily impact on FRS efficiency, but will impact on FRS costs.
In addition, the ND capabilities have long term costs, including equipment maintenance and staff training, which CLG provide ongoing support for, which do not fall within the remit of this study.
Tables 3.1 to 3.3 show our assessment of the impacts of different elements of the NDP on FRS costs. The tables are set out according to the three NDP capabilities of urban search and rescue, water and mass decontamination. Listed under “Impact” is a qualitative description of the impact of the particular NDP capability on output and where relevant on costs. A tick under “Potential FRS Cashable Benefit?” indicates some net cashable benefit.
Table 3.1 Potential FRS efficiency gains delivered by the NDP: Urban search and rescue
NDP Functional Capability Impact Potential FRS cashable benefit? Breaching and breaking: rock Reduction in rescue time Breaching and breaking: cutting Reduction in rescue time Breaching and breaking: hot cutting Reduction in rescue time Breaching and breaking: breaking Reduction in rescue time Shoring Safer system of work for FRS: fewer FRS injuries Shoring Reduction in risk of damage to FRS assets Shoring Reduction in rescue time Shoring Reduction in waiting time for building surveyor – more rapid entry Shoring Conducting work that would previously have Additional been managed by outside contractors, often cost appointed by the local authority Shoring Training allows identification and prevention of secondary collapse – potentially reduced rescue time Technical search: including Reduction in search time; this will be improved listening devices and cameras further with the delivery of canine support Lifting and moving: heavy lift Reduction in rescue time; fewer FRS injuries Lifting and moving: heavy lift Conducting work that would previously have Additional been managed by outside contractors, often cost appointed by the local authority or highway authority, for example Lifting and moving: mechanical Reduction in risk of injury to FRS personnel handling equipment Lifting and moving: Multi Purpose Reduction in transport time to incident site for Vehicle response equipment, reduction in number of appliances required to deal with incident, reduction in waiting time for contractor or local council. 34 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Table 3.2 Potential FRS efficiency gains delivered by the NDP: Water
NDP Functional Impact Potential FRS Capability cashable benefit? HVP: hosing More complex planning requirements, including gaining access Potential to water and potential road closure involving highway authorities additional and police. cost HVP: hosing Quicker to set-up hosing, when pumping is required over long distances, than for traditional appliances. HVP Fewer appliances, and associated crewing, required: HVP pump rate can be around three times that of a traditional fire appliance. Large savings in the number of appliances required if water is pumped over longer distances. HVP FRS may now respond to more incidents as a result of this capability: Additional particularly flooding incidents requiring pumping large volumes of cost water over long distances.
Table 3.3 Potential FRS efficiency gains delivered by the NDP: Mass decontamination
NDP Functional Impact Potential FRS Capability cashable benefit? 30 IRU MD1 MD capabilities mean that more people can be decontaminated Additional in a given time. Previously, however, FRS would not have had this cost responsibility (it would usually have been conducted by the ambulance service / NHS, who continue to carry out small scale decontamination); therefore it imposes an additional cost on the FRS. IRU: lighting Powerful lighting for incidents in general: improves working conditions, so that rescues can be conducted more quickly. Fire-fighter May be time savings in some instances. decontamination unit DIM Suspect packages/white powder incidents can be checked more quickly and thoroughly. This can eliminate the need to send samples away for analysis to a specialist laboratory. Rescue operations can be conducted more quickly. DIM FRS may now respond to more incidents as a result of this capability, Additional whereas previously they may have been dealt with by the police. cost
3.2 Review of available data
3.2.1 Overview
We have investigated the feasibility of estimating the impact of the NDP on FRS efficiency using top-down analysis of inputs and outputs, and applied a top- down approach which we present in section 3.3. We have also explored the use of a bottom-up approach, where we seek to generalise efficiency impacts with respect to individual incidents through extrapolation. In order to develop these approaches, we have conducted a detailed review of relevant data sources. This review is presented in this section.
30 For the larger incidents, Fire and Rescue Authorities, like other local authorities, may be eligible to recover costs through the Bellwin scheme. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 35
The data have a number of characteristics that may make analysis difficult. They are as follows:
• the NDP consists of specialist capabilities, and makes up less than 1 per cent of FRS total output; FRS input and output data do not distinguish between activities involving ND capabilities and other activities
• CLG collects very detailed data on fire incidents, but much less detailed data on special service incidents. In contrast, we estimate that over 80 per cent of incidents for which ND equipment are mobilised are for special services, whilst fewer than 20 per cent involve fires 31
• FRS data held by CLG tend to be processed slowly, and may only be finalised after two or three years. As many of the ND capabilities were rolled out in 2006 or later, their impacts have yet to feed through fully into the CLG data
• we have been able to review a number of deployment reports, and other reports on the impact of ND capabilities with respect to particular incidents; very few of these, however, provide quantitative estimates of impacts
These issues are discussed further in chapter 3.3.
3.2.2 FRS input and output data
3.2.2.1 FRS operational data
FRSs submit operational data to CLG, for example on numbers of employees and equipment. CLG uses these data to calculate best value performance indicators (BVPIs).
For fire, there are a number of BVPIs relating to the number of different types of fires, fire deaths and injuries and escapes, false alarms, expenditure per head of population, smoke alarms, equality, absence, retirement, invoicing and e- delivery.
3.2.2.2 CIPFA
The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) collect statistics for a number of public services, including Fire and Rescue Services. For each FRS, a large number of indicators are published (over 200 for 2007), including data on actual and estimated expenditure and income, a breakdown of expenditure categories per 1,000 population, pensions, staffing, appliances, incidents, inspections and more.
These data would include FRS activities involving deployment of ND capabilities, but do not distinguish them.
31 Source: NERA analysis of FRSNCC mobilisation data. This analysis is presented in chapter 3.5. 36 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
3.2.3 Data on incidents
3.2.3.1 Fire incident data
FRSs report all primary fires to CLG through completion of a detailed form, FDR1. 32 FRSs complete an equivalent form, FDR3, for secondary fires, and CLG receives monthly summaries of these forms. CLG published fire statistics are compiled using data from these returns.
This process is currently being replaced by a new incident recording system (IRS). The IRS provides some information additional to the FDR1, for example the vehicles mobilised for each incident. The IRS has been piloted in some FRSs, and we understand associated data will first be published in August 2008.
3.2.3.2 Neighbourhood statistics
CLG receives data from FRSs to compile neighbourhood statistics (www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk). The data are recorded by incident, and include all incidents, not just those related to fires. CLG categorise special service incidents in this database as follows:
• road traffic collisions
• extrications
• lift rescues
• lock-ins/outs
• hazardous chemicals
• line rescues
• ladder releases
• water rescues
• other special services
For each incident, there may be details on:
• the timing of the incident, including the time the fire brigade first received a call regarding the incident, and the time each appliance ceased to be used on the incident
• number and severity of casualties and
• numbers and types of appliances used to respond to the incident
32 Fire Damage Report Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 37
We understand that 2006 data were expected to be available in August 2008.
3.2.3.3 FRS National Coordination Centre data
Each time an FRS mobilises ND equipment, it is required to report the mobilisation to the FRSNCC, and the information is recorded in an FRSNCC database. The database reports the equipment mobilised, the time and duration of its use, the location of its use, and the FRSs involved. It also contains a brief description of the incident, for example “structural wall collapse” , “white powder in envelope” , “chemical spill on slip road” , and the incident number provided by the FRS. This information can be used to examine the impact of specific and / or generic incidents in more detail (for example, by contacting the affected FRS).
In addition, the FRSNCC keeps a live database on the availability of ND equipment.
We have analysed the mobilisation data and present the results in section 3.5.1.
3.2.3.4 New Dimension Programme equipment
The NDP has a database recording all equipment, its location, the date it became operational (“on the run”) and the date it was last serviced. We have received a subset of these data, relating to vehicles.
3.2.4 Reports of individual incidents
There is more detailed reporting on use of the ND capabilities in the context of individual incidents. We have been shown examples from the following sources.
• the NDP has a ‘business benefits plan template’; several of the more significant incidents have been written up in accordance with this template. 33 A new template is now being piloted, with the intention that the FRSs would complete it for all incidents using ND equipment
• deployment debrief reports for Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM). These have been prepared each time a DIM vehicle is deployed. The report contains a section on ‘learning outcomes’, where the appropriateness and effectiveness of the deployment may be discussed
• deployment reports for USAR capabilities
• an end project report for the USAR capability of the ND programme. This includes a summary of the benefits of the USAR capability in a number of incidents, compiled from USAR deployment debrief reports
• quarterly FRS newsletter, at www.frsonline.fire.gov.uk; this often provides detail of particular, often quite major, incidents involving ND capabilities
33 A few examples can be found in Appendix E. 38 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
We explore how these data may be used to assess efficiency gains in section 3.3. 3.3 Quantifying efficiencies: Options considered
We have considered the following broad approaches for assessing efficiency gains of the New Dimension Programme (NDP).
• approach 1: assess variations in performance indicators across FRSs and time, and correlate these variations with access to ND assets
• approach 2: flag incidents when ND assets have been used, and compare efficiency of these incidents with a control group of incidents – perhaps equivalent incidents prior to ND roll-out
• approach 3: as approach 2, but concentrating on impacts within select FRS and then seek to draw conclusions as to the impact across FRSs more widely
• approach 4: a bottom-up approach, where expert judgement is used to construct assumptions as to efficiency gains for individual incidents; total efficiency gains are then estimated using FRSNCC mobilisation data
3.3.1 Approach 1 – assess efficiency across FRSs and time
Under approach 1 we would compile statistics on FRS outputs, inputs and other relevant variables, including deployment of ND capabilities.
Using econometric techniques and performance indicators, we would examine the data for step changes in FRS efficiency that follow from deployment of ND capabilities.
This broad approach, set out in the project proposal, is contingent on the quality of output data, details of ND deployment and productivity measures.
The feasibility of this approach is thus constrained because:
• although CLG has detailed fire incident data, consistent across FRSs, we suspect that the NDP will not have had a material impact on productivity with respect to such incidents, because few fire incidents (less than 0.5 per cent) use ND kit
• ND capabilities are often deployed for special service incidents. We have not been able to obtain input data relating to special service incidents. It is therefore not possible to compare productivity for special service incidents across FRSs Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 39
3.3.2 Approach 2 – assess efficiency of incidents
Under approach 2 we would consider the subset of incidents for which ND capabilities have been used, across FRSs. We would prepare performance indicators across relevant incidents, and compare the performance indicators for a control group of incidents that have similar characteristics.
3.3.2.1 Performance indicators
Under this approach we would propose to focus on the performance indicators set out below. We have constructed these indicators on the basis of our understanding of the information FRSs typically record for each incident.
Indicators of outputs and productivity:
• some measure of duration of incident and
• number and type of appliances mobilised: these could be weighted by a measurement of mobilisation cost to give a single measure
Indicators of outcomes:
• number and severity of casualties and
• area of damage (for fires)
Our understanding is that FRSs record such information for all, or certainly most, incidents, including special service incidents.
3.3.2.2 Control group
This approach relies on the ability to select a comparable control group of incidents for which ND capabilities are not used. This is not straightforward.
In particular, it may be that ND equipment will tend to be used for more severe incidents. Therefore, when comparing incidents with ND mobilisations with the average incident, we may find that they tend to require more inputs and have outcomes with higher levels of damage. It would be wrong to conclude from this that the use of ND equipment causes the responses to be less efficient and effective.
We would need to reduce the severity of this bias in our selection of the control group. In particular, we would seek, as far as is practical, to compare like with like. In the case of fires, this may mean matching first what appear to have similar characteristics initially, such as the numbers of rescues required, or the presence of hazardous chemicals. 40 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
3.3.2.3 Data availability
We think that this approach may be feasible for fire incidents where ND kit is used, because CLG has detailed data on such incidents. 34
However, we understand from CLG that CLG typically does not capture all the data that we would require. The process of extracting the data from the forms may therefore be very time consuming, and there are issues associated with data protection that would need to be addressed.
It should also be feasible for special service incidents, using the dataset compiled for computation of neighbourhood statistics. Unfortunately, only data for 2005 and earlier years are available currently; we understand that 2006 data is expected to be available in August 2008.
Note also that the methodology relies on linking the incident number given (in most cases) for each mobilisation recorded by the FRSNCC with the fire brigade incident number recorded in FDR1 and in the neighbourhood statistics database. Typing error or, worse, different systems or format may prevent this from occurring. In this event, linking the two datasets may still be possible, but would be more time consuming and reduce the sample sizes used in the analysis.
3.3.3 Approach 3 – assessing incidents within select FRSs
Under this approach, as with approach 2, we would prepare performance indicators using data for incidents for which ND equipment was deployed, and compare this with performance indicators for a control group of incidents.
Unlike approach 2, we would limit the analysis to a small number of FRSs and then seek to extrapolate the results to the population of interest.
We think that this approach may be feasible for special service incidents, for FRSs that record the incidents in sufficient detail. The approach would be contingent, however, on the quality of records relating to the incidents. For example, it would be useful to have data on the vehicles and staff deployed for the incident, and the length of time for which the FRS attended the incident.
A major problem, however, is the length of time it would take to compile the dataset. In addition, the problems of specifying the control group, discussed in section 3.3.2.2, may undermine the quality of the results.
3.3.4 Approach 4 – Bottom-up approach
Under this approach, we would use expert analysis and judgements, of capability managers and members of the FRS, regarding the performance of ND capabilities relative to conventional equipment and techniques.
34 The FRSNCC database appears to have a unique code for each incident, which we hope we could link up with FDR1 returns. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 41
For example, we understand that a high volume pump can pump water at a rate equivalent to a number of fire engines. We would use these efficiency assumptions at the level of individual incidents, and extrapolate them across incidents to determine aggregate efficiency levels.
This approach is feasible to the extent that comparisons between NDP and traditional capabilities can be made.
3.3.5 Selection of options
We do not think that approach 1 is feasible because data on inputs and outputs are not sufficiently disaggregated.
We have applied approach 2 to incidents involving fires, using data compiled through form FDR1. This analysis is presented in section 3.4. Unfortunately, we have not been able to apply this approach to data for special service incidents, because at the time of preparing this report such data were only available to 2005. 35
It may be possible to collect more recent data on special service incidents from individual FRSs, i.e. apply approach 3, but this process would take too long for the purpose of this study.
Approach 4 is practical to the extent that it is possible to use expert judgement to quantify efficiency impacts with respect to particular deployments. It is also the mechanism by which we can conduct a qualitative assessment of efficiency gains.
We have therefore sought to compile expert judgement on productivity gains associated with ND equipment from a variety of sources, including discussions with capability managers, discussions with the FRS, deployment reports, and articles in newsletters and other publications.
This approach may be criticised for failing to provide independent verification of the NDP’s benefits, because it relies to a large extent on the input of those closely involved in the Programme’s development. We have sought to overcome this perceived shortcoming through:
• complementing it with a top-down approach, i.e. approach 2 and
• consulting members of the FRS, who have observed the effectiveness of the equipment in their own area
35 Only the mass decontamination incident response units and some of the high volume pumps were delivered prior to 2006. 42 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
3.4 Efficiency analysis using fire incident data
3.4.1 Introduction
This section describes the application of approach 2, as described in section 3.3.2, as one approach to assessing efficiency impacts of the NDP. This approach entails assessing efficiency from data on fire incidents, across the FRSs, by constructing performance indicators.
We have compiled performance indicators for incidents for which ND equipment was mobilised and for a control group of similar incidents where it was not mobilised. If the two groups are correctly specified and directly comparable, we can compare performance indicators for the two groups in order to assess the impact of ND capabilities on performance, including FRS efficiency.
We have only been able to apply this approach to fire incidents, and not special services incidents, even though most ND mobilisations relate to the latter category. This is because data for special service incidents are much more limited than those for fire incidents. Detailed information for fire incidents is provided to CLG in the FDR1 form.
3.4.2 Fire incident data
We used fire incident data for primary fires. The data came from FDR1 forms that FRSs submitted to CLG. We used data for the period January 2005 to June 2007, 36 which consisted of more than 300,000 incidents. For 2005 and quarter 1 2006, all primary fire incidents are included in the dataset. For quarter 2 2006 onwards, incidents are sampled on a one in five basis, and then weighted to account for the un-sampled incidents. However, all fires with casualties are included in the database, with a weight of one. Furthermore, some FRSs submit their records electronically and all of these are included in the database.
A large number of variables are included in the dataset. This is a subset of the data provided on the FDR1 form: in some cases data have been removed for disclosure reasons; in other instances data are either no longer collected or are not judged to be reliable. The key variables we have used in this analysis include “fire brigade”, “incident number”, “time of call to brigade”, “control time for fire”, “number of pumps used”, “the presence of dangerous substances”, “the number of fatalities” and “…non-fatalities”, “the damage caused by the fire”, and “the spread of the fire”.
3.4.3 “New Dimension Incidents”
The first step of this analysis was to identify those incidents in the FDR1 data for which ND equipment was mobilised (“New Dimension Incidents”). In order to do this, we needed to identify fire incidents in the FRSNCC mobilisation data.
36 CLG fire data were only available to June 2007; FRS NCC has provided us with mobilisation data from August 2005 onwards. Our analysis required the two datasets to overlap so we were only able to analyse incidents between August 2005 and June 2007, inclusive. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 43
We flagged possible fire incidents, as opposed to special service incidents, from the FRSNCC mobilisation data by specifying and searching for a number of keywords. 37 We excluded large incidents (which we defined as having eight or more mobilisations of ND equipment) from the analysis, as large incidents are being considered separately in stage 2 of this study (see Section 4, outcome benefits). 38 This process resulted in the identification of 128 possible fire incidents for which ND equipment was mobilised. 39
We then sought to match these incidents with incidents in the FDR1 data. First we matched “brigade” and the date of the ND incidents to all FDR1 incidents. 40 We then manually checked these possible matches to find matching incident numbers. 41 We then repeated this process using the date plus one day for the FDR1 data, as mobilisations of ND equipment do not always occur on the first day of an incident, especially if the fire starts towards the end of the day.
Of the 128 ND fire incidents, around a third could not be matched with the FDR1 data because the incident number was not provided in the FRSNCC mobilisation data, and no other potential identifier (such as address) was available in the FDR1 dataset. For around another third of the incidents, it was possible to confirm that they were not included in the FDR1 sample, by examining incident numbers above and below on the same date for the same FRS. In a number of cases, we were unable to determine why a match had not occurred. In total, we matched only 31 of the 128 “fire” incidents we had identified from the FRSNCC database to the FDR1 data.
3.4.4 Performance indicators
In order to assess the efficiency impact of ND capabilities, we wished to develop performance indicators for incidents that measured outputs and productivity. Limitations to the data available – for example there were no data on the number of firefighters or firefighter hours accruing to an incident – meant that instead we compiled performance indicators relating to inputs, outputs and outcomes, as follows:
• incident duration (minutes) – the difference between the call time and control time for the fire 42
• fatalities – the number of fatalities for the fire incident
• non-fatalities – the number of non-fatalities for the fire incident
37 The keywords we used were fire, burn, pump, pf (pump fire) and alight 38 We excluded one large incident in 2005 and two large incidents in 2006. Here, mobilisations of prime movers and other equipment are counted separately. 39 Given the size of the FRSNCC mobilisation dataset, it is infeasible to manually identify fire incidents, and so this keyword approach may omit a small number of fire incidents. 40 Both incident host and New Dimension resource host brigade are considered where this information is available 41 Problems with this stage of the analysis included the use of abbreviated incident numbers. 42 There were some data problems with calculating the duration of the incidents. The format in which times were provided was not suitable for calculating duration, and so the times were reformatted to allow this to be calculated. 44 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
• the area damaged by direct burning
• total area damaged and
• fire spread 43
It was clear that the FDR1 dataset contained a number of errors. We excluded incidents that the data showed to have a negative duration, either because the call date was reported to be after the control date, or the call time was reported to be after the control time. This excluded a total of 2,527 incidents (less than 1 per cent of the total dataset). It also reduced the size of the sample of ND incidents by one to 30.
3.4.5 Definition of the control group
We sought to construct a set of incidents for which ND equipment was not mobilised, but that were otherwise comparable to the ND incidents. If we were able to construct a perfectly comparable control set of incidents, we would then be able to compare performance indicators for the two groups on an equivalent basis, and therefore infer that any difference in the performance of the two groups was due to the ND capabilities.
We sought to specify a control set of fires that had the same average and distribution of values as those for the “New Dimension” fires with respect to potentially relevant criteria. The characteristics we were able to control for were:
• “number of pumps” which we used as a proxy for the scale or severity of the fire, we also used an alternative measure of total number of appliances 44
• the presence of dangerous substances and
• the type of property (we have observed that ND incidents tend not to occur in residential properties)
We would have wished to control for a number of other characteristics, for example other measures of the scale or severity of the incident and an indicator of incidents for which USAR capabilities would be useful, but data constraints precluded this.
The number of incidents in the ND sample decreased further by one to 29, as for one incident there were no control incidents with the same characteristics.
43 Spread is a measure of the spread of the fire using an ordinal scale, for example confined to an item (code 1), room (2), floor (3). 44 “Number of pumps” refers to the number of traditional fire appliances mobilised initially. Although a HVP can ultimately replace several traditional appliances, it has a longer set up time and this substitution would not be taken into account in this variable. Hence the deployment of a HVP for a particular incident does not distort the use of this variable as a measure of the scale or severity of the fire. The alternative measure of the total number of appliances is the sum of number of pumps and other appliances attending. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 45
3.4.6 Results
We constructed the results using 29 ND incidents, and a control group derived from 23,238 incidents. Of the 29 ND incidents, four incidents used an Incident Response Unit (IRU), seven incidents used urban search and rescue (USAR) equipment, thirteen incidents used one or more high volume pumps (HVPs), four incidents used detection, identification and monitoring (DIM) vehicles and one incident used only a prime mover.
3.4.6.1 Duration
The average (mean) duration of the 29 ND incidents is 936 minutes 45 , compared to an average duration of 274 minutes for the control group. For the whole fire dataset, the average duration is only 31 minutes.
We also devised an alternative definition of the control group, where the proxy for the scale of the fire was the total number of appliances (consisting of “pumps” and “other appliances”) rather than the total number of pumps. This resulted in an average duration of 922 minutes for the 30 ND incidents, compared to an average duration of 320 minutes for the control group. 46 Although this is a smaller difference in duration than for the “number of pumps” measure, the duration of ND incidents is still substantially longer.
We also repeated our analysis for the subset of ND incidents that mobilise HVPs, as the efficiency of HVP in comparison to conventional fire appliances, when deployed appropriately, is well understood. Of the 13 ND incidents for which HVPs were mobilised, the average duration of the incident was 1,522 minutes, compared to an average duration of 388 minutes for the control group. Again, this shows a much longer duration for ND incidents.
3.4.6.2 Fatalities and non-fatalities
The sample size is too small for a robust comparison to be made for the number of fatalities and non-fatalities because fatalities and non-fatalities are recorded in only a small number of fires.
3.4.6.3 Area of damage
The ND incidents have an average area of damage by direct burning of approximately 100 square metres, slightly higher than, but similar to, the control group. The total area of damage is also approximately the same for both the ND incidents and the control group. For the fire dataset as a whole the average area of damage by direct burning is two to three square metres, with four to five square metres of total damage.
45 We also calculated the median duration of the ND incidents as 456 minutes. This is still substantially higher than the mean of 274 minutes for the control group (and median of 271 minutes for the control group), and so demonstrates that the finding that the ND incidents last longer is not simply the result of one or two outlier incidents. 46 This analysis includes 30 ND incidents rather than 29, as there were some incidents in the control group with the same characteristics as the ND incidents for all 30 ND incidents. 46 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
3.4.6.4 Spread
The average spread is slightly lower for ND incidents than the control group. For the fire dataset as a whole, the spread is lower than for the control group.
3.4.6.5 Discussion
These results are surprising: in many cases ND resources should be capable of reducing the duration of a given type of incident. However, there are reasons why this analysis may not produce the expected results:
• in particular, it is likely that we have been unable to specify the control group adequately. We may not be comparing like with like in terms of the difficulty and complexity of incidents. We need a counterfactual for the incidents that use ND equipment to assess how long they would have taken without the ND kit. There may be a selection issue in that for a given number of pumps, if USAR equipment is deployed, for example, the incident has more complex aspects that mean the fire takes longer to bring under control
• in addition, ND equipment may achieve efficiencies that we have been unable to measure, such as reductions in the traditional pumping appliances and firefighters deployed at the incident. For example, at a 20 pump fire, a HVP may be mobilised to replace three or more appliances, and therefore there may be no decrease in duration expected, even though there are associated efficiencies in the form of fewer firefighters being required
The results suggest that:
• incidents for which ND equipment is mobilised tend to be more serious than average primary fires – as we would expect given that ND capabilities have been specified with respect to deployment on a level 4 (national) incident and
• data limitations have meant that we have not been able to specify a control group that adequately reflects the complexity and severity of such incidents
3.4.7 Conclusions
It should be possible to conduct further, more comprehensive, analysis using this approach in the future because more fire and special services incident data should become available. However, the results presented above imply that we have not been able to identify a robust, comparable, control group . Until this becomes possible – and data from the new fire Incident Recording System may improve matters in this respect – further similar analysis is unlikely to produce meaningful results. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 47
3.5 Quantitative assessment of assets utilisation and efficiency gains
This section describes the application of approach 4, described in section 3.3.4. This approach uses FRSNCC mobilisation data for ND equipment, along with expert analysis and judgements, to determine aggregate efficiency levels.
Section 3.5.1 presents analysis of how ND equipment has been used, based on mobilisation data provided by the FRSNCC. In section 3.5.2 we use these mobilisation data to measure efficiency gains.
3.5.1 Mobilisation of New Dimension equipment
In this section we examine how ND equipment has been deployed. We do this through analysis of data of equipment / vehicle mobilisation. The FRSNCC compiles these data on the basis of information given to them by individual FRSs.
The FRSNCC has provided us with data for mobilisations from August 2005 to June 2008 (prior to August 2005, some records of mobilisations were kept, but in a more limited format). For each mobilisation a number of data fields are completed, including details of: the particular vehicle mobilised, the date, the time that the vehicle was mobilised, and the time that the mobilisation ceased, the FRS that hosted the equipment, the FRS where the incident occurred, and in most cases an incident number and brief description of the incident.
It is thought that some degree of under-reporting occurs, though this problem has diminished over time as FRSs have become more aware of reporting procedures. The FRSNCC has asked for both information at the time of mobilisation, and monthly reports, so that data can be cross checked. As immediate reporting of an incident has increased, the need for the monthly reports has diminished.
Although the FRSNCC records mobilisations for both England and Wales, the following analysis takes account only of resources located in England. For the purpose of this analysis we have also ignored mobilisations of prime movers. The mobilisation of prime movers is not reported consistently to the FRSNCC over time, and the inclusion of such data is likely to distort the analysis.
Between August 2005 and June 2008, around 2,300 mobilisations of ND equipment were reported, for around 1,600 incidents. 47
Figure 3.1 shows the number of mobilisations of ND equipment and the number of incidents for which ND equipment has been used on a quarterly basis.
47 A single mobilisation could be that of, for example a DIM vehicle or a USAR module. 48 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
As shown, the rate of mobilisation increased up to 2007, when there were in excess of 400 mobilisations per quarter. The upward trend in mobilisations over this period reflects an increased number of ND resources rolled out. In addition, it is likely that mobilisation reporting rate to the FRSNCC has improved over time.
The mobilisations peaked in the second and third quarters of 2007, probably as a result of wide spread flooding, and have since fallen back to between 200 and 300 mobilisations per quarter.
Figure 3.1 Mobilisations and incidents per quarter
500 Mobilisation Incidents 450
400
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200 M
o 150 b i l i s a
t 100 i o n s / I
n 50 c i d e n
t 0 s 2005 Q4 2006 Q1 2006 Q2 2006 Q3 2006 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2
ND capabilities are directed at addressing national incidents, and so tend not to be appropriate for most day-to-day incidents. Indeed, they are used for a very small proportion of total FRS incidents. For example, in each of the years 2001 to 2005, the FRS attended over 800,000 incidents in England. 48 Assuming a similar number were attended in 2007, ND equipment was used at only approximately 0.1 per cent of (fire and special service) incidents.
In order to assess how ND resources are used, it is possible to examine the number of mobilisations for each incident. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of ND mobilisations per incident. 1238 out of a total of 1566 incidents between August 2005 and June 2008 required the mobilisation of only one piece of ND equipment.
48 Office for National Statistics, Neighbourhood Statistics Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 49
Figure 3.2 Mobilisations per incident
1400
1238 1200
1000
800
600
400
200 165 122
21 5 3 442 1 0 1 0 1 23456-7 8-10 11-20 21-30 31-50 51-70 71-100 ND mobilisations per incident
There were a small number of large incidents with a large number of mobilisations. These incidents are primarily flooding in June and July 2007 and January 2008. 49 For example, in July 2007, ND resources were used to deal with flooding in Gloucestershire. This incident involved the mobilisation of 74 pieces of ND equipment from a large number of different FRSs, with 71 of the 74 mobilisations being cross-border. The equipment used was primarily the high volume pumps and hose laying modules of the water capability, although some USAR and mass decontamination (MD) equipment was also mobilised.
