DOCSLIB.ORG

Africa in Transition » Why the U.S. Military Should Care About African Opposition Parties 5/2/14 8:12 AM

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Africa in Transition » Why the U.S. Military Should Care About African Opposition Parties 5/2/14 8:12 AM Africa in Transition » Why the U.S. Military Should Care About African Opposition Parties 5/2/14 8:12 AM JOHN CAMPBELL Africa in Transition Campbell tracks political and security developments across sub-Saharan Africa. Why the U.S. Military Should Care About African Opposition Parties by Guest Blogger for John Campbell March 27, 2013 This is a guest post by Catherine Kelly, a Ph.D. candidate in Government at Harvard University; and Jason Warner, a Ph.D. student in African Studies and Government at Harvard University. Sub-Saharan Africa is an increasingly important theater of operation for the U.S. military. From al-Shabaab, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and Ansar Dine, the Department of Defense is recognizing that Africa will be a vital A general view shows the eight Kenyan presidential candidates (L-R) James Ole Kiyiapi, Musalia Mudavadi, strategic battlefield in the next century. Paul Muite, Martha Karua, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, Mohammed Dida, Uhuru Kenyatta and Peter Kenneth attending the second presidential debate at Yet in discussions of future African security policy, the Brookhouse School in Kenya's capital Nairobi, February potential role of opposition political parties in Africa has 25, 2013. (Joan Pereruan/Courtesy Reuters) received virtually no attention. Following are three reasons why the Department of Defense should pay close attention to African opposition parties. 1) Opposition parties can be barometers of domestic opinion about foreign presence. Opposition parties’ http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2013/03/27/why-the-u-s-military-should-care-about-african-opposition-parties/ Page 1 of 3 Africa in Transition » Why the U.S. Military Should Care About African Opposition Parties 5/2/14 8:12 AM rhetoric on U.S. foreign policy and intervention—when it exists—can reveal local attitudes that incumbent governments may not openly share. This is especially helpful in countries such as Djibouti, Niger, and Ethiopia, where the U.S. military is currently engaged in a wide range of activities including military training, crisis management exercises, drone activities against al-Qaeda, and operating the United States’ only military base on the continent; Camp Lemonnier. Foreign policy debates tend to have scant prominence in African elections, precisely because of the limited range of choices available to some of the world’s weakest states. But major opposition party leaders almost invariably have more social and cultural capital than foreign diplomats, and thus have the potential to function as intermediaries between the U.S. government and the wider African public on potentially contentious issues. 2) Today’s opponents could be tomorrow’s incumbents. Being cordial to (and even cautiously supportive of) opposition parties is deeply important in states where regime changes—electoral or otherwise—are likely. The absence of such a contingency plan in the event of a regime transition limits U.S. policy options. In late March 2012, for instance, the U.S. offered few critiques as Djibouti’s president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, repressed supporters of the Union for National Salvation (USN) opposition coalition. Were the USN ever to control the presidency, the U.S. could potentially face expulsion from the U.S. military base Camp Lemonnier. Given Djibouti’s geographic proximity to volatile and strategically important countries in the Horn of Africa, the loss of such a geostrategic foothold would profoundly undermine the United States’ already modest security assistance capabilities throughout the region. 3) Certain opposition members are potential interlocutors on issues of conflict and terrorism. Major opposition party leaders can play integral roles in local conflict resolution efforts, and often exhibit the capacity to encourage or stem particular antagonistic behaviors among the populace. For instance, the leaders of six major opposition parties in southern Sudan recently joined rebel groups in “endorsing peaceful and armed opposition to Sudan’s government;” and in Kenya’s 2007 elections, ethnic violence, allegedly fueled by certain ruling and opposition party leaders, reduced regional stability and inflicted devastating human costs. Although opposition leaders in these contexts can at times exacerbate delicate security situations, their http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2013/03/27/why-the-u-s-military-should-care-about-african-opposition-parties/ Page 2 of 3 Africa in Transition » Why the U.S. Military Should Care About African Opposition Parties 5/2/14 8:12 AM social networks could also potentially facilitate the resolution of other U.S. security concerns. To this end, Eritrea’s opposition parties—some of which apparently launched an unsuccessful coup attempt in January 2013—could be the key to the U.S. acquiring domestic leverage on President Isaias Afewerki, a known source of regional instability in the Horn of Africa. This said, although opposition parties might have some role in mediating security outcomes, opposition leaders are almost never the most central players involved in such instances, nor are they necessarily tied to insurgencies that serve as the core security concerns of most African regimes. Nevertheless, cultivating opposition leaders as potential participants in peacebuilding, transparency, or counterterrorism measures could indeed increase the quality of human and state security on the continent. In summary, although democratization is not yet the norm in Africa, the trends towards greater political opening across the continent signal new opportunities for U.S. military engagement. As such, though it is the Department of State that invariably shoulders the responsibility