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The Lavon Affair: How a false-flag operation led to war and the Israeli bomb Leonard Weiss Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2013 69: 58 DOI: 10.1177/0096340213493259

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Feature Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69(4) 58–68 ! The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav The Lavon Affair: How a DOI: 10.1177/0096340213493259 false-flag operation led to http://thebulletin.sagepub.com war and the Israeli bomb

Leonard Weiss

Abstract The Lavon Affair, a failed Israeli covert operation directed against in 1954, triggered a chain of events that have had profound consequences for power relationships in the Middle East; the affairÕs effects still reverberate today. Those events included a public trial and conviction of eight Egyptian Jews who carried out the covert operation, two of whom were subsequently executed; a retaliatory military incursion by into Gaza that killed 39 Egyptians; a subsequent Egyptian”Soviet arms deal that angered American and British leaders, who then withdrew previously pledged support for the building of the Aswan Dam; the announced nationalization of the by Nasser in retaliation for the withdrawn support; and the subsequent failed invasion of Egypt by Israel, , and Britain in an attempt to topple Nasser. In the wake of that failed invasion, France expanded and accelerated its ongoing nuclear cooperation with Israel, which eventually enabled the Jewish state to build nuclear weapons.

Keywords Egypt, France, Israel, Lavon Affair, nuclear, sabotage,

n 1954, Israeli Military Intelligence Western governments that NasserÕs (often known by its Hebrew abbrevi- regime was unstable and, therefore, I ation AMAN) activated a sleeper cell unworthy of financial and other support. that had been tasked with setting off a The operation started with the bomb- series of bombs in Egypt. In this risky ing of the post office and, operation, a small number of Egyptian within a matter of weeks, six other build- Jews were to bomb Western and Egyp- ings in Alexandria and also were tian institutions in Egypt, hoping the targeted. But the Egyptian government attacks could be blamed on Egyptian was apparently told about the next opponents of the countryÕs leader, bombing target, and the bomber was , including mem- arrested. Eventually, Egyptian security bers of the or the rolled up the entire Israeli cell. Communist Party. The ensuing chaos, it The failed operation became a scandal apparently was hoped, would persuade and blame for the ill-conceived attempt

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Stanford University Libraries on July 29, 2013 Weiss 59 is still not officially settled. During the time, was significantly disadvantaged 1954”55 trial of the bombers, however, in regard to nuclear technology develop- , IsraelÕs minister of ment at the end of the war (Goldschmidt, defense, was painted as having approved 1982). However, the US Atomic Energy the sabotage campaign and LavonÕs poli- Commission and its nuclear labs at Los tical enemies at home echoed the charge Alamos, Livermore, and Oak Ridge pro- in early inquiries into the matter. Subse- vided a model that was followed by quent Israeli investigations suggest that other countries with nuclear ambitions, Lavon was framed, to divert attention including France, which created the from other Israeli leaders, but the inci- Commissariat ˆ lÕnergie atomique in dent has retained the name given at the 1945 and, subsequently, the nuclear time: the Lavon Affair. research centers at Chatillon in 1946 This ill-conceived false-flag operation and Saclay in 1952. Meanwhile, IsraelÕs failed, embarrassingly, to accomplish its first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, goal of undermining Nasser. Although influenced by his science advisor Ernst usually ignored or portrayed as an intra- David Bergmann, decided to launch a mural political fight among high-level nuclear technology development pro- Israeli politicians, the Lavon Affair also gram within the Ministry of Defense. played a major role in setting in motion a Bergmann was a scientist with an inter- chain of events that led to IsraelÕs acqui- national reputation in chemistry and sition of nuclear weapons, via scientific professional connections in many coun- and military cooperation with France. tries, including France. These connec- Narratives of the affairÑincluding this tions enabled Israel to send some of its oneÑare hampered by Israeli govern- budding nuclear physicists for training ment secrecy and the failure thus far of at Saclay (Cohen, 1998). Thus, the foun- those who organized and ordered its dation for a future French”Israeli nu- execution to reveal publicly their inner- clear connection was laid. most thinking about it. But regardless of While Israel was pleased to obtain the details of how the Lavon Affair came advanced scientific training in France, about, the affair triggered events that its main concern in the near term was accelerated the Israeli bomb program. conventional military assistance, another Even absent the Lavon Affair, Israel area that the Israelis thought was ripe for would almost certainly have obtained cooperation between the two countries. the bomb. But the path to it would have Mohammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel been longer and more difficult, with an Nasser had shared power after the 1952 unpredictable impact on the power overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy, a dynamics of the entire Middle East. development that gave both the Israelis and the French cause for concern. The Israeli”French connection Nasser became EgyptÕs sole leader in 1954 after a failed assassination attempt France, partly because it was excluded against him by a member of the Muslim from cooperating with the United Brotherhood. The failure, witnessed by a States on the development of the bomb large crowd that had gathered to hear during and after World War II, as well as Nasser speak, made him a hero (Rogan, its parlous financial condition at the 2009). He used his new, elevated status

