DOCSLIB.ORG

Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality Intensional Logic and The Metaphysics of Intentionality Author's Preprint Author's Preprint Intensional Logic and The Metaphysics of Intentionality Edward N. Zalta Stanford University Author's Preprint Author's Preprint Copyright c 1988 by Edward N. Zalta (This work is forthcoming at MIT Press/Bradford Books.) All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the author. This book was typeset in Computer Modern Roman using the LATEX document preparation system. It was printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Zalta, Edward N., 1952{ Intensional logic and the metaphysics of intentionality Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Intentionality (Philosophy) 2. Logic, Symbolic and mathematical. I. Title XXXX.XXXXX 1988 110{dc19 87-32171 ISBN X-XXX-XXXXX-X Author's Preprint To Melissa Author's Preprint Author's Preprint Contents Preface xi I Introduction 1 1 Intensionality and Intentionality 3 1.1 Intensional Logic . .3 1.2 Intentional States . 10 2 An Overview of the Theory 15 2.1 The Insight Behind the Theory . 15 2.2 The Presentation of the Theory . 19 2.3 The Explanation of the Theory . 22 2.4 Some ObservationsAuthor's . Preprint. 33 II Strong Extensionality 39 3 The Basic Theory of Relations 41 3.1 Taking Relations as Primitive . 41 3.2 The Semantic Conception of the Language of Encoding . 45 3.3 Conditions Under Which There Are Relations . 46 3.4 Identity Conditions for Relations . 51 4 Propositions, Situations, Worlds, and Times 56 4.1 The Basic Theory of Propositions . 57 4.2 Situations, Worlds, and Times . 61 4.3 Other Theories of Worlds and Times . 68 4.4 The Challenge for Other Logics . 75 vii viii Contents 5 Definite Descriptions 78 5.1 A Simple View of Descriptions . 78 5.2 The Semantics of Rigid Descriptions . 81 5.3 Descriptions, Propositions, and Relations . 83 5.4 The Logic of Descriptions . 86 5.5 Non-rigid Descriptions . 91 5.6 Final Comments . 97 III Existential Generalization 99 6 The Turn-of-the-Century Debate About Intentionality 101 6.1 Two Kinds of Existence . 102 6.2 Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl . 105 6.3 Mally, A-Objects, and Noemata . 108 6.4 A-Objects and Meinong . 113 7 The Analysis of Existential Generalization 115 7.1 Russell's Objections to Meinong's Views . 115 7.2 A Clear Response to Russell's Objections . 120 7.3 Names, Descriptions, and Fiction . 123 7.4 The Principles of Generalization . 127 8 Meinong's Recent Resurrection 130 8.1 Parsons' TheoryAuthor's of Meinongian Preprint Objects . 131 8.2 A Strict Understanding of Meinong . 135 8.3 Did Meinong Have to Commit Himself to Principle (G)? . 138 8.4 The Principle of Independence . 143 IV Substitutivity and Existential Generalization151 9 Direct Reference, Fregean Senses, and The Propositional Attitudes 153 9.1 Roles Senses Play in the Philosophy of Language . 154 9.2 A-Objects as Senses: The General Picture . 159 9.3 Sense1, Sense4, and Sense7 .................. 161 9.4 Sense2, Sense5, and Direct Reference . 164 9.5 Sense3, Sense6, and the Propositional Attitudes . 166 9.6 Summary . 172 Contents ix 10 Further Issues Concerning the Attitudes 174 10.1 Possible Objections to the Theory . 174 10.2 The Triadic Theory of Belief . 181 10.3 Existential Generalization . 184 11 Other Substitutivity Puzzles 187 11.1 Russell's Puzzle About George IV . 187 11.2 Kripke's Puzzles . 189 11.3 Indexical Belief . 196 V Conclusion 203 12 A Comparison with Montague's Intensional Logic 205 12.1 General Comparison . 206 12.2 Montague and Nonexistence . 216 12.3 Propositional Attitudes . 220 12.4 Modality, Descriptions, and Intensionality . 223 Appendix The Formal Intensional Logic 231 A.1 The Language . 232 A.2 The Semantics . 236 A.3 The Logic . 240 A.4 The Proper Axioms . 243 Bibliography 245 IndexAuthor's Preprint 253 Author's Preprint Preface In writing this book, I have had three goals in mind: (1) to develop a new, expanded conception of intensionality, (2) to explain clearly how the theory and technical apparatus developed in my first book is sensitive to this conception, and (3) to extend and apply the theory in new ways. The expanded conception of intensionality occurred to me while thinking about the differences among intensional logics. There is a wide variety of such logics, and some of them have very little in common. Though most of them were designed to explain apparent failures of the principle of substitution, each system focuses on a somewhat different body of data. And each breaks down when faced with intensional data outside its focus. It seemed important to try to collate and classify the entire range of data that occasioned the development of these intensional logics. And as a result of doing this, it became clear that there was a wider group of inferential principles thatAuthor's appeared to Preprint fail in various situations. So the expanded conception of intensionality is tied essentially to this expanded set of inferential principles. My second goal has been to show that the system described in my first book, Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics, can represent the entire range of intensional data. In that book, I de- veloped a theory of abstract objects and tried to construct, by means of the theory, a progressive explanation of certain sentences that had puz- zled metaphysicians and philosophers of language. But there was little attempt to state explicitly the puzzles that surrounded these sentences. There was almost no attempt to argue for the theory or compare it with alternatives. And little mention was made either of the philosophical presuppositions of the theory or of a host of