By the Seat of Their Pants:
Military Technological Adaptation in War
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University
By
Nina A. Kollars Graduate Program in Political Science B.A., M.A.
The Ohio State University 2012
Dissertation Committee: Professor Randall Schweller, Chair Professor S. M. Amadae, Advisor Professor Theodore Hopf, Advisor
Copyrighted by
Nina A. Kollars
2012
Abstract
Fighting the war we are in is about bridging the gap between theory and practice. It is about adaptation. Adaptation is a particular kind of innovation, though we tend not to think of it that way. The literature on military innovation is focused nearly entirely on top-down processes. It posits a uni-directional model of innovation that begins above and terminates below. While this represents one potential pattern of innovation it is a decidedly lop-sided one. Innovation has two dimensions a vertical and a horizontal one. In a period of war the major route of innovation is the horizon—the battlefield. The primary innovator is the user of technology and tactics—the boots on the ground. This project traces the path of field level technological adaptations through two theaters of war and onto the modern battlefield. It demonstrates that major military innovation is possible from the field level upward but also that adaptation processes are an innovations all on their own that do not necessarily need support from above. The project suggests that there are three primary causal dimensions in field-level adaptation (horizontal and vertical linkages and machine design). These dimensions interact to produce outcomes that affect the creation and diffusion of new technologies. The causal dimensions were derived from a process of moving back and forth between data and theory—between insights generated by a random selection of soldiers and theories of user-innovation and open source/open design. This project explores these dimensions and their interactions through several cases studies that exhibit variation in terms of horizontal and vertical linkages. The final empirical chapter takes machine design as its central point of investigation and argues that the U.S. military is formally adopting user- centered technologies as a potential third path of technological development.
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Acknowledgments
“A man who carries a cat by the tail learns something he can learn in no other way.” And I have carried this one for a while now. Throughout the writing of this project— each iteration of tortured thought and mangled writing—I had the support of a brilliant committee; a clan of stalwart colleagues; and a dedicated historian. I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr.’s Randall Schweller, S.M. Amadae, and Ted Hopf. They nurtured this project every step of the way. They allowed me to lead it, and find my own words—true masters of mentorship. My colleagues, Caleb Gallemore, Jason Keiber, Fernando Nunez, and Dave Traven provided countless hours of reading, and support of my ideas. I laughed through the pain of this process with them. Army Transportation historian Richard Killblane provided me with far more resource and guidance than I can ever repay at no reward to himself—a humble and dedicated man. And finally, my editor, to whom this project is ultimately dedicated to—words can never convey the journey we travelled to get here. These were the people who stood not behind, or over me, but next to me. I extend a sincere thanks to every single one of the brilliant men and women in uniform who took time to talk to me and share their stories. Without them, there would have been no way to document any of this. I have been and will always be deeply humbled by everyone’s confidence in me—most importantly in those times when I had none left in myself. Whatever becomes of this work, no one can ever say that I let my schooling get in the way of my education.
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Vita
1992 ...... William Kelley High School
1996 ...... B.A. St. Benedict/St. John’s University
2003 ...... M.A. International Relations, George Washington University
2006 to present ...... GTA Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University
Publications
“Pass Em’ Right: Innovation, Adaptation, and the Threat of WMD Terrorism from the American Radical Right” Perspectives on Terrorism, Summer 2011. “Teaching Through Simulation Design: The Organic and the Synthetic” Journal of Political Science Education, Spring 2011 “2011 Teaching and Learning Conference Track Summary” Political Science Quarterly “China and Tobacco: A Source List.” World Bank 2004 “Transnational Activities of Chinese Crime Organizations.” Trends in Organized Crime 2003. “A Global Overview of Narcotics Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups.” Library of Congress FRD 2002 “Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism: South East Asia.” Library of Congress, FRD. 2003 “Abu Sayyaf. Threats to National Security.” Library of Congress, FRD. 2002
Fields of Study
Major Field: Political Science
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Table of Contents
Abstract ...... ii
Acknowledgments ...... iii
Vita...... iv
List of Tables ...... viii
List of Figures ...... ix
CHAPTER 1: Why Military Technological Innovation and From Where? ...... 1
What We Tend to Mean by Military Innovation ...... 6
What Innovation Isn’t ...... 15
A Focus on Field Adaptation: Restoring Balance in the Field ...... 20
Scope and Methodology ...... 25
Potential Implications of the Study ...... 33
Chapter Layout ...... 35
CHAPTER 2: Parsing Innovation—Grand Design, Adaptation, and Improvisation ...... 38
Innovation’s Sub-concepts ...... 38
A Stretched Concept ...... 40
Grand Design: Visionary Paradigm Shifts ...... 47
Adaptation: Repurposing the Received ...... 51
Improvisation: The Art of MacGyvering ...... 55
The Three Processes and Major Change/Innovation ...... 58
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Implications and Conclusion ...... 60
CHAPTER 3: Taking Design Seriously—Technological Adaptation as an Open Logic ...... 62
Two Logics of Innovation ...... 62
Standard Economic Model ...... 63
Open Logics: A Direct Mechanism ...... 66
Machine Design and the User: The First Causal Dimension ...... 74
Two Types of Linkages: The Horizontal and the Vertical ...... 80
The Horizontal Linkages ...... 80
Vertical Linkages ...... 82
Interactions Among the Causal Dimensions ...... 83
Summary...... 87
Chapter 4: From Failure to Adaptation—Vietnam Gun Trucks ...... 89
What is Transportation? ...... 90
Vietnam and the 8th Transportation Group ...... 92
Field Level Technological Adaptation ...... 99
Vertical Linkages—LWL, and the Cadillac Gage V-100 ...... 112
Horizontal Linkages—Prestige and Notoriety ...... 124
Gun Truck Innovation—A Case of Failed Success ...... 135
Analysis of Adaptation ...... 138
Chapter 5: A Failed Innovation Revisited—Iraq Gun Trucks...... 141
Iraq and the 507th Maintenance Company in An-Nasiriyah ...... 143
Field Level Technological Adaptation ...... 151
Vertical Linkages—LLNL, the M1117, and Duncan Hunter ...... 166
Horizontal Linkages—Skunk Werks, and Udairi Firing Range...... 174
Iraq Gun Truck Innovation—A Case of Successful Failure ...... 180
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Cross Case Comparison ...... 183
Analysis of Adaptation ...... 190
Chapter 6: Machine Design and the Transition to the User ...... 192
Adaptive Technology—Turning to the User ...... 195
User Toolkits and War—There’s an App for That ...... 201
Modular Designs and Robotics ...... 208
A Hybrid Design—Web Communities ...... 217
The Transition to the Third Path—User Production...... 220
Chapter 7: In the Absence of Prediction Design for Adaptation ...... 224
A New Perspective on the Military ...... 231
Another Look at Military Innovation Literature ...... 238
Fewer Chances at Prediction and Less Time ...... 241
Accepting Change Under Fire ...... 246
References ...... 248
Appendix A: Military Innovation Literature Chart ...... 271
Appendix B: Vietnam Order of Battle 8th Transportation Group ...... 273
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List of Tables
Table 1: Innovation Models ...... 73
viii
List of Figures
Figure 1: Range of Open and Black-Box Designs ...... 79
Figure 2: The Justifier Three 50 Caliber weapons on pedestal mounts ...... 104
Figure 3: Ye Olde Warlord Multiple 50 caliber weapons ...... 104
Figure 4: Ye Olde Warlord Multiple 50 caliber weapons ...... 106
Figure 5: Mighty Minnie Pedestal mounted helicopter mini-gun ...... 106
Figure 6:The Good, Bad & Ugly 50 Caliber Machine Gun ...... 107
Figure 7: Corps Revenge after hit from RPG. Modular Armor Kit with Portals...... 107
Figure 8: Trucks with Upside Down Modular Armor ...... 108
Figure 9: Cadillac-Gage Commando V-100 ...... 114
Figure 10: LWL Modular Armor ...... 122
Figure 11: Route map from Virginia to Rams...... 145
Figure 12: Welding the pedestal mount to the HMMWV ...... 153
Figure 13: Field adapted pedestal and wooden gun box ...... 155
Figure 14: Gun box with roof made from shipping container ...... 155
Figure 15: Rare example of a decorated gun truck ...... 156
Figure 16: Iron Horse after an IED ...... 156
Figure 17: Welded gun box from Russian Armor Plate ...... 159
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Figure 18: Gun Truck with Pedestal, Ring, Armor, and Roof ...... 159
Figure 19 The LLNL Modular Armor System ...... 172
Figure 20: Range of Open and Black Box Designs ...... 197
Figure 21: Screen Capture of Battery Presentation ...... 215
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CHAPTER 1: Why Military Technological Innovation and From Where?
Military innovation is essential to the development and maintenance of military power. In turn, military power—marshaled correctly—is critical to the preservation of national security. Therefore, in the parlance of the sciences, while military innovation may not be sufficient to maintain security, it certainly is necessary.1 This necessity is owed largely to the nature of the international system and the nature of modern states.
If the international system were a static ecology of angel states and predictable outcomes, military innovation would be unnecessary.2 That, however, is simply not the case. Military innovation remains a necessity because nations exist in dynamic, uncertain, and competitive environments where military stagnation can result in extinction.3 The consistent development, refinement, and application of new modes and means of military force remain central to addressing the ever-changing international political landscape and maintaining national security. Effective military
1 Theo Farrell makes this point about military change. The only thing that is necessary in a time of war is adaptation. I follow his instinct in this study. See: Theo Farrell, "Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009," Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010). 2 A comment often made by Randall Schweller but echoed in the speeches Viscount James Bryce in his international relations lectures. Pg 24. James Bryce, International Relations; Eight Lectures Delivered in the United States in August, 1921 (New York,: Macmillan Co., 1922). 3 This is the position of most of the innovation theorists, but its earliest arguments were made by authors such as Barry Posen and Harvey Sapolsky Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development; Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1972), Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
1 technological, tactical, and procedural innovations yield the advantage of battlefield power.4 Ergo, those who are concerned about national security must think long and hard about how to drive successful military innovation.
The problem is this; wanting effective innovation and bringing it about are two very different things. Staying ahead of the technological curve requires more than building and deploying machines for the battlefield. It isn’t enough to build a brand new weapon. We have to know how to use it: and I don’t mean in a user’s manual kind of way. I mean “use” in the highly contextualized and specific ways that a robotics engineer or a Northrup Grumman scientist cannot possibly anticipate. Effective military innovation means getting from abstract theory to concrete practice. In the execution of war the realm of concrete practice, is not in the laboratory, it is in the hands of the users who wield the technology. We think innovation is about what we produce. Innovation isn’t about what. Innovation is about how we do it. Technological innovation is the creation and adaptation of material things that transforms how we do the dirty business of violence.
For example, we are fascinated with drone technology in war, not because of what it is, but how it will potentially transform the way in which war is conducted.5
4 Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power : Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004). 5 The primary concern of most people who follow drone technology and its transformation of how war is conducted is over the “clean” way in which our forces can wield power. The idea of war by remote control is repulsive to many and has energized a debate about a whole different kind of ethics in war; namely that in order for war to be just or effective, both sides must be at risk. That debate is not part of this project. For more on it see. Kenneth Anderson, "Predators over Pakistan: The U.S. Drone Campaign Is
2
Now consider this. There are over 12,000 operational robots deployed in support of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.6 From this perspective it appears that we are actively transforming our military into a highly mechanized robotic force. It is an impressive number, but if the creation of technologies alone meant military power then we’d simply keep making more. Having the machines and using them are two separate things.
How many of those machines are actually being employed? How are they being used?
How many are sitting idle under the Middle Eastern sun? From programming errors to weight and battery problems, there’s more to just turning out a good robot than test runs on an experimental proving grounds in the Mojave.7
The puzzle of inducing military technological innovation, that is, the puzzle of transforming how we conduct ourselves in conflict through technology is about going from theory to practice. How we get from plans, ideas, and machines to using and doing? In war, not only do we have to figure out what machines are going to work in conjunction with a particular strategy, geography, and/or culture; we also have to do it faster than our adversary.8 We must continually adapt and adjust. There may have
Effective—and Legal. Why Won’t the Obama Administration’s Lawyers Defend It?," Weekly Standard, March 8, 2010 2010, Peter W. Singer, "Military Robots and the Laws of War," The New Atlantis: Journal of Technology and Society Winter no. 2009 (2009), P. W. Singer, "The Ethics of Killer Applications: Why Is It So Hard to Talk About Morality When It Comes to New Military Technology?," Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010), Patrick Lin, "Ethical Blowback from Emerging Technologies," Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010), George Lucas, "Postmodern War," Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010). 6 P. W. Singer, Wired for War : The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). 7 Ralf W. Zimmermann, "GI Ingenuity Unleashed in Iraq," Defense Watch Forum 2004. 8 William S. Angerman, "Coming Full Circle with Boyd's Ooda Loop Ideas: An Analysis of Innovation Diffusion and Evolution" (Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics, Air Force Institute of Technology Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 2004).
3 been a point in history where we didn’t need to worry about adaptation. Holding a preponderance of power through a monopoly on technology coupled with the willingness to bomb indiscriminately may have provided victories at some point. But this isn’t the current era.
Technological monopolies are no longer likely. In an international environment marked by rapid technological diffusion, designs that are cheap, small, and ‘good enough’ mean that technological innovation is not constrained entirely to Western military powers.9 This is owed to the fact that the international system is becoming more technologically complex. This complexity, in turn, offers smaller powers the chance to militarily compete with their first world cousins. The cheap and small technology boom makes small but lethal machines available to militaries and insurgents of all stripes.10 Technology now cuts both ways and that fact carries its own implications for security.11
It should be entirely unsurprising that the Libyan rebellion of 2011 came complete with its own improvised robots, unmanned vehicles, and hybrid weapons.
These were not the products of the state military. They were pieced together by rebel fighters who were formerly machinists and engineers.12 Alternately, just after we began
9 Alex Pasternack, "Vbs Tv: "Gun Markets of Pakistan": Where the Taliban Goes Shopping"," 2011/5/3 (2011), http://www.motherboard.tv/2011/5/3/vbs-tv-gun-markets-of-pakistan-where-the-taliban-goes- shopping-slideshow. 10 Ajey and Gunjan Singh Lele, "Communication Technologies and Non-State Actors," Indian Defence Review 24, no. 3 (2009). 11. See: Edward Tenner, "The Dark Side of Tinkering," Knowledge, Technology & Policy 16, no. 2 (2003). 12 For a fantastic short BBC report on this see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCyRBUAEneM
4 to conduct unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) bombing runs on Taliban strongholds in
Pakistan, the Pakistani military employed its own model of unmanned aerial vehicles.13
For that matter, so did the Iranians.14 Not to be outdone, Israel recently signed contracts with German defense weapons designer Rheinmetal Defense.15 In September of 2011 the Turkish government signed a contract with the Egyptians to produce their home-grown Anka UAV.16 More than a few other new unmanned flying models, unsurprisingly, are being developed by the Chinese.17 Similar patterns appear on the ground; the most bombastic unmanned ground robots being South Korean autonomous armed sentries that have been set along its border against North Korea.18 The bottom
90% can now produce machines that emulate the capabilities and firepower of the top
10%. What matters most today is the adaptively innovative ways in which technology is put to use on the fields of conflict.
Innovation is difficult. Figuring out how to design and utilize technology isn’t just about smart science and a futuristic high tech world, it is about the environment in which the change must occur, and the pace is set by those who think carefully about
13 "Pakistan and China Will Jointly Develop Uav," Global Military News and Report (2009), http://www.global-military.com/pakistan-and-china-will-jointly-develop-uav.html. 14 Ian Black, "Iran Unveils Long-Distance Bomber Drone P21 of the Main Section Section of the Guardian on Monday 23 August 2010. It Was Last Modified at 14.00 Bst on Tuesday 24 August 2010. ," The Guardian, Monday 23rd August 2010 2010. 15 See: UPI.com, "Israel Seeks to Boost Uav Strike Power," UPI Daily Briefting (2011), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/09/12/Israel-seeks-to-boost-UAV-strike- power/UPI-96741315848241/. 16 Tamir Eshel, "Turkey, Egypt Discuss Possible Export of Anka Uav," Defense Update (2011), http://defense-update.com/20110923_turkey-egypt-discuss-possible-export-of-anka-uav.html. 17 David Axe, "Chinese Navy Mission Reveals Secret Drone," http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/chinese-navy-mission-reveals-secret-drone/. 18 Joshua Davis, "If We Run out of Batteries, This War Is Screwed," Wired, June 2003 2003.
5 opportunities, barriers, and pitfalls. Driven by survival instincts, this pace picks up during times of armed conflict. This drives us to answer some fundamental questions. How can we wrap our minds around military technological innovation in a time of war?
How do we get the right machine in the right spot with the right techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP’s) for the fight we are in?19 I argue that we can answer both by broadening and deepening our understanding of military innovation.
What We Tend to Mean by Military Innovation
The study of military innovation is hardly new, but I submit that the research agenda remains in an unbalanced state. The tradition has been to think about military innovation coming out of the minds of scientists and generals.20 It is the stuff of doctrine, organizational funding, and civilian intervention into stagnating military organizations.21 The literature is comprised of four primary schools of thought
19 John Gartska, "A Conceptual Framework for Innovation in Capability Development," in Crosscutting Issues in International Transformation Interactions and Innovations among People, Organizations, Processes, and Technology, ed. National Defense University (Washington DC: The Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2009). 20 The insight is generally attributed to strategist Carl von Clausewitz who simultaneously detracts from and adds to the top-down mystique through his characterization of the “military genius” Chapter 3. Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). 21 Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
6 identified by their independent variables: civil military relations, intra-service rivalry, inter-service rivalry and culture.22
Civil-military relations explanations are primarily about doctrinal change. This school of thought took center stage with Barry Posen’s 1984 determination that the international balance of power has a determinative effect on U.S. and British doctrinal innovation, though not through direct means.23 Posen’s position is that military organizations function like any bureaucratic structure, and tend towards stasis without civilian intervention. Innovation is spurred from outside by civilian intervention that sees a threatening external strategic environment.24 It is not enough, however, for civilians to want change. According to Posen, they must find a sympathetic actor inside the military structure to respond. Posen reveals that military mavericks’ take up the challenge posed by civilian innovation demands and bring about doctrinal change.25
Following Posen, Deborah Avant looks more deeply into two specific cases of
U.S. and British doctrinal change and refines Posen’s observations regarding the civil-
22 Adam Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies," Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006). 23 Interestingly, Posen’s analysis of civil-military relations is presented as a test of organizational versus structural elements pitting endogenous and exogenous factors against one another to determine which sets of theories carry more weight, realism or organization theory. See page 221 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine. Perhaps a sign of its first departure from IR theory’s main body of literature in which the debates over the ‘isms’ still rage, the innovation literature has since moved entirely away from isms debates into a far more ecumenical environment in a sub-section of security studies where theories are as often complementary as they are competitive. 24 Posen pulls his bureaucratic theories and insights from James Q. Wilson’s work See: pages pp 193-218 James D. Thompson, Vernon E. Buck, and University of Pittsburgh. Graduate School of Business., Approaches to Organizational Design ([Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966). 25 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security 21, no. 3 (1997).
7 military relationship. Avant finds the variation between the two cases of doctrinal innovation rooted in domestic institutional structure. The variation, she explains, comes from the short term political interests of civilian actors. The way in which these interests are interpreted have an effect on the way in which they understand the international threat and thusly directly affects doctrinal innovation.
Kimberly Zisk takes the same set of organizational theory insights and applies them to the shaping of Soviet doctrine according to the development of U.S. strategic thought during the Cold War. Zisk isolates three instances in which external strategic debate had a direct effect on the debates surrounding Soviet defense policy. As in the case of Flexible Response, Zisk finds that U.S. and NATO planning had a demonstrable effect on debates within the Soviet Union through the 1960’s.26 Zisk reveals that
Gorbachev and Schevardnadze frustrated military High Command by seeking a defensive doctrine in a time of peace given the continued development of offensive doctrine in Europe.27
Posen, Avant, and Zisk all investigate the problem of innovation as a question of doctrinal change. 28 They center their research on the problem of a state’s ability to adjust to global political shifts and to respond to those shifts in a timely manner. In this way, a shift in doctrine serves as both a path and a proxy for the capacity of a state to
26 Page 47 Kimberly Marten Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation 1955-1991 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 27 Page 193 Ibid. 28 Pg 140 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine.
8 adjust to international political change.29 Nevertheless, there are problems associating doctrine directly with an organization’s innovativeness. Perhaps most problematic is that a change in doctrine may be a change in doctrine only; it may not necessitate any real material shifts in acquisition, funding, or posturing of the force.30 If that is the case, then there are cases in which doctrinal shift is simply an innovation in word but not action as the shift requires no institutional change. Additionally, doctrine may not mean the same thing across international military organizations. The cases of doctrine examined by Posen, Zisk, and Avant may exhibit a similarity of purpose, scope and depth because of the history of interaction among these militaries (Britain, France, and the
Soviet Union). This focus constrains the study of military innovation to first world countries. It has not yet been established whether doctrines across militaries worldwide necessarily do the same thing or are even subject to the same amount of military control and as such this significantly narrows the explanatory capability of using doctrinal shifts as a measure of organizational innovativeness.31
This critique aside, civil-military relations tends to emphasize grand scale shifts in military organizational thought. By virtue of its own focus on doctrine, the civil-military relation research paradigm sees innovation as widespread major military change
29 For more on the early theories of civil military relations, though not necessarily focused on innovation see: Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957). 30 The case studies presented in chapters 4 and 5 of this project highlight this startlingly well. Even after doctrinal changes were made, the conduct of Transportation Corps’ training and preparation did not change. 31 Adam Grissom also argues this in his literature review picking it up from Stephen Rosen’s critique of Posen..Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies."
9 emanating from the upper echelons. It is a transformation that is thrust downward onto the lower echelons of the military hierarchy by civilian oversight. Civil-military relations’ aim is toward grand strategy–the grand ideational design we seek to plan for national security from the current era forward.
Innovation, however, need not only be driven by the tension between civilian and military interests over doctrine; it can also be driven by the organizations that make up the security infrastructure. The standard among state militaries is the division of services into their core competencies; Army (command of the ground), Navy (command of the seas), and Air Force (command of the air). Competition between these services is also a source of innovation. Inter-service rivalry innovation is endogenously generated through competition over scarce resources or future potential funding.32 New missions, technologies, and threats create new sources of funding, and new imperatives to develop a program that fulfills that new need.
Harvey Sapolsky has this in mind in his seminal volume examining the drivers of technological innovation triggered by the Soviet threat for the Americans in the 1950’s.
Developing a deterrent threat to the Soviets in the 1950’s required developing a strategic weapons system through intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). At the outset three branches proposed programs, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Even though flight is the core competency of the Air Force, it was actually the Navy’s superior
32 See citations in appendix A: Military Innovation chart or Grissom’s literature review Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies."
10 management techniques that won out over the Air Force (the Army program ran short of funding early on). The Air Force developed the System Safety program while the
Navy opted for a submarine launched Polaris system. Sapolsky finds increased competition yielded faster innovation at a cheaper price; in essence, competition was beneficial to innovation.33 Sapolsky also finds that the Navy prevailed because of smart management through four key components: differentiation of product from their competitors,34 co-optation of tasks, moderation, and managerial foresight.35
Henry Armacost follows the service against service competition insight through
IRBMs (intermediate range) by tracing the process by which the Air force Thor system and the Jupiter program forwarded by the Army were both funded and developed through an intensely open and political process.36 Though his ultimate aim is to ascertain the overall benefit of these two programs to the weapons development process given massive strategic uncertainty, the model of innovation that emerges is distinctly one of political competition among pressure groups supporting one or the other program.37 Sapolsky’s project is the very reason the field of American politics should take international security more seriously as a relevant research agenda, because its outcomes and mechanisms for innovation are almost entirely domestically
33 Harvey M. Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, and Brendan Rittenhouse Green. "Us Military Innovation since the Cold War Creation without Destruction." (Place Published: Routledge, 2009. 34 Page 43 Harvey M. Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, and Brendan Rittenhouse Green. "Us Military Innovation since the Cold War Creation without Destruction." (Place Published: Routledge, 2009. 35 Page 57 Ibid. (Place Published. 36 Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York,: Columbia University Press, 1969). 37 For additional interservice rivalry explanations see military innovation chart Figure 1:
11 driven. Owen Cote follows up this project by asking whether ‘jointness’ or cooperative missions among the services stifles innovation and change. Cote finds that jointness, if over-emphasized, actually slows the process of independent thinking and freedom of exploration that comes from competition.38 Cote’s findings should remind us that competition and collaboration can be drivers of innovation, but so too are the degrees of freedom that each actor or agency has to pursue and refine its own hunches.
Military services, unsurprisingly, are not monolithic. Competition over scarce resources is a motivator within organizations as well. Intra-service rivalry takes competition among service members as its potential source of innovation. Rank, promotion, and prestige; concepts central to military leadership are significant to innovation and change. Stephen Rosen found that competing arguments over new
“theories of victory” brought about organizational change within a service.39 Rosen’s argument is a two step process by which service leaders develop a new theory of what the future war will be and what it takes to win that war. They then restructure the pathways for mid-career officers to advance up the ranks who are sympathetic to that new theory of victory.
Culture, as a final theoretical approach has been used to explain both organizational innovativeness as well as variations between military doctrines under similar threat environments. Elizabeth Kier uses “organizational culture” to reach
38 Owen R. Cote, "The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The U.S. Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles" (Massachusetts Institute for Technology, 1998). 39 Pg 110 Rosen, Winning the Next War.
12 beneath Posen's explanation for doctrinal change by looking to interest formation.40
While Posen finds support for external influence as a guiding tenant for the character of military doctrine, Kier argues that our interests are by our particular domestic political environments. For her, the idiosyncratic pathways to decision cannot be overrun by such broad perspectives as offense, defense balancing, shifts in the balance of power, or technological discovery. Rather, within her case of the French doctrinal shift, she finds that the organizational culture41 has a more strongly determinative effect on doctrine than external threat. She shows that military leaders carry "assumptions about the military's role in society" as well as the "proper conduct of their mission"42 She agrees with Posen that civilians play a role in the nature of military doctrine, but the particular interests that these civilians have are more deeply influenced by a domestic political environment than a broad world view. Kier argues that culture works to determine doctrine by distorting the lens through which we understand the world. Culture screens out some parts of reality while magnifying other parts.
Theo Farrell reveals that the global security environment and international law provide a template for military structure through which local “strategic circumstances”
40 Pg 186 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars, ed. Jack L. Snyder and Richard H. Ullman, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 41 defined as a set of basic assumptions values norms beliefs and formal knowledge that shapes collective understandings. Pg 184 Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," International Security 19, no. 4 (1995). 42 Pg 187 Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars.
13 can affect the way in which that global template gets employed.43 Dima Adamsky argues that the revolution in military affairs was interpreted differently among the
Israeli’s, the U.S. forces, and the Soviets, even though all were confronted with the same impetus for innovation.44 Adamsky argues that the way in which each of the state militaries interpreted and ultimately created their own versions of the revolution in military affairs was dependent upon each country’s specific strategic culture.
Despite the immense variation among the four primary schools of thought, the preponderance of scholarly work argues that innovation is a “top-down application” of power.45 The foundational work in the field of innovation studies rests upon the tacit primary assumption that effective change is the product of genius and planning. These theories and models point to a type of innovation that is developed at the highest levels of organization and forcibly pushed downwards to those at the field level. Despite the strength of the insight and the research, it is at best a half picture.46
This study opens a new line of inquiry distinct from the “top down” view because its trajectory has inadvertently provided a tacitly unidirectional view of military change.
It is a perspective that deeply biases the source of innovation toward the role of the
43 T. Farrell, "World Culture and Military Power," Security Studies 14, no. 3 (2005). 44 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation : The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the Us, and Israel (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010). 45 Adam Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies," Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006). 46 Gartska shows us that there are several different kinds of innovation in the business world that may well map onto the military world. Though our conceptualizations work at different purposes, it is important to note that what Gartska calls macro-level and micro-level variables do reach beyond the top- down understanding. Gartska, "A Conceptual Framework for Innovation in Capability Development."
14
DARPA scientist, the enlightened military commander, and the reclusive scholar.
Military organizations channel power differently than our stereotypical understanding of hierarchy. There is a tendency to treat sources and pathways of innovation as monopolized by elites in a monolithic structure that emanates centrally and downward.47 There is no doubt that this form of innovation exists, but innovation’s sources and processes are far more complex and they do not necessarily overlap.48
Although the top-down process may be one source of change, it is far from the only one.
I begin in a different place—the field level. Innovations can and do happen at the field level. Sometimes they filter upward, sometimes they spread across the battlefield, and sometimes they go nowhere at all. At the field level, innovation is about adaptation, a process entirely different from the top-down model of innovation. At the field level, the problem of innovation is about technology and connections. It is less about organizational politics and self-interested competition than it is about getting around organizational limitations and cooperating to survive.49
What Innovation Isn’t
47 Although our aims are entirely different his point regarding power holds. Gene Sharp and Harvard University. Center for International Affairs., The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston,: P. Sargent Publisher, 1973). 48 The field level is the point at which military praxis happens. It is distinct from bureaucratic innovations that help to shape praxis. 49 Tinkerers are those who take everyday objects and use them solve problems by creating new machine solutions. My basic sentiment when I speak about tinkerers is epitomized by the work of Ed Tenner and Henry Petroski. Henry Petroski, The Evolution of Useful Things, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), Edward Tenner, "The Dark Side of Tinkering," Knowledge, Technology & Policy 16, no. 2 (2003).
15
Military innovation, in the contemporary use of the term, is everything and nothing at once. Due to the imprecise use of the phrase, innovation has, sadly, become little more than a beltway buzzword.50 It is a term that makes policy makers swoon and weapons developers salivate. In nearly every academic discipline, there exists an innovation alter before which all good power-seekers genuflect. Business and management schools, engineering, applied science, medicine, and political science all have significant literatures on the study of innovation.51 In the colloquial use, innovation gets cast as inventions and new ideas, new forms, and new methods.52
Innovation, by these measures, is essentially everything new under the sun. These overly-broad definitional parameters simply cannot hold weight for an academic discipline.53
Instead, we need to walk away from the idea that innovations are machines or new objects and ideas. Innovation is the process of application, it is the change between t1 and t2. Innovations are not the gadget we create; it is the harmonization of bringing
50 Echevarria’s critique of these military buzz phrases and buzzwords is especially damning. Antulio Echevarria, "Challenging Transformation's Cliches," ed. Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA: Department of Defense, 2006). 51 For Examples See: Thomas M. Williams, "Understanding Innovation," Military Review July-August 2009 (2009), T. Peisl, V. Reger, and J. Schmied, "Innovation Process Design: A Change Management and Innovation Dimension Perspective," in Software Process Improvement, Proceedings, ed. R. V. Oconnor, et al., Communications in Computer and Information Science (2009), C. Demartini, Cognition and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and the Autopoietic Approach: The Cases of Aer Lingus and Fiat, ed. D. Remenyi, Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Entrepreneurship and Innovation (2007). 52 See Chapter 2 for the OED definition of Innovation. 53 As with most of our models and theories in the social sciences, so much hangs on our conceptualization and operationalization of concepts. Conceptualizing innovation is about as hairy as conceptualizing culture, which
16 new things and ideas into practice.54 Innovation is a change in how we do things.
Imagine the overflowing laboratory benches of Thomas Edison or Nikolai Tesla, halls of genius where you find the hundreds of mechanical objects they created.55 All wondrous, yes, but it would be awkward to call these things innovation. They are potential innovations in the form of invention.56 Until brought into practice, these machines are simply the product of one man’s theoretical design, until applied, they are just an invention.
This brings us back to the current question of innovation studies: is innovation top-down or bottom up? I submit that this is a false choice. In a time of war, major military innovation is neither top down nor bottom up, it is a constant dialectic between groups concerned with the long term implications of grand strategy and the groups concerned with a far more immediate goal…survival. 57
Innovation is More than Vertical
First, military innovation is no more a top-down versus bottom-up phenomenon than research in social science is a purely deductive or inductive process. In both, we repeatedly move back and forth between ideas and empirics. We develop claims, we
54 This is the position of the entire social construction of technology (SCOT) school of theorizing. See Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: Actor Network Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005). 55 For more on Tesla and his scientific genius see: John J. O'Neill, Prodigal Genius : The Life of Nikola Tesla (Kempton, Ill.: Adventures Unlimited Press, 2008). 56 On Invention and Innovation see: Yale Brozen, "Invention, Innovation, and Imitation," The American Economic Review 41, no. 2 (1951), W. Ruttan Vernon, "Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation, and Technological Change," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 73, no. 4 (1959). 57 War has a dialectic. This is nicely revisited by Luttwak’s book on the paradoxes of war. Edward Luttwak, Strategy : The Logic of War and Peace, Rev. and enl. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001).
17 check, we revise. By doing so, we narrow the gap between theory and practice and, in the process, bring them into alignment. The same can be said of military innovation.
Second, part of this confusion over what we mean by innovation reveals yet another bias in our thinking about the term. The postulate that innovation is either top- down or bottom-up ignores a remarkable oversight in the entire body of the literature.
Innovation requires a horizontal component. We’ve been dazzled by the dizzying heights of technological fantasy that we have forgotten that even if we use it, the use must diffuse across the horizon of potential users. In fact, the horizon is arguably the vector that carries the greatest amount of effect. Innovations of any kind transform how we do things, and much like the Tesla example, it is not an innovation if it does not become an active part of human practice. The implication of this only further underscores the gaps in the current literature on military innovation. The verticality of it all is perhaps not nearly as important as its horizontal diffusion when it comes to innovation in a period of war. Doctrine can change and the world could just go on doing as it always has.
What this mean is that processes of military change are multi-directional and oscillate wildly, moving downward, upwards, and horizontally–often simultaneously.58 This insight is reflected in the newest literature on change in military organizations that attempts to break away from the top-down narrative. A second
58 Although the terminology is mixed the most recent scholarship on innovation and change recognizes this. See: J. A. Russell, "Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007," Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010).
18 generation of scholars studying innovation has come to the foreground. Their primary focus of observation is on the tactical and operational levels, in direct observation of military practice. They want to see what else might be out there, specifically, in keeping with my intuition here, whether innovation has other sources. The majority of this new edge of scholarship is being written by participants in or visitors to the current theatres of war (Iraq and Afghanistan).59 Through participant observation, oversight, and interviews they attempt to determine for themselves how the gritty work of war gets done.60 It is among these thinkers that I stand. The most recent work comes from
James Russell’s book on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Russell reveals that much of the understanding and development of COIN doctrine was developed by those operating in the field, as organic unit-generated solutions and changes.61 Theo Farrell also finds a home here by addressing the alternatives that are available to forces in the field who find themselves mapping theory onto praxis. His conceptualization is that upon finding a gap between theory and application, forces have the option to either exploit prior paths or explore new ones. He then marries styles of organizational cultures to those choices.62 Finally there is Jon Lindsay’s work on user innovation theory and the development of FalconView software as a specifically technology-centric analysis of
59 Specifically, researchers James Russell. Steve Biddle and Adam Grissom have found their way to the theatres of Iraq and Afghanistan in order to see first hand the changing context of war. 60 J. A. Russell, "Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007," Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4. 61 Russell, "Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005- 2007." 62 Farrell, "Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009."
19 change also provides some additional support for the bottom-up change theorists. His research reveals the oddly bureaucratizing nature of user-developed software, which is to say that FalconView was developed by airmen and diffused by airmen, but in order to maintain its existence it needed to find a home in a bureaucratic structure thereby shedding itself of its bottom-up nature.63
A Focus on Field Adaptation: Restoring Balance in the Field
When it comes to military innovation, there’s more than grand strategy that needs to be understood, we need a balanced understanding of military change. Held aloft from the field it is a more parsimonious model, but it is also too pristine. Military innovation studies cannot afford to continue standing apart from the battlefield in order to understand how innovation works. In order to proceed, it must get its hands dirty.
It has to start thinking about the actual fabric of war fighting, the machines and men that do the applied work of organized violence. How that work diffuses horizontally and finds its way back up the chain of command. This study develops a theory of technological adaptation in a time of war. That is, figuring out how we get the right machine, in the right place, doing the right work, in a time of war. It does so by suggesting that adaptation is a kind of innovation—one of three distinct forms of it.
Although this project focuses specifically on adaptation the following chapter provides a full typology of innovation and its sub-concepts. I focus on adaptation because it
63 Lindsay, ""War Upon the Map": User Innovation in American Military Software."
20 matters far more in the picture of major military innovation, and victory in war than the current literature affords it.
If necessity is the mother of invention, then survival is the mother of adaptation.
Foot soldiers seeking to ensure their own survival have their own drivers of change—all born of necessity: adapt, improvise, or die.64 Soldiers universally prefer the former two choices, and failure often results in the third. Adaptation is the primary objective in a time of war for two reasons: 1. If a campaign is fought on foreign territory then the context of the fight will be foreign to at least one of the forces in play. Adapting to that new context is necessary to success. 2. When two forces meet the action-reaction cycle begins between them whereby one side acts and the other reacts; both parties update their estimates of victory and shift tactics and planning. Failure to do so results in loss.
This makes the theater of battle the most kinetic of arenas for this kind of innovation—it is the primary point of contact between forces. If a particular strategy or course of operations is ill fitted to the fight, adaptation can fix the fit and fill the gap. If the environment or enemy changes technology or tactics, adaptation becomes the necessary component to future success. Our capacity to adapt quickly under duress is central to success on a battlefield that demands you produce your own solutions.65
There is scant little time develop a new prototype while bullets are flying. The
64 T. Terriff, "'Innovate or Die': Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps," Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 3 (2006). 65 This is the centerpiece of Carafano’s historical recovery of World War technological and tactical tinkering. See: James Jay Carafano, Gi Ingenuity : Improvisation, Technology, and Winning World War Ii, War, Technology, and History. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006).
21 production of those solutions generally involves adapting or repurposing military machines. This is the central focus of this project. A change in technology is generally accompanied by a change in tactics, however, so frequently both are explored in the empirical chapters.
The angle from which I approach military technological adaptation is derived from two distinct positions. The first derives from the idea that technologies themselves are political. The design and human interface of machines carry with them positions of encouraging and discouraging innovation.66 The way in which something is put together and designed affects our ability to tinker with it, our familiarity with it and our fear of it. Design and interface defines who should operate it, and constrains who can alter the insides of that machine. This has a direct effect on technological adaptation in a time of war, particularly new technologies.67
Second, by my estimation there exists an “innovation paradox.”68 Innovation, and its sub-processes need both chaos and structure to bring itself into being. Chaos generates the sources; structure gives them form and diffuses them. Innovations are paradoxical because they operate in tension with one another in terms of centralization
66 This insight is directly derived from Langdon Winner’s essay. Langdon Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics?," Daedalus 109, no. 1 (1980). 67 Dan Baum, "Battle Lessons: What the Generals Don't Know," The New Yorker, January 17, 2005 2005. 68 My use of this phrase is coincidental but not entirely removed from the technology literature on the “innovation paradox” which emphasizes the problem of trying to innovate. If we try to innovate we end up squelching creativity. George Haour’s book on the Innovation Paradox speaks to this point. My emphasis, rather, speaks to hierarchy and decentralization. The problem of needing to control a production process while allowing decentralized problem-solving. This is the central problem of military adaptation processes.Georges Haour, Resolving the Innovation Paradox : Enhancing Growth in Technology Companies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
22 and decentralization. We see this paradox playing out before our very eyes in the “wiki” revolution of mass collaboration.69 The proliferation of interesting new ideas requires freedom, as Google headquarters, Steve Jobs, and the writers and artists of the Parisian
Left Bank can attest to. It requires the decentralized and the multiple problem solving minds of non-conformity. Conversely, in order to bring those innovations down to practice on a major military scale, it is not decentralization that is necessary but structure and hierarchy as Google, Steve Jobs, and the eventual commoditization of the
Left Bank show us. Both components are necessary and they exist in tension with one another, structurally, temporally, and intellectually. This project accepts that there is a natural tension that comes of technological innovation and its diffusion and I do not try to resolve it. Rather, I suspect it necessary to the production of truly effective major military innovation—a topic I will address in the final chapter.
Innovations require two things, source and diffusion. This is the paradox of innovation. What generates new creations and ideas often operates in tension with those things that can diffuse them.70 In the military realm, the sources of innovation can come from anywhere; the scientist’s laboratory, the ingenious layman, or the clever master sergeant. Creative independent thought generates innovative military
69 Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, Wikinomics : How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything (New York: Portfolio, 2006). 70 This is reflected in the literature on creativity and innovation. The problem of seeing a problem and a solution from new perspectives and many sides, getting to a dynamic organizational culture, and stronger psychological analyses of the types of persons who do well in these environments are all part of this literature. For examples see: Göran Ekvall, "Organizational Climate for Creativity and Innovation," European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 5, no. 1 (1996), F. Terblanche E.C. Martins, "Building Organisational Culture That Stimulates Creativity and Innovation," European Journal of Innovation Management 6, no. 1 (2003).
23 machines and ideas; but this process works in stark opposition to its purposeful incorporation into a system. Machines and ideas require refinement, production, training, testing, standardization, and acquisition. All of these components are part and parcel of a centralized military structure. The organizational structure that is responsible for the birth of the innovation, a decentralized network of independent thinkers simultaneously needs the central nervous system and spine necessary for the widespread adoption and diffusion of these innovations to the boots on the ground.
Independence of action creates innovation, interconnectedness, and hierarchy makes it possible for all to enjoy its benefits. Hence, the paradox of innovation.