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Stanford University Libraries on July 29, 2013 60 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69(4) to order one of the largest crackdowns in being at odds with the French and British EgyptÕs history, which resulted in the over the Suez Canal, which they con- arrest of 20,000 people (mostly Brother- trolled via their majority position in the hood members and communists) (Aburish, Suez Canal Authority, Nasser provided 2004). Then-President Naguib was re- assistance to Algerian rebels fighting for moved from office and placed under independence from France. The Israelis, house arrest, with Nasser assuming the who armed and trained militias in the title of president. Jewish-Algerian communities to help NasserÕs ambition was to lead a pan- protect them from Islamist rebels, Arab movement that would finally aided France in the Algerian fight. Some- expel Western colonial powers from times, Jewish-Algerian reservists in the the Middle East and eliminate the state French army even commanded those of Israel. He encouraged terrorist attacks militias, and the Israelis provided intel- on the British military base in the Suez ligence to the French, cracking the codes Canal Zone, putting economic pressure for Algerian underground messages on the British to leave at the expiration broadcast from Cairo (Karpin, 2006). of the 20-year agreement of 1936 that pro- Although there were disagreements vided for the British Suez base. However, within the Israeli leadership on how to BritainÕs troubles with Nasser did not handle Nasser, Ben-Gurion and his resonate with the , whose Army chief of staff, , were secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, convinced that another war with Egypt was more concerned with possible So- was both likely and better triggered viet encroachment in the Middle East sooner than later. Thus, Israel was des- than with the protection of BritainÕs colo- perate to obtain arms in preparation for nial position. The United States saw what it viewed as the inevitable and saw Nasser, an opponent of the Egyptian France as having a common interest with Communist Party, as a possible bulwark Israel in getting rid of Nasser. againstSovietexpansionismintheregion. The task of forging Israeli”French Its other troubles with Nasser not- military cooperation via an arms deal withstanding, Britain shared the goal of was given to then-Director General of trying to keep Nasser from falling under the Ministry of Defense , Soviet influence and joined with the who was spectacularly successful, thanks United States in providing aid to Egypt. to Abel Thomas and Louis Mangin, the In particular, the two countries agreed to chief assistants to French Minister of provide substantial direct financial sup- Interior Maurice Bourgs-Maunoury port ($68 million) for the building of the (Pan, 1982). Thomas, though not Jewish, high dam at Aswan, which Nasser was a passionate supporter of Israel, believed would be seen as one of his partly because of what he viewed as his most significant accomplishments as brotherÕs shared history with victims of . The United States the Holocaust (Karpin, 2006). (His also promised to support a $200 million brother, an underground fighter, was mur- loan from the World Bank for the Aswan dered by the Nazis at Buchenwald.) Dam (Boyle, 2005). Despite opposition from French Foreign Nasser was troubling the French Minister Christian Pineau, Bourgs- during this period as well. Besides Maunoury approved the sale of 12 Mystere