for crafting U.S. diplomatic policy regarding opposition parties, the Department of Defense—a silent observer on the political front—should be deeply cognizant of the security implications bound up in the politics of African opposition parties. Indeed, given the unavoidable U.S. reliance on a mix of authoritarian and democratic allies for security- related initiatives in Africa, an effective U.S. security strategy must continue evolving to take heed of the unique roles played by opposition parties on the continent. CFR seeks to foster civil and informed discussion of foreign policy issues. Opinions expressed on CFR blogs are solely those of the author or commenter, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions. All comments must abide by CFR's guidelines and will be moderated prior to posting. Pingbacks http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2013/03/27/why-the-u-s-military-should-care-about-african-opposition-parties/ Page 3 of 3.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Kenya's Supreme Court
    Kenya’s Supreme Court: Old Wine in New Bottles? By Special Correspondent As the six Supreme Court judges were adjudicating Kenya’s first presidential election petition in March 2013, Justice Kalpana Hasmukhrai Rawal was waiting for a new president to take office and the newly elected National Assembly to convene so that her nomination as Deputy Chief Justice could move forward. The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) had settled on her appointment after interviewing a shortlist of applicants in February 2013. The Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board had earlier found her to be suitable to continue serving as a Court of Appeal judge. Justice Rawal eventually joined the Supreme Court on 3 June 2013. Two years later, Justice Rawal became the second Deputy Chief Justice (after Nancy Baraza, who resigned after she was heavily criticised for abusing her authority by threatening a security guard after the guard demanded to search her at a mall) to be embroiled in controversy. In 2015, Rawal challenged a notice that she retire at the age of 70. Around the same time, the then Chief Justice, Dr Willy Mutunga, would announce that he wanted to retire early so that the next Chief Justice would be appointed well ahead of the next election. In May 2014, Justice Philip Kiptoo Tunoi and High Court judge David Onyancha challenged the JSC’s decision to retire them at the age of 70. They argued that they were entitled to serve until they reached the age of 74 because they had been first appointed judges as under the old constitution. What seemed like a simple question about the retirement age of judges led to an unprecedented breakdown in the collegiate working atmosphere among the Supreme Court judges that had been maintained during the proceedings of the presidential election petition.
    [Show full text]
  • Post-Election Violence in Kenya
    Spontaneous or Premeditated? DISCUSSION PAPER 57 SPONTANEOUS OR PREMEDITATED? Post-Election Violence in Kenya GODWIN R. MURUNGA NORDISKA AFRIKAINSTITUTET, UppSALA 2011 Indexing terms: Elections Violence Political violence Political crisis Ethnicity Democratization Kenya The opinions expressed in this volume are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Language checking: Peter Colenbrander ISSN 1104-8417 ISBN 978-91-7106-694-7 © The author and Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 2011 Production: Byrå4 Print on demand, Lightning Source UK Ltd. Spontaneous or Premeditated? Contents Contents ..............................................................................................................................................................3 Foreword .............................................................................................................................................................5 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................7 Post-Election Violence: Overview of the Literature .............................................................................8 A Note on the Kenyan Democratisation Processes ............................................................................13 Clash of Interpretations ................................................................................................................................17 The Ballot Box and
    [Show full text]
  • Kenya Election History 1963-2013
    KENYA ELECTION HISTORY 1963-2013 1963 Kenya Election History 1963 1963: THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS These were the last elections in pre-independent Kenya and the key players were two political parties, KANU and KADU. KADU drew its support from smaller, less urbanized communities hence advocated majimboism (regionalism) as a means of protecting them. KANU had been forced to accept KADU’s proposal to incorporate a majimbo system of government after being pressured by the British government. Though KANU agreed to majimbo, it vowed to undo it after gaining political power. The majimbo constitution that was introduced in 1962 provided for a two-chamber national legislature consisting of an upper (Senate) and lower (House of Representative). The Campaign KADU allied with the African People’s Party (APP) in the campaign. KANU and APP agreed not to field candidates in seats where the other stood a better chance. The Voting Elections were marked by high voter turnout and were held in three phases. They were widely boycotted in the North Eastern Province. Violence was reported in various parts of the country; four were killed in Isiolo, teargas used in Nyanza and Nakuru, clashes between supporters in Machakos, Mombasa, Nairobi and Kitale. In the House of Representative KANU won 66 seats out of 112 and gained working majority from 4 independents and 3 from NPUA, KADU took 47 seats and APP won 8. In the Senate KANU won 19 out 38 seats while KADU won 16 seats, APP won 2 and NPUA only 1. REFERENCE: NATIONAL ELECTIONS DATA BOOK By Institute for Education in Democracy (published in 1997).