The paradox is especially relevant to military technological adaptation in a time of war because distrust over risk taking ventures is said to increase in times of greater uncertainty. During a period of violent chaos, emphasis is placed upon on the chain of command, following orders, and stringent systems.71 Nevertheless, in a time of conflict, adaptation must happen in order to prevail. No single doctrine, machine, or tactic is a necessary component to victory. The only thing that is necessary for victory in a time of war is adaptation.72 That adaptation must happen at the field level. No matter where the ideas, machines, and strategies come from, they must reach the boots on the ground or there cannot be victory.
71 This is Williamson Murray’s project as well. He explores the concept of adaptation in war through a historical lens. Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War, ed. INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING PROGRAM (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2009). 72 Theo Farrell, "Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009," Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010).
24
It is an increasingly complex technological world out there. While we appear to have lots of theory about how to get a weapons system and a doctrine developed and pushed downward, we appear to have very little to explain what happens from there.
The central questions explored by this study are as follows: How do field level soldiers adapt technologies in a time of war? By this I mean, how do we get the right machine in the right spot with the right TTP’s for the fight we are in? When the strategy is set, when all the chess pieces are ready and the fog of war begins to descend, how does technological adaptation come about? How do new field-level technological adaptations diffuse horizontally and vertically? This project argues that field level innovation and its successful incorporation into practice is affected by the interaction of three causal variables: Informal horizontal linkages, formal vertical linkages, and machine design. The full explication of these causal dimensions and their potential for successful innovation and major military innovation is explored in Chapter 3.
Scope and Methodology
We develop theory for ‘prescriptive richness.’ While adaptation is a complex phenomenon, a useful theory should present variables that can be reasonably manipulated in order to be applied to policy.73 This first salvo into adaptation’s processes is perhaps more complex than parsimonious, but it does not mean that it cannot be made useful to the policy maker. As such, I arrived at the causal dimensions
73 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
25 through a process of deduction and induction with an eye towards policy impact. There may well be other drivers of adaptation and major military innovation from the field- level (such as the natural human will to survive) but machine design, vertical and horizontal linkages are well within the reach of the policy maker to influence. As such they are relevant for the development of theory or a model.
This study is a work of political science, set to propose theory in an area of theoretical imbalance and fill a gap in theorizing about military innovation previously untouched by research in political science.74 My particular contribution to the field reveals a tendency to color outside the lines of political science. Though broad in its approach it offers furtherance of research and thinking three areas: the re- conceptualization of innovation into three distinct processes of change (detailed in chapter 2), the introduction of machine design as a variable in innovation/adaptation, and an investigation of the horizontal component of innovation as necessary to victory in war and major military innovation.
The scope of my research was limited to technological adaptations made during a time of conflict by junior officers or below while they were deployed in theater. I made no restrictions on specific conflicts but the majority of my interviews were conducted with soldiers who deployed in Vietnam, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.
74 Though perhaps not history. See: Murray, Military Adaptation in War, Carafano, Gi Ingenuity : Improvisation, Technology, and Winning World War Ii.
26
In order to generate a theory of field level technological adaptation and to confirm its existence, I conducted interviews to distill the potential causal dimensions.
My research and interviews spanned from one end of the spectrum of military organizations all the way down to the other and across. Whenever possible I sought input from professional scientists, military leaders, and engineers about adaptation, keeping in mind that the majority of them were detached from the battlefield by two oceans and/or thousands of miles. I decided early on that the centerpiece of my work would derive from insights generated by a broad range of soldiers who deployed for the
United States military to a zone of conflict. The selection of subjects was limited solely to two criteria: having been deployed into a field of conflict; and that during that period of deployment that soldier must have been a junior or field grade officer, or an enlisted soldier. I conducted interviews with soldiers from across occupational specializations, branches of the military, and of widely divergent levels of training.75 My sample included enlisted soldiers trained in signal intelligence, to highly-trained Army Special
Forces officers and many careers in between. By no means were their perspectives on battlefield adaptations similar. They were, nevertheless, interestingly unified in their understanding of their role as the people who convert plans into action.
The interviews provided a broad range of perspectives, narratives, and cases to sort through. I listened to enlisted troops complain about obstacles put in place by their
75 Although there is a standardized set of basic training for soldiers within each branch of the military, the subsequent degrees of specialization add additional requirements. In the Army they call this an MOS or Military Occupational Specialty. Not only is training extremely varied across specializations, but also between enlisted soldiers and officers.
27 lieutenants and captains; I heard the ranting of majors irritated by the bureaucracy and red-tape generated by senior commanders; and I listened closely to the engineers exasperated by the fact that troops were not using their creations to their maximum potential.76 I listened closely not simply for the collection of potential cases, which was the primary purpose in my research design, but also for anything that might indicate that my hypothesized causal dimensions might be problematic.
Mining the experiences of these soldiers, recurring factors were noted that directly impacted the eventual scope of innovations made in the heat of battle. Using a variation of the Delphi method to generate initial hypotheses of wartime innovation I induced three main causal dimensions: machine design (open or closed), horizontal linkages (generally informal) and vertical linkages (direct to industry, elites, or civilian representatives). Admittedly, the interview process and the selection of cases among them were far from ideal. A number of potentially biasing components threatened to undermine the range and strength of the cases that were provided to me. First and foremost is the incentive for soldiers to take credit for changes to technology or tactics in order to write themselves into their own historical narratives may have been at play.
This concern, however, does not nullify the relevance of the causal dimensions explored in this project. If soldiers did play up or play down their particular contribution vertically
76 There is often strong acrimony between enlisted soldiers and the officers who command them. Senior enlisted soldiers, the ones who make a career out of training and advising young enlisted are often known as NCO’s or Non-Commissioned Officers. They function as a liaison, between young commissioned officers and their often inexperienced young enlisteds. They are the Sergeants, the Corporals, and the Petty Officers of the military ranks.
28 or horizontally, or became frustrated with the limits of a particular technology is beside the point since I did not select my cases based on the preponderance of responses obtained in interviews. The causal dimensions revealed themselves in all the soldier interviews whether they were successful or not. Second, there was an additional likelihood that the interviewer’s gender may have affected the interviewee’s incentives for participation, thereby producing additional incentive to bolster one’s role in the telling of successful adaptations.77 This again, while a concern, did not affect the induction of the potential causal dimensions.
To guard the project against such biases in the selection of the actual cases I sought cases that provided enough primary and secondary source material that also exhibited variation along the three causal dimensions.
Accordingly, case studies were chosen that explore the validity of my causal dimensions and their interaction in the crucible of war. While admittedly, there are three cases and three causal dimensions, which does not bode well for strong logical theory testing, (ergo this project is primarily theory propositional) cross case analysis is provided to bring depth of analysis and provide some confirmation of the interactions among the dimensions. Since the process of adaptation is extremely complex and no single case is entirely absent vertical and horizontal components probabilistic statements regarding the interaction of the dimensions in terms of more or fewer
77 Research of the effects of gender on the interview process return significant results that the interviewer’s sex may skew results. SeeLeonie Huddy et al., "The Effect of Interviewer Gender on the Survey Response," Political Behavior 19, no. 3 (1997).
29 linkages is the best that any current case can offer until further development and testing is conducted.
Despite the declaration of theory proposition, two of the case studies do demonstrate variance in vertical and horizontal linkages controlling for machine design
(the same foundational technology) thereby providing me with an opportunity to provide some early logical comparisons. Second, between the two cases the technological solutions produced in conjunction with field level insights as stopgap measures (the LWL Modular Armor Kit, and the LLNL Modular Armor Kit) provide an opportunity for comparison to the formal technology provided by the standard military acquisition process (the V-100 Commando and the M1113). The third case provides a much more complicated technological form to illustrate the potential implications of incorporating user insight and opening design to the inputs of its users.
To make my claims I relied upon process tracing to chronologically work backwards, fill in information gaps, and verify the narratives provided by the soldiers.78
Process tracing is appropriate for a study on the complexity of wartime innovation, since the method is “well-suited to testing theories in a world marked by multiple interaction effects, where it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of two or three independent variables—precisely the world that more and more social scientists believe we
78 The technique originally developed and published by Dalkey at RAND has been extended to demonstrate all kinds of social science phenomena. See: Norman Dalkey and Olaf Helmer, "An Experimental Application of the Delphi Method to the Use of Experts," Management Science 9, no. 3 (1963), G.J Skulmoski, "The Delphi Method for Graduate Research," Journal of Information Technology Research 6, no. 2007 (2007).
30 confront”.79 The method is valuable due to the fact that it is a powerful tool in uncovering causal processes of the phenomena under investigation80.
The variations exhibited in the two cases of wartime technological adaptation highlight factors that co-vary with aspects of the adaptation process and major military innovation. Each case begins with a failure from the top down, but in the first case the adaptation process was successful but failed to produce a major military innovation, the second case resulted in an initially failed adaptation process but a major military innovation. Each case of technological adaptation occurs on the same technological frame (the trucks of the transportation units) The outcomes of the two cases differ, however in the diffusion of the technology as well as the creation of a major military innovation. In simpler terms, two nearly-identical cases solve the immediate local problem through field-level technological adaptation in nearly identical ways but their contribution to major military innovation and the rate of diffusion across the battlefield differed. Cross-case comparison reveals that this variation in outcomes covaries with strong vertical and horizontal linkages. The third case was selected in order to illustrate the key concept of machine design. However here too, some cross-case comparison is possible By selecting a technology that represented failure to adapt at one point in time and in another period successful adaptation I can control for several aspects of the cases to rule out other potential variables. Concomitantly, the negative
79 Peter A. Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics," in Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington DC: APSA, 2000). 80 Pg 212-213 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
31 cases of innovation ensure that the selection of case studies in this study would not fall subject to the criticism of selection bias should only positive cases be chosen for study.81
Beyond case selection, the interviews provided additional support for the importance of the three causal dimensions tested. That is to say, additional questions aimed at determining how the adaptation diffused and how the soldier learned about other adaptations provided the investigator with tacit insight as to just how well linked each interviewee along a host of potential networks: within the soldier’s unit, within the soldier’s career field, among other soldiers at the operating bases, with the producers of the technologies they used, and finally across the battlefield. However, since I am relying upon a soldier’s self-reporting of just how well-connected each of them may have been, I again found myself in a territory of potential bias. Whenever possible I asked soldiers for specific names and dates and contact information in order to be able to verify those relations.
Finally, by way of reflection, although I had initially set out to complete more than fifty individual interviews with soldiers I found that there was a process of getting to know each subject that took much more time than I initially planned. For each 45 minute interview, on average I spent at least an additional hour just allowing the soldier to share the history of their deployment, their challenges, and the difficulties of the
81 Pg 115 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Also of significance is the debate over the necessity and importance of the negative case. See: David Collier et al., "Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias," American Political Science Review 89, no. 2 (1995).
32 problem of adaptation. I tried, whenever possible to allow the subjects to tell their story at their own pace. This significantly slowed he data collection and complicated the interviewing process. Although slower, the approach yielded data far richer than would have been possible to glean through surveys or a more impersonal method.
Potential Implications of the Study
Most established models of military change, especially those that focus only on grand strategic design, are incomplete at best and increasingly irrelevant at worst.
They produce problematic half-theories which hold little to no practical value because they cannot show us how ideas get to practice.
The implications of developing a stronger understanding of adaptation processes at the field level stands to inform both the policy world and academia.
Policymakers who tout the coming robotic future of warfare lend too much credence to the permanence and effect of technological inventions and do not give enough credit to either the way in which technology reshapes the social fabric into which it is inserted or the way in which the social fabric reshapes technology itself. Having cool and novel technological objects is not the same thing as being able to use these objects effectively.
What’s newest isn’t always what works, and what works often isn’t what we had
33 originally intended or planned.82 The resulting gap between the theoretical object and practice has to be resolved at the field level by soldiers using the machines.
Maintaining technological superiority, then, asks more of a military than simply producing faster, quieter, and more precise prototypes. It requires figuring out how best to use them in the context of a specific theater of war and knowing how to design machines that can be more easily adapted and adopted into field-level practices. This is something that even the most experienced generals and clever scientists often overlook. No matter how ingenious the new widget, there is a large element of uncertainty regarding which technological objects will actually be used; uncertainty over how they can be developed and adapted quickly in the context of the battlefield.
On the academic side, this study helps to clarify some of the conceptual problems with theories of innovation. Most importantly, that top-down versus bottom- up is a false choice. Not only is it a dialectical process oscillating across levels, but it completely ignores the horizontal component of innovation, something that we are only now recognizing with the new literature on “mass collaboration” and Wikipedia.
Furthermore ‘major military change’ requires an alignment between the field and the organization, something that simple doctrinal change does not recognize. As will be presented in the next chapter a more refined characterization of innovation helps to
82 David Edgerton makes this point in his critique of the study of technology. Too much attention is paid to the invention not enough to the practices into which they are placed. David Edgerton, "From Innovation to Use: Ten Eclectic Theses on the Historiography of Technology," History & Technology 16, no. 2 (1999).
34 clarify these processes and may provide more clarity as to how to get true major military innovation. It is one think to dream up an idea, another thing entirely to use it, both are required for major military innovation.
Finally, if nothing else, this study seeks to correct the immensely skewed understanding of what is possible with emerging technologies (an understanding that is often fantastical to the point of radical risk). Since the current perspective vastly undervalues the contribution of boots on the ground while overvaluing the role of military leaders and scientists I provide three cases to demonstrate the opposite. At a minimum, it undermines the idea that technological innovation is about being the ‘first to the finish line’ and that cutting-edge technologies automatically confer power to those who hold it. The vast graveyard of billion dollar military technological gambles indicates otherwise. It is not in the holding but in the wielding of it that confers power in war. In so much as this is true, users have a say in whether we are powerful.83
Chapter Layout
This chapter has presented the puzzle of innovation as distinctly different from the predominant view. I suggest that the problem of technological innovation in a time of war is the problem of getting from theory to practice. My point of inquiry to this
83 This is particularly the case in early scholarship in International Relations that uses technology as a measure of power in macro-level theories. Though historians roundly disagree about the true benefits of mechanization and technology’s role in measuring power through weapons; a very significant contribution to the clarification of the role of technology in military power is Steve Biddle’s work on combined arms tactics and doctrine. See Chapter 1 Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power : Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
35 puzzle is to focus on a sub-process of innovation, called adaptation, which is distinct from grand design and improvisation. Chapter 2 provides a typology of innovation that separates it into three distinct processes: grand design, adaptation, and improvisation. I argue that no single process is sufficient to produce a major military innovation, but rather the alignment and interaction among these processes makes major military innovation possible. Chapter 3 presents three causal dimensions for investigation: vertical and horizontal linkages and machine design. All three dimensions are derived from the logic of open source/open design innovation—a process distinctly different from the standard economic model of innovation. For each dimension I posit the potential interactions and their affect on the field-level adaptation process. Chapters 4 and 5 present two independent case studies of field-level adaptation. The first case follows the development of the gun truck and the hardened convoy concept in Vietnam.
While the adaptation process was successful in Vietnam it did not result in a major military innovation. The second case traces the development of gun trucks and the hardened convoy concept during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unlike the Vietnam case, the
Iraq gun truck becomes a major military innovation. Following the summary of the second case I provide a cross case analysis and ask what might explain the variation between the two outcomes. Chapter 6 departs from gun truck technologies and presents a series of technologies present in the modern battlefield. I illustrate different aspects of machine design and argue that the U.S. military is demonstrating a formal acceptance of the importance of machine design and user insights as central to
36 successful military innovation. Chapter 7 provides a summary of the overall findings of the project and provides policy prescriptions and potential future research projects.
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CHAPTER 2: Parsing Innovation—Grand Design, Adaptation, and Improvisation
Innovation’s Sub-concepts
“Fighting the war we are in” is about effective change in the conduct of and preparation for war. That puzzle is distilled into this project as the means of getting from theory to practice with military technology. It reflects the need to fit technology and tactics to the context of the current battlefield rather than the last one84 It is about change.
There are, of course, significant puzzles in making the right kind of change. The challenges seem unending in a time of conflict: the dynamism of the battlefield,85 the mind of the enemy,86 uncertainty over the performance of weaponry,87 disruptions to tactical and operational communications...etc.88 But they are all ultimately about changing, changing fast enough, and changing in the way that fits the context of the battle.
84 Michael Howard and John Guilmartin, "Two Historians in Technology and War," in Fifth Annual Conference On Strategy, ed. Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1994). 85 Michael T. Plehn, "Control Warfare: Inside the Ooda Loop" (Air University Maxwell AFB, 2000). 86 Richard and Michael P. Fischerkeller Herrmann, "Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive- Strategic Research after the Cold War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995). 87 Emily O. Goldman, "The U.S. Military in Uncertain Times: Organizations, Ambiguity, and Strategic Adjustment," Journal of Strategic Studies 20, no. 2 (1997). 88 Murray, "Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs."
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Yet this is not how we tend to think about it, or innovation for that matter. In a time of war we tend to approach the battlefield as a proving ground for technology89--
The place in which our innovations are tried out. Engagement outcomes serve as mental proxies for good or bad innovation—whether the changes made in peacetime were right or wrong. But for understanding the pathways and processes of innovation this is a limited perspective, war is an ongoing and dynamic adjustment process of action and reaction.90 It is a crucial cycle of failing, finding a solution, adjusting, and beginning again. In this sense, the battlefield is more than a proving ground against which to take a static measure of success and failure, it is an innovation process—an adaptation process.91
This chapter proposes a perspective on innovation that parses it into three subconcepts: grand design, adaptation, and improvisation. I suggest that we deflate and demystify innovation by delinking it from “newness” and “size” and take innovation to mean change. From there, I argue, innovation becomes a concrete concept that has processes subsumed under it. Following an explication of theories that support this
89 “[war]… determines who is the best man--who is the highest-bred, the most self-denying, the most fearless, the coolest of nerve, the swiftest of eye and hand. You cannot test these possibilities wholly, unless there is a clear possibility of the struggle's ending in death.” George C. Marshall et al., The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces [and] Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, [1st ed. (Philadelphia,: Lippincott, 1947). 90 Book 6: Defense pg 377. Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).. 91 Business and Management literature know well the phenomenon of success through failure. Tim Harford, Adapt: Why Success Always Starts with Failure (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
39 conceptualization, I rearticulate the subconcepts into a definition of major military innovation.
A Stretched Concept
Nearly a half century ago Giovanni Sartori elegantly expounded on the problem of conceptual stretching.92 His 1970 article warns us that we have a responsibility as scholars to be conceptually clear—to remain vigilant while moving up and down the ladder of abstraction. Failing to do so allows concepts take on a life of their own; to become stretched and distended. For security studies terminological ambiguity is the order of the day when it comes to innovation. Consider the following publications that make reference to ‘innovation’ and the military: Predicting Military Innovation93;
Innovation in a Military Research Laboratory94; Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of
Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism95; The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The
Thor-Jupiter Controversy96; Innovation and the Military Mind97;The Airmail Pickup
System of All American Aviation - A Failed Innovation98; Students in Military Institutions
92 Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," The American Political Science Review 64, no. No. 4 (Dec., 1970) (1970). 93 Jeffrey A. Isaacson et al., Predicting Military Innovation (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1999). 94 A. E. Thal and D. E. Shahady, "Innovation in a Military Research Laboratory: An Initial Exploratory Study," Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 22, no. 2 (2010). 95 Michael C. Horowitz, "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism," International Organization 64, no. 01 (2010). 96 Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy. 97 R.A. Mason, "Innovation and the Military Mind," Air University Review, no. Jan-Feb (1986). 98 W. D. Lewis and W. F. Trimble, "The Airmail Pickup System of All American Aviation - a Failed Innovation," Social Studies of Science 22, no. 2 (1992).
40 of Higher Education: Life Strategies and Innovation Potential99. The range of its use is staggering. Innovation simultaneously refers to a mental capacity, an operational capability, an organizational possibility, and new technology.
From the morass, there is a strong tendency to want to say that innovation is about the introduction of new material things. Certainly in military terms part of the blame for it falls on the RMA literature or Revolution in Military Affairs. That project sought to determine the potential for full spectrum dominance through new technologies.100 But the bias toward newness is present throughout the literature in security studies. Partially because much of the popular writing on military technological innovation is based on a concept borrowed from Bower and Christenson’s notion of
“disruptive” technology.101 For them, two kinds of new technologies could be introduced into a system, a sustaining one or a disruptive one. Despite Christenson’s refinement of the concept to warn against a bias toward disruptive technologies,102 the allure was too strong. The jargon became powerful in circles of military technology because it appeared to promise military dominance.103
99 A. K. Degtiarev and E. Y. Litvinenko, "Students in Military Institutions of Higher Education: Life Strategies and Innovation Potential," Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya, no. 12 (2003). 100 Dima Adamsky and Kjell Inge Bjerga, "Introduction to the Information-Technology Revolution in Military Affairs," Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010). 101 Joseph L. & Christensen Bower, Clayton M. , "Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave " Harvard Business Review, no. January-February 1995 (1995). 102 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma : When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). 103 Terry C. Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies : Disguising Innovation, Cass Series--Strategy and History. (London ; New York: Frank Cass, 2004).
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Beyond the new technology bias as the leading characteristic of innovation, lies the problem that innovation can be associated with tactics and techniques. As a result, even those strongly opposed to technologized fanaticism tended to associate innovation with markedly new ideas or concepts. Jeffrey Isaacson et al. strongly critique the techno-centric emphasis on machines but maintain the bias toward newness.104
“…innovation is manifested by the development of new warfighting concepts and/or new means of integrating technology…..(it) might include revised doctrine, tactics, training, or support.”105
But this begs the question, new compared to what? How different must the new thing be from the old thing to be considered an innovation?106 Is there some difference between the development of a new war fighting concept which alters how we understand global strategy, and revising providing predator drone tactics? If we revise something, is that new? The hangup over newness is ahistorical and beside the point.107
104 Pg 2. Jeffrey A. Isaacson et al., Predicting Military Innovation (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1999). 105 Jeffrey A. Isaacson et al., Predicting Military Innovation (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1999). 106 This point is particularly relevant when we examine the literature on military transformation which builds upon Christenson and Bower’s concepts of disruptive and sustaining innovations. The distinction between the two categories points to inventions that fundamentally transform a market and consumer habits. In their use, both are innovations. Yet clearly one has created far more change than the other. Additionally it isn’t clear what is actually new. If CD’s are new, to the music industry they are only new media for listening, but the music and the markets stay the same. For more on disruptive and sustaining innovations in corporate and military applications see: Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies : Disguising Innovation, D. E. Shahady et al., Understanding the Emergence of Disruptive Innovation in Air Force Science and Technology Organizations, 2008 Portland International Conference on Management of Engineering & Technology, Vols 1-5 (2008), Joseph L. & Christensen Bower, Clayton M. , "Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave " Harvard Business Review, no. January-February 1995 (1995). 107 If we intend to cling to something akin to new I suggest something akin to novel, as in, different than other alternatives rather than new. In the very least we will save the historians from paroxysm of dissent.
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Likewise, how significant or big does the change have to be in order to be called innovation? This big versus small controversy likely stems from the thread of research in military history that explores military revolutions.108 Is an innovation a revolution? Is it possible to have small innovations? Is a revolution a major military innovation? This is a mental gymnastic that starts to look like the newness argument. How big is big enough?
At what level? Are doctrinal changes “bigger” than field practices? Is a shift in the way food is transported for the Army “bigger” than the introduction of armored tanks to warfare? For now, the point is that newness and size of change is contestable, confusing, and infinitely debatable.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines innovation as “The action of innovating; the introduction of novelties; the alteration of what is established by the introduction of new elements or forms.”109 Although the newness component pervades, the notion of an alteration of established practice is a much more useful way to consider the term.
At its most basic level the unifying component of innovation among all the varied definitions is that it stands for some kind of change.
In an attempt to step away from the technological, newness, and size problem, I define innovation as a novel revision/change in how we do things that is brought into
108 The history literature on military revolutions is a brilliant treatment of how technologies have affected outcomes and spread globally to create advantages and disadvantages for militaries. For excellent examples of this work see: Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution : Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), William Hardy McNeill. "The Pursuit of Power Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000." (Place Published: University of Chicago Press, 1982), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.00833. 109 Soanes, Stevenson, and Oxford University Press., "The Concise Oxford English Dictionary."
43 practice on purpose.110 1. Novel because it points to a difference but not necessarily new technique or technology; 2. Change, because it signifies a departure from what is established; 3. Brought into practice, because if we create it but no practices follow it isn’t an innovation; and 4. purposeful because innovation—unlike biological references to evolution—is intended. It is purposeful whether we can fully anticipate the implications of changing or not.
In doing so we bypass yet another morass of confusion—Innovations do fail.
They fail to be effective, they cause untoward outcomes, and they can result in military waste and failure to achieve objectives. Adam Grissom notes that the field of military innovation studies tends to be consequentialist111—we only study the changes to military practices that resulted in positive outcomes. This is problematic. Innovations, as I define them, do not always produce a positive effect even when we have the best intentions. The Maginot Line comes to mind, so does the Army’s Pentomic Division.112
Some innovation processes are abandoned in the middle of their diffusion only to be replaced by a completely different innovation—The population of people who purchased the Laser Disc in the early 1990’s will woefully agree.113 Innovations can fail, a multi-billion dollar graveyard of military weaponry reveals as much.
110 I did not come to this definition alone. My perspective is strongly influenced by the theories of Langdon Winner, David Edgerton, and the historians of technology Edward Tenner and Henry Petroski. 111 Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies." 112 David Lewis and William Trimble do a fantastic job of illustrating this through the “failure” of a national mail delivery system. See: W. D. Lewis and W. F. Trimble, "The Airmail Pickup System of All American Aviation - a Failed Innovation," Social Studies of Science 22, no. 2 (1992). 113 The laser disc went on the market in the mid-1990s but was nearly immediately replaced by the DVD.
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An innovation process is the cycle of change from one practice to another. If there is no shift in practices from the old ‘how’ to the new ‘how’ there has not been an innovation. New machines facilitate those processes, just as changes in practices facilitate the production of new machines.114 In all these examples, the change in practices is purposeful. We intend innovation but often its effects are accidental, successful innovation is therefore distinct from increased military effectiveness.
Successful military innovation is the completion of an innovation process—the transition from one set of practices to another.
Setting innovation as a broad concept permits us the ability to parse it into sub- concepts. We parse phenomena in order to get an analytical handle on it. No single perspective has the monopoly. Theo Farrell provides a typology that sees innovation’s sources as something distinct from adaptation and emulation.115 Steve Rosen divides innovation into three broadly divisible categories: wartime, peacetime, and technological innovation116; Adam Grissom just two categories—top down or bottom up.117 Each cut of the innovation apple provides a different clarity but each of these perspectives are insufficient for understanding field-level innovation. Rosen’s typology separates technology from wartime innovation and focuses entirely on the command-
114 This is referred to as the technique/technology interaction. This is an incredibly light reading of the insights and critique of Bordieu’s habitus, that the investigation of technology puts us directly into the mystery of working through how material objects affect and are affected by humans. Deep thoughts for what military practitioners know to be true, for each new technology there must be a technique. Pg 20. Jonathan Sterne, "Bourdieu, Technique and Technology," Cultural Studies (2003). 115 Pg 6. Ibid. 116 Pg Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 117 Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies."
45 level structures, and as a result does not capture field-level phenomena. Farrell’s typology identifies sources, but stops short at creation—leaving diffusion to later research.118 Adam Grissom’s division into top-down or bottom-up points to the need for something other than top-down perspectives and instead serves as a call for further theorizing. This project works to supplement his call directly.
Innovation is a covering concept; a blanket term for a set of three distinct processes of change: grand design, adaptation, and improvisation.
Grand design is the product of theoretical visionaries, scientists, and engineers.119 It is theory driven, and is naturally top-down and expressed in forms like military doctrine, weapons research programs like the fantastical robot- centric Future Combat Systems program.120 Adaptation is a deeply localized and contextual process of problem solving. It takes received objects or techniques and revises them to solve a specific puzzle or problem.121 Adaptation is most commonly found among people who operate in an applied world.122 In armed conflict adaptation happens at the field level. The Libyan rebels who
118 It is also the case that by making innovation a source rather than a process, it falls prey to the innovation as object problem. Nevertheless the typology stands as a great analysis of where ideas might come from: brand new inventions, adding an incremental change to an invention, and copying someone else’s invention. 119 I selected grand design as a term because it pointed to this broadest level of thinking about the combination of all the smallest parts of a structure. Military grand design is reflected in doctrine. A country’s grand strategy is rooted in its grand design. For examples outside military applications see: Yoichiro Murakami and Thomas J. Schoenbaum, A Grand Design for Peace and Reconciliation : Achieving Kyosei in East Asia (Cheltenham ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2008), Daniel Twining, "America's Grand Design in Asia," The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2007), Kenneth B. Pyle, "In Pursuit of a Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past and the Future," Journal of Japanese Studies 13, no. 2 (1987), Donald J. Stoker, The Grand Design : Strategy and the U.S. Civil War (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press). 120 John Matsumura, "Exploring Advanced Technologies for the Future Combat Systems Program," Rand, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=81635. 121 P. Andries and K. Debackere, "Adaptation in New Technology-Based Ventures: Insights at the Company Level," International Journal of Management Reviews 8, no. 2 (2006). 122 Nelly Oudshoorn and T. J. Pinch, How Users Matter : The Co-Construction of Users and Technologies, Inside Technology. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).
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came together to mount semiautomatic weapons to remote control cars were adapting.123 Improvisation is the act of combining thought and action simultaneously. Improvisation is not planned. Top improvisers are those who are masters of their skill.124 Improvisation is “MacGyvering.”125 It is the art of making due by making changes for just the moment with duct tape and ball point pens.
Grand Design: Visionary Paradigm Shifts
When you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success. That is the way it was with the atomic bomb. –J. Oppenheimer126 Less than a decade after the delivery of the first military airplane to the Signal Corps, and within a few years of the first aerial combat, Mitchell was speaking and writing of air power in terms that would take many decades to realize. His vision of the potential of air power was so complete that he saw beyond aerial flight and into space itself…..—Billy Mitchell127
Grand design is the broadest process of innovation. It is also by far the most often confused for being the only important component of innovation because its shifts are the most overarching and well advertised. Grand design is generally expressed in
123 Jeremy Hsu, "Libyan Rebels Debut Machine Gun-Firing Robot," Innovation News Daily (2011), http://www.technewsdaily.com/2742-libyan-rebels-military-robot.html. 124 Consider all the work done by musicians. Jazz masters. There is a literature on music and improvisation. See chapter 4. 125 MacGyver was a tv character played by Richard Dean Anderson. It developed a huge following. A summary from the fan website that describes the “bio” of the fictional character is as follows: “MacGyver, or "Mac," as his friends call him, is a master of improvisation. Using his vast scientific knowledge and unique ability to see items as individual components he can use ordinary objects to get himself and his companions out of trouble. All he carries with him is a Swiss Army knife and, occasionally, a roll of duct tape and some odds and ends having forsaken guns (and firearms in general) after a traumatic childhood incident, and tries to avoid violence as much as he can.” http://www.macgyveronline.com/pages/c1.html Date accessed 10/12/2011 126 This quote is well published as Oppenheimer’s but the analysis and the importance of the quote itself is beautifully laid out in Trevor Pinch’s contribution to the Bijker volume. Pg 17 Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas Parke Hughes, and T. J. Pinch, The Social Construction of Technological Systems : New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987). 127 Johnny R. LtCol. Johnes, "William "Billy" Mitchell's Air Power," (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, 1997).
47 the form of military grand strategy, new concepts of war, or cutting edge technological discoveries. The Revolution in Military Affairs and the military transformation literature are both steeped heavily in grand design innovation.128
Grand design innovations function as road maps of the national security trajectory. They are the grand scheme blueprints of our national security plans. Grand design innovations require an overall strategic vision--a well articulated grand theory of how the world works and the nation’s strategic plan given that theory.129 Nuclear weapons, nuclear strategies, and the Cold War were born of Oppenheimer’s dream, but the entire logic and strategic picture bore in mind an image of the future.
Grand design is distinct because its source comes from theory rather than practice. If we think of a whole system that moves smoothly along a set of tracks, a grand design innovation is the train jumping the tracks in order to create an entirely new system with new (usually unanticipated) problems and solutions. Bringing about a military change through grand design innovation is an attempt to control the long view of the future for some sort of advantage or to minimize perceived risks associated with continuing along the current path.
Grand design’s source is driven by an imagined future system, future threats or challenges that have yet to present themselves. To bring about a grand design change is
128 For more on the military transformation literature and the RMA see: Erica D. Borghard, "Military Organizations and Military Innovations; or, How the Armed Services Can Be the Vanguard of the Revolution (in Military Affairs)," in Mini-APSA (Columbia University: 2010). 129 Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy."
48 to cause a paradigm shift of the order that Thomas Kuhn described in his Structure of
Scientific Revolutions.130 Some scientists will work within the confines of the current understanding of the world and others will not. Says Kuhn, “Under normal conditions the research scientist is not an innovator but a solver of puzzles, and the puzzles upon which he concentrates are just those which he believes can be both stated and solved within the existing scientific tradition.”131 Whether they are inspired by a technology or a technique, the source of military innovation begins with theory, a guess, or gamble about future military operating environments.
Presidents, generals, Nobel prize winners, and physicists are all in on the creation of different grand designs; they are a small core of actors concentrated near the top of the power hierarchy.132 The diffusion and successful incorporation of grand design shifts is an act of interpretation as grand designs spread they may be applied differently.133 The originating country that bears the burdens of research and development of the grand design isn’t always the one that reaps the greatest benefits.
130 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 131 Pg 234. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension : Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 132The diffusion of grand design ideas across borders demonstrates very clearly that while ideas may travel easily, the adjustment of an entire organization or force posture will express that design in entirely different ways. For an example see Kier’s explanation for the variation in doctrine between states, or Adamsky’s explanation for variation between RMA’s.Adamsky and Bjerga, "Introduction to the Information-Technology Revolution in Military Affairs.", Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars." 133 In the military innovation literature this energizes the cultural innovation explanations. Specifically, Dima Adamsky’s work on military cultural adaptation and explaining why two different militaries interpreted a single concept differently speaks directly to the interpretation of a grand design innovation. See Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation : The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the Us, and Israel (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010).
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Intellectual think tanks, research, and development are costly endeavors that require significant resource expenditure; agendas not all states can afford. Rather, states in inferior power positions can emulate it or simply react to the grand design shifts initiated by great powers. 134 The timing for these innovations is likely in peacetime. A shift in grand design during a time of war is risky and is generally avoided unless the potential for defeat is high.135 Peacetime, on the other hand permits militaries the space and time to develop and create new theories of victory.136
Finally, grand design innovation is controversial for its potential to create bizarre versions of the very systems they imagine to be real in two ways. First, striking out toward a new theoretical design can bring about unintended, unanticipated effects.
Consider the transition to the digital era in the business world. In terms of paper logistics alone, administrators extolled the virtue of the virtual revolution because it would cut back on paper use. In practice, this was not the case. In most cases people continued to use paper as often, or in some cases, even more often than before the digitizing of their communications.137 Second, grand design innovations also have an
134 Robert Gilpin’s insight of the “advantage of backwardness” demonstrates as much Pg 178 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 135 See: Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, "Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Ignorance," in Global Environmental Risk, ed. Jeanne X. Kasperson and Roger Kasperson (London: Earthscan, 2001), Michael McNerney, "Military Innovation in Times of Conflict--Is It Too Risky?," http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2005/2tri05/mcnerneyeng.html, Erica D. Borghard, "Military Organizations and Military Innovations; or, How the Armed Services Can Be the Vanguard of the Revolution (in Military Affairs)," in Mini-APSA (Columbia University: 2010). 136 Pg. 20 Rosen, Winning the Next War. 137 Pg 5. Edward Tenner, Why Things Bite Back : Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1996).
50 oddly material self-fulfilling quality about them. In preparing for an oncoming robotic future of warfare we simultaneously create the material means by which the future comes about.138 Like a run on a bank, simply discussing the details of a grand strategy shift can produce reactions.139
Adaptation: Repurposing the Received
The Humvee proved to be a liability in many situations. Although its standard armor plating made it much safer for passengers than the standard Army Jeep, it was vulnerable to close-range AK fire as well as IED’s, or improvised explosive devices, that were being deployed by enemy soldiers. The Humvee armor was designed for far-off AK fire and shrapnel but not close-in assaults. Enterprising GIs raided junkyards and scrap heaps to find steel plates and other heavy metal pieces to bolt to their Humvees in an attempt to protect themselves from attack. Sometimes they would fill buckets with sand and hang them from the vehicle’s side panels. The soldiers dubbed this jury-rigged setup “hillbilly armor” and “gypsy racks….” 140
Grenades without their pins made me nervous, but to my amazement, jamming a grenade into a Mason jar would hold the safety lever—the “spoon”—tight against the glass wall of the jar…I just dropped my jars through the sunlight one
138 See also: Peter W. Singer, "Reasons to Love Washington (D.C.): We're Inventing the Future Military Technology, Washington Dc, Defense Strategy, Technology, Defense," The Washingtonian Online May 2009. 139 Bringing about an innovation by creating new objects and new ideas about how to use those objects can have the effect of making function follow form. Much the same way that a run on a bank can lead to its realization, theoretical thinking brought into realization through objects and practices may be able to do the same. See Robert K. Merton, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy " The Antioch Review, Vol. 8, no. No. 2 (Summer, 1948) (1948). By way of example consider Vannevar Bush’s article that seems to predict the internet. “One can now picture a future investigator in his laboratory. His hands are free, and he is not anchored. As he moves about and observes, he photographs and comments. …. His typed record, as well as his photographs, may both be in miniature, so that he projects them for examination”.-Vannevar Bush, "As We May Think," The Atlantic Monthly July 1945 (1945). 140 Baum, "Battle Lessons: What the Generals Don't Know."
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after another, and watched them disappear into the green cover. Even from our altitude we could see the grenades explode.141
Some soldiers fashioned strings, weights and candles together, but the Lance Corporal’s model was the simplest and most reliable. Scurry took two kerosene cans and arranged them one over the other. He tied a string to the lower tin and placed water in the upper. At the moment of departure, a tiny hole pierced into the upper can released a steady drip of water that would last about 20 minutes. As the water dripped into the lower tin it pulled the string tied to the trigger sending a round across to the Turkish side. The “drip-gun” was born. The soldiers arranged their guns according to Scurry’s design along the line. They pierced their cans and then they walked out. It was simple field-level technological adaptation in the name of deception.142
Adaptation is intended change aimed at the solution of a current problem for which current techniques and technologies are not desired.143 It is reactive rather than proactive like grand design. It involves the definition of a need and finding a solution to that need.144 In war, producing a solution and employing it before the enemy can react is the key to battlefield success. This is called getting inside the enemy’s OODA loop:
Observe, orient, decide, and act.145 The OODA loop is the military’s tracing of the adaptation process. Adaptation’s timeframe is far shorter than that of grand design.
While grand design seeks to capture future potential worlds by jumping the theoretical tracks, adaptation processes reach out where the tracks are broken and patch them
141 Tommy Franks, American Soldier, 1st ed. (New York: Regan Books, 2004).pg 143 142 This is my own summary adapted from the pages provided in: Ibid. 143 Significant work on adaptation is represented in psychology, history of technology (particularly the Social Construction of Technology theorists), business management, information technology, and the natural sciences.For more on SCOT see: Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas Parke Hughes, and T. J. Pinch, The Social Construction of Technological Systems : New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, 1st MIT Press paperback ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989). 144 A. Majchrzak et al., "Technology Adaptation: The Case of a Computer-Supported Inter-Organizational Virtual Team," Mis Quarterly 24, no. 4 (2000). 145 Pg 13 Plehn, "Control Warfare: Inside the Ooda Loop".
52 forward to avoid a train wreck. The agents of adaptation tend to be the users and practitioners of it. Sometimes a non-user can provide insights to adapting, but it is predominantly ruled by the user.
Technological adaptation, the primary focus of this study, begins with the recognition of a poor fit between needs and existing solutions.146 At the field level, the adaptation process is handled by the agents in the field given that there is an absence of time and resources to handle the problem before the next event occurs.147
Technological adaptations are less common than tactical or technique adaptations because they require shifts of what you have rather than what you do. That is, technological adaptations require an additional knowledge of how something is put together and obtaining the tools needed to alter the object. Nevertheless ample illustrations of technological adaptations exist both in the military and domestic realms.
Technological adaptation is recognizable across the academic literatures as user innovation theory148, collaborative innovation149, crowdsourcing150, wiki-behavior151,
146 K. C. Desouza, Y. Awazu, and A. Ramaprasad, "Modifications and Innovations to Technology Artifacts," Technovation 27, no. 4 (2007). S. M. Ansari, P. C. Fiss, and E. J. Zajac, "Made to Fit: How Practices Vary as They Diffuse," Academy of Management Review 35, no. 1, Dorothy Leonard-Barton, "Implementation as Mutual Adaptation," Research Policy 17, no. 1988 (1988). 147 Erik Von Hippel uses the term innovation as synonymous with adaptation, but his process when incorporating the end user involves no major changes to the way in which a system runs. Ergo, Von Hippel’s User Innovation Theory would be better labeled Adaptation Theory. We see some instances of the simultaneous use in his work with Tyre.Marcie J. Tyre and Hippel Eric von, "The Situated Nature of Adaptive Learning in Organizations," Organization Science 8, no. 1 (1997). 148 Eric von Hippel, "Democratizing Innovation: The Evolving Phenomenon of User Innovation," International Journal of Innovation Science 1, no. 1 (2009). 149 John Maxfield, Terrence Fernando, and Peter Dew, "A Distributed Virtual Environment for Collaborative Engineering," Presence Teleoperators and Virtual Environments 7, no. 3 (1998). 150 Paul Boutin, "Crowdsourcing: Consumers as Creators," Business Week, July 13, 2006 2006.
53 etc. In these instances the designers of the technologies work closely with users to design a system geared specifically to create technological adaptations.
