DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL TRUST AND DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS (THE CASE OF BRAZIL)
José Álvaro Moisés 1 Paper presented to the seminar “Democracy and Citizens Distrust of Public Institutions in Brazil in Comparative Perspective”, Oxford University 1/6/2007.
1 Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for Public Policy Research, University of São Paulo.
1 INTRODUCTION 2
Brazil has realized in October 2006 its fifth presidential election since the demise of the military regime. As it has been the case of all recent elections since then, the electoral process was fair, competitive, and open to the participation of all segments of the Brazilian society - independently of ideology, cultural, ethnical, and socioeconomic roots. Thus Brazil can be considered as an electoral democracy, according to the Freedom House criteria, as since 1989 - when a civilian president was freely elected for the first time in three decades -, elections, coordinated by an independent electoral tribunal, are free and assure the participation of almost 126 million voters out of a population of 186 million people, that is, more than 90% of the total adult Brazilian population 3. Moreover, since the election of Lula da Silva in 2002 - and with his reelection in 2006 -, who presented himself as a left- winger alternative to the center-right and center-left forces that governed the country after the military, the principle of alternation in power has been taken for granted.
Brazil is now considered to be a democracy both by the relevant political actors and by the majority of experts. In fact, fifteen years ago when Samuel Huntington (1991) argued that a third wave of democratization had swept the globe from 1974 to 1990 - referring to no more than 30 countries which had made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy -, Brazil was included among them. There is little dispute now as to whether the Brazilian democracy is consolidated or not 4. In fact, the country concluded a long process of transition from a more than twenty-year-military regime to a new democratic system with the proclamation of the so-called New Republic in the middle 80s. Brazilian democratization resulted from liberalization initiatives of the ancient regime, mobilization of the civil society, and from negotiations with democratic leadership. But the first civilian president, egress from authoritarianism, was chosen by the National Congress according to the military’s rule 5. This ambiguity deeply influenced the final phase of the Brazilian transition and, as a consequence, the voting of the 1988 Constitution was marked by disputes around the duration of the president’s mandate, the system of government, the executive-legislative relations, and the
2 I am indebted to Clecio Ferreira and João Francisco Resende for their work in organizing the data and statistical analysis presented here. I am also thankful to Marta Maria Assumpção and Teresa Sachet for their careful reading of my original version in English and their suggestions to ameliorate it. 3 The expansion of suffrage is an important characteristic of the process of democratization in Brazil. In 1930, under an oligarchic system, 2 million citizens (5% of the population) voted for president; in 1945, during the Brazilian democratization of the post-war, 16% of the population voted; and, in 2002, 66,6%, but considering only 18-year-old (or more) population, it represented 94%. The vote is mandatory and optional for 16 to 18 years old or for more than 70 years old people. In the 2002 presidential election, 75% of the voting were considered valid, that is, excluding blank and nulls votes, as well as the no-attending (Lamounier, 2005; Kinzo, 2004). 4 Pinheiro, one of the most important exceptions, refer to “a prevailing authoritarian system, incrustate in institutions of violence and crime control, existing under the democratic regime in Brazil” (Pinheiro, 2001). 5Tancredo Neves, the leader of a coalition of dissident forces of the ancient regime and leaders of the democratic resistance, was elected president according to the constitution of the military regime, but died before taking power. The vice-president, José Sarney, a dissident from the old regime and until a few months before the leader of its party, became president.
2 role of the state in the economy. Praised for improvements in relation to individual and social rights, the new Constitution has, however, institutionalized a political system characterized by strong powers of the president, while limiting the ways and rules, according to which the congress can control executive actions 6. Controversially characterized as a singular case due to limitations enhanced from authoritarianism and the previous democratic experience, the Brazilian political system is said to associate a plebiscitarian presidential system with federalism, electoral rules that combine open lists of candidates with proportional representation, a weak and fragmented multiparty system and the formation of great coalitions based on heterogeneous political forces (Cardoso, 2006; Power et al., 2006; Lamounier, 2005; Reis, 2003; Mainwaring, 1993; Santos, 1999; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Moisés, 1995; Abranches, 1988; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986).
These existing institutional deficiencies do not threaten the democratic regime in the short run, but they compromise its quality and may affect the relationship of citizens with the polity. Free and competitive elections mean that, from the moment they are established, the choice of who governs is subject to the principle of popular sovereignty. But indispensable as they are, elections guarantee neither the complete instauration of democracy, nor do they assure the quality of the new regime. Recent democratizing experiences show that different political regimes characterized as electoral democracies, even assuring the amplification of citizens civil and political rights do not necessarily attend to all criteria by which an authoritarian political system transforms itself into a complete democratic regime. Among newly democratized countries there are cases that have achieved competitive electoral processes but live together with governments that violate the primacy of rule of law and some of the citizens rights, use corruption and mismanagement of public funds to realize political objectives, and block or impede citizens´ control of governments actions through legislative and judiciary procedures, i.e., vertical and horizontal accountability. In these cases, what is at stake is not whether democracy exists, but its quality (Shin, 2006, Diamond and Morlino, 2004, O´Donnell, 2004, Morlino, 2002; Diamond, 2002).
Democracy is also the political regime preferred by the majority of the Brazilian citizens, a pattern of attitudes which is confirmed by the increasing rejection of both military return and monopartism along the time (see figure 1 below and also appendix 1). Nonetheless, it faces a paradox: democratic
6 Article 62 of the 1988 Constitution allows presidents, in cases of “urgency and relevance” to decree “provisional measures with force of law”. This prerogative has been largely used by all presidents since 1988 and, although subject to controversy among analysts, it is considered as “a strong form of legislative authority because it allows chief executives to overrule statutes altogether and move the policy status to their desired position” (Amorim Neto, 2006).
3 institutions are subject to great and continuous distrust by Brazilian citizens. Data from different sources show that, in spite of the support enjoyed by the democratic regime per se , around 2/3 of the Brazilian people do not trust – in different degrees - in political parties, parliaments, executive branches, courts of law, as well as health, educational, and security public services. Surveys realized in 1989, 1990, 1993 and 2006 by the author revealed that the negative perception of public institutions crosses all segments of society, irrespectively of income, schooling, age, and ecological distribution (see appendix 2). They also demonstrate that dissatisfaction with the actual functioning of democracy is very high (Moisés, 1995; Moisés e Oliveira, 2005; Moisés, 2006; Power and Jamison, 2005; Torcal, 2001).
Figure 1: PREFERENCE FOR DEMOCRACY AND REJECTION FOR MILITARY RETURN AND MONOPARTISM IN BRAZIL 1989/2006 (%)
80
76,1 75
70 68,1 68,1
64,2 65 63,8 65,3
63,4
60 61,7
54,4 55 54,4 Prefer democracy
51,5 53,0 50 50,3 50,8 Reject military return
45 Reject monopartism
40 1989 1990 1993 1997 2006 Source: Projects “Democratization and Political Culture”, coord. by J. A. Moisés (1989,1990 and 1993), “Political culture and Citizenship”, Found. ´Perseu Abramo´ (1997); "Citizens´distrust in Democratic Institutions in Brazil", coord. by J.A.Moisés and R. Meneguello (2006). (All surveys, n= 2000 or more) Note: Chi-square coefficients for association among pair of variable all significant. Don´t know, Don´t answer, and Missing Cases excluded.
At least since the seminal work by Almond and Verba (1963), political trust is considered to be crucial for political legitimacy, as well as to governability and democratic consolidation, while political distrust express citizens attitudinal syndrome of deep discredit and unworthiness of political objects central to the democratic regime, as is the case of accountable governments, the primacy of the rule of law, and institutions capable of guaranteeing rights of citizenship. There is no doubt that some amount of distrust in political institutions is a healthy sign of citizens´ critical distance from a sphere of social life of which they have little control (Pettit, 1998; Sztompka, 1999; Uslaner, 2001; Warren, 1999). Nevertheless, surmounting and continuous political distrust may
4 imply that, considering the political evaluations derived from their expectations and concrete experiences, and also their normative orientations, citizens perceive public institutions not as a way to realize their interests and preferences, or to realize the democratic promise of the expansion of civil, political and social rights, but as something different in nature from that for which they have been created. In this case, political mistrust may be accompanied by attitudes of discredit and hopelessness – and this may compromise political acquiescence, citizens´ sense of political inclusiveness and their submission to the law, as well as their propensity to engage in civic participation and social cooperation (Levi, 1998; Miller & Listhaung, 1998; Tyler, 1998; Dalton, 1999; Moisés, 2005).
This paper examines the bases of the contradictory conviviality among citizens’ distrust in public institutions and their support to democracy in Brazil. The relationship between trust and regime support is analyzed on the base of individual opinions and attitudes. The first section discuss the disagreement that exists among cultural and institutional theories about the importance of trust for democratic regimes, and the fact that little systematic research has directly addressed to possible connections among them. The paper addresses this neglect and considers systematically both the determinants and the consequences of trust for regime support, political involvement and particularly its effects to public perceptions of the quality of democracy in Brazil. The next section discusses the concept of trust; and the following deals with methodological implications of the problem and proposes a model to treat the determinants of political distrust. Finally, the paper examines the effects of the Brazilians recent experience with democratic institutions, and the impact of political distrust on citizens´ perceptions about the quality of democracy in the country.
The analysis is based on data from the project “Citizens Distrust of Democratic Institutions in Brazil”, a nationwide survey of Brazilian citizens conducted by José Álvaro Moisés and Rachel Meneguello in 2006 (see appendix 3). The interest on the Brazilian case is related not only to the fact that it is already a 20 year-old democratic regime, but also because political and social trust, democratic values and citizens´ support for the new regime vary widely along the time within the Brazilian society. In fact, although public support for democracy in Brazil initially was relatively low (Moisés, 1995), successive elected governments and the relative improvement of economic conditions after hyperinflation, particularly, after both Cardoso and Lula administrations, between 1994 and 2006, have been accompanied by a significant increase of public support for democratic regime and the rejection of alternatives to it (appendix 1, Meneguello, 2007). Then, controversial indexes of trust for the Brazilian democratization combined with substantial variation in both
5 interpersonal and political trust, on the one hand, and regime support across Brazilian citizens, on the other, all make of Brazil an excellent setting in which to assess the effects of trust for democratic theory.
Results show that consequences of institutional and interpersonal trust in Brazil are important for democracy, although not so much as cultural theories presuppose. Institutional hypotheses about the importance of political and economic performance also receive support, but again not in the entire expected direction. Nevertheless, the effects, especially of institutional trust, are sufficient to suggest that both cultural and institutional theories cannot be dismissed altogether and need to be integrated into a synthetic model of analysis.
POLITICAL CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY To explain the relationship between citizens’ political attitudes and processes of democratization, political scientists have made use of two theoretical trends apparently contradictory. On the one hand, there is the tradition of political culture studies for which the presence or absence of individuals’ democratic orientations, formed from basic processes of socialization, matters for regime change and stability. Political culture is defined as a variety of shared attitudes, beliefs and political values - such as national pride, political efficiency, political interest, tolerance, and institutional and interpersonal trust –, which are supposed to influence the conceptions that inform people’s involvement with the public life. The theory postulates that these orientations are long lasting, but changes can occur mainly as a consequence of processes of economic and social modernization and its impact over the political values (Inglehart, 2005). Political orientations and values are supposed to influence citizens’ choice to accept the democratic regime as their preferable alternative (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 2000; Eckstein et al., 1998). The relevance of citizens´ democratic attitudes is also emphasized by theories of congruence (Eckstein, 1998), and of social capital (Putnam, 1993). Some cultural theories are holistic, aggregated and deterministic in orientation, whereas others are more individualist, micro-oriented and probabilistic, but apart from these differences there are sufficient commonalities among them with regards to how they see trust as a necessary condition for democracy (Mishler and Rose, 2001; 2005).