traditional issues in the philosophy of language. This situation is rectified in the present work. But more importantly, the system is reconceptualized in terms of the ex- panded conception of intensionality. Let me note that familiarity with xi xii Preface my first book is not presupposed, and reference to it has been kept to a minimum. My third goal has been to expand the theory. Three new areas of application are: (a) the addition of tense operators and the identifica- tion of moments of time, (b) the attempt to make some of Husserl's ideas precise, and (c) the inclusion of indexicals and contexts to explain substitutivity failures affecting indexicals. The system described right at the outset includes some of the new additions. These, then, are the principal goals that have directed this project. I have had one other, more practical, goal. And that is to make the book accessible to philosophers with little training in logic. I have tried to motivate and explain all of the technical material and logical nota- tion. For example, numerous instances of comprehension schemata are constructed, to show how the schemata work. The formal semantics of the system is developed only insofar as it helps one to picture what the theory asserts. The structure of the book is rather simple. It contains five parts. One of the parts is the Introduction, and another is the Conclusion. The three parts in the middle each deal with one or more of the principles that are used to identify intensional contexts. There is also an Appendix, the only part of the book that focuses entirely on technical definitions. The Appendix contains the most highly evolved incarnation of the system, with all of the new additions and modifications. The following typographical conventions have been employed. Single quotes are used to mention subsentential words or phrases of English, as well as to mention expressions of the formal language, whether they are terms, formulas, or otherAuthor's symbols. Sometimes, Preprint when it is too obvious that I am talking about an expression of the language, the single quotes are omitted. Double quotes are used to mention entire sentences of English. This makes it easier to distinguish them from the surrounding sentences. However, double quotes serve a variety of other purposes. They are used for quotation, as scare-quotes, to give readings of formal expressions in English, and to introduce symbols and abbreviations. The context should make the meaning of the double quotes clear. There are also conventions concerning typefaces. Italics serve several purposes. Certain symbols and expressions of the formal language (for example, the primitive terms) are always written in italic. Italic is used for emphasis, and for the introduction and definition of new or technical terms. It is also used for most foreign, especially Latin, words. Greek letters, with the exception of λ and ι, are usually used as metalinguistic variables that range over expressions of the object language. The two just mentioned are part of the object language, however. Finally, bold- face is used for one purpose, namely, to identify items associated with Preface xiii the semantics of the object language. The names of interpretations, as- signment functions, denotation functions, extension functions, etc., are all written in boldface. When I use boldface variables to range over worlds and times, therefore, I am talking about entities that are prim- itive in the semantics. But when I use regular italic variables to range over worlds and times, I am talking about entities that are defined in the object language, using only the primitives of the theory. Finally, let me acknowledge my indebtedness. I am indebted first and foremost to the people at Stanford's Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI). The first draft of this work was written while I was a postdoctoral fellow at CSLI.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Steps Toward a Computational Metaphysics∗ Ideal for the Exposition of Philosophical Theories
    Branden Fitelson & Edward N. Zalta 2 one. Since ancient times the axiomatic method has been important to philosophers both as an example of successful systematization in specific sciences (e.g., optics, acoustics and mathematics) as well as a possible Steps Toward a Computational Metaphysics∗ ideal for the exposition of philosophical theories. While the history of the application of the axiomatic method in philosophy is complex (Man- Branden Fitelson cosu 1996, 232, note 39), there is no doubt that Spinoza 1677 is the best known example of this tendency. Leibniz went a step further by including University of California–Berkeley a computational component, as can be seen from the following:1 and characteristica universalis Edward N. Zalta If we had it [a ], we should be able to reason in metaphysics and morals in much the same way as in Stanford University geometry and analysis. (Russell 1900, 169) If controversies were to arise, there would be no more need of dis- putation between two philosophers than between two accountants. Abstract For it would suffice to take their pencils in their hands, to sit down In this paper, the authors describe their initial investigations to their slates, and to say to each other . : Let us calculate. in computational metaphysics. Our method is to implement ax- (Russell 1900, 170) iomatic metaphysics in an automated reasoning system. In this paper, we describe what we have discovered when the theory of ab- Notice that the Latin word Russell translates as ‘accountants’ is ‘Com- prover9 stract objects is implemented in (a first-order automated putistas’, and the Latin word translated as ‘slates’ is ‘abacos’.