The majority of incidents with one mobilisation are for DIM vehicles. There were 771 DIM mobilisations in total in 2007 and the first two quarters of 2008, of which 745 were for incidents where they were the only equipment mobilised. The high number of DIM mobilisations can be seen in Figure 3.3 below. 50 The figure also shows that the IRU and other mass decontamination equipment has been used relatively little. This is consistent with our understanding that these capabilities tend not to be suitable for smaller incidents, which can typically be dealt with by the Ambulance service.
49 The data also include a training exercise, Exercise Orpheus. 50 We calculated average quarterly mobilisations (Figures 7.3 to 7.6 and 7.8), for each category of equipment, from the point where equipment rollout was complete, or from January 2007, which ever is later. 50 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Figure 3.3 Average quarterly mobilisations
140.0
120.0 118.6
100.0
80.0
60.0 50.0 A v e
r 40.0 a
g 32.8 31.7 e m
o 21.2 b 20.0 i 15.3 l 13.8 i 13.0 s
a 9.8 t i o 3.6
n 0.7 0.7 1.3 s 0 Temporary USAR1 USAR2 USAR3 USAR4 USAR5 HVP Hose laying IRU DIM Disrobe Rerobe Other USAR unit module module equipment module module Equipment type
Figure 3.4 is an aggregation of the information in Figure 3.3, and shows average quarterly mobilisations of equipment by capability. It shows that significant mobilisations have occurred for the three ND capabilities.
Figure 3.4 Average quarterly mobilisations by capability
160.0
140.0 135.3
120.0
104.7 100.0
80.0 71.2
60.0 A v e r a
g 40.0 e m o b i
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s 0 USAR Water Mass Decontamination
Capability
The data show that the relatively high frequency of use of DIM equipment is driven to a large extent by high usage in London. Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 show average quarterly mobilisations for London and England excluding London respectively. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 51
Figure 3.5 Average quarterly mobilisations (London)
90.0 83.0 80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
A 30.0 v e r a g
e 20.0 m o
b 11.8 12.0 i l
i 8.5
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n 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 s 0 Temporary USAR1 USAR2 USAR3 USAR4 USAR5 HVP Hose laying IRU DIM Disrobe Rerobe Other USAR unit module module equipment module module Equipment type
Figure 3.6 Average quarterly mobilisations (England excluding London)
50.0 47.2 45.0
40.0 35.6 35.0
30.0
25.0 21.0 21.0 20.0 19.7 A v
e 15.0 13.8
r 13.0
a 12.7 g e
m 10.0 o b i l i s 5.0 a 3.6 t i o 1.3 1.3
n 0.7 0.7
s 0 Temporary USAR1 USAR2 USAR3 USAR4 USAR5 HVP Hose laying IRU DIM Disrobe Rerobe Other USAR unit module module equipment module module Equipment type
DIM equipment is used more heavily in London and HVP equipment is used more heavily outside London (this is driven by a small number of large flooding incidents).
Given that only two of the DIMs are located in London, there is a very large mobilisation of these units, and on a per unit basis this is many times higher than the average for the rest of England and Wales. 52 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
More detail on the use of HVPs can be seen by showing mobilisations on a monthly basis. Figure 3.7 shows the number of mobilisations per month for ND equipment that is part of the water capability, namely high volume pump and hose laying modules. For the majority of months, there were less than ten mobilisations of these modules nationwide. High numbers of mobilisations occurred in months where there were major flooding incidents. In particular there are peaks of mobilisations in June and July 2007, due to severe summer flooding in a number of areas. There are smaller peaks in November 2007 and January 2008, also reflecting the occurrence or potential occurrence of large flooding incidents.
Figure 3.7 Mobilisations of water capability equipment
90 HVP module Hose laying module 80
70
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50
40
30 N u m b
e 20 r o f m
o 10 b i l i s a t
i 0 o n
s Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 08 08 08 08 08 08
The charts above provide useful indications of the relative mobilisation frequencies of different types of equipment, but do not take account of the number of pieces of ND equipment that are available for deployment. In contrast, Figure 3.8 shows the average number of mobilisations for each piece of ND equipment per quarter.
If mobilisations are analysed this way, the resulting picture differs slightly from the one presented above. DIM is by far the most heavily utilised piece of equipment. Some pieces of equipment are used very infrequently, for example each USAR module 5 has been used on average approximately once since rollout was completed in March 2007. This illustrates how infrequently most ND equipment is used on a day-to-day basis. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 53
Figure 3.8 Mobilisations per piece of equipment per quarter
10.0
9.0 8.6
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
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3.0 A v
e 2.0 r
a 1.6 1.6 g
e 1.1
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o 0.5 b
i 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.2
l 0.1
i 0.0 s
a 0 t i o USAR1 USAR2 USAR3 USAR4 USAR5 HVP Hose laying IRU DIM Disrobe Rerobe n
s module module equipment module module p
e Equipment type r q u a r t e Ther data also include information on what equipment is used during a mobilisation. For example, a mobilisation of a DIM vehicle may report the use of C-TIC, Zellweger and Miniwarn. For approximately half of mobilisations this information is not provided. For approximately one quarter of mobilisations, the equipment is reported not to be used. 51 This indicates that the ND equipment is frequently mobilised but not used, suggesting that the analysis of mobilisations presented overestimates the actual use of ND assets.
Mobilisations can also be examined from a geographic perspective. The total number of mobilisations from January 2007 to June 2008 by incident host region (the region where the incident occurred) and resource host region (the region where the ND equipment was located) is shown in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10. 52
The difference in frequency of use between London and other regions is striking, and something we commented on earlier in this section (see Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6).
51 Examples of relevant entries include ‘mobilised but not used’, ‘none’, ‘nil’, ‘no action’, ‘non – not required’. 52 These figures show mobilisations by region and on standby. ‘Standby’ is used where the incident host brigade has been recorded as ‘Strategic standby for National Resilience’. 54 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Figure 3.9 Mobilisations by incident host region
900
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400 T o
t 300 a l m o
b 200 i l i s a t i o
n 100 s
0 East East London North North South South Standby West Yorkshire Anglia Midlands East West East West Midlands and Humberside Resource host region
Figure 3.10 Mobilisations by resource host region
900
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t 300 a l m o
b 200 i l i s a t i o
n 100 s
0 East East London North North South South West Yorkshire Anglia Midlands East West East West Midlands and Humberside Resource host region
There is little difference in the distribution of mobilisations between the two figures, reflecting the fact that most ND equipment is deployed for incidents within the region where they are located. Some cross-border mobilisations do occur, however.
This is shown in Table 3.7, where a cross-border mobilisation is defined as being one where the incident was in a different FRS area to that where the ND equipment was located (though it may be within the same region). The data are for England, January 2007 to June 2008. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 55
Table 3.4 Cross-border mobilisations (by FRS)
Total Number of cross-border Total Cross-border pieces of Equipment type mobilisations mobilisations proportion equipment USAR1 10 197 5% 20 USAR2 4 55 7% 20 USAR3 8 78 10% 20 USAR4 11 190 6% 20 USAR5 4 19 21% 20 HVP module 142 300 47% 46 Hose laying module 74 127 58% 46 Incident response unit 3 92 3% 73 DIM equipment 25 771 3% 18 Disrobe module 040% 33 Rerobe module 040% 13 Other 6 67 9% Unknown Total 287 1904 15% 329
Within England, there were 287 cross-border mobilisations between January 2007 and June 2008 Q2. For all types of equipment, approximately 15 per cent of all mobilisations are cross-border. Cross-border mobilisations have occurred primarily in the water capability, with over 75 per cent of cross-border mobilisations using high volume pumps or hose laying modules. This reflects the mass deployment of HVP during the 2007 floods.
We might expect the proportion of cross border mobilisations to be greater for categories with fewer items of equipment. This has not been the case, however. For example, there have been only 25 cross-border mobilisations of DIM equipment out of a total of 771 mobilisations, meaning that only 3 per cent of DIM mobilisations have been across FRS borders.
This is significant as there are only 18 DIM vehicles in England, and 45 FRSs. This could perhaps suggest that DIM vehicles are used when conveniently situated for the incident host brigade, but other equipment or expertise is used when this is not the case. An alternative may be that this is because the DIM vehicles are located appropriately, close to most incidents.
3.5.2 Measurement of efficiency gains
In this section, we present further work in which we have sought to explore the impacts of the NDP on FRS efficiency and costs. Here we are using approach 4, introduced in Chapter 5. This is the bottom-up approach where we make assumptions regarding the impact with respect to different types of incident, and aggregate these to investigate the impacts on the NDP as a whole.
To measure efficiency gains resulting from the NDP, our approach has been to use the FRSNCC mobilisation data in conjunction with a number of comparative statistics compiled during our interview programme and document review. 56 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
We have spoken to quite a number of people within CLG and the FRS with excellent knowledge of the NDP. But we have been able to obtain very little information to quantify cost savings that result from using ND capabilities.
Our understanding is that there are two important reasons why quantification is difficult :
• first, the NDP provides new capabilities which mean that the FRS is now being deployed in areas which would previously have been dealt with by the police, ambulance services or contractors. The FRS is therefore not familiar with all the capabilities the NDP has replaced, in areas where the capability was provided by other agencies 53
• second, prior to the NDP, the FRS did have some capabilities that overlap with those provided by the NDP, for example handling hazardous material, or hot cutting, but these capabilities varied and still do vary, by FRS. The “before” case can therefore not readily be defined in general terms
Given this situation, we have not been able to prepare a robust estimate of the efficiency saving resulting from the NDP. Instead, we have computed the potential cost saving by extrapolating savings we are able to estimate across areas where we do not have information. The result provides an indication of the order of magnitude of likely cost savings of the NDP for day-to-day incidents.
3.5.2.1 Our approach
3.5.2.1.1 Identifying small incidents
Stage 1 of this study is concerned with relatively small incidents, where ND equipment is used on a day-to-day basis. We have defined a small incident to be one with seven or fewer mobilisations. 54 We have constructed this definition by reviewing the FRSNCC data and the descriptions of incidents with different numbers of mobilisations. As shown in Figure 3.2 only a handful of incidents require eight or more mobilisations.
Our dataset therefore consisted of 1,211 unique incidents and 1,553 mobilisations of ND equipment. Four of these mobilisations, however, could not be assigned to categories due to a lack of information on the type of equipment used. Those incidents covered the period January 2007 to May 2008.
53 As a result, it is sometime difficult to get, from the FRS, a good understanding of how things were done previously. 54 Mobilisations are considered to result from the same incident if they have the same incident number, or if both the incident description and address of the incident are the same. Here, mobilisations of prime movers and other equipment are counted separately. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 57
3.5.2.1.2 Categorisation of mobilisations
We have devised a method for categorising equipment on the basis of our understanding as to the nature of incidents for which ND equipment is used, and according to the expert estimates of efficiency that we have collected. We did seek to align our categorisation with that used by CLG for categorising special service incidents, though found this to be a practical approach in only one or two instances.
We first categorise incidents into special services incidents and fires. It is useful to analyse fires separately as more detailed statistics are available for fires than special services incidents.
Fire mobilisations are disaggregated by equipment used: HVPs, USAR equipment or mass decontamination. Special services incidents are disaggregated according to the involvement of hazardous materials, flooding or the use of USAR equipment in road traffic collisions or infrastructure collapse.
Hazardous materials mobilisations are divided further into mobilisations of DIM equipment for assessment of unknown materials, and mobilisations of the IRU where decontamination is required, although some mobilisations of the IRU were not for decontamination purposes. 55
We separately identify mobilisation of USAR module 4 to make best use of the efficiency information available. These incidents involve the use of the multi purpose vehicle to travel over rough terrain or clear rubble.
The categorisation is shown in the following table, together with the proportion of mobilisations in each category. 56
Table 3.5 Categories of mobilisations used for efficiency analysis
Mobilisation type Equipment used Mobilisations Special Service Incidents Unidentified hazardous material DIM 43% Decontamination IRU 4% Flooding requiring HVP HVP/hose-laying module 9% Road traffic collision USAR (excluding module 4) 4% Infrastructure collapse USAR (excluding module 4) 10% USAR module 4 USAR module 4 9% Fires Major fire requiring HVP HVP/hose-laying module 5% Fire involving structural problems USAR (excluding module 4) 2% Fire involving hazardous problems DIM/IRU 4% Miscellaneous/unclassified Miscellaneous 11% Total 100%
55 For example both the lighting and forklift truck elements of the IRU have been used. 56 Our dataset is for January 2007 to May 2008. 58 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
We calculated the number of mobilisations in each category by combining the type of equipment used and keywords in the incident description. 57, 58
3.5.2.1.3 Assessment of increased outputs
The ND capabilities, together with statutory changes that came with the 2004 Fire Services Act, have increased the incidents for which the FRS will respond. In order to quantify cost impacts of the NDP, we have imposed assumptions on the extent to which ND deployment is additional to, rather than substitutes for, previous capabilities and procedures (the “counter factual”). We have prepared estimates that are set out in Table 3.9. We welcome comments that will allow us to improve these assumptions.
Table 3.6 Estimated proportions of ND incidents that are additional to those responded to prior to NDP
Mobilisation type Equipment used Proportion of incidents Comment Special Service Incidents Unidentified hazardous material DIM 75% Items may previously not have been regarded as suspicious or been dealt with by police Decontamination IRU 20% Deployment for firefighter decontamination, etc Flooding requiring HVP HVP/hose-laying module 25% Conventional pumps not always sufficient capability Road traffic collision USAR (excluding module 4) 50% Heavy lifting may have been left to highways authority Infrastructure collapse USAR (excluding module 4) 50% Shoring may have been left to local authority USAR module 4 USAR module 4 0% Fires Major fire requiring HVP HVP/hose-laying module 0% Fire involving structural problems USAR (excluding module 4) 0% Fire involving hazardous problems DIM/IRU 0%
3.5.2.1.4 Efficiency assumptions
To assess the efficiency gains resulting from ND mobilisations, we have identified a number of quantitative efficiency assumptions that result from our discussions with CLG and FRS capability leads and review of documents. These assumptions are explained below: 59
• conventional fire engine
57 Keywords used are: fire, burn, pump [for fire]; water, flood [for flooding]; road, rtc, traffic, bus, HGV, car [for road traffic collision]; spill, leak, chemical, package, powder, ammonia, substance, unknown, explosive, exploded, explosion, asbestos, carbon monoxide, chlorine, radiation, toxic, liquid, petrol, smell, hazardous, hazmat, gas, drum, fumes, bleach, suspect, fluid, diesel, identify, carbon dioxide, acetone, acid, anthrax [for hazardous materials incidents]; structure, structural, safe, trap, wall, collapse [for infrastructure collapse and building structure problems]. 58 If mobilisations appeared to fall into more than one category, we assigned the category on the basis of incident description. 59 The crewing assumptions in this section relate to Wholetime, rather than Retained, firefighters. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 59
– we have assumed that it pumps up to 2,250 litres of water per minute
– an additional pump is required for every 250m of hose
– it has a crew of 28 firefighters, made up of four watches of seven
• DIM
– for DIM units we use an assumption to compare the situation under the NDP with a base case. 60 We assume that in a base case the incident would require six traditional fire appliances and would take six hours. Under the NDP, using a DIM unit, the incident would take two hours
– we assume that each DIM has a crew of 12 specialist staff
• IRU
– we note that the IRU allows decontamination of around 150 people per hour 61
– for smaller incidents, however, the IRU is more frequently deployed for firefighter decontamination, without obvious cost saving, or for miscellaneous purposes. Therefore, we have assumed that the cost saving is zero in the context of smaller incidents
• flooding
– for flooding, we have assumed that the average flood for which an HVP would be mobilised would require 1km hose (NERA estimate)
– we have used the following statistics: an HVP pumps up to 7,000 litres of water per minute; a pump is required for every 1km of hose
– the implication of these assumptions is that one HVP replaces 12 conventional fire appliances
– we have assumed that an HVP has a crew of 28 firefighters, made up of four watches of seven 62
– this assumption is subject to a sensitivity test, described below
• road traffic collisions
60 Source: West Midlands FRS (via Nicola Chissell) 61 Source: Sean Booth, Greater Manchester FRS 62 Source: Martin Blunden, CLG /Fire Service College 60 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
– we do not have an efficiency assumption to apply in this area. We understand that USAR cutting equipment and heavy lifting equipment allow for the more rapid rescue of casualties
• infrastructure collapses
– we do not have an efficiency assumption to apply in this area
• major fires requiring HVP
– we have assumed that for most fires, the distance between the water source and the fire is less than 250m long, and therefore no additional traditional pumps are required
– we have used the statistics for HVP, as described above
– the implication of these assumptions is that one HVP replaces three conventional fire appliances (pumps) 63
• fires involving structural problems
– we do not have an efficiency assumption to apply in this area
• fires involving hazardous materials
– the majority of mobilisations for fires involving hazardous materials have been of DIM vehicles. We use the assumption for DIM vehicles, described above
• USAR module 4
– for USAR module 4 we assume that in a base case an incident may require five appliances for 12 hours. Using the multi-purpose vehicle of module 4 can reduce this response to three appliances for six hours. This assumption is then adjusted for the average duration of a USAR module 4 mobilisation 64
– we assume that each USAR module 4 has a crew of four watches of seven firefighters
• miscellaneous
– these tend to be mobilisations where the equipment is not clearly recorded, or the incident description is ambiguous
– we assume that the average efficiency delivered for these mobilisations is equal to the average for other mobilisations
63 This is because an HVP can pump three times as much water per minute as a conventional fire appliance. 64 Source: Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 61
The assumptions discussed above are applied to the FRSNCC mobilisation data to give quantitative results. These results consist of estimates of fire-fighter hours saved, traditional appliance hours saved, and extra hours of specialist staff.
3.5.2.1.5 Aggregating cost savings
We estimate overall impacts by summing the hours of savings associated with the different categories of mobilisation incident. We then divide these totals by the number of hours there are in a year (365.25 x 24), so that the totals can be expressed in terms of appliances and crew. 65
There are important reasons why this is a simplification:
• the number of appliances it is possible to save is more dependent on the degree to which ND incidents (i.e. incidents to which ND equipment is deployed) are contemporaneous with peak demand (or greatest risk). As ND incidents are very different from conventional fire incidents, for example with respect to the type of property affected, the correlation may not be particularly strong, and therefore this approach may overstate the fire appliances saved
• we note that the impacts of the NDP will have a wide spatial distribution, and therefore it is an oversimplification to sum total fire appliance time saved in order to derive appliances saved. We do not think that this approach biases estimates of savings, however, it just means that the geographic location of the savings is not determined
3.5.2.1.6 Sensitivity tests
We have applied three sensitivity tests.
First, for flooding incidents, we have assumed that the average pump length is less than 250m, rather than the 1km assumed in the main case. This means that an HVP is equivalent to three conventional fire appliances, rather than 12 in the main case.
Second, we have assumed that only 25 per cent of special service incidents involving DIM vehicles are additional to the previous situation, prior to ND capabilities. In the main case we had assumed that 75 per cent of such incidents are additional, so would not have been dealt with by the FRS.
Third, we have changed the proportion of mobilisations allocated to each category. In particular, we have reduced the number of mobilisations for floods from 9 per cent to 3 per cent, and the number of special service incidents involving identifying hazardous material (DIM incidents) from 43 per cent to 30 per cent. We have tested these changes because the scale of the 2007 floods
65 The calculation is based on Wholetime crew, which we consider appropriate because each hour saved is an hour when the equipment and crew would otherwise be deployed, not simply available for deployment. 62 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
was unusual, and the average number of flooding incidents is likely to be lower than this in future periods; and use of DIM has gradually decreased in recent months.
3.5.2.2 Findings
Table 3.10 shows the results of our bottom-up assessment of the potential impact of ND capabilities on savings in staff and conventional fire appliances, for England as a whole. Given the limited information on which this analysis is based, these estimates should be viewed as providing an indication of the order of magnitude of potential savings only .
Results in the table are expressed in terms of numbers of conventional fire appliances and staff saved. The latter are broken down into firefighters (where we have assumed a ratio of 28 firefighters per fire appliance) and staff that use the ND equipment. In the final column these two are netted off, to determine the impact on FRS staff.
The results include ND staff time spent responding to incidents that, prior to the NDP, and under our counterfactual, would not have been dealt with by the FRS.
As we have not been able to determine estimates of savings for around a quarter of all mobilisations, for illustrative purposes we have assumed that, on average, the efficiency per mobilisation is the same as that for the mobilisations that we have quantified. This allows us to give an estimate for total fire appliance and firefighters saved. 66
Table 3.7 Estimated ND efficiency gains from small incidents (England)
Numbers saved Proportion of Fire Mobilisation type mobilisations appliances Firefighters ND Staff All Staff A B = A x 28 C D = B + C Unidentified hazardous material 43% 1.1 32 -3 29 Decontamination 4% 0.0 000 Flooding required HVP 9% 2.7 74 -8 66 USAR module 4 9% 0.2 5 -1 4 Major fire requiring HVP 5% 0.3 7 -2 5 Fire involving hazardous materials 4% 0.7 20 0 20 Total, quantified 73% 4.9 138 -14 124 Road traffic collision 4% Infrastructure collapse 10% Fire involving structural problems 2% Miscellaneous 11% Total, all mobilisations 100% 7 193 -22 172
66 In column C (“ND staff”) the “total, all mobilisations” is simply “total, quantified” / 73%, where 73% is the proportion of mobilisations that are quantified. For the other columns an equivalent ratio is used, taken from the subset of mobilisations that would have occurred in the counterfactual case of no NDP. Chapter 3 FRS efficiency gains (Stage 1) | 63
In section 3.5.1 we showed that the pattern of mobilisations of equipment in London was very different from mobilisations in the rest of England. We therefore present our bottom-up analysis disaggregated in this way. Table 3.8 shows possible efficiency gains for London, and Table 3.9 shows possible efficiency gains for England excluding London.
Table 3.8 Estimated ND efficiency gains from small incidents (London)
Numbers saved Proportion of Fire Mobilisation type mobilisations appliances Firefighters ND Staff All Staff A B = A x 28 C D = B + C Unidentified hazardous material 65% 0.9 24 -2 22 Decontamination 1% 0.0 000 Flooding required HVP 1% 0.2 5 -1 4 USAR module 4 8% 0.1 2 -1 1 Major fire requiring HVP 1% 0.0 101 Fire involving hazardous materials 4% 0.4 10 0 10 Total, quantified 80% 1.5 42 -4 38 Road traffic collision 1% Infrastructure collapse 12% Fire involving structural problems 0% Miscellaneous 7% Total, all mobilisations 100% 2 57 -5 56
Table 3.9 Estimated ND efficiency gains from small incidents (England, excluding London)
Numbers saved Proportion of Fire Mobilisation type mobilisations appliances Firefighters ND Staff All Staff A B = A x 28 C D = B + C Unidentified hazardous material 20% 0.3 7 -1 6 Decontamination 6% 0.0 000 Flooding required HVP 16% 2.5 69 -8 61 USAR module 4 11% 0.1 3 -1 2 Major fire requiring HVP 9% 0.2 7 -2 5 Fire involving hazardous materials 4% 0.3 909 Total, quantified 66% 3.4 95 -12 83 Road traffic collision 7% Infrastructure collapse 8% Fire involving structural problems 3% Miscellaneous 15% Total, all mobilisations 100% 5 138 -17 121
Note: The sum of the figures for all mobilisations in and differs from the total in by a small margin (less than 1 per cent) due to rounding and use of different factors to extrapolate samples. 64 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
The results of the three sensitivity tests for England, in addition to the main case which we have already presented, are shown in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10 Sensitivity analysis of efficiency gains (England)
Main Case Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Fire appliances saved 7495 Firefighters saved (net) 172 94 231 127
The sensitivity tests are described in section 3.5.2.1.6. In brief, test 1 assumes flooding incidents on average require a shorter length of hose, so that an HVP replaces three conventional appliances (compared to 12 in the main analysis). Test 2 reduces the number of mobilisations concerning DIM vehicles which are considered to be additional to those that would have been dealt with prior to the NDP. Test 3 concerns adjusting the mix of mobilisations, so that there are fewer responses to floods and responses requiring DIMs but more USAR.
The range of results given for these sensitivity tests reinforce our view that the results should be taken as an order of magnitude indication only as to the possible cost savings to FRSs in England delivered by the NDP with respect to day-to-day incidents – excluding direct costs associated with the NDP such as training and equipment maintenance.
The analysis suggests that the ND capabilities deliver a saving to FRSs across England for day-to-day incidents in the region of £4.5m to £11 m a year. 67 Approximately 30 per cent of the saving is associated with incidents in London.
67 Derived by assuming full time equivalent firefighter costs, including pension, allowance and variable overheads, of £44,000 a year, and conventional fire appliance total costs of £100,000 a year, and taking account of sensitivity analysis. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 65
Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2)
The benefits estimated in stage 2 are outcomes , resulting from improvements in the effectiveness of FRSs when responding to emergencies. They consist primarily of damage cost savings , including reductions in property damage, business continuity damage, environmental damage, casualties, and emotional suffering. 4.1 Methodological framework
To define these benefits more precisely and help quantify them, we have conducted detailed case-study work on two major incidents and six ‘smaller’ incidents that have occurred since the inception of the programme:
• the Buncefield oil storage depot explosion and fire of 11 December 2005
• the summer 2007 flooding incidents in Gloucestershire and
• for the ‘smaller’ incidents:
– a white powder incident in Kent (23 April 2004)
– the Kensal Rise tornado (7 December 2006)
– a scaffolding collapse in Milton Keynes (11 April 2006)
– extreme weather conditions at the Waddington air show (1–2 July 2006)
– a building collapse in Westminster (12 June 2007) and
– another building collapse, in Whitechapel (14 February 2007)
For each of these eight incidents, we have researched available evidence (from existing publications, witness accounts and news reports) and conducted in- depth interviews with FRS personnel and other subject matter experts (including officials from CLG and local authorities). We have sought to determine which New Dimension assets were used, and understand what effects the use of these resources might have had on the nature and magnitude of the damage caused, and other outcomes.
The interviews were based on a pre-defined questionnaire, focusing on a set of ‘performance indicators’, as defined in Section 4.1.1 below. 66 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
To the extent possible, the benefits of the programme were calculated as the difference between the actual, observed damage and the damage that would have occurred in the absence of the specialist New Dimension equipment, procedures and training (the ‘counterfactual’).
To this end, our desktop research work and interview programme were supplemented with findings from stage 1 of the study, and with information assembled by CLG through the business benefit reports 68 and operational incidents forms. Excerpts from these documents can be found in E.
Valuation also required a number of simplifying assumptions, which we have based on departmental guidance (e.g. the cost of fire), literature findings, or professional judgement.
Where valuation was not possible, we prepared a qualitative assessment of benefits, including a brief description of impacts and comments on their relative importance (e.g. the community reassurance value of HVP deployment during the 2007 flooding is commonly viewed as essential).
For those benefits that could be valued, we first estimated benefits associated with each incident, individually. We then extrapolated the incident-level estimates to the entire programme using data on mobilisations (as recorded in the FRSNCC mobilisation database) by incident type, and a number of simplifying assumptions.
4.1.1 Identification of performance indicators
Building on a review of available information (publications and news bulletins, as listed in ) and our understanding of the New Dimension functional capabilities, we have identified a set of ‘performance indicators’, likely to have been affected by the use of New Dimension equipment, procedures or training.
These indicators are listed in D for the two major incidents selected for this study (Buncefield and the summer 2007 flooding).
They include , in no particular order:
• duration of fire, in hours and minutes
• fuel losses, in millions of litres
• number of persons evacuated
• average duration of evacuations, in days
• number of casualties (fatalities, minor or severe injuries)
68 Business benefit reports relate to specific incidents where New Dimension equipment was used. In addition to summary information on the incident, they include information on direct financial benefits, direct non-financial benefits, unplanned benefits and disbenefits. Most of this information is qualitative. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 67
• volume of CO 2 emissions
• number of properties damaged, by property type
• average property damage, in £
• number of persons affected by power losses or
• extent of water contamination, in litres
The indicators retained for the ‘smaller incidents’ are presented in the core of the document. They include, again in no particular order:
• incident duration, in hours
• duration of road closures, in hours
• number of commercial properties affected (e.g. cordoned)
• duration of business interruptions, in hours
• number of casualties (fatalities, minor or severe injuries) or
• number of persons rescued or treated
The nature of these indicators varies by incident type and equipment type (type of New Dimension assets used in the response). But, as discussed later in the report, a number of core indicators apply across incidents and capabilities. These core indicators account for a large portion of the total (monetised) benefits of the programme.
Finally, whereas many of the indicators for the two major incidents could be populated through our desktop research work prior to the interviews, because both incidents had been subject to extensive investigation and are very well documented, we often had to rely on the interviewees to provide estimates of actual impacts (e.g. number of commercial premises impacted) for the smaller incidents, for which very limited quantitative information was available.