On the other hand, institutional theories of democracy offer the principal alternative to cultural theories, ascribing little importance to either institutional or interpersonal trust. This tradition measures the institutionalization of democracy from data about elections, participation, competition among political parties and their alternation in governments’ control. This approach also analyses
6 aggregate indexes of political institutions and governments’ performance, and the relationship between these two dimensions. What counts for this perspective are not political values or the normative orientation of individual citizens, but the institutional efficiency in relation to ends desired by political actors. Common to institutional theories is the core assumption that political institutions and behavior are products of rational choice and purposive design based variously on individual and collective evaluations of political performance. In the same way that institutional theories conceive regime support as the product of citizen’s evaluations of the regime’s performance, institutional trust is conceived by institutional theories as the expected utility of institutions performing well (Coleman, 1990; North, 1990; Hetherington, 1998; Norris, 1999).
A limitation of the institutional approach is, however, its treatment of the functioning of democratic institutions as exogenous to collective decision-making process, and to the publics´ reactions to it. Institutionalism states that actors make choices in response to institutional incentives. These incentives may be indeterminate, so that courses of action do not follow strictly, in a one-to-one fashion, from specific institutions. But actors are seen as making choices within institutions. This assumption justifies the proposal of causal models that treat institutions as independent variables. But this defining feature of the institutional approach has been questioned because there is evidence that actors who are supposed to make choices within institutions also make choices about institutions based in the broad social and cultural context in which political leaders and voters interact among themselves, mutually influencing one another and, at the same time, acting accordingly to a frame defined by the institutional rules (Moisés, 1995; Downs, 1991; Munck, 2004).
Although cultural and institutional theories disagree about the importance of trust for democratic regimes, little systematic research has directly addressed to possible connections among them (with few exceptions being Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Norris, 1999; and Mishler and Rose, 2001; 2005). David Easton’s contribution to the theme suggests, however, the existence of a link between these two perspectives. His analysis about conditions related to the formation of legitimacy emphasizes that the importance of the phenomenon of political support - diffuse and specific - is associated to citizens’ political experience, i.e., to the relation and use that citizens make of public institutions in their practical experience, and the political judgment that stem from this experience. It is questionable, however, whether political judgment or evaluation of institutional experience can be taken as only orientated by rational considerations, or also by values and normative perspectives held by citizens about political institutions conceived as means to realize their interests and preferences. The alternative hypothesis states that interests and preferences are formed in a complex
7 context that involves not only rational considerations, but also social and political values (Easton, 1965; Downs, 1991; Norris, 1999; Shin, 2006; Moisés, 2006).
As a consequence, both the tradition of political culture and the one that values the design and the performance of institutions must be taken into consideration to explain how and why citizens relate to political regimes. Orientations derived from the socialization process, although important to form citizens’ attitudinal tendencies, mix themselves with the political judgment originated from citizens’ experience with institutions. In other words, people learn and re-learn about the role played by institutions, despite opinions formed in early life, and that results mainly from their contact and concrete experience with them and from the meanings that governments and officers in charge attribute to them. It is from this fusion of orientations – relative both to the political culture tradition and to the evaluation generated from their experience with political institutions - that citizens’ attitudes, opinions and reactions over the democratic regime are formed. Regime support - of which trust is supposed to be a component - should be seen, then, as a dynamic, complex and multi-faced phenomenon, involving simultaneously the acceptance of democratic rules and procedures, the rejection of alternatives to them, and also attitudes that fuse both choices (Dalton, 1999; Klingemann, 1998; Shin, 1999; 2005).
In short, while democracy supposes citizens´ aspiration towards ideal values, it also alludes to an institutional system from which they expect practical solutions to collective problems (Gunther and Montero, 2003). The phenomenon of political support has to be seen, then, as unfolding in two distinct analytical dimensions: the normative and the practical. The normative refers to the adherence to democracy as a principle or an ideal value, and the practical relates to the satisfaction with the regime generated by the functioning of its institutions. Shin and others, based on analysis of different democratization cases, have argued that there is a gap between these two dimensions, because citizens of new democracies may have not yet obtained the degree of sophistication required by the complex functioning of principles such as the rule of law, separation of powers, and incumbents’ obligation to render accounts of their action to the public (Klingemann, 1999; Norris, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Shin, 2005). Even when mobilization of sectors of civil society has played a relevant role in the democratization process, this might not be enough to make the majority of citizens to adopt at once a positive orientation towards the new regime and its institutions. To make it happen, beyond its significance as an ideal, the functioning of the democratic regime must generate the feeling that it is worth counting on specific public institutions for citizens to realize their interests and expectations (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1988; Rose and Shin, 2001, Shin and Munro, 1999).
8
THE EFFECT OF TRUST FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS Trust is supposed to be one of the most important answers to this situation. In the last decades, the concept has been used to designate a great variety of social and political phenomena that, in spite of putting actors at risk, it refers to the necessary social cohesion required by the functioning of complex, unequal and differentiated societies. In this situation, trust is thought to fulfill the emptiness left behind by difficulties that common people face to mobilize the necessary cognitive resources to evaluate and judge the quality of political decisions that affect their lives (Luhmann, 1979; Giddens, 1990; Newton, 1999; Warren, 1999). But the argument has been contested by authors who sustain that trust involves the rational perspective of A in relation to the course of action to be adopted by B. Inasmuch as it is not enough per se to entirely determine the result of the interaction, defenders of the rational choice perspective argue that the trusting relation has to include the encapsulated interests of involved parts to avoid the abuse of confidence. Trust, particularly interpersonal trust, would have to comprehend, then, situations in which mutual interests, that generate common benefits and eliminate the injuries derived from its abuse, may be mobilized. Beyond that, trust would not be justifiable from a rational perspective (Hardin, 1999; Levi, 1998).
On the other hand, critics of this approach sustain that the situation is far from being the most common, since the decision to trust is not always rational, nor is it determined exclusively by the level of available information related to the behavior of others. Individuals do not have the cognitive capacity to access, in the necessary amount of quantity and quality, the appropriate information to evaluate the behavior of others or the utility of institutions (Downs, 1991). Efficiency, pluralization and social mobility - all typical of contemporary societies, have amplified the possibilities of individuals’ choices; but the complex collective decision-making process limit their capacity to control the necessary information to make their decisions compatible with their interests and aspirations. This is the reason why trust is so needed.
But the premise that social trust generates political trust has to face the classic objection that democracy was born from distrust, that those who have power are not trusty, and that the usual procedures of power exercise must be controlled to avoid abuse. Accordingly, the advantage of rules and democratic institutions are the control of power, and its limitation and distribution propitiated by them; the democratic singularity refers to the creation of norms of procedures to put arbitrary powers in check. Democracy implies in supervision and monitoring the political power by
9 citizens, and for that reason it implies in distrust based on norms and institutions designed in such a way that the original risks can be controlled. In this case, how to speak of political trust?
The argument in favor of trust inverts the previous reasoning. As there is no absolute guarantee that the political conflict of interests may be solved in a peaceful manner, modern democracy has institutionalized rules, norms and procedures, which assure a civilized pattern of political competition. Mechanisms such as elections, representation, freedom of expression, right of a just and impartial judgment, separation of powers, and accountability of governments are supposed to enable citizens to challenge relations which they distrust. But, in order to do so, their distrust must be “institutionalized” in permanent rules and procedures that, once mobilized, assure citizens that they can compete for their interests without risk for their liberty and rights. The idea is that rights are “naturalized” by institutions, and “internalized” by its functioning; accordingly, rules serve to guarantee citizens´ right to control circumstances that may generate distrust. In other words, the “institutionalization” of distrust requires the existence of a culture of trust to function, and democratic institutions are said to make it possible. In this sense, Sztompka (1999) [but also Downs (1991), from a different perspective], refers to five democratic practices, which require trust to operate successfully: communication among citizens in order to define public objectives; tolerance and acceptance of differing values and views; civility among actors competing for different objectives; civic participation in both the political life and in associations of civil society, and finally a minimal consensus about rule and procedures that guarantee the democratic functioning (also Offe, 1999; Warren, 1999).
Trusting in institutions, however, is not the same thing as trusting people from whom one may expect reciprocity, indifference, or hostility. In contrast to Hardin (1999), for whom the inexistence of trust in institutions is a result of limited information, authors as Offe (1999) focuses the analysis on the normative resources of institutions. Trust in institutions supposes the knowledge of the basic idea attributed to them by society - as for example, the belief that the police exists to guarantee the safety of people. Once they are able to clearly signalize the universalism, impartiality, correctness, and probity of their procedures, institutions assure that different interests at stake will be taken into account by the political system. Institutions, then, are not neutral, but mechanisms of political mediation informed by values derived from choices made under the pressure of collective political dispute. Political trust is neither blind nor automatic, but it depends on whether the functioning of institutions effectively allows citizens to know, retrace or question their final ends. In this context, democratic rules such as impartiality in elections, probity in the use of public resources, the equality before the law and equal access to justice - all generate social expectations which affect the
10 relationship of citizens with the polity. Thus, political trust depends of the coherence of institutions concerning their normative justification; and the repertoire of meanings resulting from their functioning deeply influences the measure of citizens´ trust, inasmuch as it affects their evaluation of institutions (Offe, 1999; Levi, 1998; Norris, 1999).
CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL HYPOTHESES
Cultural and institutional theories have alternative hypotheses about the relationship between trust and democracy, and we need to test them in order to assess their relevance for democratic theory. Political culture theories depart at least of three distinct but strongly interrelated perspectives about how and why trust matters. In the first place, trust is hypothesized as being part of the syndrome of diffuse support for the regime, that is, the set of values that, even not being absolutely consensual, clearly distinguish this regime from others (Easton, 1965; Braithwaite & Levi, 1998; Gibson et al., 1998). Second, as discussed in the previous section, cultural theories hypothesize that trust affects the public’s acceptance or rejection of democratic institutions responsible to assure principles such as citizens´ equality before the law, civil and political rights, public control of governments´ actions and access to universal and fair justice (Muller, Jukam & Selingson, 1982; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Norris, 1999). Third, theories of political culture also hypothesize that political trust influences both political involvement and perceptions about the quality of the democratic regime (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Norris, 1999; Putnam, 1993, 2000). In other words, trust is supposed to have direct effects on both the survival of the regime and its effective functioning. It creates a relationship of confidence between institutions, governments and those who are governed, allowing elected leaders to take decisions that provide long-term benefits to citizens even when those decisions are unpopular in the short run. Trust is also supposed to strengthen or to weaken citizens´ beliefs that public institutions, governments and public services are responsive, and it encourages the electorate to express their demands via participation in activities as voting and taking part in political parties or civic organizations.