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Stanford University Libraries on July 29, 2013 Weiss 61 jet fighters to Israel and later followed it stability of Egypt under Nasser could be up with an arms deal worth about $70 mil- undermined, the likelihood that the lion involving more planes, thousands of United States and Britain would sell antitank rockets, and tens of thousands of arms to Nasser or leave the Suez base artillery shells (Karpin, 2006). NasserÕs would be reduced. That is, if it could be rise to the presidency of Egypt, his vehe- demonstrated that Nasser did not have ment opposition to the Jewish state, and control over the countryÑthat NasserÕs his efforts against the former colonial enemies had the ability to create powers in North Africa and the Middle chaosÑthe West might think twice East made Israel and France natural about further support. It remains unclear allies. Extending that narrowly based alli- why some high officials in Israel thought ance to nuclear weapons cooperation, that they had the ability to produce this however, required a catalyst powerful result through the actions of a handful of enough to overcome opposition from people on the ground. On the surface, some parts of the French Foreign Ministry however, it appears that extreme hubris, to any French”Israeli nuclear partnership. combined with complete disrespect for The Israelis unintentionally provided Egyptian competence, enabled the logis- that catalyst through an improbable plan tically complicated idea that became the that aimed to thwart a pragmatic pol- Lavon Affair to flourish in some circles icy decision by the United States and of Israeli Military Intelligence. Britain to provide Nasser with limited In the aftermath of the 1948 Arab” economic help. Israeli War, AMAN established Òsleeper cellsÓ in Egypt; that is, small groups of Hubris and bombs: The Lavon Israeli loyalists who were trained Affair secretly to be a fifth column that could engage in sabotage or terror attacks While Nasser was pleased to obtain against Egypt in the event of war with American help for the Aswan Dam pro- Israel. The Lavon Affair involved a slee- ject, he also wanted an arms deal, which per cell that was ordered to carry out a the United States was reluctant to grant, risky false-flag operation code-named partly because of NasserÕs stated aim of Operation Susannah. The cell consisted eliminating the Jewish state. Neverthe- of a small number of Egyptian Jews who less, Israeli leaders feared a strengthen- received training in Israel and Egypt in ing of NasserÕs political position in the delayed-action explosive devices and region and a possible US”Egyptian arms conspiratorial techniques. The plan deal that they considered a dire threat to called for the bombing of Western insti- Israel. In addition, because of rising tutions and buildings in Egypt, under the Egyptian attacks on British troops in assumption that the attacks would be the Canal Zone, the British began to blamed on Egyptian dissidents, such as openly consider leaving the Suez base; the Muslim Brotherhood or the Commu- the Israelis opposed a British departure nist Party. Among other reasons, the because they believed the British troops Muslim Brothers were upset with Nasser provided a buffer and a deterrent against because he had entered negotiations with an attack on Israel. Some in the Israeli the British over the Suez Canal base; leadership felt that if confidence in the Brotherhood leaders felt that Nasser was

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Stanford University Libraries on July 29, 2013 62 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69(4) prepared to compromise EgyptÕs rightful July 23, bombs went off in two cinemas, claim to complete control over the canal the railway terminal, and the central (Hirst, 1977). IsraelÕs hope was that post office in Cairo (Isseroff, 2003). Operation Susannah would embolden There were no casualties, as the bombs NasserÕs enemies and undermine argu- were detonated when no one was likely ments for Western support. to be present. A set of goals, ostensibly articulated It remains unclear exactly how the by Benjamin Gibli, the head of Israeli Egyptians were warned (it is believed Military Intelligence, was delivered to that Elad had compromised the opera- the ring by an intelligence officer about tion), but they were ready for the next to join them: bombing, planned for a movie theater in Cairo on July 27. They stationed a fire Our goal is to break the WestÕs confidence in truck outside the theater. In a lucky the existing [Egyptian] regime ...The actions break for the Egyptians, the saboteurÕs should cause arrests, demonstrations, and expressions of revenge. The Israeli origin incendiary device detonated in his should be totally covered while attention pocket as he approached the theater. should be shifted to any other possible The saboteur, Philip Nathanson, was factor. The purpose is to prevent economic arrested and interrogated, and because and military aid from the West to Egypt. The choice of the precise objectives to be sabo- the ring members were not compart- taged will be left to the men on the spot, who mentalized (they all knew one another), should evaluate the possible consequences of the sabotage ring unraveled. Elad and each action ...in terms of creating commotion Dar managed to escape, but on October and public disorders. (Rokach, 1986: 659, 664) 5, the Egyptian interior minister announced the breakup of a Ò13-manÓ A core of Israeli agents headed by Israeli sabotage network, a number in Colonel Avraham Dar, whose cover which Elad was probably included, des- identity was that of a British business- pite his escape. Among those arrested man named John Darling, recruited and was an Israeli intelligence agent, Max trained the original members of the Binett, who committed suicide upon ring (Geller, 2013). Operational details, arrest. One of the Egyptian Jews, Yosef including further recruitment, became Carmon, committed suicide in prison. the responsibility of a military intelli- The remaining 10 prisoners were tried; gence agent, Avraham (n Adolf) Sei- two were acquitted, and all the others denberg, also known as Avri Elad. Elad were convicted. The death penalty (by had a positive reputation as the discov- hanging) was announced and carried erer of methods used by wanted Nazi out for two conspiratorsÑShmuel war criminals to escape to Arab coun- Azar, an engineer, and Moshe Marzouk, tries; he also had a negative reputation a physician. The rest received prison in some Israeli quarters as a thief who sentences ranging from seven years to had been punished for looting Arab life, but those still in prison in 1968 houses. The operation began on July 2, were released as part of a prisoner 1954, with bombs set off inside the Alex- exchange in the aftermath of the 1967 andria post office; on July 14, incendiary Six-Day War. devices were set off in US consulate Elad settled abroad, but was tricked libraries in Alexandria and Cairo. On into returning to Israel, where he was

