The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations Introduction Iii

Introduction i Hong Kong University Press thanks Xu Bing for writing the Press’s name in his Square Word Calligraphy for the covers of its books. For further information, see p. iv. ii The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations Introduction iii Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo iv The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations Hong Kong University Press 14/F Hing Wai Centre 7 Tin Wan Praya Road Aberdeen Hong Kong © Hong Kong University Press 2008 Hardback ISBN 978-962-209-908-1 Paperback ISBN 978-962-209-909-8 All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Secure On-line Ordering http://www.hkupress.org Printed and bound by Condor Production Ltd., Hong Kong, China. Hong Kong University Press is honoured that Xu Bing, whose art explores the complex themes of language across cultures, has written the Press’s name in his Square Word Calligraphy. This signals our commitment to cross-cultural thinking and the distinctive nature of our English-language books published in China. “At first glance, Square Word Calligraphy appears to be nothing more unusual than Chinese characters, but in fact it is a new way of rendering English words in the format of a square so they resemble Chinese characters. Chinese viewers expect to be able to read Square Word Calligraphy but cannot. Western viewers, however are surprised to find they can read it. Delight erupts when meaning is unexpectedly revealed.” — Britta Erickson, The Art of Xu Bing Introduction v Contents Acknowledgements vii Abbreviations ix Introduction 1 1. Patron-Client Pluralism and Beijing’s Relations with 7 Hong Kong 2. The Mainlandization of Hong Kong 39 3. The Politics of Judicial Autonomy 81 4. The Emergence of Constitutional Conventions 109 5. The Implementation of the Basic Law 133 6. Identity Change from the National Security Debate 151 to Celebrations of the Tenth Anniversary 7. The Election of the Hong Kong Deputies to the National 185 People’s Congress 8. A Fusion of Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Political 199 Cultures in the 2007 Chief Executive Election 9. Applying the Spirit of “One Country, Two Systems” to 227 Taiwan’s Political Future 10. Conclusion 253 Notes 261 Bibliography 307 Index 323 vi List of Tables List of Tables Table 1.1 Patron-Client Relations between Beijing and Hong 31 Kong’s Political Actors Table 2.1 Estimated Number of Participants on the July 1 41 Protests, 2003–2007 Table 2.2 The Evolving Self-Identity of the Hong Kong 64 People, 1993–2007 Table 3.1 Events from the Court of Final Appeal’s Ruling 84–85 on January 29 to the NPC Interpretation of the Basic Law on June 26 Table 4.1 Distinguishing Conventions from Laws, Practices, 110 Understandings, and Habits Table 6.1 Timeline of the Development of the National 152–153 Security Bill Table 6.2 Some of the Local Groups Opposing Article 23 161–164 of the Basic Law Table 7.1 The 54 Winners in the First Round of Voting 187 Table 7.2 Election Results of the Hong Kong Deputies 191–192 to the Tenth National People’s Congress Table 8.1 The Support of Donald Tsang and 207–208 Alan Leong in the Nomination Process Table 8.2 Comparison of Tsang and Leong’s Political 210 Platforms Table 8.3 Surveys Conducted by Lingnan University and 220 the University of Hong Kong on the Performance of Candidates in the Chief Executive Election Table 8.4 The Reasons Why Respondents Supported Tsang 221 or Leong Table 8.5 Public Support of Tsang and Leong 221 Acknowledgements I express my gratitude to Colin Day of Hong Kong University Press for his support of my book project and to Dawn Lau for her editing work. I must also thank Patrick Kwong and Joseph Cheng for granting me the copyright permission to use the revised version of my chapter on mainlandization in Professor Joseph Y. S. Cheng’s edited book entitled The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First Decade (City University of Hong Kong Press, August 2007), Professor Rick Glofceski and Professor Albert Chen for giving me the authorization to reprint the updated version of my article entitled “The Emergence of Constitutional Conventions in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” in the Hong Kong Law Journal (Part 1, 2005, published by Sweet & Maxwell), and to Professor John Burns and Professor Ian Thynne for letting me adopt my essay on the 2007 chief executive election in The Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration (“Symposium on the First Ten Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China,” July 2007). These works have been revised and they are now appearing in this book as Chapter 2, Chapter 4, and Chapter 8 respectively. Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to all those people who are yearning for a peaceful resolution of the political future of Taiwan. viii The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations Introduction ix Abbreviations ATV Asia Television CCP Chinese Communist Party CCTC China Central Television CEPA Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement CFA Court of Final Appeal CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CPU Central Policy Unit DAB Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong DP Democratic Party DPP Democratic Progressive Party ExCo Executive Council FTU Federation of Trade Unions HKMAO Hong Kong Macao Affairs Office HKSAR Hong Kong Special Administrative Region KMT Kuomintang LegCo Legislative Council LO Liaison Office LP Liberal Party MSAR Macao Special Administrative Region NCNA New China News Agency NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations NPC National People’s Congress PLA People’s Liberation Army POAS Principal Officials Accountability System PRC People’s Republic of China PRD Pearl River Delta ROC Republic of China RTHK Radio Television Hong Kong SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SCNPC Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress SDC Strategic Development Commission TVB Television Broadcasting U.S. United States Introduction 1 Introduction The transfer of the sovereignty of Hong Kong from Britain to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 1997 was a crucial experiment with the concept of “one country, two systems” designed and proposed by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. With Taiwan as the final target of reunification with China in mind, Deng hoped that the retrocession of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) would be as smooth as possible, laying the groundwork for his successors’ attempt at wooing Taiwan back to the PRC orbit. Nevertheless, as this book will argue, the governance of the HKSAR has proved to be superficially “successful” but substantially turbulent and conflict-ridden. The difficult years of governance in the HKSAR from July 1, 1997 to the sudden resignation of the former chief executive Tung Chee- hwa in March 2005 posed a tremendous obstacle for the PRC to demonstrate the success of “one country, two systems” to the world and to the Taiwan leaders. The popularity of Tung’s successor, Donald Tsang, has made it easier for Beijing to sell the “one country, two systems” to the outside world, but not necessarily to Taiwan where the pro-independence elites and masses remain resistant to the Hong Kong model. Although civil liberties in the HKSAR have been by and large maintained since July 1997, the superficial phenomenon has hidden the fact that the “one country, two systems” has brought about tremendous tensions between the people of Hong Kong and Beijing, and between the Hongkongers and the C. H. Tung administration from July 1, 1997 to March 2005, when the chief executive stepped down for health reasons. Although the people of Hong Kong were in general satisfied with Beijing’s political leadership, they were deeply dissatisfied with the fact that Beijing sided with Chief Executive C. H. Tung whose policies were out of touch with the public in the HKSAR. As this 2 The Dynamics of Beijing–Hong Kong Relations book will discuss, the debate over Article 23 of the Basic Law — the stipulation that outlaws subversion, sedition and treason — proved to be a disaster for the Tung administration in July 2003, compounded by the mismanagement of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) that broke out in the early half of the year. Although the Tung regime temporarily shelved the enactment of Article 23 of the Basic Law, the issue will sooner or later re-emerge as a sore point between some Hong Kong people and Beijing, and between the pro-democracy Hongkongers and the HKSAR government. The tenth anniversary of the HKSAR on July 1, 2007 was punctuated by a glittering fireworks display on the Victoria Harbor, marked by a high- level visit by PRC President Hu Jintao, and characterized by a parade that celebrated the return of Hong Kong to the motherland. At the same time, the tenth anniversary demonstrated an official propaganda orchestrated by the pro-Beijing local and mainland mass media. While the mainland-backed media such as the China Central Television (CCTV) and Phoenix overwhelmingly portrayed the return of Hong Kong to mainland China as a triumph of the “one country, two systems,” the local Chinese media displayed an increasingly politically correct line. What was alarming was the large number of mainland-born media professionals who worked for the CCTV and Phoenix. Naturally, their perception and description of the HKSAR developments were necessarily biased, excluding the views of most Hong Kong-born people who may not be fluent in Mandarin and who were not really interviewed by the CCTV and Phoenix, except for those pro-Beijing Hongkongers such as Jasper Tsang Yok-sing and Cheung Chi- kong.1 Compounding the problem of biased television coverage of Hong Kong was the increasingly self-censored news of the local TVB and ATV whose ownership change in recent years has been accompanied by a silent revolution toward a tendency of reporting “good” rather than “bad” news on the HKSAR.

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