    [Show full text]
  • English Version
    Diaspora Voting and Ethnic Politics in Kenya Beth Elise Whitaker and Salma Inyanji To cite this article: Beth Elise Whitaker, Salma Inyanji, “Vote de la diaspora et ethnicité au Kenya,” Afrique contemporaine 4/2015 (n° 256), p. 73-89. URL : www.cairn.info/revue-afrique-contemporaine-2015-4-page-73.htm. ABSTRACT: Many African governments have extended voting rights to nationals living abroad, but little is known about the political behavior of diaspora populations. In the context of Kenya, where the 2010 constitution authorized diaspora voting, we ask whether nationals living abroad are as likely to vote along ethnic lines as their counterparts at home. Using data from public opinion polls prior to the March 2013 presidential election, we compare levels of support for presumed ethnic candidates among Kenyans surveyed in the diaspora and those surveyed in the country. Overall, diaspora respondents were significantly less likely than in-country respondents to support the presumed ethnic candidate from their home province. The results provide preliminary support for our hypothesis that diaspora Africans are less likely to vote along ethnic lines than their in-country counterparts, and thus are less reliable for the construction of ethnic coalitions. More survey data are needed from Kenyans and other Africans living abroad to further examine the relationship between diaspora voting and ethnicity in African politics. As migration patterns have become increasingly global, African diaspora populations have emerged as an important political consideration (Akyeampong 2000). The African Union has held a series of conferences to engage the diaspora with a view toward recognizing it as the continent’s “sixth region.” African governments have been reaching out to nationals living abroad to seek their economic and political participation at home.
    [Show full text]
  • Infotrak Public Policy and Governance Research Division Infotrak Harris Popularity Poll
    INFOTRAK PUBLIC POLICY AND GOVERNANCE RESEARCH DIVISION INFOTRAK HARRIS POPULARITY POLL APRIL 2012 103 Manyani East Rd, Lavington P.O. Box 23081- 00100 Nairobi, Kenya, Tel: +254 20 4443450/1/2, For more information contact: Raphael Mulwa +254 736 360 964 1. Introduction The implication of the new constitution on Kenyan politics cannot be underestimated. All political candidates must adhere to the national values and pass the integrity test under chapter six of the Constitution. It is possible that the mind-set of the Kenyan voter has changed after the 2007/2008 post-election violence. Through opinion polls, politicians are able to tell what the voters perceive to be most important in terms of policies, voting preference, the message and also a candidate’s popularity among Kenyans from different socio-economic backgrounds. The forthcoming general elections will be the first under the new constitution. Alliances have been formed as part of the strategies to win the presidential race. The campaigns have also witnessed new entrants into the race. Ultimately, the Kenyan voter will be the determinant of who holds which elective post. In executing its mandate as a pollster and in bid to inform Kenyans, Infotrak Research and Consulting conducted a nationwide opinion poll to establish the popularity of various presidential hopefuls and political parties. The survey further sought to establish the preferred running mates for various presidential hopefuls. 2. The Methodology The poll was sponsored and conducted by Infotrak Research and Consulting between 11th and 13th March, 2012 through face to face interviews with a nationwide sample of 2400 respondents, to represent the Kenyan adult population of 19,462,358 translating into a margin of error of -/+ 2 at 95% degree of confidence.
