Democracy, Political Trust and Democratic
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DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL TRUST AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (THE CASE OF BRAZIL) José Álvaro Moisés 1 Paper presented to the seminar “Democracy and Citizens Distrust of Public Institutions in Brazil in Comparative Perspective”, Oxford University 1/6/2007. 1 Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for Public Policy Research, University of São Paulo. 1 INTRODUCTION 2 Brazil has realized in October 2006 its fifth presidential election since the demise of the military regime. As it has been the case of all recent elections since then, the electoral process was fair, competitive, and open to the participation of all segments of the Brazilian society - independently of ideology, cultural, ethnical, and socioeconomic roots. Thus Brazil can be considered as an electoral democracy, according to the Freedom House criteria, as since 1989 - when a civilian president was freely elected for the first time in three decades -, elections, coordinated by an independent electoral tribunal, are free and assure the participation of almost 126 million voters out of a population of 186 million people, that is, more than 90% of the total adult Brazilian population 3. Moreover, since the election of Lula da Silva in 2002 - and with his reelection in 2006 -, who presented himself as a left- winger alternative to the center-right and center-left forces that governed the country after the military, the principle of alternation in power has been taken for granted. Brazil is now considered to be a democracy both by the relevant political actors and by the majority of experts. In fact, fifteen years ago when Samuel Huntington (1991) argued that a third wave of democratization had swept the globe from 1974 to 1990 - referring to no more than 30 countries which had made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy -, Brazil was included among them. There is little dispute now as to whether the Brazilian democracy is consolidated or not 4. In fact, the country concluded a long process of transition from a more than twenty-year-military regime to a new democratic system with the proclamation of the so-called New Republic in the middle 80s. Brazilian democratization resulted from liberalization initiatives of the ancient regime, mobilization of the civil society, and from negotiations with democratic leadership. But the first civilian president, egress from authoritarianism, was chosen by the National Congress according to the military’s rule 5. This ambiguity deeply influenced the final phase of the Brazilian transition and, as a consequence, the voting of the 1988 Constitution was marked by disputes around the duration of the president’s mandate, the system of government, the executive-legislative relations, and the 2 I am indebted to Clecio Ferreira and João Francisco Resende for their work in organizing the data and statistical analysis presented here. I am also thankful to Marta Maria Assumpção and Teresa Sachet for their careful reading of my original version in English and their suggestions to ameliorate it. 3 The expansion of suffrage is an important characteristic of the process of democratization in Brazil. In 1930, under an oligarchic system, 2 million citizens (5% of the population) voted for president; in 1945, during the Brazilian democratization of the post-war, 16% of the population voted; and, in 2002, 66,6%, but considering only 18-year-old (or more) population, it represented 94%. The vote is mandatory and optional for 16 to 18 years old or for more than 70 years old people. In the 2002 presidential election, 75% of the voting were considered valid, that is, excluding blank and nulls votes, as well as the no-attending (Lamounier, 2005; Kinzo, 2004). 4 Pinheiro, one of the most important exceptions, refer to “a prevailing authoritarian system, incrustate in institutions of violence and crime control, existing under the democratic regime in Brazil” (Pinheiro, 2001). 5Tancredo Neves, the leader of a coalition of dissident forces of the ancient regime and leaders of the democratic resistance, was elected president according to the constitution of the military regime, but died before taking power. The vice-president, José Sarney, a dissident from the old regime and until a few months before the leader of its party, became president. 