    [Show full text]
  • A Cross-Cultural and Pragmatic Study of Felicity Conditions in the Same-Sex Marriage Discourse
    Journal of Foreign Languages, Cultures and Civilizations June 2016, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 58-72 ISSN 2333-5882 (Print) 2333-5890 (Online) Copyright © The Author(s). All Rights Reserved. Published by American Research Institute for Policy Development DOI: 10.15640/jflcc.v4n1a7 URL: https://doi.org/10.15640/jflcc.v4n1a7 A Cross-Cultural and Pragmatic Study of Felicity Conditions in the Same-Sex Marriage Discourse Hashim Aliwy Mohammed Al-Husseini1 & Ghayth K. Shaker Al-Shaibani2 Abstract This paper investigates whether there are Felicity Conditions (FCs) for the same-sex marriage as being a contemporary practice of marriage relations in some countries. As such, the researchers adopt Austin’s (1962) Felicity Conditions (FCs) to examine if conditions of satisfaction are applicable to the same-sex marriage in Christian and Islamic cultures. The researchers focus on analysing and discussing the social, religious, and linguistic conventional procedures of the speech acts of marriage, specifically in the same-sex marriage discourse. We find out that same-sex marriage in Christianity is totally different from the traditional marriage with regard to the social, religious, and linguistic conventions. Consequently, we concluded that same-sex marriage discourse has no FCs in contrast to the traditional marriage in Christianity as well as marriage in Islam which has not changed in form and opposite sex marriage. Keyword: Felicity Conditions; homosexual relations; marriage speech acts; same-sex marriage discourse; conventional procedures 1. Introduction Trosborg (2010, p.3) stated that one can principally affirm that all pragmatic aspects, namely speech act theory and theory of politeness, may be liable to cross-cultural comparisons between two speech communities and/or two cultures.
    [Show full text]
  • Performative Speech Act Verbs in Present Day English
    PERFORMATIVE SPEECH ACT VERBS IN PRESENT DAY ENGLISH ELENA LÓPEZ ÁLVAREZ Universidad Complutense de Madrid RESUMEN. En esta contribución se estudian los actos performativos y su influencia en el inglés de hoy en día. A partir de las teorías de J. L. Austin, entre otros autores, se desarrolla un panorama de esta orientación de la filosofía del lenguaje de Austin. PALABRAS CLAVE. Actos performativos, enunciado performativo, inglés. ABSTRACT. This paper focuses on performative speech act verbs in present day English. Reading the theories of J. L. Austin, among others,. With the basis of authors as J. L. Austin, this paper develops a brief landscape about this orientation of Austin’s linguistic philosophy. KEY WORDS. Performative speech act verbs, performative utterance, English. 1. INTRODUCCIÓN 1.1. HISTORICAL THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 1.1.1. The beginnings: J.L. Austin The origin of performative speech acts as we know them today dates back to the William James Lectures, the linguistic-philosophical theories devised and delivered by J.L. Austin at Harvard University in 1955, and collected into a series of lectures entitled How to do things with words, posthumously published in 1962. Austin was one of the most influential philosophers of his time. In these lectures, he provided a thorough exploration of performative speech acts, which was an extremely innovative area of study in those days. In the following pages, Austin’s main ideas (together with some comments by other authors) will be presented. 1.1.1.1. Constative – performative distinction In these lectures, Austin begins by making a clear distinction between constative and performative utterances.