4.1.2 Use of experts opinion to establish the counterfactual
As explained earlier, the estimation of outcome benefits required comparing the actual incident outcomes (as represented in the observed value of the performance indicators) with a reference case, a hypothetical situation best described as ‘without New Dimension’ or ‘in the absence of New Dimension’. We defined this reference case (or ‘counterfactual’) by relying on the opinion of subject matter experts, gathered during our interview programme. 68 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
The interviews were conducted in order to collect information (opinions) on the likely value of the performance indicators in the absence of New Dimension assets, training and procedures. To make this process easier, we utilised multiple choice questions, where each choice is a range of possible variations (in per cent) in the associated indicator.
For example, Question 11 of the Buncefield questionnaire was expressed in these terms:
Several types of damage are related to the length of the fire. It took more than 102 hours to extinguish the fire. In the absence of ND equipment, the fire would have burnt:
i At least 100% longer (more than 8 days in total) ii 75-100% longer iii 50-75% longer iv 25%-50% longer v Up to 25% longer vi Approximately as long
This approach, however, was not practical for the smaller incidents, about which (again) we had only limited information prior to conducting the interviews. Instead, we asked the interviewees (most are FRS personnel 69 ) to provide quantitative inputs to the best of their ability. We also sent a few follow-up emails, after the interviews, to seek clarifications and/or request additional information (e.g. on the number of commercial premises impacted or the duration of road closures). The information we received was often expressed as a range of likely values (e.g. between 30 and 40 properties affected), or as a minimum value (e.g. at least three times longer).
The persons we interviewed are listed in A. They were selected in close collaboration with CLG. We interviewed a total of sixteen persons over the course of stage 2.
4.1.3 Estimation and monetisation of benefits
Changes in the value of the performance indicators were used to derive estimates for the programme benefits. This involved:
• selecting, among all the performance indicators those that could lead – directly or indirectly – to a quantifiable benefit, while avoiding double counting
• identifying all additional input values required to estimate and – where possible – monetise benefits (e.g. cost of a minor injury; value of time; cost of one tonne of CO 2 or other pollutants)
69 FRS personnel were best placed to provide these quantitative inputs due to familiarity with the incident response and equipment used. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 69
• collecting and – where needed – adjusting these input values (the most frequent adjustment consisting of expressing unit cost estimates in the value of the year the incident occurred) and
• developing and implementing simple methods to derive the benefit estimates from all the information at hand (e.g. method for estimating aggregate travel time savings from reductions in the duration of road closures)
To express benefits in monetary terms, we have conducted an extensive search of the literature, and reviewed techniques and assumptions for the monetisation of:
• losses of agricultural land from flooding
• business interruptions
• inventory losses
• air quality damage
• human costs (casualties and emotional suffering)
• the value of a school day
• disruptions to essential services, such as water or electricity supply
• the cost of road and railway closures and
• the cost of Ambulance and other emergency services
The information we were able to gather is summarised in C. This appendix provides a brief discussion of sources of values, and identifies the values we have used in the estimation of benefits.
Where available, we have always retained CLG guidelines. For example, our injury costs are from the Department for Transport, as recommended in the 2006 ODPM report on the cost of fire. In the absence of such guidelines, we have used recommendations from other departments. Thus, for example, the value of time used in the monetisation of road closures is from the Department for Transport; the cost of carbon retained for monetising emissions is from Defra; etc. In a few instances, we were unable to identify an appropriate approach or default values. This is true, in particular, of the cost of railway closures or the cost of decontamination. 70 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
4.1.4 Extrapolation of incident level benefits
We used information on the number of incidents attended to by the FRS (as recorded in the FRSNCC mobilisation database) organised by incident type, size (number of mobilisations) and equipment type to extrapolate the benefits estimated in the context of our case studies.
We applied a flat, arbitrary, 50 per cent markdown factor to the resulting estimates to account for:
• incidents where New Dimension assets were mobilised but not used
• a possible optimism bias in the information collected during the interviews and
• the considerable uncertainty associated with our approach, overall and with the extrapolation in particular
In addition, and following the general guidelines set forth in the HM Treasury Green Book on the treatment of uncertainty, we present all benefit estimates under a pessimistic “low” scenario (defined as a set of assumptions leading, jointly and individually, to lower benefit estimates) and an optimistic “high” scenario. These scenarios are based, to a large extent, on the ranges of possible impacts established during the interviews.
4.1.5 Presentation of findings
We present a series of tables providing, for each incident or group of incidents under review:
• a description of the effects of New Dimension assets, procedures or training
• an assessment, either qualitative or quantitative, of the magnitude of the effect with, where possible, a value for the associated performance indicators with and without the programme
• the assumption, or set of assumptions, used in the monetisation of the effect, where applicable and
• the associated benefit estimates, where applicable
We also provide summary tables with sketchy estimates of what the benefits of the programme might be, using the extrapolation method outlined in the previous section. As in stage 1, these estimates should be considered as illustrative at best. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 71
4.2 Buncefield oil storage depot disaster
4.2.1 Incident overview
The Buncefield depot is a large tank farm of which Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd (HOSL), a joint venture between Total UK Ltd and Chevron Ltd, is the most important occupier. The site is of strategic importance to the UK and connected to refineries and downstream users by several pipelines. When operational, the site accounted for 8 per cent of the UK fuel supply, 20 per cent of the supply to the South East and 40 per cent of the supply to Heathrow. The site consists of several clusters of storage tanks, surrounded by ‘bunds’ for safety reasons. 70
On the night of 10 December 2005, a level gauge in one of the depot tanks failed to register an overflow of unleaded fuel. The overflow caused a flammable vapour cloud to spread throughout the site. At 06:01 am on Sunday 11 December, the cloud ignited, resulting in the main explosion, followed by several smaller explosions and a fire which encompassed 20 storage tanks. The main explosion measured 2.4 on the Richter scale and led to devastation throughout the site and its neighbouring industrial and residential estates. The fire resulted in a smoke plume which covered a large part of South East England.
Firefighters had been called to the scene only a few minutes before the first explosion and a major incident was declared almost immediately. At 9:00 am on Sunday 11 December, the multi-agency Gold Command was activated. Fire and rescue services from all over the country assisted Hertfordshire FRS (HFRS) in an attempt to contain and extinguish the flames. The “fire all out” was only declared on 15 December. 71
On 20 December, the Health and Safety Commission directed the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency (EA) to carry out an investigation into the cause and consequences of the explosion, creating the Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB). This investigation is still ongoing. 72 In February 2006 all firewater had been removed from the site. In May 2008, Total UK and HOSL admitted that negligence by a supervisor was responsible for the explosion. Chevron denies these claims. In October 2008, a civil court case began that is set to establish liability for the incident. 73
4.2.2 FRS response
After a brief search and rescue operation during the morning of 11 December, a containment effort started to protect unaffected tanks with water curtains. The multi agency Gold Command started investigating possible strategies to tackle the fire.
70 Buncefield Investigation Board, First Progress Report , p16 71 Buncefield Investigation Board, First Progress Report , p5 72 BBC Beds, Herts & Bucks, Buncefield: Compensation still pending , 4 Apr 2008 73 BBC News, Buncefield blast worker negligent , 23 May 2008 72 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
The two options considered were: i) a controlled burn out, and ii) an active extinction of the fire. Because of the possible health risks posed by the plume and likely disruptive effects to residents, businesses and M1 traffic during the whole period of the burn out , it was decided to fight the fire with an aggressive foam attack. 74, 75
Table 4.1 below summarises the mobilisation of New Dimension equipment in response to the incident.
Table 4.1 Mobilisation of ND assets at Buncefield
Type of equipment Capabilities Number Resource host brigades HVP High Volume Pump 15 London, Royal Berkshire, Norfolk, Somerset, Staffordshire, Derbyshire, Greater Manchester, Northamptonshire, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, Fire Service College Hoses High volume hose 10 London, Royal Berkshire, Norfolk, and laying device Somerset, Staffordshire, Derbyshire, Northamptonshire, Fire Service College USAR Module 4 Multipurpose vehicle 2 Incident Response Unit Mass decontamination 1 unit, fork lift truck
Main source: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service, Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response, 3 Nov 2006, p96
Out of a national stock of twenty high volume pumps (HVPs), fifteen units were mobilised at Buncefield. 76 These HVPs had the equivalent pumping capability to 160 traditional fire appliances. Six HVPs were used to supply water from a balancing tank to the site, where water was used for cooling jets and foam production.
The HVPs are reported to have been crucial in meeting the water requirements of the main foam attacks, which were at 25,000 litres per minute. 77 Other HVPs were used to act as booster pumps, to pump water as part of the water recycling and environmental protection recirculation systems. 78 Ten double hose boxes (each containing 2 km of high volume hoses and a hose laying device) were also used with the HVPs. Two module 4 urban search and rescue units provided multipurpose vehicles which were used for general site work. An incident response unit (IRU) provided a fork lift truck which was used to move equipment and foam stocks. 79
74 Hertfordshire FRS, Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response , 3 Nov 2006, p36 75 There is a Health Protection Agency report about the public health impact of Buncefield. The report does not cost the health and safety risk, but the basic conclusion is that there is no evidence of a significant public health risk. The report describes a risk assessment evaluation that was carried out to determine whether the information at the time of the incident was accurate and if the public health advice given was correct. The MIIB final report references the Health Protection Agency report, but does not provide further quantitative information on health and safety risk. 76 FRS Online, FRS 17, Apr 2006 77 Hertfordshire FRS, Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response , 3 Nov 2006, p96 78 Hertfordshire FRS, Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response , 3 Nov 2006, p96 79 Hertfordshire FRS, Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response , 3 Nov 2006, p107-108 Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 73
The sourcing of the ND equipment was co-ordinated by the FRS National Co- ordination Centre (FRSNCC) in West Yorkshire, which had not officially started its activities at the time of the incident. HVP operators (but no equipment) were brought in by Nottinghamshire FRS, Devon FRS and Cornwall County Fire Brigade. 80
Overall, the Buncefield incident saw a major deployment of the water units of the ND programme. According to FRSNCC mobilisation data, it was the first incident which required the mobilisation of this equipment on a national scale. 81
4.2.3 Damage estimates
Even though the explosion claimed no lives or severe injuries, the resulting devastation was enormous. HOSL is reported to face compensation claims in excess of £1bn. 82 The impact in terms of injuries and fatalities was limited by the timing of the incident. As it occurred at 6am on a Sunday, the surrounding area was unoccupied. This could have been very different during the week, and in this case the incident would have been likely to have a greater impact in terms of the number of lives and injuries claimed, and may also have required a different response.
Forty-three people suffered minor physical injuries during the incident. 83 The health risk from the plume appears in practice to have been very limited, even though this was a major concern during the incident. 84 Several residents report to have been suffering from severe emotional distress ever since the incident. 85
The explosion caused windows to break in a 2 km radius from the site 86 , leaving hundreds of properties damaged. 87 The emergency triggered the temporary evacuation of 2,000 people and the temporary closure of the M1, M10 and M25. 88
The total impact on local businesses (other than the depot site) has been estimated to be around £130m-170m, including physical damage to business premises and lost output. 89
80 Hertfordshire FRS, Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response , 3 Nov 2006, p96 81 As discussed in Section 3.5.1, the FRSNCC data are incomplete, in particular for the early years of the programme. 82 The Lawyer , Buncefield Lawyers fear coroners will be cut , 16 Jun 2008 83 Buncefield Investigation Board , First Progress report , p4 84 Defra, Initial review of Air Quality Aspects of the Buncefield Oil Depot Explosion , May 2006, p iii 85 SQW (2007), Social Impact Assessment , Jan 2007 86 Buncefield Investigation Board, Initial Report , p13 87 According to the Major Incident Investigation Board, most of the damage to domestic properties was “minor”; with an average claim from individuals (including non-housing claims) of less than £9,000. In addition, in its final report, the Board indicates that “house prices in general appear to have remained unaffected” (p26). The Guardian reached a different conclusion in its article When it all goes up in smoke , dated 28 June 2008. In that article, house prices are reported to have fallen by as much as £200,000 (from an average £675,000) in areas within 1 km from the site. 88 Buncefield Investigation Board , First Progress report , p4 and Final report , p28 89 The direct loss of (net) output has been estimated to be in the region of £70m to £88m; SQW, Apr 2006 74 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
The total value of claims from businesses located outside the perimeter of the site, however, is significantly larger; and exceeds £480m. The costs of rebuilding the Buncefield site itself have been estimated at around £70m. 90
The explosion disrupted fuel supplies to Heathrow for several weeks, at a reported cost of $1m per day for non-UK carriers. 91 The aggregate cost to the aviation industry has been estimated to be around £250m. 92
No final data exist on the environmental damage caused by the Buncefield incident. However, more than 786,000 litres of foam, some of which contained the now banned substance PFOs, 93 were used in the fire fighting. Even though most of the contaminated fire water was successfully contained within the site, substantial volumes of polluted water escaped off site during and after the incident. The clean up of contaminated water on and off site lasted until February 2006. Unusually high levels of hydrocarbons and foam substances were found in ground water up to 2 km from the site. 94 But in the end, total environmental costs (air and ground pollution) appear not to have been as high as initially feared. 95
4.2.4 Benefits of New Dimension
The benefits delivered by New Dimension were assessed on the basis of a questionnaire reproduced in B.
4.2.4.1 Survey findings
We have contacted a number of people directly involved in the incident, and have received completed questionnaires from:
• Martin Blunden , former ND Capability Manager for CLG, Silver Commander at Buncefield responsible for ND assets and providing advice to Hertfordshire FRS Incident Commander
• Emma Edgell , Hertfordshire County Council, Emergency Planning Officer deployed to multi-agency silver (tactical) command for several night shifts during the early phase of the incident
• Gordon Macmillan , former ND Capability Manager for CLG, duty officer for CLG at Buncefield, and liaison at Gold for CLG (Fire and New Dimension) and
90 Buncefield Investigation Board, Final report , p27 91 Financial Times, Heathrow and airlines agree fuel rationing , 10 Feb 2006 92 The final report of the Major Incident Investigation Board , p27 93 PFOS are Perfluorooctane Sulphates. This is a toxic substance used in fire fighting foams that does not break down in the environment. PFOS is being phased out but the amount of foam needed to contain the Buncefield blaze saw old stocks brought in (Source: Buncefield Investigation Board, Initial Report ). 94 EA Website, Buncefield Latest News , Last update 27 Dec 2007 95 The final report of the Major Incident Investigation Board , p27 Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 75
• Mark Yates , Deputy Chief Fire Office, Hertfordshire FRS, and Incident Commander for much of Buncefield
The following have also provided us with information:
• Kathrin Peters , SQW Limited, produced both a social and an economic impact assessment of the Buncefield incident, and provided additional information on the basis of knowledge gained writing impact assessments and
• Taf Powell , Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Investigation Manager of the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB), recommended information in publicly available reports of the MIIB
All respondents agreed that the New Dimension equipment and training were a very useful or essential part of the FRS response.
In particular, the key benefits identified by the respondents were:
• a shorter burn of fire (and, possibly, shorter traffic and business disruptions), with respondents estimating the fire to last between 50 and 100 per cent or more longer in the absence of ND equipment
• a reduction in the size of the area burnt, with respondents estimating the area burnt in the absence of ND equipment to be up to 100 per cent or more larger
• a reduction in the volume of fuel lost, with estimates of fuel lost in the absence of ND ranging from the actual volume of fuel lost (i.e. no change) to all the fuel stored on the site and
• reduced psychological effects, as a result of the shorter burn of fire, including the effects on members of the public and FRS personnel
On the other hand, respondents do not believe that the use of ND equipment:
• helped prevent any casualties 96
• prevented further damage to homes and businesses, as there is a consensus among respondents that the damage was caused by the initial explosion
• had a significant impact (positive or negative) on the environment. 97 Respondents tended to agree that the use of ND equipment allowed more water to be used, but also for most of it to be contained
96 Indirectly, the ND equipment may have in fact increased the risk of injuries to firefighters by facilitating a foam attack; as the large volume of foam released masked conditions underfoot and created hazardous conditions. 97 Other than through a shorter burn and smoke plume 76 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Their detailed answers are summarised in Table 4.15 below, which follows the structure of the questionnaire used in the interviews. 98 As explained in Section 4.1, the percentage changes shown in the table are variations in the associated indicators under the counterfactual (e.g. percentage change in the volume of fuel lost in the absence of New Dimension relative to the actual, observed volume lost).
Table 4.2 Summary of responses to the Buncefield questionnaire
Questions Respondent 1 Respondent 2 Respondent 3 Respondent 4 3 How useful was ND Extremely useful Essential Difficult to Very useful. National equipment and training for supply enough coordination of the FRS response? water without assets took pressure ND off local responders and control. 4 Would a large scale foam Not in early stages No No No attack have been possible without ND? 5 Did ND prevent a second n/a 99 No No n/a major explosion? 8 Change in volume of fuel +20% 0% All fuel at site n/a lost in the absence of ND? would have been lost 8 Change in area burnt in +20% to +50% 0% +100% or more n/a absence of ND? 8 Qualitative – Damage to More due to Same High probability Greater burn site in absence of ND? potential fire of total loss of spread to site unaffected tanks 9 Increase in damage to houses 0% 0% 0% 0% and businesses in absence of ND? 9 Qualitative – Damage to Same Same. Damage Same Same. Damage homes and businesses in done by first was a result of absence of ND? explosion the (first) explosion 10 Change in environmental n/a 0% +50% to +100% Unknown damage in absence of ND? 10 Qualitative – Environmental n/a With ND the Vast majority of Difficult to say – damage in absence of ND? FRS could use stored / re-used ND allowed both more water but water would have more water and also could been uncontained foam use and contain more and caused more containment water contamination 11 Change in length of fire +50% to +75% +100% or more +75% to +100% Unsure, but thinks in absence of ND at least +50% 12 Change in number of 0% 0% 0% 0% evacuations in absence of ND 12 Change in duration of 0% 0% +75% to +100% Unknown evacuations in absence of ND
98 The number in the first column is the question number, as identified in the questionnaire. The full questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. 99 In this table, n/a means not answered. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 77
Table 4.2 Summary of responses to the Buncefield questionnaire – contd
Questions Respondent 1 Respondent 2 Respondent 3 Respondent 4 12 Qualitative – Disruption of n/a There was Return to Effects in both local businesses and length smoke normality would directions – ND of evacuation in absence disruption while have taken equipment of ND the fire was longer and disrupted A414, burning but this public perception but longer fire is a tenuous link. of when it was may have caused safe to return more disruption would have taken and longer longer to form. evacuation. 12 Qualitative – Disruption of n/a Less traffic As above. The M1 See above. road traffic in absence of ND disruption. A414 in particular would may or may not have had at least have been closed a significant speed anyway. restriction in force. 13 Change in casualties in 0% 0% 0% 0% absence of ND : fatalities 13 Change in casualties in 0% 0% 0% 0% absence of ND : severe injuries 13 Change in casualties in 0% 0% 0% 0% absence of ND : minor injuries 13 Qualitative – physical and Greater Foam attack Impact on FRS Limited effect as psychological injury in psychological may have personnel – psychological injury absence of ND impact related increased risk psychological was more the result to greater to firefighters. impact of social of the explosion disruption perception of than the fire. caused by ND assets did letting fire burn out; longer burn. not assist to stress on families; reduce injuries. stress on retained FRS personnel and main employers; increased likelihood of breathing problems; increased risk at other incidents from not attending in normal time; impact on normal day-to-day non front-line services.
Impact on members of public – unable to return to homes and employment; longer disruption from school closures. 14 Qualitative – other n/a ND assets and n/a n/a elements of damage expertise did not prevention prevent damage but led to ability to extinguish fire. 78 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
The information gathered during the interviews provides an indication of the benefits resulting from the use of New Dimension assets. Although there is some divergence between respondents in some areas, their views are generally consistent , making it possible to determine where the main benefits of the programme can be found.
It also appears that, in general, respondents had difficulties providing detailed, quantitative estimates of impacts (such as the percentage change in the area burnt or in the duration of fire). In addition, a number of important effects identified by the respondents do not lend themselves to quantification. This includes the psychological impact associated with the shorter burn, for example.
The information presented in Table 4.2 is combined with estimates of actual damage and assumptions gathered from the literature to derive benefit estimates, as explained below.
4.2.4.2 Quantification of benefits
Four key benefits were identified during the interviews. They are further described, and tentatively quantified in the sections below.
4.2.4.2.1 Shorter burn of fire
The table below shows benefits associated with a shorter burn of fire. The actual duration of the fire was 102 hours and 28 minutes (about 4.25 days). Information collected during the interviews indicates that the burn could have been 50 to 100 per cent longer without the use of New Dimension assets.
As a result of the shorter burn of fire, benefits in the following areas might have been realised:
• shorter evacuation and reduction in the cost of temporary accommodations : it is not clear how many of the 2,000 evacuees were placed in temporary accommodations and for how long; in addition, two of the four interviewees felt that the length of the evacuations would probably have been the same in the counterfactual. In the tentative estimation presented in Table 4.3, we assume: i) an average observed duration of 2.125 days (50 per cent of the incident duration); ii) that half of the evacuees were hosted in temporary accommodations; and iii) an average accommodation cost of £100 per day. Given the range of impacts provided by the interviewees (0 to 100 per cent), these assumptions lead to a limited cost saving of £0.0 to £0.2m 100
• shorter disruption to local businesses : research work by SQW indicates that the average number of lost business days for severely affected firms is around three to seven days. 101 This is in line with the observed duration of
100 Estimated as follows for the upper bound: 2,000 evacuees x 0.5 x 2.125 days x £100 per day = £212,500 101 SQW, Apr 2006, p15; the average number of non-operational days per business varies between 3 and 15.5 days, depending on the activity of the firms. The upper value, however, is considered atypical. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 79
the incident, and smoke plume. To derive benefit estimates, we assume: i) one additional day of non-operation for all 90 severely affected local businesses, in the counterfactual; ii) an average 120 employees per firm; 102 and iii) an average value added per employee per day of £90 103
• shorter road closure and traffic disruption : the impact in this area is not clear, as some of the traffic restrictions were caused by the deployment of New Dimension equipment. These additional restrictions might have offset the effect of the shorter burn 104
Table 4.3 Benefits associated with shorter burn of fire
Indicators Value Percent Absolute Moneti- Benefit Estimates, Change Change sation £ million Low High Low High Low High Duration of fire 4.25 50% 100% 2.125 4.25 n/a n/a n/a burn days Duration of 2.125 0% 100% 0 2.125 £100 £0.0 £0.2 evacuations days per person (2,000 persons) per day Disruption of 3 to 7 days n/a n/a 01£90 GVA £0.0 £1.0 local businesses per firm on per employee (90 firms; 10,800 average per day employees) Disruption of M1, M10, uncertain uncertain n/a n/a n/a traffic due to M25 and road closure A414 Total £0.0 £1.2
Source: NERA analysis, using data from various sources
In addition to the benefits associated with the shorter burn of fire included in the table above, some interview respondents indicated there were associated psychological benefits as well. A longer burn would have caused greater disruption and so led to a greater psychological impact. There may also have been a psychological impact on FRS personnel (distress associated with letting the fire burn out, in the counterfactual).
4.2.4.2.2 Reduction in the volume of fuel lost
Table 4.4 below illustrates the economic benefits associated with reduced fuel losses.
102 SQW reports a total 9,467 jobs for 77 of the 90 businesses, that is 123 jobs per firm; SQW Apr 2006, pp14-15 103 National Statistics estimate based on £20,000 gross value added per person, and 220 working days per year; SQW Apr 2006, page 20 104 There are no estimates of traffic impacts in existing studies. The final report of the Major Incident Investigation Board lists “closure of M1, M10 and M25 motorways” among un-quantified effects. 80 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
The total volume of fuel stored at the site at the time of the incident is known and has been reported by Defra (2006): 105 million litres. The volume of fuel lost in the incident, on the other hand is not well established. In the calculations below, we retain Defra’s preferred scenario (60 per cent loss for all fuel types, 105 except aviation fuel) leading to a cumulated fuel loss of 71.4 million litres.
Information collected during the interviews indicates that in the absence of New Dimension resources, fuel losses might have been between 20 per cent higher and up to the full amount of fuel stored at the site. We understand this is related to: i) the longer duration of the fire burn, and ii) the risk of the fire spreading to unaffected tanks.
To estimate benefits, and under the assumption that the remaining fuel was of monetary value, we monetise the avoided fuel losses with the market value of the fuel at the time of the incident (see C for details). 106
Table 4.4 Economic benefits associated with reduced fuel losses
Indicators Value, fuel Percent Absolute Moneti- Benefit Estimates, loss in millions Change Change sation in £ million of litres Low High Low High £ per litre Low High Petrol 22.0 4.4 14.7 £0.22 £1.0 £3.3 Burning fuel 10.8 all fuel 2.2 7.2 £0.26 £0.6 £1.8 Aviation fuel 25.2 +20% stored at 5.0 2.8 £0.23 £1.2 £0.7 DERV (diesel) 9.5 the site 1.9 6.3 £0.26 £0.5 £1.6 Gas oil 3.9 0.8 2.6 £0.23 £0.2 £0.6 Total 71.4 £3.4 £8.0
Source: NERA analysis, using data from various sources
The table below shows the environmental benefits associated with reduced fuel losses.
Emissions of various pollutants associated with estimated fuel losses at Buncefield have been estimated by Defra (2006). These emissions include 144,000 tonnes of Carbon Dioxide (CO 2), 8,250 tonnes of particulate matter of 10 microns or less (PM 10 ), 4,950 tonnes of particulate matter of 2.5 microns or 107 less (PM 2.5 ), and 37 tonnes of nitrous oxides (NO X).
Total emissions in the counterfactual under the high scenario are as estimated by Defra (2006). We estimated the change in emissions under the low scenario using the percent change in the volume of fuel lost (as a first approximation), i.e. +20 per cent. 108
105 According to Defra (2006), the HOSL inventory (about 75% of total fuel stored) was held in both the West and East sections of the terminal. The West terminal was most affected by the fire, while the tanks in the East section remained intact. 106 We use the exchange rate at the time of the incident, to convert the dollar value estimates into pounds (£0.56 per US dollar). 107 Under Defra’s preferred, “more realistic” scenario 108 In Table 4.5, the “low” absolute changes were estimated by taking 20% of the preferred values (eg, 28,800 tonnes = 0.2 x 144,000). The “high” changes were estimated as the difference between emissions in Defra’s high scenario (loss of all fuel stored at the site) and the preferred values (eg, 67,000 tonnes = 211,000 – 144,000; where the estimate of 211,000 tonnes comes directly from Defra’s report). Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 81
Changes in emissions are monetised with unit cost estimates from Defra, for the year 2005.
Table 4.5 Environmental benefits associated with reduced fuel losses
Indicators Value, fuel Percent Absolute Moneti- Benefit Estimates, in tonnes Change Change sation in £ million Low High Low High £ per tonne Low High CO2 emissions 144,000 28,800 67,000 £23.6 £0.7 £1.6 based on volume PM10 emissions 8,250 1,650 3,860 £2.9 £9.7 of fuel lost £1,738– (methodology PM2.5 emissions 4,950 990 2,316 £2,522 £1.7 £5.8 used by Defra) £2,219– NOx emissions 37 7 17 £0.0 £0.1 £3,168 Total £5.3 £17.2
Source: NERA analysis, using data from various sources
4.2.4.2.3 Reduction in the size of the area burnt
The table below shows the economic benefits associated with a reduced size of area burnt. The area affected by the fire was 80,000 square metres. Information from the interviews indicates that this area might have been significantly larger in the absence of New Dimension. But not all respondents agreed on the extent of this effect.
One respondent indicated that traditional fire-fighting methods would have prevented further spread of the fire, whereas another suggested that the whole site might have been lost if New Dimension equipment had not been used.
To estimate the benefits of the programme, we retain the following assumptions: i) a total site damage cost of £70m (site rebuilding costs, reported in the final report of the MIIB); and ii) a percent change in the area burnt – and site damage – of 0 to 50 per cent (this range includes the more conservative estimate provided by one of the respondents, while allowing for the possibility of a significant impact).
Table 4.6 Economic benefits associated with reduced spread of fire
Indicators Value Percent Absolute Moneti- Benefit Estimates, Change Change sation £ million Low High Low High Low High Area affected 80,000 m 2 0% entire site 0 entire site n/a 109 n/a n/a by fire Estimated £70 0% 50% £0 £35 n/a £0.0 £35.0 damage to site million million million Total £0.0 £35.0
Source: NERA analysis, using data from various sources
109 In this table, n/a means not applicable 82 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
4.2.4.2.4 Summary of quantified benefits
The benefits from using New Dimension assets at the Buncefield incident, we were able to quantify in the context of this study, are summarised in Table 4.7 below.