    [Show full text]
  • Forty Days and Nights of Peacemaking in Kenya
    Page numbering! JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ELECTIONS FORTY DAYS AND NIGHTS OF PEACEMAKING IN KENYA Gilbert M Khadiagala Gilbert Khadiagala is Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg e-mail: [email protected] We are ready to go the extra mile to achieve peace. Today, we take the first step. My party and I are ready for this long journey to restore peace in our land …We urge our people to be patient as parties work day and night to ensure that negotiations do not last a day longer than necessary. Raila Odinga, leader of the Orange Democratic Movement (East African Standard 25 January) Kenya is a vital country in this region and the international com- munity is not ready to watch it slump into anarchy. Norwegian Ambassador Hellen Jacobsen (East African Standard 5 February) I will stay as long as it takes to get the issue of a political settlement to an irreversible point. I will not be frustrated or provoked to leave. It is in the interest of the men and women of Kenya, the region, Africa and the international community to have a new government. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Daily Nation 6 February) ABSTRACT Recent studies on resolving civil conflicts have focused on the role of external actors in husbanding durable agreements. The contribution of authoritative parties is vital to the mediation of conflicts where parties are frequently In the interests of avoiding repetition citations will carry the date and month only unless the year is anything other than 2008.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Article [PDF]
    VOLUME 7 NO 2 135 ‘WE’VE BEEN TO HELL AND BACK…’1 Can a Botched Land Reform Programme Explain Kenya’s Political Crisis? (1963–2008) Samuel Kariuki Dr Samuel Kariuki is a senior lecturer in the Sociology Department, School of Social Sciences of the University of the Witwatersrand e-mail: [email protected] ABSTRACT A central argument pursued in this paper seeks to accord primacy to the unresolved land reform programme in Kenya in debunking the genesis of the country’s intermittent political crises since independence. It is argued that one cannot come to terms with Kenya’s failed democratic process without acknowledging the extent to which patrimonial politics were systematically developed and sustained, and the key to this was land. Land as a resource of political patronage, to reward, and punish, those who were part of, or were perceived as outsiders in an evolving political system that personified the ideals of its leaders gained a particular premium, easily manipulated across the three presidential epochs: Kenyatta (1963-1978), Moi (1978-2002) and Kibaki (2002-2007). The failure of land reform contributed immeasurably to the conflict that followed the December 2007 elections. The spatial character of the electoral violence (eg, Rift Valley and Coastal Province) suggests systemic faults that have marked decades of historic injustices brought about by a land reform policy largely informed not by a constitutional pronouncement but by the interests of the incumbent president. The paper concludes that an end to Kenya’s political crises is not fully contingent on resolving the land issue, but rather on transcending the quest for land reform as a contributor to economic growth and political stability.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kenya General Election
    AAFFRRIICCAA NNOOTTEESS Number 14 January 2003 The Kenya General Election: senior ministerial positions from 1963 to 1991; new Minister December 27, 2002 of Education George Saitoti and Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka are also experienced hands; and the new David Throup administration includes several able technocrats who have held “shadow ministerial positions.” The new government will be The Kenya African National Union (KANU), which has ruled more self-confident and less suspicious of the United States Kenya since independence in December 1963, suffered a than was the Moi regime. Several members know the United disastrous defeat in the country’s general election on December States well, and most of them recognize the crucial role that it 27, 2002, winning less than one-third of the seats in the new has played in sustaining both opposition political parties and National Assembly. The National Alliance Rainbow Coalition Kenyan civil society over the last decade. (NARC), which brought together the former ethnically based opposition parties with dissidents from KANU only in The new Kibaki government will be as reliable an ally of the October, emerged with a secure overall majority, winning no United States in the war against terrorism as President Moi’s, fewer than 126 seats, while the former ruling party won only and a more active and constructive partner in NEPAD and 63. Mwai Kibaki, leader of the Democratic Party (DP) and of bilateral economic discussions. It will continue the former the NARC opposition coalition, was sworn in as Kenya’s third government’s valuable mediating role in the Sudanese peace president on December 30.
    [Show full text]
  • Severe Drought Forces Closure of Schools
    The SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT REPORT THE PARTNERSHIP REVIEW OF FOR PEACE DEVOLUTION TASK FORCE PROJECT FUNDED LEnhancingink governance for all REPORT BY THE EU — PAGES 14 & 19 — PAGES 15 - 18 MAY 2011 Issue No. 079 Kshs 40/= No direction on devolution …as Mudavadi team throws back to the people crucial decisions By GIDEON OCHANDA HE Task Force on devolution created by the Ministry of Lo- Tcal Government has thrown back a raft of recommendations to the people without fixing firm posi- tions for improvement. Turn to Page 2, Col. 1 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Local Government Musalia Mudavadi. Severe drought forces closure of schools By MALACHI MOTANO “Until June last year, while the small blackboard loaded onto camels periods of drought in Kenya’s north- water and pasture and by November, region had enough pasture and wa- would move with the nomadic herd- ern grazing areas, brought on by the all mobile schools were closed down A PROLONGED drought ravaging ter, pastoralist children from northern ing families through the region’s arid, effects of climate change, have forced as the drought intensified, drying up the northern Kenyan towns of Garissa Kenya’s Somali community were en- dusty plains. The mobile school ac- many pastoralist children to miss boreholes and forcing pastoralists to and Wajir has interrupted a unique ed- rolled in mobile schools that followed commodated the traditions and cus- school. move across the border to Somalia in ucation system that was enabling the their families from one grazing area to toms of the pastoralists while ensuring In September, mobile schools op- search of pasture.