    [Show full text]
  • Exclamatives, Normalcy Conditions and Common Ground
    Revue de Sémantique et Pragmatique 40 | 2016 Exclamation et intersubjectivité Exclamatives, Normalcy Conditions and Common Ground Franz d’Avis Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rsp/279 DOI: 10.4000/rsp.279 ISSN: 2610-4377 Publisher Presses universitaires d'Orléans Printed version Date of publication: 1 March 2017 Number of pages: 17-34 ISSN: 1285-4093 Electronic reference Franz d’Avis, « Exclamatives, Normalcy Conditions and Common Ground », Revue de Sémantique et Pragmatique [Online], 40 | 2016, Online since 01 March 2018, connection on 10 December 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/rsp/279 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/rsp.279 Revue de Sémantique et Pragmatique Revue de Sémantique et Pragmatique. 2016. Numéro 40. pp. 17-34. Exclamatives, Normalcy Conditions and Common Ground Franz d’Avis Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz 1. INTRODUCTION The starting point for the search for exclamative sentence types in a lan- guage is often the description of a certain function that utterances of sentences of that type would have. One formulation could be: With the use of an excla- mative sentence, a speaker expresses that the state of affairs described by a proposition given in the sentence is not in accordance with his expectations about the world.1 Exclamative utterances may include an emotional attitude on the part of the speaker, which is often described as surprise in the literature, cf. Altmann (1987, 1993a), Michaelis/Lambrecht (1996), d’Avis (2001), Michaelis (2001), Roguska (2008) and others. Surprise is an attitude that is based on the belief that something unexpected is the case, see from a psychological point of view Reisenzein (2000).
    [Show full text]
  • Existence As a Real Property
    Francesco Berto Existence as a Real Property The Ontology of Meinongianism For Graham Priest, Long-distance teacher Prologue: Much Ado About Nothing Some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don’t know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking. –Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity 1 In an episode of The Today Show of some years ago, Gene Shalit – NBC’s film and book critic, famous for his wits – reviews several books sharing the feature of bearing entertaining titles. The highpoint of the monologue comes with Nonexistent Objects, by the UCLA philosopher Terence Parsons. Shalit wonders how one could write a whole book on things that do not exist!1 This whole book, too, is about things that do not exist. But if one stops to think, one may find that, in a sense, there is nothing special about this. There are, in fact, thousands of books speaking about unreal things. You have probably read quite a few of them: Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories portrait the adventures of the detective Sherlock Holmes; The Lord of the Rings speaks at length of Gandalf the wizard. Doyle represents Sherlock Holmes as a detective living in London, Baker Street (precisely, at number 221b), describes his remarkable observational and deductive abilities, makes of him the arch-enemy of the criminal mastermind Moriarty. J.R.R. Tolkien characterizes Gandalf as a wizard with a pointy hat and a grey robe (a white one, from a certain point of the story onwards), a heavy pipe-herb 1 The anecdote is reported by Roy Sorensen [2003], p.
    [Show full text]
  • Abstract 1. Russell As a Mereologist
    THE 1900 TURN IN BERTRAND RUSSELL’S LOGIC, THE EMERGENCE OF HIS PARADOX, AND THE WAY OUT Prof. Dr. Nikolay Milkov, Universität Paderborn, [email protected] Abstract Russell‘s initial project in philosophy (1898) was to make mathematics rigorous reducing it to logic. Before August 1900, however, Russell‘s logic was nothing but mereology. First, his acquaintance with Peano‘s ideas in August 1900 led him to discard the part-whole logic and accept a kind of intensional predicate logic instead. Among other things, the predicate logic helped Russell embrace a technique of treating the paradox of infinite numbers with the help of a singular concept, which he called ‗denoting phrase‘. Unfortunately, a new paradox emerged soon: that of classes. The main contention of this paper is that Russell‘s new con- ception only transferred the paradox of infinity from the realm of infinite numbers to that of class-inclusion. Russell‘s long-elaborated solution to his paradox developed between 1905 and 1908 was nothing but to set aside of some of the ideas he adopted with his turn of August 1900: (i) With the Theory of Descriptions, he reintroduced the complexes we are acquainted with in logic. In this way, he partly restored the pre-August 1900 mereology of complexes and sim- ples. (ii) The elimination of classes, with the help of the ‗substitutional theory‘,1 and of prop- ositions, by means of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment,2 completed this process. 1. Russell as a Mereologist In 1898, Russell abandoned his short period of adherence to the Neo-Hegelian position in the philosophy of mathematics and replaced it with what can be called the ‗analytic philoso- phy of mathematics‘, substantiated by the logic of relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Felicity Conditions for Counterfactual Conditionals Containing Proper