Adaptations are incremental though not necessarily linear in their processes.152
Research in business and technology indicate that as firms take on new technology to compete they must simultaneously adapt the organization, the techniques and the technology in order to bring the machines and the firm into alignment with one another.153 It is a ‘mutual adaptation’ process whereby the machine has effects on the firm and the firm affects the machine simultaneously until a workable solution is created.154
Of course, the mutual adaptation process needn’t actually take place. If products and techniques are ill-suited for the user they can simply reject the technique or technology and seek alternatives through other means.155 In many cases there are readymade solutions to a problem that are available through the consumer markets.
Consumer Off-The-Shelf (COTS) behavior is common to businesses that do not have the time or resources to produce another solution. Instead they go in search of a readily
151 Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, Wikinomics : How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything (New York: Portfolio, 2006). 152 John E. Ettlie, William P. Bridges, and Robert D. O'Keefe, "Organization Strategy and Structural Differences for Radical Versus Incremental Innovation," Management Science 30, no. 6 (1984). 153 This mutual adaptation process is precisely the insight behind the observations of historians and philosophers of technology. Langdon Winner actually obscures the distinction between technology and technique. See: Pg. Winner Langdon, "Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology," Science, Technology, & Human Values 18, no. 3 (1993). 154 Dorothy Leonard-Barton, "Implementation as Mutual Adaptation," Research Policy 17, no. 1988 (1988). 155 An unfortunate title that only serves to reinforce the confusion in the terminology; Von Hippel’s theory is in fact really a theory about adaptation, not innovation.
54 available cheap solution that solves the problem well enough.156 COTS behavior is adaptation as well.
Improvisation: The Art of MacGyvering
On the ground Olson considered throwing a grenade up the stairwell, but realized it would be easy for the insurgent to throw it back. He considered mounting a big explosive under the floor. But that could harm his soldiers. He considered scaling the scaffolding alongside the building to get at the insurgent. Then it came to him. Duct tape. A long pole. A Claymore mine. Roughly brick-size, Claymore mines fire hundreds of ball bearings in a 60-degree arc. Their explosion is much bigger than a hand grenade’s. Usually they are set on the ground to defend against enemy advance. Olson had a different idea. He would duct-tape a Claymore mine to a pole. He’d stick the mine through the narrow stairwell space to the insurgent’s position. No one in the fight had ever seen a Claymore used like this. Olson took two 15-foot poles from a street vendor’s stall. He taped a mine to each and marked at his end which direction the Claymore had to face. Back into the building they went, fresh Afghan soldiers in the lead. By this time, there were more than 100 Afghan soldiers and police in the area, most of them spectators. Again, each floor was cleared. As they approached the fifth floor, the insurgent shot down the stairwell, wounding two Afghan soldiers. They and the ones behind turned and fled. Olson could hear the insurgent walking above him. Holley could see his rifle muzzle. With hand signals, Holley directed Olson where to aim the Claymore. Olson propped the pole’s butt end on a stair. They moved to a nearby office and detonated the mine.157
Within the vignette of war, improvisation is purely reactive, an instantaneous response with little to no forethought. As it is born of necessity, and is a response to a given situation, it is much like adaptation, only with a far shorter timeframe. In terms of military change, improvisation also happens in a time of war and in conditions of
156 For more on COTs behavior in the defense industry see: J. L. Burbank and W. T. Kasch, "Cots Communications Technologies for Applications: Challenges and Limitations" (paper presented at the Military Communications Conference, 2004. MILCOM 2004. IEEE, 2004). 157 Dan Tobin, "Ingenuity, Valor and Duct Tape: A Soldier and His Green Unit Overcome an Entrenched Enemy in Afghanistan," The Post-Standard, May, 23 2010 2010.
55 necessity and/or survival.158 Improvisation is distinct from adaptation because source and execution happen simultaneously (as opposed to having a delay between the two).
In this way improvisation is difficult to understand as a process because source and execution are without any real delay between them. While adaptation is about making received items or ideas fit the existing context, improvisation is driven by an absence of resource. As such, improvisation is action and theory all at once. While adaptations can be produced by someone other than the user, improvisations, by definition, cannot. The replication and diffusion of improvisations render them into adaptations. The agents of improvisation are generally time-honored, grizzled field veterans. They are the highly experienced agents who are most accustomed to operating under duress with limited resources at their disposal. Typically, the NCO or well-seasoned enlisted with experience in battle is a candidate for a source of improvisation. Improvisation is awkward because it flies in the face of everything scholarship emphasizes about military planning and soldier training. Or at least so it appears. Just as Chamberlin told his men to fix bayonets and charge in the battle of
Gettysburg, a soldier’s intellect and situational awareness affects the frequency and quality of the improvisation.159
158 This is captured repeatedly by the work of James Carafano. Most interesting are his tales of adjustment to armor tactics. Pg 165-188. James Jay Carafano, GI Ingenuity : Improvisation, Technology, and Winning World War Ii, War, Technology, and History. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006). 159 For a beautiful historically narrative on the battle see: Michael Shaara, The Killer Angels : A Novel of the Civil War, Modern Library ed. (New York: Modern Library, 2004).
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Military studies rarely focus on improvisation as a theory but the practice has been in place since the creation of drill and training. Improvisation in music theory speaks to talent and practice as demonstrated by jazz and bluegrass performances.160
Mastery of instrument and expertise eliminate the role of planning. In improvisation there is only knowledge of the structure of the system and tools by which work is completed. It is pure creation in the moment of action, without premeditation.161
Additional work in improvisation shows up in theory regarding Zen meditation and persistent practice. The strength of an improvisation rests entirely upon its masterful single iteration.162 But the ability to improvise requires persistent applied practice and experience. Shu-ha-ri Zen method teaches that the truly skilled artisan or musician achieves the freedom to improvise by first mastering all the basic components of what it is to create through the tools provided.163 This link is central to understanding the distinction between soldier drill and muscle memory training and independence of thought and action on the battlefield. Quite contrary to the perception that drill and memorization serve entirely as hierarchical control mechanisms, drill and practice also
160 Derek Bailey, Improvisation : Its Nature and Practice in Music (Ashbourne [Eng.]: Moorland Pub. in association with Incus Records, 1980). 161 Pg 103 Ibid. 162 Woe be unto the many aspiring artists who simply replay the recorded versions of prior Jazz pieces. The purpose of the art is lost. There are, however, variations on how we judge the strength of improvised music that might translate well into military improvisation. See: Jacob Eisenberg and William Forde Thompson, "A Matter of Taste: Evaluating Improvised Music," Creativity Research Journal 15, no. 2 (2003). 163 Dori Digenti, Zen Learning a New Approach to Creating Multiskilled Workers, ed. MIT Center for International Studies, The Mit Japan Program Science Technology Management (Cambridge: MIT, 1996).
57 aid in the inculcation of a skill set that prepares a soldier to improvise.164 his theory of action combined with thought happening simultaneously has been adopted by the organization theorists who study innovation as the result of improvisation.165
Clausewitzian fog and friction guarantees that improvisation is a permanent component of warfare.166 The need to improvise in warfare teaches us about the importance of leadership, experience, and training. It reveals the importance of learning to be aware and flexible to the demands of the environment in which warfare takes place. Improvisation is distinct from grand design and adaptation because its process is nearly instantaneous and has no independent diffusion path. Rather it relies upon adaptation and grand design to take its creations and diffuse them into practice.
The Three Processes and Major Change/Innovation
Separate processes of innovation do not necessarily need to overlap. In fact this helps us understand some of the confusion between what is considered major military innovation and shifts in doctrine. Doctrinal change is grand design change, but it may or may not be accompanied by a change in military practice. Likewise, there can be
164 What is written about improvisation is generally not theorized but rather postulated as something that did happen. Improvisation for military soldiers is generally captured in stories of heroism. See: Baum, "Battle Lessons: What the Generals Don't Know.", Ralf W. Zimmermann, "Gi Ingenuity Unleashed in Iraq," Defense Watch Forum 2004.Carafano, Gi Ingenuity : Improvisation, Technology, and Winning World War Ii. 165 M. M. Crossan, "Improvisation in Action," Organization Science 9, no. 5 (1998), M. H. Zack, "Jazz Improvisation and Organizing: Once More from the Top," Organization Science 11, no. 2 (2000), C. Moorman and A. S. Miner, "Organizational Improvisation and Organizational Memory," Academy of Management Review 23, no. 4 (1998), Ken Kamoche, Miguel Pina e Cunha, and João Vieira da Cunha, "Towards a Theory of Organizational Improvisation: Looking Beyond the Jazz Metaphor," Journal of Management Studies 40, no. 8 (2003). 166
58 adaptation at the field level without a change in doctrine. Therefore, major military innovation requires the alignment of theory and practice—the marriage of the adaptation process with grand design. Just exactly how that comes about should be research agenda of the literature.
Just as successful military operations necessitate clear connections from tactics to operations to strategy and finally to doctrine, so too must major military innovation connect grand design to adaptation and perhaps improvisation.167 Most research in military innovation stresses grand design processes. True major military innovation is the syncronization or alignment of the adaptation processes.
The three sub-processes described above: grand design, adaptation, and improvisation are like any good trio—Crosby, Stills and Nash; Emerson Lake and Palmer; or the Three Stooges. The real magic happens when all three work in harmony. Each talent works in their own world, has their own independent objectives and goals, but the alignment of the three produces something larger than the sum of its parts. The three can come together by accident, like when your windshield wipers move in sync with the radio and the flashing traffic signs. Or major innovations can come together like a trio of brass, strings, and percussion led by a conductor. Major innovations are simply the concordance of two processes occasionally supplemented by the third. They inform, develop, and build off each other. Consider the history of tanks as we know
167 Ibid. Chapter 1. See Also Wirtz’s summary of Luttwak. James Wirtz, "Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Review)," Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 3 (2003).
59 them. While armored vehicles were designed for use in use in the First World War, none of those solutions did anything to resolve the stalemate of trench warfare.168 The first tanks were deployed in the Somme and summarily pronounced as an astonishing failure.169 The soil of the swampy French marshlands couldn’t support the weight of the new tracked vehicles.170 What followed was a prolonged adaptation process to bring them into practice. The grand theoretical masterpiece, the armored pachyderm around which we—eventually—declared a major military innovation needed something more than just really smart engineers and organizational support. The adaptation cycle needed to be put in place to learn where, how, and under what circumstances this new potential capability could be employed. Until that occurred tanks remained a grand design without feet.171
Implications and Conclusion
168 Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Swinton, then serving in the position of journalist to the British Army observed the meat grinder that was no man’s land in the sites of the enemy machine gunner. His solution, inspired by the form of a farm tractor, was to create a tracked armored vehicle that could traverse the trenches on the offensive. LTC Swinton, who was initially ignored by his superiors, eventually got the nod from Winston Churchill See:Michael D. Doubler, Busting the Bocage, ed. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combate Studies Institute (Fort Leavenworth: Libary of Congress, 1955). 169 R. P. Hunnicutt, Firepower : A History of the American Heavy Tank (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988). 170 Carolina Castaldi, Roberto Fontana, and Alessandro Nuvolari, "‘Chariots of Fire’: The Evolution of Tank Technology, 1915–1945," Journal of Evolutionary Economics 19, no. 4 (2009). 171 There appears to be no particular order for the source of the grand design shift, sometimes it appears to be triggered from below, like Swinton’s case, but sometimes from up above, like Oppenheimer. Either way, what follows grand design in instances of major military innovation, is the adaptation, or improvisation process, in order to bring it down to directed and contextualized practices in the course of war.
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Every literature has its dogma. The dogma of military change is, and always has been, steeped in the language of big and new innovation. Fundamental changes pressed downward from upon-high into the muck of the battlefield. This view has biased our analysis and made innovation a fuzzy concept. It biases technology over technique, top-down flows over bottom-up, overemphasizes the nature of centralized hierarchical power, ignores the horizontal component to innovation and obscures the rich variety of contributors to the process.
I have attempted to replace conceptual bloat with simplicity. Innovation is change—purposeful, novel changes from established practice. Beneath this covering concept are three sub-processes: grand design, adaptation, and improvisation. Each of the sub-processes has its own predominant flows, agents, timelines, and effects.
Overlapping sup-processes make up major military change. A change in only one is not a major military innovation, but it may be a subtype.
My proposed perspectives on change offers a new way to divide and think about the phenomena in a way that permits us to explain better what we see. It permits us to see different users, different sorts of incentives for creation, and different outcomes in terms of success or failure, and increased or decreased effectiveness. Finally, this conceptualization permits more than top-down or bottom-up thinking, but also permits thinking across the horizon of any level of military organizations. With this understanding of innovation in mind, I turn to focus on just one sub-process; adaptation and its process of creation and diffusion at the field level.
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CHAPTER 3: Taking Design Seriously—Technological Adaptation as an Open Logic
We like to think that innovation hangs solely on the creativity of a few brilliant people. But innovation theories give far too much to intelligence when it comes to innovation, especially in war. It gives everything to grand design and offers little insight for adaptation and improvisation. Part of this stems from the fact that innovation has two potential logics, and we tend to favor one over the other. This chapter introduces those logics and suggests that technological adaptation at the field level is best represented by the second logic. From this second logic of innovation I derive three causal dimensions: machine design, horizontal linkages and vertical linkages.
Machine design makes it easier or harder for soldiers to modify technology. Horizontal linkages push the technology and ideas across the battlefield to other users. Vertical linkages push the idea up the chain of command to transform doctrine and industry solutions. In the sections to follow I describe each of the causal dimensions and their interactions in producing successful field-level adaptations. The greater or lesser of each of these causal dimensions has effects on the adaptation process, its chances for success in the adaptation process, and major military innovation.
Two Logics of Innovation
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Innovation has two foundational logics. One comes from economic theories of production, the other was built out of the IT industry—standard economic logic and the open source logic. The first is nearly hegemonic, the second is capturing more attention as a logic that could explain other behavior. To be clear, neither model captures the truth about innovation and its causes. Rather, both work
Standard Economic Model
Innovation in the marketplace is directly associated with a legal property framework. It assumes the perspective of the producer and posits a self-interested actor seeking a share of potential profits. In order to induce innovation, the producer must be guaranteed a profit.172 In order to protect those profits the creator can engage a legal framework that ensures creators receive profits from their work.173 The standard logic is linear and top down. It presumes a producer and a consumer with a flow of goods from one to the other.174 The standard model embeds new ideas and machines in a legal structure of patents, trademarks, and copyright law known as intellectual property rights (IPR). The IPR model rewards the creator by inducing a monopoly (generally temporary) that provides a window of time to reap the benefits of their ideas.175 These patents, copyright, and trademarks form a highly legalized structure that protect the
172 Georg Krogh and Eric von Hippel, "The Promise of Research on Open Source Software," Management Science 52, no. 7 (2006). 173 Steve Weber, The Success of Open Source (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004). 174 ODASD, "Systems Engineering: Modular Open Systems Approach," DOD, http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/initiatives/init_mosa.html.
63 inventor’s profits (and by proxy, the inventor’s work) from piracy. By safeguarding against the theft of the inventor’s prospective gains, the IPR model incentivizes creativity and innovation comes about through the desire to make money. 176
The inability to ensure the promise of profit is presumed to eliminate the incentive for innovation177, but it is an imperfect logic for meeting user needs. This is because it relies upon an indirect mechanism for problem solving.178 IPR is designed to incentivize creation but not necessarily to solve the most pressing user problems, just the most profitable ones. This means that the produced solution is the one that maximizes profit and solve the problem better than whatever else is available. Beyond this, there is no guarantee that the produced solution is the most efficient or useful to the user.
Erik von Hippel identified it as a problem of information asymmetry.179 The producer’s solution to a user’s problems is driven by a company’s particular area of expertise. Even with the best of intentions a producer’s solution may not be the most ideal solution for the user.180 The producer anticipates the needs of the user, whether by responding to a consumer specified demand (a pull from the consumer), or in
176 Ibid. 177 Yale Brozen, "Invention, Innovation, and Imitation," The American Economic Review 41, no. 2 (1951). 178 Judiciary United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the, Protecting Copyright and Innovation in a Post-Grokster World Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, September 28, 2005 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 2009). 179 von Hippel, Erik "Perspective: User Toolkits for Innovation," JOURNAL OF PRODUCT INNOVATION AND MANAGEMENT 18, no. 4 (2001). 180 Eric von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
64 anticipation of a need (a push to the consumer).181 In either case the producer is not living the experiences of the end user. Boeing may produce a flying drone for covert surveillance; HTC, a phone tapping system; but the soldier may use both or neither based on the conditions of the field. While the producers see along their lines of expertise, the soldier sees across the entire range of imagined solutions.182 There is often no way for producers to know up front exactly how their technology will be used and what form of the technologies will be best suited to the soldier in the field.183
The standard logic for innovation is a valid and tested model but is a poor fit for observing field-level adaptation. First, the producer’s view tends to focus on its linear and singular realms of expertise; the soldier’s across the spectrum of potential solutions in the field. One is a deep knowledge, the other is broad knowledge. Second, firms carry immense overhead costs in machinery and knowledge that resist complete departures from prior solutions; field soldiers bear none of these overhead costs so they have maximum flexibility. Third, the standard logic has a different structure of relationships between producer and consumer. Producers and users are distinct in the standard logic, separated by the profit motive. Field-level adaptations are produced primarily for the user, who is also the producer but not the purchaser (the DOD). The standard logic
181 For more about push pull technology theory see: Gregory F Nemet, "Demand-Pull, Technology-Push, and Government-Led Incentives for Non-Incremental Technical Change," Research Policy 38, no. 5 (2009). 182 Hippel, The Sources of Innovation. 183 This work, and those observations came prior to von Hippel’s work, but he emphasizes it in his justifications for the seemingly non-rational reasons for consumers to innovation without the incentive to make money on their creations. For a terrific summary of the SCOT research agenda from outside its own adherents See: Hans K. Klein and Daniel Lee Kleinman, "The Social Construction of Technology: Structural Considerations," Science, Technology and Human Values 27 (2002).
65 conflates user with purchaser and arrogates the role of producer as distinct from both of those categories.184 Finally, the classical logic presumes a level of competition among actors that is not true among soldiers at the field level. It is too far a stretch to conceptualize survival and battle victory as profit. The incentive for innovation is problem-solving, not profit. This means that what was a competitive environment is now a cooperative one.
Open Logics: A Direct Mechanism
The newly prevalent logic of innovation comes from thinking about design rather than the market—the logic of open source/open design. The open in ‘open source’ refers to open access to the building blocks of an architecture. Source refers to the
‘source’ in source code—as in the computer programming languages that make up software systems.185 An “open source program” makes its source code readily available to the user to inspect and adapt. The design component of openness is an offshoot of the open source movement for all other engineered things beyond software.186
184 This has implications for weapons acquisition in general since the production of solutions could be aimed at the purse rather than the direct needs of the user. This indicates a potential overlap between this project and Steve Rosen’s typology of war time and peace time innovation. While the soldiers are the users, the generals hold the purse which may incentivize the producer to please the buyer not the user. See Page 36 Hippel, The Sources of Innovation. 185 The “open” in open source refers to the ethic promoted in computer programming. Richard Stallman first coined the term “free software” in the 1980’s. Stallman saw that computer programming would be plagued by the rate at which computer processers developed. Rather than encrypt the source code for his programs he promoted the liberation of code (making it free). Rather than imprison the software code, Stallman imagined that continuous improvement and adjustment of software would be better handled by sharing the code with the programming community. 186 Christer Karlsson, Rajesh Nellore, and Klas Soderquist, "Black Box Engineering: Redefining the Role of Product Specifications," Journal of Product Innovation Management 15, no. 6 (1998).
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Open source logics proliferated with the ion of the concept of openness began in the field of computer software engineering. Programmers realized that the rate of change in computers would leave them reinventing the wheel repeatedly. Moore’s law observed that processing speeds would increase rapidly.187 This was great news for computing power but bad news for software engineers. There was no concomitant
Moore’s law for software, rather it seemed precisely the opposite; software code is a tedious affair and copyrighted software code is illegal to copy. 188 Engineers started pushing for an open architecture and open framework that allowed everyone to contribute their own fixes and adjustments. As an answer to this tension (though many others were already doing the same) Linus Torvalds created the Linux operating system.189 He released the program with its open source code in 1991. His program now serves as the foundation for both traditionally marketed operating systems like Red
Hat as well as its many free download versions.190 Torvalds recognized that
187 Moore’s law, the exponential increase in processing power of computers, confirmed to software engineers that if they didn’t cooperate in the production of software they’d be continually rewriting code rather than just adapting to everyone’s contributions. For more on Moore’s Law See: Gerald M. Borsuk, Timothy Coffey, and National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy. "Moore's Law a Department of Defense Perspective." In Defense horizons no. 30. (Place Published: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2003), http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42318. 188 Dana Blankenhorn, "Moore's Law and Open Source," no. Feb, 25, 2009 (2009), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/open-source/moores-law-and-open-source/3583. 189 Linus Torvalds worked on his program, Linux, for several years. Upon completion in 1991, he shared his source code rather than to search for a profit. Linus Torvalds, "Linux Online," http://www.linux.org/info/linus.html.Linus His message to people who used Linux was that they should alter it, help it adapt, deconstruct and recreate it to make it more robust; Linux, he thought, could serve as the foundation for many program extensions and applications. Torvalds’ software was a turn in a different direction from the IPR model He understood that he alone could not provide all the potential solutions to people’s operating system needs. 190 M. A. Hiltunen, R. D. Schlichting, and C. A. Ugarte, "Building Survivable Services Using Redundancy and Adaptation," Ieee Transactions on Computers 52, no. 2 (2003).
67 programming code worked like building blocks and that by leaving the architecture open to addition and recombination better and more robust programming solutions could be made. If users found glitches or wanted to add a new capability they were welcome to because the program code was open. Since then Linux has been rewritten and readapted by its users millions of times. Currently, over 40% of the major businesses in the United States run on some successor of Linux, and in 2004 an estimated 65% of the web page were run on Apache (another Linux mutation). 191 Unlike most proprietary software which is copyright protected and encrypted—“black boxed” code, open source is disseminated without those restrictions. Open design refers to the construct of a technology whose architecture is available to users to see and alter.192
The open logic enables innovation by reducing constraints on its users. Unlike the classic logic, which incentivizes for a profit, open source logics invite users to produce solutions to their own problems. User’s needs provide the natural incentives: it is a direct mechanism.
Open source logics invite user innovations through individual solutions or as collaborative “wiki” style developments.193 Collaborative problem-solving among users is not a new phenomenon but the internet era has increased the number of potential
191Torvalds, "Linux Online." 192 Although theorists frequently tend to write about open source as an IPR alternative, that is only an offshoot of Torvald’s project, which the development of a longstanding and robust foundation for computer operating systems. The central idea was that the software would be made better, not just free and anti-capitalist. 193 Boutin, "Crowdsourcing: Consumers as Creators."
68 contributors to the solution. Collaborative problem-solving permits for multiple, simultaneous problem-solving and adaptation among many users.194 Although open logics do not necessarily need collaborative problem-solving for innovation to occur, they are one effect of the open source/design logic. The open source/design logic significantly shortens the chain of links between problem and solution. Whereas in the standard economic model, problems must be recognized by the producer as problems— whose solutions will yield a profit—open logic allows independent users to determine for themselves what they believe are ‘problems’ and then lets them attempt solutions without regard to profit.
The two logics are nearly mirror images of innovation. In the classic logic the failure to fulfill user’s needs comes from inadequate profit protection. The failure is solved by closing off user access. In the open source logic the failure to solve a user’s needs comes from restricting access and preventing idea sharing. The failure is solved by opening access in order to induce innovation among users. Second, the flow of the classic logic is top down from producer to user; its diffusion has a predominantly singular flow about it. Open logics invite user adaptation. The user is situated among a community of other users, so the solutions have a bi-directional option: upward toward producers or horizontally across users.195
194 Weber, The Success of Open Source. 195 Ikka Tuomi provides a stunningly deep analysis of the user-centered nature of knowledge and knowledge transfer in the production of technologies through her analysis of Linux. She brings in all the usual suspects of actor-network theory which forms the theoretical basis of vertical and horizontal
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Obviously there is no panacea here. There are as many challenges to the second logic as there are to the first. Having a clear path matters. User innovation pathways do not have a naturally embedded system like the classic logic’s market. Although the transition to the digital era is changing this through horizontally aligned virtual communities, it is still an emerging pathway.196 Without an embedded system of clear diffusion paths, user innovations often remain localized and unknown. Just because open logics are useful to the decentralized and uncoordinated work of users, it does not mean that the diffusion of those solutions does not need a centralized system to coordinate and adjudicate among better and worse ideas. This is the innovation paradox. The market does this for the classic logic but there is often no clear path for the open logics.
Second, upward movement to producers is difficult. The profit motive for producers means that ingenious adaptive solutions are sometimes too narrowly focused to be worth production. These idiosyncratic solutions to idiosyncratic problems are innovations that suffer—like most salmon swimming upstream—from a lack of clear paths upward.
linkages. See: Iikka Tuomi, "Internet, Innovation, and Open Source: Actors in the Network," First Monday 6, no. 1 (2001), http://www.firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/824/733, Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: Actor Network Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), Reijo Miettinen, "The Riddle of Things: Activity Theory and Actor-Network Theory as Approaches to Studying," Mind, Culture & Activity 6, no. 3 (1999). 196 This sorts of communities are exampled by projects such as Wikipedia and social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, and online blogs like Tumbler, Wordpress, and Pinterest.
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Finally, users need to actually be able to alter the technology. The most successful open logic examples require an engaged community that understands how to tinker with the technology and stay active in producing solutions.197 Although the vast majority of computer users have access to open source Linux operating systems, the majority of users do not improve upon the program because they lack the programming skills to understand it.198 Furthermore, a single problem-solver has fewer connections across the spectrum and, as such, is less likely to have his/her idea diffused. The relevant community is the key to continuous innovation and diffusion. Open systems are available to all users but not all users are equally capable. Openness is permissive but it is no guarantee—there needs to be additional refinement in design to get from open design to user-centered innovation in many cases.199
There is no single correct logic. Each logic has its own weakness. Open source logics are quick, low-level, user-informed answers to local problems. They are situated directly in the user’s realm of operation but suffer from a diffusion problem. Classic logics have a natural diffusion mechanism but suffer from an information asymmetry
197 Jon R. Lindsay, ""War Upon the Map": User Innovation in American Military Software," Technology and Culture 51, no. 3 (2010). 198 Although there is no unified definition of open in the open source logic, my use of the term maintains a strict division between the design of the technology and the capability of the user. In Hippel’s work he incorporates the capabilities of the user into the definition of openness which I find problematic for clarity. Instead I maintain that design of the technology is open or closed and capability of the user is as distinct and separate notion for which additional design must be considered, see the description in the machine design causal dimension. For more on skill and design see Hippel’s original definition. 199 This refinement is explained more clearly in the causal dimension of machine design. For the foundational understanding of the link between open design and user-centered innovation see: von Hippel, "Democratizing Innovation: The Evolving Phenomenon of User Innovation."
71 problem.200 Nevertheless, the open logic is the natural match to an investigation of technological adaptation at the field level. Open logics strongly illustrate the innovation paradox introduced in the first chapter. Inventions are plentiful in a decentralized system but need a coordinated centralized effort to bring them into effective practice. It is for these reasons that field-level technological adaptation and open logics are brought together in this project. They also mimic key aspects of the adaptation process that frustrate soldiers namely, weaknesses, in design—particularly unnecessary complexities given their lack of time to learn and adjust. Simpler technologies got modified as soldiers taught each other solutions; while complex technologies got handed off to specialists if there were any around. Military weapons producers embedded employees with soldiers to teach units but also learned about exactly how the practices might improve later designs. The adaptation process is about connections across and upward; machine design largely determines what is rejected, adjusted, and incorporated into practice.
200 Hippel, The Sources of Innovation.
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Model of Permissive Advantages Disadvantages Innovation condition
IPR Logic Protection Favors a top-down model of Slow production of new of production using market pathways. concepts or solutions Individual/ firm right to Strong in big projects requiring Fails to meet niche user needs if monopoly massive investment and research there’s no strong profit motive Information asymmetric: producers cannot see the entire range of potential solutions available to the user
Open Openness of Favors a horizontal diffusion across Needs relevant engaged Source/Design architecture users and sometimes from the community Logic to user bottom up Requires centralized Rapid production of potential coordination for diffusion (the solutions innovation paradox)
Niche needs are addressed Difficult to diffuse upward immediately
Pulls from across the entire range of user perspective
Table 1: Innovation Models
Given that open source logic for innovation provides a better intuition for the field level environment, the remainder of this chapter introduces the three potential causal dimensions and their interactions in terms of the adaptation process and prospects for major military innovation.
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Machine Design and the User: The First Causal Dimension
Machines can be designed in one of two ways: open and black boxed. Open designs permit users access to their building blocks. Closed designs, the black boxes constrain access to their architecture thereby making it opaque to the user.201
Producers interested in maintaining their monopoly on rents can, and do, construct technologies so that their components are not easily tinkered with. This technique not only protects rents but it also protects ideas. Black boxing is used to help cutting edge technologies stay within the hands of their creators and out of the hands of their competitors.202 It protects on two fronts, it extends the profit protection and it protects ideas from duplication outright. This is particularly salient in a national security context where the protection of profits is often secondary to the protection of design.
Wartime technological adaptation and open logics are simple to link together conceptually but are more complicated in application. Open or closed is not a dichotomous measure. Openness and closedness are ideal types—two opposite ends of a spectrum of permissiveness. Instinctively the relationship feels straightforward. Some degree of machine openness increases the instances of technological adaptation, but refinements are needed. For most young, non-technically trained soldiers living under wartime constraints, completely open and completely closed technologies look roughly
201 See for example: Karlsson, Nellore, and Soderquist, "Black Box Engineering: Redefining the Role of Product Specifications." 202 Kevin Curtis, "Core Proliferation: Security and Protection Issues with Ip Integration," Electronic Design 46, no. 1 (1998).
74 the same: they require specialized knowledge (welding, electrical, computer languages, html savvy) and huge time commitments. In this sense permissiveness is not the same as ease of adaptation for the average soldier.
While black-boxing rejects adaptation and openness invites it, neither end of the spectrum is suitable for the majority of users because most lack the know-how to tinker with technology.203 This is why design is so important at the field level. The task of the engineer is to design within the range of open logics—to balance between inviting adaptation while controlling for the number of users who can actually do it. As we go from simple technologies like tactical belts and assault rifles to complex electronic ones like Predator drones, the importance of designing for the user is increasingly pronounced. The more electronically complex and interdependent the technologies, the harder it is for soldiers to adapt no matter how open the system because they simply do not have the time and resources to dedicate to thoroughly adapting.
By this logic then, the peak adaptation potential for the largest number of non- technologically savvy users sits somewhere between an open and closed design rather than the extreme end of the spectrum of complete openness. There are terms for these middle-range designs. Design options in the real world manifest themselves in two forms: modularity and toolkit s.
203 von Hippel, Erik "Perspective: User Toolkits for Innovation."
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Toolkits: One can think of toolkits like plastic toy Legos. Along the spectrum of open to closed, toolkits are closer to a fully open logic than modular technologies.
There are a myriad of parts that are easily connected together and reassembled into entirely new objects. The pieces themselves, do not ask the user to create plastic or even make squares. The pieces are prepared to be connected in somewhat constrained but simple ways to come up with brand new functions and shapes. 204 The kit eliminates the need for users to learn highly specialized knowledge to contribute their insights. The most commonly recognizable toolkits are those that come from the smart-phone industry. Smart-phone builders invite user tinkering by providing programs that help users build their own ‘apps’ or applications. These apps most commonly help users deal with the massive amount of information that the web makes available.205 User designed apps literally alter the way in which cellular telephone technologies are used. The user is in control of creating the new capabilities though not the device itself. The Army takes app building very seriously. While deployed to Iraq
Spc. Nicholas Johnson created an app for his smart phone that kept track of local inhabitants while he was on patrol. The data he collected and became a local census.206
The Army has since called upon Johnson to develop more apps for military applications.
Last year Captain John Springer, an artillery specialist, developed a terrain mapping app
204 User toolkits are especially important for distributed environments of collaboration in engineering. See: Maxfield, Fernando, and Dew, "A Distributed Virtual Environment for Collaborative Engineering." 205 Pg 8 Larry Downes and Chunka Mui, Unleashing the Killer App : Digital Strategies for Market Dominance (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1998). 206 Sgt. Sinthia Rosario, "Soldier Creates Smart Phone Apps," U.S. Army News (2011), http://www.army.mil/article/61628/.
76 for the iPhone designed for soldiers on the move in hostile areas.207 In 2010, the Naval
Postgraduate School assisted a pair of soldiers (one from the Marines and another from the Army) in developing FIST (Field Information Support Tool), a field program that eschews over 40 pounds of data collection machines into a single application carried on the soldier’s smart phone.208 Smart phones are not the only technologies to employ toolkits but it is a burgeoning field for users who have ideas about how to manage data.
Modularity: Slightly less open is the concept of modularity. Rather than inviting soldiers to create new objects entirely, modular systems come as a set of interchangeable parts. Modularity is like the children’s toy Mr. Potatohead. All of basic components are there: the eyes, the noses, different mouths, hats, etc. All the parts fit onto a universal base, but there are no constraints regarding which nose, which mouth, or hat should be combined. The hat, the tie, the mouths, can be switched out to produce varying Potatoheads, while the foundation remains—it is a version of the original head with a different theme. Modular designs are particularly salient for the robotics industry.209 Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams are very familiar with modular ground robots. Explosive devices come in varying forms (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) with varying triggers (wire, timer, pressure, heat). It would
207 Kyana Gordon, "Tracking the Taliban? Soldier Develops and App to Do Just That," PSFK (2011). 208 Barbara Honegger, "Student-Developed Smart Phone App Maps the “Human Terrain” " NPS News, http://www.nps.edu/About/News/Student-Developed-Smart-Phone-App-Maps-the-Human-Terrain.html. 209 For examples of the utility of modular systems see: P. Barbaroux and T. Le Texier, Managing Knowledge within Military Open Source Software (Moss) Projects, ed. D. Remenyi, Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Intellectual Capital, Knowledge Management and Organisational Learning (2007), Sandra I. Erwin, "Future Tactical Truck to Expedite Transportation: Army Garnering Support for What Could Be a $3 Billion Vehicle Program by 2006," National Defense 87, no. 590 (2003).
77 make no sense to arm a robot with every device available. Users need different kinds of sensors and grippers based on the kind of mine or explosive they are dealing with.210
For the iRobot’s Talon or CSIP’s Chameleon UGV (unmanned ground vehicle) and others like it, the manufacturers have even identified sets of sub-assemblies that are more likely to be used on certain types of missions (reconnaissance, explosive ordnance detonation, search and rescue, etc…).211 The producer arranges those components into a grouping for easier selection by the squad leader. An IED package might include articulating hands, close and high resolution cameras, tracked feet, and listening devices.212 Alternately, a reconnaissance package might contain include a quieter propulsion system, a lower profile, and a long range head sensing camera.213
Modularity and toolkits sit in the middle range of open and closed design in terms of user adaptability. They are intentionally designed for re-fitting by users who do not have the knowledge base necessary to work on the higher functions of the machine but need flexibility in their technology.
210 Liu and Zhang Minglu Xuan, "Methods to Modular Robot Design," in Intelligent Information Technology Application (Shanghai: IITA, 2009). 211 CSIP, "Modular Robot for Eod, Cbrne Sampling, Reconnaissance or Laboratory Use," Defense File, no. 3/29/2010 (2010), http://www.defensefile.com/Customisation/News/Weapons_Ammunition_and_Explosives/Explosive_Ord nance_Disposal/Modular_Robot_For_EOD_CBRNE_Sampling_Reconnaissance_or_Laboratory_Use.asp. 212 C. Davenport et al., "Inexpensive Semi-Autonomous Ground Vehicles for Defuzing Ieds," Proc SPIE Int Soc Opt Eng Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering 6943 (2008). 213 Robert Bogue, "Detecting Mines and Ieds: What Are the Prospects for Robots?," Industrial Robot: An International Journal 38, no. 5.
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Figure 1: Range of Open and Black-Box Designs
Reducing the learning curve and making battlefield technologies more flexible matters—design matters. The largest UAV Global Hawk frustrated its early users because they couldn’t change its flight pattern on missions.214 A standard issue assault rifle is black. Under the Iraqi sun that makes it nearly untouchable without gloves (many soldiers acquired paint to solve that problem).215 As one Colonel told me, “we’ve got con-exes [giant metal storage bins] full of technology we don’t use. We don’t know how to use them.”216 Design matters for adaptation. Failure to consider the user and to design for their input threatens the viability of having cutting edge technologies. All the
214 Interview Dr. Tim Chung Naval Postgraduate School June 2011 215 Interview #13 SF December 2011 216 Interview #25 January 3, 2012.
79 research and development, money, and potential power in the world means nothing if the soldiers can’t use it in the context of battle.
Two Types of Linkages: The Horizontal and the Vertical
Machine design matters for initiation of the adaptation process but not in isolation—solutions must diffuse to complete the process. As innovation processes initiate and diffuse, they follow paths upward and across the theater of battle. Linkages are the lump sum of interactions between people, both formal and informal, passive
(like reading the newspaper) or active (like phone conversations).
The Horizontal Linkages
Traditionally, we think of horizontal linkages chiefly in terms of communications in battle. Horizontal linkages permit field commanders to move infantry units, call in air support, and muster aid to the injured simultaneously. These are the formalized horizontal communications through which lessons learned and casualty counts are assessed. The products of these formal links are the documents of war, the formal reports written and compiled for record.217 But horizontal linkages also reach beyond the formalized communications of officers. The chief interaction across the horizon in adaptation includes informal ones. These linkages are formed informally at physical points of coalescence; forward operating bases where soldiers en
217 Pamela S. Chasek, "The Convention to Combat Desertification: Lessons Learned for Sustainable Development," Journal of Environment and Development 6, no. 2 (1997), Adjutant General's Office, "Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck)," ed. Army (Washington DC: 1970).
80 route from one place to another have an opportunity to rest, share eating spaces in chow halls or even web sites and emails between soldiers and their worlds at home.
They are the locations and means of casual conversation where stories are shared and chance interactions among soldiers take place. The spaces in bunks and operations centers where lore gets passed around; stories about harrowing survival, great practical jokes, and home. The informal communities are crucial for adaptation. This is partially because of the need for material resources. Effective adapters are extremely skilled at working the horizon—working with the actors in the field—because in a moment of need the vertical supply chain takes too long. Hillbilly armor, the field adaptation of the thin-skinned HMMWV, was the product of informal horizontal linkages.218 The
Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio system (MBITRS) was invented in the field by a group of electronically savvy Special Operations soldiers who knew a guy that knew a guy who could fix stuff.219
Linkages permit the transfer of material objects. Machines change hands— sometimes against regulation. Soldiers indicated “losing” their technology when they crossed paths with soldiers who were ill-equipped for the battlefield. More often than not, if soldiers have unmet technological needs, horizontal linkages permit an expedient solution. This works for fixing or modifying technology too. Soldiers hand their radios, guns, even vehicles to local tinkerers who adapt them. Savvy field commanders
218 Michael Hirsh, John Barry, and Babak Dehghanpisheh, "Military: The Pentagon's Hillbilly Armor' Problem," Newsweek. (2004). 219 Interview #27 January 2012
81 invariably know the go-to “tech guys” or “some mechanic” on the forward operating base (FOB) who will provide all sorts of technological modifications.220 The horizon is important for user innovation. Since innovation’s ultimate endpoint is incorporation into practice the horizon may be sufficient and perhaps faster than formalized vertical paths—the “up the ladder and down again” may be the longer and less efficient route to innovation.221
Vertical Linkages
Vertical communications are generally formalized pathways upward and downward. They keep generals apprised of the overall campaign; the success or failure of specific engagements; and assessments of the viability of the current strategy.
Communication downward permits war planners to make adjustments in a campaign.
Vertical linkages piggyback on those formalized information flows upward and downward in field reports and requests for adjustments to supply. Vertical linkages can also be the informal connections between field users of technology and the producer, or they can be communiqués from the field to offices within the organization. The presence of vertical linkages to the producer can permit the free-flow of field technological adaptations upward, allowing for formalized top-down production.
220 Subject interview June 6, 2011 221 The literature on informal networks, nodes, and communications speaks directly to this causal dimension and plays a strong part in the overall success of the initiated technological adaptation both through communication, as well as through physical transfer of machinery from the expert to those who will use the technology. For examples outside military affairs see: D. Krackhardt and J. R. Hanson, "Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart," Harvard Business Review 71, no. 4 (1993), N. C. Mullins, "The Distribution of Social and Cultural Properties in Informal Communication Networks among Biological Scientists," American sociological review 33, no. 5 (1968).
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Vertical linkages are increasingly essential to research and technological development because direct linkages between user and producer help the producer see the battlefield more clearly. 222
Vertical linkages also permit adjudication over multiple solutions created in the field. If there are several solutions to a particular gap in capabilities on the battlefield the vertical linkage can collect those solutions, permitting selection of the best adaptations. Such adjudication over better or worse solutions yields formalized tactical manuals and more suitable technologies. In 2004, we saw this transition in Senator
Duncan Hunter’s up-armoring movement. The field expedient measure for thin- skinned HMMVW was to weld scavenged metal to the sides of the vehicle. Once information travelled upward about the fatalities and casualties, a formalized technology replaced the field-generated adaptation.223 The aforementioned MBITRS project also took the field adaptations and formalized them into an industry-produced battlefield technology.224
Interactions Among the Causal Dimensions
222 "User Feedback Causing: Selex Galileo to Adjust Its Plans for the Falco Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle," AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY 170, no. 8 (2009). 223 Grace Jean, "Troop Carriers: Combat Vehicle Designs Seek Increased Utility in Multiple Roles.(Armored Vehicles)," National Defense 91, no. 635 (2006). 224 For more on the formalized solution see pg 21 Peter Donaldson, ed., Digital Battlespace Handbook 2007-08, Digital Battlespace Handbook (Berkshire: Shepard Press, 2007).