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Stanford University Libraries on July 29, 2013 Weiss 63 arrested and tried before a secret tribu- imaginary crimesÓ (Speech to the Knes- nal in 1959. He was not charged with set in 1954; Rokach, 1986: chapter 7). The being a double agent, but was convicted Israeli press, and later the American and sentenced to 10 years in prison for press, picked up on this theme, and days having illegal contact with Egyptian after the story of the arrests and trial intelligence. Elad served two additional broke, the Jerusalem Post, Davar (the years via the administrative detention daily controlled by the authority of the Ministry of Defense; party), and (the daily of Menachem subsequently, he was allowed to emi- BeginÕs party of the same name) began to grate to the United States, where he compare the situation in Egypt with lived until his death in 1993. Although events in Nazi Germany (Beinin, 1998). he continued to profess innocence, the At the trial, Pinhas Lavon, IsraelÕs minis- Associated Press reported in 1988 that ter of defense, was painted as having the Egyptian magazine October cited approved the sabotage campaign. But Egyptian sources to the effect that Elad Lavon claimed he, like Sharett, knew was an agent for both Israel and Egypt nothing of the affair and asked for a (Herman, 2013). secret inquiry to clear his name. The failure of Operation Susannah In January 1955, Sharett established the was a shock to IsraelÕs leaders, and Olshan-Dori Committee, named for its none was prepared to accept responsi- members, a Supreme Court justice and bility for the activation of the sleeper a former chief of cell, which, among other things, put the staff, to determine who had authorized 50,000 Jews living in Egypt at high risk. Operation Susannah. The inquiry The question of who gave the order included testimony by Elad, who pro- became an issue that roiled Israeli pol- duced a document containing LavonÕs itics for more than a decade and is still signature that gave the order for the not officially settled. And the botched operation. Although the committee did operation had serious consequences not conclude that Lavon had given the beyond the fate of the conspirators. order (finding that either Lavon or Gibli may have done so), Lavon was officially The trial that led to the in charge of such intelligence operations, Soviet”Egyptian connection and he was forced to resign on February 17, 1955, while still maintaining his non- The convictions of the eight Egyptian culpability. Jews were given much publicity in Ben-Gurion took LavonÕs place as Egypt and Israel. Israeli Prime Minister defense minister and shortly afterward Moshe Sharett, who had been kept in the became prime minister. A few years dark about the false-flag operation until later, a secret ministerial investigation it unraveled, provided the Israeli public reviewed the Olshan-Dori investigative narrative, which painted the proceedings record and concluded that Elad had sub- as a of Òa group of Jews who mitted perjured testimony, and that the became victims of false accusations of document ostensibly showing Lavon espionage, and who, it seems, are being had given the order was forged, inescap- threatened and tortured in order to ably implying that Lavon had been extract from them confessions in framed. This in turn implied that Israeli