Although its importance is supposed to be indirect or mediated through trust in political institutions, interpersonal trust is also emphasized. According to the theory, interpersonal trust is generated through face-to-face interactions among individuals in informal groups and it ´spills over´ to cooperative relations with others in social and civic associations, and this then ´spills up´, contributing to public trust in representative institutions (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002; Rose and Mishler, 2005). The relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust is, however, controversial and has to be tested empirically. While Putnam (1993) conceives of the relationship as
11 unidirectional – that is, social trust leads to institutional trust – others argue that their effects are reciprocal, and yet some doubt that any relationship does exist between these two dimensions (Putnam, 1993; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Della Porta, 2000; Newton, 1999). In relation to this, indexes of interpersonal trust are not usually very high in the newly democratized countries (Rose, 2004), but Brazil seem to be a singular case with an even lower average than other Latin American countries (Moisés and Oliveira, 2005; Torcal, 2001; Meneguello, 2007).
By contrast, institutional theories do not count on the importance of interpersonal or political trust for democratic regimes and they even question whether political trust is a cultural characteristic. In fact, while political culture theories assume that trust is intergenerationally transmitted and deeply embedded in the social context, the institutionalist approach holds that trust is produced by the same factors that generate support for democratic regimes; and it is supposed to be a rational response to institutional performance (Jackman & Miller, 1996; Mishler and Rose, 2001). In relation to that, many authors typically conceive economic performance as the primary source of both political support and institutional trust, but some others also emphasize the relevance of political performance – of which the protection of liberties, the control of corruption, and the respect for the law are important aspects (Gibson, 1993; Rose et al., 1998; Shin, 2005). At the same time, the institutional claim that political trust and regime support have the same source raises the possibility that any relationship between trust and political support should be considered spurious rather than causal (Mishler and Rose, 2005).
However, in the recent literature about the relationship between trust and democratization, political trust is assumed to be associated to both values and the role of institutions (Norris, 1999; Klingenmann and Fuchs, 1998; Shin, 2005; Moisés and Oliveira, 2005), and its consequences is seen as particularly important for newly democratized countries that typically inherit an institutional deficit either by virtue of the legacy of the former authoritarian past or because citizens did not have yet enough time to get used to complex functioning of the democratic regime (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mishler and Rose, 2005; Shin, 2006). Brazil is a case in point here, for it has some of the lowest macro levels of political trust among the Latin American countries, while also demonstrating some of the greatest micro level variation for both interpersonal and institutional trust. But instead of conceiving the Brazilian trusting deficit as depending of the political culture tradition alone, or alternatively of the unilateral effect of institutional performance over citizens´ attitudes and beliefs, the main hypothesis of this work holds that trust or distrust can be explained by the combined effect
12 of citizens´ normative perspective about institutions and the judgment or political evaluation that derives from their concrete experience with democratic institutions (Moisés, 2006) 7.
MEASURING TRUST: UNIVARIATE AND BIVARIATE ANALYSES
In order to assess the relationship of trust with the functioning of democracy, its determinants and effects had to be empirically tested. The following analyses were based on data provided by a national survey undertaken in June 2006 (see appendix 3). The survey measured institutional trust by asking interviewees, “I am going to mention now some public and private organs/institutions and would like to know what is the degree of trust that you have in each one of them: a lot, some, little or no trust at all”. Although the main concern was with political institutions – among which were included the army, the judiciary power, the police, the National Congress, the political parties, the government, the president, the firemen, and the laws of the country -, a set of main institutions of civil society were also mentioned: the church, television, unions and entrepreneurs. Taking into consideration the role played by institutions of civil society during the political transition and the democratic consolidation, the idea was to explore possible relationships among trust in public and private institutions. The survey also measured interpersonal trust on the basis of two general questions: the first, based on the same categories for political trust, had the following phrasing: “I would like to ask whether do you have a lot, some, little or no trust at all in your family, your friends, your neighbours, your work fellows, people attending to your church, and the majority of people”; the other was an alternative similar to the usual classic question about social trust: “Do you think you can trust the majority of the people or, on the contrary, do you have to be careful in dealing with others?” (not shown here, as statistical associations with other variables were not significant).
Table 2: INTERPERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN BRAZIL – 2006 (%)
INTERPERSONAL TRUST (%) None (0) Little (1) Some (2) A lot (3) Mean Family 1,5 9,9 16,0 72,5 2,59 People of your church 11,3 32,6 37,7 18,4 1,63 Friends 12,3 39,1 34,6 14,0 1,50 Neighbours 21,3 42,1 29,3 7,2 1,22 Work fellows 22,3 42,3 27,8 7,5 1,21 Majority of the people 22,3 54,5 21,2 2,1 1,03
TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS (%) None (0) Little (1) Some (2) A lot (3) Mean
7 Anthony Downs, in a text dedicated to explain why “social values are especially crucial to democracies”, has argued that “social values are culturally determined”, and has emphasized the fact that, in real life, “average citizens are rational enough to justify society’s entrusting major governmental decisions to them” based on the fact that “citizens in a democracy accept a basic ´common sense´” related to values and the socially attributed mission of institutions (Downs, 1991; pp.143-146).
13 Firemen 2,8 11,1 32,4 53,7 2,37 Church 6,0 18,7 34,3 40,9 2,10 Army 9,8 28,9 40,1 21,3 1,73 Television 8,0 34,1 46,0 11,9 1,62 Judiciary power 13,7 42,0 33,4 11,0 1,42 President 23,0 33,8 31,2 12,0 1,32 Police 18,8 43,2 29,4 8,7 1,28 Laws 20,8 41,3 30,6 7,3 1,24 Unions 19,4 44,3 30,6 5,7 1,23 Government 24,9 40,8 28,5 5,9 1,15 National Congress 26,7 45,9 22,6 4,7 1,05 Entrepreneurs 26,9 44,3 25,7 3,0 1,05 Political parties 36,8 44,2 16,9 2,1 0,84 Source: Project "Citizens Distrust in Democratic Institutions in Brazil", coord. by J.A.Moisés and R. Meneguello (2006). Note : DK, DA and “Missing Cases” all excluded.
Table 2 reports the distribution of trust in Brazil for all private and political institutions, and also for the interpersonal trust (see also appendix 2). Data show that trust varies significantly both within and among institutions, and also that it does in a similar pattern in relation to interpersonal trust. The median citizen in Brazil actively distrusts four of the main political institutions of the democratic regime (political parties, congress, government and president) and also has no confidence in laws. At the same time he/she is skeptical about the remaining three (police, the judiciary power and the army) and is only positive in relation to firemen, but this refers to a long lasting efficient public service (the fire brigade), which is not usually seen as part of the democratic institutions and does not seem to be an adequate indicator for institutional trust.
Distrust is greatest for the main democratic political institutions, especially, political parties and parliaments, which are actively distrusted by 81% and nearly 73% respectively of interviewees (but the government is also distrusted by 66%). The highest level of popular trust, as in other new democracies as Mexico (Durand Ponte, 2004) and Russia (Mishler and Rose, 2005), is enjoyed by “the least democratic institution of the state”, that is, the military which obtained more than 61% of answers for categories such as ´a lot´ and ´some´ trust. Curiously enough, this is also the case of the strongest hierarchical private institution of civil society, the church, which enjoys 75% of answers of ´a lot´ and ´some´ trust. Brazilians seem to trust more traditional and hierarchical institutions rather than the democratic ones, but the data has shown that at least in the case of the army this does not mean significative support for its return to power (see figure 1), rather it is probably due to its
14 prestige as an efficient and serious institution, and also to its apparent non-involvement in practices of corruption.
No political institution is strongly and positively trusted in Brazil for more than one third of citizens - firemen, the army and some private institutions, as the church and television, being the exceptions. In fact, while the scaling of variable categories runs from 0 to 3 (0 corresponding to the lowest level of trust and 3 to the highest), among the strictly political institutions only the judiciary power has achieved an average mean of 1,42, whereas all others were rated bellow of that. At the same time, if we assume that the category of ´some trust´ is a measure of skepticism, even the skeptical citizens are in short supply in Brazil, as Mishler and Rose (1997; 2005) have also reported for Russia two years ago. Finally, apart from the army and the judiciary, the next institutional reference to which Brazilian citizens express a relative level of trust is the president, but trust in the presidency is probably confounded with personal trust in recent presidents like Cardoso and Lula, who were the best evaluated Brazilian presidents among all the five that Brazil has had since the military demise in 1985 (Meneguello, 2007) 8.
Low levels of positive trust in political institutions in Brazil are only partially consistent with both cultural and institutional theories. While the latter predicts that levels of institutional trust would increase inasmuch as the performance of public institutions would improve along the time, the former usually refers, on the one hand, to the authoritarian legacy that is supposed to characterize most Latin American countries and, on the other, to the positive effects of a long process of social and economic modernization and its impact over the traditional political values and attitudes of their citizens (Inglehart and Wezel, 2005). However, although Brazilian democracy is already 20 years old, democratic institutions seem to have not yet achieved a pattern of satisfactory response to citizens’ aspirations; and modernization advances seem not to have deeply affected political attitudes about the role of public institutions (Moisés, 1995). Rather, in both cases, the pattern of malfunctioning of democratic institutions has to be taken into consideration, because the public seem to react to this pattern both for normative and practical reasons, and does not hold high levels of trust in spite of its adherence to the democratic regime.
8 Evaluation of performance of Brazilian presidents is regularly made by private public opinion enterprises as DATAFOLHA and IBOPE and can be accessed through assembled data at CESOP – Center for Public Opinion Research, http://www.unicamp.br/cesop.
15 Consistent with cultural expectations, results about interpersonal trust in Brazil seem to follow the hierarchy supposed by the theory, that is, trust in the family is very high and also in people close to one’s own experience, as friends and devoted fellows of the same church, but it is remarkably low to others who can be considered ´strangers´, that is, the majority of unknown people, but also to others not so distant, as neighbors and work fellows; this contradicts cultural theory expectations that existing favorable conditions for interpersonal trust may produce social capital and democratic adherence. Trust in strangers is, however, higher than trust in political parties and just a bit less than trust in the National Congress. In a broad sense, this means that in Brazil individuals are relatively less distrustful than citizens of other Latin American democracies (Moisés and Oliveira, 2005), but not that their interpersonal trust forms a solid basis for social capital. In other words, relative low levels of trust and skepticism seem to characterize the median orientation of Brazilians towards other citizens and towards the majority of institutions as well, including some private institutions as unions and the entrepreneurs.
Univariate analysis, however, is insufficient to reveal the actual nature of a pattern of attitudes that is supposedly important for regime support and also for institutional trust. We still do not know whether these two dimensions were part of the same attitudinal syndrome or were consistently autonomous among them. A categorical principal component analysis (SPSS´s catpca) 9 of trust in 13 private and political institutions, on the one hand, and in the set of 6 variables of trust in family, friends and others, on the other hand, was undertaken in order to allow a more advanced understanding about the nature of both dimensions. Table 3 demonstrates that trust or distrust tends to be generalized across institutions and people; the analysis produced three components or factors with eigenvalues greater that 1.0, the first clearly showing that trust in institutions, private and public, forms one dimension, accounting for more than 33% of the total variance of 19 measures of trust, nearly two times and a half more than the variance explained by the second factor, relative to trust in people, that is, 13%. While the complete model accounts for 53% of the variance, a third factor has shown that, although highly trusted by people in general, the category of firemen is really not perceived as part of the relevant private and public institutions: with a loading of .49, this isolated factor explains only 6,5% of the variance.
9 The objective of principal components analysis for categorical data is to reduce an original set of variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated components that represent most of the information found in the original variables. The procedure is useful when a large number of variables make effective interpretation between objects difficult; SPSS´s catpca quantifies categorical variables while reducing the dimensionality of the data.