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The interaction among the dimensions is complicated. Nowhere in an organized military can a pure case of horizontal or vertical linkages be found.225 There will always be some element of both. Likewise, purely closed or open technologies are ideal forms rarely found on the battlefield. Taking each dimension independently, some potential conclusions appear logical. First, since successful field-level adaptation requires creation and use across the battlefield, horizontal linkages logically serve as an intervening variable in the spread of technological adaptations—in horizontal diffusion. This leads to an unsurprisingly straightforward claim that in the presence of strong horizontal linkages, field-level technological adaptations become more likely. Second, since successful major military innovation requires the alignment of the adaptation process with grand design, strong vertical linkages make major military innovation more likely— again another unsurprising claim.
But the relationship between field-level adaptation and linkages is more complicated than this. Weak linkages along either dimension cannot eliminate the necessity of adapting this is because avoidance of adaptation at the field level is directly linked to survival. The quest for victory and survival fuse the horizontal and the vertical together for soldiers. Given the nature of war on the battlefield horizontal linkages adjust in response vertical linkages and—given a responsible leadership—vice versa. It is a give and take. Fewer robust vertical linkages create the necessity for good horizontal
225 Potential research in terrorist cells and field-level adaptation may provide more data about adaptation in purely horizontal and vertical environments. Given that cells often operate in complete isolation from other organizations (purely vertical linkages), and that insurgent organizations often have no vertical component (purely horizontal linkages) the potential for more insights might reveal itself.
84 ones. This is because communication and resources come from above; if vertical linkages fail to provide, survival and victory dictate that horizontal linkages must expand to fill that gap or you have a failure to adapt.
Alternately, strong horizontal linkages reduce dependence upon vertical links if they are more efficient as a source of solutions. But independence from the vertical means that successful adaptation may not produce a major military innovation.
Effective field-level adaptations that are completely independent from other levels of military organization may even obscure the fact that a problem exists.
In sum, the give and take between the vertical and horizontal means that direct connections between the producer and military leaders to the field level can provide effective direction and resources needed for successful adaptation but absent these linkages, soldiers will find their own solutions from across the horizon of the battlefield.
Likewise the presence of strong vertical linkages increases the likelihood of a major military innovation. Without those strong vertical linkages, even under a successful field level technological adaptation, nothing may be incorporated into practice for the long term.
To these initial insights we add the third dimension: machine design. In a time of war, the adaptation process is made more or less effective by designing machines oriented to the user: modular or toolkit. These design features of technology are better suited to each kind of linkage—one requires more vertical oversight, the other more horizontal assistance.
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Toolkits, being more open in design, provide fewer constraints on soldier creativity. Fewer constraints on soldier initiatives means a multiplicity of solutions— each suited to their own particular environment. Because no two soldiers working independently have the same perspective on what constitutes the right solution, toolkits require vertical linkages to ensure two things: 1. that does not violate limitations on conduct, and 2. that centralized adjudication occurs over better and worse solutions.
First, in terms of limitations on conduct, too much openness requires oversight— lest soldiers produce solutions that surpass established rules of engagement or laws of war (like building a giant robotic bomb in the middle of Baghdad). User toolkits give soldiers the freedom to create context-specific solutions to their environment, but those solutions must be kept in line with the military’s limits on the conduct of war. Second, machines designed with user toolkits and stronger vertical linkages are more beneficial to technological adaptation than strong horizontal linkages because the organization has a bird’s eye view of the battlefield. Because of this position—in keeping with the innovation paradox—the upper echelon is best positioned to collect and analyze field- level adaptations to decide which are consistent with the overall strategy of campaign and perhaps suggest even better solutions. Weak vertical linkages in the presence of toolkits risk the loss of ingenious solutions and practices that should inform doctrine.
With modular systems, the vertical isn’t as important as the horizontal. Since the range of potential solutions is already constrained to a system of mix and match
86 components, it is more important to communicate the most successful packages across the battlefield. Soldiers learn which components work best together for the current theater of war—information that may be useful to the producer, but more crucial for soldiers to share with one another. In the presence of machines that are designed for modularity, horizontal linkages are more beneficial to field-level technological adaptation. The relative number of combinations to the modular machine may be of less use to the vertical production of the machine since the modularity already implies a certain finite set of solutions for which there may be little overall production value.
Summary
Open source logics may provide the clearest path forward when it comes to understanding technological adaptation at the field level.226 Technological adaptation is everywhere, but so commonly practiced that it goes virtually unnoticed as the efforts of thousands of soldiers providing their own solutions to immediate problems. The perspective challenges the foundational theorizing about stagnant actors in organizations vying for resource pie slices. It turns against intra-service and inter-service rivalry explanations under the demands of direct problem-solving and collaborative behavior. But most importantly it adds new actors—field grunts, new dimensions—the battlefield horizon, and new logics—open source to theorizing about innovation.
226 As defined in Grissom’s summary of the literature. See: Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies."
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In the chapters to follow I trace the history of two nearly identical field-level technological adaptations; the gun truck in Vietnam, and the gun truck in Iraq. The first is a case of a failure of major military innovation that began as a successful adaptation process. The second case demonstrates the success of a major military innovation that began as a failed adaptation process. The final empirical chapter analyzes machine design aspects currently in use in the modern battlefield. I suggest that in doing so the Department of Defense is steadily formalizing its acquisition of user- centered machines and the discourse of user-adaptation as a central variable in its calculation of power. The final chapter summarizes the insights and potential routes for testing and research of the project.
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Chapter 4: From Failure to Adaptation—Vietnam Gun Trucks
The next two chapters center on the creation of the gun truck and its associated tactical concepts. I trace two separate instances of the evolution of the gun truck and the hardened convoy concept through two theaters of war. 227 I treat the cases as separate instances of field-level adaptation despite their nearly identical development and conditions.
The first case follows the cycle of adaptation initiated in Vietnam on route QL19 in September 1967 and terminates with the departure of U.S. forces in 1972. The second case, in the following chapter, initiates in late 2003-2004 during Operation Iraqi
Freedom and effectively terminates in 2007. The two cases of field level technological adaptation highlight the interactions and complexity of horizontal and vertical linkages on a single technological frame—the gun truck. Both cases begin with the recognition of convoy vulnerability in a guerilla or counterinsurgent environment.
A gun truck is most simply defined as an armored offensive vehicle created for the defense of a convoy.228 At the outset of both Vietnam and Operation Iraqi Freedom
227 Steven Rosen and Walter Jones, The Logic of International Relations (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, 1974). 228 The title of gun truck can be expanded to any armored vehicle utilized for aggressive posture or force protection. This contributes to some degree of confusion since there were many instances of soldier modification of vehicles for defense. This project uses the term gun truck to refer to the vehicles embedded in a convoy for convoy protection specifically, operated by the transportation soldiers and
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(OIF) the Army had no dedicated technology identified in doctrine for convoy self- defense. Transportation units were left to figure out how to solve the vulnerability gaps.
An initiative sponsored by soldiers as a “field expedient measure.”229 The two cases appear nearly identical in the early stages but differed along the horizontal and vertical components of innovation as well as overall outcomes for major organizational change.
Following a narrative of each instance of adaptation (first Vietnam then Iraq) I provide an analysis of the linkages both vertical and horizontal and its interaction with machine design. Neither case represents a pure case of failed technological adaptation, but the diffusion process is markedly different and so too were the changes in overall outcomes for the Army on a grand scale. Following the conclusion of the second gun truck case I provide a cross-case analysis that explores this aspect. In that analysis I ask whether the absence of strong vertical linkages co-varies with the failure of major military innovation.
What is Transportation?
In order to understand the gun truck one needs to understand Combat Service
Support or CSS. Contrary to public perception, all soldiers are not intended to be combat fighters. A scant few, in fact, are actually intended to fulfill those objectives as a
used in conjunction with ‘hardened convoy’ tactics which involves the protection of convoy vehicles through the adoption of an aggressive posture. 229 The ‘field expedient measure’ is the general term for the kinds of tinkering that soldiers do with technology.
90 primary function.230 Rather, they provide services to those in combat—they “arm, fuel, fix, and move the force”.231 Although CSS troops bear the slightly less-than-sexy slogan of the “spearhead of logistics” there is truth in the aphorism that “amateurs talk about strategy, but professionals talk about logistics.”232 Nevertheless, to those who are enamored of combat infantry and frontline fighting CSS sounds more like “first station wagon to the grocery store.” But CSS are the pit crews in a time of war they make it possible to fight. Within CSS is embodied the task of transportation—moving objects from point A to point B. Army Transportation is staffed by the men233 who move those supplies by sea and land by trucks and boats. Transportation soldiers operate in the theater of war, but are not trained as combat fighters. Nevertheless, without the
Transportation Corps there are no guns or ammo with which to fight, no food or fuel to provide energy, and no medical supplies with which to heal.
230 Soldiers trained to engage in combat have additional training and qualifications that make it possible for them to do so. They are referred to often as the teeth of the force. All other forces that work to support those teeth are referred to as the tail. This produces a figure often called the tooth to tail ratio—the number of troops that work to support and sustain the combat troops and the overall strategic effort. Currently the tooth to tail sits at around 1:4 depending on what we want to call tooth. In a counterinsurgent or non-conventional environment obviously those who have trained for combat aren’t the only soldiers who will engage in it. For more on tooth to tail see: John J. McGrath, The Other End of the Spear: The Toothto-Tail Ratio (T3r) in Modern Military Operations, ed. CSI, vol. Occasional Paper 23, The Long War Series (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007). 231 For more on logistics and the role of CSS see: John J. McGrath, The Other End of the Spear: The Toothto-Tail Ratio (T3r) in Modern Military Operations, ed. CSI, vol. Occasional Paper 23, The Long War Series (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007). 232 This has been attributed to General Omar Bradley 233 At this point in Vietnam transportation units were staffed by men entirely. Once we move forward to Iraq women become part of transportation and out of it arises the Jessica Lynch case. She was caught up in a convoy ambush that was broadly publicized as she was taken prisoner. See: U.S. ARMY, "Us Army Official Report on 507th Maintenance Co.: An Nasiriyah, Iraq," (US Army, 2003).
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Obviously, while Transportation corps’ primary measure of success is measured in hauled tonnage, transportation soldiers aren’t immune to the danger of the battlefield. Depending on the character of the battlespace the risks and challenges for transportation changes. Any theater of conflict in which the occupying force lacks a secure rear area consistent supply lines are crucial to force sustainment. This aspect of defense was left out of preparations for the soldiers of transportation. It was only a matter of time before the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) recognized the soft spot in the armor. U.S. combat soldiers didn’t have to be fought head on—you could bleed them dry because transportation was unprotected.234 This was the context of Vietnam that transportation units tasked themselves with adapting to. The result was the gun truck.
Vietnam and the 8th Transportation Group
8th Transportation Group arrived in Vietnam on October 19, 1966. The 8th was responsible for line haul motor transport out of Qui Nohn.235 Line haul meant they moved supplies from sea port to inland base by truck. There were two other transportation groups responsible for motor transport in addition to the 8th—the 48th and the 500th (each group was made up of a several battalions of roughly 40 to 55
234As General Sheridan charged with controlling the Native American Indians observed: if you destroyed the commissary the ability to wield power shriveled up under resource scarcity. Observations about the necessity of logistic supply obviously pre-date Sheridan. Nevertheless his memoirs are insightful. See: Philip Henry Sheridan and Michael V. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of Philip Henry Sheridan, General, United States Army : With an Account of His Life from 1871 to His Death, in 1888 (New York: Appleton, 1904). 235 The 8th’s headquarters were moved to Da Nang in 1970. Pg 222 Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, Updated and reprinted. ed. (Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus Reprint, 1986).
92 solders each).236 Under the 8th Transportation group were the members of the 27th,
54th, and 124th Transportation Battalions.237 All were classified as Motor Transport and were supplied with various cargo trucks of light medium and heavy duty. Each of the battalions served for differing years in Vietnam 65-72, 66-70, and 67-71 respectively.238
The history of the gun truck and the beginning of our adaptation cycle, by most records, begins here with the 8th; specifically the 54th Transportation Battalion early in
September 1967.
Eight miles off the An Khe Pass headed east against the backdrop of the
Vietnamese landscape, a convoy of “deuce-and-a-half” cargo trucks bumps slowly along the road. 239 These slogging behemoths are run by the 8th Transportation group 54th
Transport Battalion.240 The east-west supply route from the port of Qui Nohn to Pleiku is about 80 miles as the crow flies, but there are no crows in Vietnam.241 There is no
236 The record of the companies within each battalion and battalions in each group are recorded in a war’s order of battle. The order of battle for Vietnam in the 500th Group had two battalions the 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck) and the 39th. The companies assigned to each battalion were selected based on the kinds of equipment they contained. The 36th Transportation Battalion: 442nd Transportation Company (Medium) 515th Transportation Company (Light)529th Transportation Company (Light) 670th Transportation Company (Medium)32nd Transportation Platoon (Reefer Truck) and the 39th Transportation Battalion: 63rd Transportation Company (Light) 585th Transportation Company (Medium) 630 Transportation Company (Medium) 863rd Transportation Company (Medium). 237 See Appendix B for units assigned to each battalion. 238Richard Killblane, "U.S. Army Transportation Museum," U.S. Army, http://www.transchool.lee.army.mil/museum/transportation%20museum/OB.htm. 239 The “deuce-and-a-half” is generally a reference to the M35 cargo truck. Also referred to as a 2.5 ton cargo truck. The 2.5 tons refers to the maximum payload of the truck off road in short rather than metric tons (2000lbs per ton). At 2.5 tons, these trucks were dwarfed only by the 5 ton cargo trucks. Both were supplied to the transportation groups in Vietnam. 240 Richard Killblane, "Circle the Wagons: The History of U.S. Army Convoy Security," Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 13 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005). 241 Though intended as a metaphor, there actually are indeed no crows in Vietnam, or Southeast Asia for that matter.
93 direct route here—this is transportation highway QL-19, a roadway whose serpentine path is only the first of its challenges. It is September 2nd 1967, early in the U.S. ground war campaign in Vietnam. Early enough that the road engineers haven’t dealt with the problems this path will cause. Route 19 is only partially paved. It is a winding, often single-lane route pocked with potholes, and lacking in shoulders. Some of the road damage is the weather’s fault, but the rest is the work of Viet Cong enemy sappers setting roadside explosives.242 On the horizon, the trucks approach An Khe, the middle point between Qui Nhon and Pleiku. They ramble along cautious but unaware that an adaptation process is about to begin.
The men of the 54th are slogging home their transport trucks are already emptied of their cargo. They preferred to press on earlier that day to return home rather than “RON”—remain overnight—at Qui Nohn. Round trips were not uncommon for supply convoys. Since the metric for success among transportation units was weighed in tonnage delivered RON was less desirable. Owing to this the men of the 54th press on despite the fact that Viet Cong (VC) harassment of convoys has picked up in frequency of late. Moreover, on the return trip if anything slowed them they would be travelling at night when roadside bombs and enemy positions become nearly undetectable.
242 Historical reports indicate that the NVA were less involved in small scale convoy attacks. See: Chapter 1 of Gordon L. Rottman, Vietnam Gun Trucks (Oxford; Long Island City: Osprey Pub Co., 2011).
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Leading the 8th Transport group vehicles is its lead jeep armed with an automatic weapon. Following this are deuce-and-a-half cargo trucks, 5 ton trucks, and fuel tankers.
As they approach the hairpin curves of An Khe Pass tensions increase. Somewhere in the middle of the lineup a fuel tanker struggles with engine trouble. Inevitably the struggling tanker causes a lag in the line, lengthening the convoy over longer and longer stretches of road. Without a solution, the lead trucks drive on and eventually sever the line; Half the convoy stalls out to remain with the tanker while the remainder moves on toward home.243
As the gap between the two halves widens chatter kicks up over the radio between the convoy’s two protection units (the jeeps) now hopelessly separated—one at the lead and one at the rear—they’re ripe for an ambush and both protection units know it.244 It isn’t as if the jeeps are unarmed. In fact, each jeep sports a ‘pig’—a formidable fully-automatic M-60 machine gun.245 The operators know, however, that the guns work most effectively in tandem. Suppression of attack is more effective in twos especially if one of the guns jams, needs reloading, or is temporarily disabled
(which happens often).
The invitation to adapt is all too often written in the ink of tragedy—the ambush comes as feared, and it plays out as devastatingly as one would fear. At 4:55pm, the
243 Timothy J. Kutta, Gun Trucks, Vietnam Studies Grou (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc., 1996). 244 8th Transportation Gp Vietnam Website 245 The formal name of the M-60 is literally the United States Machine Gun.
95 loud crack of fire comes from ahead. The lead gun jeep shudders from the impact of the first strike as a 57mm recoilless rifle round—a massive piece of metal—rips through the vehicle spraying slag and chunks of steel throughout the vehicle.246 Sergeant Leroy
Collins, the passenger in the jeep, takes a direct hit and is killed instantly. The driver and machine gunner are both severely wounded by the shrapnel from the round bursting through the jeep. One man dead and two wounded—the ambush is just warming up.
VC fighters emerge from the tree-line firing both semi-automatic and fully automatic weapons into the side of the front half of the convoy. Drivers in both halves of the convoy exit their vehicles and attempt to return fire. A halted convoy in the middle of a kill zone is already bad news, but a virtually unarmed convoy that is tactically unprepared to defend themselves against a coordinated assault begged disaster. They were effectively lone men poorly armed and vulnerable outside their stalled vehicles—there were no odds worth calculating, just a dead count. When back- up arrived (the MPs) the enemy had already destroyed the majority of the convoy. The
September 2nd ambush resulted in 26 casualties with 7 dead and 19 injured. 12 cargo trucks were completely destroyed, and 18 severely damaged.247 The ambush was
246 For those unfamiliar with the weapon that fires these rounds, the recoilless is the predecessor to the M18 (the rifle itself) is no squirrel hunting tool. Rather, it looks more like a shoulder-mounted 3 inch steel pipe and is easily mistaken for its cousin, the bazooka. Perhaps more telling of the potential for destruction is the fact that the M18 is generally used as an antitank weapon. The average HEAT or high explosive anti-tank round weighs more than five pounds and is approximately… in length. 247 Col. Joseph Bellino, "The Bellino Report," (1970).
96 highly successful, out of 37 vehicles on the road that day, 30 were destroyed or incapacitated.248 Official reports indicate no casualties for the opposition.249
The ambushes increase in frequency and coordination for months but the story changes for the 8th Transportation Group. It is early December (not much more than four months have passed). Adjustments and experiments, refinements and tests are underway.
8:15am on December 4th a convoy approaches from the east. The 54th
Transportation Battalion is on its way down route 19 when Specialist Harold Cummings brings his vehicle to a stop. Cummings is leading 69 trucks in total (nearly double the
September 2nd attack). As they bumble their way along the still pothole-pocked passes of route QL 19 just outside An Khe the driver turns the corner as the VC sappers detonate a hidden mine to halt the convoy. Cummings spies a plank being drawn across the road also rigged with high explosive. The plank will be detonated the moment a truck drives over it. Cummings is aboard the lead vehicle and he pauses to determine his course of action; it will be an ambush.250
A recoilless rifle round bursts through the truck windshield, killing Cummings instantly. The call goes out: “Contact, contact, contact!” Signals are immediately sent to helicopter gunship support teams to come to the rescue but it will be some time until they arrive. The VC company emerges from the ditches and orients its attack to the
248 Richard Killblane, Interview by Telephone, January 14th 2012. 249 Bellino, "The Bellino Report." 250 Pg 29. Richard Killblane, "Circle the Wagons: The History of U.S. Army Convoy Security," Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 13 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005).
97 center of the convoy creating a massive 3,000 meter kill zone, far longer than even the
September 2nd attack.251 The objective for the VC is straightforward, halt the convoy and destroy all the vehicles. Each VC soldier carries satchel charges (small explosives) for this purpose. After the convoy is stopped they will destroy each vehicle one by one by coming in close and lobbing a charge into the cab or into the engine.252
The difference this time is in technology and tactic. His deuce-and-a-half has been adapted.253 Specialist Cummings is leading a ‘hardened’ convoy. His truck, the
Grim Reaper, is recently reinforced with 1/4 inch steel plates; hyper-armed with 50 caliber weapons; supplemented by additional machine guns; manned with crews who can run those weapons; and practiced in a new set of tactics.254 Though wounded, the remaining three soldiers set about to activate their new operating procedures. While
Lieutenant Todd fires rounds off the front of his jeep, Giroux, Foster, and Belcastro use his cover to start up the crew-served weapons on the gun truck and return fire. They are called crew-served weapons for a reason: one man to shoot and the remainder to reload and resupply.
But unlike prior attacks, the convoy does not stop. It moves forward at all cost.
Trucks force inoperative trucks to the side of the road. They collect the men inside and flee the kill zone. With enough firepower to deliver a curtain of metal rounds in excess
251 Ralph Grambo, "Atav Guntrucks," http://grambo.us/atav/gunpictures.htm. 252 Kutta, Gun Trucks.pg 3. 253 A deuce-and-a-half is the term used to refer to 2.5 ton cargo trucks generically. The specific military models being used in Vietnam at that point are formally identified as the M35. See page 30 Rottman, Vietnam Gun Trucks. 254 Dennis Belcastro, "54th Transportation Battalion," http://grambo.us/belcastro/54guntruck.htm.
98 of 25,000, the offensive stance of the vehicle holds the attackers at bay. Unable to penetrate the perimeter of the gun truck, the VC satchel charges are useless.255 The enemy retreats and the gun truck crews go in pursuit. The convoy suffers little more than flattened tires and a few burnt-out engines. Back-up helicopter gunships arrive to find the ambush broken and the bulk of the convoy intact.
The resultant tallies for the ambush differed significantly from the September
2ndambush; one KIA and four casualties. Enemy losses were greater; thirteen killed and one captured. While death in any measure is lamentable the technological and tactical shifts devised by the 8th was a welcome change. The armored and heavily armed trucks developed in the field by the 8th Transportation Group out were the adaptive response.
Field Level Technological Adaptation
The creation of the gun truck in Vietnam is a study in resourcefulness and the relationship between tactics and technology. Evolving in tandem with the gun truck was a set of tactical procedures dubbed the “hardened convoy concept.” Bullet-resistant, heavily armed trucks created a change in how motor transport operated. Technology enabled new tactics, and new tactics drove refinements in technology. Increased armor on an escort truck meant expanded capabilities—the offensive kind—and with the ability to go on the offensive, crews became more skilled at handling heavy ambushes.
255 Timothy J. Kutta, Gun Trucks, Vietnam Studies Grou (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc., 1996).
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Skills and tactics mastered meant greater demand was placed on protection and firepower.
The trucks of transportation’s motor pool were the foundation for the technological shift. They needed to be armored and armed to provide “organic” convoy protection.256 Four types of basic vehicles were issued to motor transport: Jeeps (1/4 ton task vehicles), ¾ ton vehicles, deuce-and-a-halfs, and 5 ton trucks.257 There were additional vehicles like tankers for carrying fuel, trailers, and other associated heavy trucks, but the majority of the adaptations occurred using these first four types of vehicles.
With trucks as their base the transportation battalions sought solutions to small arms fire, enemy ambush and roadside bombs by tinkering with the truck bodies— armoring them. The welding and basic carpentry skills necessary to tinker with their trucks was readily available. While transportation groups were staffed with mechanics who maintained their trucks it wasn’t uncommon for truck crews to work on their own vehicles.258 Most motor transport soldiers were pulled directly from their jobs as
256 The reference to organic refers to anything that the Group has issued to it as a matter of Army record. If something is organic it is original and issued to the unit for operations. For most commanders the confusion over the gun trucks of Transportation Corps was over whether gun trucks would be organic to the units or if the military police (MP’s) should provide the escort. 257 Richard Killblane, "U.S. Army Transportation Museum," U.S. Army, http://www.transchool.lee.army.mil/museum/transportation%20museum/OB.htm. 258 Though truck crews were generally responsible for the condition of their trucks there existed a pool of mechanics whose sole task is to maintain the fleet of vehicles.
100 civilian truck drivers.259 The architecture of the trucks was known and knowable to anyone who wanted to tinker with them but what really made modification possible was that most men in transportation already had experience working on trucks at home.260
Early gun truck modifications consisted of either double-walled lumber with sand bags stuffed between them or single ¼ inch sheet metal. The 36th Transportation
Battalion’s correspondence describes in much detail advantages and disadvantages of the early lumber versions and preferred the metal solution. The sheet metal, however, was in short supply.261 This explains why, even despite the knowledge that lumber/sandbag designs placed undue stress on axles and engines they continued to be built. Sandbags were tolerable for the dry season but monsoon season brought unanticipated complications.262 Water-logged sandbags proved the tipping point for the maximum capacity of engines and axles for all but the five-ton trucks.263 In some cases crews replaced the sandbags with other fillers, but most went on to weld steel plates to
259 “Because of the similarities in military and commercial transportation operations, the transportation corps had a good base of professional knowledge to draw upon. For the most part, transportation personnel sent to Vietnam, both officers and enlisted personnel, had been in the business before.” Pg 157. Joseph M. Heiser and Army United States. Dept. of the, "Logistic Support," Dept. of the Army, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS51773. 260 Pg 157. Joseph M. Heiser and Army United States. Dept. of the, "Logistic Support," Dept. of the Army, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS51773. 261Pg 7 Adjutant General's Office, "Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck)," ed. Army (Washington DC: 1970). 262 Paul S. Gardiner, "Gun Trucks: Genuine Examples of American Ingenuity," Army Logistician, no. August (2003). 263 Pg 24. Killblane, "Circle the Wagons: The History of U.S. Army Convoy Security."
101 the sides of their trucks to replace the wood as supplies became available.264 The evolution generally went from lumber, to steel sheets, and in some cases to pulling the hull from bombed-out armored personnel carriers (APCs) from salvage.265 Likewise the design generally went from single to double walled protection with the metal sheets.
The look of the gun trucks was nothing less than motley—nearly post-apocalyptic. They were, after all, machines built out of things gathered, cobbled, and bartered. Soldiers experimented with designs for bumpers, windshields, and side armor. They even lined the beds of their trucks with full ammunition boxes to serve as protection from improvised explosives.266
Despite the variation across the 8th Transportation Group within about two years the evolution settled into a general agreement; the pill box design.267 The pill box required stripping a bed off an armored personnel vehicle or welding together several steel plates into a box-like shape. There was never a unified blueprint or command for a specific design. Rather it was the result of a broad experimentation process that created a kind of consensus in body design by late 1968.
With increased fragment and small arms protection offensive suppression became even more important. Although gun jeeps had mounts for automatic weapons,
264 There has been some effort to try to classify the evolution of the gun truck into generations but the multiplicity of design and the variation in resources across Vietnam make sorting the trucks into generations extremely problematic. See: 265 Pg 16. Adjutant General's Office, "Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 937th Engineer Group, Period Ending 30 January 1970," ed. Army (Washington: U.S. Army, 1970). 266 Pg 40. James Lyles, The Hard Ride Vietnam Gun Trucks, ed. Planet Art (New York: Planet Art, 2009). 267 Pg 56. James Lyles, The Hard Ride; Vietnam Gun Trucks Part Ii, 1st ed. (2003). See also: Kutta, Gun Trucks.
102 deuce-and-a-halfs and five-ton trucks did not. Ring mounts (literally a ring shaped piece of metal that were necessary to create a full 360 degrees of automatic firepower for the men in the back of the truck. Ring mounts, however, were not available to transportation in ’67.268 Instead soldiers fashioned and rescued pedestal mounts from salvage yards and welded them to the beds of their trucks.269
268Ltc Burke had ordered the ring mounts but it would be several months before they could be sourced and sent to Vietnam. See: 269 Adjutant General's Office, "Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Bg Wallace K. Wittwer, 18th Military Police Brigade & Provost Marshal," ed. Army (Washington 1971).
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Figure 2: The Justifier Three 50 Caliber weapons on pedestal mounts
Figure 3: Ye Olde Warlord Multiple 50 caliber weapons
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When it came to firepower the convoy soldiers often preferred the mini-gun, an automatic gun that could leverage up to 10,000 rounds of 7.62 mm bullets per minute.
The mini-gun was designed for helicopters to fire down on enemy positions. Although crews tended to fire them at the 1000-2000 rate the high pitch buzz was unmistakable and intimidating. An alternate was to mount a “single” or “dual” .50 caliber weapon
(also automatic) known as the M2 to a pedestal.270 The .50 caliber M2 Browning was designed as an anti-aircraft weapon. It fired between 400 and 500 rounds per minute with startling range and accuracy. Finally of significant reputation was the quad 50 (of the same firepower as the M2, but this time in a formation four mounted to a single trigger. (see figure ??) The quads were generally assigned to artillery units and mounted to the beds of five ton trucks for enemy suppression.271 Both the .50 calibers and the mini-guns were sensitive machines that required their own adaptations for use by the truckers. M2 belts often had difficulty in feeding rounds. Soldiers held onto their c- ration cans (the containers in which their food was stored), and mounted them to the side of the gun, under the belt so that it would feed more smoothly.272 When it was all put together, the gun-truck possessed the firepower to lay down an incredible suppressive wall of lead, and had the armor necessary to protect the soldiers inside it.
270 Pg 57. Lyles, The Hard Ride; Vietnam Gun Trucks Part Ii. 271 Pat Costello, "The Thunder Truckers of Mr2," Typhoon V, no. 3 (1971). 272 Lyles, The Hard Ride; Vietnam Gun Trucks Part Ii.
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Figure 4: Ye Olde Warlord Multiple 50 caliber weapons
Figure 5: Mighty Minnie Pedestal mounted helicopter mini-gun
106
Figure 6:The Good, Bad & Ugly 50 Caliber Machine Gun
Figure 7: Corps Revenge after hit from RPG. Modular Armor Kit with Portals.
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Figure 8: Trucks with Upside Down Modular Armor
If the technology available to transportation was insufficient, the doctrine was even less so. The most recent update to the convoy operations field manual in 1963 bore no mark of the lessons learned from relevant prior convoy experiences. Field manuals translate vague doctrinal concepts of war and procedures into actual detail.
Doctrine is operationalized in the form of the field manual—the FM. Periodically FMs are updated to reflect new knowledge and tactics. But the updates can have the effect of erasing knowledge. Following the 1967 ambush the Lieutenant Colonels John Burke and Melvin Wolfe (newly appointed XO and temporary XO for 8th Group) learned the hard way that, at a minimum, FMs and standard operating procedures (SOPs) needed
108 desperately to be rewritten. This realization came at the very moment they realized that they would be the men to rewrite it. Some of the battalions had S-3 notes but they didn’t address the concept of an ambush.273 So Major Nicholas Collins consulted other units to determine the consensus on what do to. The resulting SOP was to stop the convoy and to return fire.’274 This was an entirely untenable tactic since the entire purpose of the satchel charges carried by the NVA sappers was to wait for the convoy to halt and then destroy it vehicle by vehicle.
The absence of recommendations in the updated FM should not be mistaken for its absence of it in prior versions. The kind of environment under which transportation units operated wasn’t new; it was just new to the people in that theater. The Army’s
1914 Field Service Regulations contained the final remnants of the convoy tactics derived from the American Indian Wars.275 While admittedly a time of horse and oxen, wagon trains required protection against enemy ambush. They needed scouts, cavalry flanks, and wagon formations that would keep cattle from dispersing or worse yet, stampeding while simultaneously permitting movement and defense.276 The practical management of security was embedded in each convoy to protect against enemy ambush by Indian attack.277 By 1943 the Army Motor Transport FM 25-10 was
273 Killblane, "Circle the Wagons: The History of U.S. Army Convoy Security." 274 Pg. 31. Richard Killblane, "Circle the Wagons: The History of U.S. Army Convoy Security," Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 13 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005). 275 Killblane. 276 ———, "Circle the Wagons: The History of U.S. Army Convoy Security." 277 Richard Killblane, "U.S. Army Transportation Museum," U.S. Army, http://www.transchool.lee.army.mil/museum/transportation%20museum/OB.htm.
109 re-written to emphasize the shift in technology to a secure rear area and motorized movement of supplies. This left all remnants of non-conventional fighting in the dust.
The 1943 FM 25-10 does recommend the creation of security detachments to provide reconnaissance and mine-clearing patrols but under conditions of duress the security detachment was to do “everything possible to delay the enemy (including blocking the road and laying out antitank mines).…” It further instructs the convoy security should arrange for “… All but two or three vehicles reverse direction and take cover to the rear.
The two or three remaining vehicles are turned sideways on the road to form a temporary road block, and a band of antitank mines is laid across the road ...”278
Perhaps a reasonable tactic for conventional warfare but certainly not for sappers with satchel charges.
By 1963 the updated Motor Transportation 33-50 field manual had been so fully updated that nothing in it regarding hardening, or anything resembling a tactical explanation of what to do under enemy ambush existed. We had fully written all that prior knowledge and innovation right out of the books. It further allocated the role of convoy protection to the MPs.279 The 1963 FM 33-50 did at least provide several pages of analysis on the tactics of enemy guerilla fighters and stressed that “Motor transport personnel at all echelons must therefore be constantly alert to the conditions that invite sabotage and must maintain a tight security.” It further states that “Motor transport
278 Chpt 6 pg 168. Albert E. and Adjutant General's Office Hunter, "Senior Officer Debriefing Report: U.S. Army Support Command, Qui Nhon," ed. Army (Washington: 1970). 279 Pg 21. Army, "Field Manual 55-30: Motor Transportation Operations."
110 units should be as self-sufficient as possible in providing their own security.”280 An unclear addition to the manual since it afforded all the control roles to the MPs.
Doctrine was clear on the potential threat but without direct guidance for a tactical response.
By the 1967 ambush lessons had been learned and unlearned and then erased from doctrine by the simple act of updating the FMs.281 Soldiers arrived in theater without any knowledge of the duress under which they would be driving. The tactical developments that were to become the “hardened convoy” concept needed to be learned the hard way—on the job.282
Beginning from the ‘67 ambush the evolution of hardened tactics, was mostly decentralized and specific to each crew that protected the convoys. In some cases
“clearing the kill zone” meant that one truck would lay down suppressive fire while others ushered the convoy forward. In other areas, the tactic involved the clustering of a couple gun trucks on the point of attack and as sections of the convoy cleared a new gun truck would take over the offensive position while the prior moved onward.283
Eventually, someone needed to write out a unified SOP. The task fell to Colonel Bellino.
280 Pg 64. Department of the Army, "Fm 55-30 Motor Transport Operations," ed. Army (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1963). 281 . The lack of institutional memory squares very nicely with Theo Farrell’s observation that organizations with poor memories are likely to create new solutions. See: Theo Farrell, "Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009," Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010). 282 Bellino, "The Bellino Report." 283 Richard Killblane, Interview by Telephone, January 14th 2012.
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He created 60 page manual that summarized the basics of the hardened convoy and gun truck tactics:
1. Keep weapon ready to fire, 2. Be alert for changes in familiar scenes along route 3. Use your weapon. Return fire immediately. 4. Notify security force by radio call –contact contact contact 5. Continue moving, maintaining interval if possible 6. Track vehicle ahead to prevent further detonation of mines 7. Don’t enter kill-zone if possible 8. If disabled and convoy is moving through kill-zone, mount a passing vehicle 9. Provide flanking support fire into kill-zone Gun trucks apply maximum bases of fire; fight as a team, deploy upon command284
Vertical Linkages—LWL, and the Cadillac Gage V-100
The early September attack of 1967 made serious waves all the way up the chain of command and created a sense of urgency. There was, however, a slight but continued controversy over their conversion to gun trucks. Deuce-and-a-half and five- ton cargo trucks were the bread and butter of the 8th Transportation group. Taking them out of the supply convoy to ‘harden’ them reduced the number of vehicles in a convoy that could carry supplies. The message from doctrine was consistent: convoys should be armed but they should leave policing to the MP’s and stay within their specific realm of expertise, moving things285 Nevertheless, something had to be done. In the absence of effective protection the convoys were ducks in a row.
284 Pg 113. Col. Joseph Bellino, "The Bellino Report," (1970). 285 This is consistent with the doctrine written in the 1963 Motor Transportation field manual. See pg.22 Department of the Army, "Field Manual 55-30: Motor Transportation Operations," ed. Army (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1963).
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Changes from the top down were immediate for motor transport on those routes. Two distinct approaches were taken to bridge the distance between the war we planned for and the war we were about to fight. The first was the traditional solution emphasized a top-down technology and regular command processes. The second sought to consider the context closely and adjust its solutions based on machine design.
The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was brought in to provide additional security for the Pleiku end of the route. Contractors paved of route 18 and made repairs to alleviate the potholes. The 815th Engineer Battalion was charged with creating a 1000 meter swath along both sides of the road with a foliage clearing device called a
Rome Plow to eliminate enemy concealment. Rome plows were followed by a layer of
Agent Orange to destroy foliage. Finally, convoys were given restricted SOP’s regarding night travel and additional MP’s for control of the roads, patrolling, and non- organic escort support.286 Trucks could now move faster and better vision along the sides of the road. All that remained was the technology necessary to protect the convoys.
From the traditional approach, most saw the vulnerability of convoys as a road security problem; i.e. the realm of jurisdiction was in the hands of the MP’s and security.
The 1963 field manual reinforced a doctrine that tasked MPs with convoy protection and escort (the non-organic solution). For this perspective the emphasis was on one technology—the V-100 Commando APC.
286 Ibid 22
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Figure 9: Cadillac-Gage Commando V-100287
The Cadillac-Gage V-100 APC (armored personnel carrier)—also known as the
Commando—was the result of decades of armored warfare development beginning in
World War II. Military planners sought an all-around vehicle that could move quickly, operate on various terrains, support firepower, and protect its soldiers inside. Although in full production by 1964, the V-100’s were in short supply. V-100’s were designed for
MP use and were therefore issued only to MP’s through the early years of the U.S.
287 Source: https://picasaweb.google.com/lh/photo/i7gQ_W8ueKsf_Dpmmd1Qk
114 presence.288 As ambushes picked up through 1967, it strained MPs and their resources alike. Too few policemen and too few V-100s made embedded convoy protection frustrating for convoys and local MPs.
After the 1967 ambush, efforts to reroute the V-100 to provide organic convoy protection continued to stall out over shortages. The production of the V-100
Commando, it was argued, would eventually replace the modular trucks in convoy protection—or so this was the original plan.289 Joe Bellino concurred with the top-down solution that the modified task vehicles were a temporary solution to the V-100 and anticipated adding them to each convoy as organic protection to replace the five and deuce and a half solutions.290
By November 1970 a quarterly report suggests that security vehicles for convoy operations should be provided for ‘organic’ protection to transportation units.291 The
80th General Support Group argued that both doctrine and equipment lists be adjusted:
“Hardened organic vehicles, dedicated to provide security for line haul operations, are not authorized by TOE for transportation units whose primary mission is to provide combat service support over land lines of communication on a daily basis. …
It is recommended that additional vehicles for security be authorized to augment organic vehicles or that all TOE of transportation units with line haul mission, be
288 Pg 64. Lyles, The Hard Ride Vietnam Gun Trucks. 289 Pg 19. Adjutant General's Office, "Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 80th General Support Group." 290 Pg 2. U.S. Army Transportation School, March 15, 1968 1968. 291 The reference to organic refers to anything that the Group has issued to it as a matter of Army record. If something is organic it is original to the unit.
115 modified to include a security platoon with adequate hardened vehicles, weapons and communications.”292
Repeating the same solutions and commands with no additional resources does not solve a problem. It merely highlights it. There were never enough Commandos produced to supply motor transport with sufficient resources. Lessons learned reports from the 500th Transportation Group are broadly supportive in their request for more V-
100’s, but it was seldom the case that units received them through normal acquisition routes.293 Some truck companies received them from MP units as they departed
Vietnam in the latest years of U.S. involvement.294
Supply and TOE aside, it was never clear that the V-100 was the single best solution. Gun truck crews treated the V-100 with some degree of suspicion.295
Hardened convoy tactics had settled into an SOP that made the V-100 somewhat mismatched to most crews. The v-100 was entirely closed off on the sides as well as above. This made it difficult for gun truck crews to replicate the full 360 degree circle of firepower they needed to protect themselves and their convoy. The V-100 offered gun ports and a mount for a single crew served weapon near the front (see photo), but it’s v-
292 Adjutant General's Office, "Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 80th General Support Group," ed. Army (Washington DC: Army Office of the Chief of Research and Development, 1970). 293 Maj. Jeffrey A. Bradford, "M1117 "Guardian" Armored Security Vehicle (Asv) Employment in Peace Operations," ed. U.S. Army Command and General Staff and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army, 2001). 294 Larry A. Ballard, "Guntrucks of Ambush Alley," Army Logistician July-August, no. 1986 (1986). 295 Killblane.
116 shaped hull was vulnerable to close-in attacks by NVA sappers.296 The hull was shaped to deflect roadside bomb blasts (not unlike its contemporary descendant the M113) but the V left gunners blind to the close-in sides of their own vehicle and therefore vulnerable guerilla attack.297
Second, the rise of the roadside bomb in Vietnam made sitting in an enclosed vehicle problematic. Even if the blast from the improvised device never penetrated the armor, the effect of the percussion on the inside caused ear and brain injuries. The damage from a blast wave works as a function of physics. In an open space a major wave passes through a body roughly once. In a closed hard space those waves are reflected off surfaces to bounce and rebound through the body repeatedly—something akin to sitting inside a giant barrel while someone beats on the outside. Simply put, blast waves in an enclosed space reverberate and bounce through the bodies of those inside in a way that open spaces do not.298 Steven De Teresa of Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories has also concluded that the V-shaped hull of the V-100 didn’t improve the chances of survival from an improvised bomb over the five-ton gun truck, arguing that it was distance from the ground rather than armor shape that made the most significant difference.299
296 Steven De Teresa, January 19th 2012. 297 Steven De Teresa, January 19th 2012. 298 To date there are no studies comparing the M1114 to an open truck bed with armor sides, however see: Chaloner Eddie, "Blast Injury in Enclosed Spaces," BMJ 331, no. 7509 (2005). 299 De Teresa.