2 role of the state in the economy. Praised for improvements in relation to individual and social rights, the new Constitution has, however, institutionalized a political system characterized by strong powers of the president, while limiting the ways and rules, according to which the congress can control executive actions 6. Controversially characterized as a singular case due to limitations enhanced from authoritarianism and the previous democratic experience, the Brazilian political system is said to associate a plebiscitarian presidential system with federalism, electoral rules that combine open lists of candidates with proportional representation, a weak and fragmented multiparty system and the formation of great coalitions based on heterogeneous political forces (Cardoso, 2006; Power et al., 2006; Lamounier, 2005; Reis, 2003; Mainwaring, 1993; Santos, 1999; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Moisés, 1995; Abranches, 1988; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986). These existing institutional deficiencies do not threaten the democratic regime in the short run, but they compromise its quality and may affect the relationship of citizens with the polity. Free and competitive elections mean that, from the moment they are established, the choice of who governs is subject to the principle of popular sovereignty. But indispensable as they are, elections guarantee neither the complete instauration of democracy, nor do they assure the quality of the new regime. Recent democratizing experiences show that different political regimes characterized as electoral democracies, even assuring the amplification of citizens civil and political rights do not necessarily attend to all criteria by which an authoritarian political system transforms itself into a complete democratic regime. Among newly democratized countries there are cases that have achieved competitive electoral processes but live together with governments that violate the primacy of rule of law and some of the citizens rights, use corruption and mismanagement of public funds to realize political objectives, and block or impede citizens´ control of governments actions through legislative and judiciary procedures, i.e., vertical and horizontal accountability. In these cases, what is at stake is not whether democracy exists, but its quality (Shin, 2006, Diamond and Morlino, 2004, O´Donnell, 2004, Morlino, 2002; Diamond, 2002). Democracy is also the political regime preferred by the majority of the Brazilian citizens, a pattern of attitudes which is confirmed by the increasing rejection of both military return and monopartism along the time (see figure 1 below and also appendix 1). Nonetheless, it faces a paradox: democratic 6 Article 62 of the 1988 Constitution allows presidents, in cases of “urgency and relevance” to decree “provisional measures with force of law”. This prerogative has been largely used by all presidents since 1988 and, although subject to controversy among analysts, it is considered as “a strong form of legislative authority because it allows chief executives to overrule statutes altogether and move the policy status to their desired position” (Amorim Neto, 2006). 3 institutions are subject to great and continuous distrust by Brazilian citizens. Data from different sources show that, in spite of the support enjoyed by the democratic regime per se , around 2/3 of the Brazilian people do not trust – in different degrees - in political parties, parliaments, executive branches, courts of law, as well as health, educational, and security public services. Surveys realized in 1989, 1990, 1993 and 2006 by the author revealed that the negative perception of public institutions crosses all segments of society, irrespectively of income, schooling, age, and ecological distribution (see appendix 2). They also demonstrate that dissatisfaction with the actual functioning of democracy is very high (Moisés, 1995; Moisés e Oliveira, 2005; Moisés, 2006; Power and Jamison, 2005; Torcal, 2001). Figure 1: PREFERENCE FOR DEMOCRACY AND REJECTION FOR MILITARY RETURN AND MONOPARTISM IN BRAZIL 1989/2006 (%) 80 76,1 75 70 68,1 68,1 64,2 65 63,8 65,3 63,4 60 61,7 54,4 55 54,4 Prefer democracy 51,5 53,0 50 50,3 50,8 Reject military return 45 Reject monopartism 40 1989 1990 1993 1997 2006 Source: Projects “Democratization and Political Culture”, coord. by J. A. Moisés (1989,1990 and 1993), “Political culture and Citizenship”, Found. ´Perseu Abramo´ (1997); "Citizens´distrust in Democratic Institutions in Brazil", coord. by J.A.Moisés and R. Meneguello (2006). (All surveys, n= 2000 or more) Note: Chi-square coefficients for association among pair of variable all significant. Don´t know, Don´t answer, and Missing Cases excluded. At least since the seminal work by Almond and Verba (1963), political trust is considered to be crucial for political legitimacy, as well as to governability and democratic consolidation, while political distrust express citizens attitudinal syndrome of deep discredit and unworthiness of political objects central to the democratic regime, as is the case of accountable governments, the primacy of the rule of law, and institutions capable of guaranteeing rights of citizenship. There is no doubt that some amount of distrust in political institutions