16 Consistent with theoretical assumptions, according to which public institutions form a specific dimension of institutional trust, 8 items out of 13 private and public institutions (army, police, congress, political parties, president, judiciary power, government and the laws of the country) have loadings ranging from .62 to .72 on the same dimension, while the loadings of two of the main private institutions (church and television) range from only .45 to .54. Unions and entrepreneurs also range from .63 to .64, but this probably reflects some ambiguity of the public perception about them, as corporatist associations of entrepreneurs and workers, and particularly unions, are also seen in Brazil, at least since the 1940´s, as belonging to the state. In fact, further factor analysis - including private and public institutions together with indicators of political values and political evaluation of governments and institutions - has demonstrated that, although showing a significant relationship between the two, political and private institutions are different dimensions of a common syndrome of attitudes 10 . Trust in institutions in Brazil seems, therefore, to be of a one- dimension nature, and citizens seem to be only able to distinguish broadly among different set of institutions.
Table 3: INTERPERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN BRAZIL – 2006 (Component loadings of factor analysis)
Dimensions
1 2 3 Family ,386 Friends ,636 Neighbours ,640 Work fellows ,591 Majority of people ,578 People of your church ,470 Church ,458 Army ,623 Judiciary Power ,723 Police ,672 National Congress ,727 Policial Parties ,691 Television ,546 Unions ,643 Entrepreneurs ,634 Govenment ,718 President ,648 Firemen ,493
10 Not shown here, information may be displayed by request from the author.
17 Law ,633 Variable Principal Normalization.
The next step in exploring the public’s attitudes about trust consisted in examining its relationships with indicators of democratic adherence, perceptions about corruption, evaluation of political and economic performance, a set of constructed scales relative to attitudes and perceptions about democratic values, corruption, rights of citizenship, political efficacy, institutions considered important for the country, political evaluation, socio-tropic and egocentric economic evaluations, evaluation of political institutions as whole, public services, institutions of civil society, justice, congress and political parties (see appendix 4). The rationale of this step was straightforward: to check for signs that political and economic performance, on one hand, and indicators of values and normative orientations, on the other, were worth analyzing further as determinants of both institutional and interpersonal trust. Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients summarizing the bivariate relationships between the set of predictors and both institutional and interpersonal trust as the dependents variables.
Table 4: BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS OF INSTITUTIONAL AND INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN BRAZIL – 2006 Institutional Interpersonal Pearson Correlations Trust Trust
Preference for democracy 0,164 0,130 Preference for dictatorhisp -0,109 -0,077 Doesn´t matter regime 0,100 0,088 Satisfaction w/ democracy 0,274 0,142 Perception of corruption increase -0,143 Not significant Approval of corruption 0,048 0,061 Corruption socially accepted -0,177 -0,120 Democracy as social equality 0,071 0,092 Democracy as liberty 0,048 0,079 Anti-institutional model of democracy -0,201 -0,089 Perception of rights of citizenship 0,225 0,091 Political efficacy (subjective) 0,124 0,086 Institutional trust ------0,339 Criteria for trusting public institutions 0,251 0,134 Institutions necessary for country 0,254 0,166 Evaluation of justice 0,364 0,101 Socio-tropic economic evaluation 0,327 0,074
18 Egocentric economic evaluation 0,147 Not significant Evaluation of performance of public services 0,347 0,087 Evaluation of specific public services 0,194 0,055 Evaluation of public institutions as a whole 0,534 0,132 Evaluation of civil society institutions 0,395 0,126 Evaluation of National Congress 0,410 0,098 Perception of political parties 0,230 0,155 Evaluation of the political situation -0,365 -0,106 Participation in last presidential elections -0,103 -0,061 Source: Project "Citizens´distrust in Democratic Institutions in Brazil", coord. by J.A.Moisés and R. Meneguello (2006). Note: Sig. (2-tailed): p<0.05; DK, DA and missing cases excluded.
The correlation matrix shows, in the first place, that although their specific coefficient of association is one of the highest (.339), there is a clear distinction between institutional and interpersonal trust: while the latter is only weakly associated with the majority of variables included in this analysis - exceptions being the perception of political parties (.155), evaluation of public institutions in general (.132) and democratic values (.130) -, the former has significant association (at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed) at least with 9 relevant indicators: evaluation of the main democratic institutions (.534), evaluation of the National Congress (.410), evaluation of institutions of civil society (.395), evaluation of the political situation (.365), performance of public services (.347), evaluation of justice (.364), socio-tropic economic performance (.327), satisfaction with democracy (.-274), institutions considered necessary to the country (.254) and criteria for trusting public institutions (.251). The correlation coefficients are lower for others indicators as perception about political parties (.230), perception about rights of citizenship (.225), anti-institutional model of democracy (.-201), democratic values (.164), and also for others as democracy as liberties, democracy as social equality, political efficacy, evaluation of egocentric economic conditions and evaluation of specific public services (all with lower coefficients).
Apparently, then, Brazilian citizens associate political trust basically to their evaluation of the functioning of democratic institutions, but also to interpersonal trust, evaluation of institutions of the civil society, satisfaction with democracy, evaluation of the political situation, economic performance of democratic governments, and also - in a less extent – to indicators of political culture, that is, democratic values, rights of citizenship and perception about political parties. As to interpersonal trust, its pattern of associations is much weaker as compared to political trust. This is partially consistent with the hypotheses based on institutional theories, but also with the normative perspective about democratic institutions inasmuch as interviewees seem to be expressing their
19 rational evaluation of the performance of public institutions, but also their political judgment on how much specific institutions do consummate the mission for which they have been created for. But, although showing lower coefficients, indicators of values and attitudes proper to the political culture tradition are also associated to political trust. In fact, the indicators of citizens’ attitudes relative to trust point to a mixed pattern, cultural and institutional in its nature.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Most previous conclusions were based on bivariate relationships, but rather than offering a complete picture about the effects of political trust, these preliminary tests pointed to the necessity of exploring its nature with other statistical procedures. What are the determinants of political trust in Brazil and what is its influence on democratic adherence, political involvement and perceptions about the quality of the existing democracy? In order to explore these questions, the measures of political trust were regressed on assessments of economic conditions, political performance and a set of indicators of political values and institutional evaluation (see appendix 5). The reasons to do so were based on previous results, and aimed to test the relationships of trust with both political values and the public’s evaluation of democratic institutions in Brazil.
The outcomes (see table 5) are compatible with the main hypotheses of this work: most indicators included in the model (which can explain 43% of the variance) are statistically significant, meaning that they are relevant to determine the phenomenon of political trust in Brazil. As predicted, citizens´ evaluations of political institutions in general, as well as the specific evaluation of the functioning of justice are particularly important, but also is interpersonal trust, as shown by their
Table 5: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL TRUST IN BRAZIL –2006 Standardized Coefficients Df F Sig. Beta Std. Error
Criteria for trusting political institutions ,049 ,020
Sociotropic economic evaluation ,024 ,021 1 1,250 ,264
Evaluation of National Congress ,055 ,024 1 5,185 ,023
Schooling -,054 ,020 2 7,239 ,001
Sex -,016 ,019 1 ,764 ,382
Age ,036 ,020 4 3,333 ,010
Region ,062 ,019 3 10,667 ,000
20 Religion -,007 ,018 1 ,134 ,715
Corruption is a serious problem -,061 ,018 2 10,862 ,000
Interpersonal trust ,213 ,019 1 124,177 ,000
Evaluation of justice ,119 ,021 1 31,241 ,000
Evaluation of public institutions ,329 ,023 1 201,290 ,000
Elections fraudulent -,086 ,019 1 19,832 ,000
Evaluation of the political situation -,079 ,022 3 13,279 ,000
Influence of voting over government and politics ,044 ,019 1 5,496 ,019
Labor laws protection ,057 ,019 1 8,979 ,003
Political interest ,068 ,019 3 12,856 ,000 Source : Project ´Citizens Distrust of democratic institutions´ (2006) Dependent Variable: Scale of trust in democratic institutions Note: R square: .43
Beta coefficients, and - as expected - by their positive signs of associations. But also variables that refer to citizens´ adopted criteria for trusting institutions, their positive evaluation of the National Congress and of the country’s political situation, their perception about the seriousness of corruption and about the perceived quality of the Brazilian democracy (equality before the law, political efficacy and reliability of elections), and, last but not least, political interest – although with lower coefficients -, they all define the syndrome of mass attitudes that can explain trust or distrust in democratic institutions in Brazil. And while religion has demonstrated to not have any influence on trust, of 4 socio-demographic variables added to the model for controlling purposes, 3 of them are also significant: schooling, age and geographic region . In Brazil, more educated and younger citizens, but also inhabitants of the most developed states of the country – for different reasons - tend to be more distrustful of public institutions than less educated, older aged and inhabitants of North, Northeastern and Center-Western regions, but particularly of the Southern area, that is, the less developed or not so much developed areas of the country; this is somehow contradictory, because while more educated individuals have a higher cognitive repertoire to evaluate the political situation, and inhabitants of states as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais seem to be more critical – the Brazilian “critical citizens” - precisely because they are more informed and have higher educational standards, this does not hold for the Southern area (Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul), and clearly we need more research to know why this is so 11 . Finally, important as it is for democratic theory, indicators of sociotropic economic evaluation, sex and religion are not significant, contrary to both expectations of institutional and cultural theories. This is a very relevant founding since it shows that in Brazil neither recent perceptions about social
11 Analyses reported here were not directed to provide such a kind of explanation.
21 and economic developments nor old hierarchical catholic tradition explain trust or distrust in institutions. Contrary to predictions that states that Brazil belongs to a “cultural map” based on religious and Iberian hierarchical and authoritarian traditions (Inglehart, 2000), Brazilian citizens tend to define their trusting attitudes based on their experience and on the political judgment that stem from it.
In fact, consistently with the institutional theories, Brazilians citizens tend to trust democratic institutions when they have reasons to evaluate positively the actual functioning of those institutions - as when they feel that corruption is not a serious problem -, and particularly when they perceive specific institutions as the judiciary working according to its mission, that is, allowing equal and fair access to courts and judicial procedures. But institutional reasoning alone is insufficient to explain institutional trust: as a matter of fact, to trust in known people and, at the same time, to be interested in the political life or perceive laws as actually protecting civil and political rights are also important determinants of the phenomenon, as predicted by cultural theories. These results seem to confirm that individual citizens in Brazil mix rational evaluations about the performance of institutions with political values with which they judge their experience with the existing democratic regime. Also, the portrait revealed by the results brings new light about the connections of interpersonal trust with institutional trust in Brazil (more about that in the next sections).
EFFECTS OF TRUST AND ALTERNATIVE PREDICTORS
The analysis presented up to this point, while encouraging caution conclusions insofar as it provides some confirmation for the theoretical perspectives about the connections between the institutional and cultural approaches, is still incomplete as an account of the consequences of trust over the political involvement of citizens and their perceptions about the quality of democracy in Brazil. Considering the previous results, a logistic regression analysis was done to allow an assessment about the effects of institutional trust or distrust and of alternatives predictors over a set of dependent variables relative to individual’s perceptions about the equality before the law, citizens´ inclusion in the political community, subjective and objective perception about political efficacy, civil and political rights, satisfaction with democracy, corruption, democratic values, and particularly interviewees´ preference for anti-institutional models of democracy. The regression model included not only the usual socio-demographic variables for control, but also other independent variables relative to alternative theoretical perspectives under discussion: political values, political evaluation, perception about corruption, socio-tropic economic evaluation, interpersonal trust, evaluation of justice and evaluation of institutions in general (see appendix 6).