117
The finalized versions of the field adapted gun trucks were nearly always open on the top regardless of the capacity to create closed-topped versions for the crews.300
While it left them exposed to the potential for a grenade tossed into the bed of the truck the truckers saw this as an acceptable tradeoff, especially given the capacity for a full 360 degrees of close-in and long range firing. The v-100 APC in this sense was true to its name. It was a personnel carrier more so than an offensive machine. In the calculus for the soldiers was the implicit willingness to subject themselves to harm in order to defeat the potential for a successful enemy ambush.
The second technological solution is significantly less well-documented. Contrary to the major narrative provided by Bellino and his men, there remained a research puzzle. Gun truck photographs reveal that some early gun trucks are constructed from what appears to be a modular armor kit. If gun trucks were a bottom up solution, where did these seemingly manufactured solutions come from? This is the second path of top- down solutions.
While the accepted field-level history begins on September 2nd the history of the gun truck is a little more complex. In fact it comes prior to the insertion of 8th
Transportation group into Vietnam. In 1962 a research and testing organization was activated to anticipate the demands of soldiers working in non-conventional conditions.
Initially named USA Limited War Laboratory, LWL was later renamed USA Land Warfare
Laboratory toward the latter part of its years. LWL was responsible for a separate kind
300 Ibid.
118 of research and development intended specifically for rapid and immediate needs generated by the field experience of soldiers.301
LWL’s lifespan wasn’t particularly long. From activation to deactivation the agency saw a total of 12 years of work predominantly in the Vietnam arena. Very little is written organizationally about the LWL but the purpose of the organization is succinctly summarized by J.E. Mortland of Battelle Laboratories when he and his team did the post mortem on the organization:
In the early 1960's it had become apparent that a nuclear standoff existed between the two super powers rendering unlikely a planned nuclear war. Historically, U. S. military doctrine, training, and equipment reflected the primary objective of being prepared to fight in Northern Europe. Accordingly, most U. S. doctrine, training, and equipment were directed at countering potential enemy capabilities in that environment or exploiting U. S. capabilities there. However, during the above period, warfare of a third dimension, viz., guerrilla insurgency, loomed increasingly large as a threat to world peace. Members of the highest echelons of Army technological development were all too aware of the coming nature of the battlefield and undertook a number of actions to cope with it.302
The LWL’s mission and purpose was to implement a faster connection from technological idea to finalized project. In Mortland’s view the LWL was set up to be an
“R&D organization working directly with troops in the field, and producing hardware on a quick-reaction basis was a revolutionary approach to materiel problems. The degree of
301 Very little is published or known about the LWL. Its acquisition processes differed from traditional systems and it answered directly to the U.S. Army Office Chief of Research and Development. The history of LWL is summed into a single document produced in 1974 by Battelle Columbus Laboratories. See: 302 Pg 1. J.E. et al. Mortland, "U.S. Army Land Warfare Laboratory Volume I Project Report, Appendix A. Documentation," ed. U.S. Department of Commerce, Battelle Columbus Laboratories (Columbus, OH: National Technical Information Service, 1974).
119 emphasis placed by LWL on maintaining close liaison with the field fostered the development of an intense interest in the welfare of the individual soldier.”303
The original activation of the LWL is documented and signed by the Adjutant
General stipulates a specifically non-conventional aim for the organization: “The mission of this activity is to provide a centralized quick reaction research and development activity responsible for meeting Army requirements relating to limited war, particularly to war of low intensity in under-developed or remote areas of the world.”304
Alongside hundreds of other specialized tools and gadgets the LWL anticipated the challenge that truck drivers would have in the Vietnam environment. They saw clearly that task trucks had to operate absent a secure environment. Nowhere in the pamphlet does it suggest that transportation corps specifically will need to harden their vehicles, but the LWL had put their finger directly on a particular family of vehicles and what they expected to be a problem in Vietnam. Out of this research a 17 page pamphlet detailing how to harden a truck against small arms fire was produced for distribution through USATAC305
In the pamphlet photographs of a deuce and a half armed with special bolt-on plates with port holes is sketched followed by alternate armoring solutions that maybe
303 Pg2. Ibid. 304 Page 102. Ibid. 305 USATAC is now U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armament Command (TACOM). For more on their role and purpose see: U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, "Tacom Lcmc Public Site," https://www.tacom.army.mil/main/index.html.
120 available in the absence of the armor kit. The descriptions, measurements, and advice are aimed at dealing with attacks on task trucks and how to harden them. 306
Additionally, by 1965, LWL had moved forward with their armor research. They developed, tested, and fielded their own modular truck armor kit in accordance with its research.307 The kits were designed to be fitted to several different kinds of trucks through a bolt-on mechanism. 308 Their modular design is of particular interest because the design reflects careful attention to flexible design and multipurpose use of the kit across several truck bodies. The kit produced and distributed by USATAC was of built out of an armor called XAR-30. In conjunction with this kit, LWL also developed and fielded another field expedient solution called “armor by the yard” which consisted of fiberglass bags that could be filled with small plates of armor for door and window protection.309 One hundred of the kits were produced and ordered for delivery to 1st
Logistical command for evaluation and testing.310
Gun truck crews benefitted from the armor kit but few people, if anyone ever saw the Baer report from LWL despite its reported distribution to Vietnam. The kit was
306 Pg 47. U.S. Army Limited War Laboratory, "Progress Report," ed. Army (Aberdeen: 1968). 307 John L. Baer, "The Use of Field Expedient Armor -- Revision 1," ed. Army Land Warfare Lab (Aberdeen: USA LWL, 1965). 308 Source research matches the insertion, creation, and dissemination of the LWL prototype. Richard Killblane confirms the suspicion that the kit was distributed through USATAC. Although the distribution documentation from USATAC to the 8th Transportation Group, Richard Killblane confirms that any kits would have been released from that agency. LWL reports that it delivered its armor kit prototypes to USATAC in 1965 in the Baer report cited within. 309 U.S. Army Limited War Laboratory, "Report, U.S. Army Land Warfare Laboratory--Progress Report, June 1962-30-June 1968,," ed. Richard L. Clarkson Collection:, Richard L. Clarkson Collection (20990117001, Richard L. Clarkson Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University, 1968). 310 Kenneth Wickham, "Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1967 ", ed. Army (Washington: 1967).
121 extremely successful in providing early solutions to hardening convoys (firepower acquisitions aside) but the kit wasn’t initially handed off to the 8th Transportation Group officially.
Figure 10: LWL Modular Armor
The design of the armor system is flexible and decidedly modular but reflects some design features that the soldiers rejected. The porthole in the armor sheets was often inverted or covered. The engineers undoubtedly presumed that soldiers would point their weapons through the ports to fire, but soldiers preferred to have the range
122 of motion and visibility afforded by standing up. This made the portholes liabilities rather than functional designs.311 Photographs of several gun trucks reveal mysterious port holes near the base of the truck pill box rather than in its upright position—a tell- tale mark that the armor was produced and then modified to suit soldier preferences.
Nothing much came of the kit. Senior leaders appeared to be satisfied with the field expedient measures and despite the continued limited production of the kits almost no mention of the top-down technology (outside a modest reference in a few lessons learned reports).312 The armor kits existed, that’s all they knew. Field commander notes indicate familiarity with the technology but not its source.313
When I queried historians about the armor kit, they too were baffled by the mysterious appearance. None of them had heard of the LWL. Historians have yet to positively trace the source and distribution of the kits, but the link can be credibly established through lessons learned documents. LWL created several kits for distribution, one for ¼ ton and ¾ ton trucks, and one for deuce and a half and five-ton trucks. Documents from the 18th Police Military Brigade indicate that they were on hand to field test top-down modular kits for their jeeps. The resulting report indicated that
311 Pg 17.James Lyles, The Hard Ride Vietnam Gun Trucks, ed. Planet Art (New York: Planet Art, 2009). 312 Army Combat Developments Command 96375 Liaison Attachment, "Survey of Route and Convoy Security Methods," ed. Army (Washington DC: 1967). 313 A 1970 lessons learned report from M.E. Clark a Captain of the Adjutant General Corps writes the following: “The use of armor plate in doors and on the floors of task vehicles is a highly successful defense against small arms fire..due to its great value, action should be initiated to develop MWO or ENSURE requirement for such an armor kit. Pg 14. Adjutant General's Office, "Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group, Period Ending 31 January 1970," (Washington: 1970).
123 the armor kits would not be reordered because they lacked resistance to RPG and .30 caliber arms fire.314
Whether or not the MPs liked or disliked the armor, it would explain how the 8th
Transportation group got their hands on it—particularly if the MPs found no use for it.
The 18th operated throughout Vietnam, and in particular on QL 19 (ambush alley). This means that battalions in the 18th provided convoy escort to the 8th Transportation group.
The two major approaches to top-down problem-solving produced two technological solutions. The traditional route through the V-100 provided only a partial solution to transportation’s problems. The design limitations made the V-100 an incomplete solution as an organic security technology. It’s scarcity in Vietnam both made it unfeasible as a broad based solution, and because it was issued at first to MPs, the evolution of hardened convoy tactics favored the deuce and a half and five ton solutions because these were the resources offered to truck crews.
Horizontal Linkages—Prestige and Notoriety
The 8th Transportation group had behaved in an innovative manner, but to their knowledge largely independent of top-down support. They field-modified their trucks and created a tactical solution. That solution did not stay local. Rather it spread across
314 Pg 21———, "Operational Report-- Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade," ed. Army (Washington: 1967).
124 the battlefield in under a year to all but two other battalions in Vietnam. How did that occur and what explains the two battalions that did not incorporate the gun truck innovations into practice? The answer, I argue lies in the informal horizontal links among the men in the field, regardless of rank. Simply, as soldiers developed tactics and technology they needed scarce resources. As they collected those resources through unofficial channels their technology and tactics diffused with them. These informal horizontal linkages were also bolstered by the gun truck identity. As gun truck crews sought scarce resources the lore of the gun truck and its crews became known and further developed strong horizontal links.
Equipment shortages and gaps in protection were handled either formally through the vertical channels of support.315 However, when it came to equipment that wasn’t traditionally issued to them, the support quickly deteriorated. When 8th
Transportation group needed new ¼ ton trucks they requisitioned them and rather than replace them with more ¼ ton trucks they requisitioned 23 new ¾ ton trucks to take their place.316 This took time but it was not problematic.
The other solution is the horizon of actors in theater. The field in a time of conflict is a virtual informal swap-fest of resources and supplies. Solders trade, give, and do favors for one another to meet their needs. It is an informal ecology of soldiers
315 Pg 11, ———, "Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 80th General Support Group," ed. Army (Washington DC: Army Office of the Chief of Research and Development, 1970). 316 Adjutant General's Office, "Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)," ed. Army (Washington DC: 1970).
125 solving each others’ problems, especially given the limitations of their issued equipment. This being the case, prestige, charisma, and connectedness meant easier lives. In terms of the gun trucks, the durability and firepower of each gun truck differed based on the savvy of its company members. Absent vertical support for added fire power and organic security, soldiers were left to source and recover arms, armor, and ammo on their own. The better connected the battalion and gun truck crew, the better the truck. At the helm of the best trucks you found an NCOIC that had mastered the structure of the army organization—rather, how to work his way around it.
A good NCOIC knows how to work their way around the assigned equipment list— the Army Table of Organization and Equipment, or TOE for short. The Army has clearly specified rules and procedures for who gets what and how much. This gets detailed into the TOE (also TO&E).317 If units need something and it isn’t in the TOE, it requires a written request—a modification of the TOE or MTOE. The request isn’t always granted and even if it does, it often takes months to fulfill.
The 8th Transportation group soldiers didn’t have that kind of time. So they found their way around the TOE through several means. It was no small irony that transportation units could carry all the ammunition and big guns to the fight but were themselves unable to use them.
317 Kutta, Gun Trucks.pg 34
126
In practice this meant that the preferred weapons for gun trucks—mini-gun and the quad 50—were definitely not in the motor transport TOE. Transportation soldiers cultivated distinctly strong ties with men outside transportation who assisted in their defense. Motor transport generally received fire support from helicopter pilots, local
MP’s assigned to protect them, and artillery units located in the same area. All of these actors had the significantly enhanced firepower capabilities that gun trucks needed.
Helicopter pilots provided close air support during emergencies. They saw first-hand the kind of destruction that enemy ambush could do. Whenever possible in the early 70’s pilots often provided a second set of eyes over potentially lethal ambush sites along QL 19. They could see and help direct the convoy to safety or warn them of enemy forces hiding in the jungle.318 Close coordination put the pilots and truckers in conversation. From there it was a matter of time and personal favors before gun trucks had access to helicopter firepower. The helicopter pilots loaned their mini-guns or found ways to give them to truck crews to be mounted to their trucks.319 In one instance the members of the 500th Transportation Group were lucky enough to have Louis
Brittingham, a transportation warrant officer stationed out of Cam Rahn Bay. Louis’ brother Alvin worked as the Huey crew chief nearby. It is no mystery how the gun truck
“Brutus” procured its mini-gun.320
318 Pg 233. Jimmie Lambert Collection, 1970. 319 Historians Killblane and Lyles both agree that strong friendships and mutual respect developed between truckers and helicopter pilots Richard Killblane, August 7, 2009 2009, Lyles, The Hard Ride Vietnam Gun Trucks. 320 Louis "Pat" Brittingham, "The Birth of Brutus," (2010), http://grambo.us/atav/birth_of_brutus.htm.
127
“I decided that my 5-ton could double as a gun truck and maintenance truck so I
set about designing it and "obtaining" the armor and weaponry. I conceived of it
having a large caliber main gun and at least two 50's. I had an Air Force friend
who got me a 20 mm aircraft wing gun which I tried to build a swivel mount for
as the main gun. Unfortunately, my welding team could not build a mount that
would hold up under sustained fire of the 20 mm gun. I don't know how in the
world an aircraft wing stands the shock.It just so happened that my brother, Sgt.
Alvin Brittingham, a Huey Crew Chief, was station up at Phu Bai with the 101st at
MACV Forward. I had now opted to try and mount a 7.62 mm Mini on the gun
truck so I went up to visit Al and came back with the gun and all its
accessories.”321
What worked for networks with helicopter pilots was universal across the battlefield. Despite the fact that MP’s were overtaxed and scarce for consistent convoy protection, the cooperation and brotherhood amongst soldiers provided assistance here as well. MPs and NCOICs also worked their way around the TOE problem similar to the pilot relationship. Although MPs had good firepower, they also had the V-100
Commando, a fully armored personnel carrier. Although MPs couldn’t easily lend the cars to the soldiers it wasn’t uncommon for them to leave them behind as they were moved out of theater. The same was true for transportation’s relationship with Army artillery units. When it came to guns, the artillery had them. The quad 50 (effectively
321 Ibid.
128 four 50 caliber barrels all mounted together) was not an uncommon sight on gun trucks.
Battalions working in conjunction with or near artillery units found themselves the recipients of these mammoth guns for their trucks. Conversely, artillery units were sometimes tasked with convoy protection. When this occurred it wasn’t uncommon for artillery units to modify their own trucks into gun trucks.322
Finally there was a great deal of “garbage can” innovation for the gun truck crews. When soldiers couldn’t obtain guns through interpersonal connections, they scrounged the parts of worn weapons and put them together to “dx” them (direct exchanging). Dx-ing a weapon was the army’s way of repairing malfunctioning weapons, but it worked to collect and then trade-in weapons outside the TOE.323 This is likely how many battalions got their hands on a mini-gun or quad 50 permanently.
Beyond dx-ing you could simply pilfer the salvage yard for sheet metal, and discarded truck parts. Early in the 8th’s hardening process the veteran field officers recalled having ring mounts in prior wars on the top of their vehicles.324 The ring mount holds the automatic weapon so that it can be swiveled around by the operator. Report documents from the 500th Battalion emphasize that by November of 1967 the ring
322 See the personal history and chronology of the 8th Battalion 4th Artillery: Charles Adams, "8th Battalion 4th Artillery Vietnam Chronology," http://www.8th-4th-arty.com/chronology. 323 Interview with Richard Killblane. For more on DX (Direct Exchange) see: page 116 Patrick H. Dockery, Vietnam Was More Than Just the Killing : The Untold Day to Day History : A Memoir (Victoria, B.C.: Trafford, 2002). 324 This was the case for the 8th Transportation group’s Ltc Wolfe, who had trained soldiers on ring mounts and upon entering Vietnam found that ring mounts weren’t available. Burke then went on to order them specifically for his ¼ ton trucks. See: pg 17 Killblane, "Circle the Wagons: The History of U.S. Army Convoy Security."
129 mounts ordered had not been received. Instead, soldiers went to the salvage yard to fashion or repair pedestal mounts (a central pole upon which the gun sits) to seat their weapons.325 Units also pilfered disabled helicopters for functioning or non-functioning arms.326 There was no telling what you might find by simply scrounging.
There was never any official report or instruction to transportation groups distributed at a national level during the conflict. Colonel Bellino did write articles and talk to senior leaders up his chain of command about the hardened trucks, but nothing ever came back down again. While the networks and work-arounds for obtaining supplies solved the problem of the immediate needs of the soldiers the diffusion of the tactics and technology were likewise supported by these same efforts. As soldiers sought supplies and talked about their experiments, the concept and the adaptation spread as a practice across Vietnam.
Motor transport drivers naturally found their way across the country to source scarce items. The roads of Vietnam, though dangerous, were also the conduit for the diffusion of the gun truck. Drivers crossed paths at ports and bases and through a process of show and tell the concept and the design diffused. Gun trucks and the hardened convoy concept spread by word of mouth from driver to driver, battalion to battalion, company to company across Vietnam.327
325 Pg 12. Adjutant General's Office, "Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck)." 326 Pag 47 James Lyles, The Hard Ride; Vietnam Gun Trucks Part Ii, 1st ed. (2003). 327 Richard Killblane, August 7, 2009 2009.
130
Although the 500th, the 48th, and the 8th Transportation Groups all operated in different zones in Vietnam, they all operated on a single surface, the roads of Vietnam. By 1969 the gun truck was a fixture not just in all the convoys run out of the 8th group but also in the 500th.328 The tactic and technology diffused.
The tactics and technology freely supported by Burke, Bellino, and Wolfe created more than new tactics and machines it created an identity. The gun trucker identity had aura of toughness and prestige. This created an elevated awareness both inside and outside of CSS for these men, further extending their horizontal reach. Gun truckers were now distinct from their CSS brethren because of their trucks. CSS soldiers, largely characterized as the clerks and quartermasters were thought to mostly paper pusher and arbitrarily gate-keep.329
The elevation of identity began with breaking from military regulation regarding their vehicles. Truck drivers named and personalized their trucks as they modified them.
No longer just operators, now creators, they took pride in their ingenuity and distinct solutions. The users of the technology became the owners, the designers. Joe Bellino played to this flair for personalization. He encouraged experimentation and
328 Jim Rose, "172 Transportation Company Unit History," http://sites.google.com/site/172ndtransportationcompany/home. 329 An archived issue of Stars and Stripes refers to transportation crews in the following terms: “Most GIs think of supply in terms of an overweight sergeant who uses his practiced, fish-eyed stare of suspicion masterfully whenever a new-issue mess kit is mentioned or of a helicopter or Caribou churning into woods and paddies with pallets and boxes of ammo can C-rations in the middle of a battle. It is only partly that.”
131 exploration.330 Although regulation requires serial numbers gun trucks were known and referred to by their names. Naming was the prerogative of the crew. Some names conveyed a fighter’s love of chaos—Yea Olde Warlord, Psychotic Reaction,
Pandemonium, and Eve of Destruction; Some were just obscene—The Abortion, Devil’s
Kid, and Dirty Bitch; and some were simply funny—Blood Sweat and Tires, The Big
Kahuna, and Piece Maker.
Officially, truck regulation permitted only green paint. In time, however, regulations for the gun trucks were impressively relaxed. Gun truckers decorated and named their trucks with images reminiscent of World War I era bomber pilots.331 By the end of U.S. involvement most of gun trucks were aggressively colored and distinctly personalized. Personalized trucks also had personally selected crews. Trucks belonged to specific crews and the crews to the trucks. New members were decided by the NCOIC
(non-commissioned officer in charge) who was usually the main gunner on the truck.
Gun truck crews had support from men across the battlespace and as they rotated throughout the country their experiences with the crews inspired them to modify their own vehicles. Their bravery and aggression was rewarded with a status that gave them an identity that elevated their job’s visibility among men in the field.
These informal connections served as additional pathways to gathering and sourcing the items they needed to build even more powerful trucks. Second, as the
330 Ralph Grambo, 01/15/2012 2012. 331 For more on the variation and photos of nearly 40 gun trucks see: Ralph Grambo, "Atav Guntrucks," http://grambo.us/atav/gunpictures.htm.
132 soldiers sourced their parts and talked across units and career fields, word spread about the gun truck and its tactics—gun trucks and the concept diffused through the work of mouth and face to face interactions of the soldiers. The reputation for courage and the bombastic nature of the vehicles and crews contributed to the diffusion. The more remarkable the truck and the more aggressive the fight, the greater was the prestige of the truckers. Truck drivers were highly noticeable and the awareness of the practice
(while not specifically supported by the command structure in Washington) was widely known and documented throughout the conduct of the war.332
With no specific action from above, the idea was left to diffuse horizontally. The lore and the technology spread simultaneously. That is to say as the lore diffused it assisted in the diffusion of the technological and tactical adaptation. By creating sensation, the gun truck identity strengthened networks across the horizon by elevating the crews as distinct fighters in Vietnam. As the distinction rose, individual drivers turn to their own trucks and modified them.
One outlier, the 48th did not use or create gun trucks like the other two groups.
What explains the variation? The difference between the September attack and the
332 Countless lessons learned reports were written, concurred and filed throughout the 1967 to 1973 timeframe. While reports when upward, there were no specific reports downward to enhance and develop the technology and tactics. Simply a willingness to allow it to occur. Bellino, Wolfe, and Burke were all permissive and encouraging of their Group’s experimentation and the situation reports they filed show concurrence over the continued use of the tactics and technology. See: Adjutant General's Office, "Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1967," (Washington DC: Army, 1968), ———, "Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 937th Engineer Group, Period Ending 30 January 1970," ed. Army (Washington: U.S. Army, 1970), ———, "Operational Report--Lessons Leraned, Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, Period Ending 31 January 1968," ed. Army (Washington: 1968).
133
December solution was no quick or unified path. Convoy vulnerability to attack had remained unresolved at the official level despite policy changes through the December timeframe. Top down solutions were offered. Certainly given the continued and in many cases increased violence of the enemy ambushes command had taken notice. But command understood the solution from a broader perspective as a road security problem. Was it the case that the 48th saw things from the top’s perspective?
Lyles indicates that gun trucks were largely frowned upon by the command structure, suggesting that some field commanders went so far as to reverse the modifications to the trucks before official inspection to avoid reprimand.333 This declaration is difficult to substantiate. Despite the relatively casual manner with which the chain of command tolerated the conversion, the hardened convoy concept took up men and trucks—nearly 15% of the Transport group’s convoy space.334 It may have been that it was a gamble some unit leaders didn’t appreciate.
As it turns out, the hardened convoy concept did diffuse to the 48th. Interviews with truckers reveal that members of the 6th and 7th Transportation Battalions knew of the gun truck phenomenon.335 The word of mouth had spread. The 48th, however, had additional constraints. They neither had enough men nor enough equipment to satisfy their hauling objectives. With a lack of manpower and machines dedicating a task
333 James Lyles, The Hard Ride, ed. Planet Art (New York: Planet Art, 2004). 334 Pg 25 Col. Joseph Bellino, "The Bellino Report," (1970). 335 Richard Killblane, Interview by Telephone, January 14th 2012.
134 vehicle to gun truck modification made no sense.336 In several cases the 7th
Transportation Battalion hired local Vietnamese to fill in the gaps, but it remained that a shortage in trucks and manpower would immediately rule out the advantages of gun trucks and gun truck crews.337 Since the hardened convoy reduced the number of task vehicles in a convoy often by 5 or 6 trucks this seemed too high a price to pay. Second, gun trucks used crew-served weapons that required more than just a driver and a gunner. A gun truck pulled twice the number of men per truck than a regular task vehicle. Finally, the route traveled by the 48th experienced neither the same degree of ambush as QL-19, nor did it have the shortage of MPs to patrol the roads (likely a strongly correlated condition). All of these things together reveal that while the adaptation did diffuse, it wasn’t brought into practice because the local circumstances favored another solution.338
Gun Truck Innovation—A Case of Failed Success
By the close of the U.S. presence in Vietnam the number of gun trucks in operation numbered over 50. There is no way to positively confirm how many trucks were put into service and later destroyed by the enemy or converted back into line haul
336 Adjutant General's Office, "Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck)," ed. Army (Washington: 1967). 337 Pg 11. Department of the Army, "Operational Report--Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966," ed. Army (Washington: 1966). 338 Pg 4. Office, "Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Bg Wallace K. Wittwer, 18th Military Police Brigade & Provost Marshal."
135 but estimates range between 300 and 400 throughout the course of the war conservatively.339
The post mortem on the innovation process may be puzzling to some. Contrary to how military organizations appear to be characterized, senior leaders were actually quite willing to permit many instances of creativity. From the top’s perspective it seemed that it would tolerate technological adaptation and doctrinal change just so long as it didn’t result in the reallocation of vast amounts of manpower or equipment.
This was managed through controlling the TOE. Senior commanders were aware of the gun truck phenomenon but didn’t seek to squash the ingenuity. However, given the innovation, neither did they seek ensure the preservation of the concept or technology.
Rather, they treated it purely as a field expedient measure and were willing to allow battlefield adaptation as long as it didn’t cut too far into the cargo tonnages delivered.340
The “field expedient measure,” was never formally recognized as an innovation up the chain of command; this in spite of the fact that the LWL had forwarded its own modular technological solution and documents. Half of the top down solution not only worked to support field-level adaptation, but it actually was incorporated into it.
Nevertheless, there was no recognition at the official levels of the innovation.
339 Lyles, The Hard Ride Vietnam Gun Trucks. 340 Ibid. pg 13
136
In terms of machine design, there are three technologies up for consideration— first the trucks organic to transportation convoys. The construct of the deuce-and-a- half and 5 ton trucks is arguably a more open than closed design. There are no parts that are secretive about these trucks. Their repair manuals are readily published, and the parts of the machines are intended to be repaired and replaced over time. Cargo trucks are a mix of different knowledge sets and technologies that are all mixed together. The men who work transportation were by and large men who had driven and worked around trucks before.341 There were, of course, dedicated mechanics in each unit who could do the more challenging labor and modifications but most everyone in those first few years of transportation history were men who knew their way around the trucks.
The V-100 provided a slightly more closed design to truck crews than their original deuce and half and five ton trucks. While the design of the Commando couldn’t honestly be considered to be closed, its LWL counterpart, the modular armor kit bears all the markings of an open design solution that was designed specifically for the flexibility in alteration and adaptation. While the V-100 was the official solution to transportation security problems, the LWL solution cost a fraction of a V-100 and made use of armor sheets that could be sourced and sent immediately to Vietnam. Since the kit was modular it is no surprise to find that crews used whatever parts of the kit they wanted and left other parts behind. This was not the case for the V-100. Crews
341 Pg 157. Heiser and United States. Dept. of the, "Logistic Support."
137 admired the fully armored design but found no way to alleviate or alter the shortcomings in visibility that the Commando had. As Richard Killblane argues, the only people who appreciated the V-100 were those who hadn’t been on the five ton trucks.
The preference was for the latter.
Bellino, Wolfe, and Burke, the commanding field officers overseeing the 8th operated in accordance with official pressure to find a solution, but stood back to allow the enlisted and junior officer solutions to bubble up from their own intuition. As a result, the transportation crews were left with blank slates and the resources at hand to protect themselves. This means that official support for the gun truck project didn’t provide direction as much as it provided permission to explore designs and solutions that were indigenous to the crews. In this way the Vietnam field commanders protected and encouraged technological adaptation in a way that was consistent with the open source logic—to permit access rather than restrict soldier ingenuity through regulation.
Analysis of Adaptation
Innovation at the field level reinforces the innovation paradox repeatedly.
Organizations exist to channel power and permit the commands from above to be executed below. Rules and hierarchy ensure this process. Nevertheless, the successful field adaptations reveal that organizations perform another function—they organize.
And in providing organization they provide soldiers with pathways to violate the rules.
Field-level technological adaptation in Vietnam was about learning to break the rules.
138
Using the organization’s ordering of things to show them where and how to gather the things they needed. Bellino’s contribution to Iraq was the willingness to permit that behavior.
The tension that exists between centralized and decentralized power is a necessary tension, not one that needs resolution, but rather one that needs to be explored. Bellino was not uncomfortable with managing that tension. This, in fact, is the mark of a good leader.
The Vietnam case exemplifies the limitations of the current literature on innovation. Specifically, this case demonstrates that there is a very clear distinction between the top and the bottom in terms of competitive rivalry. The practices, perceptions, and incentives of the top are not those of the men in the field. First, intra-service and inter-service rivalries are unrecognizable at this level. A sacrifice, and as can be imagined, is required to trigger a process of change. Nevertheless it is here at the field level that Stalin’s aphorism is undermined. While the death of one is a tragedy, the death of many does not get ignored, it does not become a statistic, it becomes an imperative to adapt. On the field, it isn’t simply about sensitivity to lives lost. It is more personal, impending, and real. It is about survival and retribution.
To the degree that there is competition among the services and between units at the field level is almost insignificant. The incentives just aren’t there. Survival overrides the self-serving instinct and perpetuates the sharing and mutual support instinct. Where one would anticipate competition at the top, field-level adaptation reverses this trend.
139
Cultural theories take on a much thicker sense of levels in the field. The development of a gun truck prestige, identity, and culture of fighting spirit helped the truckers obtain the machines they needed to defend themselves. This is distinctly different from the way in which culture and identity are portrayed in the top-down models. Rather than taking culture as determinative of behavior, the development of a gun truck culture raised awareness and elevated the prestige levels of the NCOIC’s. That identity/culture of aggression created pathways that soldiers could use to adapt and evolve further. At the field level, the development of a kind of notoriety then may have an effect on a unit’s capacity to adapt effectively.
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Chapter 5: A Failed Innovation Revisited—Iraq Gun Trucks
March 23rd 2003 was the public’s first signal that the invasion of Iraq would be complicated. Barely three days into the beginning of the hostilities a convoy, en route deep into the heart of Iraq, was ambushed. As logistics struggled to keep up with the front lines they found themselves conventionally trained for an invasion that was about to go unconventional. March 23rd is infamously known as the Battle of An-Nasiriyah.
The battle is notable to the layman because it represents the first rescue of a U.S. female prisoner of war—Jessica Lynch,342 but for those monitoring the tempo and character of the battlefield, the event held a deeper significance—it was time to adapt.343 An-Nasiriyah is the story of the 507th Maintenance Company’s first steps onto
Iraqi soil–the sparking point for the re-evolution of gun trucks and the hardened convoy concept.
This chapter traces the creation of the gun truck and its associated tactical developments during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from early 2003 through to late
2004. Despite a slower diffusion process, gun trucks and their tactical concepts became
342 Capt. James F. Kelly, "The Legend and Lessons of Jessica Lynch," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 130, no. 3 (2004). 343 Dean Dominique, "Gun Trucks: A Vietnam Innovation Returns," Army Logistician 38, no. 1 (2006).
141 an established part of organizational practice complete with fully-articulated top- down solutions and doctrinal concepts—a major military innovation.
Following the narrative and the analysis of the adaptation and outcomes of the
Iraq case this chapter delves deeper into a cross-case analysis between the Vietnam and
Iraq cases. I argue, that Iraq adaptation process ultimately resulted in major military innovation through stronger vertical linkages purposeful interaction through established alignments between vertical and horizontal linkages at the field level.
When the U.S. departed Vietnam in the early 70’s it left its technological and tactical adaptations in the dustbin. Despite their colorful history, and high profile identity, the gun trucks and tactics so painfully-learned ceased to exist. The Limited War
Laboratory (LWL) modular armor kit, the V-100 Cadillac Gage, and Bellino’s tactics manual on convoy protection were swept under the rug. The LWL even changed its name to Land Warfare Laboratory to try and escape the stigma of the conflict, but to no avail, it too was closed out. The U.S. government, the public, and militaries set about to create as much distance between itself and that conflict as it could. The lessons, tactics and technologies weren’t just forgotten, they were abandoned.344 If Combat Service
Support (CSS) needed organic convoy protection in future wars, it would have to start again from scratch.
344 Richard Killblane, Interview by Telephone, January 14th 2012.
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Iraq and the 507th Maintenance Company in An-Nasiriyah
In early February of 2003 the 507th Maintenance Company arrived in Kuwait 88 soldiers strong. They were Combat Service Support (CSS), they were tasked with ensuring that logistical supply and maintenance was available to the frontlines. By most measures the picture mimicked that of Vietnam, they were logisticians en route, behind enemy lines, with limited training, experience, armor and arms. The unit, set to infiltrate
Iraq alongside the 3rd Forward Support Battalion (3rd FSB), was responsible for hauling supplies, maintenance vehicles, and machinery in support of a Patriot missile
Battalion.345 Near the Kuwait port at Camp Virginia the unit trained for a few weeks in preparation for their convoy’s movement into Iraq.
On March 20th the convoy set off for Objective Rams deep inside Iraqi territory.
Leading the convoy was Captain Troy King. King received his orders to follow the 3rd FSB vehicles northwest via preset map routes to Objective Rams. King was given a map, a
Garmin GPS and his specified orders on CD Rom. Despite orders readily available, King mistakenly believed route Blue to be his only course (shown here in the darker line); in actuality the directive was to begin on route Blue, transition to Route Jackson
(thoroughly bypassing An Nasiriyah), and then back to Blue again. On the morning of the execution of orders the 507th left Camp Virginia still under this misconception.
345 1st Special Forces Group, "507th Attack," A 114 1st Special Forces Group, http://www.deta114.org/documents/507th_attack_2.htm.
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The entire stretch of the convoy was about 600 vehicles long; full of soldiers, supplies, fuel, and equipment. The 507th brought up the rear with 62 of its original 88 soldiers. The convoy would accordion on from point to point as they stopped and then departed from established traffic control points (TCPs). The route was from Virginia to
Dawson, Dawson to Bull, Bull to Lizard, and finally to Objective Rams.
As is always the case amidst the fog of war, moving was harder than the convoy had anticipated. Between Objective Bull and Lizard, some of the 507th’s heavier vehicles became slowed and stuck in the sand. In an effort to avoid slowing the entire convoy,
King split the 507th into two and placed First Sergeant Dowdy in command of the lagging vehicles while he moved onward to Lizard with the lead element. King arrived at Lizard at 5:30 am to rest and refuel. Dowdy lagged further and further to the rear, spending most of the night repairing and towing vehicles with the help of 3rd FSB soldiers
Sergeant George Buggs and Private First Class Edward Anguiano. The 3rd FSB, scheduled to depart Lizard at 2pm that day, inquired as to Captain King’s status. Rather than delay the entire convoy, King sent the remainder of the 507th onward with the 3rd FSB and waited at Lizard for Dowdy and the remaining 33 soldiers.
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Figure 11: Route map from Virginia to Rams
After a bitterly frustrating first leg, the remainder of the 507th arrived around
4pm. Wanting to avoid losing even more ground to the lead element, King reordered
the vehicles in the convoy and set out again. At this point, the 33 soldiers in the second
half of the 507th had been on perpetual march with no sleep for over 24 hours. Under
King’s direction, this would be their second all-night movement. The weary convoy set
out again and, after a failed short cut that resulted in another 5 hour delay, the 507th
reached their first Traffic Control Point (TCP). There was no communications capability
145 between the 507th and 3rd FSB, so King inquired at the TCP as to the direction of route
Blue—still unaware of the directed Blue Jackson Blue transition. With help from soldiers manning the TCP, King determined the Blue route and continued north toward
An-Nasiriyah. Route Blue turned west just prior to entering the city of An-Nasiriyah, but King, unable to read his GPS correctly, missed the highway turn to stay on Blue. The
507th rolled directly into the city of An-Nasiriyah at 5:30 in the morning. Tentatively moving through the city, convoy soldiers noticed armed (and confused) Iraqi soldiers.
The residents of the town took notice of the convoy but didn’t appear to be bothered.346
Now fully north of the city, Capt. King realized that he had lost route Blue and ordered an immediate u-turn. The convoy labored under the maneuver as heavy maintenance vehicles take time and space to turn around. Some of the vehicles were stopped altogether in an effort to refuel; others were dangerously low but continued onward back to An-Nasiriyah. King’s convoy was crumbling beneath him. To make matters worse communications amongst the vehicles was down—their rechargeable radio batteries having since died in the prolonged march. King and Dowdy’s vehicles had the only vehicle-powered communications capabilities. Most importantly, the soldiers of the 507th had entered their 60th hour of movement with no rest. Heading south again, the convoy retraced its path back into the city limits. The Iraqis, now
346 John Andrew, Battle of an-Nasiriyah, ed. U.S. Marine Corps History Division (Washington DC: realfastbook, 2011).
146 alerted to American forces in their area, were not willing to let them pass a second time unaffected.347
Thus began the battle of An-Nasiriyah. Upon reentry into the city, the convoy began to receive sporadic arms fire. Recognizing the ambush and their vulnerability,
Captain King and a small group of vehicles sped ahead to try and exit the city. Dowdy, in a vehicle group behind him, saw King miss the turn back onto the highway and radioed ahead to notify him. It was to no avail. By the time King got the message, all vehicles had missed the turn. The convoy needed to turn yet again, this time with even narrower streets and under enemy fire.
In the melee, the convoy fragmented into three parts. King and five other soldiers in three vehicles successfully exited the city moving south, but were ineffective in returning fire as their weapons malfunctioned. King’s group met up with Marines from the 8th Tank Battalion and reported the ambush. The Marines charged forward to rescue the remainder of the convoy.
The second group had ten soldiers and five vehicles. They also escaped the city limits following King but became disabled short of King’s position. The 507th’s only .50 caliber weapon was in this group but, likely due to improper maintenance, also malfunctioned in operation. Many soldiers attempted to fight their way out using their M16s but most of them jammed in operation. The Marines recovered all ten of
347 ARMY, "Us Army Official Report on 507th Maintenance Co.: An Nasiriyah, Iraq."
147 these soldiers, sent them back to meet up with King’s group, and continued onward into the city. The remainder of the functioning vehicles were in group 3 with 19 soldiers including the two men from 3rd FSB—Buggs and Anguiano. This group remained in the city limits, trapped in an increasingly lethal kill zone. Sgt Dowdy continued to direct the group out of the city as his HMMWV was hit but he eventually drove his vehicle directly into a tanker. The crash killed Dowdy on impact. The remaining soldiers defended themselves as best they could.
Of the 33 soldiers in the battle of An Nasiriyah, 11 soldiers were killed in action and nine turned up captured or missing.348 The ambush response was uncoordinated, decentralized, and fraught with nearly uncountable errors in decision, technological malfunction, and misfortune. Hundreds of lessons could be distilled from the battle. The malfunction of poorly maintained weapons; the lack of vehicles appropriate for the terrain; a surprising shortage of communications systems; an over-reliance upon a single decision-maker; the list goes on. But for veterans of the Vietnam war—especially those from transportation units—it rhymed too strongly with history. So much so that some even called the Army Transportation Museum’s historian to complain.349 CSS was again in an unconventional theater of war acting as if it were a conventional one.350 The
Battle of An-Nasiriyah was a red flag for commanders. While those back home
348 Ibid. 349 Killblane. 350 Dominique, "Gun Trucks: A Vietnam Innovation Returns."
148 struggled to recognize the tiger’s tail in hand, officers in theater prepared to deal with their apparent vulnerability--again, a move initiated by the boots on the ground.
A year passes in theater. As field commanders work furiously to sustain the force the insurgency grows. In early 2004 a newly coordinated set of attacks (generally called the April uprising), signals a fully centralized convoy attack strategy under
Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Shia insurgency.351 The damage inflicted upon U.S. convoys leaps with massive increases in IED and ambushes.352 In the meantime field expedient solutions are in play. Some units called it “mad max,” but most called it hillbilly armor—the practice of scavenging local metal scraps to up-armor their vehicles. All across Iraq soldiers simultaneously borrowed and boosted the firepower and small arms resistance of their vehicles. The development and diffusion of the ideas is in flux, however. The April uprising came just as the first full year in theater was completed.
For OIF this meant a near-complete rotation of transportation soldiers out of theater— replacing predominantly active duty units with an almost entirely new set of Reserve and National Guard units.
With this new wave of violence and soldiers the established and developing practices is upset and slowed. Among the soldiers rotated into the melee is 1st
Lieutenant James McCormick II the designated the platoon leader for a newly formed
351 Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace the Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," Military Review 2005, no. July-August (2005). 352 Robert Lt. Col Sadowski, "Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: Anomaly or Future Roadmap" (U.S. Army War College, 2008).