Table 4.7 Estimated benefits from the use of ND equipment, procedures and training at the Buncefield oil storage depot disaster, summary
Benefit Categories Benefit Estimates, £ million (2005) Low High Benefits associated with shorter burn of fire (reduced £0.0 £1.2 evacuation costs and business impacts) Economic benefits associated with reduced fuel losses £3.4 £8.0 (avoided inventory losses) Environmental benefits associated with reduced fuel losses £5.3 £17.2 (avoided air pollution) Economic benefits associated with reduced size of area burnt £0.0 £35.0 (reduced site damage) Total quantified benefits £8.7 £61.4
Source: NERA analysis, using data from various sources
Overall we estimate that the use of New Dimension capabilities at the Buncefield oil storage depot disaster might have generated £8.7 m to £61.4 m in economic cost savings.
4.2.4.3 Extrapolation of benefits
We do not believe that the benefit estimates derived for the Buncefield oil storage depot disaster can be extrapolated to any other “comparable” incidents.
The analysis presented in this section, however, can certainly help identify the types of benefits that might be expected from using New Dimension assets at large fire incidents. 4.3 Summer 2007 flooding incidents
4.3.1 Incident overview
During June and July 2007, floods struck many areas of England and Wales, affecting hundreds of thousands of people. In particular, five regions were severely hit by the floods: East Riding of York and Hull, South Yorkshire, Gloucestershire, Worcestershire and Oxford/Thames Valley. 110 We focus on the flooding events in Gloucestershire .
110 The floods are documented further in the June 2008 Pitt Review. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 83
In Gloucestershire, the consequences of the flooding were severe. There were three fatalities related to the flooding. The effects of the floods were felt widely with approximately 6,000 households and 1,000 businesses being flooded, and millions of pounds of damage being caused.
Over a wider area, over 42,000 people were affected by a loss of electricity and 350,000 people by a loss of running water over an extended period. Both of these losses of services were due to the flooding of essential infrastructure.
Table 4.8 Overview of the summer 2007 flooding incidents
Fire and Rescue Date Key Incidents Authority (FRA) Gloucestershire July 2007 • 7,000 homes and businesses flooded • 350,000 people (and 7,500 businesses) without clean running water for up to 17 days • Castle Meads Electricity substation shut down for 24 hours, affecting 42,000 to 48,000 people • Walham electricity substation saved by building temporary defences, preserving the electricity supply of more than 500,000 people Hereford and June and • 4,000 houses and businesses flooded in Worcestershire Worcester July 2007 • 1,185 people rescued from car, home or boat Humberside June 2007 • 14,600 houses flooded in East Riding of York and Hull • at least 10,000 people forced to live in temporary accommodation, many of them in caravans Oxfordshire July 2007 • 5,780 houses and businesses flooded in Oxfordshire and Thames Valley South Yorkshire June 2007 • 5,800 houses and businesses flooded • closure of Neepsend electricity substation, leading to loss of power to 40,000 people • near collapse of the Ulley reservoir dam
Main source: Pitt Review, 2008
4.3.2 FRS response
The FRS was one of the main emergency responders to the summer 2007 floods. In particular, HVPs and hoses have been described as “crucial” to the successful response of the FRS. 111
Table 4.9 below summarises the mobilisation of New Dimension assets in England during the floods. Mobilisations in Gloucestershire are also shown, accounting for 80 of the 230 mobilisations of New Dimension assets. For other regions, the equivalent mobilisation statistics are presented for comparison.
On average, the equipment was mobilised for 77 hours across England and Wales, reflecting the severity of the incidents. In Gloucestershire, this average duration was slightly lower at 53 hours.
111 CLG Flood Review (auth: Sir Ken Knight), Interim Report , Oct 2007 84 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Across England, most of the mobilisations involved HVPs (146 out of 230). Hose boxes follow, with 70 mobilisations. Only a very limited number of incidents required the mobilisation of mass decontamination and USAR equipment. This pattern is also broadly observed in Gloucestershire, although Gloucestershire accounts for a disproportionate number of mass decontamination and USAR equipment.
The majority of mobilisations for the Gloucestershire floods were cross-brigade border. This is to be expected given the dispersion of HVPs across the country and the concentration of flooding in specific regions. For England as a whole, the largest mobilisation of HVPs at one point in time was 36 units (out of a national fleet of 50) in the 25 June to 5 July period, and 40 units in the 20 July to 24 July period. 112
The FRSNCC was responsible for the coordination of the mobilisation of the assets on a national level.
Table 4.9 Mobilisation of ND assets during the 2007 flooding incidents
Mobilis- Average Standard Cross HVP Hoses MD USAR ations Duration of Deviation of Border Mobilisation Mobilisation (hours) (hours) Gloucestershire 80 53 65 71 45 27 35 Hereford and Worcester 4 51 81 0 40 00 Humberside 17 127 94 12 12 500 Oxfordshire 7 65 41 65200 South Yorkshire 57 158 127 51 35 21 10 England and Wales 230 77 119 156 146 70 77
Source: CLG data on ND mobilisation Notes: Includes all natural flooding incidents during June and July 2007
4.3.3 Damage estimates
The impact of the Gloucestershire flooding was significant in various respects. There were three fatalities in relation to the flooding, and in addition an estimated 200-530 people were rescued. The number of injuries is unknown; however there are reports of social distress following the flooding, with anxieties related to rain and anticipation of further flooding.
Thousands of buildings were flooded including up to approximately 6,000 homes and 1,000 businesses. An estimated 825 households, or 1,950 people, were forced to leave their home. Many of these people lived in temporary accommodation for more than six months. Between 500 and 1,000 businesses were flooded, with some small and medium sized businesses expected to close
112 CLG Flood Review (auth: Sir Ken Knight), Facing the Challenge , Mar 2008, p24 Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 85
because of flood damage. A number of other buildings were damaged including several village halls, some leisure facilities and 20 schools. Damage to schools was estimated at £1.9m for the school most badly damaged, with a combined repair bill of £2.4m for the other schools.
Physical damage to properties was significant. 1,300 houses lost possessions such as cookers, washing machines and fridges, with 270 of these homes being uninsured.
A significant impact of the flooding was on essential infrastructure. Due to the flooding of Mythe water treatment works near Tewkesbury, which was shut down on 22 July, 350,000 people across Gloucestershire were left without drinking quality running water for about 15 days. This affected between 130,000 and 140,000 properties. Electricity provision was also affected due the shut down of Castle Meads electricity sub-station before it flooded. This left 42,000 to 48,000 people without electricity for one to two days.
Gloucestershire’s transport infrastructure was affected as well, with an estimated £25m of repairs expected to be made. The impacts on the transport network were also felt by rail and road users as the floods hit. On 20 July 2007, 500 people were stranded in Gloucestershire station and 10,000 people were stranded on the M5.
4.3.4 Benefits of New Dimension
The benefits of the New Dimension programme were assessed on the basis of a questionnaire provided in B.
4.3.4.1 Survey findings
We have contacted a number of persons and have received completed questionnaires or support information from:
• Alan Hoar , Assistant Chief Fire Officer, Gloucestershire FRS, Gold Commander and Fire Gold Operational Commander for the Tewkesbury area
• Pete House , Fire and Rescue National Resilience Assurance Team, Regional Fire Resilience Coordinator (South West region), acted as a Capability Advisor for the mobilisation and distribution of ND assets
• Geoff Black , Gloucestershire County Council, Education Department (provided information regarding schools closures);
• John Dora , Network Rail (provided information on the number and duration of rail closures)
• Gary Jackson , Association of British Insurers (provided information on insurance claims) and 86 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
• Susanne Smith , Gloucestershire County Council; member of the Flood Risk Management Team (provided additional information on flooding impacts)
Overall, respondents believe New Dimension equipment to be extremely useful in dealing with the flooding. The primary benefits of the programme include:
• the protection, or faster recovery, of significant infrastructure (such as the water treatment plant at Mythe and electricity sub-stations at Walham and Castle Meads), with respondents estimating an increased duration of disruption of between 50 and 200 per cent or more in the absence of ND equipment
• faster clearing of flooded properties, with an estimated duration of flooding up to 25 per cent longer in the absence of ND equipment 113 and
• the community reassurance value of HVP deployment, as the use of HVP sent a positive message to communities
In the other hand, respondents do not believe that the use of ND equipment:
• helped contain the extent of the floods (number of domestic and commercial properties impacted). This is because the depth of water required by HVPs means that they cannot be used preventatively , but only for quicker clearing of water
• prevented any fatalities, primarily due to the circumstances in which ND equipment was used (for protecting infrastructure and removing flood water, rather than preventing further flooding, which might reduce fatalities) or
• led to significant reductions in the number of injuries, although there may be a tenuous link between the reduced duration of flooding and contamination possibilities
The responses collected for this study are summarised in Table 4.10 below. There are only two sets of answers shown in the table as no other respondents completed the full questionnaire. 114 This was partly due to a lack of knowledge of New Dimension equipment.
113 There is disagreement between respondents on the extent to which ND equipment reduced the duration of flooding, as recovery is not significantly affected by high volume pumps. 114 The answers provided by other respondents are not presented in the table because they are not related to the use of New Dimension equipment. They focus on specific damage estimates instead (eg, school closures, rail closures, insurance claims). Although we approached many people, no one else was able to give us information on the impact of New Dimension. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 87
Table 4.10 Summary of responses to the flooding questionnaire
Questions Respondent 1 Respondent 2 4 How useful was ND equipment and Extremely useful for Invaluable – traditional training for the FRS response? protecting significant equipment could not have infrastructure and coped. for community reassurance. Protected and saved Walham and ensured rapid recovery at Mythe and Castle Meads. 5 Would a large-scale pumping operation Yes, but longer timescale. No. have been possible without ND? 6 Has the pumping operation prevented No – quicker clearing and At Castle Meads and further flooding damage? psychological effect. Walham, HVPs were used to prevent further flooding damage but elsewhere to clear areas already affected by flooding. 7 Change in damage to houses, 0% +10% to +25% business and public buildings in absence of ND 7 Change in number of uninhabitable 0% +10% to +25% houses in absence of ND 7 Change in average duration in absence Pumps helped lower water +10% to +25% of ND equipment level quicker but may have only been a day or so difference. 7 Qualitative – change in damage to Same Use of HVPs reduced exposure buildings to flood water, so may be expected to have reduced level of damage. 8 Change in agricultural land lost in n/a 115 +10% to +25% absence of ND equipment 8 Change in duration of flooding of +25% to +50% +10% or less agricultural land in absence of ND at a specific location only equipment (Deerhurst) 8 Qualitative – potential damage to FRS focuses on residential Not known – but flooding agricultural land in absence of ND rather than agricultural areas. affected land not normally affected by floods. At Deerhurst, recovery was quicker with ND assets but this was not the case everywhere. 9 Change in length of road and railway Cannot tell. Varies by area. +10% to +25% tracks flooded in absence of ND 9 Change in duration of road and 0% +10% to +25% railway closures in absence of ND
115 In this table, n/a means not answered. 88 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Table 4.10 Summary of responses to the flooding questionnaire – contd
Questions Respondent 1 Respondent 2 9 Qualitative – disruption of road and Not much effect. Significant difference in railway traffic in absence of ND disruption for outlying towns in absence of ND, but little difference around Gloucester and Tewkesbury, where the flooding was so significant that ND assets could not make a significant difference. 10 Change in number of evacuations in absence of ND 0% up to 25% 10 Change in average duration of evacuation in absence of ND 116 0% up to 25% 10 Qualitative – effect of ND on n/a Evacuation of outlying towns evacuation requirements would have been more significant without HVPs. 11 Change in casualties in absence of 0% n/a ND : fatalities 11 Change in casualties in absence of Difficult to say – moving n/a ND : severe injuries water more quickly may reduce contamination possibilities, but this is a tenuous link. 11 Change in casualties in absence of n/a n/a ND : minor injuries 11 Change in number of rescues in 0% n/a absence of ND 11 Qualitative – physical and HVPs have a psychological Unknown, although there are psychological injury in absence of ND effect and also increase the anecdotal accounts of speed of returning to children suffering normality. psychological trauma. 12 Change in duration of disruption to +200% or more (Castle +100% to +200% essential services in absence of ND Meads, but not fully attributable to ND) 50% (Mythe) 12 Change in number of people affected Up to 600,000 people would n/a by disruption to essential services in have been affected for days absence of ND if Walham sub-station had been lost. 12 Qualitative – additional services Electricity at Walham, possibly n/a disrupted in the absence of ND and gas or telecommunications. people affected 13 Qualitative – other benefits? n/a n/a
116 According to Respondent 1, the HVPs helped lower the water level faster, but with no significant impact on the speed of recovery (which is only marginally affected by pumping capabilities); this view was not shared by the other respondent. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 89
The information gathered in the interviews provides an indication of the nature and extent of the benefits of using New Dimension assets during the summer 2007 flooding in Gloucestershire.
Although interview respondents disagreed in some areas, their views are generally consistent, making it possible to identify where benefits lie. As with the other incidents, respondents often had difficulties providing detailed estimates of impacts. In addition, many of the benefits identified could not be quantified at all; this includes the community reassurance value of HVP deployment or the impact of reduced exposure to flood water.
Finally, the large geographic area and diversity of the sites affected by the floods means that benefits would often be best estimated by a detailed evaluation, at specific sites. In many instances, interview respondents indicated that the impact “varies by area” or might not be present “everywhere”. This greatly complicates the estimation of benefits.
4.3.4.2 Quantification of benefits
Three major benefits were identified during the interviews. They are further described, and quantified in the sections below.
4.3.4.2.1 Enhanced protection, or faster recovery, of significant infrastructure
The Gloucestershire flooding caused a loss of about 46,000 person-days of electricity supply (42,000 to 48,000 persons lost power for one day following the shut down of the Castle Meads substation), and between four and six million person-days of water supply (350,000 persons were left without clean running water for 12 to 17 days).
Information collected during interviews indicates that in the absence of New Dimension, there would almost certainly have been a greater disruption to these essential services.
For the Castle Meads substation, the duration of disruption might have been 100 to 200 per cent longer in the counterfactual (although one respondent indicated that the impact was not fully attributable to New Dimension). This is because the substation was shut down before it was lost in order for it to be protected and for power to be restored more quickly; New Dimension assets (HVPs and hoses) increased the speed with which this could be achieved.
New Dimension equipment also allowed the Walham National Grid substation to be protected, which meant there was no associated loss of electricity supply. If this station had been lost to flooding, up to 600,000 people would have been without electricity for an estimated four days. 90 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
For Mythe Water Treatment Works , information gathered during interviews indicates that the disruption to water supply might have been 50 per cent longer in the absence of New Dimension. This is because the HVPs allowed flood water to be pumped more quickly.
This information is presented, along with additional estimating assumptions, in Table 4.11 below.
Table 4.11 Benefits associated with the enhanced protection, or faster recovery of significant infrastructure
Indicators Value Percent Absolute Moneti- Benefit Estimates, in person- Change Change sation £ million days Low High Low High £ per day Low High Disruption to electricity supply: Castle Meads 46,000 50% 100% 23,000 46,000 £12.5 £0.3 £0.6 Disruption to electricity supply: Walham 0 n/a 117 n/a 900,000 2,400,000 £12.5 £11.2 £29.9 Disruption to water supply: Mythe 4.2 to 5.95 50% 50% 2,100,000 2,975,000 n/a n/a n/a million Total £11.5 £30.5
Source: NERA analysis, using data from various sources Notes: the hypothesised impact of New Dimension at Castle Meads was reduced by half to account for other factors that might have contributed to the limited duration of the shut-down. The monetisation assumption for losses of electricity supply is based on Carlsson et al. (2004): £12.5 per day = £0.012 per minute x 60 x 16 hours per day, plus a 2 per cent escalation per annum between 2004 and 2007. We were unable to locate an appropriate value for monetising water disruptions.
The benefits associated with infrastructure protection are substantial. Our estimates indicate that they could range between £12m and £30m (excluding impacts on the Mythe water treatment plant, which we were unable to monetise). 118
4.3.4.2.2 Faster clearing of flooded properties
The table below shows the benefits associated with the accelerated clearing of flooded properties.
The average duration of flooding for homes and businesses was two to ten days. Information collected through interviews indicates that this duration was reduced in some cases, through the use of New Dimension equipment as it helped lower the water level more quickly. This might have led to a difference of
117 In this table, n/a means not applicable 118 It is important to remember that the assumption used in the valuation of impacts was derived from an existing study, Carlsson et al. (2004). One obvious problem is that the welfare impact of power outages must be extremely dependent on the circumstances. In very cold weather the welfare loss would be vastly more that in warm weather, as most people need electricity for central heating and few households have alternative, non-electrical sources of heat. Besides, after some period, the loss may increase as for example freezers thaw out, and perhaps crime begins to increase slightly. Therefore, although sensible, Carlsson et al.’s estimate may or may not be applicable to the situation at hand. This is one area where department guidance would be particularly useful . Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 91
up to 25 per cent, or approximately one day. Some farm land was flooded for two weeks, in areas not normally affected by floods. At a specific location, the use of HVPs and hoses allowed for a faster recovery of the land.
It is unclear how the duration of flooding is related to damage and costs. We explored the following relationships:
• duration of evacuations and cost of temporary accommodation : we assume that, other things being equal, the faster clearing of domestic properties allowed for a reduction in the average duration of evacuations. We further assume that half of all 1,950 evacuees 119 were hosted in temporary accommodation; 120 at a cost of £100 per evacuee per day 121
• exposure to flood water (homes, businesses and other buildings) : there is arguably a relationship between exposure to flood water and damage: the longer the exposure the more severe the damage. Unfortunately, we were unable to quantify this relationship, and cannot offer any benefit estimate in this area
• duration of business interruptions : we assume that the faster clearing of commercial properties led, other things being equal, to a reduction in business interruptions and output losses. To estimate benefits, we made the following assumptions: i) one additional day of non-operation, in the counterfactual, for 50 per cent of all 750 businesses affected; ii) an average five employees per business; and iii) an average net output (gross value added) per employee per day of £92 122
• impacts on farms and farm land : we were unable to establish a relationship between the extent and duration of flooding and the cost of damage to agricultural land (estimated to be between £2,670 and £6,675 per farm in the Pitt Review). We do not offer any benefit estimate in this area
119 A statement in the 2007 Gloucestershire County Council report indicates that: “ Many of these [1,950] people are still unable to return to their homes and will be living in temporary accommodation for the foreseeable future” (p.21). It is unclear how many of them were actually hosted in temporary accommodation at some point . The estimate of 1,950 evacuees comes from a residential door-to-door survey carried out in August / September 2007. It is based on the number of properties vacated at the time of the floods. 120 To gain further information on the number of evacuees housed in temporary accommodation, we contacted the six local authorities in Gloucestershire: Cotswold District Council; Stroud District Council, Forest of Dean District Council, Gloucester City Council, Cheltenham Borough Council and Tewkesbury Borough Council. We received the following information. Forest of Dean District Council hosted 50 evacuees from Tewkesbury Borough (and had 80 properties that required evacuation at the height of the emergency). Gloucester City Council estimates that there were about 700 people in temporary accommodation for one to two days on average. Tewkesbury Borough Council estimates that there were approximately 500 evacuees, for an average of two days, some of whom were hosted by other councils . Stroud District Council reports that there were 150 flooded properties but only a small number of households known to be displaced, a total of 29. Only one household from the area was housed in alternative accommodation, although two households from Gloucester City were also accommodated. This information, although useful, does not cover the whole county and illustrates the difficulties associated with deriving a single, precise estimate. 121 We have been unable to locate an estimate for the cost of temporary accommodation. £100 per evacuee per day is a NERA assumption. 122 The assumption of one additional day of non-operation is based on information collected during the interviews; the 50 per cent markdown factor is an arbitrary assumption reflecting our inability to determine how many of the affected businesses actually benefited from the deployment of ND assets; the number of employees per business is a national average; the estimate of £92 per employee per day was derived from National Statistics data, adjusted to 2007 conditions (see Appendix C for details). 92 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
• duration of school closures and number of pupil-days lost : because of the timing of events, the impact of the flooding on schools was kept to a minimal; and therefore, it is unclear what it might have been in the absence of New Dimension
Table 4.12 Benefits associated with the accelerated clearing of flooded properties
Indicators Value Percent Absolute Moneti- Benefit Estimates, Change Change sation £ million Low High Low High Low High Duration of 2 days 0% 25% 0 0.5 £100 per £0.00 £0.05 evacuation person (1,950 persons) per day Duration of flooding, 2 to 0% 25% 01Uncertain n/a n/a homes (4,000 10 days houses damaged) Duration of flooding, 2 to 0% 25% 01£92 GVA £0.00 123 £0.35 businesses (750 10 days per employee firms damaged) per day Duration of flooding, 14 days 10% 25% 13Uncertain n/a n/a farm land (175 (2 weeks) farms affected) Duration of minimal 0% 25% 00£27 per £0.00 £0.00 school closures pupil day (20 schools damaged) Total £0.00 £0.39
Source: NERA analysis, using data from various sources
The flooding also affected roads and railways. The extent and duration of these effects vary on a case by case basis. One interview respondent indicated that HVPs were not widely used to clear flooding from public infrastructure (such as roads and railways). This is because the main problem that affected transport infrastructure was pluvial flooding, which drained away naturally; or where the depth of water was insufficient for use of HVPs. However, other interview information suggests that New Dimension did help reduce transport disruptions in outlying towns. A detailed, separate assessment of these areas would be required to quantify the associated benefits.
4.3.4.2.3 Community reassurance value
At least 4,000 people were affected by emotional suffering related to the floods (4,000 houses were damaged). Interview responses indicate that the use of HVPs provided community reassurance in allowing a faster return to normality, and consequently reduced stress and emotional suffering. The mere deployment of the pumps often helped reassure those impacted by the floods; as they felt that something was being done to help them.
123 This estimate is based on the low case assumption that ND had no significant impact on the duration of flooding and time to recovery (Respondent 1). Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 93
Although we were able to identify a monetisation approach for emotional suffering associated with flooding, 124 the change in “suffering” brought about through the deployment and/or use of New Dimension assets is unclear. Therefore, we are unable to estimate benefits in this area.
4.3.4.2.4 Summary of quantified benefits
The benefits from using New Dimension assets during the 2007 flooding incidents in Gloucestershire, quantified for this study, are summarised in Table 4.13 below.
Table 4.13 Estimated benefits from the use of ND equipment, procedures and training during the summer 2007 flooding in Gloucestershire, summary
Benefit Categories Benefit Estimates, £ million (2007) Low High Enhanced protection, or faster recovery, of significant infrastructure £11.5 £30.5 Faster clearing of flooded properties £0.0 £0.4 Community reassurance value n/a n/a Total quantified benefits £11.5 £30.9
Source: NERA analysis, using data from various sources
Overall we believe that the benefits of using New Dimension capabilities during the summer 2007 flooding in Gloucestershire might be in the region of £12 m to £31m .
4.3.4.3 Extrapolation of benefits
The benefits estimated for the summer 2007 flooding in Gloucestershire cannot be used to estimate benefits in other parts of the country, or during other comparable incidents (i .e. other flooding incidents).
Most, if not all of those benefits are indeed associated with the protection or recovery of significant infrastructure, and can only be determined through a careful review of the infrastructure (e.g. type of infrastructure, number of persons potentially affected) and the circumstances of the incident (e.g. duration of the disruption, with and without New Dimension).
In Gloucestershire, over 95 per cent of total quantified benefits are associated with the protection of the Walham National Grid substation.
Similarly, we can expect that a significant portion of total benefits in South Yorkshire would be associated with the protection of the Ulley reservoir dam and possibly , the faster recovery of the Neepsend electricity substation. 125
124 Based on a 2005 study by Defra, as explained in Appendix A 125 Qualitative information on the Ulley reservoir incident is provided in Appendix E. 94 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
In addition, as the conditions under which New Dimension assets were deployed and used in Hereford and Worcester, Humberside, and Oxfordshire are largely unknown (to us), we believe it would be unwise to try and estimate other New Dimension benefits (i.e. faster clearing of flooded properties) in those areas from the benefits estimated in Gloucestershire.
We observe in particular that although the number of flooded properties (houses and businesses) is roughly the same across all five FRAs, 126 the number of mobilisations is not (there were significantly more mobilisations in Gloucestershire and South Yorkshire than in the other FRAs.) 4.4 Smaller incidents
As part of stage 2, we have also examined a number of small incidents where ND equipment was used. We were provided with a list of incidents by CLG, but were unable to obtain information for all incidents. We have retained the following six incidents in our analysis:
• white powder incident in Kent (23 April 2004)
• Kensal Rise tornado (7 December 2006)
• Milton Keynes scaffolding collapse (11 April 2006)
• heat wave at Waddington air show (1–2 July 2006)
• Westminster building collapse (12 June 2007) and
• Whitechapel building collapse (14 February 2007)
These incidents are discussed further in sections 4.4.1 through 4.4.6 below. For each incident we provide an incident overview and damage estimates, a summary of the FRS response, a description of the benefits of New Dimension, and an estimate of the number of “similar” incidents attended to by the FRS, using ND equipment. Benefit estimates for the selected incidents and for the entire programme are presented, tentatively , in the last section.
4.4.1 Kent white powder incident
4.4.1.1 Incident overview
On Friday 23 April 2004, a suspicious white powder package was received in the post by a Kent distribution company, Galleon, situated at the Sittingbourne Research Centre. The package was opened by an automatic opening device, with three members of staff who were in close proximity being contaminated. Six employees came in contact with the powder. However, the number of potentially contaminated people was much larger, as staff moved within the building.
126 Between 4,000 houses and businesses in Hereford and Worcester, and 14,600 in Humberside. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 95
No-one suffered any ill effects following the incident. The powder turned out to be talcum powder, or something similar.
4.4.1.2 FRS tesponse
The event triggered the mobilisation of more than 60 firefighters and 11 fire engines. This included a full CBRN attendance of an IRU (tent) and six support pumps. In addition, two ND support officers attended the incident. The Police set up Gold control, and there was also a combined control point away from the affected building at silver level.
Kent Fire and Rescue set up a decontamination tent on the site and 67 people underwent decontamination including two Police officers. 127 The decontamination tent used was one of two mass decontamination structures (MD1) that form part of an incident response unit (IRU). Other equipment used includes a fork lift truck (to move equipment), gas-tight suits and disrobe packs.
4.4.1.3 Benefits of New Dimension
Information provided by the FRS indicates that there were significant benefits of using ND equipment at this incident, as the FRS did not have the capability to deal with this before. The following benefits were identified:
• reduced emotional suffering (the FRS reports some emotional suffering at the site because of dignity issues; but argues that the IRU reduced emotional suffering as compared to what would have been possible previously)
• reduced impact on the environment (due to the containment of water runoff made possible by the IRU)
• reduced pressure on other emergency services (the Police and Ambulance Service had very limited decontamination capabilities) and
• increased public confidence
On the other hand, the FRS did not identify benefits in the following areas:
• reduced number of fatalities or injuries (partly because the powder was not harmful)
• containment or reduction of material damage and
• reduced impact on commercial interests, as the incident took place just as people would normally have been leaving for home
127 BBC News, Alert over White Powder Discovery, 23 April 2004 96 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Box 4.1 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the April 2004 white powder incident in Kent None of the benefits identified during the interview can realistically be quantified. The reduction in emotional suffering of those being decontaminated and the reassurance value of New Dimension deployment, although important, cannot be expressed in quantitative terms. Estimating the impact of the programme on other emergency services would require a detailed assessment of the organisational structure, workload and operating costs of those services and is beyond the scope of this study. Finally, there is insufficient information available to estimate the benefits of water containment, partly because: i) it is unclear how much water would have been used and possibly “lost” in the counterfactual (absence of ND); and ii) it is unclear how much water was actually contained. 128
4.4.1.4 Other similar incidents
As shown in Section 4.4.8 below, we have identified 69 other ‘white powder’ incidents from the FRSNCC database, including six where an IRU was mobilised.
Forty-six additional incidents, involving hazardous materials, explosives or suspect packages, and leading to the mobilisation of an IRU, could also be considered ‘similar’ to the April 2004 white powder incident in Kent.
Given the peculiar circumstances in which the Kent incident unfolded (the incident took place as people would normally have been leaving for home), additional benefits might have been realised at these other incidents. In particular, the use of an IRU might have reduced the economic costs associated with lost business time. These additional benefits, however, cannot be estimated in the absence of additional information.
4.4.2 Kensal Rise tornado
4.4.2.1 Incident overview
At around 11am on 7 December 2006, a tornado hit the Chamberlayne Road area in Kensal Rise (Brent Council, London). The tornado is reported to have lasted about 40 seconds and to have struck in an area covering three quarters of a square mile. 129 The incident as a whole lasted from approximately noon to 7pm.
Over 200 properties (houses and shops) and many cars were damaged. 130 Damage ranged from partial collapse to minor damage such as broken tiles or smashed windows. Several houses were left uninhabitable (for instance because
128 According to the FRS, a very small quantity of water did enter the water catchment area on site. 129 UK Resilience Website, Dealing with Insurance Issues, Kensal Rise Tornado in London, 26 October 2007 130 Brent Council Website, Kensal Rise Tornado, December 2006 Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 97
the roofs were ripped off); but eventually none of the houses needed to be demolished. One person suffered a serious head injury and five were treated for minor injuries and shock. 131 According to the Association of British Insurers, “initial estimates suggested damage would be in the millions of pounds rather than tens of millions […].” 132 The total of the costs incurred by the emergency services and local authority was approximately £700,000. 133
4.4.2.2 FRS response
The FRS was initially called out to a number of separate addresses. Part way through the incident, the London Fire Brigade declared the Kensal Rise tornado a “major incident”. 134 The incident was jointly managed by the emergency services through meetings of tactical commanders from each agency through the initial response and recovery phase in the following week. The London Fire Brigade managed the response phase.