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Stanford University Libraries on July 29, 2013 64 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69(4) intelligence chief Benjamin Gibli, Moshe leaders, especially the Saudis) and Dayan, and Shimon Peres, all of whom domestic political considerations. So testified against Lavon, had been Nasser did what the Americans and engaged in a political vendetta designed British did not want him to do: He to shift responsibility away from them- approached the Soviets, who told him selves. Despite LavonÕs demand for they could arrange for him to buy exculpation, Ben-Gurion did not pub- Czech-made arms to meet his needs. licly exonerate him, instead protecting President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his protgs and the security establish- Secretary of State Dulles were incensed ment from the charge that military offi- with Nasser for allowing the Soviets a cers were being allowed to conduct toehold in the Middle East, as well as risky operations without proper civilian for recognizing the Chinese communist authorization. At the same time, the gov- government, and decided to punish him ernment held to the public position that as an example to others. Dulles told the Egyptian Jewish conspirators were Nasser that the United States and Britain innocent victims of anti-Semitism. This would withdraw their financial support stance was finally put to rest in March for the Aswan Dam project and get the 1975 when the government allowed three World Bank to cancel its $200 million of the conspiratorsÑRobert Dassa, loan for the project. NasserÕs response Victor Levy, and Marcelle NinioÑto was to end negotiations with Britain acknowledge their roles as saboteurs in and announce the nationalization of the Egypt by appearing on Israeli television Suez Canal and the closure of the British to declare that they had acted on orders base in the canal zone. His intent was to from Israel (Beinin, 1998). use proceeds from the canal to build the In February 1955, though, the Israeli Aswan Dam. And he now had the back- public and news outlets were outraged ing of the Soviets (Boyle, 2005). over what they believed were unjustified Britain and France attempted to have show trials. Calls for retaliation for the the canal internationalized via a UN executions of Azar and Marsouk pro- Security Council resolution, but the vided Ben-Gurion with the public sup- Soviets vetoed it, leading the French to port he wanted for a military incursion believe that only military action against against Egypt. On February 28, 1955, Egypt could alter the situation. They Israel mounted a military raid on Gaza, sent a delegation to London to try to per- then under Egyptian control, that suade Britain, whose economy would be resulted in the death of 39 Egyptians. seriously affected by NasserÕs move on Israel suffered no casualties in the the canal, to join in a military attack. Gaza raid, embarrassing Nasser, who British Prime Minister Anthony Eden realized more than ever that he needed would not agree to join a military effort to strengthen his military if he was going unless there was a pretext that would to confront the Israelis. The United provide some political cover; the States and Britain did not want to arm French told him that Israel would pro- a Nasser-led Egypt, not only because of vide the pretext. In a subsequent meet- his public anti-colonialist stance, but ing, however, Israeli leaders told the also because of regional considerations French they would join a military (Nasser was not trusted by other Arab effort, but not initiate the attack. The

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Israeli government changed its position of British, French, and Israeli forces in return for a historically significant from Egypt. Britain and France agreed inducement: the French agreement to to withdraw, leaving Israel in an unten- provide Israel with a nuclear reactor, able position. A UN vote that insisted on uranium, and additional technology Israeli withdrawal sealed the result, but that would enable the establishment of not before Israel received a reiteration a viable nuclear weapons program from top French officials that they (Karpin, 2006). would live up to the nuclear deal. Thus, the events that followed from French Prime Minister Guy Mollet later the Lavon Affair had now created a situ- was quoted as saying, ÒI owe the bomb to ation that put France, Britain, and Israel themÓ (Hersh, 1991: 83). at the brink of war with Egypt and soli- The Israeli”French agreement res- dified the Israeli”French nuclear con- ulted in the construction in 1958 of a nection in a way that would help Israel large research reactor and a reprocess- achieve a nuclear weapons capability. ing facility at Dimona, which became and remains the center for Israeli nu- The Britain”France”Israel clear weapon development. Israel and Suez plan French nuclear scientists worked to- gether on weapon-design issues, and It was agreed: Israel would invade Egypt French test data were shared. When the and drive toward the eastern bank of the French successfully tested their first Suez Canal, conquering the Sinai Penin- device in 1960, it was said that two sula in the process. As protectors of their nuclear powers were being created by interests in the canal, Britain and France the test, a notion memorialized by the would demand the withdrawal of Israeli journalist Pierre Pan, who titled his and Egyptian forces from the canal zone, 1982 book about the joint effort Les under the assumption that Egypt would Deux Bombes. But Israel had an ongoing refuse after Israel agreed. The Israeli need for nuclear materials for its pro- invasion began on October 29, 1956, gram and found ways of obtaining such shortly before the American presidential materials illegally or clandestinely from election, in which Eisenhower was seek- a variety of countries. Heavy water for ing a second term. The British and the reactor was purchased from Norway French followed the plan, invading in 1959 under the false pretense that it Egypt on November 5 and November 6, would be used only for peaceful pur- the latter of which was election day in the poses (Milhollin, 1988). After France United States. cut off shipments of uranium following The invasion was a complete surprise the 1967 Arab”Israeli war, 200 metric to Eisenhower, who was furious and tons of yellowcake (processed uranium believed that it would give the Soviets oxide) presumably bound for Genoa the opening they sought for involvement from Antwerp was transferred at sea to in Middle East affairs. Indeed, the Soviet a vessel going to Israel in another false- Union, in the midst of crushing the Hun- flag operation, mounted this time by the garian uprising, issued an ultimatum , IsraelÕs agency responsible for that referenced its possession of nuclear human intelligence, covert action, and weapons and demanded the withdrawal counterterrorism (Davenport et al.,