22 The idea was to check what factors were more likely to predict attitudes and behavior relevant for the functioning of the democracy and to citizens´ involvement with the political life.
The results presented in table 6 show a rather complex picture relative to the hypothesized connections between institutional and cultural theories, but they clearly indicate, in the first place, the importance of political trust (as it affects alone 11 dependent variables out of 16), individuals´ evaluation of institutions in general, and assessment of specific ones as justice, as the main predictors of perceptions and attitudes about the quality of democracy, citizens´ political involvement, satisfaction with the functioning of the regime, and their choice about whether the democratic regime can work without political parties and the congress.
Table 6: EFFECTS OF TRUST AND OTHER INDICATORS OVER PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE LAW, POLITICAL INCLUSION, EFICACY, PARTICIPATION, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY, SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND PERCEPTION ABOUT CORRUPTION – 2006 [Odds ratio: Exp(Beta)] Equality Accept. Doesn’t want Officers Labor laws Not proud of Politics not Can influence before the enforcem. of to leave care about protect. nationality complicat. government law the law country opinion Corrup. 0.949 1.073 1.070 0.918 Increased Democr. 1.068 1.036 Values Authoritar. 0.946 1.096 0.927 Values Institut. 1.104 1.110 1.191 1.065 0.900 Trust Interpers. 0.912 0.931 1.113 Trust Evaluat. of 0.919 1.053 0.892 Justice Econom. 1.071 1.134 Evaluat. Evaluat. of Public 1.150 1.121 Institut. Illiter. and incompl. 0.644 0.72 elem. School Complete elem. and 0.666 0.569 1.730 0.597 1.792 1.769 incompl. high school Complete 0.692 1.861 1.964 3.578 1.894
23 high and incompl higher educ. Age 16-24 0.610 0.339 0.629 1.641 1.609 Age 25-39 0.687 0.483 0.613 Age 40- 55 0.572 0.663 Male 1.312 0.742 1.660 0.740 PseudoR 2 .076 .047 .115 .112 .082 .021 .057 .061 Would not Voting Democracy Democracy Corrupt. Corrupt. Elections Insatisfact. w/ vote if not influence needs doesn´t need decreased decreased last fraudulent democracy mandatory politics congress parties last year 5 years Corrup. 1.041 1.047 ------Increased Democr. 0.947 0.935 1.082 1.065 0.952 Values Autoritar. 1.100 0.842 1.137 .941 Values Institut. 0.866 0.882 1.066 1.077 0.914 0.857 Trust Interpers. 0.943 1.105 1.069 Trust Evaluat. 1.108 1.051 0.958 0.922 .786 Justice Econom. 0.861 0.782 1.053 1.128 0.909 0.873 1.202 1.255 Evaluat. Evaluat. of Public 0.937 0.833 1.102 1.141 Institut. Illiter. And incompl. 0.649 0.717 1.389 1.821 elem. scholl Compl. elem. And 0.371 0.619 1.515 1.445 .719 incompl. high school Age 25-39 1.394 1.423 Age 40- 55 1.959 Male 1.416 PseudoR2 .122 .183 .073 .117 .099 .196 .053 .081 Source: Project "Citizens´distrust in Democratic Institutions in Brazil", coord. by J.A.Moisés and R. Meneguello (2006). Sig. (2-tailed): p<0.05; empty cells: not significant; Don´t know, Don´t answer, and Missing Cases all excluded; Note: PseudoR 2 Nagelkerke
This does not mean that only trust and measures derived from people’s experience, as evaluation of institutions and others, are the predictors of the observed attitudes and behavior. While interpersonal trust shows a more limited pattern of influence over some similar democratic attitudes (it affects only 6 dependent variables), and therefore showing a much more limited direct effect over the dimensions considered than it is supposed by theories of political culture and social capital, indicators of some kind of instrumental perspective, as perception about corruption and socio-tropic
24 evaluation of the economy (it affects 10 variables) seem to be more effective, although not in the same extent as institutional trust. At the same time, independent variables relative to democratic or authoritarian values have also an impact on dependent variables (altogether, they affect 7 different dependent variables), reinforcing in a certain extent previous partial conclusions that the kind of attitudes under consideration are actually the product of different factors, cultural and institutional. Finally, the results of the logistic regression analysis have demonstrated that, as expected, socio- demographic indicators are also important, but they have not a different impact over the pattern of observed attitudes and behavior under consideration.
Accordingly, odds ratio presented in table 6 shows that any increase of institutional trust affects positively individuals´ perceptions about the equality before the law, the consent to its enforcement, the effectiveness of labor protection, the proud of being Brazilian, and also convictions that voting allows citizens to influence governments and politics. At the same time, more importantly, as political trust increases, it also affects the belief that democracy does not work without a congress and the sense of belonging to the national community. Political distrust, on the other hand, affects negatively feelings about the nationality, the reliability of elections, satisfaction with the democratic regime and both the tendency to participate in elections and the sentiment that democracy can work without political parties. In a similar vein, and taking into consideration the fact that ´evaluation´ is not the same thing as ´trust´, as the evaluation of public institutions increases, perceptions about law equity and that corruption has not increased in recent times are equally reinforced. At the same time, negative effects of public institutions evaluation do influence satisfaction with democracy and the opinion that elections are not reliable in Brazil.
On the other hand, interpersonal trust has shown positive effects for national proud and for the perception that corruption has not increased in recent times, but it affects negatively individuals´ decision on whether to leave or not the country, and the feeling that citizens are protected by labor law. Also, in contradiction with theory, it does not favor the feeling that voting is a way of influencing politics; neither has it produced more satisfaction with democracy. This is clearly not consistent with cultural theories, neither with the social capital perspective. At the same time, while the positive evaluation of economic and political performance of governments and regimes decreases perceptions that corruption is greater in recent periods, on a different level, the effect of the increasing perception itself that corruption is more present in Brazilian public life produces important negative consequences: it decreases the perception about law equity, amplifies the notion that politics is too complicate and reinforces both the tendency to not participate in elections and
25 that democracy can exists without political parties. In other words, while evaluation of economic performance seems to play a similar positive effect over relevant political dimensions, as institutional trust does, negative perceptions about corruption produce the opposite effect, that is, a consequent negative perception of democratic institutions and the regime, as also observed by Della Porta (1999) and Phaar (2000) for Italy and Japan respectively. In fact, perceptions that corruption has increased in Brazil, in the last years, are only positive to reinforce citizens´ consent to the enforcement of the law; a founding that seems to signalize that for some sectors of the Brazilian society there is a deficit relative to effectiveness of the primacy of the rule of law. This deserves more exploration, to be done in another work.
As to the importance of political values, the analysis undertaken shows that increase in the acceptance of democratic principles have positive consequences – as expected by cultural theories – for consent to the enforcement of the law, and positive convictions about the influence of voting and political participation. Democratic values also affect positively the preference for a democratic regime based on representation and political parties, but as it diminishes it has negative effects for citizens´ decision about voting if vote was not mandatory and for perceptions of elections as subject to fraud. On the contrary, as long as individuals prefer authoritarian values, the consequences for political involvement and perceptions about the quality of democracy become critical: it affects negatively national proud and citizens´ decision about to live in another country, stimulates their tendencies not to vote and reinforces opinions that democracy can exist without congress and political parties. In other words, even considering that values are not the most important predictors of political attitudes and behavior under consideration; it is not possible to conclude that they are irrelevant.
A last observation has to do with the influence of socio-demographic indicators. Education and time can be taken – as also observed by others (Mishler and Rose, 2005) -, as indicators of both the influence of socialization processes and social and economic development. The logistic regression analysis has demonstrated that education is more effective than sex or age, and that illiteracy and low schooling levels have strong influence on individuals´ opinions and attitudes under consideration. Higher schooling levels affect positively interviewees´ opinions and convictions, and are particularly important for perceptions about subjective political efficacy and sentiments about the effectiveness of labor laws, but has contradictory results in relation to political participation, satisfaction with democracy and preference for different models of democracy; as to the latter, intermediary schooling levels do not seem to affect the preference for a democratic regime without
26 political parties and congress. This may suggest that education is relevant for political participation, but it does not mean, necessarily, that it increases voting or produces support for institutions of representation for all levels: in fact, only attendance to college seems to strength this option. The more educated are actually more participant and more critical. This picture is more similar to the “critical citizen” found by Norris (1999) and others in old democracies.
On the other hand, the passage of time seems to have a significative influence: older individuals are not positive about inclusion in the national community and they do not feel that institutional officers pay attention to their opinions, but more importantly, they are strongly less committed to participate in elections. This may suggest two conclusions: either long lasting non-democratic cultural tradition is still influencing Brazilian older generations; or their concrete experience with the democratic regime has not yet been sufficiently effective to alter the negative impact of their original socialization process. Apparently, the latter explanation seems to be more likely if we observe the results for younger segments of the population: independently of the fact that they might have formed their political convictions based on processes of socialization which were more democratic in character, they are not positive in respect to protection by labor laws, subjective political efficacy, inclusion in the national community and commitment to political participation. This situation suggests that either the implications of traditional socialization process are still too powerful in Brazil or that the democratic regime has not yet produced results capable of impacting the concrete political experience in such a way as to generate widespread democratic convictions; on the contrary, for those segments of the Brazilian society, recent concrete political experience seems to have had important negative effects over their political attitudes and behavior. One important example is the fact that 40% of unemployed people in Brazil are 16 to 24 years old – what certainly reinforces the contingent of “unsatisfied” citizens with the democratic regime; but in terms of political trust, the problem is that they also do not seem to have met the adequate institutional environment at least to be heard by the political system.
BRIEF FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Most of the recent discussion about the relationship between trust – institutional and interpersonal – and the new democratic regimes of countries like Brazil is based on a general question: how can young and new democracies survive, and much less complete their complex democratization processes, when there is so little trust among citizens in political institutions and also in their fellow citizens?
27
The analysis of the Brazilian case provides some evidence for a possible answer. Citizen’s support for the democratic regime in Brazil, although increasing with time, has not been sufficient to alter substantively the amount of distrust in democratic institutions. The relationship between these two dimensions does not seem to be one of cause and effect, but the existing evidence is sufficiently consistent to suggest that institutional distrust does affect peoples´ disposition about political involvement, and also about the nature of the democratic regime preferred by them. In fact, the evidence points to the fact that distrust is an attitudinal phenomenon associated to political alternatives that dispense a central feature of democratic regimes, that is, institutional representation through political parties and the congress. While this does not imply necessarily negative effects over the democratic regime in the short run, it reinforces aspects of the Brazilian political tradition, according to which institutions does not matter very much for the functioning of public life. In this sense, the Brazilian experience offers a rather worrisome answer to the above mentioned question, and it reveals a different result than what others have found for other new democratized countries (Mishler and Rose, 2005).