149 independent gun truck company the 1487th. Despite the changes to tactics and technology since early 2003, the creation of the brand new gun truck company meant that McCormick was starting with a fresh slate of learning tactics and adjusting technology. Upon arrival he found his HMMWV was soft-topped and unarmored, and his crew unfamiliar with the combat environment. Like most other leaders in the field,
McCormick had already done his research on the internet. He’d been in touch with
Vietnam vets and transportation historians. Upon arrival McCormick negotiated a hand- selected crew. To this group he added an M-915 5-ton truck modified with a ring mount and a steel gun box. McCormick had a second gun truck—“the Zebra” a provocatively striped HMMWV hardened and armed with a borrowed .50 caliber from the 201st Field
Artillery Regiment.353
While men like McCormick hammered out individualized solutions, another pattern of solution-building developed. Members of the 181st Transportation group pulled together local Iraqi welders, and a few vehicles, while they surfed the web for ideas. This collection of engineers, maintenance workers, and welders under the guidance of their field commanders created a garage for hardening vehicles. They called it the Skunk Werks, and opened their shop to any and all vehicles in theater. By early
2004 the Skunk Werks was the central focal point in theater for gun truck modification
353 Richard Killblane, "April Uprising," in Transportation History Museum Manuscripts (Fort Eustis: 2010).
150 and development.354 Meanwhile across the border in Kuwait, and also in response to an initiative led by the 181st, a private military contractor known as MPRI began to teach live-fire exercises to recently arrived transportation units. In order to provide that training, MPRI pulled experienced soldiers from the field to distill their lessons and tactics. In the process, Udairi became a collection point for field level tactical adaptations.355 By the end of 2004 the adaptation process for gun trucks had come full circle, resulting in organization-wide solutions and adjustments to the challenge of transportation security in the field.
Field Level Technological Adaptation
The changes in tactics and technology between March of 2003 and 2004 reflect a remarkably brisk transformation. If the battle of An-Nasiriyah did not signal the problem clearly, the Achilles heel of Iraq’s transportation routes—MSR (Main Supply Route)
Tampa—provided the flashing neon signs necessary for adaptation. Tampa is among the most infamous stretches of road for IED (improvised explosive device) attacks and ambushes—primarily those parts of the route directly to the south of Baghdad. In
March of 2003, truck drivers from KBR blatantly refused to leave base without additional arms and convoy protection travelling on MSR Tampa. On October 13th the
354 Most of the interviews conducted by the Operational Leadership Experience program that dealt with any aspect of security, tended to reference gun trucks as an assumed part of the convoy and CSS experience. For Example see: Angie Slattery, "Interview with Major Ted Kaiser," ed. Institute Combat Studies, Operational Leadership Experiences (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center, 2010). Jenna Fike, "Interview with Major Eric Saulsbury," ed. Institute Combat Studies, Operational Leadership Experiences (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center, 2010). 355 32nd Transportation Group, "Convoy Leader Training Handbook," ed. MPRI Kuwait Observer Controller Team (Doha: MPRI, 2003).
151
343rd Quartermaster Company publicly refused to follow orders because it meant driving up MSR Tampa.356 It wasn’t as if these convoys went unescorted. The MPs
(Military Police) assigned to these convoys provided some degree of firepower and support but it wasn’t enough. The combination of MPs and HMMWVs proved problematic for two reasons. First, there weren’t enough MPs for the massive scale of logistical needs in theater. This meant that convoys had to wait, or risk reduced protection. Second, HMMWVs were thin-skinned (lacking in armor); they bore soft-tops vulnerable to fire; and if equipped with weapons, the single automatic weapon was insufficient for convoy protection. 357
Lacking in bodies and protection, transportation solved their problem along two paths. First, they hardened their vehicles. The armor welded to HMMWVs came to be known as ‘hillbilly armor’ because of its likeness to the jalopy featured in the opening credits of the television show “the Beverly Hillbillies.” The look of the modified HMMWV gun truck was more rusty than artistic. Soldiers filled the floors of their HMMWVs with sandbags and supplemented their cab doors with wood and scavenged metal.358 Most units stripped the soft tops of their vehicle replaced them with ring mounts for a top- side gunner. Seldom satisfied with a single weapon for enemy attack suppression resourceful units welded locally-fabricated pedestal mounts to the beds of their
356 Ron Jensen, "Soldiers Who Refused Convoy Mission Won't Be Required to Face Court-Martial " Stars and Stripes (2004), http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_120704_Court,00.html. 357 Pg 65 Richard Killblane, "Road Warriors," (Fort Eustis: Army Transportation Museum, 2012). 358 Pg 4. Maurice A. Sgt Master Rambert, "Heading into the Unknown Fire," ed. U.S. Army Sergeant Majors Academy.
152
HMMWV’s for an additional automatic weapon. The weapon of choice was the .50 caliber weapon, although most units could more easily source a M249 Squad Automatic
Weapon (SAW).
Figure 12: Welding the pedestal mount to the HMMWV
Second, transportation units looked beyond MPs and the HMMWV gun truck.
While they were good patrol vehicles, they moved slower than many transportation vehicles on hard surfaces. This left truck drivers with the unenviable burden of driving slower in vulnerable territory in order to avoid outpacing their own security element.359
This constraint produced variants of the gun truck. The 5-ton M923A2 appeared to be
359 Killblane, "April Uprising."
153 the vehicle of choice for convoy conversion. Though some of the 5-ton trucks had ring mounts for a gunner, most did not. When ring mounts weren’t available, the pedestal mount was the next and easiest supplement to support the .50 caliber and the SAW.
The beds of these trucks were augmented with sand-filled double-walled lumber boxes placed directly behind the cab.(see figure 4) The lumber solution was sufficient only long enough until sheet-metal and armor walls could be purchased locally or shipped in to make a gun box.
Yet another variant of the gun box was to cut shipping containers and supplement them with lumber roofs. The boxes cut a striking image on the desert horizon. Battalion leaders disliked the roofs because they were often rickety in construction (see figure 4) but they remained central to the box design. Gun truck patrol crews literally baked under the sun so the roofs were fundamentally practical. Beyond this, the roofs protected crews from grenades and stones being dropped from bridges.360 The grenades were generally the work of insurgents; the stones were generally the result of Iraqi children.361
360 Richard Killblane, "Interview with Ltc George Akin," ed. Institute Combat Studies, Operational Leadership Experiences (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center, 2005). 361 Ibid.
154
Figure 13: Field adapted pedestal and wooden gun box
Figure 14: Gun box with roof made from shipping container
155
Figure 15: Rare example of a decorated gun truck
Figure 16: Iron Horse after an IED
Although the truckers had shared experiences, routes, refueling points, and faced the same vulnerabilities no single initial source of development occurred.
Rather, the progenitors of the gun truck were spread across the battlefield nearly
156 simultaneously. Units did their own research, sourced their own solutions and often claimed to be the first to create the gun truck. Some of their work has been chronicled, in other cases, not at all.
Among the earliest documented examples comes from the 240th Quartermaster
Battalion; they were responsible for the set-up and maintenance of the fuel depots in
Iraq. They of course, like the transportation units went in with MTOE’s that didn’t support the challenges of their environment. Technologically, their needs were similar to transportation, but their tactical needs were different. In early 2003, the prevalence of the insurgency was less pressing than theft of supplies by locals. They knew that brandishing a Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) was enough to deter fuel and aluminum thieves, and they also knew that they lacked vehicles that could withstand small arms.362
In response to the threat they scavenged plywood to add to their HMMWVs and placed a ring mount atop the roll bar for their SAW.363 This was sufficient early on, but as the insurgency developed and more transportation units moved into theater other solutions developed.
362 Ltc Sean P Walsh, "More Tooth for Tail," Army Logistician 36, no. Jan-Feb 04 (2004). 363 Ibid. “Since the PPTOs were authorized neither vehicle mounts for crew-served weapons nor hardened high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), they improvised by hardening vehicles with sandbags and placing two plywood “doors” over the canvas roof of the HMMWVs and another sheet of plywood under the canvas roof and roll bar of the vehicle. When the roof doors were open, soldiers could rest their weapons on the plywood on the vehicle roof. This improvised method kept M249 squad automatic weapons (SAWs) in plain sight, which helped to deter attacks and placed the weapon in a ready-to-fire position”
157
The 180th Transportation Battalion went directly to converting their 5-ton trucks. The 1058th Transportation Company (of the 180th) completed the conversion of their 5-ton truck in April of 2003. Company Sergeant Major Joseph Paccioretti describes his unit’s work as comprising the first in-theater solution utilizing the drop-side flat bed of their trucks as the supporting surface for a lumber double-walled pill box.
“My unit had only four M923A2s equipped with ring mounts for crew served weapons. More trucks equipped to carry crew served weapons were needed, but there was an Army wide shortage on vehicle ring mounts. The solution to our need for trucks that could carry crew served weapons came at the local level. Using materials available in theater we constructed the first “gun trucks”. Pedestal mounts for crew served weapons were constructed and mounted in the beds of our M923A2’s. The NCOs of my unit then designed and constructed double walled plywood boxes around the gun mounts. They were then filled with sand bags to provide the gunner standing in the open truck bed with some protection.”364
Some solutions were developed in conjunction with experienced advisors. Among the more creative solutions was the 548th CSB (Combat Service Battalion), 10th Mountain
Division who 548th enlisted the help of several Vietnam war veterans serving in the
Army National Guard.365 The 548th’s models were welded out of Russian vehicle armor plates found in a local warehouse in Iraq. To the armor plates they added both ring and pedestal mounts.366 The 548th also developed an altered version of the gun truck box that could be shifted from one truck to another with the help of a forklift. (see
364 Pg 9. CSM Joseph C. Paccioretti, "The Pioneers: Operation Iraqi Freedom, Oif-1, Fob Speicher, Tikrit, Iraq 18 Apr 03-19 Apr 04," ed. United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (Combined Arms Center, 2008). 365 Capt Daniel T Rossi, "The Logistics Convoy: A Combat Operation," Army Logistician 37, no. 1 (2005). 366 Damian A Green, "Gun Trucks in Brigade Support Battalions—How Much Longer?," Army, May 2011 2011.
158 figure 7) They also developed a distinct set of tactics and procedures for convoy protection and response. 367
Figure 17: Welded gun box from Russian Armor Plate
Figure 18: Gun Truck with Pedestal, Ring, Armor, and Roof
367 “we developed effective convoy procedures and battle drills. We determined that the minimum effective convoy security configuration included two gun trucks, one positioned in front of the convoy and one in the rear.”Rossi, "The Logistics Convoy: A Combat Operation."
159
The 518th Gun Truck Company based out of Navistar Kuwait at the height of its strength had a total of 35 HMMWV’s and 5 M939 five-ton trucks. All of those vehicles were modified in the field including a ring mount that McCormick had added to the roof of his HMMWV. McCormick’s methods were aggressive but effective. His unit elevated the visibility of their gun truck by painting black stripes on it.368 McCormick also reached back to the United States via the internet to contact Army Transportation
Historian Richard Killblane for additional tactical and technological solutions.
The instances are nearly uncountable. Individual units sourced and developed their own technological solutions across the battlefield and over time. The 630th
Transportation Company converted eight of their M939 5-ton trucks.369 The 1484th
Transportation Company of the Ohio National Guard armored and used a camouflage net for shade on their M923A1s.370 The 5th Special Forces Group up-armored, placed a metal gun box behind the cab, armed, and painted giant teeth on the front bumper of their 6X6 5-ton truck.371
In the midst of all the decentralized development a single location managed to attract a great deal of it—the 181st Transportation Battalion’s machine shop at LSA
Anaconda.372 They called it the Skunk Werks. It was an ad hoc machine shop run by
368 Pg 8. Ibid. 369 Pg 55. Carl and Ralph Zwilling Schulze, Armored/Gun Trucks of the Army in Iraq, ed. Tankograd, American Special No 3002 (Erlangen: Tankograd Publishing, 2005). 370 Pg 52. Ibid. 371 Pg 50. Ibid. 372 Global Security, "181st Transportation Battalion: The Road Warriors."
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Lieutenant Mitchell Bierl. Bierl hired local Iraqi metalworkers and assembled a welding shop. Together with any other skilled welders in the unit they turned out specialized armor systems for any unit that had the time to come through.373 As word of mouth spread, the Sunk Werks converted vehicles and simultaneously learned about the field solutions developed by individual units. The technological adaptations both coalesced and diffused from this central point.374
As modifications popped across Iraq so too did tactical shifts. At the outset of
OIF the readily available tactical information was a mere shadow of the Vietnam evolution. Doctrinally, FM 55-30 (last updated in 1997) was the accepted field manual for motor transport operations. Written largely for a conventional environment, the manual provides two notable components. First, the section on ambush provides a bullet point list of actions transportation can do to avoid ambush, and to reduce its effectiveness. Within that list were two specific instructions: “harden vehicles” and “use escort vehicles (military police, tanks, armored vehicles) or gun trucks.375 Second, in the manual was Appendix O—nine pages of diagrams and suggestions for how a unit
373 The 181st Battalion headquarters asked the companies for anyone with metal working experience. LT Mitchell Bierl stepped forward and the 181st Battalion hired a crew of Iraqi metalworkers. The welding shop referred to themselves the “Skunk Werks, named after the laboratory in the comic strip, “Lil’ Abner.” The new Skunk Werks specialized in the custom armoring of vehicles. They constructed square gun boxes, or “dog houses,” on the backs of M923 5-ton cargo trucks, FMTVs and Palletized Loading System (PLS) flat-racks initially with mounts for M249 SAWs…CW3 Wayne Glass, an active duty Soldier of 602nd Maintenance Company, also came up with a design for a weapon’s mount bolted in the gun boxes so the Soldiers could mount an M2 .50 caliber machinegun, an Mk19 automatic grenade launcher or M249 SAW. The Battalion contracted with local Iraqis to make the pedestal mounts for the gun trucks.” Pg 129 Killblane, "Road Warriors." 374 Spc Mary E. Ferguson, "Monster Garage," Sustainer 2006. 375 Pg 100 Army, "Fm 55-30 Army Motor Transport and Units Operations," ed. U.S. ARMY Headquarters (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1997).
161 might harden a truck. The third page of the appendix presents an image of a Vietnam era gun truck with its steel armor panels and pedestal mounted weapons.
As a tactical guide for operations the field manual assigns responsibility for security and protection to the MP’s first and suggests that transportation units be aware, though not specifically train or prepare for this outcome. The term gun truck appears only twice prior to appendix O in the 300-page manual, if you didn’t know to look for it, you wouldn’t know what it was.376 The gap in preparedness appeared to be sufficiently filled by doctrine, but there was no application of the appendix to match its words. In over 30 gun truck driver there appears no reference to appendix O as being part of their training or field experience. In fact aside from the transportation museum historian, no one appears to know that the section exists.377 On paper there appeared to be no gap in doctrine. In practice, it was invisible. Apparently in war, and the preparation for it, nobody reads.
To fill this gap individual unit-led solutions appeared; generally attached to specific technological solutions. In terms of the HMMWV, Captain Isaac Bristow of the
181st in LSA Anaconda recalled reading an article written by transportation instructor
Dean Dominique. Dominique’s concept dubbed “rat patrols” set a forward scout group patrolled ahead of the convoy to look for trouble.378 Bristow commandeered the idea
376 Page 280- 289.Department of the Army, "Field Manual 55-30 Army Motor Transportation Units and Operations," ed. Army, Field Manual (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1997). 377 Killblane. 378 See: Dean Dominique, "Convoy Rat Patrol," Army Logistician 34: 3, no. May/June (2002).
162 and renamed it “tiger team.” He then arranged for the newly minted 2632nd Air
Expeditionary Force (AEF) to train in live fire and to practice convoy security as tiger teams with modified HMMWV’s. The tiger team concept could only work with the highly mobile vehicles with low profiles. The tiger team concept only worked under altered information transmission. Since the teams needed as much information regarding threats, solutions, and troop movement, the concept required a cross-rank intel meetings among convoy commanders so that information could be passed directly.379
Larger vehicles and convoys developed their tactics in terms of vehicle ordering.
Vehicles organic to transportation units tend to be larger and less mobile off-road.
Units developed tactics to capitalize upon this characteristic. The HET (Heavy Equipment
Transporter), is the largest vehicle with the greatest clearance from ground to belly in transportation’s TOE. As the IED attacks increased in frequency, some units pushed their gun trucks to the back and led with the HET because it could survive the blast and shield its passengers more effectively.380
Some solutions developed were purely a matter of combat tactics. The “turn, fix, and fire” developed by the 518th’s Lieutenant James McCormick instructed that gun
379 Pg 18. Killblane, "Interview with Ltc George Akin." 380 Pg 9. Lawrence Lessard, "Interview with Major Dan Williamson," ed. Institute Combat Studies, Operational Leadership Experiences (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center, 2007).
163 trucks stop to fix their position before returning fire.381 It made sense for the convoy to move forward as quickly as possible, but gun trucks could protect and return fire more effectively while standing still. McCormick advised that once sufficient distance was reached the gun truck should stop and turn on its attackers.
In the midst of the decentralized tactical solutions a centralized collection point developed. Once again the decentralized solution production found an incidental single focal point in theater through the work of the 181st Transportation group. Very early on,
Major Clifford Serwe saw that his transportation troops lack first-hand experience with heavy weapons under live-fire conditions. Captain Andrew Bristow took this observation and pressed upward to 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM) to permit him to set up a live-fire range outside LSA Anaconda. Although soldiers eventually received live-fire training prior to deployment the Udairi firing range positioned in
Kuwait provided soldiers with one last opportunity to practice before moving into
Iraq.382
The course itself was administered by a private firm MPRI but it was staffed by retired soldiers, civilian trainers, and officers who’d experienced convoy protection duty. The firing-range had initially been intended for soldiers in combat roles, but the
181st pressed to have a specific class aimed at convoy protection. Between June of 2003 and 2004, roughly 100,000 soldiers went through that live-fire two-day crash course in
381 Pg 68. Richard Killblane, "Convoy Ambush Case Studies," (Fort Eustis: Transportation Corps Historian, 2006). 382 Staff, "Gun-Truck Alley Provides Convoy Security Training," Army Reserve Magazine 2003.
164 convoy operations.383 For most soldiers, it was the most realistic and useful training they would encounter in preparation for the line haul of Iraq.384
Udairi was a training site, just as the Skunk Werks was a welding shop. They were first and foremost, direct solution providers to the problem of convoy vulnerability. But they also worked as points of coalescence. In order to stay relevant these shops and ranges were constantly fed by the ideas created in the field. For tactics this meant a centralized brain trust for convoy solutions. By late 2003, the knowledge collected at
Udairi became a tactical manual developed in conjunction with the Army’s Center for
Army Lessons Learned (CALL).385
The Udairi training manual was not the only manual to come out of that period of transition. Overall, at least three formally accepted updated guides for convoy patrol, protection, and operations were in full circulation. All three take gun trucks and convoy security tactics as one of their central components and utilize lessons directly derived from the experience in Iraq. The manuals are based partly on the lessons learned from Vietnam for hardening vehicles and partially on the tactics derived from the insights of convoy commanders in OIF. CALL’s Convoy Leader Training Handbook
(originally published in November of 2003) came directly from the Udairi training center in Kuwait. Through a joint editing project with the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E), Joint Survivability (JSURV) Quick Reaction Test (QRT), Joint Test and
383 Dennis Steele, "Last Stop before Iraq," Army 2004, no. May 2004 (2004). 384 Katherine McIntire Peters, "Hard Lessons," Government Executive 2004. 385 Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Convoy Leader Training," ed. Combined Arms Center (Fort Leavenworth: TRADOC, 2003).
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Evaluation (JT&E), and the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) the manual distilled and represented the current lessons learned in theater.386 From this handbook, the private contract company MPRI developed its supplement meant for direct application to the range at Udairi.387 In the meantime, Transportation Historian
Richard Killblane and Major Dean Dominique worked together to produce a tactical convoy handbook for the U.S. Army Transportation School in the United States that pulled the relevant doctrinal lessons from current manuals.388 Finally, the Air Land Sea
Application’s (ALSA) manual titled Tactical Convoy Ops was published in 2005, but was already in circulation by mid 2004 in Iraq.389
The technological and tactical evolution of the gun truck in Iraq was complete by the middle of 2004, barely a year after the battle of An-Nasiriyah. Where once there had been doctrinal dearth, there was now relevant abundance. Where once there was a technological gap, there were now several solutions.
Vertical Linkages—LLNL, the M1117, and Duncan Hunter
The events as they unfolded in OIF demonstrated a permissiveness and responsiveness to field-level adaptation. While there existed a field-level pathway of gun truck evolution, multiple additional solutions in the form of tactical training,
386 Pg 2.Ibid. 387 Group, "Convoy Leader Training Handbook." 388 Dean Dominique, "Tactical Convoy Handbook," ed. U.S. Army Transportation School (Fort Eustis). 389 Pg 1. Air Land Sea Application Center, "Tactical Convoy Ops," ed. Air Land Sea Application Center (Washington DC: Air Force Publishing, 2005).
166 modular additions, and information sharing were provided from the top down. The solutions worked in direct support of adaptations filtering up from the field-level.
The opening of OIF revealed too clearly to the public, the government, and the highest echelons of the Department of Defense (DoD) that soldiers weren’t dying in combat—they were dying on their way to it. The stories weren’t heroic—they were incongruous with a picture of technological superiority.390 In late 2003, the persistence of IED attacks and the national attention to thin-skinned HMMWV’s had captured the national attention. Soldiers openly asked questions of their senators and defied orders to drive the most dangerous routes in Iraq.391 The champion of the Revolution in
Military Affairs himself, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, appeared caught in a paradox—all the technological superiority couldn’t win a war by fiat.392
Simultaneously, field commanders shrugged and nodded with Rumsfeld’s aphorism that you “went to war with the army you have” and while they trudged onward mapping solutions to gaps, the solutions from above kicked into gear.393
Despite the appearance that the military had been entirely unprepared there were solutions already in production that addressed the problem of convoy vulnerability. From the conventional acquisition process was the M1117. The M1117
390 M. Hirsh, J. Barry, and B. Dehghanpisheh, "Iraq: Hillbilly Armor," NEWSWEEK -AMERICAN EDITION- 144, no. 25 (2004). 391 Jensen, "Soldiers Who Refused Convoy Mission Won't Be Required to Face Court-Martial ". 392 Eric Schmitt, "Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld over Lack of Armor," New York Times, December 8, 2004 2004. 393 An oft cited quote from Donald Rumsfeld in late 2004 trying to explain why armor was still in short supply in theater. See: Ibid.
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ASV (Armored Security Vehicle) has been assigned for use by MPs since 1999.394 There simply weren’t enough to go around. The M1117 looks nearly identical to the V100
Commando from the Vietnam era. And for a very significant reason, the M1117 ASV is produced by Cadillac Gage, the same producer as the original V100. The single design difference is that the M1117 is modularly designed.
Unlike the V100’s largely static in design, the M1117 comes with Mexas; the modular expandable armor system. Mexas functions as a bolt-on armor kit so that soldiers in the field can adjust the body of the vehicle based on the level of threat and the desired performance. Additional armor affords the crew more protection against enemy arms, but slows and labors the engine more. The ASV also has an optional turret enhancement kit to provide for variation in gunner protection and firepower.395 The
18th MP Brigade had been using the M1117 since 2000. In December 2004 the Army requested an additional 212 M1117’s to be delivered by 2006, this was increased again to 724 M1117’s by June of 2007 reflecting yet again the transition from the ASV’s status as an MP vehicle to its expansion into a convoy security role.
394 Staff, "M1117 Armoured Security Vehicle, United States of America," Textron, http://www.army- technology.com/projects/m1117/. 395 Textron Systems, "Textron Marine & Land Systems: Armored Security Vehicle M1117," (Slidell: Textron Systems Inc, 2011).
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Figure 19: M1117
Figure 20: V-100 Commando
Once again, however the preference for or against the M1117 was limited to the perspective of the driver and crew. Transportation units found, as they did in Vietnam, that the shape of the M1117 denied the 360 degrees of visibility and fire capability.
Some gun truckers were comfortable with this. Most, unfortunately, were not. In his
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Congressional testimony Lawrence Livermore Research Laboratory (LLNL) engineer
Steven DeTeresa explained the disadvantages associated with closed body armored personal carriers and argued for additional alternatives to be included in transportation’s TOE.396 The echoes of Vietnam lessons learned were undeniable—for the same reasons many Vietnam gun truck crews disliked the V100—Iraq gun truck crews felt ambivalent about the M1117.397
The debate position was nearly moot since the early limited availability of the
M117 meant that even if it was the perfect solution, there weren’t enough to go around anyhow. This energized additional top-down responses—namely from commercial producers and Congress. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) responded with a plan to up-armor most of the vehicles already in theater. The up-armor issue was considered a theater-wide problem across all military occupations. As a result the
HASC sought solutions along those lines. The initiative to look specifically at gun trucks came from John Hunter, brother of the Chairman of the HASC Duncan Hunter. The interim solution needed to be low-cost, rapid, and flexible. He reached out directly to
Transportation Museum Historian Richard Killblane. Killblane put Hunter in touch with two Vietnam gun truck specialists who immediately went to work developing a hardening kit in conjunction with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). In
396 House Armed Services Committee, "Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives One Hundred Tenth Congress First Session Hearing Held June 6, 2007," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007). 397 Namely the lack of full visibility, the tradeoff between soldier protection and the ability to return fire effectively, and the problem of IED blast waves. See: Chaloner Eddie, "Blast Injury in Enclosed Spaces," BMJ 331, no. 7509 (2005).
170 addition, John Hunter visited Killblane at Fort Eustis to get a first-hand study of ‘Eve of
Destruction’ the only original Vietnam gun truck, currently housed at the Transportation
Corps History Museum at Fort Eustis.398
Meanwhile the Honorable Duncan Hunter pushed demands through the HASC to provide Killblane and LLNL with the resources they needed to develop and test their ideas. Design and flexibility was of central concern to the LLNL crew so they sought direct advice from soldiers in the field and queried Killblane’s research at Skunk Werks.
The result was a fully modular bolt-on kit that could be assembled by six non-specialists in less than two hours.399
The LLNL solution was not the only solution on offer. In fact, over 40 armor kit solutions were offered up and sent into theater from producers eager for the contract.
One company in particular (Steward & Stevenson Services Inc) also turned out a competitive design. The solutions on offer for kits initially looked entirely different from the LLNL package designed for the 5 ton truck. After LLNL conducted its demonstration of the 5-ton gun box design (a specifically Vietnam inspired design), S&S went back to the drawing board to provide a solution that mimicked the box design.
LLNL’s solution was unbeatable, however. The S&S solution ran $60,000 per unit, the
Radion solution ran $64,000 yet required professional installation, and the LLNL solution of comparable strength came in at $30,000 and was easily fitted to most truck designs.
398 Dominique, "Gun Trucks: A Vietnam Innovation Returns." 399 Pg 163. Killblane, "Road Warriors."
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Both the S&S and LLNL prototypes were field tested by the 7th Transportation
Battalion in theater in early 2004. The first LLNL prototype (called the Armored
Survivability Kit or ASK) was struck by an IED just outside the wire of LSA Anaconda and continued to roll with crew intact. Upon return to the LSA, it was struck again.
Shortly thereafter, the 7th requested 28 additional LLNL kits for their 5-ton trucks.
Figure 21 The LLNL Modular Armor System
Not everyone liked the armor kits—specifically the generals. Their opinion was that the open gun box unduly risked the lives of the soldiers with the potential for death by rollover.400The feedback from the field overrode those cautions and despite this, soldiers currently continue to use the gun box design with or without the top-down solution.
400 Pg 12. Jim Bird, "Interview with Ltg R. Steven Whitcomb," ed. Institute Combat Studies, Contemporary Operations Study Team (Fort Leavenworth: 2006).
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Tactically, the upper echelons coordinated directly again with the field level through the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). In early 2003, the 181st
Transportation Battalion’s Major Clifford Serwe, recognized the vulnerability of his convoys and the lack of tactical direction. Serwe immediately reached out to CALL to learn anything and everything about convoy protection, TTP’s for convoys, and enemy tactics.401 They were responsible for coordinating and developing the tactical manual in conjunction with the now immensely busy Richard Killblane.
Established in the mid 1980’s CALL’s mission is to utilize the mountains of information and experience developed from prior wars to inform the current battle. In order to facilitate this CALL has a Facebook page, a direct dial number, a searchable online database, and established connections with historians across the nation.402 CALL staffs their phone lines with experienced soldiers and researchers prepared to answer just about any question.403 CALL is a conscious attempt by the Army organization to store its lessons somewhere in an accessible manner. CALL makes itself directly available to deployed soldiers of all ranks in the theater of war.404 Serwe knew to contact CALL in order to bridge the doctrinal gaps. In this sense, while doctrine failed, the organization did not.
401 Pg 127. Killblane, "Road Warriors." 402 CALL was the subject of NPR’s radio show “This American Life.” See: CALL’s Mission http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/mission.asp 403 Patricia Kime, "Instant Readiness: Lessons Learned in Iraq Available Online and in the Field the Next Day (About Center for Army Lessons Learned) " Army Times 2005 404 Killblane, "Road Warriors."
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Despite widespread public recognition of the shortcomings in technology and tactics in Iraq, it wasn’t as if the DoD had nothing in place to provide for the adaptation process. Despite gaps in written doctrine, the DoD readily engaged both traditional and non-traditional means of acquisition and tactical developments. The nature of the vertical linkages was decidedly bi-directional in nature. It wasn’t the case that war planners simply wanted the distilled lessons for re-broadcast across the field. Producers and planners wanted soldiers to be actively participating in the process of production.
In their minds it was the best way to get to the right solution.
Horizontal Linkages—Skunk Werks, and Udairi Firing Range
While efforts from above reached downward, the wheels of the decentralized field-level trading system warmed its engines—the time honored tradition of making it work was in full force. Just as in Vietnam, an informal trading system sprung up to fill the gaps left by the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE or MTOE). Gun trucks assembled from scavenged armor and borrowed guns were inspired by word of mouth and the active trade in unit assets horizontally. Beyond this, the Iraq battlefield also revealed two new patterns of adaptation. Beyond the localized trade of machinery and ideas, horizontal linkages no longer stopped at the borders of the theater. Second, within theater, gun truck tactics and technological solutions pooled and collected at particular collection points. These collection points made it easier for top-down initiatives to connect to the field and vice versa.
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The Iraq theater was a permissive environment for adaptation. Field level expedients and efficient solutions were encouraged early on by commanders just so long as everything was accounted for.405 Equipment was passed hand to hand from unit to unit to the places that needed it most. 406 To do so the development of connections across MOS’ (military occupational specialty) was crucial for most units. The strength of those connections across the horizon was supplemented by soldiers who knew how to source and obtain objects while in theater.407
By late 2004 skirting the equipment roster was a matter of common practice.
Soldiers were supposed to build gun trucks; the exception was to remain within the boundaries of their MTOE.408 Interviews with soldiers who provided logistical support reiterate again and again that adaptation and improvisation were the order of the day
405 “What we did end up doing, just like we did for a lot of supply, you wheel and deal to get what you can for your soldiers. Either go down to Kuwait and see if you can talk someone into issuing it to you. Because they’re going to get it back when you go home anyway…So, wherever we could get it. No theft. We didn’t steal it or anything. We had soldiers, as much as our guys were on the road, they visited a lot of different installations and supply activities, because they were delivering equipment or supplies. And so, they would go in and say, “Hey, we can’t get this where we are at, can we sign for this from you?” Pg 8. Dan Ltc Kenda, "Interview with Maj. Mary Beth Taylor," ed. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operational Leadership Experiences (Fort Leavenworth: 2005). 406 Pg 8. Marty Maj. Deckard, "Interview with Major Heidi Baird," ed. Institute Combat Studies, Operational Leadership Experiences (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008). 407 Pg 8. John JMc. McCool, "Interview with Capt. Jennifer Mlocek," ed. Institute Combat Studies, Operational Leadership Experiences Project (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Arms Center, 2006). “Don’t take that as there was anything illegal or inappropriate going on, absolutely not, but the maintenance folks found out who they needed to go talk to. They worked the system – all above board – but no stone was left unturned if we needed something, and I think my maintenance folks pushed the envelope a bit at what we accomplished at our level.” 408 See pg 4. Ibid. “JM: We learned we needed to have gun trucks, and that was very significant. Transportation companies by modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) don’t have a gun truck platoon, but we figured out that that was something we were going to need. Iowa assisted us in putting add-on armor on six of our Humvees.”
175 and that these choices were quite often against protocol but simultaneously expected.409
“…the whole TOE, Table of Organization and Equipment, that dictates what equipment is standard for our type units….So you don’t have gun trucks or the assets available to make gun trucks. We didn’t have the armor. We had to do welding of steel to the sides of our vehicles….We didn’t have the security we probably should have had in many cases. We ended up doing vehicle modifications. In the heavy equipment truck, there is a place in the roof of the cab where you can put in an air conditioner. None of our vehicles had air conditioning. But you could take that panel out and put somebody up there to stand, not mount the gun, but stand up there with a gun… Plywood. Steel. Sandbags. Whatever we could come up with. That’s what we did.410
When not working around the MTOE independently, the natural linkages across transportation truck units served as the pathways for the diffusion of concepts and technologies. The roads crisscrossing Iraq provided points of collection where soldiers exchanged ideas and technologies in an entirely decentralized manner. They shared meals and talked about their troubles in the DFAC (dining facility). Soldiers also collected and traded the things they needed in theater. One gun truck leader even commandeered and entire metal shipping container and stocked it full of enemy weapons acquired during combat. He collected and traded insurgent AK-47’s with
409 “…soldiers had to improvise and make things happen. When a link would go down and soldiers would have to troubleshoot and figure out what's wrong, there are certain procedures they're supposed to follow, like they call electronic maintenance (ELM). They need to get a part, and then they get permission to get the part, controlled substitution, whatever it takes to get a link up. Sometimes we just had to improvise for the mission. And I think that improvising, while not a doctrinal - it's not something you're supposed to do doctrinally, but we did what we had to do,….” Pg 5. Jim Timmerman, "Interview with Cpt. Pamela Alexander," ed. U.S. Army Signal Center Military History Office, Global War on Terrorism History Project (Fort Gordon: 2005). 410 Kenda, "Interview with Maj. Mary Beth Taylor."
176 members of the Special Forces community in exchange for extra .50 caliber ammunition for his gun truck.411
In step with the individualized technological modifications, the evolution of gun truck tactics varied across units and in terms of the equipment on hand. The 181st’s tactical tiger team meetings provided an open and frank conversation for each gun truck crew about the state of equipment, roads, and threats to security every morning.
Platoon leaders realized that the best possible way to stay on top of the requirements for trucks and their associated tactics would be to continue providing the tiger team meetings because they permitted free conversation about updated tactics.412 Rather than using the traditional means of information distribution, downward through the chain of command, tiger team meetings were held with convoy commanders, drivers, crews, and officers all at the same time. As one Sergeant reported: “proves the importance of conducting hands-on, performance oriented training, and using all available Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP) that are currently coming out of theater, and not relying too heavily on past experiences in an ever changing asymmetrical battlefield.”413
411 Anonymous Interview with gun truck commander. 01/11/2012 412 Pg 7. Killblane, "Interview with Ltc George Akin." 413 Pg 3. Jonathan D. Dantzler, "Convoy Training and Ied Ambush, Oif 04-06, Iraq, June 2004 through February 2006," ed. Center for Army Lessons Learned (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2006). Duran is careful to point out that one of the key components of the innovation was the realization that CSS troops needed training in tactics and live fire. “CPT Watson and I soon learned that there was some work to be done as far as training, especially instilling in leaders the use of hands-on, performance- oriented training. ….but Havoc Troop seemed to be an afterthought for combat training events except for the planning and execution of resupply of Class III, Class V, and medical support at training sites and
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Beyond trading in goods and chatting over meals, soldiers actively teach each other. Squad and platoon leaders know that idle soldiers are better served by learning. Most leaders, informally, but actively require their soldiers to learn and teach across professions during their downtime. It is a nearly universal practice that while on operating bases or during layovers you practice what you learned or you teach other units what you already know. It is a constant state of practice and teaching—whether that be fixing equipment, stopping a sucking chest wound, or seeking advice on proper documentation for leave.414 The same was true of soldiers in Transportation who commonly received additional training and tactical tips from infantry, and artillery units.
The other teaching method pushes operational knowledge forward to the replacing unit. This was crucial for transportation units in March of 2004 as the U.S. initiated a near complete rotation of soldiers out of OIF. That rotation signaled a potential severing point of many of the horizontal linkages already established on the battlefield. The potential for major disorientation was softened by two formal field practices: RIPTOA (Reinforcement in Place Transfer of Authority) and Left Seat/Right
Seat rides (generally used by though not constrained to transportation units to learn routes and methods).415 The two concepts essentially place soldiers in theater to work
ranges. Nevertheless, CPT Watson and I decided to make sure the Combat Service Support Soldiers of Havoc Troop were trained in not only their MOS specific tasks, but also individual Soldier fighting tasks.” 414 Interview with Dean Dominique, June 30, 2011. 415 Very little is written about RIPTOA in security studies. What is written seems to disagree with the opinions of the soldiers I met. Most found RIPTOA a useful demonstration of unit practices, whether they become adopted, however is another story entirely. See: Tommie J. ; Riley Lucius, Mike "The Logcap Iii to
178 alongside the unit they will replace. They do so in order to learn their practices and techniques. Though the replacement unit is free to change practices and procedures the
RIPTOA and Left Seat/Right Seat rides are an opportunity (though narrow) to communicate and explain the how and why of the current practices to the replacements.
Further supplementing the strength of the common horizontal linkages was the newly patterned flow of ideas through the Skunk Werks and the Udairi firing range. LSA
Anaconda was the central hub for logistics repair and transfer. The crew at the Skunk
Werks welding shop was efficient, skilled, and could turn out a requested gun truck modification within a day.416 The Skunk Werks also had the supplies and equipment necessary to produce and repair the field level solutions. Their skill at technological adaptation became a magnet for gun truck crews and their designs. This made the machine shop, the inadvertent recipient of many of the individually developed field adaptations. Likewise the Udairi firing range run by MPRI brought together experts and novices from all across the battlefield onto the same playing field to share their insights and ideas on tactical operations. It did so because MPRI needed to train units with the latest tactics techniques and procedures. In order to do so, it had to bring in the practitioners of gun truck tactics. Steadily, MPRI collected the most advanced knowledge and tactical developments on the Iraqi battlefield.
Logcap Iv Transition in Northern Afghanistan. Contract Services Phase-in and Phase-out on a Grand Scale ", ed. Defense Acquistion University (Fort Belvoir: 2011). 416 Spc Andrew Orillion, "Skunkwerks," Sustainer 2006.
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Finally, horizontal linkages were fundamentally altered by the 21st century.
Instantaneous communications and worldwide computer access lengthened the reach of individual soldiers by entire continents. The sourcing system left the battlefield entirely many times as individual soldiers sought clues to providing improved convoy defense. Soldiers were no longer asking only for care packages with cookies, they sought technological fixes and knew how to ask for them…by tapping into chatrooms and blog sites. Soldiers bought the equipment they needed online, through eBay, and from Rei.com. And when money was short, or parts were too specific, they simply asked for help.417
Given all this horizontal activity, what did not happen was the development of a gun truck identity or a gun truck culture. There was no concomitant culture of brightly- colored and audaciously named machines as occurred in Vietnam. Rather the primary horizontal mechanism was fulfilled through individual soldier initiative and the funneling of services through MPRI training and the Skunk Werks systems. . The role was seemingly replaced by the collection points.
Iraq Gun Truck Innovation—A Case of Successful Failure
In the transition from 2003 to 2004 what began as tragedy turned to field-level adaptation and eventually to full scale organizational incorporation into practice—major military innovation. It is unknown precisely how many gun trucks were created in Iraq
417 Dan Baum, "Battle Lessons: What the Generals Don't Know," The New Yorker, January 17, 2005 2005.
180 but the adaptation process was never top-down driven. The entire process was one of mediated top-down and bottom-up solutions aligning over time to produce major military innovation.
Horizontal linkages present across the battlefield and beyond spread ideas and designs throughout the theater. Soldiers inside and outside transportation units were confronted with the same security problems and all reached out to try to resolve the issue independently. This held until the 181st provided the Skunk Werks and the Udairi training range. Moreover, the linkages across the horizon didn’t stop at national borders in Iraq. Instead they reached all the way back to the United States as young actors in the field used the internet to source and solve their technological and tactical problems. The vertical linkages present in Iraq gave soldiers direct access to information sources, producers, the public, and decision makers. The character of some of the vertical linkages was not unidirectional they were collaborative in the production of solutions with soldiers and their ideas. Between the vertical and horizontal linkages there was a very strong interaction. The interaction between the top and the field was initiated from both ends and met in the middle through organizational sites of collection at the field level. It is at these points that the potential for major military innovation became possible as the adaptation process aligned directly with efforts from above.
Overall the case points directly to the necessity of purposeful alignment between the top and the bottom. Top-down solutions already existed prior to Iraq, the M117,
CALL, and Appendix O were all essentially doctrine without practice. The direct
181 implication is that a change in written doctrine enshrined in field manuals means almost nothing without associated practice—It is doctrinal grand design change independent of field-level adaptation. Moreover, the case demonstrates that military innovation needn’t only be initiated from one location, it can originate in several places, but the absence of the alignment with an adaptation or improvisation process will not result in a major military innovation.418
The post mortem on the innovation process reveals several surprising outcomes.
First, contrary to how military organizations are characterized, senior leaders were actually quite willing to permit creativity, and open experimentation. Second, the
Iraq case demonstrates the direct interaction between the horizontal and vertical dimensions in producing an adaptive outcome. OIF began with a theory of war that did not fit the battlefield. Where the vertical solutions were insufficient, the horizontal dimension expanded. The soldiers fill the gap between theory and practice with their own interpretation and collaboration. Third, the rules of a bureaucratic system can be bypassed for the value of its ability to structure a chaotic environment. Forth, almost nothing in my research suggests that anyone down range has the time to read anything so lengthy as a book or even a report. Effective field-level adaptation requires active persons. Soldiers learned from each other through direct verbal exchanges, or technological trades. Even CALL’s role, as a central database for knowledge was
418 This is keeping with Steve Rosen’s critique of Barry Posen’s understanding of doctrinal change and major military innovation being synonymous. See: Stephen Peter Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," International Security 13, no. 1 (1988).