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1978). Israel is also suspected of illegally to sign the NPT and had a famous meet- receiving a significant amount of highly ing with Israeli Prime Minister Golda enriched uranium from an American Meir in 1969 in which the basic US” company, the NUMEC Corporation of Israel nuclear deal was struck (although Apollo, Pennsylvania, during the 1960s not in writing). Israel would no longer be (Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010). asked to sign the NPT; in return, Israel When the Dimona project was dis- would maintain a position of nuclear covered by a U-2 surveillance flight in ambiguity or opacity and forgo any 1957, the Israelis first denied the project nuclear testing. IsraelÕs adherence to was nuclear related and said the com- the bargain was implicitly incorporated plex was a textile manufacturing plant. into its oft-repeated public statement Later, the Israelis claimed it was a water that it Òwould not be the first nation to desalination project before finally admit- introduce nuclear weapons into the ting its nuclear character. Once Dimona Middle East.Ó was identified as a nuclear project, the The most serious challenge to the bar- United States sought an Israeli pledge gain came on September 22, 1979 (Weiss, that it would be used for peaceful pur- 2011). Despite significant evidence that a poses only, and inspections by American US Vela satellite recorded a nuclear test scientists and technicians would be off the coast of South Africa, the United allowed. Israel initially rebuffed the States has not admitted that a test took notion of inspections, then agreed to place, that the perpetrator was almost them, but kept delaying their implemen- certainly Israel, and that alternative tation. When they finally took place, the explanations of the satelliteÕs signal rec- inspections were cursory and allowed ording of the event have little credibility. the Israelis to effectively hide the true The vast majority of scientists who have nature of the activity (Hersh, 1991). examined the data, particularly those at By this time, the Nuclear Non-Prolif- US nuclear weapons laboratories, are eration Treaty (NPT) was being nego- convinced a test took place, but the US tiated, and the US State Department government has thus far not declassified and President John F. Kennedy were or released much of the information in eager for Israel to approve the treaty as its possession regarding the event. a non-weapon state. However, Ken- The Israelis are characteristically silent nedyÕs assassination in November 1963 on the issue, allowing a small amount of removed a major source of pressure on additional room for those who are so Israel, and while the State Department inclined to doubt that a test took place. continued to press for an Israeli signa- There is, however, no doubt about the ture, using the withholding of arms ship- existence of the Israeli nuclear arsenal, ments as leverage, President Lyndon which is estimated to contain 80 war- Johnson intervened, overruling his own heads with enough fissile material to State Department; he saw political bene- construct up to 200 warheads (McDon- fit in removing the pressure, as long as nell, 2013), including ÒboostedÓ weapons the Israelis did not make their weapons (Sunday Times, 1986; Wisconsin Project, project public. Richard Nixon, who fol- 1996). lowed Johnson as president, made it History is replete with seemingly clear that Israel would not be pressured small events that set in motion forces