Moreover, the analysis presented here has also demonstrated that while interpersonal trust has limited effects for democratic feelings and political involvement, the influence of institutional trust is much more effective and important. Trust in political institutions encourages citizen’s involvement in politics and stimulates support for democratic values; it is relevant for citizens´ positive convictions about the equality of the law, the consent to its enforcement, the effectiveness of labor laws protection and to positive perceptions about common people’s influence over governments and the political life. On the contrary, political distrust is especially relevant for citizens´ opinions about whether a democratic regime can exist without a congress and political parties, and it affects negatively both citizens´ feelings relative to inclusion in the political community and their satisfaction with the existing democracy, as well as the credibility of the electoral process and interest in political participation. In other words, the results show that trust is relevant for the existence of a democratic regime and also for the appreciation of representative institutions; but distrust can stimulate attitudes and behaviors which may favor the emergence of political alternatives to the democratic regime. At the same time, interpersonal trust is not as relevant for democracy in general as cultural and social capital approaches have suggested, but it does affect institutional trust. In this sense, the Brazilian data do not confirm conclusions suggested by other authors (Newton, 1999), and point to the necessity of more research about the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust.
28
This existing evidence is consistent, however, with the main hypotheses presented earlier, and shows that the most important predictor of political trust in Brazil is in fact citizens´ evaluation of democratic institutions as whole – and particularly of justice, but also of the National Congress – something which is related to their concrete political experience. In fact, as the analysis of the survey data has shown, distrust seems to be a function of the malfunctioning of democratic institutions, as the perceived seriousness of corruption to predict Brazilian citizens´ distance or discredit of public institutions is an example. Yet the analysis has also pointed to the fact that political trust is affected by both the normative criteria adopted by citizens to judge the functioning of democratic institutions and the impact of interpersonal trust, political interest and feelings about effectiveness of the law in Brazil; important for the theoretical discussion about the nature of political trust is also the fact that neither socio-tropic economic evaluation, nor egocentric economic evaluation have shown to be predictors for trusting attitudes, but individual’s evaluation of political performance does affect levels of institutional trusting.
In general, then, the results point to a rather complex picture relative to the hypothesized connections between the institutional and cultural approaches. Clearly, the consequences of both institutional and interpersonal trust are important for the democratic regime in Brazil, but not in the extent that cultural and institutional theories alone presuppose. While political values and confidence among people, on one hand, and evaluation of political and economic performance, on the other, have both received some empirical corroboration of their influence for democracy, it was not in the entire expected direction. In some cases, institutional explanations revealed to be more effective than values and culture to influence political involvement, but democratic or authoritarian values, as well as political interest were also seen as relevant to determine attitudes about the consent to the enforcement of the law, voting and the acceptance of political representation. We are clearly before a kind of mixture of determining factors, and for that reason we need to be cautious about possible conclusions, insofar as the analysis provides some confirmation for the theoretical perspectives about the connections between the institutional and cultural approaches. Nevertheless, the effects, especially of institutional trust, are sufficient relevant to suggest that both cultural and institutional theories cannot be dismissed altogether and need to be integrated into a more synthetic model of analysis. In this sense, this work is a first step in this direction.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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(2005). “Os partidos no eleitorado: percepções públicas e laços partidários no Brasil”, Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 57 (20): pp. 65-82; Klingemann, H-D. (1999). “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis”, in Norris, P. (ed.). Criticial Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance . Oxford: Oxford University Press; Klingemann, H-D. e Fuchs, D. (1998). Citizens and the State , Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press; Lamounier, B. (2005). Da Independência a Lula: dois séculos de política brasileira . São Paulo: Augurium Ed.; Levi, M. e Braithwaite, V. (1998). Trust and Governance , New York: Russell Sage Foudation; Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and Power , New York: Wiley; Mainwaring, S. (1995). “Brazil: weak parties, feckless democracy”, in Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. (eds.). Building democratic institutions: party systems in Latin America . 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Brazil: The Chalenges of (1990)s . Londres: The Latin American Institute; Moisés, J. A. (1995). Os Brasileiros e a Democracia – Bases sócio-políticas da legitimidade democrática . São Paulo: Ed. Ática; Moisés, J. A. (2005). “A Desconfiança das instituições democráticas”, Opinião Pública XI (1): 33-63; Moisés, J. A. (2005). “Cidadania, confiança e instituições democráticas”, Lua Nova 65: pp. 71-94; Moisés, J. A. (2006). “Citizen´s Distrust in Democratic Institutions”, IRS- International Review of Sociology16 (3): pp. 593-616; Moisés, J. A. (2006). “Citizens´ Evaluation of Democratic Institutions and The Quality of Democracy in Brazil”, paper presented to the 20 th IPSA World Congress, Fukuoka, July 8-13; Moisés, J. A. and Oliveira, G. (2005). “Democracy, political distrust, and dissatisfaction with the regime – the case of Brazil”, paper presented to the Conference Ten Years of Latinobarometro – September 19-20. St. Antony´s College, Oxford University; Moisés, J. A., Shin, D. C. and McDonough, P. (1998). “Democratization and Participation: comparing Brazil, Spain and Korea”, The Journal of Politics 60 (4): pp.913-953; Morlino, L. (2002). “What is a “Good” Democracy? Theory and Empirical Analysis”, paper presented at the Conference The European Union, Nations State, and the Quality of Democracy – Lessons from the Southern Europe – October 31-November 2. University of California; Newton, K. (1999). “Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies”, in Norris, P. (ed.) (1999). Critical Citizens – Global Support for Democratic Government . Oxford: Oxford University Press;
30 Norris, P. (1999). Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government , Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press; Norris, P. (1999). Institutional Explanations for Political Support in Norris P. (ed.). Critical Citzens: Global Support for Democratic Government , N. York, Oxford University Press. North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press; Nye, J. S., Zelikow, P. D, e King, D. C (1997). Why People Don´t Trust Government , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press; O´Donnell, G. (1994). “Delegativ Democracy?”, Journal of Democracy 5 (1): 55-69; O´Donnell, G. (2004). “Why the Rule of Law Matters”, Journal of Democracy 15 (4): pp. 4-19; O´Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. and Whitehead, L. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule – Prospects for Democracy . Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Offe, C. (1999). ´How Can We Trust our fellow Citizens?´ , in Warren, M., Democracy and Trust (1999). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press; Pharr, S. J. (2000). ´Official´s Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies´ in Pharr, S. J. e Putnam, R. Disaffected Democracies: What´s Troubling the Trilateral Countries?, Princeton, N. Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press ; Pettit, P. (1998). “Republican Theory and Political Trust”, in Braithwaite, V. and Lei, M. (1998) Trust and Governance, New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Pinheiro, P. S. (2001). “Transição Política e não-estado de direito na República”, in Sachs, I., Wilheim, J. e Pinheiro, P. S. (2001). Brasil – Um Século de Transformações, Cia. das Letras, São Paulo; Porta, D. D. (2000). ´Social Capital, Beliefs in Government and Political Corruption´ in Pharr., S. J. e Putnam, R.. Disaffected Democracies: What´s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? , Princeton, N. Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press; Power, T. and Jamison, G. D. (2005), ´Desconfiança Política na América Latina´, Opinião Pública, vol. XI, nr. 1: pp 64-93;. Power, T. et al. (2006), ´From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda power, presidential decrees, and the unintended consequences of reform in The Brazilian Congress´, Working-paper CBS-71-06, Center for Brazilian Studes, Univ. of Oxford, Oxford; Przeworski, A. e Teune, H. (1971). The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry , Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company. Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work , Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Putinam, R. (2000). Bowling alone, New York: Simon and Schuster; Reis, F. W. (2003). “Engenharia e Decantação”, in Benevides, M. V., Vannuchi, P. and Kerche, F. (ed.) (2003), Reforma Política e Cidadania, Ed. Fundação Perseu Abramo, São Paulo; Rogowski, R. 1974. Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support . Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose, R. (2004). New Russia Barometer XIII: Putin´s reelection. Centre for the Study of Public Policy, paper 388, Univ. of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland; Rose, R. and Shin, D. C. 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(2001). “La desafeicción en las nuevas democracias del sur de Europa y de Latinoamerica”, Revista Instituciones y Desarrollo nr. 8 y 9: 229-280, Institut International de Governabilitat de Catalunya; Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The Moral Foundations of Trust, Cambridge: Cambrige University Press; Warren, M (1999). Democracy and Trust , Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press; Weffort, F. C. (1984). Por que Democracia? São Paulo: Ed. Brasiliense;
31 APPENDIX 1
Table 1: PREFERENCE FOR POLITICAL REGIME IN BRAZIL – 1989/2006 (%)
1989/sept. 1 1989/dec. 2 1990/mar. 3 1993/mar. 4 1997/nov. 5 2006/jun. 6
Prefer Democracy 51,5 63,6 61,7 68,1 63,4 68,1
Prefer Dictatorship 23,0 17,3 18,9 16,1 14,4 14,2
Indifferent about regime 25,3 19,1 19,4 16,1 19,8 17,7
Source: 1, 2, 3, and 4 Project “Democratization and Political Culture”, coord. by J. A. Moisés (1989,1990 and 1993); 5 Project “Political culture and Citizenship”, ´Perseu Abramo´ Found. (1997); and 6 Project "Citizens Distrust in Democratic Institutions in Brazil", coord. by J.A.Moisés and R. Meneguello (2006). (All surveys 2000 or more interviews) Note: “Don´t know”, “Don´t answer”, and “Missing Cases” all excluded.
APPENDIX 2 Table 3: INTERPERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONL TRUST IN BRAZIL – 1989/2006 (%) 1989 1993 1997 2002 2006 1991 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 PC PC PC&C ESEB CDDI WVS WVS LB LB LB LB (6) (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5) (6) (6) (6) Interpersonal Trust “Can trust or have to be – – – – 4,3 6,7 2,8 2,4 3,2 3,7 4,1 careful ?” – positive answers - Family/relatives – 79,0 96,5 88,0 88,5 – – – – 72,7 – - Neighborns – 48,2 70,7 – 36,5 – – – – 54,0 – - Work fellows – 54,1 80,1 – 35,4 – – – – 62,3 –
Trust in private
Institutions - The church/clegirmen – 62,9 79,6 – 75,2 74,8 74,3 75,1 74,7 75,9 82,8 - Press, radio and TV – 46,1 73,9 – – 54,4 61,4 – – – – - Television – – – – 57,9 38,5 57,2 39,3 32,8 36,8 34,7 - Unions – 45,9 73,5 – 36,3 47,6 55,1 – – 40,5 37,6 - Entrepreneurs/ – 24,9 55,7 – 28,7 57,9 67,9 33,4 34,5 43,9 50,0 Enterprises
Trust in Public
Institutions - The army/military – 37,6 66,4 – 61,3 66,8 71,4 54,9 63,1 56,4 63,0 - Police – 36,3 58,7 – 38,1 37,6 45,3 32,2 37,8 36,9 36,3 - President/ Ministers – – – – 43,2 – – 32,9 – 53,5 48,3 - Government 38,6 37,0 56,2 – 34,4 – 48,7 – 24,4 43,2 39,6 - Justice/Law 55,1 48,9 68,9 – 44,4 44,5 55,0 40,2 33,7 44,1 49,7 courts/Judges - Congress 39,6 29,3 43,7 – 27,3 24,8 33,7 24,7 26,2 29,5 36,5 - Political Parties 56,3 30,6 49,1 – 19,0 – 32,5 53,1 39,2 45,2 53,1 Sources: 1 project “Democratization and Political Culture”, coord. by J. A. Moisés (1989, 1993); 2 project “Political Culture and Citizenhip”, Perseu Abramo Found. (1997); 3 project ESEB, Electoral Brazilian Study/CESOP; 4 project “Citizens Distrust of Democratic Institutions in Brazil”, coord. By J.A. Moisés and R. Meneguello (2006¨; 5 World Values Survey (1991, 1996); 6 Latinobarometro (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004).