The FRS sent a USAR response alongside other specialist appliances and some conventional pumping appliances. In total, seven USAR units were mobilised (one of which was a temporary unit). Also, an Incident Response Unit (IRU) was mobilised on both 7 and 8 December. All of this equipment was provided by the London Fire Brigade. Apart from the IRU, all equipment was called to the incident before 1pm on 7 December and became available again before 6pm on the same day. Three of the USAR units mobilised were module 1 units, and three were module 4 units. From the IRUs, the fork lift truck is reported to have been used to move other equipment. 135
Information from interviews with the FRS indicates that the majority of the mobilised USAR equipment was not actually used, with the exception of snake- eye cameras and listening devices. However, the trained USAR crew members who attended the incident used their training to search properties and locate casualties. These teams worked with building surveyors from Brent Council, who were able to assess the safety of structures. 136
The FRS also assisted in the evacuation of about 100 people, but did not have to rescue anyone using shoring or other specialised equipment.
4.4.2.3 Benefits of New Dimension
Information provided by the FRS indicates that the training of the USAR crew was a major benefit in this incident. This training allowed the USAR crew to do an initial survey and reconnaissance to decide where to prioritise efforts, and subsequently complete a risk assessment covering the nature and status of the
131 BBC News, Six Hurt as Tornado Hits London, December 2007 132 Quoted from: BBC News, Six Hurt as Tornado Hits London, December 2007 133 UK Resilience Website, Dealing with Insurance Issues, Kensal Rise Tornado in London, 26 October 2007 134 ‘Major incident’ is defined by the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel Procedure Manual 135 FRSNCC data on deployment of ND equipment 136 UK Resilience Website, Dealing with Insurance Issues, Kensal Rise Tornado in London, 26 October 2007 98 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
damage. Without the New Dimension Programme the incident would have taken more time, primarily as a result of the lack of training rather than equipment. This gives rise to the following benefits:
• there might have been a smaller risk of injury during the evacuation
• it took less time for people to return to their homes, potentially causing less emotional suffering
• public and commercial areas, cordoned during the incident, were returned to use more quickly, which reduced the impact on commercial interests (according to the FRS, there might have been 30 to 40 commercial premises within the cordon, including a range of small retail shops, offices and public houses; New Dimension might have reduced the impact of the incident “by many hours”)
• roads were also reopened more quickly and
• the shorter incident duration may also have reduced pressure on other emergency services, such as the Police and Ambulance Service
Another benefit of the ND Programme is that the ND equipment allowed conventional fire pumps and crews to return to the fire station where they were available to respond to other incidents. This helped contain FRS resource and deployment costs.
The ND training also allowed the FRS to provide a more effective response, with a particular advantage being that a USAR advisor was able to attend the Silver coordination group meetings.
An intangible benefit was identified by the FRS in terms of reputation, as the ND response improved the reputation of the FRS. 137
The FRS did not identify benefits in the following areas:
• reduction or containment of material damage, as the damage was already done before the FRS arrived
• reduced impacts on the environment
137 The FRS was congratulated on its response at various events, including during a meeting with the Mayor of London. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 99
Box 4.2 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the Kensal Rise tornado incident A few of the benefits identified during our interview with the FRS could potentially be quantified. These include: i) reduced risk of injury during the evacuation; ii) reduced traffic disruption; and iii) reduced impact on commercial interests (access to commercial properties). None of these benefits, however, can be estimated accurately with the information at hand. The number of injuries in the counterfactual (absence of ND) could not be ascertained during our interview. Similarly, the number and type of properties left inaccessible for the duration of the incident are not well known. Difficulty in obtaining this information is compounded by the progressive re-opening of the cordoned area, whereby access to some properties was restored earlier in the incident. Estimating changes in traffic disruption requires information on the volume and type of traffic affected: none of this information is readily available. Other benefits (emotional suffering, pressure on other emergency services, and reputation effects) do not lend themselves to quantification.
4.4.2.4 Other similar incidents
We have not identified any directly comparable incidents from the FRSNCC database. This is due to a lack of use of ND equipment during other extreme weather events (according to information recorded in the database).
4.4.3 Milton Keynes scaffolding collapse
4.4.3.1 Incident overview
On Tuesday 11 April 2006, a 10 storey high scaffold collapsed in the centre of Milton Keynes. A new Jurys Inn hotel and several houses were being built on the incident site. At the time of the incident, about 200 workers were working on the site. As the collapse happened during lunch time, few of them appear to have been on the scaffolds. 138
Nevertheless, three workers who were on the scaffold sustained severe injuries and one of them died three days later in hospital. A person was missing at the beginning of the incident, but this person was located by the Police about six hours into the incident (away from the incident site).
Following the incident, health and safety officials launched an investigation. At an inquest in January 2008, a spokesperson for the jury stated that “no one cause can be identified for the collapse of the scaffold but there were several factors that contributed to it.” 139
138 BBC News, Workers Hurt in Scaffold Collapse, 11 April 2006 139 Health and Safety Executive, Milton Keynes Scaffolding Collapse 11 April 2006, 25 January 2008 100 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
4.4.3.2 FRS response
Buckinghamshire FRS received the first call to the incident at 12.37pm. The FRS response to this incident was part of a coordinated response by a large number of organisations including safety officials, the Ambulance Service and the Thames Valley Police. At the peak of the incident, 60 FRS personnel, eight fire engines, two aerial platforms and one USAR unit were in attendance at the scene. The incident entailed cross-brigade border mobilisation, with appliances and firefighters from Bedfordshire and Northamptonshire attending the incident.
The initial FRS response involved the use of thermal imaging cameras to locate the victims of the collapse and rescue them. The rescue operation was made more difficult by high winds.
Later in the incident, the Buckinghamshire USAR team was mobilised to support the operation. The USAR team conducted a more thorough search using a variety of equipment. This included “search cams” and “snake-eye” cameras. The team was able to search 70 per cent of the area using these cameras to check for casualties. Two search and rescue dogs 140 were used to search the remaining 30 per cent of the area, containing “non-survivable” voids and inaccessible areas. 141 The searches were completed within three hours.
Following the searches of the USAR team and search and rescue dogs, the Thames Valley Police declared there were no more casualties. The FRS handed the scene over to the Police and the Health and Safety Executive following the completion of the search operation.
FRS Online states that this incident shows the usefulness of ND equipment in day-to-day incidents. Also, the successful cooperation of incident command and operation response teams was praised.
4.4.3.3 Benefits of New Dimension
Information from the FRS indicates that the main benefits of the use of ND equipment are largely hypothetical . The FRS response to the incident involved searching the area of the collapse for a missing person, who was later located by the Police 142 away from the incident site.
If this missing person had not been located, the use of ND equipment would have:
• saved time in searching (if someone had been missing, the response to the incident would have taken longer with “normal” equipment)
140 Both dogs were originally trained by the UK Fire Services Search and Rescue Team (UKFSSART) for use overseas, but were to be transferred across to ND funding as the programme progressed. 141 Note that USAR was not used to rescue the three workers. The Milton Keynes Fire Service released the workers from the scaffolding to get them off before any further collapse. 142 The missing person was located within 6 hours of the collapse. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 101
• reduced demand on FRS resources (had the missing person not been found so soon, the eight fire engines would have needed to be relieved, and part-time firefighters would have been called in)
• improved firefighter safety (the USAR equipment was a safer way of searching the area; firefighters might otherwise have been put at risk; alternatively, the FRS might have needed to make the scaffolding safer first, which would have led to a very protracted response), and – possibly – reduced fatality risk if the missing person had been trapped under the collapsed scaffold
• reduced emotional suffering (a protracted incident would have heightened emotional suffering)
• reduced the impact on public areas and commercial interests (the FRS was at the scene for 24 hours, but some of this time was used to protect the area while contractors were cleaning up the site. Without ND, the incident could have lasted up to 48 hours, assuming again that the missing person had not been located after six hours. Roads were closed and a car park for a large office block had to be evacuated: neighbouring businesses would have been affected by a longer incident duration) and
• helped reduce pressure on other emergency services (the Police in particular)
With the person being located by the Police within six hours of the collapse, it is unclear what the actual, realised benefits of the New Dimension programme might be. It is probably fair to assume that some of the hypothetical benefits identified above still hold, in particular those associated with firefighter safety (assuming that without New Dimension, but with the missing person located, the FRS would still have searched the site). Our conversation with the FRS, however, suggests that in the counterfactual (absence of ND), given the timing of events, the searches would have been kept to a minimum, and that therefore, very limited benefits were realised at this particular incident.
Box 4.3 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the Milton Keynes scaffolding collapse incident The benefits of New Dimension, for this particular incident, are largely hypothetical. They rely on the assumption that at least one worker would have been unaccounted for in the counterfactual, which would have led to an extensive search and rescue operation using standard, non-ND equipment. Some of these hypothetical benefits could indeed be quantified, including: i) improved firefighter safety (using ad-hoc assumptions regarding injury risk during SAR operations); and ii) reduced impact on commercial interests (with information on the number and type of businesses affected). Reductions in traffic disruptions might be considered as well, although we understand that traffic flows are low on the roads immediately adjacent to the site. 102 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
4.4.3.4 Other similar incidents
As discussed in Section 4.4.8, we have identified eight other “scaffolding collapse” incidents from the FRSNCC database, and 83 other infrastructure collapse or structural damage where USAR capabilities were deployed.
4.4.4 Heat wave at Waddington Air Show
4.4.4.1 Incident overview
The air show at Royal Air Force Waddington was staged over the weekend of 1– 2 July 2006 and drew audiences of between 25,000 and 30,000 people on each day. Following predictions of a heat wave, a silver command structure, including the Ambulance Service, Police, the Royal Air Force and an emergency planning officer, was set up. 143
On Saturday 1 July double the number of expected casualties had been treated owing to the heat wave conditions. Silver Command met on Sunday 2 July, 12.43 pm, to discuss options to deal with an expected 200-300 casualties. A single incident response unit (part of the ND mass decontamination capacity) was mobilised to enable onsite treatment of a large number of individuals in conditions respecting the dignity of the victims.
Twenty-five casualties walked unaided through the MD showers spending an average of five minutes under the shower. Five non-ambulant, unconscious casualties had to be wheeled through the unit on medical trolleys. One of these casualties was bordering on coma. These casualties recovered consciousness whilst in the MD unit.
4.4.4.2 FRS response
The Lincolnshire IRU, supported by one pumping appliance, was officially mobilised at 1pm and had arrived at the scene by 1.30 pm. A medical team consisting of a doctor, a paramedic and a nurse worked to treat and monitor casualties. Five FRS personnel assisted the medical team within the MD structure.
Following treatment, casualties were released to the on-site medical team once their condition was stable enough, and were subsequently allowed to go home without any further off-site medical treatment.
Following the scaling down of the air show at 18.00 no more casualties were presented and the IRU returned to its base station.
143 Source: FRS Online, Lincoln’s Incident Response Unit mobilised during July heat wave, 10 August 2007 Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 103
4.4.4.3 Benefits of New Dimension
Information collected through an interview with the FRS indicates that there were benefits of using the ND equipment in the following areas:
• a reduced number of fatalities or injuries (in the absence of ND, the casualties would have been treated but it would have taken longer, leading to higher health risks)
• reduced emotional suffering
• reduced pressure on other agencies, including a temporary hospital set up by a private organisation, and the Police
Potential benefits were also identified in other areas, where benefits would have had arisen if the expected 200-300 people had required treatment :
• prevention of the impact on Police that would have been caused by the shut down of the air show
• reduced impact on commercial interests, compared to a shut down of the air show
Benefits were not identified in the following areas:
• containment or reduction of material damage
• reduction in time to return impacted areas to public or commercial use
• reduced impacts on the environment
FRS Online writes that “the provision of on-site treatment and care reduced pressure on the external local healthcare providers.” 144 Also, they indicate that the MD structure avoided the stress involved in the transfer of casualties to local emergency departments (the nearest of these, in Lincoln, was eight miles away). Finally, the successful cooperation between different agencies is emphasized.
144 Quoted from: FRS Online, Lincoln’s Incident Response Unit mobilised during July heat wave, 10 August 2007 104 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Box 4.4 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the Waddington air show incident The quantifiable realised benefits for this incident possibly include: i) reduction in the number of fatalities, or in the severity of sustained injuries, although what would have happened in the counterfactual (without ND) is very difficult to determine; and ii) cost savings to local emergency departments, associated with the treatment in situ of the casualties (in the counterfactual, some of the casualties might have been transported, by ambulance, to the nearest care centre, located eight miles from the site). In the hypothetical situation where the expected 200-300 casualties had required treatment: i) the hypothetical benefits associated with the avoided shut down of the show could be approximated by considering the total number of attendees, their willingness- to-pay for the show (i.e. entry fee), and assumptions regarding the timing of the shut down; and ii) the hypothetical avoided costs to the Police could be estimated with staffing estimates and hourly labour costs.
4.4.4.4 Other similar incidents
We have not identified any similar incidents from the FRSNCC database. This is due to a lack of requirement for ND equipment during similar events (according to information recorded in the database).
4.4.5 Westminster building collapse
4.4.5.1 Incident overview
At around 4pm on Tuesday 12 June 2007, the top two storeys of a five storey office block in Dean Farrar Street (Westminster, London) partially collapsed. Refurbishment works were being carried out inside the building. The collapse left a builder trapped on the third floor. The collapse was investigated by Health and Safety officials. 145
4.4.5.2 FRS response
Following the incident, seven fire engines, three fire and rescue units, over 50 firefighters and the USAR teams were mobilised. The USAR advisor also attended the incident to give advice on the whether USAR could be used and what equipment would be required.
Three module 1 USAR units were mobilized as well as two module 4 units. One temporary USAR unit 146 attended the scene, as well as an incident response unit (IRU) and two detection identification and monitoring (DIM) units. All of this equipment was provided by the London Fire Brigade.
145 Source: FRS Online, High drama in London : Trapped man freed by London Fire Brigade’s USAR teams, 4 January 2008 146 A temporary USAR unit is a vehicle carrying miscellaneous search and rescue equipment. These units were rolled out in the early stages of the programme, as an interim resource. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 105
The USAR equipment used included listening devices and special cameras. This equipment was used to help locate the casualty, particularly in small voids. The rescue teams also used communications equipment to update the casualty on progress, via an interpreter. Other USAR equipment used allowed teams to shore up the building and make the area safer. Rescue efforts were assisted by a 150ft crane to lift rubble away.
The FRS response continued through Tuesday evening and the early hours of Wednesday morning. The rescue took nine hours in total, in part due to the risk of collapse of the building. The rescue was completed at 2.30am, using both USAR and line rescue techniques. 147
4.4.5.3 Benefits of New Dimension
Information from the FRS indicates that there were benefits in the following areas:
• increased safety for the FRS, reducing the risk of injury and potentially emotional suffering of those at risk
• reduced number of fatalities/injuries, as the rescue may not have been possible without USAR
• reduction in pumping appliances required, which gave better coverage for other incidents
• other agencies (e.g. the Police) could access the building sooner, to start their investigation
• reduction in duration and extent of road closures, as without ND equipment contractors would have been called in, which would have entailed more road closures, and would have taken longer (roads were closed for four to five hours; without ND, according to the FRS, they would have been closed for at least 24 hours)
• reduction in the impact on commercial interests, as the use of ND equipment helped ensure that surrounding buildings were safe for businesses to return (three commercial properties were affected; it is unclear when exactly they resumed normal operations) and
• reduced pressure on other emergency services
On the other hand, benefits were not identified in the following areas:
• containment or reduction of material damage, as the damage was already done before the FRS arrived
• reduced impacts on the environment
147 FRS Online, High drama in London : Trapped man freed by London Fire Brigade’s USAR teams, 4 January 2008 106 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Finally, FRS Online emphasises the role of the ND equipment and interagency cooperation in the successful ending of the rescue operation.
Box 4.5 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the Westminster building collapse incident Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of New Dimension at the Westminster building collapse include: i) reduction in the number of fatalities, or severity of injuries, although it is difficult to ascertain what might have happened without ND; ii) reduction in the duration and extent of road closures; iii) reduction in the extent of business interruptions; and iv) enhanced firefighter safety. As with the earlier incidents, however, none of these benefits can be estimated precisely with the information at hand, and a number of simplifying assumptions are required.
4.4.5.4 Other similar incidents
We have identified 28 other “building collapse” incidents from the FRSNCC mobilisation database, and 83 “other infrastructure collapse or structural damage” incidents, where USAR equipment was mobilised.
4.4.6 Whitechapel building collapse
4.4.6.1 Incident overview
On 14 February 2007, a four storey building partially collapsed on Commercial Road, Whitechapel (East London). The second and third floors of the building collapsed. Construction works were taking place at the site, which had seen a scaffold placed. However, the building company supervising the work indicates that heavy overloading of the upper floors is the most likely cause of the collapse. Due to the incident, Commercial Road was closed off in both directions; all traffic being diverted to alternative routes. 148
A Health and Safety investigation has been launched into the cause of the incident. 149
One person was rescued early on, and brought safely out. One boy and ten adults were treated for shock by paramedics, but none of them had to be taken to hospital. The incident did not claim other casualties.
148 BBC News, Building Collapses in East London, 14 February 2007 149 BBC News, Building Collapse Investigation Launched, 31 December 2007 Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 107
4.4.6.2 FRS response
The FRS response to the incident was significant, and involved establishing whether anyone had been trapped inside the building following the collapse. This involved using shoring equipment to make a tunnel into the building to hold the ground floor and the remaining parts of the first floor while the FRS accessed the basement.
The London Fire Brigade mobilised one incident response unit, three module 1 USAR units and two module 4 USAR units. One DIM unit also attended the scene. This equipment was deployed on the site for a total duration of 15 to 20 hours. All of this equipment was provided by the London Fire Brigade. 150 USAR dogs are also reported to have attended the rescue operation. 151
4.4.6.3 Benefits of New Dimension
Information from the FRS indicates that benefits of using ND equipment arose in the following areas:
• increased safety for the FRS, reducing risk of injury and potentially emotional suffering of those at risk (six to 12 firefighters were working at the scene at any one time, and could have been injured in a further collapse)
• ability to search inaccessible areas to eliminate the possibility of trapped casualties
• reduction in pumping appliances required, which gave better coverage for other incidents
• reduction in incident duration, leading to a reduced impact on commercial interests due to an earlier opening of the road (the road was closed for approximately 24 hours; it is unclear how long the road would have been closed without ND, possibly 72 hours; 152 five commercial properties were affected but we could not determine when exactly they resumed normal operations)
• reduced pressure on other emergency services such as the Police, due to the enhanced ability to get information and to open the road more quickly, and reduced pressure on the local authority in terms of time and resources required
• a feeling of safety and capability for the FRS
On the other hand, benefits were not identified in the following areas:
150 CLG data on deployment of ND equipment 151 Newbury Today, Rescue Dog Searches Collapsed Building, 14 February 2007; and discussion with the FRS 152 The road was partially opened at some point (one lane), which greatly complicates the analysis 108 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
• containment or reduction of material damage, as the damage was already done before the FRS arrived
• reduced impacts on the environment
Box 4.6 Quantifiable benefits associated with the use of ND assets during the Whitechapel building collapse incident Quantifiable benefits for the Whitechapel building collapse are comparable to those associated with the collapse on Dean Farrar Street. They include: i) reduction in the duration and extent of road closures; iii) reduction in the impact on commercial interests; and iv) reduction in the risk of injury to FRS personnel. But again, none of these benefits can be estimated precisely with the information at hand, and a number of simplifying assumptions are required.
4.4.6.4 Other similar incidents
As stated earlier (Section ), we have identified 28 other “building collapse” incidents, as well as 83 additional incidents involving other infrastructure collapse or structural damage.
4.4.7 Sample of other incidents reported in the CLG business benefits and operational incidents forms
To supplement the outcomes of our interview programme, we have collated information from the CLG Business Benefits and Operational Incidents forms. A variety of information is collected, including the date and location of the incident, an incident identification number, an overview of the incident, and a qualitative description of the benefits.
We have obtained a selection of these forms that range over time and by location. There are Business Benefits forms for 10 incidents, and Operational Incidents forms for 21 incidents. These 31 incidents cover the period January 2006 to September 2008. Incidents are located in the East Midlands, the West Midlands, Yorkshire, the South East, East Anglia, London and the South West.
The incidents covered are of various types, primarily flooding, fire and hazardous materials related incidents. The benefits of using ND equipment identified in the forms vary by incident type. They include:
• for flooding incidents
– release of other FRS resources (enhancing coverage for other incidents)
– reduction of distress for members of the community
– prevention of property damage and Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 109
– potential reduction in the number of fatalities (the term “potentially life-saving” is used in the forms, although the information provided is not sufficient to determine exactly why)
• for fires
– reduction in attendance times and/or release of other FRS resources (due to improvements in water supply)
– reduction in disruption caused
– reduction in risks to firefighters and members of the community and
– reduction in environmental damage
• for incidents involving hazardous materials
– earlier resolution of incidents, reducing disruption
– reduction of distress for members of the community
– reduction in risks to firefighters and
– potential reduction in risks to the environment
These benefits are generally consistent with those identified during our programme of interviews.
Tables summarising the information provided in the Business Benefits and Operational Incidents forms are provided in E, at the end of this report. The text provided in this table is taken directly from the forms, with only minor edits by NERA (to correct typos or spell out acronyms).
4.4.8 Outcome benefits: Summary of evidence from smaller incidents
4.4.8.1 Quantification of benefits
Tentative estimates for the benefits realised in the context of the six ‘smaller incidents’ under review are set out in Table 4.27 below. The table provides a brief description of the key assumptions used in the quantification of benefits and their monetisation.
The estimation of benefits associated with changes in the number of casualties is self-explanatory: we multiply the number of casualties avoided by unit cost estimates developed by DfT (see C for details).
To estimate impacts on commercial interests, we multiply the number of properties affected by: i) the change in the duration of the impact (in hours); ii) the average number of employees per commercial property (assumed to be five, 110 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
the national average number of employees per enterprise according to statistics from the BERR Enterprise Directorate Analytical Unit); and iii) a measure of net output, or gross value added, per employee per hour based on National Statistics data (£90 per day, for a 7.5-hour work day).
To estimate benefits associated with changes in traffic disruption, we consider: i) an average traffic flow (expressed in number of vehicles per hour, based on actual traffic counts from DfT, where available); ii) the change in the duration of road closure, provided by the interview respondents; and iii) an assumption for the extra travel time imposed on road users as a result of the closure. Changes in aggregate delays resulting from the use of New Dimension assets are then monetised with an average value of time per vehicle from DfT (expressed in £ per hour).
Table 4.14 Estimation of outcome benefits for smaller incidents
Incident Quantifiable benefits Key assumptions Monetisation Benefit estimates, £ Low High Kent white powder incident (2004) 153 none / limited n/a n/a n/a n/a Kensal Rise tornado (2006) reduced impact on 30 to 40 commercial £90 per £5,400 £14,400 commercial interests properties impacted employee per impact reduced by 3 to 6 day hours (NERA assumption) reduced traffic disruption 500 vehicles per hour £12 per vehicle £1,500 £6,000 (low traffic flow) impact reduced by 3 to 6 per hour hours extra travel time of 5 to 10 minutes due to road closure (NERA assumptions) reduced risk of injury in 0 to 1 minor injury £12,370 per £0 £12,370 evacuation avoided injury Milton Keynes scaffolding collapse (2006) 154 none / limited (mostly n/a n/a n/a n/a hypothetical)
153 No impact could be estimated for this incident, partly because it occurred outside normal business hours. Benefits at other “similar” incidents – that might have occurred during business hours – would probably be limited. According to mobilisation data, the average duration of a white powder incident where an IRU was used is 0.13 days (3.1 hours). If we assume that time is cut by half because of the IRU, with no further information on the size of the business impacted, this would lead to a benefit estimate of about £412 (7 “similar” incidents x 0.13 days saved x 5 employees (average business size in England) x £90 per employee per day). Larger businesses might have been impacted, or even more than one business, but we have no basis for determining this. Therefore, in the absence of additional information, we believe it is more prudent to consider that benefit estimates for this type of incidents are “not available”. 154 As explained earlier in the report, the quantifiable benefits of using ND at this incident were largely hypothetical. As a result, estimates of “realised” benefits are not available. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 111
Table 4.14 Estimation of outcome benefits for smaller incidents – contd
Incident Quantifiable benefits Key assumptions Monetisation Benefit estimates, £ Low High Heat wave at Waddington air show (2006) reduced health risk 0 to 1 fatality avoided £1.4 million per £61,850 £1,737,430 5 to 25 minor injuries fatality; £12,370 avoided per injury avoided transfer to local accounted for under £260 per n/a n/a emergency departments “reduced health risk” patient journey Westminster building collapse (2007) reduced impact on 3 commercial premises £90 per £1,800 £3,600 commercial interests impacted employee per impact reduced by day 10 to 20 hours reduced traffic disruption 1,500 vehicles per hour £12 per vehicle £15,000 £60,000 (low traffic flow) impact reduced by per hour 10 to 20 hours extra travel time of 5 to 10 minutes due to road closure (NERA assumptions) reduced risk of injury to 0 to 1 severe injury £160,480 per £0 £160,480 fire fighters avoided injury Whitechapel building collapse (2007) reduced impact on 5 commercial premises £90 per £1,800 £14,400 commercial interests impacted employee per day impact reduced by 6 to 48 hours reduced traffic disruption 500 vehicles per hour £12 per vehicle £12,000 £48,000 (high traffic flow) impact reduced by 24 to per hour 48 hours extra travel time of 5 to 10 minutes due to road closure (NERA assumptions) reduced risk of injury to 0 to 1 severe injury £160,480 per £0 £160,480 fire fighters avoided injury
Source: NERA analysis, based on information collected during interviews and simplifying assumptions
Total estimated benefits per incident are summarised in Table 4.15 below:
• for two out of six ‘smaller incidents’, no realised benefits could be quantified. As explained earlier in the report, this is because benefits for these incidents were largely hypothetical, or failed to materialise due to very specific circumstances (e.g. missing person located early; or onset of the incident at the end of the workday) 112 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
• relatively large benefits might be estimated for incidents where the use of New Dimension unambiguously reduced health risks. This is only true of the IRU deployment at the Waddington air show in response to extreme weather conditions
• benefit estimates for the two building collapses in our sample are comparable, but we believe this is more due to the use of common simplifying assumptions than an indication that our approach is robust
Table 4.15 Summary of estimated outcome benefits for smaller incidents
Incident Mobilisations Incident and response Benefit estimates, £ type Low High Kent white powder 1 IRU white powder incident, n/a n/a incident (2004) MD Kensal Rise tornado 7 USAR units, 1 IRU, extreme weather £6,900 £32,770 (2006) (SAR training essential) conditions, USAR Milton Keynes scaffolding 1 USAR unit scaffolding collapse, n/a n/a collapse (2006) USAR Heat wave at Waddington 1 IRU extreme weather £61,850 £1,737,430 air show (2006) conditions, MD Westminster building 3 Module 1 USAR units, building collapse, £16,800 £224,080 collapse (2007) 2 module 4 USAR units, USAR 1 temporary USAR unit, 1 IRU, 2 DIM units Whitechapel building 3 module 1 USAR units, building collapse, £13,800 £222,880 collapse (2007) 2 module 4 USAR units, USAR 1 IRU, 1 DIM unit
Source: NERA analysis, based on information collected during interviews and simplifying assumptions
All in all, the estimation of total programme benefits from the findings of our case studies is likely to be extremely precarious. This is explored in the next section.
4.4.8.2 Extrapolation of benefits
For the purpose of extrapolation, we have first identified incidents directly comparable to the smaller incidents described above, using the FRSNCC mobilisation database over the period August 2005 to June 2008 and a number of key words. 155
Table 4.16 below shows the distribution of mobilisations per incident for each of the following incident types: white powder incident, scaffolding collapse and building collapse; as well as flooding incident and fire, retained for comparison with our earlier case study work.
155 The keywords used are as follows: ‘powder’ for white powder incidents; both ‘scaffold’ and ‘collapse’ for scaffolding collapses; both ‘building’ and ‘collapse’ for building collapses; ‘flood’ for flooding incidents; and one of ‘fire’, ‘alight’, ‘burn’, ‘pump’ or ‘pf’ (pump fire) for fires. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 113
Table 4.16 Distribution of incidents by incident type and number of mobilisations
Incident type Number of mobilisations Total 123-4 5-10 11-40 41-80 White Powder 63 5100069 Building collapse 8216 11028 Scaffolding collapse 2150008 Fires 169 40 14 420229 Flooding 77 27 5222115
Note: each cell in the table indicates the number of incidents within the associated category; for example, the database includes 169 fires with only 1 mobilisation, 40 fires with 2 mobilisations, etc. for a total of 229 fires. Source: NERA analysis of FRSNCC data, August 2005 – June 2008, England
Most white powder, flooding and fire incidents involve only one mobilisation. For white powder incidents this is usually one DIM unit, which contains the equipment needed for detection, identification and monitoring of suspicious substances.