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Stanford University Libraries on July 29, 2013 Weiss 67 that result in major world upheavals. In a References recent example, the immolation of a Aburish S (2004) Nasser, the Last Arab. New York: street vendor in Tunisia began the St MartinÕs. ongoing Arab Spring that has toppled Beinin J (ed.) (1998) The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. governments in the Middle East and is Boyle P (2005) The Eden”Eisenhower Correspondence far from finished. The Lavon Affair is 1955”57. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North such an event; it not only led to war Carolina Press. and attendant upheavals in the Middle Cohen A (1998) Israel and the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press. East but accelerated the proliferation of Davenport E, Eddy P, and Gillman P (1978) The nuclear weapons in one of the most vola- Plumbat Affair. New York: Lippincott. tile regions on the planet. It is therefore Geller D (2013) The Lavon Affair: The American” important to understand what lessons Israeli cooperative enterprise. Available at: the affair contains for both policy www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/ lavon.html. makers and ordinary citizens desiring a Gilinsky V and Mattson R (2010) Revisiting the peaceful, just, and democratic world. NUMEC Affair. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists The Lavon Affair can be viewed as a 66(2): 61”75. case history in which a small group of Goldschmidt B (1982) The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy. hubristic government officials, acting La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society. in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy Herman P (2013) Los Angeles had its own Israeli Ex- and ideological fervor, put their country ÔPrisoner XÕ. jewishjournal.com, February 19. on a path toward war, with little or no Available at: www.jewishjournal.com/demographic_ duo/item/los_angeles_had_its_own_israeli_ex_ debate. It is another cautionary tale that prisoner_x. ought to inform policy makers of any Hersh S (1991) The Samson Option. New York: country of the dangers of the arrogance Random House. of power, coupled with an atmosphere of Hirst D (1977) The Gun and the Olive Branch. Futura. secrecy that inevitably interferes with, Available at: www.allaboutpalestine.com/index. php/page,76.html. and can trump, accountability. Isseroff A (2003) The Lavon Affair: Israel and terror As the so-called war on terror in Egypt. Report, MideastWeb. Available at: proceeds with its intrusive surveillance www.mideastweb.org/lavon.htm. programs, expanding drone operations, Karpin M (2006) The Bomb in the Basement. New York: Simon and Schuster. and secret Òkill lists,Ó prudence and McDonnell T (2013) Nuclear pursuits: Non-P-5 accountability are more important than nuclear-armed states, 2013. Bulletin of the Atomic ever. Have our leaders absorbed the Scientists 69(1): 62”70. cautionary tales of the past? Time will Milhollin G (1988) NorwayÕs heavy water scandals. Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Sep- tell, but the increasing amount of tember 14. Available at: www.wisconsinproject. secrecy in government and the increas- org/pubs/editorials/1988/heavywaterscandals. ing number of prosecutions of whistle- htm. blowers do not provide confidence in Pan P (1982) Les Deux Bombes. Paris: Fayard. the robustness of the American system Rogan E (2009) The Arabs: A History. London: Allen Lane. of accountability. Rokach L (1986) IsraelÕs Sacred Terrorism. Washing- ton, DC: Association of Arab-American Univer- Funding sity Graduates. Available at: msuweb.montclair.  This research received no specific grant from any edu/ furrg/essays/rokach.html. funding agency in the public, commercial, or not- Sunday Times (1986) Revealed: The secrets of IsraelÕs for-profit sectors. nuclear arsenal. No. 8,461, October 5, p. 1.

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Weiss L (2011) IsraelÕs 1979 nuclear test and and Cooperation. For more than 20 years, he the U.S. cover-up. Middle East Policy 18(4). Avail- worked in the US Senate as staff director on able at: www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east- the Governmental Affairs Committee, writing policy-archives/israel-s-1979-nuclear-test-and- legislation and leading investigations in the us-cover. areas of nuclear proliferation and nuclear Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control (1996) IsraelÕs nuclear weapon capability: An overview. safety. He is a former tenured professor of Risk Report 2(4). Available at: www.wisconsin applied mathematics and engineering at Brown project.org/countries/israel/nuke.html. University and the University of Maryland.

Author biography Leonard Weiss is a visiting scholar at Stanford UniversityÕs Center for International Security

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