    [Show full text]
  • An Evaluation of Moderators' Performance And
    AN EVALUATION OF MODERATORS’ PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTIONS ON COVERAGE OF ISSUES IN 2013 PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE IN KENYA BY CITIZEN TELEVISION BY LIBWEGE MACDONALD OVIYO A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA STUDIES. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA TECHNOLOGY MASENO UNIVERSITY © 2017 DECLARATION This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for academic award in any other university …………………………… …………………….. Signature Date Candidate: LIBWEGE MACDONALD OVIYO PG/MA/0069/2012 This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor …………………………… ………………………….. Signature Date Supervisor: Dr. ABIGAEL MASASABI Lecturer: Department of Music and Theatre Studies Maseno University ii ACKNOWLEGMENTS I greatly acknowledge my research supervisor Dr. Abigael Masasabi for her encouragement and support toward completion of this research project. You repeatedly and promptly made time available to critically evaluate drafts, tireless guiding and strengthening this study. Your kindness, patience and dedication have been immeasurable, invaluable and inspirational. I am really greatly indebted for your contribution. Without it, this study would not have seen the light of the day. I would also like to thank the chairman of communication and media department Dr. Charles Nyambuga of Maseno University for helping me to lay the groundwork for this project. I am also grateful to other members of Maseno University media department for their meticulous professional guidance during this study. My heartfelt thanks also go to my family. It supported me in every way possible. Their love and encouragement has shaped who I am today. Finally I would like to thank my mother Anitter Kangashi and my late dad Nathan Oviyo for unending devotion to my education from an early age as it has been instrumental in my career both inside and outside academics.
    [Show full text]
  • Macro Report Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4: Macro Report September 10, 2012
    Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1 Module 4: Macro Report Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4: Macro Report September 10, 2012 Country: Kenya Date of Election: 4 March 2013 Prepared by: Matthias Krönke, Abel Oyuke and Robert Mattes Date of Preparation: 23 November 2016 NOTES TO COLLABORATORS: . The information provided in this report contributes to an important part of the CSES project. The information may be filled out by yourself, or by an expert or experts of your choice. Your efforts in providing these data are greatly appreciated! Any supplementary documents that you can provide (e.g., electoral legislation, party manifestos, electoral commission reports, media reports) are also appreciated, and may be made available on the CSES website. Answers should be as of the date of the election being studied. Where brackets [ ] appear, collaborators should answer by placing an “X” within the appropriate bracket or brackets. For example: [X] . If more space is needed to answer any question, please lengthen the document as necessary. Data Pertinent to the Election at which the Module was Administered 1a. Type of Election [] Parliamentary/Legislative [X] Parliamentary/Legislative and Presidential [ ] Presidential [ ] Other; please specify: __________ 1b. If the type of election in Question 1a included Parliamentary/Legislative, was the election for the Upper House, Lower House, or both? [ ] Upper House [ ] Lower House [X] Both [ ] Other; please specify: __________ Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2 Module 4: Macro Report 2a. What was the party of the president prior to the most recent election, regardless of whether the election was presidential? Party of National Unity and Allies (National Rainbow Coalition) 2b.
    [Show full text]
  • Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
    Responses to Information Requests - Immigration and Refugee Board of... https://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?... Kenya: The Mungiki group, including organizational structure, leadership, membership, recruitment and activities; the relationship between the government and the group, including protection offered to its victims (2016-April 2018) 1. Overview For information on the Mungiki group for the period of 2010 to 2013, see Response to Information Request KEN104594 of November 2013. Sources describe the Mungiki as an "outlawed religious Kikuyu Kenyan sect" (M&G Africa 15 July 2016) or an outlawed sect "which originally stems from members of Kenya's influential Kikuyu tribe" (FPA 14 Apr. 2016). According to sources, the Kikuyu are the largest ethnic group in Kenya (IRIN 26 Oct. 2017; The Washington Times 11 May 2017). The Washington Times reports that the Kikuyu comprise an "estimated 20 percent of the total population of 46 million" and has "produced three out [of] Kenya's four presidents since independence," including President Uhuru Kenyatta (The Washington Times 11 May 2017). Freedom House refers to the Mungiki as an "ethnically affiliated gan[g]" (Freedom House 2017). Sources refer to the Mungiki as a pro-government "gang" (The Washington Post 28 Nov. 2017) or "militia" (Human Rights Watch 25 Feb. 2018). A 2017 report by the International Federation for Human Rights (Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme, FIDH) and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) [1] states, without providing further details, that the Mungiki group "seems to have rebranded as Eminants of Mungiki" (FIDH and KHRC July 2017, 29).
    [Show full text]