In contrast, scaffolding or building collapses tend to involve more than one mobilisation, as more than one USAR module is usually involved.
A small number of flooding incidents involve a very large number of mobilisations, up to 78. This finding is difficult to interpret as flooding incidents are not necessarily as clearly defined as other incidents: their definition depends on whether an incident is counted as a mobilisation at one address, or a collection of mobilisations in a geographical area.
These data allow us to compare the smaller incidents considered in Section 4.4 to similar incidents:
• the Kent White Powder incident is not very typical of similar incidents, as it involved the use of an IRU, whereas most white powder incidents involve the use of a DIM vehicle. This is likely to be because the incident occurred before the rollout of DIM
• the Milton Keynes scaffolding collapse had only one mobilisation, in contrast to the majority of scaffolding collapses which involve more than one mobilisation
• on the other hand, the Whitechapel and Westminster building collapses were both bigger than a typical building collapse, with 13 and nine mobilisations respectively and
• as explained earlier in the report, we were unable to identify incidents comparable to the Kensal Rise tornado or the Waddington air show 114 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
We have also sought to characterise the other incidents recorded in the FRSNCC Table 4.17 Distribution of incidents by incident type and equipment database in terms of the equipment mobilised in response . This is illustrated in mobilised the table below, where we expand the list of incident types to include all Incidernetc toypreded incidents (afrllo UmSA AR ugusHt V2P 005 Htohsreos ugh JuIRnU e 2D0is0ro8b).e DIM Total modules rerobe modules White powder 0006162 69 Building collapse 27 0000128 Scaffolding collapse 8000008 Fires 60 93 32 37 3 50 229 Flooding 5 104 31 402115 Incidents involving hazardous materials, explosives or suspect packages 13 3246 2 643 700 Other infrastructure, collapse or structural damage 83 0010384 Road traffic collision 49 1141760 Other transport incidents 12 3020320 Miscellaneous 126 37 9 37 1 35 230 Total 383 241 75 137 8 806 1,543
Source: NERA analysis of FRSNCC data, August 2005 – June 2008, England Note: Each cell in the table indicates the number of incidents where the equipment was mobilised. The last column provides the total number of incidents within each incident category; it is not the sum of the values in column.
The information provided in Table 4.18 confirms that the white power incident included in our sample of ‘smaller incidents’ is atypical as it did not involve the mobilisation of a DIM (62 out of the 69 white powder incidents in the database did). It is also generally consistent with the distribution of mobilisations by category (with categories defined specifically for the efficiency analysis) presented in stage 1 of the study (Section 3 of this report).
The table on the next page provides tentative estimates for the benefits of New Dimension extrapolated to the entire set of incidents in the FRSNCC database.
As in stage 1, these estimates should be viewed as providing an indication only of the order of magnitude of potential benefits. They should not be quoted without a full description of the methodology and disclosure of the underlying estimating assumptions. Chapter 4 Outcome benefits (Stage 2) | 115
Table 4.18 Extrapolation of outcome benefits from evidence on smaller incidents
Incident type and equipment Representative incident Number Total benefits, £ million used in response of incidents low high Case study incidents white powder incident, MD Kent white powder incident 7 £0.0 £0.0 extreme weather conditions, USAR Kensal Rise tornado 1 £0.0 £0.0 scaffolding collapse, USAR Milton Keynes scaffolding collapse 9 £0.0 £0.0 extreme weather conditions, MD Heat wave at Waddington air show 1 £0.1 £1.7 building collapse, USAR 156 Westminster building collapse 28 £0.1 £1.6 Whitechapel building collapse £0.1 £1.6 Total benefits from case studies 46 £0.3 £4.9 Other incidents fires requiring HVP n/a 157 93 unknown Unknown flooding requiring HVP n/a 104 unknown Unknown incidents involving hazardous n/a 643 £0.1 £1.5 materials, explosives or suspect packages, DIM other infrastructure, collapse or n/a 83 £0.5 £6.6 structural damage, USAR road traffic collision and other n/a 61 £0.0 £0.4 transport incidents, USAR all other incidents n/a 513 unknown Unknown Total benefits for other incidents 1,497 £0.6 £8.5
Source: NERA analysis, based on information collected during interviews and simplifying assumptions
As can be seen in the table, total realised benefits from the use of ND equipment, procedure and training in the context of white powder incidents, building collapses and scaffolding collapses are thought to range between £0.3m and £4.9m.
Additional benefits are to be expected from the following incidents, or incident categories:
• incidents involving hazardous material, explosives or suspect packages and the use of DIM : £0.1m to £1.5m
– we used the relationships determined as part of stage 1 of the study (reduction in the average incident duration from six hours – in the counterfactual – to two hours with New Dimension) along with a number of additional assumptions to estimate benefits associated with reduced output losses (business interruptions) 158
156 As discussed earlier in the section, both building collapses were bigger than a typical building collapse (based on the number of mobilisations). Our extrapolation might therefore be seen as “optimistic”. We believe this is mitigated by the 50 per cent markdown factor, and the use of relatively conservative assumptions elsewhere (in particular to derive the low estimate). 157 In this table, n/a means not applicable, as we have not examined representative incidents of these types. 158 For the low estimate, we tentatively assumed that 1 small firm (5 employees) would be impacted; for the high estimate, five firms with 20 employees each. We also assumed an average net output per day per employee of £90. 116 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
– we ignored the potential health benefits (to FRS personnel and the public) associated with the use of DIM, as we do not have sufficient information to establish whether these risks were real (for a large number of incidents, the unknown substance or suspect packages turn out to be inoffensive)
• other infrastructure, collapse or structural damage, USAR : £0.5m to £6.6m
– we assimilated these incidents with the scaffolding and building collapses in our sample case studies, and used a non-weighted average of the benefits estimated for the three incidents (Kensal Rise tornado, Westminster building collapse, and Whitechapel building collapse). This is obviously an extreme simplification
• road traffic collision and other transport incidents, USAR : £0.0 to £0.4m
– we estimated potential reductions in traffic disruptions (resulting from shorter incident duration), using illustrative estimating assumptions, based on professional judgment 159
In all cases, the resulting benefit estimate is multiplied by the number of “similar” incidents divided by two, to account for those incidents where New Dimension assets were mobilised but not used.
159 As an illustration , for the low estimate, we assumed an extra incident duration of 1 hour (25% of the actual duration, estimated from FRSNCC mobilisation data) affecting an average traffic flow of 500 vehicles per hour, with an extra 15 minutes of travel time; for the high estimates, these assumptions are, respectively: two hours (50% increase), 1000 vehicles per hour and an extra 30 minutes. A value of time of £12 per hour per vehicle is assumed in both scenarios. Chapter 5 Summary of findings and conclusions | 117
Chapter 5 Summary of findings and conclusions
5.1 How New Dimension equipment is mobilised
New Dimension equipment in recent months has been mobilised around 200 to 300 times per quarter. For smaller incidents, this may increase a little in the future as FRSs gain greater awareness of urban search and rescue (USAR) capabilities, for example, and the remaining equipment is delivered. To date, mobilisations peaked in mid 2007, at over 400 mobilisations per quarter, as FRSs responded to widespread flooding.
We estimate that of all incidents to which the FRS respond, only around 0.1 per cent are those to which ND equipment is mobilised.
More than 75 per cent of mobilisations are for incidents where a single piece of ND equipment is mobilised. A large proportion of such mobilisations are of detection, identification and monitoring (DIM) vehicles, responding to incidents involving unidentified hazardous material. Around 85 per cent of all mobilisations are for incidents within the same FRS area as the ND equipment is held. This is consistent with ND equipment being deployed most frequently for smaller scale incidents.
Less than 15 per cent of ND mobilisations are for incidents involving fires. Most incidents with ND mobilisations are classified as “special services”.
Almost half of all mobilisations have been for incidents within Greater London. 5.2 FRS efficiency gains
Stage 1 of this study was concerned with assessing the benefits of the NDP with respect to FRS efficiencies and costs, both in qualitative and quantitative terms.
5.2.1 Qualitative assessment of efficiency benefits
ND capabilities have the potential to deliver savings to FRSs in a number of areas. These primarily take the form of:
• reduction of the time required to carry out a rescue or to respond to an incident (such as a flood, where a rescue may not be required)
• reduction in the number of appliances required and 118 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
• safer FRS operation, lowering the risk of injury to FRS members and risk of damage to FRS equipment
The capabilities can increase FRS costs, however, in that the FRS is now able to respond to incidents where previously other public bodies may have taken responsibility, or where rescues may not have been attempted, for example on safety grounds.
Examples of important efficiencies include:
• high volume pumps replacing several fire appliances when responding to large fires or to floods where water is pumped over relatively large distances
• DIM vehicles identifying suspect material more quickly, allowing rescues to proceed more rapidly
• USAR equipment speeding up searches for casualties
Capabilities with respect to hazardous material, USAR and high volume pumps varied widely between FRSs prior to the NDP, and many FRSs had some capabilities in these areas that pre-dated the NDP.
5.2.2 Top-down assessment of efficiency benefits
As ND equipment is deployed for only around 0.1 per cent of FRS incidents, it is not possible to use aggregate input and output data to analyse the impact of the NDP on FRS efficiency.
Instead we have conducted analysis on a set of incidents for which ND equipment were mobilised. We compared performance indicators constructed from these data with indicators for a control group of incidents. We used fire data, compiled from FDR1 forms, to conduct this analysis. Equivalent special service data, which would have been more suitable, were not available for the time period of interest.
We found that ND incidents involving fires had very different characteristics to those of average fire incidents. They tend to be fires that are more severe, more complex and take longer to control. We sought to construct an equivalent control group, but were unable to do this with the data we had available.
It may be possible to conduct further, more comprehensive, analysis in the future because more fire and special services incident data should become available. However, until it becomes possible to identify a robust, comparable, control group – and data from the new fire incident recording system may improve matters in this respect – further similar analysis is unlikely to produce useful results. Chapter 5 Summary of findings and conclusions | 119
5.2.3 Bottom-up assessment of efficiency benefits
We also sought to estimate the impact of the NDP on FRS efficiencies and costs using a bottom-up approach, extrapolating assumptions concerning efficiency gains for individual incidents.
Even though we spoke to a number of people within CLG and the FRS with excellent knowledge of the NDP, we were able to obtain very little information to value cost savings from using ND capabilities. We understand that valuation is difficult because:
• first, the NDP provides new capabilities which mean that the FRS is now being deployed in areas that would previously have been dealt with by the police, ambulance services or contractors. The FRS is therefore not familiar with all the capabilities the NDP has replaced
• second, prior to the NDP, the FRS did have some capabilities that overlap with those provided by the NDP, for example handling hazardous material, or cutting, but these capabilities varied and still do vary, by FRS. The ‘before’ case can therefore not readily be defined in general terms
Given this situation, we have not been able to prepare a robust estimate of the efficiency saving of the NDP. Instead, we have computed the potential cost saving by extrapolating savings we are able to estimate across areas where we do not have information. The result provides an indication of the order of magnitude of likely cost savings of the NDP for day-to-day incidents.
Table 5.32 shows the results of our bottom-up assessment of the potential impact of ND capabilities on savings in staff and conventional fire appliances in England. Given the limited information on which this analysis is based, these estimates should be viewed as only providing an indication of the order of magnitude of potential savings. 120 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Table 5.1 Estimated efficiency gains from small incidents (England)
Numbers saved Proportion of Fire Mobilisation type mobilisations appliances Firefighters ND Staff All Staff A B = A x 28 C D = B + C Unidentified hazardous material 43% 1.1 32 -3 29 Decontamination 4% 0.0 000 Flooding required HVP 9% 2.7 74 -8 66 USAR module 4 9% 0.2 5 -1 4 Major fire requiring HVP 5% 0.3 7 -2 5 Fire involving hazardous materials 4% 0.7 20 0 20 Total, quantified 74% 4.9 138 -14 124 Road traffic collision 4% Infrastructure collapse 10% Fire involving structural problems 2% Miscellaneous 11% Total, all mobilisations 100% 7 193 -22 172
Source: NERA analysis, based on various sources, and simplifying assumptions
We tested the sensitivity of the results by varying some of our assumptions, primarily with regards to flooding and use of DIM vehicles, which have been the main source of potential efficiency savings. The range of results for these sensitivity tests reinforce our view that the results should be taken as indicative orders of magnitude. They exclude direct costs associated with the NDP such as training and equipment operation and maintenance.
The analysis suggests that the ND capabilities deliver a saving to FRSs across England for day-to-day incidents in the region of £4.5m to £11m a year. Approximately 30 per cent of the saving is associated with incidents in London. 5.3 Outcome benefits
Stage 2 of the study was concerned with assessing the effects of the NDP on outcomes . We have found this assessment extremely difficult, for the following reasons:
• benefits vary considerably from one incident to another, even when incidents are seemingly comparable; this is particularly true for outcome benefits, where the impacts of ND vary not only with the type, size and duration of the incident but also with its exact location and timing. For example, large building collapses in London, attended to by a USAR team can lead to very different ‘benefits’ depending on whether the building is located along a major road or not; whether it is part of a densely or sparsely populated neighbourhood; whether victims were trapped in the building or not; and even whether the collapse occurred on a weekday or Sunday! Chapter 5 Summary of findings and conclusions | 121
• the information on ND benefits collected since the rollout of the programme is sparse and predominantly qualitative; there has been – to our knowledge – no systematic recording of quantitative information on the incidents where ND assets were used
• the FRSNCC mobilisation database does not provide a clear, consistent incident classification system (key words must be used to identify incident types). A number of additional issues have been highlighted in the report, including seemingly duplicate entries and the failure to indicate whether the equipment was actually used or not. The database provides very limited information on the incident itself
• even with large, well documented incidents, such as the Buncefield disaster or the 2007 flooding, information is generally not available at a level of detail consistent with benefit estimation; difficulties are compounded for smaller incidents that are often not so well documented
• departmental guidelines on the unit costs applicable to incidents typically attended to with ND assets are sparse; and so is the associated literature 160
Under these circumstances, estimating the benefits of ND requires:
• a thorough review of the incident(s) and the gathering of large amounts of information, from a variety of independent sources
• assumptions regarding the actual damage (what did happen) and the counterfactual (what would have happened without ND), derived possibly from experts opinion, and assembled several months, or even years after the facts, and therefore often precarious 161
• assumptions regarding the monetisation of benefits, to supplement the limited departmental guidelines and economic literature
Finally, given the amount of research needed to develop benefit estimates for just one incident, a full evaluation of the programme requires some extrapolation. As explained earlier in this report, however, any extrapolation of incident-level benefit estimates is necessarily inexact because of the unique set of circumstances within which the incident unfolds and is attended to by the FRS.
5.3.1 The estimation carried out for this study
In this study, we have focused our attention on two large incidents (the Buncefield oil storage depot disaster and the summer 2007 flooding in Gloucestershire), and six ‘smaller incidents’ selected by CLG.
160 There are – to our knowledge – no guidelines for determining the costs associated with special service incidents; and important limitations to the existing guidelines on the cost of fires remain 161 Defining the counterfactual is challenging. This requires a very good understanding of the incident and its idiosyncrasies, of the capabilities offered by New Dimension, and of the capabilities available before the rollout of the programme. For most incidents, we have found that only a few people satisfy these requirements (hence our limited sample sizes). 122 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
For each of these incidents, we have:
• conducted an extensive review of available documentation, seeking to collect (any) quantitative information on the circumstances of the incident, the damage caused by the incident, and the FRS response
• identified and arrayed a series of ‘indicators,’ which could later be used in the estimation of ‘benefits’ (e.g. the amount of fuel lost at Buncefield was used in the estimation of reduced air pollution; the number of commercial premises impacted by the Kensal Rise Tornado was used to estimate the reduction in lost output)
• conducted interviews with those individuals (within the FRS or other agencies) most likely to help us quantify the benefits of the programme, and identified in collaboration with CLG; the interviewees were asked to evaluate the change in the ‘indicators’ had the ND equipment, procedures and training not been provided
• supplemented the interview findings, where needed, with estimating assumptions based on existing research (e.g. traffic counts) or professional judgement (e.g. additional travel time due to road closures)
• combined the (augmented) interview findings with the information collected, along with further assumptions pertaining to the monetisation of benefits (e.g. value of time, average turnover per commercial premise, injury costs), to derive benefit estimates
• summarised and arrayed the benefit estimates for the incidents under review, and extrapolated these benefits to the entire programme. To carry out this extrapolation, we used information on the total number of “similar” incidents attended to by the FRS (as recorded in the FRSNCC mobilisation database), with adjustments for the type of equipment mobilised. We applied a flat 50 per cent markdown factor to the resulting estimates to account for: i) incidents where ND assets were mobilised but not used; ii) a possible optimism bias in the information collected during the interviews; and iii) the considerable uncertainty associated with our approach, overall
5.3.2 Summary of outcome benefit estimates
The benefits of ND estimated during stage 2 of the study are summarised in Table 5.2 below.
The low and high estimates define a tentative range of possible values, derived from data on those benefits that could be valued in the course of this study. Chapter 5 Summary of findings and conclusions | 123
Table 5.2 Estimated outcome benefits (England)
Benefit estimates, £ million Comments on extrapolation low high Buncefield oil storage depot disaster, £8.7 £61.4 no extrapolation possible December 2005 Summer 2007 flooding incidents in £11.5 £30.9 no extrapolation possible Gloucestershire Extrapolation from “smaller incident” £0.3 £4.9 direct extrapolation for case studies comparable incidents Other incidents £0.6 £8.5 limited extrapolation, additional assumptions required Total outcome benefits £21.1 £105.8
Source: NERA analysis, based on various sources, and simplifying assumptions
These estimates cover benefits in the following broad categories:
• reduced incident duration , and associated reductions in business interruptions, 162 traffic disruptions, or damage to the site (in the case of large fires and, to a lesser extent, flooding), as the use of ND equipment, procedures or training, typically enhances the effectiveness of FRS responses. For example, in our case studies, we found that the NDP allowed:
– a shorter burn of fire at Buncefield, through the use of HVPs
– faster search and rescue operation at the site of the Westminster building collapse, through the use of cameras and listening equipment and
– faster assessment of structural damage, following the Kensal Rise Tornado, made possible by USAR training
• reduced risk of injury to FRS personnel , as the ND assets generally offer a safer means of attending to an incident site; for example in our case studies:
– safer search and rescue operations at the site of the Whitechapel building collapse, through the use of shoring equipment and search dogs
• reduced health risk to the general public , as ND offers capabilities for the treatment or decontamination of large numbers of people, in situ ; for example:
– ability to treat heat wave casualties within a mass decontamination structure at the July 2006 Waddington Air Show and
162 These benefit estimates are small, especially with respect to changes in business interruptions. The average cost of “lost business” for all incident types is only £100 per incident, according to ODPM (2006), and not all of this will be saved by ND equipment. 124 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
– safer evacuation procedures in the aftermath of the Kensal Rise Tornado, owing to USAR training
We have also identified a number of other areas where benefits are thought to be important but could not be valued, including the community reassurance value of specialist assets; reduced emotional distress associated with faster incident resolution; preservation of dignity in the context of decontamination procedures; and enhanced FRS reputation from miscellaneous improvements in effectiveness.
On the other hand, we have found no unambiguous evidence indicating that the NDP has saved lives, and were unable to demonstrate strong environmental value. This of course might be due to the specific incidents that we examined and from which (in the case of smaller incidents) we have extrapolated.
Overall, we have found very limited scope for the valuation of ND benefits given the nature and quality of the information currently available. As demonstrated in this report, valuation remains possible for some incidents and for a few benefit categories, but at a very high cost of background research and assumptions. 5.4 Recommendations for future valuation
We believe the following would be desirable:
• systematic recording of quantitative information on special services incidents, on the context within which these incidents arise, the nature and extent of the damage, and the effectiveness of the FRS response
• recoding and restructuring of the mobilisation database, with detailed information on the equipment actually used, and a clear and consistent coding of incident types; along with a link to the augmented incident recording system for easy referencing (we understand that this revised database architecture is under development, or already in place)
• systematic recording of quantitative information on the impacts of ND, possibly through a series of predetermined performance indicators or grading scales (e.g. intervals of possible values for the percent change in incident duration)
• enhanced departmental guidance on the economic and environmental costs associated with special services incidents, and standardised values (assumptions) for use in the monetisation of benefits
We describe these recommendations in detail below. 163
163 Some of these recommendations might be difficult to implement; they will need to reviewed and possibly adjusted with inputs from FRSs. Chapter 5 Summary of findings and conclusions | 125
5.4.1 Systematic recording of quantitative information on special services incidents
In stage 1 of this study we did some analysis using FDR1 data on primary fires (see Section ). Data about “serious reportable fires” collected through the FDR1 form include: 164
• time and date of call
• incident duration (defined as the difference between the call time and control time for the fire)
• brigade or other geographical area
• type of building or vehicle
• most likely motive (accidental or malicious)
• cause of fire (e.g. chip or fat pan fires, electrical, etc.), source of ignition (e.g. cigarettes, cookers, etc.), and materials (e.g. furniture, etc.)
• materials involved in explosion, if any
• area damaged by direct burning and total area damaged (including damage from smoke or heat)
• spread of fire (i.e. how far the fire is confined, for example to an item, room, floor or building)
• nature and number of fire casualties
• rescue information and method of extinction and
• others (e.g. effectiveness of automatic smoke detectors)
It would be useful to gather similar data for special services incidents , using a standard form to facilitate consolidation into a single, centralised database. If at all possible, the following information should be collected:
• time and date of call
• incident duration
• exact incident location
• type of incident (to be selected from a pre-defined list)
164 Derived from Fire Statistics, a User Guide for Research , Home Office, Research Development and Statistics Directorate, December 1998 126 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
• brigade(s) involved in response
• FRS and other resources mobilised in response (including number of staff and type of equipment)
• FRS and other resources actually used in response
• nature of response (e.g. search and rescue, water removal, decontamination, etc)
• nature and number of casualties (including among FRSs and other emergency services)
• number of rescues
• number of evacuees and duration of evacuations
• type and number of properties impacted (including residential, commercial, and public properties)
• type and extent of material damage caused in the incident (with, if possible, a distinction between initial and subsequent damage, i.e. before and after FRS’ arrival); damage could be expressed as an area, a percentage of the site, on a scale (e.g. limited, severe, complete), or described qualitatively; losses of business inventory should be documented, where applicable
• duration and extent of road closure (where the extent of closure could be measured in lane-miles, for different classes of roads)
• duration and extent of business interruptions (number and types of establishments closed, number of employees affected)
• duration and extent of school closure (number of schools closed, number of pupil-hours lost)
• disruptions to essential services, such as electricity or water supply (including duration, and approximate number of households affected) and
• other consequential costs (described qualitatively, with quantitative information where available)
Finally, each special services incident should be given a unique identification number for easy referencing; in particular with a view to combine incident-level data with information on the mobilisation of ND assets. Chapter 5 Summary of findings and conclusions | 127
5.4.2 Recoding and restructuring of the New Dimension mobilisation database
As discussed earlier in the report, the FRSNCC compiles data on equipment mobilisation on the basis of information provided by individual FRSs.
We have used these data in our quantitative assessment of efficiency gains (in stage 1) and in the extrapolation of benefits estimated from our case studies (stage 2). In so doing, we have encountered some difficulties (see Section 3.5.1 for detail), which leads us to suggest a number of possible improvements.
First and foremost, the mobilisation data should be recorded with greater accuracy; and those in charge of recording should:
• always provide complete entries where the information is available (i.e. incident number, incident date and time, etc)
• avoid spelling errors in FRSs or regions
• use consistent recording of incident and resource host brigades (e.g. elimination of Leicestershire / Leics problems)
• use a consistent approach to reporting the mobilisations of prime movers
• use separate variables for time and date of mobilisation, attendance and availability (e.g. in the current database, mobilisations that take more than one day have both a time and a date in the one cell available for “time of availability”)
Some additional or altered variables would also be useful:
• a separate variable for incident number (rather than having the number in the description field), recorded consistently across all host brigades
• in addition to the description, or possibly to replace it, a set of classification variables for the incident type (for example: fire, flooding, collapse, decontamination, identification of hazardous materials, road traffic collision, other transport incident, and others (to be specified))
• equipment type used, in addition to call sign
• a dummy variable to indicate whether the mobilised equipment was used at the incident (some information on this is currently available in the “equipment used” field, but it is not always completed) and
• incident duration, in addition to duration of mobilisation
A further step towards the estimation of Programme benefits would consist of recording quantitative information on the impacts of the Programme itself. This is explored in the next section. 128 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
5.4.3 Systematic recording of quantitative information on the use and impact of New Dimension assets
Quantitative information on the Programme benefits could be gathered, and recorded, at the aggregate level, by incident type (where a number of “rules” and estimating assumptions could be derived with assistance from a large number of stakeholders), or for each incident, individually .
5.4.3.1 Consensus-based approach to defining estimating assumptions
Our stage 1 work would have benefited from better information on the so- called “efficiency assumptions” we have made (see Section 3.5.2.1.4 for detail). For some categories of incident, we did not have an assumption, and for others it was based on a single piece of information, from one person or brigade. A more robust set of assumptions could be derived, in the context of a broader research effort, with cooperation from a large number of FRSs, possibly under the supervision of CLG.
Similarly, our stage 2 quantification efforts were centred on a limited number of case studies. These case studies allowed us to define “benefit patterns” by incident type (e.g. impact on commercial interests reduced by six to 48 hours when using USAR equipment at a major building collapse), which we then extrapolated on the basis of mobilisation data provided by the FRSNCC. These “benefit patterns” could be defined for a larger set of incidents (e.g. incidents involving suspect packages, road traffic collisions, or fires requiring HVP) and/or refined through additional consultation with the FRS.
One approach to refining estimating assumptions for both stage 1 and stage 2 benefits would consist of setting up and distributing (across the fire brigades) a set of assumptions tables, and inviting the brigades to comment and provide inputs on those assumptions, on the basis of their recent experience with the Programme.
An evident limitation of this approach is that the problem would still arise that there is no such thing as a “standard” incident; and therefore, a number of simplifications would be required to estimate overall Programme benefits.
5.4.3.2 Recording of incident-level data on the effects of New Dimension
The recording of incident-level data on the benefits of New Dimension is currently done through the use of “business benefits forms” and “operational incidents forms”. 165 As explained earlier in the report, however, most of the information contained in these forms (if not all) is qualitative, and cannot be used to measure benefits.
165 We provide a few examples of these forms (compiled in a tabular format) in Appendix E. Chapter 5 Summary of findings and conclusions | 129
The incident-level data required to estimate the benefits of New Dimension fall within two broad categories:
• what actually happened : FRS resources actually deployed (and/or used) and observed incident outcomes and
• what might have happened : hypothetical resource deployment (and/or use) and hypothetical incident outcomes, in the absence of New Dimension
Our recommendations for the first category of data (what actually happened) are set out in Section 5.4.1 (systematic recording of quantitative information on special services incidents).
Our recommendations for the second category of data (what might have happened) are illustrated in the table on the next page.
For each of the variables – or indicators – listed in the table (in rows) the person providing information on actual outcomes would also record estimates of “impacts”, either as an absolute value – where known – or along a scale of possible deviations from the actual outcome.
A brief description and explanation of benefits (similar to those reported in the business benefits and operational incidents forms) should also be recorded, in support of the quantitative information provided.
An alternative approach to estimating the impact of New Dimension, which we have explored in stage 1 for fire incidents (Section 3.4 – Efficiency analysis using fire incident data) would consist of comparing performance indicators for incidents where ND equipment was used (or mobilised) to performance indicators for a control group of similar incidents where it was not used. 166 This approach could be applied to special services incidents, for the estimation of both stage 1 and stage 2 benefits, when the data described in Section 5.4.1 become available.
166 Without the need for further recording of – or additional assumptions on – the effects of New Dimension. 130 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Table 5.3 Recording of quantitative information on the impacts of ND, recommended template
Performance Indicator Unit of Observed Impact Quantification Comments / Description (examples) measurement value of ND of impacts of impacts (yes/no) % (OR) change value without without ND ND incident duration hours 24 yes +25 to 30–36 explanations: why the 50% use of ND helped reduce incident duration number of fatalities persons 1 no 0% 1 number of severe injuries persons 5 no 0% 5 number of minor injuries persons 10 yes +50% 15 explanations: why the use of ND helped contain the number of minor injuries duration of road closure hours 12 yes +100% 24 extent of road closure lane-miles 3 lanes no 0% 3 lanes comments: name, type 50 miles 50 miles and description of the affected roadways duration of business hours 12 yes +15 to 14 interruptions 20% number of businesses establishments 2 no 0% 2 comments: type of affected businesses affected, indication of size (eg, number of employees) Source: NERA, for illustration only Note: In this table, n/a means not applicable
5.4.4 Enhanced departmental guidance on the monetisation of benefits
Further data gathering and research efforts are needed to develop sensible assumptions for the monetisation of ND benefits. Our recommendation would be for CLG to issue a guidance document on the costs of special services incidents, comparable to the 2006 ODPM report on the economic cost of fires.