32 APPENDIX 3
Information about the survey:
Nationwide survey of Brazilian adult citizens, with the eligibility requirement of age 16 years old; National representative sample of 2.004 face-to-face interviews; Sample Selection Procedures: - In the first stage - 146 primary sampling units (PSU) or municipalities were selected by region based on the Index of Human Development - IDH groups; probability proportional to size (PPS); 30 of these municipalities were selected with certainty as self-representing PSUs, 19 as state capitals and 11 as metropolitan areas. 116 were randomly selected. - In the second stage - secondary units (census tracts) were selected PPS within each of the PSUs; - In the third stage - households were selected within census tracts based on quotas by sex, age, education and working/not working population, as defined in the 2004 National Household Sample Research. The survey has been undertaken during the first and second weeks of June, 2006
Sample distribution UNIVERSE SAMPLE REGIONS (4) Population (2000) % Municipalities Interviews % Municipalities Interior 15835990 9,3% 880 192 9,6% 16 North / Center-West Capital 8186520 4,8% 11 96 4,8% 6 Metrop.area 514922 0,3% 4 0 0,0% 0 Interior 34242953 20,2% 1744 396 19,8% 33 Northeast Capital 10162346 6,0% 9 132 6,6% 8 Metrop.area 3336412 2,0% 34 48 2,4% 4 Interior 38989306 23,0% 1573 456 22,8% 38 Southeast Capital 18822986 11,1% 4 216 10,8% 3 Metrop.area 14600119 8,6% 89 180 9,0% 15 Interior 18278129 10,8% 1101 216 10,8% 18 South Capital 3290220 1,9% 3 36 1,8% 2 Metrop.area 3539267 2,1% 55 36 1,8% 3 Total 169.799.170 100% 5.507 2.004 100% 146 To reduce costs of travel, the North and Center-West regions were considered as one. These regions concentrate the less populated areas of the country.
APPENDIX 4
Variables included in the bivariate analysis were scales and dummy variables.
Methodological procedures for the construction of scales 1. The first step involved an evaluation of the degree of simultaneous association of each group of variables in order to reduce its dimensionality. The objective was to facilitate data interpretation, and also to evaluate the relationship among these measures and other variables under consideration. The procedure adopted was the categorical factor analysis (SPSS´s catpca), which allowed the observation of variables groups registering higher coefficients for each dimension. To check the one-dimensionality (latent constructs) of each group of variables, the following procedure adopted was to undertake the test of reliability analysis (internal consistency), measured by the Cronbach´s alpha, and then to accept only scales that achieved a cut point of 0.50; 2. The next step was to realize a new factor analysis (one factor) with variables forming each scale (the highest loadings in the dimensions), reserving the score generated. In order to obtain a better interpretation, scores were then transformed for scales running from 0 (minimum value) to 10 (higher value).
33
Dependents variables:
Institutional Trust (Cronbach´s alpha: .86) is a scale based on a set of 8 questions as follows: “I am going to mention now some public organs/institutions and would like to know what is the degree of trust that you have for each one of them: a lot, some, a little or not trust at all: a) the army, b) the firemen, c) judiciary power, d) president, e)police, f) government, g) National Congress, h) political parties and i) the laws of the country”;
Interpersonal Trust (Cronbach´s alpha: .81) is a scale based on a set of 6 questions: “I would like to ask whether you have a lot of trust, some, little or not trust at all in a) your family, b) your friends, c) your neighbours, d) your work fellows, e) people attending to your church, and d) the majority of people”;
Independent variables:
Preference for Democracy, Dictatorship and Indifference about the regime are dummy variables derived from the question: “I would like to know with which of the following statements do you agree more: a) Democracy is always better than any other form of government; b) In some cases, a dictatorship is better than a democratic regime; c) It doesn’t matter whether the government is a democracy or a dictatorship”. The variable was recoded in order that preferences for a regime or indifference were computed alternatively to the other choices;
Satisfaction with Democracy is a dummy variable derived from the question: “Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Brazil?”;
Perception of Corruption Increase (Cronbach´s alpha .82) is an index based on 2 questions: “Speaking about corruption in Brazil, would you say that it has increased a lot, has increased a bit, has remained the same, has diminished a bit or has diminished a lot in the last 5 years?”, and also “And what about the last year, corruption has increased a lot, has increased a bit, has remained the same, has diminished a bit or has diminished a lot?”;
Approval of Corruption ( Cronbach´s alpha .92) is a scale based on a set of 5 questions: “I am going to read some statements and would like to know whether do you agree a lot, agree a bit, disagree a bit or disagree a lot with them: a) It makes no difference whether a politician steal (public goods) or not, what matters is that he/she realizes what is needed by the people; b) A politician that does lot and steals a bit deserves to be voted by the population; c) A politician that does a lot and steals a bit does not deserve to be condemned by justice; d) A politician that realizes a good government must be allowed to embezzle public money to finance his/her electoral campaign; e) The best politician is the one who does a lot of achievements, even if he/she steals a bit”;
Democracy as liberty (Cronbach´s alpha .62) is an index based on 2 questions: “Speaking about democracy, do you think that it has a lot to do, has to do, has little to do or doesn’t has to do with political liberties to organize unions and movements, and with the right of expression?”, and also “Speaking about democracy, do you think that it has a lot to do, has to do, has little to do or doesn’t has to do with moral and sexual liberties?”.
Democracy as social equality (Cronbach´s alpha .80) is a scale based on 3 questions: “Speaking about democracy, do you think that it has a lot to do, has to do, has little to do or doesn’t has to do a) With more social equality?; b) With the government’s duty to attend the public’s needs of health, jobs and education?, and c) With equal rights for women?”;
Anti-institutional model of democracy (Cronbach´s alpha .70) is a scale based on 3 questions: a) “Some people think that without political parties there is no democracy, while some other thinks that a democracy can exist without political parties. What do you think: without parties there is no democracy or democracy can work without parties?”; b) The National Congress is formed by federal deputies and senators. Some people think that without the National Congress there is no democracy, while some other thinks that democracy can work without the congress. What do you think: without the congress there is no democracy or democracy can work without the congress?”; c)”Do you think that Brazil needs the National Congress, that is, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, or we could go on well without it?”;
Perception of Rights of Citizenship (Cronbach´s alpha .66) is a scale formed by 4 questions: a) “Would you say that Brazilians demand their rights? They do it a lot, they just do it, they demand a bit or they don’t demand at all their rights?”; b) “Thinking about things as they are in Brazil, would you say that, in practical, terms Brazilians manage to make their rights worth: they do it always, almost always, rarely or they don’t do it at all?”; c) “Would you say that Brazilians are very much aware, just aware, not so much aware or not at all aware of their obligations (duties)?”; d) “And
34 what about their rights: would you say that Brazilians are very much aware of them, just aware, not so much aware or not at all aware of their rights?”;
Political Efficacy (Cronbach´s alpha .54) is formed by 3 questions: “I am going to read some statements and would like to know whether do you agree a lot, agree a bit, disagree a bit or disagree a lot: a) Government officers do not care about what people like you think; b) Sometimes politics and the government seem so complicated that people like you can not really understand what is going on; d) People like you has no way to influence what the government does”;
Criteria for Trusting Public Institutions (Cronbach´s alpha .81) is formed by 5 questions: “I am going to read some statements about public agency/institutions and would like to know whether do you agree a lot, agree a bit, disagree a bit or disagree a lot: a) Public agencies/institutions are subject to total control (supervision); b) Public agencies/institutions always assume, shoulder they responsibility for mistakes; c) Officers in charge of public agencies/institutions always treat people well; d) Public agencies/institutions treat all people equally; e) Public agencies/institutions do fulfill their promises”;
Socio-tropic Economic Evaluation (Cronbach´s alpha .56) is an index formed by 2 questions: a) “What is your evaluation of the economic situation of the country: very good, good, neither good or bad, bad or very bad?”; b) “And what about the next year, how will it be the economic situation of the country: much better, a bit better, the same as today, a bit worse or much worse”;
Egocentric Economic Situation (Cronbach´s alpha .60) is a scale formed by 3 questions: a) “How is it your and yours´ family present economic situation: very good, good, neither good or bad, bad or very bad?”; b) “And what about the next 12 months, do you think that your and yours´ family economic situation will be much better, a bit better, the same as now, a bit worse or much worse than it is today?”; c) “Thinking about your present economic situation, and comparing it with what it was 10 years ago, would you say that it is much better, a bit better, it remained the same, is a bit worse or much worse than that of other Brazilians?”;
Perception about Political Parties is an index (Cronbach´s alpha .54) formed by 3 questions: a) “I would like to know whether do you agree a lot, agree a bit, neither agree or disagree, disagree a bit or disagree a lot of the statement: a) ´Brazil would be much better if there was just one party in the country”; b) “In your opinion, political parties are indispensable for democracy or political parties only serve to divide the people?”; c) “I am going to read a list of public agencies/institutions and would like to know whether do you think that they are necessary for the country to go ahead: political parties – yes or no?”;
Trust in Institutions of the Civil Society (Cronbach´s alpha .62) is a scale formed by 4 questions: “I am going to mention now some private organs/institutions and would like to know what is the degree of trust that you have in each one of them: a lot, some, a little or not trust at all”: a) the church, b) television, c) the unions, d) the entrepreneurs”;
Institutions Necessary for the Country (Cronbach´s alpha .86) is a scale formed by 7 questions: “I am going to read a list of public agencies/institutions and would like that you say what are necessary for the country to go ahead: a) Federal deputies and senators; b) Courts of Justice; c) Police; d) Prefectures; e) President of the Republic; f) Ministers; g) Governors;
Evaluation of Justice ( Cronbach´s alpha .83) is a scale formed by 3 questions: a) “Thinking about the working of the justice in Brazil, would you say that, in general, judges, public prosecutors and courts of justice have a very good, good, neither good or bad, bad or very bad performance?”; b) “And still thinking about the justice, which mark would you give to the judges, 1 meaning that you are totally unsatisfied and 10 totally satisfied?”; c) And what about the public prosecutors and the courts of justice, which mark would you give to each one of them?”;
Evaluation of specific Public Services (Cronbach´s alpha .70) is a scale formed by 3 questions: “Have you made use of one of the following public services: hospital, public transportation and police in the last 6 months or more? If used in the last 6 months, which mark would you give to each one of them: 1 (less satisfied) to 10 (more satisfied): a) public hospital; b) public transportation; c) police?”;
Evaluation of Public Institutions (Cronbach´s alpha .85) is formed by 8 questions: “I would like that you say what is your evaluation – very good, good, neither good or bad, bad or very bad - of each one of the following institutions: a) the army; b) the judiciary power; c) police; d) the National Congress; e) the political parties; f) the government; g) the president; h) the laws of the country”;
35 Evaluation of the National Congress (Cronbach´s alpha .93) is formed by 2 questions: a) “Would you say that the performance of Federal Deputies and Senators, acting at the moment in the National Congress, is very good, good, neither good or bad, very bad?”, and b) “Talking about the Federal Deputies and Senators that have been elected in 2002, would you say that you are (1) very unsatisfied or (10) very satisfied with them?;
Evaluation of the Political Situation is dummy variable derived of the recoding of the question: “What is your evaluation of the political situation in Brazil today: very good, good, neither good or bad, bad or very bad? (very good/good=0; neither good or bad, bad and very bad=1); in other analyses, 1=very good, 2=good, 3=bad; 4= very bad;
Participation in the last Presidential Election is a dummy variable derived of the recoding of the following question: “For whom did you vote to in the last presidential election: a) Lula; b) Serra; c) null or blank; d) was not able to go to vote; e) not at age of voting; f) doesn’t vote any more. Recoding was: a and b=0; all other categories= 1”;
APPENDIX 5
Variables included in the multiple regression analysis are scales and dummy variables . For quantifications of variables used in the analysis, see Appendix 7 below.