182 primarily useful for providing a pulse at the other end of a phone line to communicate directly. This reveals that written documents are insufficient for war practices and organizational innovation. They must be acted, and lived for their greatest effect.
The men and women who fill the role of the boots on the ground are marvelous adapters. They adapt their technologies and their tactics to fit the context of the fight.
They do so in cooperative and collaborative means by networking, sidestepping rules, and (in many occasions) dumpster diving. The Iraq case demonstrates the completion of an adaptation process with a strong degree of vertical linkages after the initial recognition of the problem. The interaction between top-down and bottom-up solutions created a major military innovation that incorporated elements of soldier insight with technological solutions. What remains is a cross-case comparison of the variation in outcomes between the two cases. Namely, what explains why one case produced major military innovation while the other did not?
Cross Case Comparison
The Iraq and Vietnam gun truck cases are remarkably similar at the outset as well as in their solution. Both cases are united on a single technological frame—the task vehicles of transportation. Both cases involve similarly unprepared sets of actors from varying backgrounds roughly familiar with their machine but not necessarily the environment. In both cases, the military had an established history of dealing with non- conventional environments, but was accustomed to a conventional battlespace rather
183 than an irregular one.419 The driver of adaptation for both gun trucks vulnerability for transportation; both cases resulted in the development of organic protection for convoys; both cases utilized field resources and the tendency to work around the TOE to achieve their solutions; and finally; both cases resulted in the diffusion of a technology that looked remarkably similar.
Nevertheless there are four overlapping differences between the two outcomes three of which directly inform the hypothesized outcomes in chapter 3: patterns of diffusion, the absence of gun truck identity/culture, and major military innovation.420
The differences between the two cases appear in the pattern of horizontal linkages and the flow of ideas through the vertical linkages. In the first case, the diffusion spread outward from the 8th Transportation group to other areas. The increase in violence on
QL-19 increased first and it necessitated a response. Each tactical zone of Vietnam had its own Transportation corps and each felt the increase in enemy ambush over time, but the most immediate threats and damage happened on QL-19. Bellino’s direct support for his soldier’s work increased the degree of cohesion in the unit assisted by the threat of attack. It produced direct cooperation within the unit and a unified sense of purpose.
As a result, the 8th led the adaptation process as a unified and strongly linked unit.
Through their work and ingenuity the tactics and technology evolved quickly through
419 In both cases the FEBA (forward edge of battle area), FLOT (forward line of own troops), and FSCL (Fire Support Coordination Line) became null concepts in the irregular environment of insurgency. Maj John M. Fawcett, "Which Way to the Feba?," ASPJ 40, no. 3 (1992). 420 The uniformity of the threat environment is the forth difference.
184 trial and error. From there the ideas emanated outward and around Vietnam with the rise of gun truck lore and gun trucker identity. The adaptation process was successful but the technology and tactics moved around the field but collected nowhere officially beyond the field level—there was no concomitant major military innovation.
Efforts from the top down worked out of sync with the experience of the field level. Neither was there a coherent point for the top to collaborate or work with the adaptations in evolution. The one solution with the potential to filter upward was
Bellino’s report summarizing the 8th’s convoy tactics but the updated FM33-50 reflects none of the same language produced in the Bellino report. Rather FM33-50 mimics the bias of prior convoy FM’s allocating convoy protection to MPs. While there were top down solutions, the top down solutions did not absorb this document. By the time of the departure of U.S. forces there was no significant coordination of top down efforts to meet the field-level adaptation. In the rush to exit Vietnam, the adaptations were left in the field.
Iraq was a different story. The An-Nasiriyah attack of 2003 revealed a nearly universal problem of soldier vulnerability in transit—the pressure was applied evenly across the battlespace. MSR Tampa was a central line that all convoys had to traverse so all the units felt the pinch of IEDs and ambush from the very beginning. Rather than a single point of creation as in Vietnam, multiple solutions appeared all at once. Each individual unit produced its own solution—a multiplicity of potential answers. During this early process of adaptation, however, two sites of diffusion/collection popped up—
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Skunk Werks and Udairi firing range. The Skunk Werks, positioned at the major transportation hub LSA Anaconda, was open to all visiting units. It was here that they came to request and suggest solutions. Shop workers, known for their efficiency and expertise simultaneously collected and disseminated the insights of independent creators through talk and tinkering. After Skunk Werks’ reputation spread, most modifications went to LSA Anaconda; it became the central hub that collected and diffused gun truck technology.
Tactically, the same is true for the Udairi firing range. The range was a training point, not just for the soldiers of the 181st, but for all soldiers coming into Iraq.
Experienced convoy commanders returned to help train incoming soldiers. They taught the newest battlefield-tested tactics and techniques.421 Although it took several months to develop, Udairi served as a central dissemination point for convoy tactics. In order to provide that knowledge it had to pull from local experts—a central hub that collected and diffused gun truck tactics.
The differing diffusion patterns—one outward and around, the other inward and centralized—began with uneven threats posed in the field. Since the 8th of Vietnam felt the pressure most and first, it led the adaptation process; formulated strong intra-unit horizontal linkages that eventually radiated outward across the battlefield as they
421 Peters, "Hard Lessons."
186 sought resources to modify their trucks. As other units saw the adaptation and experienced ambushes they emulated the 8th’s work.
Alternately, the units all across Iraq were ambushed entirely from the beginning.
All the units felt the pressure and universally scrambled to solve their own problems.
Given a longer period of time, strong intra-unit and inter-unit horizontal linkages might have developed but Skunk Werks and the Udairi firing range provided more economical points of diffusion and collection. The provision of these specialists for machine modification and field-tested TTPs created horizontal linkages that worked like a hub passing ideas and technology inward and outward. The linkages within units weren’t as developed because they didn’t need to be. The hubs were more effective.
The differing pattern of diffusion may also explain the emergence of the lore and culture of prestige associated with gun truck drivers. Both sets of soldiers were permitted to color outside the lines of the MTOE and modify their machines but only the
Vietnam case developed a strong identity associated with those machines. In both eras units deployed with their own equipment and were individually responsible for it is surprising that a similar culture did not develop. The only two instances of outright decoration and naming of gun trucks in Iraq belonged to the rogue Lieutenant James
McCormick422 and the Iron Horse, the LLNL gun truck.
422 Interview with James McCormick
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More importantly, these differing patterns of horizontal diffusion are immaterial without the second dimension of diffusion in a vertical manner. Both theaters of war had non-traditional agencies willing to develop and adapt technologies. In Vietnam the
LWL’s mission spoke specifically to keeping an ear to the ground in order to help soldiers adapt to the new fight. Likewise with CALL and LLNL in Iraq; despite LWL’s mission to provide for the needs of the soldiers in Vietnam, LWL used Vietnam more as a testing ground for its technologies rather than an ear for the preferences of the soldiers in the field. The flow of technology downward was more rapid, but LWL wasn’t structured to pull adaptations upward, just the feedback from its own projects—the vertical linkages were uni-directional and generally unaligned with soldier initiatives from below. In the
LLNL and CALL cases, the flow of data went both directions. Particularly with CALL, since it had its own data collectors in theater asking questions and interviewing soldiers upon return to the United States, the CALL researchers, listened as well as handed out advice.
Likewise in Iraq the field initiatives pooled in a location at Udairi and Skunk Werks in a way that aligned the adaptation process with the attempts at change from above. The direct alignment of these two efforts from the coalesced solutions in the field in conjunction with active bi-directional vertical linkages brought the levels into sync with one another.
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Finally, the influence of Duncan Hunter cannot be ignored. His work in
Congress lends support to Posen’s argument that mavericks are central to innovation.423
Upon closer inspection, however the Senator’s role in producing gun truck innovation should not be overstated. Having the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee dedicated to the protection of soldiers is immensely powerful, as is the role of the media in elevating the importance of the cause. But neither the media nor Duncan
Hunter listened specifically to the soldiers in transportation units in the field. It raised the question but did not offer a solution. The thin-skinned HMMWV problem was but one component of the larger problem of convoy security.
Given these differences in outcomes and diffusion I now return to the hypothesized interactions to for assessment. First I suggested that there was an interaction between the vertical and horizontal linkages—the absence of one led to the expansion of the other. Both cases presented an unmet need that was initially solved at the field level. From here, however, the Vietnam case went on to produce an entirely horizontal solution that never met with vertical linkages to support soldier efforts. They were supplemental at best, with ditch clearing, additional MP’s, and road paving. The 8th extended and developed its horizontal linkages to source the solution. The Iraq case began with the same vertical dearth, and individual units expanded their linkages to provide solutions. In the interim, however,
Duncan Hunter and Army historian Richard Killblane stepped into the void to provide direct vertical linkages. The expansion of the vertical, slowed the horizontal linkage process and formalized a set of solutions that reduced the necessity of their expansion.
423 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine.
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The inferences regarding machine design aren’t supported by the cases as much as they illustrate a shared intuition regarding adaptation. The foundational technology for adaptation— the task truck—is an open technology without user toolkits and at best some nominal degree of modularity.424 In both cases the final solutions offered from the top were designed for modular adaptation. Rather than wait for a fully articulated solution to convoy security the Army produced modular solutions that could be applied by any soldier (not just mechanics) with limited equipment and time. Additionally, those modular armors and ring mounts were agnostic about their base—they could be mounted to most task vehicles in transportation’s TOE. Neither case produced a user toolkit for gun trucks so this particular point of analysis is in need of additional case studies for exploration.
The most substantial support for this project’s theoretical intuition is the exploration of vertical and horizontal alignment for major military innovation. My findings across the two cases demonstrate that the alignment between the top down and field level initiatives permitted major military innovation during the Iraq conflict in a way that did not occur during the course of conflict in Vietnam. Second, in the presence of strong aligned vertical linkages the likelihood of a major military innovation increases, but in the presence of weaker horizontal linkages at the field-level the success of the adaptation will be slowed.
Analysis of Adaptation
The field-level adaptations of Vietnam did manage to travel upward and become incorporated into what we understand as military doctrine, but this alone was
424 Insofar as some of the task vehicles had beds and cabs that could be removed and altered for different supplies.
190 insufficient to produce major military innovation. The strategic, operational and tactical levels all agreed on a reasonable solution but the links among the organizational levels prevented the codified doctrine from turning into a major military innovation. A change in doctrine did not mean a change in practice. Quite the opposite, FM55-30 held the essential elements of knowledge (though admittedly scant) in Appendix O. But no one read the appendix, turning instead to word of mouth and the internet for solutions.
Without an active practice of hardening, and training provided by vertical support the concept was left to photos and the recollection of the individuals who were lucky enough to leave the Vietnam theater.
Whatever the outcome for major military innovation, the immediate needs of both the Vietnam and Iraq soldiers were eventually met through the development of gun trucks and the hardened convoy concept. The field-level adaptation process moved from creation to diffusion through established networks of story-telling and informal interactions among soldiers. This at a minimum has been traced here.
Whereas the last two chapters focused nearly entirely on linkages vertically and horizontally, the next chapter looks specifically at the emerging conversation about machine design in military acquisition. As a concept, machine design and openness is a new concept to the military. Promising research and systems designed for rapid adaptation through machine design now sits center stage as a potential solution to the incredibly complex nature of modern warfare. So it is to this causal dimension that we now turn.
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Chapter 6: Machine Design and the Transition to the User
New and cutting edge technologies are important in warfare but not in isolation.
It cannot be understood as the path to military dominance—the military historians know this very well. Calculating the relationship between power and machines is a difficult task with an unclear payoff.425 Despite this we persist. We bean count and compare—our planes to their planes, our tanks to their tanks. We continue to develop bigger and faster vehicles; better robots with more bells and whistles. We talk about military power as if having a few more tanks or planes than China was somehow meaningful as an independent measure—as if simply owning Predator drones ensured victory.426
There is of course, more to it than this. Using machines to achieve victory requires knowing when and how to use them. This study adds refinement to that insight—the ability to adjust to the context of the given conflict. These elements of merging machines with practice through adaptation, more than sheer numbers, are an
425 Year over year the Military Balance is published. One such program that tries to understand military power by looking at technologies and numbers. See: Studies Institute for Strategic and Studies International Institute for Strategic, "The Military Balance," The Military Balance. (1964). 426 This is the central argument of Stephen Biddle’s work. His insights are reflected in this project as well, the mere possession of technology is not sufficient for victory. Use matters. Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power : Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
192 essential key to military victory. Given a modestly equal playing field, it won’t be numbers but knowledge and flexibility that will make the difference.
It isn’t that counting cutting edge machines doesn’t matter, it does. Accuracy, firepower, lethality, these are all important elements of the conduct of modern war. But the 21st century technological revolution has fundamentally altered the concept of military power. When the price point of previously-complex machines tumbled, it lowered the bar of acquisition. Now a multitude of actors—many of them non-state— have access to the same capabilities. The problem of modern technology is that expensive R&D projects can be mimicked and copied more easily—the ‘advantage of backwardness’ is more relevant now than ever.427 Even if we do master technological use and form, there exists a timeline in which a given technology can be a decisive factor in war.428 That timeline, incidentally, looks more like a stopwatch in the 21st century.
Further complicating things, more technology and more actors means an even faster rate of change, and fewer opportunities to predict accurately. This new security frontier has the U.S. military seriously rethinking its approach to military weapons development. Historically, what were programs measured by reliability and refinement are now under scrutiny. Do we have time to develop perfect and rugged machines in an environment where many actors strive for ‘good enough,’ cheap, and mostly
427Pg 184. Robert Gilpin The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). 428 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
193 reliable?429 The modern technologically-complex environment is faster, more unpredictable, with more actors, and less time to plan. When you can’t plan, you learn to adapt. You put yourself on a footing of rapid reaction rather than prediction. Simply stated, adaptation is the new power variable in technology. Thinking about adaptation and flexibility links battlefield users to machine design—to embrace adaptability means greasing the wheels of field-level adaptation by making user-centered technology. The
U.S. military understands that the transition is complicated but has already begun to take adaptive design seriously.430
This chapter re-introduces two important concepts related to machine design: user toolkits and modularity. After providing a short description of each design concept, three illustrative cases selected from OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and OEF (Operation
Enduring Freedom) are highlight the respective concept’s importance. In addition to serving as illustrations of the interaction among the causal variables, the cases also demonstrate that the military is actively in pursuit of a third path of military technological production—one that directly incorporates user insights. While it is too soon to adjudicate over the success or failure of this addition, the cases highlight the elevation of individual soldier needs as a driving factor in technological success. This transition that places an emphasis on user-driven innovation captured through machine design.
429 Joshua Davis, "If We Run out of Batteries, This War Is Screwed," Wired, June 2003 2003.
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Adaptive Technology—Turning to the User
The most important military innovations in this century won’t be about obscure knowledge from laboratories, but the materialized forms of that obscure knowledge into flexibly designed machines. Design is king because the modern era is technologically complicated and the character of warfare has shifted predominately towards the irregular and non-conventional. In an unpredictable environment your greatest assets are flexibility and adaptability in both training and technology.431
There is a relationship between a military’s adaptability and its technology; it relies upon the openness of a machine’s architecture and whether it enables or hinders a user. Machine architecture exists on a spectrum of open and closedness (the terminology often used for closed design is black-boxing).432 The open end fully reveals its architecture and is permissive of technological adaptation. The closed end, though not impenetrable, is designed to shield its architecture from the end-user to limit knowledge, change, and copying.433 Open source permits change, black boxed designs prohibit change.
Permissiveness, however, is distinct from enabling. Neither end—fully open or black boxed—is ideal for encouraging field-level adaptation; especially in complex cases
431 H. F. R. Arciszewski, T. E. de Greef, and J. H. van Delft, "Adaptive Automation in a Naval Combat Management System," Ieee Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Part a-Systems and Humans 39, no. 6 (2009). 432 For more on Black box see: Karlsson, Nellore, and Soderquist, "Black Box Engineering: Redefining the Role of Product Specifications." 433 For a full explanation of these concepts see chapters 2 and 3 of this study.
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(computer software or delicate electrical circuitry requires expert knowledge and tools to alter).434 Rather, certain features of machine design along this range of open or closed design permit end-user adaptation. Toolkits and modularity are design features that can be incorporated into machines to enable change in the absence expert knowledge and equipment.435
Toolkits are a relatively new concept in engineering that first became popular in the 1980’s. Electronic circuit designers and later software programmers became exasperated trying to understand every possible permutation of needs their customers had. Unable to predict needs, they shifted tactics. They didn’t need to understand specific user needs, they just needed to understand how to translate their world into simpler terms and let the user do it themselves.436 The development of user toolkits represents a near-revolution in technological development.437 Like toy plastic Legos
(small and able to be rearranged nearly infinitely), toolkits bundle obscure knowledge into packets of easily rearranged chunks. Toolkits diminish the necessity of needing to know things like software code but allow everyday users to use simpler building blocks
434 Blankenhorn, "Moore's Law and Open Source." 435 There is often ambiguity regarding the distinction between user toolkits and modular design. In general, especially in currently published work on user innovation and machine design, the words modular and toolkit are used interchangeably. I maintain that there is a distinction if only by degree if not in kind. See for instance: Henry Kenyon, "DoD's Move to Android Started with Darpa Apps Program," Government Computer News, 31 January 2012 2012, staff, "Us Army Launches Apps Marketplace Prototype," Soldier Systems Daily, no. 26 March 2012 (2012), http://soldiersystems.net/2012/03/26/us- army-launches-apps-marketplace-prototype/. 436 von Hippel, "Perspective: User Toolkits for Innovation." 437 Ibid.
196 to create solutions.438 MIT scholar Erik von Hippel refers to the surge in the creation of toolkits as needs-related production—the transition from guessing the user’s wants to just helping them build their own.
Figure 22: Range of Open and Black Box Designs
The proliferation of user toolkits in engineering design formally recognizes three potential paths of technological production. The first, and most predominant model, is linear. It mimics the standard logic of innovation. Producers see a need, produce a solution and sell it on the market. The second model is collaborative, called the Kline
“chain-link” model (often in military acquisitions it is referred to as the spiral model) of product development.439 The chain-link is iterative rather than linear; it uses a process of prototyping, revision through feedback from users, and refinement into a fully
438 Ibid. 439 ODASD, "Systems Engineering: Modular Open Systems Approach," DOD, http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/initiatives/init_mosa.html.
197 developed machine. The chain-link model designs in conjunction with the user rather than simply for the user.440 User toolkits can do this as well. But they also contain a potential third pathway of technological development—the user-produced solutions.441
This is the new path on the table for the military. User toolkits permit solution production that is deeply contextualized and powerful, but still centrally supported.
Modularity, alternately, is an engineering practice that provides single components of capabilities that can be mixed and matched onto a single base.442
Modular designs exist slightly closer to the closed end of the design spectrum. They have clearly delineated parts that can be rearranged somewhat, but the degree of freedom is something more like a Mr. Potatohead toy—there are differing arms, legs, eyes, and noses; put into different configurations produce variations on a same base.
Unlike the proliferation of toolkits, modularity is more well-established as a design practice rooted in pragmatism regarding maintenance and reliability. The more robust the machine, the longer it lasts, and the less repair it needs.443 For engineers and technicians this boils down to a calculation between two numbers MTTR (Mean Time to
Repair) and the MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures)—simply ‘how long it takes to fix’
440 Pg 9. M.S. Vassiliou, S.O. Davis, and Jonathan Agre, "Innovation Patterns in Some Successful C2 Technologies," ed. Institute for Defense Analysis (Alexandria: IDA, 2011). 441 To date the literature does not specify a difference between spiral development and individually produced solutions, but given the continued development of user toolkits it is clear that entirely user- produced solutions can be an outcome of this design approach. 442 Modular designs likely took on particular importance in electronics design as portable power sources proliferated. See: Eric S. Hintz, "Portable Power: Inventor Samuel Ruben and the Birth of Duracell," Technology and Culture 50, no. 1 (2008). 443 For more on MTBF see: Wendy Torell and Victor Avelar, "Mean Time between Failure Explanation and Standards," in APC TradeOff Tools: White Paper, ed. Schneider Electric (Schneider Electric, 2010).
198 and ‘how long until it fails again.’ The math can be reduced to a fairly simple equation:
MTTR/MTBF+MTTR.444 Complex machines that are built as a single unit without interchangeable parts need a good MTBF or they become frustrating to soldiers.
Alternately, with complex machines, minimizing MTTR—getting it up and running again—can be reduced to nearly zero through modularity.445 This is because complex machines with easily interchangeable parts can stockpile those individual parts without needing to deconstruct the whole machine.446 Moreover if the non-functioning part is non-essential to the machine you can operate without it. In an electronic/robotic world, this translates directly into design flexibility. It is a cornerstone of robotics research.447
A universal base with plug and play alternatives means longevity for the lifecycle of the technology.
Although the distinction between modularity and toolkits are often blurred, they produce radically different outcomes. Modular systems are easily changed by the user, but the range of creativity is constrained by the number of different components on a single framework. It is a finite combination. Toolkits, on the other hand are nearly infinite. In terms of a single technology, toolkits will take longer to create but can be distinctly tailored to the mission. Modular systems require less time, and are more easily
444 Pg 12. Captain Leroy Dean Schneider, "Reliability and Maintainability of Modular Robot Systems: A Roadmap for Design" (Ph.D. , University of Texas at Austin, 1993). 445 Ibid. 446 Scientists first attempted to calculate machine reliability in an industrialized world. The first serious work on MTBR and MTTR was done in the 1940’s see:Torell and Avelar, "Mean Time between Failure Explanation and Standards." 447 R. Cohen et al., "Conceptual Design of a Modular Robot," Journal of Mechanical Design 114, no. 1 (1992).
199 reproducible. Toolkits will produce substantially varied qualities of work based on the creativity and commitment of the user. Modular assemblies of a technology will tend to maintain a standard of quality since the user is simply rearranging parts rather than creating new functions. Toolkits have a greater potential to violate the previously accepted rules for operation, modular systems will tend to operate under the limits originally designed into the machine. Finally toolkits can produce highly idiosyncratic solutions custom tailored to the niche needs of a user. Modular systems, on the other hand, can accommodate a range of needs but produces a range that is constrained when compared to the toolkit.
Both toolkits and modular systems demonstrate the key tension in the innovation paradox. Toolkits enable specific solutions that may not be useful across the horizon and, as a result, it requires a strong centralized support that can interpret its central strengths and see where else it can apply in across a broad range of potential problems in order to diffuse. Modular systems constrain the range of choices up front.
The centralized controls are implicit in the construction through standardization requirements; in order for a technology to be universally modular, it must first be standardized in terms of ports, power, and connectivity. This is so all the parts and bases can truly be plug and play. With these components secured the modular system’s various forms of recombination are communicated across the horizon of the battlefield in a manner that offers but does not dictate the final particular combinations.
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User Toolkits and War—There’s an App for That
When soldiers went to war in OIF and OEF they carried their toolkits with them.
The modern military force is comprised of generations of tech-savvy users. They grew up immersed in a world of electronic simulation, signals, and the internet. Before they went to war, they used GPS systems in their cars, participated in online social networking, understood the basics of networking and shared software. They used these interactive, personally-tailored technologies in their daily lives. When they went to war, they carried their machines with them; and they kept on using them.
When Captain Jonathan Springer wasn’t performing his duties in Afghanistan’s
Pech River Valley, he was in his bunk creating a software application for his smartphone.
The app combined his phone’s compass, map system, and GPS system into a single application. He calls it Tactical NAV. It can identify the operator’s location within 24 feet—more accurately than his military-issues GPS. More importantly, Tactical NAV has
‘compass lock.’ This means that a user can look through the phone’s camera and based on the soldier’s lat/long position coupled with his compass reading, it can calculate the exact location of whatever the camera sees and send that data to whomever needs it.448
Springer’s plan was to send that data to artillery units armed with howitzers. One day on
448 Dominic Adams, "Local Soldier’s App Helps Fight in Afghanistan Directs Artillery for the 101st," The Journal Gazette, no. 6 March 2011 (2011), http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20110306/LOCAL12/303069921/- 1/LOCAL11&asid=06b57d0d.
201 the job, surreptitiously, he tried it out. It worked.449 While unwise, Springer’s contribution to the user adaptation discussion resonated strongly with the military. For
$5.99 soldiers can direct artillery fire with their cellular telephone. It is available only on the iPhone and iPhone touch, the platform that Springer carries.450
The capability is unnerving, but the activity—app writing—is quite common in the civilian user world. Normal everyday citizens create their own programs as a common practice.451 While very few people can write or read software code, curious tinkerers rely upon application toolkits—software programs that translate obscure software code into comprehensible English. They do it through something called an API- an application programming interface.452 API is literally the software form of an open design toolkit.
Where the commercial market led, the military followed. Captain Springer’s app likely won’t see any major financial returns, but it certainly points to some profound changes that the military must be willing to consider. Captain Springer’s app stood a chance to proliferate until DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) field tested its own smart phones running on the Android operating system—Apple’s primary competitor. The idea was to give soldiers what they were familiar with, and then to
449 Dave Howard, "Us Soldier Makes App for Tracking Down Taliban Fighters," BBC (2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/13928538. 450 Adams, "Local Soldier’s App Helps Fight in Afghanistan Directs Artillery for the 101st." 451 Ellyne Phneah, "User-Created Apps to Face Greater Security Risks.," ZDNet News Asia, no. 15 July 2011 (2011). 452 Schauer Brandon, "Pirate This: Breakthrough Mindsets from the Web," Journal of Business Strategy 30, no. 2/3 (2009).
202 open their own user-collaborative site.453 DARPA opened an app marketplace in 2012 from which soldiers can download and test new applications on their Android phones.
The site also incorporates some of the same features available through consumer sites by incorporating toolkits and online specialists who can collaborate produce user- specific solutions.454 Dr. Mari Maeda serves as the program manager for DARPA’s
Transformative Apps program. The program provides direct avenues for collaboration between experienced designers of applications and soldiers with needs and insight.455
Her take on the program is that…“We want to empower the soldiers. We want to give them the vote. Let them figure out what would be useful to them.”456
The transition to user-enabling systems like the Army’s mobile app store reflects a serious transition for the military toward soldier-produced and soldier-collaborated technological solutions. This study already established that commanders are conscious of the wisdom that soldiers develop from the battlefield. Historically, that wisdom is enshrined in the doctrine and lessons learned reports housed at places like the Center
453 Kenyon, "Dod's Move to Android Started with Darpa Apps Program." 454 Ibid. 455 “The Transformative Apps program will develop a diverse array of militarily-relevant software applications ("apps") using an innovative new development and acquisition process. A military apps marketplace will be created to enable rapid innovation to meet user needs based on a direct collaboration between a vibrant and highly competitive development community and involved communities of end- users. The program will address all the challenges-technical, business and operational to make the new capabilities available for use in the field. The objectives are to transition the resulting systems to end- users in the Services and to foster a new model for rapidly and effectively acquiring, introducing, maintaining and enhancing software.” Mari Maeda, "Darpa: Transformative Apps Program," http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/I2O/Programs/Transformative_Apps.aspx. 456 Maryann Lawlor, "Apps Advance onto the Frontline," SIGNAL, no. 5 October 2010 (2010), http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/Signal_Article_Template.asp?articleid=2426&zoneid=302 .
203 for Army Lessons Learned. But the conscious incorporation of soldier solutions throughout the technological development process is recent, forced by rapid and unpredictable changes in technology.
This transition isn’t new. The military fully accepts that the future resides in collaboration and user insight—if only as a cost-saving measure. Consider the conscious selection of Android smartphones over Apple. Android systems are open, Apple systems are not. Android is a product of the Google enterprise which is an open source software (OSS) system. Apple is not. While Apple embraces a black box solution for its products on the consumer market, those solutions are increasingly rejected in the military acquisitions market. The debate over open source software (OSS) in government and the military specifically has been around for over a decade.457 For agencies with non-sensitive information the OSS debate was a simple matter of calculating cost over time. The year over year the costs associated with maintaining proprietary software in a medium whose capabilities are changing literally monthly was untenable.458 The DoD has lagged due to concerns over security but the outright
457 U.S. military and other government agencies had their eye on the potential for open source software integration for at least the last decade. See for example:Carolyn Kenwood, "A Business Case Study of Open Source Software," ed. MITRE Contract from U.S. Army (Bedford: MITRE, 2001), John Viega, "Static Security Analysis for Open Source Software ", ed. Secure Software Solutions (Fairfax: 2004), Steven Schearer, "Increasing Open Source Software Integration on the Department of Defense Unclassified Desktop " (Naval PostGraduate School, 2008), John M. Vines, "Leveraging Open Source Software to Create Technical Animations of Scientific Data," ed. Army Research Laboratory (Aberdeen: U.S. Army, 2006), Thomas A. Alspaugh and Hazel Asuncion Walt Scacchi, "Investigating Advances in the Acquisition of Systems Based on Open Architecture and Open Source Software," ed. Institute for Software Research (Irvine: University of California, Irvine, 2011). 458 "If you have 25 developers working on building a piece of software, that's going to cost you $500,000 a year…..They're going to consume two to three servers per developer. That's 50 to 75 servers. You'll need
204 rejection of OSS for defense ended in 2009 with the release of forge.mil. Forge.mil is the military’s first open source software operating system. Forge is fully open to the public to view, but only DoD employees are permitted to edit the code.459 This non- proprietary software is open and it can be improved upon through collaboration at one tenth the cost to taxpayers.460
Whether we realize it or not, previously unfathomable tinkering with complex electronics is now an everyday part of the consumer world. When we sent the soldiers to war, they simply continued tinkering. A generation with a love of electronics and experience in tinkering with civilian toolkits produced incidental outcomes like Captain
Springer’s Tactical Nav. But from the perspective of the military, it was now possible to imagine how technological production can happen on the battlefield. DARPA, traditionally the source of the most cutting edge technologies, took the lead in providing the secure resource in their app marketplace.
Optimism over the potential for user toolkits is worth tempering, however. Any material solution derived from an abstract concept carries its own theory to practice problems—namely security, quality, and motivation. The electronic information
one full-time person to manage the server farm. It'll cost you $1,000 a year just for the electricity. To get [Federal Information Security Management Act] compliance in your lab will be another $168,000 a year.” As excerpted from: Carolyn Duffy Marsan, "Collaborating in the Cloud: Software Developers Share Resources Online to Speed Systems to the Warfighter. ," Government Executive, no. 1 February 2011 (2011), http://www.govexec.com/magazine-analysis/magazine-analysis-managing- technology/2011/02/collaborating-in-the-cloud/33198/. 459 Matt Asay, "Defense Department Sets up Its Own Sourceforge," CNET--The Open Road 31 January 2009 (2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13505_3-10154053-16.html. 460 Marsan, "Collaborating in the Cloud: Software Developers Share Resources Online to Speed Systems to the Warfighter. ."
205 environment is an invisible one. Because of this quality,we don’t know exactly who is receiving or sending information unless we have a secure system and methods of authentication. The problem with Springer’s TacticalNav is that it sends data on an unsecured piece of technology. Potential attackers could interrupt the signal, provide false data, or learn about unit positions by hacking those systems. Likewise, with user construction of solutions, close observation is necessary to ensure that soldiers aren’t taking unnecessary risks as they build new solutions. The security hurdle is central to
DoD hesitation regarding user collaboration and production, but it isn’t a deal-breaker.
At least not yet. Secret information is only useful if it can be acted upon in a useful timeframe. Given a short enough transition from information to action, the need for absolute secrecy is minimized.
Second, in terms of quality, a soldier produced solution isn’t necessarily the right solution. It only points to their perception of the problem. Often, the solution to their perceived problem may actually complicate issues at command levels above their pay grade. User toolkits provide a mechanism for individual solutions, but the potential exists for hare-brained solutions just as much as brilliant ones. In the consumer world, overall sales on the apps marketplaces determine the quality of a user creation. In the theater of war, an additional check on product needs to come from above to ensure that solutions fit overall strategy. Without this, we risk allowing the operational and tactical levels to dictate strategy. User-produced solutions must be watched closely so that they comply with the current ROE (rules of engagement).
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Finally, a well-designed toolkit optimizes the user’s time commitment to building a solution. The longer the time, the greater the motivation needed to use the kit. The user toolkit lowers the bar of knowledge while enabling the production of firmly context-based solutions to problems. Enabling is a permissive condition, it is not guarantee. The user/soldier actually needs to fill the gap which requires both motivation and familiarity with adapting machines.
Motivation may be extrinsic or intrinsic—driven by rewards or driven by curiosity.461 The drivers of user-driven solutions are still mysterious to researchers.
On the civilian side, designing for user solutions suffers from a problem of motivation.
Professionals with unmet niche needs tend to be passionate about their jobs, not necessarily the technological solutions.462 Having niche or unmet needs is a direct mechanism for adaptation but it does not serve as direct motivation to use a toolkit. In a time of war some of that motivational slack can be taken up by the threat of death and injury but time and familiarity can also frustrate the creator. Unsurprisingly, research indicates that motivation for users to produce their own solutions diminishes the more unfamiliar they are with a new technology.463
461 There’s a huge literature on motivation, creativity, and learning. See: Randolph B. Cooper and Bandula Jayatilaka, "Group Creativity: The Effects of Extrinsic, Intrinsic, and Obligation Motivations," Creativity Research Journal 18, no. 2 (2006), Karim R. Lakhani and Robert G. Wolf, "Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects," SSRN eLibrary (2003). 462 Pg 4. Patrick Kierkegaard and Panos Markopoulos, "From Top to Bottom: End User Development, Motivation, Creativity and Organisational Support," in End-User Development Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2011, ed. M.F. Costabile et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2011). 463 Pg 6. Ibid.
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Given the challenges and potential outcomes, user toolkits will need more vertical linkages than horizontal ones to be successful. Strong horizontal linkages could help refine and diffuse the solution. This was certainly Springer’s intent, but just as the cross-case comparison indicates, units will produce their own solutions in the absence of strong horizontal linkages if vertical linkages provide the needed resources. Second, because toolkits permit the production of extremely specific solutions, it is unclear whether it is useful for those solutions to diffuse. Rather, strong vertical linkages may ensure direct quality checks and guidance for a faster production cycle (though not necessarily diffusion across the horizon) in a way that horizontal linkages will not. As in the DARPA case, soldier-led initiatives through toolkits need a much stronger support structure both for guidance and avoidance of dangerous mistakes. Springer’s testing of his application was extremely risky, and the DARPA program marketplace resolves this tension. In terms of major military innovation, user toolkits enable industry to observe the multiple field level solutions in order to adjudicate and adjust future acquisitions and software development.
Modular Designs and Robotics
The introduction of thousands of robots into war was the single largest enduring technological headline of the Iraq war. It felt like science fiction was finally, terrifyingly, about to come true. There went humanity, and with it the utter destruction of the laws
208 of war.464 Philosophers, lawyers, politicians, and gawkers whipped up frenzied headlines about autonomous warfare—the ensuing loss of humanity, the apocalypse was nigh. Meanwhile, beyond the thunder of press and hyperbole, EOD teams at traffic checkpoints configured their robots to inspect cars, detonate IEDs, and peep around corners.
On the ground, the hype didn’t meet reality. In over 8 years only two-sensational events occurred with ground robots; in the first case, a unit used their MarcBot (a small ground robot the size of a toy vehicle) as the lead scout in urban environments. They attached an explosive to it, and in the event enemy was around the corner, they detonated the explosive.465 The second case was the mysteriously short mission of
Foster Miller’s SWORDS (Special Weapons Observation Remote Direct-Action System) robot.466 Three of the fully armed version deployed to theater in 2007 (un-armed versions were already there). The event was heralded the first example of a formally armed robot in theater. As the unofficial lore goes, they were unboxed, one of the three moved its gun when not intended during a systems test, they were re-boxed and sent home.467 Foster Miller opted to bury the entire affair since it seemed there would be no way to control the spin.468
464 Singer, "Military Robots and the Laws of War." 465 Ibid. 466 Yes it appears that Foster Miller dreamt up an acronym to fit a name they already wanted. 467 Eric Sofge, "America's Robot Army: Are Unmanned Fighters Ready for Combat? ," Popular Mechanics, no. 18 December 2009 (2009). 468 Ibid.
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The truth is that while their potential for autonomy frightens us, most of what happens on the ground is much more complex, refined, and playful. Marine Master
Sergeant Ted Bogosh wired his EOD robot to hold a fishing rod. Bogosh never caught a fish while he was deployed, but he tried. He admitted that it just seemed like something to do.469 Robots, no matter their shape, create a complex set of reactions from their human agents—notably that regular interaction with remotely operated machines brings out a strong desire to anthropomorphize them. Scooby doo, Sgt. Talon,
Frankenstein, Cheryl, and Johnny Five all did their robotic duty in the protection of their units from IED’s (Improvised Explosive Devices). 470 Most soldiers named their robots— decorated them, personalized them and tinkered with them. They had them promoted, made honorary team members, and felt genuine heartache when they were injured in the line of duty.471 Military UGV’s are the stars of numerous non-informational
Youtube videos where the robots are depicted as colleagues, friends, and toys.472 And of course, in the absence of a robot, the soldiers improvise.
“Yesterday, I was “outside the wire,” patrolling with the 2nd Platoon. We came upon a possible IED in the middle of the road, and stopped all traffic to check it out… trying to figure out if the cardboard box in the middle of the road is merely a windblown piece of trash or a bomb planted there to kill us!
A young private in that platoon has one of those radio-controlled toy cars. When they find unidentifiable debris in the road, E.S. sends out his little RC car and rams it. If it’s light enough to be moved or knocked over, it’s too light to be a
469 Joel Garreau, "Bots on the Ground," Washington Post, 6 May 2007 2007. 470 Ibid. 471 Ibid. 472 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHwQc5V4qeY, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cY4S6nQPLdk,
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bomb, so we can approach it and get rid of it. If it’s heavy, we call EOD. At night, they duct tape a flashlight to the car.”473
To date, no field-level research has been aimed at examining just how soldiers learn, adapt, and adapt to these machines. In fact, despite the sheer number of machines in the field, the transition has been remarkably unremarkable and almost wholly unremarked upon. What we do know is that UGV’s (Unmanned Ground Vehicle) were accepted fairly smoothly into their roles. Soldiers learned how to use them effectively, and used them well. Part of the reason for the smooth transition is that
UGV’s are designed on platforms that are modular. UGV’s in theater are flexible in design and components. This leaves them open to soldier adaptation by mixing and matching their parts—payloads in the vernacular. Soldiers adjusted quickly to the controls and learned which packages worked best with each robotic platform.474
Modular systems are easily assimilated into use because they take closed systems and chunk them into singular functions that can be combined. In 2010, the U.S.
Army identified five primary modular design sets, called capability sets; Soldier
Transportable, Vehicle Transportable, Crew Served, Self-Transportable, and Applique
Systems.475 Of the Army’s Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) family of robots, all have payloads that can be rearranged to fulfill different missions like EOD, search and rescue,
473 Greg Papadatos, 2005. 474 Nadia Gilani, "Soldiers in Mourning for Robot That Defused 19 Bombs after It Is Destroyed in Blast," Daily Mail, 4 January 2012 2012. 475 Donald Sando, "Memorandum: Army Unmanned Ground Vehicle Strategy," ed. United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (Washington DC: 2010).
211 medical, and counter-IED.476 Modular systems provide users with the freedom to adjust technology to context by mixing and matching particular capabilities. The three most common UGV’s in theater are the PackBot, the MarcBot, and the Talon. The PackBot is a product of iRobot—a commercial developer of civilian robotics; the MarcBot is a DoD developed technology; and the Talon currently belongs to Qinetiq, the British military weapons developer who bought out Foster Miller.477 Despite their distinctly different sources of development, modularity is their unifying characteristic.
Talons stand about three feet tall and weigh between 115 to 150 pounds
(depending on the configuration). They are quick and versatile on different varied surfaces (sand, water, roads) and up stairs. They can be configured based on the task at hand but there are packages specifically marketed by Qinetiq (Foster Miller’s parent company): Standard military Talon with infrared and standard zoom cameras, a two- way communications device, separate attachments for night and thermal imaging. The
Talon Responder adds an arm meant to lift and drag objects, and long-range communications capabilities. The Talon SWAT adds night vision, thermal cameras, and a weapons payload (lethal and non-lethal) Finally the Talon CBRNE carries attachment brackets for chemical detectors and sensors for radiation. The variation continues, but all on the same foundation—the Talon robot.478
476 Ibid. 477 Staff, "Qinetiq Caps $163m Buy of Foster-Miller " Boston Business Journal, 9 November 2004 2004. 478 Qinetiq North America, "Market Overview: Talon Robots."
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Modular systems are more closed than toolkits, but take much less time to fix and refit to specific missions or environments. At the field level, modular robotic systems are re-tasked after an upgrade comes through to replace them. The 95th
Chemical company at Fort Richardson took outmoded PackBots and modified them for chemical detection. Although the robot wasn’t initially designed with this mission in mind, its modular construction made it possible.479
As is the case with toolkits, problems with modularity exist as well. There are two primary issues—standardization across acquisitions and interface design. Most of the weapons industry has shifted to some degree of modularity; the LLNL gun truck armor was designed to be modular;480 most personal body armor systems are now modular;481 weapons companies like Black Diamond Advanced Technology created their MTS wearable tactical computers to be completely modular.482 Nevertheless these examples are of modular systems within a particular contractor rather than across all contractors. Significant DoD coordination is necessary to force industry suppliers to agree to a united standard of ports, power, and connections. Much of this pressure came from experiences at the field level during OIF.