In the ODPM report, the total costs of fires are broken down into three main categories:
• costs in anticipation: protection and prevention measures undertaken to prevent or mitigate the damage caused by fire
• costs as a consequence: costs incurred as a result of fire, and due to exposure of property, individuals or the environment to fire and its products (heat, smoke, etc.) and
• costs in response: costs of extinguishing and cleaning-up after the fire Chapter 5 Summary of findings and conclusions | 131
Estimates for the following consequential costs are presented in the report: 167
• property losses
• loss of business and
• fatalities and injuries (including emotional and physical suffering, healthcare costs, and lost output 168 )
Additional consequential costs are identified but are not estimated , including:
• environmental costs
• emotional suffering related to property damage
• clean-up costs
• disruption costs to public services and
• wider economic distortions
We understand that the OPDM report is being updated, and possibly expanded to provide a wider range of estimates in all three cost categories.
Although some of the estimates recommended for fires can be applied to special services incidents (e.g. loss of business, value of avoided fatality), most cannot. And CLG guidelines are needed for all special services incidents attended to with ND assets (flooding, road traffic collisions, building collapses, etc.). Where possible, these guidelines should include a general approach to monetisation, as well as standardised unit cost (or benefit) estimates.
167 Costs as a consequence are of particular interest for the estimation of (stage 2) ND benefits. 168 Through the use of estimates from the Department for Transport (as discussed in Appendix C of our report) 132 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Appendix A Meetings, interviews and communications
A.1 Stage 1 Meetings and interviews
In addition to project meetings, the following table sets out the discussions we have had for stage 1 of this study. We are grateful to the individuals who have spent time with us discussing the New Dimension Programme.
Table A.1 Meetings and telephone interviews for stage 1
Date Interviewees Organisation Principal topics covered 28 May Steve Woodfield NCC (West Yorkshire FRS) NCC 3 June Paul McEvoy, CLG FRS statistics Cath Reynolds 3 June Colleen Jones CLG New Dimension Programme 9 June Sean Booth Capability Manager for CLG Mass Decontamination; Urban Search and Rescue 9 June Vicky Ernst Serco for CLG Process for recording business benefits 10 June Paul Quinn CLG Measuring FRS efficiency 17 June Martin Blunden Capability Manager for CLG Water 30 June Gordon MacMillan Capability Manager for CLG Urban Search and Rescue 11 July Martin Blunden Capability Manager for CLG Water, USAR, MD 17 July Paul Murphy Merseyside FRS USAR 23 July Roy Wilsher Hertfordshire FRS Command and Control 24 July Tyson Truelove Humberside FRS MD, USAR, Water 25 July Damian Smith Buckinghamshire FRS MD, USAR, Water 25 July John Fairweather Capability Manager for CLG USAR 28 July Martyn Emberson Northamptonshire FRS MD, USAR, Water 5 August John Mills Hertfordshire FRS MD, USAR, Water 26 August Paul Cross and Devon and Somerset FRS MD, USAR, Water Colin Rockey 2 September Jon Hall West Midlands FRS MD, USAR, Water, assistance and informative messages 4 September Kieran Nolan Greater Manchester FRS MD, USAR, Water 18 September Gary Dobson London Fire Brigade ND training Appendix A Meetings, interviews and communications | 133
A.2 Stage 2 Interviews and communications
The table below provides a list of individuals and organisations we have contacted, either by telephone or email, to carry out stage 2 of the study. We are grateful to the individuals who have provided us with information on the incidents selected for stage 2, and/or their views on the impacts of the Programme.
Table A.2 Telephone interviews and email communications for stage 2
Contact name Organisation Date Outcomes Buncefield Oil Storage Depot Disaster Mark Yates Hertfordshire FRS 1 Oct 08 Detailed telephone interview completed Martin Blunden Capability Manager for CLG 1 Oct 08 Completed questionnaire received Gordon Macmillan Capability Manager for CLG 1 Oct 08 Completed questionnaire received Emma Edgell Hertfordshire County Council 7 Oct 08 Completed questionnaire received Taf Powell HSE 1 Oct 08 Responded with references to Buncefield investigation website Kathrin Peters SQW Consulting 5 Nov 08 Telephone interview completed Summer 2007 Flooding Incidents Alan Hoar Gloucestershire FRS 2 Oct 08 Detailed telephone interview completed Pete House Fire and Rescue National Resilience Assurance Team 2 Oct 08 Completed questionnaire received Susanne Smith Gloucestershire County Council 10 Oct 08 Information received Geoff Black Gloucestershire County Council 14 Nov 08 Information received regarding schools closures Mark Ravenscroft Gloucestershire Police 21 Nov 08 Road closure information not available from Police Dale Haigh Regional Resilience Team 1 Dec 08 Unable to provide relevant information due to lack of involvement Gary Jackson ABI 14 Nov 08 Information received John Dora Network Rail 5 Jan 09 Information received David Steels Tewkesbury Borough Council 17 Mar 09 Information received Wayne Best Gloucester City Council 17 Mar 09 Information received Phil Jones Forest of Dean District Council 17 Mar 09 Information received Maria Hickman Stroud District Council 17 Mar 09 Information received None Cheltenham Borough Council 17 Mar 09 Awaiting response None Cotswold District Council 17 Mar 09 Awaiting response Smaller Incidents Tim Gibson Kent FRS 10 Dec 08 Detailed telephone interview completed Dave Scott London Fire Brigade 7 Nov 08 Detailed telephone interview completed James Knighton London Fire Brigade 7 Nov 08 Two detailed telephone interviews completed Neil Boustred Buckinghamshire FRS 9 Oct 08 Detailed telephone interview completed Neil Fritzsche Lincolnshire FRS 11 Dec 08 Detailed telephone interview completed 134 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Appendix B Survey questionnaires used in the assessment of outcome benefits
B.1 Buncefield oil storage depot disaster
To estimate the ‘wider’ benefits of the programme, we are investigating a number of incidents in which ND equipment was used, including the Buncefield oil storage explosions and fires of December 11, 2005.
We have already researched available evidence on the incident and we are now conducting in-depth interviews with FRS personnel, members of the National Coordination Centre and others.
You are one of the experts whom we identified as having first hand experience of the incident and/or the use of ND equipment. We hope you can help us understand which ND assets and resources were deployed, and what effects these resources had on the nature and magnitude of the damages incurred.
The incident
We would like to gain more insight into the incident on the basis of the following questions:
1 Could you briefly describe your role in the incident?
2 Could you briefly describe the use of ND equipment during the Buncefield incident? In particular, which pieces of equipment were mobilised and how were they used?
3 Could you give an overall appreciation of how useful the ND equipment and training was for the Fire Service’s response to the Buncefield incident?
4 In particular, would a large scale foam attack have been possible in the absence of ND equipment? If a foam attack had been possible in the absence of ND equipment, would it have been likely to be the preferred response of the Gold Command?
5 Have the ND assets prevented a second major explosion ?
6 To a large extent, the damage brought by the incident was due to a major explosion at 06.01 pm which occurred before the fire services had reached the scene. In our assessment of the benefits brought by the ND Appendix B Survey questionnaires used in the assessment of outcome benefits | 135
equipment, the damage brought by the main explosion is not directly relevant as it was unpreventable. Therefore, we would like to know how you would assess the magnitude of the physical damage caused by any events after the main explosion at 06.01 pm. For instance, how important was damage due to smoke after the main explosion?
7 We encountered some difficulties in collecting information on the evacuation procedure and safety perimeters during the incident. It would be very helpful if you could provide us with your best estimate of the following pieces of information:
– When could the 2,000 people who are widely reported to have been evacuated during the incident return to their homes?
– Which area of the Maylands Industrial Estate was evacuated (as a percentage of the total of 600 businesses)? How many of these evacuated businesses received permission to resume their activities on Sunday, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday respectively?
Cost savings brought by ND equipment
The following questions will focus on the different types of damage brought by the incident. Where available, we will provide figures describing the actual impact of the incident and ask you to provide an estimate of the damage in the absence of ND assets (using a percentage scale of the actual damage).
8 The explosion caused substantial damage to the depot site .
– 52,500,000 to 105,000,000 litres of fuel were burnt. In your assessment, would the volume of fuel lost in the absence of ND equipment have been:
i. Equal to all fuel stored at the site ii. Equal to the fuel contained in the 22 tanks affected by the main explosion and subsequent fire iii. More than 50% larger than the volume lost iv. 50% larger than the volume lost v. 20% larger than the volume lost
– The total area burnt in the main fire after the first explosion is reported to be 80,000m 2. In your assessment, would the damage to the Buncefield depot in the absence of ND equipment have been:
i. At least 100% higher (ie, at least 160,000 m2) ii. 50-100% higher iii. 20-50% higher iv. 10-20% higher v. Less than 10% higher 136 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
– Qualitatively, how would you assess the potential damage to the depot site in the absence of ND assets ?
9 The explosion caused severe physical damage to houses and businesses in the area surrounding the depot.
– At least 548 houses and 90 businesses outside of the depot site suffered substantial physical damage. In the absence of ND equipment , would this number have been:
i. At least 100% higher (ie, 1096 houses and 180 businesses damaged) ii. Between 75% and 100% higher iii. Between 50% and 75% higher iv. Between 25% and 50% higher v. Between 10% and 25% higher vi. Less than 10% higher vii. Unaltered
– Qualitatively, how would you assess the potential physical damage to surrounding buildings in the absence of ND assets ?
10 The use of large volumes of foam and water in the foam attack gave rise to fears over water contamination , especially because part of the foam used in the Buncefield incident contained PFOS.
– 26 million litres of contaminated fire water were contained on the site, an off-site pool of 200m x 10m to 20m was formed and contamination was recorded in rivers up to 2 km from the depot site. In the absence of ND equipment , would the environmental damage have been:
i At least 100% higher ii 50-100% higher iii 25-50% higher iv Up to 25% higher v Unaltered vi Up to 25% lower vii Up to 50% lower viii More than 50% lower
– Qualitatively, how would you assess the potential damage to the environment in the absence of ND assets ?
11 Several types of damage are related to the length of the fire . It took more than 102 hours to extinguish the fire. In the absence of ND equipment , the fire would have burnt: Appendix B Survey questionnaires used in the assessment of outcome benefits | 137
i. At least 100% longer (more than 8 days in total) ii. 75-100% longer iii. 50-75% longer iv. 25%-50% longer v. Up to 25% longer vi. Approximately as long
12 The Buncefield fire triggered a major evacuation of the area and the rescue activities disrupted the activities of local businesses and road traffic in the area.
– 2000 people were evacuated during the fire. In the absence of ND equipment , the number of evacuations would have been:
i. At least 100% higher (more than 4000 people) ii. 75-100% higher iii. 50-75% higher iv. 25%-50% higher v. Up to 25% higher vi. Approximately as high
– The duration of the evacuation and the cordoning of the surrounding area in the absence of the ND equipment would have been:
i. At least 100% longer ii. 75-100% longer iii. 50-75% longer iv. 25%-50% longer v. Up to 25% longer vi. Approximately as long
– Qualitatively, how would the absence of ND equipment have affected the disruption of local businesses and the length of the evacuation?
– Qualitatively, how would the absence of ND equipment have affected the disruption of road traffic?
13 Miraculously, the incident did not claim any fatalities .169 No one was severely physically wounded in the Buncefield incident. Only three people were admitted to hospital, the longest stay was two days. Forty-three people are reported to have been injured.
169 The version of the questionnaire used in the interviews incorrectly stated: “ miraculously, the incident did not claim any casualties. ” We do not believe this had any impact on the answers provided by the interviewees. 138 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
– Which of the following options would have been a likely outcome of the incident in the absence of ND equipment (please select one option per type of injury, unless you think there would have been no change at all):
i. More than 10 fatalities ii. 5-10 fatalities iii. 1-5 fatalities iv. More than 20 severe injuries v. 10-20 severe injuries vi. 5-10 severe injuries vii. 1-5 severe injuries viii. More than 100 minor injuries ix. 75-100 minor injuries x. 50-75 minor injuries xi. No change
– In broader terms, how would the absence of ND equipment have affected the extent of physical and psychological injury caused by the incident?
14 Regarding the damage prevented by ND equipment in the Buncefield incident, are there any remaining elements you would like to draw our attention to?
Other Incidents
15 Did you use the ND equipment in any other large incidents ? If so, could you briefly describe the incident, how the equipment was used and give an appreciation of its usefulness?
16 Did you use the ND equipment in any smaller incidents ? If so, could you briefly describe the type of incidents, how this equipment was used and give an appreciation of its usefulness? B.2 Summer 2007 flooding incidents in Gloucestershire
To estimate the ‘wider’ benefits of the programme, we are investigating a number of incidents in which ND equipment was used, including the flooding incidents in the summer of 2007.
We have already researched available evidence on the incident and we are now conducting in-depth interviews with FRS personnel, members of the National Coordination Centre and others. Appendix B Survey questionnaires used in the assessment of outcome benefits | 139
You are one of the experts whom we identified as having first hand experience of the incident and/or the use of ND equipment. We hope you can help us understand which ND assets and resources were deployed, and what effects these resources had on the nature and magnitude of the damages incurred.
The incident
We would like to gain more insight into the incident on the basis of the following questions:
1 Could you briefly describe the most important flooding incident [attended by your fire service] in the summer of 2007? In particular, could you specify which area was affected by this incident?
2 Could you briefly describe your role in the rescue operation?
3 Could you briefly describe the deployment of ND equipment during the flooding incident identified above? In particular, which pieces of equipment were mobilised and how were they used?
4 Could you give an overall appreciation of how useful the ND equipment and training was for the fire service’s response to the summer 2007 flooding incident?
5 In particular, would a large scale pumping operation (if applicable) have been possible in the absence of ND equipment?
6 Has the pumping operation prevented any further flooding damage , or was it mainly used to clear areas that had already been hit by flooding?
Cost savings brought by ND equipment
The following questions will focus on the different types of damage brought by the flooding. Where available, we will provide figures describing the actual impact of the flooding incident and ask you to provide an estimate of the damage in the absence of ND assets (on a percentage scale of the actual damage). If we could not identify any reliable information, we will ask you to present your best estimate of the actual damage.
7 The 2007 floods caused substantial damage to houses, businesses and public buildings throughout England and Wales.
– In the incident [your FRS attended,] what is your best estimate of the number of houses, businesses and public buildings that were damaged ?
– In the absence of ND equipment , would this number have been: 140 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
i At least 100% higher ii Between 75% and 100% higher iii Between 50% and 75% higher iv Between 25% and 50% higher v Between 10% and 25% higher vi Less than 10% higher vii Unaltered
– How many houses were left uninhabitable due to the floods?
– In the absence of ND equipment , would the number of uninhabitable houses have increased by the same factor as the number of damaged houses?
– What was the average duration during which houses, businesses and public buildings were flooded?
– In the absence of ND equipment , this average duration would have been:
i More than three times as high ii Between two and three times as high iii At least two times as high iv Between 75% and 100% higher v Between 50% and 75% higher vi Between 25% and 50% higher vii Between 10% and 25% higher viii Less than 10% higher
– Qualitatively, how would you assess the potential physical damage to buildings in the absence of ND assets ?
8 The summer 2007 floods caused major losses in agricultural land .
– What is your best estimate of the acres of agricultural land that were lost in the incident [your FRS attended]?
– In the absence of ND equipment , would the area of agricultural land lost have been:
i At least 100% higher ii Between 75% and 100% higher iii Between 50% and 75% higher iv Between 25% and 50% higher v Between 10% and 25% higher vi Less than 10% higher vii Unaltered
– What was the average duration during which agricultural land was flooded? Appendix B Survey questionnaires used in the assessment of outcome benefits | 141
– In the absence of ND equipment , this duration would have been:
i More than three times as high ii Between two and three times as high iii At least two times as high iv Between 75% and 100% higher v Between 50% and 75% higher vi Between 25% and 50% higher vii Between 10% and 25% higher viii Less than 10% higher
– Qualitatively, how would you assess the potential damage to agricultural land in the absence of ND assets ?
9 Road and railroad traffic are often disrupted by flooding incidents.
– What is your best estimate of the length of roads and railroad tracks that were closed off due to floods (either because of rescue activities or structural damage)?
– In the absence of ND equipment , would this estimate have been:
i More than three times as high ii Between two and three times as high iii At least two times as high iv Between 75% and 100% higher v Between 50% and 75% higher vi Between 25% and 50% higher vii Between 10% and 25% higher viii Less than 10% higher ix Unaltered
– For how many days were roads and/or railways closed off on average?
– In the absence of ND equipment , the duration of these closures would have been:
i More than three times as high ii Between two and three times as high iii At least two times as high iv Between 75% and 100% higher v Between 50% and 75% higher vi Between 25% and 50% higher vii Between 10% and 25% higher viii Less than 10% higher
– Qualitatively, how would you assess the disruption of road and railway traffic in the absence of ND assets? 142 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
10 Several flooding incidents triggered a major evacuation of people living in the affected area.
– What is your best estimate of the number of people evacuated and/or rescued in the flooding incident [attended by your FRS]?
– In the absence of ND equipment , the number of evacuations would have been:
i At least 100% higher ii 75-100% higher iii 50-75% higher iv 25%-50% higher v Up to 25% higher vi Approximately as high
– How long did the evacuations last on average (in days)?
– In the absence of the ND equipment , this average duration would have been:
i More than three times as high ii Between two and three times as high iii At least two times as high iv At least 100% longer v 75-100% longer vi 50-75% longer vii 25%-50% longer viii Up to 25% longer ix Approximately as long
– Qualitatively, how would the absence of ND assets have affected the evacuation requirements?
11 Nationwide, the 2007 floods claimed several casualties .
– In the incident [attended by your FRS,] were there any casualties?
– How would you assess the number of casualties in the absence of ND equipment (please select all likely outcomes)? Appendix B Survey questionnaires used in the assessment of outcome benefits | 143
i More than 5 fatalities ii 1-5 fatalities iii 1 fatality iv More than 20 severe injuries v 10-20 severe injuries vi 5-10 severe injuries vii 1-5 severe injuries viii More than 100 minor injuries ix 75-100 minor injuries x 50-75 minor injuries xi No casualties
– How many people were rescued by the FRS?
– How many people would have been rescued without ND equipment ?
i As much ii 10% les iii 10-25% less iv 25-50% less v Less than 50% less
– Would these victims include members of the public, rescue workers or both?
– In broader terms, how would the absence of ND equipment have affected the extent of physical and psychological injury caused by the floods?
12 Several rescue operations during the 2007 flooding focused on preventing the loss of essential services (such as water or electricity).
– Which essential services in the flooding [attended by your FRS] were disrupted? How long did the disruption last and how many people were affected?
– Which (additional) essential services could have been disrupted in the absence of ND equipment ?
i Electricity ii Water iii Gas iv None
– How long did the actual disruptions last?
– In the absence of the ND equipment, the duration of the disruptions would have been: 144 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
i More than three times as high ii Between two and three times as high iii At least two times as high iv At least 100% longer v 75-100% longer vi 50-75% longer vii 25%-50% longer viii Up to 25% longer ix Approximately as long
– How many people were affected by the disruptions?
– In the absence of ND equipment , how many people would have been affected?
i Less than 50,000 ii 50,000 – 100,000 iii 100,000 – 200,000 iv 200,000 – 300,000 v 300,000 – 400,000 vi 400,000 – 500,000 vii More than 500,000
13 Regarding the damage prevented by ND equipment during the summer 2007 flooding, are there any remaining elements you would like to draw our attention to?
Other incidents
14 Did you use the ND equipment in any other large incidents ? If so, could you briefly describe the incident, how the equipment was used and give an appreciation of its usefulness?
15 Did you use the ND equipment in any smaller incidents ? If so, could you briefly describe the type of incidents, how this equipment was used and give an appreciation of its usefulness? B.3 Smaller incidents
1 Please provide a brief summary of the incident (nature of the incident, location, damage incurred, number of persons affected, etc.)
2 Please describe the FRS response to the incident (and the use of New Dimension assets in particular)
3 Please provide an overview of the benefits associated with New Dimension (eg, reduction in collateral damage resulting from the use of New Dimension equipment) Appendix B Survey questionnaires used in the assessment of outcome benefits | 145
4 Specific benefit metrics: please describe and quantify where possible (relative to a situation without New Dimension)
– Reduced the number of fatalities or injuries?
– Reduced emotional suffering?
– Contained or reduced material damage (e.g. damage to domestic property, commercial property, public infrastructure)?
– Returned impacted areas to public or commercial use in a shorter period of time?
– Reduced the impact on commercial interests?
– Reduced the impacts on the environment (e.g. air pollution, C02 emissions, noise, water contamination)?
– Helped contain FRS resource deployment and response costs?
– Helped reduce pressure on other emergency services?
– Increased capability outside New Dimension?
– Other benefits? 146 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Appendix C Monetisation assumptions
This appendix sets out the values used to monetise benefits in stage 2 of the study, together with a description of relevant sources. C.1 Material damage from fires or floods
We considered four broad approaches for monetising material damage:
• direct reports of damage
• claims filed in court or with insurers
• using information on the number of affected units in conjunction with average damage estimates from secondary sources and
• use of secondary sources with no detailed information from primary sources
We choose to follow the third approach, using information on the number of damaged properties by type and average damage estimates.
For fires, ODPM (2006) provides average material damage cost per fire for different categories of property. 170 These average costs are based on ABI insurance statistics.
Table C.1 Monetisation of material damage
Value Units Year Source Notes
Domestic fire £7,303 per domestic fire Average property Commercial fire £27,676 per commercial fire 2004 ODPM (2006) damage per fire, based Public sector fire £27,676 per public sector fire on insurance data.
Source: ODPM (2006), The Economic Cost of Fire: Estimates for 2004
Although these damage costs relate to fires, they could also be used as a first approximation of damage costs in explosions or other similar incidents where properties experience significant structural damage. This also includes smaller incidents such as building collapses.
170 ODPM, The Economic Cost of Fire: Estimates for 2004 , Apr 2006 Appendix C Monetisation assumptions | 147
For flooding, detailed information on material damage by property type is unavailable. The Pitt Review provides estimates of the average payout as a result of the summer 2007 flooding. The average payout lies between £15,000 and £45,000. Information from the ABI indicates that the average payout for a house with half a metre of flooding is between £30,000 and £40,000. Flooding by surface water only results in lower average claims. There is no evidence for a link between the duration of flooding and the cost of damage .
C.1.1 Loss of agricultural land
The Pitt report provides estimates of the damage to agricultural land in the summer 2007 flooding. The cost is estimated to be £2,670 to £6,675 per farm, which relates to the losses experienced as a result of loss of crops, reduced yield, or lower quality.
C.1.2 Business interruptions
ODPM (2006) reports the average cost of lost business per commercial fire to be £3,122. This is based on ABI data on insurance claims for business interruption. The average costs of lost business by location are shown in the table below.
Table C.2 Average cost of lost business per incident
Location of fire Value Units Year Source All incidents £100 All fires £100 All Primary fires £300 Building £500 average cost 2004 ODPM (2006) Commercial £3,100 per incident (£) Agricultural £3,100 Industrial £3,100 Trade £3,100
Source: ODPM (2006), The Economic Cost of Fire: Estimates for 2004
The key methodological concern is that a loss of output for firms affected by a fire may not translate into a loss to society (of equal magnitude), because firms other than those affected by the incident can be expected to take over business. Previous estimates have assumed that the loss to society is half of the value of claims for business interruption. 171
The value of a lost working day is reported by the Confederation of British Industry as £517 per employee. This is the average direct cost of absence, based on a study relating to the costs of sick leave. This includes lost production and the expense of covering absence with temporary staff or overtime.
171 See ODPM (2006), The Economic Cost of Fire: Estimates for 2004 , p.16 148 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Lost business can also be measured using adjusted output data. BERR (2008), SME Statistics for the UK and Regions 2007 contains data on small and medium sized enterprises, on annual turnover by number of employees and industry on a regional basis. Table C.3 shows number of enterprises, employment and turnover by government office region, along with average turnover per enterprise.
Table C.3 Number of enterprises, employment and turnover in the private sector at the start of 2007, by industry section and government office region/country
All Industries Enterprises Employment Turnover Average annual turnover per enterprise (thousands) (£ millions) (£ millions) United Kingdom 4,679,080 22,734 2,794,684 0.6 North East 133,620 675 61,305 0.5 North West 444,150 2,109 210,932 0.5 Yorkshire and the Humber 349,930 1,886 179,675 0.5 East Midlands 327,300 1,736 175,791 0.5 West Midlands 376,315 1,938 211,039 0.6 East of England 512,455 2,446 306,564 0.6 London 757,685 4,046 749,201 1.0 South East 740,785 3,342 458,881 0.6 South West 417,910 1,716 159,771 0.4 England 4,060,155 19,895 2,513,160 0.6 Wales 194,560 737 69,317 0.4 Scotland 292,330 1,570 160,720 0.5 Northern Ireland 132,040 533 51,488 0.4
Source: BERR Enterprise Directorate Analytical Unit
Table C.4 on the next page shows the number of enterprises, employment and turnover for the “Wholesale, Retail and Repairs, Hotels and Restaurants” industry in London. Appendix C Monetisation assumptions | 149
Table C.4 Number of enterprises, employment and turnover in the private sector at the start of 2007, by size of enterprise and industry section in London
Wholesale, Retail & Enterprises Employment Turnover Average annual Repairs; Hotels & turnover per Restaurants enterprise (thousands) (£ millions) (£ millions) All enterprises 98,735 1,170 320,088 3.2 With no employees 52,535 58 11,083 0.2 All employers 46,200 1,111 309,005 6.7 1-4 30,490 89 23,490 0.8 5-9 8,570 58 20,008 2.3 10-19 4,190 57 23,512 5.6 20-49 1,775 54 50,158 28.3 50-99 560 39 20,846 37.2 100-199 275 38 10,894 39.6 200-249 65 14 17,453 268.5 250-499 130 44 62,710 482.4 500 or more 155 718 79,936 515.7
Source: BERR Enterprise Directorate Analytical Unit
The estimates of the cost of “lost business” from fires reported in ODPM (2006) are probably applicable to other incidents (with comparable recovery times), as the reason for business interruption should not affect the value of lost business from interruptions of a given duration. These estimates, however, are only available on a “per incident” basis and cannot be used to monetise changes in the duration of incidents and business interruptions.
In the end, we have used an estimate of gross value added per person per day , derived from National Statistics data. This estimate of £90 per day is a national average based on £20,000 gross value added per person and 220 working days per year. 172
C.1.3 Inventory losses
Inventory losses may be experienced by businesses as a result of fires, floods or any other incidents that cause damage to commercial property. The focus for this study is the loss of fuel at Buncefield.
Fuel loss at Buncefield can be valued by the wholesale price of the types of fuel that were lost in the incident. This market value is used as a proxy for estimating the losses. The Energy Information Administration, a section of the US Department of Energy, collects data on spot prices for crude oil and petroleum products. These prices for the 12 December 2005, the closest date to the Buncefield incident, are shown in the Table C.5 below.
172 As reported in SQW (2006), page 20. 150 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Table C.5 Spot prices for petroleum products
Type of Fuel Value Units Year Source Notes Petrol 0.40 Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp Burning 0.45 EIA, Spot Prices (ARA) 10ppm Conventional for Crude Oil Gasoline Regular Spot Price Aviation turbine 0.42 $ per litre 2005 and Petroleum New York Harbour No. 2 DERV (diesel) 0.46 Products Heating Oil Spot Price Gas oil 0.41 Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel Spot Price New York Harbour No 2 Diesel Low Sulphur Spot Price Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) Gas oil Spot Price
Source: Energy Information Administration
C.2 Air quality damage
Defra issued a general guideline for assessing an air quality impact, Air Quality Damage Cost Guidance .173 This report provides estimates of the environmental costs per tonne of emission of 3 pollutants: particulate matter (PM 10 ), oxides of nitrogen (NO X) and sulphur dioxide (SO 2). The costs included in the analysis are chronic mortality effects, chronic morbidity effects, impact on building soil (only for PM 10 ) and damage to materials (only for SO 2).
For Carbon Dioxide we follow Defra guidance on the cost of carbon, as stated in How to Use the Shadow Price of Carbon in Policy Appraisal .174 The shadow price of carbon reflects the damage costs of each additional tonne of greenhouse gas emitted.
Our recommended values are shown in the table below.