    Counterfactuals in Context: Felicity conditions for counterfactual conditionals containing proper names William Robinson A thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts University of Washington 2013 Committee: Toshiyuki Ogihara Barbara Citko Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Linguistics 2 ©Copyright 2013 William Robinson 3 University of Washington Abstract Counterfactuals in Context: Felicity conditions for counterfactual conditionals containing proper names William Robinson Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Toshiyuki Ogihara PhD Linguistics Linguistics This thesis provides felicity conditions for counterfactual conditionals containing proper names in which essential changes to an individual are counterfactually posited using contrastive focus in either the antecedent or consequent clause. The felicity conditions proposed are an adaptation of Heim’s (1992) CCP Semantics into Kratzer’s (1981) truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals in which the partition function f(w) serves as the local context of evaluation for the antecedent clause, while the set of worlds characterized by the antecedent serves as the local context for the consequent clause. In order for the felicity conditions to generate the right results, it is shown that they must be couched in a rigid designator/essentialist framework inspired by Kripke (1980). This correctly predicts that consequents containing rigid designators are infelicitous when their input context—the set of worlds accessible from the antecedent clause— does not contain a suitable referent. 4 Introduction We use counterfactual conditionals like (1a-b) to make claims about the “ways things could have been,” not about the way things actually are1 (Lewis 1973, p.84). The antecedent clause of a counterfactual conditional posits a change to the actual world from which the consequent clause would/might follow.
    [Show full text]
  • Ernst Mally's Theory of Properties!
    ERNST MALLY'S THEORY OF PROPERTIES! Roberto POLl University of Trento 1. Of Meinong's pupils, Ernst Mally is the one who probably made the most significant contribution to furthering the ideas of his teacher.2 It is sufficient, in this regard, to cite Meinong's explicit acknowledgement of Mally's work in his "The Theory ofObjects".3 Of greatest importance in this respect are Mally's unravelling of the distinction between Sein and Sosein4 and between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties,S and his introduction of important termi­ nological refinements which for the most part Meinong accepted.6 Nevertheless, the recent revival of interest in Meinong's theories has not been matched by equal consideration of Mally's work and insights. If we inspect the literature of the last fifteen years, it is immediately apparent that the overwhelming majority of references to Mally concern just two passages in his works, the two that Findlay quotes and comments on in his classic book on Meinong.7 One 1. I thank Liliana A1bertazzi, Johannes Brandl, Rudolf Haller, Dale Jacquette, Karl Schuhmann, Barry Smith and Jan Wo1enski for their comments on a previous version of this paper. 2. Ernst Mally was born in Krainburg (now Kranj, Yugoslavia) in 1879 and died in Graz in 1944. He studied philosophy, mathematics and physics at the University of Graz and in 1913 wrote his dissertation in philosophy under Meinong's supervision. On Meinong's death he was appointed director of the psychology laboratory that has been established by Meinong. In 1925 he became full professor and retained his chair in the university until 1942.
    [Show full text]
  • 324 10 2 Pragmatics I New Shorter
    Speaker’s Meaning, Speech Acts, Topic and Focus, Questions Read: Portner: 24-25,190-198 LING 324 1 Sentence vs. Utterance • Sentence: a unit of language that is syntactically well-formed and can stand alone in discourse as an autonomous linguistic unit, and has a compositionally derived meaning: – A sentence consists of a subject and a predicate: S NP VP. – [[ [NP VP] ]]M,g = 1 iff [[NP]]M,g ∈ [[VP]]M,g • Utterance: The occurrence (use) of a sentence (or possibly smaller constituent that can stand alone) at a given time. • Bill: Sue is coming. Jane: Yes, Sue is coming. – Two utterances of the same sentence. Same meaning. • Bill: “I am tired.” Jane: “ I am tired, too” – Two utterances of the same sentence. Two different meanings. • Semantics studies the meaning of sentences; pragmatics studies the meaning of utterances. LING 324 2 Semantic Meaning vs. Speaker Meaning • A: Most of the people here seem pretty glum. • B: Not everybody. The man drinking champagne is happy. • A: Where? • B: That guy! (pointing) • A: He’s not drinking champagne. He’s drinking sparkling water. The only person drinking champagne is crying on the couch. See? • B: Well, what I meant was that the first guy is happy. [c.f. Donnellan 1966, Kripke 1977] LING 324 3 • The semantic (or expression) meaning of a sentence (or a smaller constituent) is its literal meaning, based on what the words individually mean and the grammar of the language. • The speaker’s meaning of a sentence is what the speaker intends to communicate by uttering it. • These often coincide, but can diverge.