Dependent variable :
Trust in Public Institutions (see appendix 4);
Independent variables:
Criteria for trusting political institutions, Socio-tropic economic evaluation, Evaluation of National Congress, Interpersonal Trust, Evaluation of Justice and Evaluation of Public Institutions (see appendix 4);
Schooling refers to 4 levels: 1=Illiteracy/Elementary incomplete; 2=Elementary complete/intermediary incomplete; 3=Intermediary complete/college incomplete; 4=College complete and post-graduation; in other analysis, 4 is reference category;
Sex : male=1,female=2; in other analyses, 2 is category of reference;
Age refers to 16-24=1; 25-39=2; 40-55=3; 56 years or older=4; in other analyses, 4 is the category of reference;
Region refers to 4 macro country regions: North/Midwest=1; Northeast=2; Southeast=3 and South=4; in other analyses, 3 is the category of reference;
Religion is based on the question: “Now I am going to read a list of religions and would like that you say what is it yours: Catholics and other 9 groups mentioned; atheist and non-religious” – the variable was recoded in order that 1=Catholic; 2=Evangelic; 3=Atheist/non-religious; 4=all others; in other analyses, the category of reference is 1;
Corruption Serious is based on question: “Would you say that corruption is a very serious=1, serious=2, not so much serious=3 or is not at all a serious problem=4?”;
Elections Fraudulent is a dummy variable based on question: “Do you believe that elections in Brazil are clean=1 or are subject to fraud=0?”;
Influence of Voting is a dummy variable based on the question: “Do you think that according to how people vote things can change=1 or do you think that, it doesn’t matter how people vote, things will not change=2?”; recoding: 1=0; 2=1;
Labor Laws Protection is a dummy variable based on the question: “And what about the labor laws, do you feel very much protected by them=1, just protected=2, not so much protected=3 or not protected at all by the labor laws=4?”; recoding: 1,2=0; 3,4=1;
Political Interest is a variable based on the question: “And what about your political interest, would you say that you are very much interested in politics=1, interested=2, not so much interested=3 or not interested at all=4?”; recoding: 1,2=3; 3=2; 4=1;
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APPENDIX 6
Variables included in the logistic regression analysis are scales and dummy variables.
Independent variables
Corruption increase, Trust in Public Institutions, Evaluation of Justice, Socio-tropic Economic Evaluation, Evaluation of Public Institutions, Schooling age and sex , see appendixes 5 and 6;
Democratic values ( Cronbach´s alpha .89) is a scale formed by 8 questions: “Speaking about democracy, do you think that it has a lot to do, it has to do, there is a bit to do or has not at all to do with: a) The right to choose governments through elections; b) Political Liberties allowing the organization of unions and movements, and free expression; c) Equality before the law; d) Government control through the Congress of Deputies and Senators; e) Less corruption and control over traffic (???) of influence traffic; f) Supervision of government’s actions through courts of justice and the public prosecutor; g) Moral and sexual liberties; h) Plurality of political parties”;
Authoritarian values (Cronbach´s alpha . 66) is a scale formed by 6 questions: “I would like to know whether do you agree a lot, agree a bit, disagree a bit or disagree a lot of the following statements: a) When Brazil has a difficult situation, it doesn’t matter whether the government surmounts the laws, the National Congress and the political institutions in order to solve the problems of the country; b) If the country faces serious difficulties, the president can leave aside the National Congress and the political parties, and make decisions by himself; c) The country would work much better if the military went back to power; d) I would give a blank check for a redeemer (???) leader able to solve the country’s problems; e) Brazil would be much better if there was just one political party; g) Only a dictatorship can manage Brazil”;
Dependent variables
Labor Law Protection , Influence over the government , Elections fraudulent, Influence of voting and Satisfaction with democrac y, see appendixes 4 and 5;
Equality before the Law is a dummy variable based on the question: “The Constitution establishes that all Brazilians are equal before the law. Do you think that all Brazilians are equal before the law or that there is not equality before the law in Brazil?”;
Acceptance of Enforcement of the Law is a dummy variable based on the question: “Please, tell me whether do you agree a lot, agree a bit, disagree a bit or disagree a lot of the following statement: The law must be obeyed always”;
Would Leave the Country is a dummy variable based on the question: “Would you live in other country if you were allowed to?”;
Proud of Nationality is a dummy variable based on the question: “How proud are you of being Brazilian: are you much proud, just proud, a bit proud or not proud at all?”;
Officers Care about One’s Opinion is a dummy variable based on the question: “Government’s officers do not care about what people like you think: do you agree a lot, agree a bit, disagree a bit or disagree a lot?”;
Politics not complicated is a dummy variable based on the question: “Sometimes politics and the government seem so complicated that people like you can not really understand what is going on: agree a lot, agree a bit, disagree a bit or disagree a lot?”;
Influence over Government is a dummy variable based on the question: “People like you can not influence on what the government does: agree a lot, agree a bit, disagree a bit or disagree a lot?”;
Would not Vote is a dummy variable based on the question: “If voting were not mandatory in Brazil, would you vote in the next presidential elections – yes or no?”;
37 Influence of Voting is a dummy variable based on the question: “I am going to read some statements and would like to know whether you agree a lot, agree a bit, disagree a bit or disagree a lot: Voting allows people like you to influence on what is going on in the country”;
Democracy needs the Congress is a dummy variable based on the question: “The National Congress is formed by deputies and senators elected by the people. Some people think that without a congress there can not be a democracy, and others think that democracy can works without a congress. What do you think?”;
Democracy doesn’t need Political Parties is a dummy variable based on the question: “Some people think that without political parties there can not be a democracy, and others think that democracy can works without a congress. What do you think?”;
Corruption Decreased last year is a dummy variable based on the question: “Talking about corruption in Brazil, would you say that it has increased a lot, increased a bit, neither increased nor decreased, decreased a bit or decreased a lot in the last 5 years?”;
Corruption Decreased last five years is a dummy variable based on the question: “And what about the last year, would you say that it has increased a lot, increased a bit, neither increased nor decreased, decreased a bit or decreased a lot in the last year?”.
APPENDIX 7 – Quantifications of variables used in the multiple regression analysis
Scale: Trust in Public Institutions Scale: Criteria for Trusting Public Institutions
Category Frequency Quantification Category Frequency Quantification ,00 - 1,21 134 -1,898 ,00 - ,55 416 -1,212 1,33 - 2,92 194 -1,271 ,93 - 2,03 402 -,583 2,97 - 4,31 300 -,643 2,07 - 3,25 263 ,046 4,31 - 5,57 384 -,016 3,26 - 4,51 301 ,676 5,58 - 6,90 342 ,611 4,53 - 6,09 214 1,305 6,92 - 8,57 312 1,239 6,18 - 10,00 126 1,934 8,59 - 10,00 56 1,866 Optimal Scaling Level: Numerical. Optimal scaling Level: Numerical
Scale: Evaluation of Economic situation Scale: Evaluation of National Congress
Category Frequency Quantification ,00 - 1,95 105 -1,983 Category Frequency Quantification ,21 - 1,73 2,33 - 3,40 322 -1,305 375 -1,296 1,92 - 2,67 3,60 - 4,51 104 -,626 348 -,658 3,08 - 3,85 4,62 - 5,19 485 ,053 342 -,021 4,32 - 5,48 5,87 - 6,63 503 ,732 280 ,616 5,55 - 7,00 7,39 - 8,01 184 1,411 256 1,254 7,26 - 10,00 9,32 - 10,00 19 2,090 121 1,891 Optimal Scaling Level: Numerical. Optimal Scaling Level: Numerical
.
Schooling Category Frequency Quantification Illiteracy/Element. Incomplete 857 -,933
Element. Complete/Intermed. Incomplete 334 ,264
38 Intermed. Complete/College Incomplete 475 1,340
College Complete/Post- Graduation 56 1,340 a Optimal Scaling Level: Ordinal.
Age Category Frequency Quantification 16 to 24 364 -,495 25 to 34 427 -1,179 35 to 44 357 -,105 45 to 59 373 ,908 60 or more 201 1,902 Optimal Scaling Level: Ordinal.
Regions Category Frequency Quantification North/Cent. 234 ,291 West Northeast 498 ,630 Southeast 745 -1,057 South 245 1,656 Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.
Religion Sex Category Frequency Quantification Category Frequency Quantification Catholic 1160 -,696 Male 860 -1,001 Other 562 1,437 Femeale 862 ,999 Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal. Scaling level: Nominal
Corruption is a serious problem Category Frequency Quantification Very serious 1383 -,117 Serious 308 -,117 Not so much serious 22 4,038 Not at all a serious problem 9 12,202 a Optimal Scaling Level: Ordinal.
Scale: Interpersonal Trust Category Frequency Quantification ,00 - 1,15 45 -1,886 1,23 - 2,79 295 -1,239 2,80 - 4,05 394 -,591 4,10 - 5,26 462 ,057 5,29 - 6,52 229 ,705 6,58 - 8,13 153 1,353
39 8,24 - 10,00 144 2,001 Optimal Scaling Level: Numerical. Optimal Scaling Level: Numerical.
Scale Evaluation of Public Institutions Category Frequency Quantification ,00 - 2,45 110 -1,920 2,48 - 3,88 228 -1,279 3,88 - 5,01 319 -,638 5,02 - 6,09 365 ,003 6,10 - 7,24 340 ,644 7,24 - 8,64 322 1,285 8,66 - 10,00 38 1,926 a Optimal Scaling Level: Numerical.
Elections: clean or fraudulent Category Frequency Quantification Clean 952 -,899 Fraud. 770 1,112 Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.
Evaluation of Political situation Optimal Scaling Level: Ordinal.
No influence of voting Category Frequency Quantification 1,00 424 -1,750 Other 1298 ,572 Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.
Not protected by labor laws Category Frequency Quantification 1,00 1245 -,619 Outros 477 1,616 a Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.
Political Interest Category Frequency Quantification Very much interest. 91 -,139 Interested 300 -,822 Not so much Interest. 804 -,655 Not at all interest. 527 1,492 Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.
6,16 - 7,77 343 ,571 7,79 - 9,78 Category Frequency444 Quantification1,156 9,89 - 10,00 ,00 - ,90 17119 -1,7681,741 1,07 - 2,88 236 -1,183 2,99 - 4,58 263 -,598 4,62 - 6,13 246 -,014
40 Scale: Evaluation of Justice
Optimal scaling level: Numerical
Evaluation of the political situation
Category Frequency Quantification
Very good 8 -1,179 Good 404 -1,076
Neither goor 245 -1,076 or bad
Bad 706 ,181 Very bad 359 1,615
Optimal scaling level: Ordinal
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