Table C.6 Air quality damage costs
Pollutant Value Units Year Source Notes Low High
CO 2 £26 £26 2007 Defra Shadow cost of carbon PM £1,738 £2,522 £ per Annual pulse damage costs, Defra NO X £1,363 £1,986 tonne 2005 for Electricity Supply Industry (2006) 175 SO 2 £2,219 £3,168 Annual pulse damage costs Source: Defra (2006), Air Quality Damage Cost Guidance, and Defra, Climate Change: Valuing Emissions, http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/research/carboncost/index.htm
173 Interdepartmental Group on Costs and Benefits (2006), Air Quality Damage Cost Guidance 174 See http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/research/carboncost/step2.htm 175 These are the damage cost values to be used as estimates for the annual pulse approach. This approach refers to the impact of a one year change in emissions. Appendix C Monetisation assumptions | 151
C.3 Human costs
C.3.1 Casualties
We take values from DfT (2007) for the cost of fatalities and injuries. These values are shown in the table below.
Table C.7 Cost of fatalities and injuries
Type of casualty Value Units Year Fatality £1,428,180 £ per fatality Severe injury £160,480 £ per injury 2005 Minor injury £12,370 £ per injury
Source: Department for Transport
As shown in the table, a 2005 estimate of the value of prevention of a fatal injury in a road accident is £1.43m; taking account of lost output, human costs and medical and ambulance costs.
These DfT values are widely used throughout government. For example, ODPM (2006) mentions that values of fatalities and injuries used in estimating the economic cost of fire should be based on the DfT estimates.
C.3.2 Emotional suffering
Apart from suffering directly related to injuries and fatalities (which DfT estimates do already take into account), catastrophic events may cause distress to a large number of people through fear of death or injury during the event, fear of death or injury in the future, or stress caused by the loss of possessions.
Based on a survey of flood victims in 30 locations in England and Wales, a Flood Hazard Research Centre (FRHC) study concludes that “about two thirds of flood victims suffered from mental health problems at some point after the flooding, while some also had long term mental health effects.” 176 These psychological effects were much more common than any physical effects and the most frequent symptom was anxiety when it rains.
Defra and the Environment Agency provide guidelines on the appraisal of the intangible impact of floods ( “stress-related health impacts and loss of, or damage to, irreplaceable personal possessions” 177 ). The report finds that “the mean willingness to pay to avoid stress effects associated with flooding is about £200 per year per household”. 178
176 Quoted from: ESRC Society Today Website (Auth: Arild Foss), The Economic Cost of Flooding , 2007 177 Defra, Appraisal of the Human Related Intangible Impacts of Flooding , R&D Technical Report, 2005, p9 178 Defra, Appraisal of the Human Related Intangible Impacts of Flooding , R&D Technical Report, 2005, p85 152 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Another attempt to monetize these costs is made in a review of the England autumn 2000 floods estimates total intangible damages at 20 per cent of tangible damage, made up of 5 per cent for stress related costs and 15 per cent for other damages. 179
We were unable to locate similar estimates for stress or emotional suffering related to fires, explosions or other incidents. C.4 Value of a school day
The value of a lost school day per pupil can be derived from the funding received by schools per pupil per year, published by the Department for Children, Schools and Families.
In the 2006-2007 academic year, with base year 2007-2008, revenue and capital funding per pupil was £5,220. Based on a 190 day school year, this equates to a value per day of £27. C.5 Disruption to essential services
The disruption of essential services such as gas or electricity often has an important impact on customers.
ICF Consulting (2003) finds that the willingness to pay to avoid an electricity outage is 80 to 100 times the retail electricity price. 180
A willingness to pay estimate of £1.03 per minute per customer is cited in Yu, Jamasb and Pollitt (2007). 181 This estimate is based on survey work carried out on behalf of Ofgem, and measures the value per minute reduction to the average power cut for Central Networks West. This is the distribution network operator that supplied Gloucestershire at the time of the flooding incident. As this is the willingness to pay to reduce the average power cut duration, it is less useful for estimating the value of a specific power cut.
Carlsson et al. (2004) finds a weighted average willingness to pay of £0.012 per minute for unplanned disruption to electricity supply. 182 This value is based on a survey of willingness to pay to avoid one outage of a given duration (within a range of 1 to 24 hours).
179 Penning-Rowsell E.C., Chatterton J.B., Wilson T.E., Autumn 2000 floods in England and Wales: Assessment of national economic and financial losses , Draft Final Report to the Environment Agency, March 2002, Middlesex University, Flood Hazards Research Centre, Enfield. 180 ICF Consulting (2003), The Economic Cost of the Blackout 181 Yu, Jamasb and Pollitt (2007), Incorporating the Price of Quality in Efficiency Analysis: the Case of Electricity Distribution Regulation in the UK 182 From Carlsson and Martinsson (2004), Willingness to Pay Among Swedish Households to Avoid Power Outages – A Random Parameter Tobit Model Approach Appendix C Monetisation assumptions | 153
Another approach is to use the incentive rate given by Ofgem to Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) as a reward for reductions in “Customer Minutes Lost”. DNOs have a target for the average number of minutes of electricity lost per customer in a year. The incentive rate for the number of minutes lost per customer is £0.15m per customer minute lost (i.e. DNO would have to pay £0.15m for each 1-minute increment over the target). This value however reflects the extra cost born by all – or many – customers and cannot be easily adjusted to meet the needs of this study.
There are also costs associated with the disruption of mains water supplies. Work by NERA Economic Consulting for Thames Water in 2006 indicates customers would be willing to pay £53.30 to lower the annual expected number of days of rationing of public water supplies by one. This is based on water supply rationing of rota-cuts or standpipes. The equivalent value for businesses is £845.40. C.6 Road and railway closure
We were unable to locate estimates of the costs of road and rail closures. These costs are likely to vary considerably depending on individual circumstances such as the level of traffic on the road/railway, the purpose of journeys made, and the availability of substitute routes.
The Highways Agency estimates that an incident involving a total road closure costs the UK PLC on average £4,140 for every kilometre of traffic delayed by one hour. However, this estimate is not directly applicable to road closures caused by flooding or other incidents, as the nature of the road closure would not necessarily result in a queue, but would instead lead to changes in journey plans and routes.
For rail closures, one possible approach to estimating economic costs would be to consider i) the duration of delay, ii) the number of passengers affected (either directly or indirectly, through the rail network) and iii) the passengers’ value of time (possibly adjusted). The extra costs incurred by train operating companies, and possibly the rail infrastructure manager, would have to be considered as well.
This approach however is not directly applicable to the rail closures caused by the summer 2007 flooding, during which trains were not simply delayed by flooding, but could not run at all; and a number of passengers were stranded as a result. There are, to our knowledge, no readily available estimates to monetise these effects. 154 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
C.7 Values of time for road users
Recommended values of time for road users are provided in WebTAG, the Department for Transport’s website for guidance on the conduct of transport studies. 183 Values are provided for both working and non-working time, and for working time these values are split by mode. Values of time per person are combined with average vehicle occupancies to produce values of time per vehicle. These values (all week averages) are illustrated in the table below.
Table C.8 Values of time for road users
Vehicle Journey Purpose Value of Time (£/hour, 2002 prices and values) Car Work 30.18 Commuting 5.74 Other 8.21 Average Car 10.46 Light Goods Vehicle (LGV) Work (freight) 12.22 Non-work 7.29 Average LGV 11.63 Other Goods Vehicles 1 184 (OGV1) Working 10.18 Other Goods Vehicles 2 (OGV2) Working 10.18 Public Service Vehicle (PSV) Work 17.33 Commuting 12.61 Other 41.68 Total 71.62
Source: Department for Transport
The GB National Road Traffic Survey is undertaken by the Department for Transport. It produces estimated traffic flows on every link of all “A” roads and motorways in Great Britain. Annual average daily flows (AADFs) are measured in number of vehicles, and are equal to the average over a year of the number of vehicles passing a particular point in the road network each day.
We use AADF data from the GB National Road Traffic Survey for Commercial Road, Whitechapel (the A13). 185 The AADF of motor vehicles on Commercial Road is 36,255, of which there are 25,101 cars, 864 buses and coaches, 6,436 light goods vehicles and 1,612 heavy goods vehicles (all types).
183 Source: http://www.dft.gov.uk/webtag/webdocuments/3_Expert/5_Economy_Objective/3.5.6.htm#012 184 OGV1 vehicles include two-axle or three-axle rigid goods vehicles. OGV2 vehicles include three-axle to six-axle or more articulated goods vehicles, or four-axle rigid goods vehicles. 185 Source: Department for Transport, http://www.dft-matrix.net/dftmatrix Appendix C Monetisation assumptions | 155
C.8 Cost of Ambulance Services
Average unit costs per patient journey in a paramedic unit and emergency ambulance are provided in PSSRU (2008), “Unit Costs of Health and Social Care”. This average unit cost is £344 for a paramedic unit and £263 for an emergency ambulance. This is based on information from one Ambulance Trust that provided information for 1994/95, which has been updated using hospital and community health services (HCHS) inflators. C.9 Cost of Police Services
The Home Office estimate the cost of police time at £33.03 per hour. This estimate is based on analysis of a number of sources, including the 2005 Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) produced by National Statistics, and 2005 CIPFA Police Actuals. 186
Another approach to estimating police costs consists of using charges for special services (eg, the charges football clubs have to pay). These are based on full economic cost recovery and include wage, employer’s contributions to pension and national insurance, overheads, overtime premium, uniform costs, accommodation allowances, etc. The charges vary by police authority and type of officer.
For example:
• London Metropolitan Police Authority: the standard hourly rate varies between £55.42 for a Constable to £223.17 for an Assistant Commissioner 187
• West Midlands Police Authority: the standard hourly rate varies between £54.69 for a Constable to £98.55 for a Chief Superintendent 188
186 As reported in http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/ia-police-crime-bill-08/ia-persistent-drinking-young?view=Binary, page 8. 187 Source: http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/committees/f/080221-06-appendix02.pdf ; Table 1 page 33 188 Source: Current Fees and Chargeable Rates 2008/9, http://www.west- midlands.police.uk/pdf/FOI/Fees%20and%20Charges.pdf ; page 5 156 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Appendix D Performance indicator summary tables
Table D.1 Performance indicators for the Buncefield oil storage depot disaster
Indicators Quantify Monetary Unit Value Source / Comments (yes/no) Benefit (observed, (yes/no) with ND) General Area affected by fire YNm2 80,000 Buncefield Investigation Board, Third progress Report , p14 Area affected by YNkm radius 2 Buncefield Investigation Board, explosion(s) Initial Report , p13 Tanks on fire YNtanks 22 Duration of fire YNhh:mm 102:28 Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service, Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response , 3 Nov 2006 Property Damage and Associated Economic Impacts Damage to fire site YYUSD 150 million Benfield Corporate Risk Newsletter, Buncefield Terminal – A Remarkable Event, spring 2006 Fuel loss, including petrol YY 18.4 to 36.7 Defra, Initial review of Air burning YYmillions 9.0 to 18.0 Quality aspects of the aviation turbine fuel YYof 14.0 to 28.0 Buncefield Oil Depot Explosion , DERV (diesel) YYlitres 7.9 to 15.8 May 2006 gas oil YY 3.3 to 6.5 Domestic properties YYhouses at least 548 Dacorum Borough Council damaged Website, Buncefield One Year On – Homes and Housing , 2006 Average damage to YY£ £9,000 Based on the total amount of domestic properties claims from individuals (£30 million, including non housing claims), submitted ahead of the civil case. Over 3,300 claims submitted. Businesses physically YYbusinesses 90 SQW, April 2006, p17 (severely damaged impacted firms) Total physical damage YY£ million £57 to £77 SQW, April 2006, p22 to businesses million Value of lost net output YY£ million £70 to £88 SQW, April 2006, p22 (gross value added) million Appendix D Performance indicator summary tables | 157
Table D.1 Performance indicators for the Buncefield oil storage depot disaster – contd
Indicators Quantify Monetary Unit Value Source / Comments (yes/no) Benefit (observed, (yes/no) with ND) Business interruptions YYdays of 1,598 SQW, April 2006 non operation across businesses Worker days lost YYtotal 81,570 SQW, April 2006 worker days lost Area evacuated YNkm radius 0.805 Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service, Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response , 3 Nov 2006, p6 People evacuated YYpersons more than Buncefield Investigation Board, 2,000 First Progress report , p4 Average duration of YYdays 2.0 NERA assumption (about 50% evacuation of total duration of fire) Damage to public YY£ 2,200,000 SQW, April 2006, p34 infrastructure Schools closed YYschools 227 Hertfordshire Council Website Child school days lost YYpupil days unknown n/a Length of road closure YYkm unknown Sections of M1, M10 and M25 closed (Major Incident Investigation Board) Duration of road YYdays unknown Variable, possibly equal to closure entire duration of fire Disruption of airport YYUSD $1million per Financial Times, Heathrow and fuel supplies non UK carrier airlines agree fuel rationing, per day 10 Feb 2006 Human, Health & Social Impacts Fatalities YYfatalities 0 Buncefield Investigation Board, First Progress report , p4 Severe injuries YYinjuries 0 Buncefield Investigation Board, First Progress report , p5 Non-severe injuries YYinjuries 43 Buncefield Investigation Board, First Progress report , p7 People “potentially YNpersons at least 2,000 Based on number of persons emotionally affected” evacuated by incident (damage, loss, injury, evacuation) Stress and emotional NNn/a 189 several Collins Solicitors, Pay Back Time, suffering reports of 25 October 2006 severe anxiety
189 In this table, n/a means not applicable 158 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Table D.1 Performance indicators for the Buncefield oil storage depot disaster – contd
Indicators Quantify Monetary Unit Value Source / Comments (yes/no) Benefit (observed, (yes/no) with ND) Environmental Impacts Duration of main plume YNdays at least Defra, Initial review of Air Quality 2 days aspects of the Buncefield Oil Depot Explosion , May 2006 Contaminated area YNkm radius 2 EA Website, Buncefield Latest News , December 2007 Air pollution: CO2 YY 144,000 tonnes Defra, Initial review of Air Air pollution: PM10 YY 8,250 emitted Quality aspects of the Buncefield Air pollution: PM2.5 YYin fire 4,950 Oil Depot Explosion , May 2006 Air pollution: NOx YY 37 Water used in response YNlitres 68,000,000 Buncefield Investigation Board, Initial report, p8 Foam used in response YNlitres 786,000 Buncefield Investigation Board, Initial report, p8 Water contamination YYlitres of 800,000 Buncefield Investigation Board, contam- litres plus a Second Progress report, p11 inated pool of water 100m x 15m escaped Opportunity cost from YY£ over £2 Buncefield Investigation Board, closure of borehole million Final report, p26 (this is the only used for water environmental impact quantified abstraction in the report) Source: NERA analysis, from various sources (as listed) Appendix D Performance indicator summary tables | 159
Table D.2 Performance indicators for the summer 2007 flooding in Gloucestershire
Indicators Quantify Monetary Unit Value Source (yes/no) Benefit (observed, (yes/no) with ND) Property Damage, Evacuations and Rescues Houses damaged YYhouses 4,000 Susanne Smith Average damage to YY£/house £20,000 Based on aggregate houses statistics provided by ABI (total pay out divided by total number of claims, nationwide) Businesses physically YYbusinesses 750 Susanne Smith damaged Average damage to YY£/business £20,000 Based on aggregate businesses statistics provided by ABI (total pay out divided by total number of claims, nationwide) Average duration of YYdays 2 to 10 Pete House flooding (houses or businesses) People evacuated YYpersons 1,950 Gloucestershire County Council, “Scrutiny Inquiry into Flood Emergency – Final Report” Average duration of YYdays 2 Alan Hoar evacuation People rescued YNpersons 529 Alan Hoar and others Agricultural land lost YYfarms 175 Susanne Smith Average duration of YYweeks 2 Alan Hoar flooding (farm land) Damage to Schools and Public Infrastructure Schools damaged and YYschools 20 closed Gloucestershire County Council, “Scrutiny Inquiry Child school days lost YYpupil days minimal due into Flood Emergency – to timing of Final Report” incident Total damage to schools YY£ £4.3 million Length of road closure YYkm unknown n/a Duration of road closure YYdays 2 Susanne Smith; consistent with Alan Hoar’s estimated duration of 1-3 days Total damage to road network YY£ £21 million Susanne Smith Length of railway YYkm unknown n/a closure Duration of railway YYdays 1 Pete House closure Total damage to YY£ unknown n/a railway network 160 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Table D.2 Performance indicators for the summer 2007 flooding in Gloucestershire – contd
Indicators Quantify Monetary Unit Value Source (yes/no) Benefit (observed, (yes/no) with ND) Loss of Essential Services Disruption to electricity YYpersons 42,000 to Gloucestershire County supply: Castle Meads affected 48,000 Council, “Scrutiny Inquiry into Flood Emergency – Final Report” Average duration of YYdays 1 to 2 disruption: Castle Meads Disruption to electricity YYpersons 0 supply: Walham affected Average duration of YYdays 0 disruption: Walham Disruption to water: YYpersons 350,000 Mythe and persons businesses 7,500 affected firms Average duration of YYdays 12 to 17 disruption: Mythe Human, Health & Social Impacts Fatalities YYfatalities 3 Gloucestershire County Council, “Scrutiny Inquiry into Flood Emergency – Final Report” Severe injuries YYinjuries unknown n/a Non-severe injuries YYinjuries unknown n/a People “potentially YYpersons at least Based on the number emotionally affected” 4,000 of houses damaged by incident (damage, loss, injury, evacuation) Stress and emotional suffering NNn/a 190 n/a n/a
Source: NERA analysis, from various sources (as listed)
190 In this table, n/a means not applicable Appendix E Summary of selected business benefits and operational incidents forms | 161
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Appendix F Glossary
BVPI Best value performance indicator CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear CIPFA Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy CFOA Chief fire officers association CFS Community fire safety DIM Detection, identification and monitoring ECS Enhanced command support vehicles FRA Fire and rescue authority FRD Fire and resilience directorate FRS Fire and rescue service(s) FRSNCC FRS National Co-ordination Centre FSC Fire Services College HAZMAT Hazardous material HVP High volume pump IRMP Integrated risk management plans IRS Incident recording system IRU Incident response unit LTCM Long term capability management MD Mass decontamination MD4 Firefighter decontamination structure MPV Multi-purpose vehicle ND New Dimension NDP New Dimension Programme NHS National Health Service NRAT National resilience advisory team PRPS Powered respirator protective suits PSA Public sector agreement RTC Road traffic collision SOP Standard operating procedures SSI Special services incidents UKFSSART UK fire service search and rescue team USAR Urban search and rescue 168 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
Appendix G References and Data Sources
G.1 Background information on stage 2 incidents
G.1.1 Buncefield oil storage depot disaster
• BBC Beds, Herts & Bucks, Travel Chaos after Depot Blast, 11 Dec 2006
• BBC Beds, Herts & Bucks, Interview with Doug Robinson, 15 Dec 2005
• BBC News, How Buncefield Fire Unfolded, 13 Jul 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4525504.stm
• BBC News, Buncefield explosion: One year on, 11 Dec 2006
• BBC News, How Buncefield fire unfolded, 13 Jan 2008
• BBC News, Buncefield Blast Worker Negligent, 23 May 2008
• Benfield Corporate Risk Newsletter, Buncefield Terminal – A Remarkable Event?, spring 2006
• Buncefield Investigation Board, First Progress Report , 21 Feb 2006
• Buncefield Investigation Board, Second Progress Report , 11 Apr 2006
• Buncefield Investigation Board, Third Progress Report , 9 May 2006
• Buncefield Investigation Board, Recommendations on the emergency preparedness for, response to and recovery from major incidents , 17 Jul 2007
• Collins Solicitors, Pay Back Time, 25 Oct 2006
• The Community Recovery Taskforce, Report 2005-2007
• Dacorum Borough Council Website, Buncefield One Year On – Homes and Housing , 2006
• Dacorum Borough Council, Buncefield Report (http://www.dacorum.gov.uk/pdf/buncefield-report.pdf)
• Defra, Initial review of Air Quality aspects of the Buncefield Oil Depot Explosion , May 2006 Appendix G References and Data Sources | 169
• EEDA, The Buncefield Oil Depot Incident – Economic and business confidence impact study , Apr 2006
• Financial Times, Heathrow and airlines agree fuel rationing, 10 Feb 2006
• Financial Times, Total admission will streamline Buncefield trial, 24 May 2008
• FRS 17, Behind the Scenes at Buncefield, Apr 2006
• FRS Online, Fire at Buncefield, 11 Jan 2006
• FRS Online, North and South: High Volume Pumps support the FRS response to summer floods, 3 Jan 2008
• The Guardian, Agency anger over Buncefield toxic waste, 25 Jul 2006
• The Guardian, When it all goes up in smoke, 28 Jun 2008
• Health Protection Agency, Surveillance of emergency personnel who responded to the Buncefield oil depot fire in December 2005 finds few adverse health impacts, 21 Sep 2007
• Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service, Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response, 3 Nov 2006
• HSE, Societal Risk, 30 Jan 2008
• Industrial Fire World, Buncefield – One Year Later, 2006
• Journal of Public Health Advance Access, Health impact of the Buncefield oil depot fire, December 2005 – Study of accident and emergency case records, 23 Jun 2007
• The Lawyer, Buncefield Lawyers fear coroners will be cut, 16 Jun 2008
• Multi-Agency Recovery Group, Multi-agency Recovery Plan, Jan 2006
• ODPM, Incident at Buncefield fuel depot 11 Dec 2005
• SQW, The Buncefield Oil Depot Incident, Economic and Business Confidence Impact Study, Final Report, April 2006
• SQW, Social Impact Assessment , Jan 2007
• Roy Wilsher, Buncefield Oil Depot Fire, National Fire Protection Association Journal, May/Jun 2006 170 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
G.1.2 Summer 2007 flooding incidents
G.1.2.1 National overview
• ABI, Flooding – Learning the Lessons, Nov 2007
• BBC News, The summer floods: What happened, 25 Jun 2008
• CLG Flood Review (auth: Sir Ken Knight), Facing the Challenge , Mar 2008
• CLG Flood Review (auth: Sir Ken Knight), Interim Report , Oct 2007
• Environment agency, Review of Summer 2007 Floods , Dec 2007
• Environment Agency: detailed case studies (http://www.environment- agency.gov.uk/subjects/flood/1867303/1883007/1882029/?version=1&lan g=_e)
• Firefighter, Flooding and use of HVP, Aug-Sep 2007
• Fire Fighter, Flooding and use of HVP, Sep 2007
• House of Commons – Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Flooding – Fifth Report of Session 2007–08 Volume I: Lessons Learned from the 2007 Floods, 23 Apr 2008
• Michael Pitt, The Pitt Review – Lessons Learned from the 2007 Floods , 25 Jun 2008
G.1.2.2 Local sources
• BBC News, Dam stable after burst worries, 26 Jun 2007
• BBC News, South Yorkshire, Survey shows flood toll a year on, 15 Jun 2008
• Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service – Congleton borough Newsletter, Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service Performance Delivery Group for Congleton
• East Riding of Yorkshire Council, Report of Flood Review Panel , May 2008
• Gloucestershire County Council, Scrutiny Inquiry into Flood Emergency – Final Report
• Gloucestershire County Council Website, What happened during Summer 2007?
• Hampshire FRS, Fire Crews respond to Gloucestershire Flooding, 23 Jul 2007 Appendix G References and Data Sources | 171
• Hull City Council (Auth: Coulthard, T.J., Frostick, L., Hardcastle, H., Jones, K., Rogers, D., Scott, M. & Bankoff, G.), The 2007 floods in Hull, final report by the Independent Review Body, 21 Nov 2007
• Nottinghamshire and City of Nottingham Fire and Rescue Authority, Support for National Flooding Response , 7 Sept 2007
• Staffordshire FRS, Flooding in Tamworth, 18 Jun 2007
• West Yorkshire FRS, June and July 2007 Archive, Jun 2007
• UK Resilience Website, Financial Impact on local Authorities – Case Study: Rotherham 2007 , 29 Apr 2008
G.1.3 Kent white powder incident
• BBC News, Alert over White Powder Discovery, 23 April 2004
G.1.4 Kensal Rise tornado
• Association of British Insurers, Insurance in Action – News from the ABI – Tornado in North West London, December 2006
• BBC News, Six Hurt as Tornado Hits London, December 2006
• Brent Council Website, Kensal Rise Tornado, December 2006
• The Guardian, Six Hurt as Tornado Strikes in London, 7 December 2006
• UK Resilience Website, Dealing with Insurance Issues, Kensal Rise Tornado in London , 26 October 2007 [http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/response/recovery_guidance/case_studies/ o1_kensal_rise.aspx]
G.1.5 Milton Keynes scaffolding collapse
• BBC News, Workers Hurt in Scaffold Collapse, 11 April 2006
• BBC News, Poles Fell like ‘Pack of Cards’, 11 April 2006
• FRS Online, USAR team mobilised to Milton Keynes, 11 April 2006
• Health and Safety Executive, Milton Keynes Scaffolding Collapse 11 April 2006 , 25 January 2008
• The Milton Keynes Citizen, Scaffold Collapse Victim has Died, 18 April 2006
• The Milton Keynes Citizen, Scaffolding Collapse – was the weather to blame?, 1 August 2008 172 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
• UK FRS Urban Search and Rescue Dogs Website, “Milton Keynes Scaffold Collapse”, downloaded 19 August 2008. [http://www.ukfssartdogteams.org.uk/milton_keynes.htm]
G.1.6 Heat wave at Waddington Air Show
• Emergency Management Website, Focus on New Dimension, 28 August 2007 [http://www.emergencymanagement.org.uk/newsarchive/NewDimension/t abid/2457/Default.aspx]
• FRS Online, Lincoln’s Incident Response Unit mobilised during July heat wave, 10 August 2007
G.1.7 Westminster building collapse
• FRS Online, High drama in London : Trapped man freed by London Fire Brigade’s USAR teams, 4 January 2008
G.1.8 Whitechapel building collapse
• BBC News, Building Collapses in East London, 14 February 2007
• BBC News, People ‘May Be Trapped’ in Rubble, 14 February 2007
• BBC News, Building Collapse Investigation Launched, 31 December 2007
• Newbury Today, Rescue Dog Searches Collapsed Building, 14 February 2007 G.2 Economic valuation
• Adler, Mathew D., Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety , Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 97, 2008
• Defra, Appraisal of the Human Related Intangible Impacts of Flooding, R&D Technical Report , 2005
• Defra, Draft partial regulatory impact assessment of environmental quality standards for implementation of the Water Framework Directive in the UK , 2007
• DfT, Highways Economics Note No. 1 – 2005 Valuation of the Benefits of Prevention of Road Accidents and Casualties, 20 07
• Environment Agency, Guidance – Assessment of Benefits for Water Quality and Water Resources Schemes in the PR04 Environment Programme , Feb 2003 Appendix G References and Data Sources | 173
• Environment Agency, COMAH Competent Authority Policy on Containment of Bulk Hazardous Liquids at COMAH Establishments Handling Petrol (Gasoline) and Similar Petroleum Products or other Fuels – Regulatory Impact Assessment , 20 Feb 2008
• Environment Agency Website, Cost Benefit Analysis , downloaded 08 Jul 2008
• ESRC Society Today Website (Auth: Arild Foss), The Economic Cost of Flooding , 2007
• Flood Hazard Research Centre (FHRC), Multi-Coloured Manual , now published as part of: FHRC, The Benefits of Flood and Coastal Risk Management – A Manual of Assessment Techniques , Jan 2006
• Garrod, G.D., Willis, K.G., Estimating the Benefits of Environmental Enhancement: A Case Study of the River Darent , Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, Jun 1996, p189-204
• Guatam, K.P., van der Hoek, E.E., Literature Study on the Environmental Impact of Floods , Delft Cluster, Jun 2003
• HM Treasury, The Green Book – Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government , 2008
• Interdepartmental Group on Costs and Benefits, Air Quality Cost Guidance – Interim Guidance , Nov 2006
• Janes, R. and Marsden, J., Carbon Foot printing in the Fire and Rescue Service , Manchester FRS
• JBA Consultants, Scoping Study into the Cost of Flooding – Using the August 2004 event as a case study , 2005
• London Economics, The External Costs and Benefits of the Supply of Aggregates: Phase II .,1999
• National Fire Protection Association (Auth: J.R. Hall), The Total Cost of Fire in the United States , Feb 2008
• OECD (Environment), The Valuation of Biodiversity , 2001
• Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, The Economic Cost of Fire: Estimates for 2004 , Apr 2006
• Penning-Rowsell E.C., Chatterton J.B., Wilson T.E., Autumn 2000 floods in England and Wales: Assessment of national economic and financial losses, Draft Final Report to the Environment Agency , March 2002, Middlesex University, Flood Hazards Research Centre, Enfield 174 | Economic benefits delivered by the New Dimension Programme
• Posner, Eric A., Sunstein, Cass R., Dollars and Death, Working paper 04- 15, AEI-Brookings Joint Centre for Regulatory Studies, Aug 2004
• Rabin, Robert L., Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for Intangible Loss , DePaul Law Review, Vol. 55, 2006
• RPA and BRE Environment (in commission of Defra), Perfluorooctane Sulphates – Risk Reduction Strategy and Analysis of Advantages and Drawbacks , Aug 2004
• World Bank, Odra River Basin Flood Protection Project – Poland , 2007
ISBN: 978 1 4098 1786 4