    [Show full text]
  • Intensional Models for the Theory of Types∗
    Intensional Models for the Theory of Types∗ Reinhard Muskens Abstract In this paper we define intensional models for the classical theory of types, thus arriving at an intensional type logic ITL. Intensional models generalize Henkin's general models and have a natural definition. As a class they do not validate the axiom of Extensionality. We give a cut-free sequent calculus for type theory and show completeness of this calculus with respect to the class of intensional models via a model existence theo- rem. After this we turn our attention to applications. Firstly, it is argued that, since ITL is truly intensional, it can be used to model ascriptions of propositional attitude without predicting logical omniscience. In order to illustrate this a small fragment of English is defined and provided with an ITL semantics. Secondly, it is shown that ITL models contain certain objects that can be identified with possible worlds. Essential elements of modal logic become available within classical type theory once the axiom of Extensionality is given up. 1 Introduction The axiom scheme of Extensionality states that whenever two predicates or relations are coextensive they must have the same properties: 8XY (8~x(X~x $ Y ~x) ! 8Z(ZX ! ZY )) (1) Historically Extensionality has always been problematic, the main problem be- ing that in many areas of application, though not perhaps in the foundations of mathematics, the statement is simply false. This was recognized by White- head and Russell in Principia Mathematica [32], where intensional functions such as `A believes that p' or `it is a strange coincidence that p' are discussed at length.
    [Show full text]
  • Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference
    FREGE AND THE LOGIC OF SENSE AND REFERENCE Kevin C. Klement Routledge New York & London Published in 2002 by Routledge 29 West 35th Street New York, NY 10001 Published in Great Britain by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane London EC4P 4EE Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper. Copyright © 2002 by Kevin C. Klement All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any infomration storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Klement, Kevin C., 1974– Frege and the logic of sense and reference / by Kevin Klement. p. cm — (Studies in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 0-415-93790-6 1. Frege, Gottlob, 1848–1925. 2. Sense (Philosophy) 3. Reference (Philosophy) I. Title II. Studies in philosophy (New York, N. Y.) B3245.F24 K54 2001 12'.68'092—dc21 2001048169 Contents Page Preface ix Abbreviations xiii 1. The Need for a Logical Calculus for the Theory of Sinn and Bedeutung 3 Introduction 3 Frege’s Project: Logicism and the Notion of Begriffsschrift 4 The Theory of Sinn and Bedeutung 8 The Limitations of the Begriffsschrift 14 Filling the Gap 21 2. The Logic of the Grundgesetze 25 Logical Language and the Content of Logic 25 Functionality and Predication 28 Quantifiers and Gothic Letters 32 Roman Letters: An Alternative Notation for Generality 38 Value-Ranges and Extensions of Concepts 42 The Syntactic Rules of the Begriffsschrift 44 The Axiomatization of Frege’s System 49 Responses to the Paradox 56 v vi Contents 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Constructional Meaning and Compositionality
    Constructional Meaning and Compositionality Paul Kay International Computer Science Institute and Department of Linguistics University of California, Berkeley 5 Laura A. Michaelis Department of Linguistics and Institute of Cognitive Science University of Colorado Boulder Contents 10 1. Constructions and compositionality 2. Continuum of idiomaticity 3. Kinds of constructional meanings 4. Model-theoretic and truth-conditional meaning 5. Argument structure 15 6. Metalinguistic constructions 7. Less commonly recognized illocutionary forces 8. Conventional implicature, or pragmatic presupposition 9. Information flow 10. Conclusion 20 11. References Abstract One of the major motivations for constructional approaches to grammar is that a given rule of syntactic formation can sometimes, in fact often, be associated with more than one semantic 25 specification. For example, a pair of expressions like purple plum and alleged thief call on different rules of semantic combination. The first involves something closely related to intersection of sets: a purple plum is a member of the set of purple things and a member of the set of plums. But an alleged thief is not a member of the intersection of the set of thieves and the set of alleged things. Indeed, that intersection is empty, since only a proposition 30 can be alleged and a thief, whether by deed or attribution, is never a proposition. This chapter describes the various ways meanings may be assembled in a construction-based grammar. 1. Constructions and compositionality 35 It is sometimes supposed that constructional approaches are opposed to compositional semantics. This happens to be an incorrect supposition, but it is instructive to consider why it exists.
    [Show full text]