479 Candace Lombardi, "Army Recycles Packbots to Sniff out Chemicals," CNET--Planetary Gear, no. 15 July 2008 (2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17912_3-9991461-72.html. 480 Dominique, "Gun Trucks: A Vietnam Innovation Returns." 481 Kenneth P. Horn, Corporation Rand, and Center Arroyo, Lightening Body Armor : Arroyo Support to the Army Response to Section 125 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). 482 Black Diamond, "Advancements in Wearable Computing Solutions Aid Jtac Missions," (Tempe: BDAT, 2011).
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The difference between the modern era and prior battlefields is that everything got smaller and more portable. The microprocessor and IT revolutions mean that a single soldier had potential access to countless capabilities. So we acquired all of them, gave them all to the warfighter, and contrary to the concept of a universally modular system, each piece of technology required a different power source.
The 21st century soldier was pregnant with technology from GPS systems, handheld radios, satellite communications devices, laptops, and cameras, generally each pulling from entirely different batteries.483 Not only did communications and computer systems require different interfaces, but each piece needed its own privately designed power source.484 For example, in OIF a dismounted rifle platoon (approx 40 men) out on a 3-day mission shared amongst them eleven different battery types totaling just over 400 lbs—more than ten pounds of batteries for each soldier.485 This prompted several outbursts of critical humor typical of soldiers. (see figure )
483 Pg 22. Michael A. Vane, "Power and Energy Strategy White Paper," ed. Development and Engineering Command – Deputy Chief of Staff Army Capabilities Integration Center – Research, G-4, U.S. Army (Fort Monroe: Army, 2010). 484 Staff, "Portable Electrical Power: Battery Supplies and Logistics Lessons Learned in Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003," Defense Update 2004, no. 1 (2004). 485 Major Steve Meredith, "Lightening the Load: Defining the Path Forward," ed. Soldier Power and Sustainment Team (Maneuver Centre of Excellence U.S. ARMY, 2011).
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Figure 23: Screen Capture of Battery Presentation486
The lack of a single standard or set of standardized batteries meant soldiers had to make tradeoffs between technology and water or ammunition while travelling dismounted. Rather than moving forward boldly with new technologies the soldiers suffered under the weight of it. Part of the solution to the power issue will be in standardization across acquisitions contracts—referred to as going battery agnostic--a central tenet in modularity.487
Second, a problem with both modular and toolkit design is the interface—the controls and visual presentation of the technology to the user. Interfaces can constrain
486 Ibid. 487 Staff, "Portable Electrical Power: Battery Supplies and Logistics Lessons Learned in Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003."
215 and invite creativity or they can limit it. Remotely controlled robotic systems are modeled after the Xbox video gaming system controller for a reason.488 Soldiers in the field have an embedded fluency with that format of control. This eases the learning curve. The study of good UI (user interface) is central to providing a structure that enables creativity.489 There are good and bad interfaces and bad interfaces can render a controller or toolkit useless. Likewise certain interfaces can frame a certain kind of thinking into a new system. The use of remote controls styled after the xBox video game controllers is controversial for precisely this reason.490 A confusing or unfamiliar interface can destroy the adoption of a technology. Mac people are Mac people and PC people are PC. There is a reason why they seldom stray—transitioning from one system’s buttons and toggles to another remains an aggravating affair for consumers.
Modular systems are much easier to incorporate into practice. Provided sufficient stockpiles of backup parts, little to no vertical support or supervision is necessary. Rather, strong horizontal linkages will more likely benefit the adaptation process. Since platforms and packages require user experimentation to determine the optimal combination for the specific theater, the more important component is that of
488 Pg 12. David Axe and Steve Olexa, War Bots : U.S. Military Robots Are Transforming War in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Nimble Books, LLC, 2008). There is a secondary debate in philosophy and the dehumanization of war that speaks directly to this sort of design. For more on this see: Staff Writer, "Joysticks Transform U.S. Warfare in Afghanistan," UAV News, no. 9 October 2011 (2011), http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Joysticks_transform_US_warfare_in_Afghanistan_999.html. 489 See: Wilbert O. Galitz, "The Essential Guide to User Interface Design an Introduction to Gui Design Principles and Techniques," Wiley Computer Pub., http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=74245. 490 Writer, "Joysticks Transform U.S. Warfare in Afghanistan."
216 the interactions across rather than upward. The risk associated with security in modular systems is constrained by the parts provided and as a result vertical judgment over the quality of those solutions is less important. For modular systems in a time of conflict, the most important component is to permit the best solution set find its way across to other users.
A Hybrid Design—Web Communities
Each of the prior cases illustrated a pure form of adaptive design features, but in many cases technology will have both factors incorporated into them. This is the case with internet-based solutions—most specifically with web-based communities of information sharing. Web communities, unlike simple databases or search engines, provide a point of interaction among users—they create potential horizontal linkages where previously there couldn’t exist because of geographical limitations.491 Internet interfaces in the consumer world are laden with Toolkit/Modular design features.
Everything from social networking sites to more complex mash-up492 software is available for free to anyone.
491 For more on web communities see: D. Stenmark, "A Critical Look at Knowledge Creation" (paper presented at the IRIS22, University of Jyvaskyla Finland, August 7-10 1999). 492 Mash-up programs make it possible for users to combine different aspects of other websites into their own personal site. For example, if you wanted to build your own website but incorporate the headlines from the New York Times, and the weather forecast information from the local news station. Mashup software helps users do this. For more on Mashups and user innovation see: Peter Madsen Yvonne Dittrich, and Rune Rasmussen, "Really Simple Mash-Ups," in Is-Eud 2011, ed. M.F. Costabile et al. (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2011), Florian Daniel Cinzia
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The internet also stands as a particularly powerful example of the potential for horizontal adaptation processes to trigger tactical shifts because it is the single best example of a route through which horizontal linkages can operate. No matter how well we plan, educate, train, and equip our soldiers, learning will happen the moment they deploy. Capturing that information and transferring it has been extremely complicated until internet connectivity gave us the war web community. In 2006 DARPA released
TIGR (Tactical Ground Reporting System). TIGR is designed to directly facilitate horizontal information sharing at the field level to help commanders make decisions. By
2010 TIGR had been adopted by all U.S. Brigade Combat Teams in both theaters.493 As in the case of the apps marketplace, TIGR was preceded by several bottom-up solutions that led the way: Company Commander, and PlatoonLeader.
CompanyCommander.org was a domestically-based horizontal communication technology unsanctioned by the military. In 2000, two men serving as company commanders in Hawaii noted that leaders had no forum through which to share their ideas, lessons and challenges—they needed a net community. Nate Allen and Tony
Burgess stepped outside Army protocol and created companycommand.com—a forum for young captains to share ideas and learn practices. Finding that CompanyCommander was useful, a year later, still flirting with trouble, they created platoonleader.org—a site
Cappiello, Maristella Matera, Matteo Picozzi and Michael Weiss, "Enabling End User Development through Mashups:Requirements, Abstractions and Innovation Toolkits," in End- User Development Lecture Notes in Computer Science ed. M.F. Costabile et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2011). 493 Pg 9. Vassiliou, Davis, and Agre, "Innovation Patterns in Some Successful C2 Technologies."
218 for young lieutenants to source and find advice on command.494 Both sites flourished and were eventually incorporated into the military’s private internet system.
In 2004, with companycommand.com and platoonleader.org already in place a third web community CAVNET spawned directly from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Major
Patrick Michaelis, the creator of CAVNET set up the community on the military’s secure classified internet connection. CAVNET was intended specifically for soldiers in theater to share real-time information about the conditions of the battlefield. The CAVNET web interface provided real-time horizontal information on updated tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as a specifically adaptive advantage.495 After the success of the user- created CAVNET, the DoD began its development of TIGR. The difference between
CAVNET and TIGR was the hand of the engineer. As with both modular and toolkit based technologies, good UI means the difference between successful use and rejection.
The war web community sites are simultaneous cases of user technological production as well as the extension of horizontal linkages across the battlefield—a case within in a case. Web communities can exhibit both toolkit and modular design components. Getting information across the horizon affects the incorporation of new ideas into practice. The design of that architecture is complicated. It is a truism that communication of information is essential to military success. This single point is unquestionable. The finer point is to ask communication amongst which people, for
494 Baum, "Battle Lessons: What the Generals Don't Know." 495 Frontline, "Frontline: A Company of Soldiers Innovating."
219 what purpose, and how? It isn’t enough to have a single database of information. It isn’t enough to publish everything you learn. The design of electronic data sharing sites, social networking sites, and databases is crucial to their actual use. Again, good UI will make a difference. Immediate need is often enough to spur the creation of solutions, but significant vertical guidance is what keeps the newly created public good alive. In this case, direct and vertical participation in the development process of TIGR ensured that its design was both usable and enabling of soldier inputs.
Developing useful electronic horizontal linkages is no easy task. It is its own design conundrum far outside the scope of this study. The development of an electronic horizontal network is only as strong as its design. Soldiers created their own systems because they were immediately needed. As soon as those needs are met, the motivation to maintain the linkage passes, and the creation is abandoned. The way in which data is stored, archived, and presented in passive versus active information networks is an entirely separate problem of information management. Some internet applications push relevant information to soldiers others exist as a space to turn to and inquire. Passive and active information sharing are all part of the design of these horizontal communications systems. All of these considerations are central lessons harnessing the potential creativity and insights of the battlefield; all of which must be adjudicated and designed by engineers working directly with the users.
The Transition to the Third Path—User Production
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This chapter both demonstrates the coming transition and tempers established notions about innovation and military organizations. What’s new about the modern military isn’t that they want to know what lessons soldiers in the field have learned.
What is new is that modern militaries are formally accepting and inviting user- participation directly into technological production processes. They are doing so by designing for it.
Commanders at all levels know soldiers in the field are quite good at adapting to the fight.496 Wise commanders seek to collect that information and create ways to encourage responsible transformation. In previous chapters we reviewed the work of the Center for Army Lesson’s Learned, the Limited Warfare Laboratory of Vietnam, and the Lawrence Livermore Research Laboratory. All of these are examples of top-down willingness to listen to the bottom. What is new today is the recognition that technological collaboration with users and production by users without the upper echelon is potentially desirable.497 It is the recognition that we are in a technologically complicated environment, and in order to maintain a position of power, engaging users and enhancing their ability to adapt technology is a potential path to victory.
496 J. A. Russell, "Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007," Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010). 497 This absolutely does not mean that it is an unchecked, unmonitored, and unregulated process. Just that IT user toolkits permit soldiers to create deeply idiosyncratic solutions on their own through technology.
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This is not something that can happen wholesale. There are tradeoffs. The implication of the shift to the third path means that we will be trading some aspects of technological secrecy and perfection for speed and flexibility. No matter how bizarre this may sound to Cold War traditionalists the DoD is demonstrating clear willingness to make that transition.
Designing for user adaptation requires a willingness to forego some aspects of secrecy and security in order to permit user tinkering. It also requires flipping our understanding of what weapons research and development means. Designing for users means reducing secrecy and incorporating field level insights—this is uncomfortable in a security environment where secrecy and planning are necessary. The tradeoff, however, is a faster learning cycle. Consider that Napoleon was among the first military commanders to bring a machine gun—the mitrailleuse—onto the battlefield. By modern intuition it should have been a decisive factor in the Franco Prussian war. It should have yielded a battlefield massacre—but Napoleon’s secret weapon was too secret. Not even Napoleon’s own commanders understood what they should do with it.
Rather than moving it to the forefront as an anti-personnel gun, they held it to the back as artillery—as if it were a field cannon. The effect was notably underwhelming. The range of the mitrailleuse round was shorter than the opposing German cannons—it was useless.498
498 Page 98 Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
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The prior two chapters revealed the phenomena of field-level adaptation. The chapters on gun trucks highlight the efforts of users in the creation and diffusion of technology and tactics. This chapter moved forward to connect soldier adaptation to machine design. Both elements are necessary for a reasonable map of field level technological adaptation. Together these chapters point to the difficulty of getting from theory to practice and the third path of technological development—user-produced or user-centered solutions—are one solution to easing that transition. Soldiers are willing participants in technological and tactical adaptation—It is a necessary part of their role in war. Designing for soldiers to ease that role can shorten the timeframe to adjustment.
Not only is the current generation of soldiers familiar with technological tinkering, they create and disseminate ideas whether or not the military wants them to. The solution on both ends appears to be to harness that deeply contextualized knowledge by designing machines to collaborate with the user—the formalized acceptance of the role of the user in the process of innovation.
Innovation—especially adaptation—requires the participation of the community into which it is inserted. No good innovation goes unaltered by its community; and in the absence of a reasonable solution, the community will produce its own. At the field level, among thousands of other cobbled solutions, this produced the gun truck. The design of a technology can assist or hinder this process of adaptation. The following chapter summarizes the overall findings of this project and suggests potential paths for future research given this perspective on innovation.
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Chapter 7: In the Absence of Prediction Design for Adaptation
“The single most effective thing we can do is sit with the Soldiers, see how they use the equipment we’re providing.”-BG William Phillips
Field-level adaptation is a necessary component of the battlefield. We owe this largely to the fact that prediction alone remains insufficient. The purpose of prediction is to plan and manage our status in the world—it allows us to dream up new plans for victory. But the devil is in the details and warfare is a two-player game. The pace and rhythm of the battlefield rarely follows prediction. After prediction is done we are left with practice—someone has to do the dirty work of matching theory to action. At some point, someone is forced to bridge that gap. This is the task of the boots on the ground. Soldiers match machines and tactics to the theater they are in—they are the drivers of adaption.
Adaptation is a sub-process of a broader umbrella concept we typically call innovation. For a number of reasons, we don’t like to think of innovation in this way. We have a preference for casting innovation as high science and powerful geniuses. In doing so, we bias the apex of hierarchy over the users and doers of war. It is a lofty optimism that gives too much to grand theoretical design and not enough to practices at the field level. The security studies literature has largely supported this position; casting
224 innovation as unidirectional and vertical—focused on the top of the vertical chain downward. It is an incomplete picture, an intensely lop-sided one.
Innovation is about change—a change in how we do things. It is much more complex than ideas and machines handed down from above. Successful innovation is a process of adjustment between theory and practice; and the field soldier is a participant in that process. They are tasked with matching theory to practice. In the course of that gap-filling, users change technology and tactics to suit their environment. And, in the absence of an acceptable solution users will make their own. They tinker and communicate those adjustments across the battlefield—this is the adaptation process.
This project began with the general form of the research question, how do militaries go from theory to practice? Or more directly, how do militaries get the right machines in the right place to fight the current war? Part of the solution is field level technological adaptation. They adapt technology and tactics to the current fight.
Innovation has a vertical and a horizontal component. Research in innovation has emphasized one dimension but scholarship has yet to explore the horizontal and its relationship to the vertical.
This study opened that door and traced the horizontal component and its interaction with the vertical through what I refer to as linkages. Overall I sought to recover a process of technological (and tactical) adaptation in a time of war. Although the basic intuitions find footing in the cases, the process of recovery revealed an imminently richer process than the ham-handed theorizing that preceded inquiry.
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The primary casual dimensions in successful battlefield adaptation were horizontal/vertical linkages and machine design. In support of the primary causal dimensions the horizontal and vertical dimensions were distinctly identifiable in chapters 4 and 5. The creation and diffusion of the gun truck in Vietnam was nearly entirely reliant upon unit-to-unit sharing of technology and tactics. These horizontal connections among units and within units were generally informal and largely undocumented by government agencies at the time. In the absence of more formalized structures, these horizontal linkages were the only component available for soldiers to diffuse their tactics and technology. Where horizontal linkages flourished vertical linkages were scarce and often one-directional. This makes sense from a logical standpoint since soldiers found alternate routes to solve their problems; if the vertical chain did not or could not provide, the horizon was the only other alternative.
The horizontal linkages provided a dual route of creation and diffusion simultaneously. As gun truck crews sourced supplies to modify their trucks the concept of the gun truck naturally travelled alongside. Likewise as the concept diffused a culture and identity sprang up that made it easier for crews to obtain their supplies creating a seemingly symbiotic relationship between the two routes.
Vertical linkages provided direct support to units in Iraq in a way that did not appear in Vietnam. Due to civilian and military pressure through research laboratories and organizations like the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the vertical linkages pressed resources downward in the form of both temporary solutions as well as fully
226 articulated technologies. The vertical linkages took close direction from soldiers in the field or incorporating their insights directly into technological production. Since the vertical solutions provided sufficient supply for some units, less reliance upon the horizon was necessary to source and develop ideas. This resulted in a looser affiliation among gun truckers and may account for the lack of the development of a robust gun truck culture or identity.
The interaction between the horizontal and vertical dimensions has implications for major military innovation. The horizontal linkages developed a directional flow toward two hubs in theater. It was at these hubs that resources and ideas were tapped.
The Skunk Werks welding shop and the Udairi firing range training center—both field level initiated solutions—centralized user adaptations. In the interim bi-directional vertical linkages provided direct connections to organizations and producers upward— the interaction between the vertical and horizontal linkages aligned putting the entire organization in sync with the changes.
Overall the two cases together reveal an overall story about field-level adaptation and linkages. First, given the right conditions of alignment innovations can move upward to become major military innovations. Second, horizontal diffusion of adaptations can be patterned in different ways and those patterns appear to have some relationship to field level identities. And finally, there may be a relationship between how innovations diffuse horizontally and their prospects for movement upward.
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In terms of machine design the two cases of gun truck creation control for central framework of the technology. The modifications that soldiers made in Iraq and
Afghanistan were done on a very open technological frame. Nevertheless, in most cases, soldiers lacked the capability to modify the internal components of their trucks with ease even though the general blueprint for combustion engines is widely known and open. Instead they relied upon the expertise of their mechanics for work. On the external components of the trucks, soldiers turned to those with welding and carpentry skills. So too with resources, soldiers scrounged and borrowed the requisite materials to modify their trucks. The gun truck drivers knew what they wanted but lacked for resources and capability to create those solutions.
Alternately, the top-down armor kit solutions investigated in the first two empirical chapters were both modular in design. The key design feature was toward flexibility in application to a number of vehicles. Engineers understood that the success of the solution relied on its ability to be applied easily to any circumstance by a non- technical soldier with limited equipment. The central logic behind the modular solutions in both Iraq and Vietnam was to design a system that reduced the barriers to adjustment—in effect reducing the barriers to adaptation. In doing so the armor solutions expanded the number of potential adapters by eliminating the need for the mechanics and welders. This being said, the modularity of those systems does not fully solve the necessity for further negotiation. As demonstrated in the Vietnam case, the
228 modular bolt-on system continued to be adapted and developed by mechanics in the field.
The foundational insights regarding machine design carry forward into the third empirical chapter where design becomes the central factor of exploration. By designing for flexibility, engineers ultimately provide more space for users to adjust technologies on their own—a conscious effort to invite user innovation. It is a formal recognition of a third potential path of production beyond previously established linear and Kline chain- link models—open recognition of the potential benefits of user-produced technology.
The transition to modularity and user toolkits in the consumer realm is predominantly represented through highly individualized electronic technologies. User toolkits and modularity reduce the load on the unit or individual user to rely upon others for technological adaptation. Designing machines for user input may nullify some of the needs to maintain strong horizontal linkages (though there may be other reasons to maintain them). Likewise, more closed modular design features may necessitate stronger horizontal than vertical linkages for successful adaptation.
In support of machine design’s growing relevance, current Department of
Defense (DoD) acquisitions and discourse demonstrate more than just a verbal acceptance of its importance. U.S. Military acquisitions programs do take design seriously, but it is of increased relevance in the current technological environment. In fact, the DoD has an established history of taking soldier insight seriously—as demonstrated in all three chapters. The cases demonstrate a military that is interested
229 in soldier insight, and permissive of field level solutions. This is and remains to be true.
What is new for the DoD is the formal incorporation of user input and feedback into technological development. This expansion of user-centered design programs signals a formal acceptance of a potential third path of technological development and potentially points to a change in perspective regarding what constitutes military power.
As the third chapter suggests, the incorporation of the user’s perspective was somewhat accidental. The consumer world changed first, soldiers as civilian users acted independently, and military programs met them halfway. Historically, defense acquisitions reflected a bias toward acquisition for (rather than in conjunction with) soldiers. It was the transition to an environment chock full of individual user capabilities and a newly complex technological security environment that smuggled the potential for user development in through the back door. No matter how it came about the current trend is toward acquisitions that it takes design seriously—one that seeks to harness the potential of user-based and user-centric technologies as a third path of technological innovation—one that accepts soldiers as a potential productive source of technological innovation.
Beyond linkages and design, the paradox of innovation is represented throughout the empirical examples. Innovation—novel, purposeful, intended change-- simultaneously needs centralized bureaucratic control and the disarticulated contextualized experiences of individuals that think and use items in their own way. It isn’t enough to simply have these things present, however. The Vietnam gun truck
230 adaptation didn’t become a major military innovation. In spite of top-down cooperation, significant field level processes, and a willingness to allow experimentation, the gun truck did not become a major military innovation. The case reveals that an entire organization can work toward the same goal, and even rewrite doctrine but fail to produce major military innovation. Major military innovations are not accidental; they are purposefully applied and they require an alignment of efforts at every level. The centralized organization is the final arbiter of adoption but the user is final arbiter of practice.
A New Perspective on the Military
Linkages and design are all part of the field-level adaptation process. The cases, interviews conducted for case selection and the primary documents investigated provide support to this argument. More interesting than the confirmation of the causal dimensions, however, is the way in which these stories upset common perceptions about hierarchy, organizations, and ingenuity. These narratives are interesting because they alter the way scholarship understands military organizations. They diminish the stereotype of strict command and control—of unoriginal thinking and bureaucratic stagnation. These cases provide a counterbalance to that perception by forcing analysis into the practice of war. This study reveals a different kind of military, preparing in different kinds of ways. They reveal an acceptance of the truth (though publicly
231 controversial) that victory is more often than not, obtained by making it up as we go along.
The U.S. Army is a bureaucratic organization, and is that way for multiple, valid reasons. This is why we must be concerned about innovation—the accepted wisdom is that bureaucratic organizations tend toward stasis.499 This is true, but not always. The
TOE (Table of organization and equipment)—i.e. the gear assigned to each occupation— is one component of a bureaucratic system that can reinforce stagnation and diminish the potential for innovation. The management and strict adherence to the TOE was a barrier to technological adaptation in the field—but it is also an ordering structure that organizes equipment across the battlefield. It may restrict your initial resource supply, but it also distributes equipment across space that is readily identifiable. Strict control of distribution also makes it possible to create a mental index of where resources might be located. This intuition is supported by both the Iraq and Vietnam cases that reveal an active give and take between respect for the system in place and a willingness to bypass the proper channels to fulfill needs. The implication is that hierarchical, bureaucratic military organizations are not unthinking but can actually be structured, useful organizers in a time of war.
Civilians and soldiers alike often misunderstand the role that rules and boundaries play in organizations—generally mistaking them in their entirety for the
499 Most of the literature on military organizations begins with this assumption. See: Chpt 1 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine.
232 reinforcement of authority. Up the chain of command, rules and standard operating procedures (SOP’s) exist to reinforce the hierarchy of command in order to ensure that strategy can be communicated downward and interpreted into action. Horizontally, however, rules can create an indexed system of organization. That is, a system by which soldiers can most effectively understand the lay of the land.
On top of the myriad of other theories that exist about centralized and decentralized decision making, what few appear to see clearly is that in a time of war, the hierarchy and rigidity of the military structure also make it possible for clerks to know how and where to source their most needed resources. Some structures tolerate the violation of rules because the purpose of that structure is to create a system that can be understood in fog, friction, and complete chaos. Successful field- level adaptation requires navigating the rules that structure manpower and resources, and knowing how to get around that without upending the entire system. That is the power of the informal horizontal linkage—it makes use of the organizations to sidestep the constraints of bureaucracy.
In both cases, equipment in Vietnam and Iraq was logged and tediously tracked, all the way down to the amount of ammunition in each unit. When it hit the field, a reasoned and rational grand trade in equipment began—an open sharing of resources
233 across the battlefield.500 Units assist each other in protecting and adapting by giving, trading, and teaching one another how and with what to conduct their missions. This practice of reciprocity, bartering, and teaching is informal but formally accepted as the way in which things get done in the field. Ensuring an organized supply and distribution is helpful because—knowing precisely from whom to collect stuffs makes it easier to adapt. Ideally, significant field work to follow these phenomena directly in theater is warranted.501 The data gathered would be immensely beneficial to the literature on cooperation as well as directly useful to war logisticians.
Building on this, field grade officers in the battlefield in each case tended to be integrative, cooperative, and clever more often than doctrinaire, competitive, and rank conscious. This was confirmed in all my interviews in which soldiers recounted the networks and paths they worked to modify their technology. Good junior officers and
NCO’s with strong connections across the battlefield know which strings to tug, which salvage yards to pilfer, and when to let their enlisteds tinker with machines. Field commanders insisted upon ensuring that their connections in different offices and bases were secure in order to maintain their access to resources.502 The instances of strong technological adaptation were accompanied by clever, curious, and resourceful officers
500 The means by which these trades occurred often involved writing off traded equipment as “combat losses”. This way one unit didn’t need to maintain documentation of to whom it was granted and why. Likewise both units no longer needed to worry about the bookkeeping process. 501 Likely the next step in working through the pitfalls of learning how innovation becomes practice in a theater of war. The Center for Army Lessons Learned is in a position to do so since they practice an ‘embed’ system currently—putting researchers in the field to distill lessons learned in the early phases of a conflict. See: Kime, "Instant Readiness: Lessons Learned in Iraq Available Online and in the Field the Next Day (About Center for Army Lessons Learned) ". 502 Killblane.
234 and enlisted personnel who understood how to work a system. This means that successful field-level adaptation is more than just the flow of ideas and resources. It is located within artifacts and people. It also means that social capital may mean more than military rank, since a soldier’s rank may mean nothing in terms of connectedness.503
Third, the two cases demonstrated that differing patterns of horizontal diffusion may matter. Recall that the diffusion of adaptations differed between Iraq and Vietnam.
The Vietnam adaptation process went from initiation to diffusion in less than three months starting at a single predominant source and diffusing outward through the line haul routes among truck drivers. Simultaneously, a significant culture of camaraderie and an identity of prestige built up around the Vietnam gun truck drivers. The routes and the identity established strong horizontal links among soldiers. Gun truck identity
It made it easier for the technological adaptation to travel because the look and the behavior of those logisticians was notable, and likewise that notoriety made it easier to source the machines they needed.
The Iraq case took longer to develop and there was no single predominant source of gun truck creation initially. Simultaneously, there was no strongly identifiable culture of gun truck identity with the exception of James McCormick’s unit and his
503 The stories are often undeniably colorful; a soldier I interviewed recalled arranging for the import of six air conditioners and boxes of mosquito nets into Vietnam. He was offered a helicopter in exchange for three of the air conditioners. He refused on the grounds that he needed flying lessons to make the trade worthwhile.
235 striped HMMWV—the Zebra. Rather, the diffusion of the technology coalesced at
Skunk Werks, a single identity, operating out of FSB Anaconda. Likewise the tactical changes coalesced and emanated out of MPRI’s Udairi firing range. The diffusion of the ideas came from these localities. One case demonstrated a clear emanation outward from a core source, the second a collection inward from varied sources. This suggests a potential relationship amongst the development of localized cultures/identities, horizontal linkages, and the resulting diffusion pattern. The relationship and its implications, however, are beyond the scope of this project but are promising for potential future research.
Fourth, while linkages were perhaps less robust horizontally in Iraq, they extended farther. Soldiers not only passed information and technology on to one another, but they also reached back home to source the things they needed. Soldiers leveraged their individual networks of influence in order to solve their adaptive problems. There is an established literature that explores terrorist organizations and their use of internet connectivity to traffic in the prohibited technologies, but very little research on the ways in which ecommerce and internet research behaviors enhance the effectiveness of established military forces.504 U.S. soldiers have more connections, more access, and operate on the open end of the web. Research in this area is of utmost
504 See: Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad : Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet : The New Arena, the New Challenges (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), Marie Wright, "Technology &Amp; Terrorism: How the Internet Facilitates Radicalization," The Forensic Examiner 17, no. 4 (2008).
236 importance beyond expansion of military capabilities however. This behavior holds the potential to be equally as disruptive to our own security as is could enhance capabilities.
Technology cuts both ways. Learning exactly how and in what ways soldiers in the field are using their electronic wallets and online linkages while deployed would balance this research.505
All of these novel solutions and patterns can be made problematic just as easily as they can be valorized. Innovation of any time is simply a change in how we do something. Still, it is difficult not to bias individual ingenuity in the face of a large bureaucracy. Everybody loves an underdog, but there are immense security risks that accompany individual freedom of thought in a theater of war.506 All these things are the reason why military organizations remain resistant to sharing and allowing individual creativity to flourish. Captain Springer’s surreptitious experiment with his iPhone application could have gone horribly wrong. Individual acts of creativity in the act of killing are fraught with ethical and legal issues. It is a tension that must be balanced with the necessity of adaptation. Too far in the other direction and we have no knowledge of how to bring practice to theory. Napoleon was among the first military commanders to bring an automatic gun onto the battlefield. By modern intuition it should have yielded a battlefield massacre. Napoleon’s secret weapon, however, was too secret.
So secret that not even the French commanders understood what they should do with
505 The New York Times article points to the phenomenon, but research has yet to follow. Kirk Semple, "G.I.'S Deployed in Iraq Desert with Lots of American Stuff," New York Times, 13 August 2005 2005. 506 Richard J. Harknett and JCISS Study Group, "The Risks of a Networked Military," Orbis Winter 2000 (2000).
237 the world’s very first automatic weapon. Rather than moving it to the forefront as an anti-personnel gun they held them to the back as artillery. The effect was notably underwhelming since the range of the mitrailleuse round was shorter than the opposing
German cannons.507
Another Look at Military Innovation Literature
Although my findings do not test and overturn prior theory on military innovation directly, there are very strong links between technological adaptation and major military innovation writ large. Twice in two eras of war I demonstrated the development and path of diffusion of user technological adaptations. In addition to this I provided additional illustrative instances of design features that invite user-initiated technological adaptation processes officially accepted and supported in the U.S. Army.
Given this, there are several potential conclusions that can be drawn regarding field level innovation and the current literature on military innovation.
First, at the field level the intra/inter-service rivalry theories may not hold in a wartime environment. We traditionally understand organizations as competitive structures that seek to maximize power and influence. There are very strong rivalries between Army, Navy, and Air Force. In the field, units from across branches worked together to share resources and provide solutions to localized problems. In an environment where security was at stake, the instinct was not that of dog eat dog, but a
507 Page 98 Addington, The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century.
238 mutual aid environment of technology swapping and modification. The war in Iraq introduced several more actors into the field of fire. The saturation of private military contractors into the haul lines and the collaborative efforts of Marines, Air Force, and
Army in providing convoy protection significantly stirred the pot for potential rivalry.
Further research on unit cohesion and cooperation is therefore warranted to determine if the interaction between civilian and soldiers produced different kinds of rivalries beyond inter-service phenomena.
Furthermore, since the willingness to share and exchange data is part of the open innovation logic the introduction of actors who seem to benefit differently from service (PMCs make a significantly larger wage and have shorter service times in theater)508 may introduce interactions that are stifling of diffusion. Alternately, given an extended period of war, it appears that even a traditional division between Active,
Reserve, and National Guard identities appear to break down as soldiers continue to serve and survive in theater.509 Though not addressed within this project, it suggests that theories of military innovation that rely upon organizational competition may break down over longer periods of war and under greater duress.
508 For all the literature on the privatization of the military the Iraq war was an opportunity to examine cohesion among units with private contractors. The literature on PMCs is vast, but very little has been done to capture the effect within militaries among young enlisteds and junior officers. The exception is the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Several of their interviews include questions regarding working with PMCs. See for example: Deckard, "Interview with Major Heidi Baird.", Jenna Fike, "Interview with Major Paul Madden," ed. Institute Combat Studies, Operational Leadership Experiences (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center, 2009), McCool, "Interview with Capt. Jennifer Mlocek.", Slattery, "Interview with Major Ted Kaiser." 509 Killblane.
239
Second, insights generated from field-level adaptation contrast and blend with
Posen’s observation regarding military mavericks, but in an unexpected way. OIF and
Vietnam had their mavericks, but they were mavericks not for championing a new grand theory of innovation, but for protecting or even fostering the development of nascent ideas. A field level maverick may have different attributes for fostering adaptation processes than Posen’s civil-military relations agent. Namely, the field maverick is in a position of access to resources, has a strong knowledge of the organization’s structure, and likely carries a great deal of social capital to call in favors; but simultaneously need not be of any particular rank.
Third, this project doesn’t clarify, but rather expands the potential research in cultural theories regarding military behavior. While cultural theories regarding state versus state behavior exist,510 seeing militaries as monolithic, and soldiers as single- purpose is intensely problematic especially given the current technological environment which increasingly emphasizes individual warfighters. First, in terms of occupation,
Combat Service Support soldiers have a distinct self-image of their task and their role, albeit a quiet and unknown one. Alternately, there are significant identities and cultural differences between elite special forces units, infantry, armor, artillery, and intelligence.
Second, in terms of the case studies, the data suggests that a field culture may exist that is distinct from soldiers operating outside the conflict zone. As a first cut on
510 Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars.", Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation : The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the Us, and Israel.
240 understanding the potential differences on a single technological frame one path is to track the differences in culture and identity of soldiers operating the Predator drone program remotely from the United States and those flying drones in theater.
Finally, the primary source documents point to failures in organizational effectiveness as well as difficulty managing institutional memory but less in terms trenchant adherence to old methods. Instead of reluctance to change, the documents reveal an almost unchecked obsession with innovation and change. In both cases of
Vietnam and Iraq, research indicates that theU.S.military is incredibly forward thinking.
The 1965 document from the Limited War Laboratory reveals a stunning amount of prior research and insight into the potential for new weapons. The soldiers deployed to
Iraq indicated frustration, not with getting their hands on cutting-edge technology, but having enough time to learn how to use it. What this means is that a better characterization of the problem of innovation in military organizations is not about stagnation, but about effective data management across a huge set of actors.
Fewer Chances at Prediction and Less Time
The amorphous modern conflict environment demands we seriously rethink the notion of long-term military dominance and national security planning. The same new capabilities that permit our soldiers to adapt and act are available to most of the rest of the world too. Technology, the apparatus that we use to complete tasks and solve
241 problems, has aggregated and proliferated. The world has become technologically crowded with various actors and machines—this is often referred to as technological complexity. This complexity shifted the character of war by changing where and from whom threats can arise—from the few to the many. The proliferation of cheap and tiny technologies brought new actors into the calculation of threat and uncertainty. Cheap, tiny, and ‘good enough’ technologies incentivize decentralized hidden and sub-state level violence. It incentivizes them to the degree that this will be a predominant form of conflict for the foreseeable future.511 More actors, at all levels acting independently with the capability to do violence, means greater uncertainty and fewer clues as to how to plan and predict for national security.
Just because prediction is less useful in a chaotic security environment does not then mean that we cannot plan and prepare. The shift to a complex decentralized threat in a technologically grounded and rich environment requires new thinking about machines, in terms of these newly prevalent innovation processes. 512 The policy implications of this project’s findings speak predominantly to the acquisitions process.
Continued development of monolithic black-boxed technology is expensive and
511 Monolithic, state-centric, conventional military threats of the 20th century have largely given way to a world of insurgencies in failed and failing states and the rise of non-state actors in a globalized world of complex interdependences in an expanded context of irregular warfare. States no longer have a monopoly on knowledge, resources, and power; these are now obtainable to some degree on the Internet and accessible with a laptop and a credit card—both of which can be stolen. Page 15 D. Neal, Technology National Defense University. Center for, and Policy National Security, Crosscutting Issues in International Transformation: Interactions and Innovations among People, Organizations, Processes, and Technology (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2009). 512 pg 6. David A. Deptula, "Toward Restructuring National Security," Strategic Studies Quarterly 1, no. 2 (2007).
242 lengthens the time to actual innovation. The measure of the effectiveness of acquisition likely needs to be extended to include the length of time it takes to incorporate into practice. That is, how complex is the machine, how long will it take soldiers to learn it, Military organizations are brimming with experiential knowledge and the struggle to incorporate that into practices that equal effective change.
Adaptation in war is a necessary component to victory, but this does not absolve us of the importance of choosing among the alternatives. After all, knowing the source and pathways of different kinds of innovation is distinctly different from deciding amongst them. The creation and diffusion of new technologies should never be mistaken for success. This applies both to top-down and bottom-up processes. At the field level, querying soldiers about their technological needs carries its own risks and ambiguities. When asked, officers and enlisteds invariably produce a list that includes a jet pack and an invisibility cloak (an easy reminder that neither end of the technological frontier has clarity over a solution set). What constrains choice over solutions from the top down—the grand theoretical end—is likely some calculation of money plus the threat environment at an international scale. At the field level the constraints are clear; time, available resource, and the threat environment at the immediate local level.
We seek innovation because in a complex technologically changing world the solution cannot be to stand still. Innovation qua innovation isn’t always right or good, but it is necessary. Not all innovations are good—they just signify an accepted and conscious change in practice. Innovations must be adjudicated and selected from.
243
Each shift in how we do something has an effect on the technological trajectory of the conduct of war. The centralized decision making powers in military organizations should serve as the final arbiter of whether those changes are supported no matter their source. This is why policy matters, and for the purpose of this study, procurement and R&D policy specifically.
First, given the current state of the world the footing of military organizations needs to shift away a position of prediction and monolithic technologies toward an adaptive perspective and flexible technological acquisitions. This has already begun, albeit largely as a result of being immersed in unconventional conflict environments for over a decade. Small, cheap, and good enough technologies have proliferated; therefore the DoD’s acquisition response cannot be to continue permitting the weapons industry to produce proprietary, non-standardized, monolithic machines.
The challenge to acquisitions is to require modularized interchangeable components across the range of personal technologies. It puts the military on a much more solid adaptation footing. This prescription won’t be entirely new to acquisitions analysts who can already point to an intensely messy bureaucratic paper system of bidding, flow charts, and requirements. But the research can begin simply with a rigorous cross-case analysis of the history of rapid acquisition and fielding programs like the Limited War Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s ASK armor kit or the MRAP initiative to harden soft-skinned HMMWV’s. Undersecretary Ashton Carter made the call for the establishment of a permanent rapid acquisition program within
244 the DoD in 2011513, a significant part of the groundwork for that program should include direct observation and collection of user practices in theater with an eye toward design and adaptability.
Second, just because segments of acquisition are moving toward the incorporation of user production and direct adaptation to technology does not mean that all programs should. This study compresses the range of machines into a single lump. The reality is that there are stunningly complex machines arranged in systems on top of systems. There will be a way to slice the apple in a way that makes sense for different systems. As a first cut, however, since the initiatives taken by users are generally driven by individuals or small groups of soldiers starting with individual technologies is likely to be simplest and with the greatest amount of increase in capabilities given the current threat environment.
Finally, not all paradoxes need a solution. There’s a strong tendency in organizations to “try” to innovate—to formalize creative activity through meetings and activities. The answer to increased adaptability may be less about inducing innovation as permitting and enabling it. This means, again, thinking carefully about machine design and studying the diffusion patterns at the field level to discern their collection points.
513 The Honorable Dr. Ashton B. Carter under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Testimony to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense on Department of Defense Acquisition in the Fiscal Year 2012 Budget April 13, 2011, 2011.
245
Accepting Change Under Fire
Walking around in the shoes of the soldier reveals a number of stark realities.
Adaptations are fine-grained, wild-eyed creatures that aren’t easily documented, but that are nevertheless are central to successful war fighting. We oddly associate being at the top of the hierarchical chain as having an increased degree of freedom. This is not the case in the field. There must be some degree of freedom to adapt and improvise. Without this tactical, technological flexibility wars cannot be won unless so entirely lop-sided as to be massacre. Adaptation in war is the informal, and unplanned gut-wrenching process of failure converted into solution. The tragedy of this dirty process is that we tend to forget about them. The outcomes of adaptation are generally captured in TTP’s, SOP’s, lessons learned, or doctrine giving them the air of centralized planning but commonly lost in practice without centralized effort. The process of field- level adaptation is elusive. It can sometimes be captured through oral histories or in snippets in history books. And it is precisely because they are not formalized, bureaucratized, or captured on a centralized planning schedule that we forget them, fail to analyze their paths and to learn from them.
The modern threat environment is shifting the way in which we calculate power.
The modern threat environment will eventually shift so far as to reward a single kind of innovation over others—adaptation. Adaptation is the sine qua non of the coming (and perhaps current) system. The ability to do it well and quickly will be the coin of the realm. Our task as scholars is to figure out how to harness that ingenuity—to learn how
246 the field-level adaptations and disseminates its technology and technological knowledge. At the forefront of this thinking are the usual suspects—strategists, policy makers, and scientists. The findings and arguments in this study suggest we add the engineers and the boots on the ground to this conversation.
247
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Appendix A: Military Innovation Literature Chart
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Appendix B: Vietnam Order of Battle 8th Transportation Group
Data Sourced from Army Transportation Museum Fort Eustis, VA
8th Transportation Group
Battalion Unit Type Dates Typical Location 27th Transportation 2nd Medium 65-72 Phu Tai Trans Truck
58th Light 65-69 Phu Tai Trans Truck 444th Light 65-71 Phu Tai Trans Truck 585th Medium 66-72 Phu Tai Trans Truck 597th Medium 65-72 Phu Tai Trans Truck
54th Transportation 57th Light 67-71 Phu Tai Trans Truck
512th Light 66-72 Phu Tai Trans Truck 523rd Light 66-72 Phu Tai Trans Truck 666th Light 67-72 Cha Trans Truck Rang 669th Light 66-71 Phu Tai Trans Truck
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124th Transportation 64th Medium 66-71 Pleiku Trans Truck 88th Light 66-72 Pleiku Trans Truck 541st Light 65-71 Pleiku Trans Truck 563rd Medium 66-71 Pleiku Trans Truck
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