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The Department of Justice's Terrorism Task Forces

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The Department of Justice's Terrorism Task Forces U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division The Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task Forces June 2005 Report Number I-2005-007 EXECUTIVE DIGEST The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks prompted the Department of Justice (Department) to redefine its mission, objectives, and priorities to focus its top priority on counterterrorism. As a result, the Attorney General elevated counterterrorism to the Department’s first strategic goal and shifted the Department’s resources to eliminating terrorist networks, preventing terrorist operations, and prosecuting perpetrators of terrorist acts. The Department also directed the formation or expansion of terrorism task forces and councils (with members from many federal, state, and local agencies and private industry) that coordinate and integrate intelligence and law enforcement functions to achieve the Department’s counterterrorism goal. In this review, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) assessed the role and operations of these terrorism task forces and councils. We examined whether the task forces and councils were achieving their purposes; whether gaps, duplication, and overlap existed in counterterrorism coverage; and how the performance of the task forces and councils is measured. We collected information through interviews of senior Department officials, task force and council managers and members, and state and local law enforcement officials; a survey of task force managers and members; document reviews; and direct observation of task force and council activities. Specifically, we reviewed the following task forces and councils: Deputy Attorney General’s National Security Coordination Council (NSCC): The NSCC, composed of senior Department officials with responsibility for national security matters, defines, coordinates, and enhances the Department’s counterterrorism strategy and resolves national security issues. U.S. Attorneys’ Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs): The purpose of ATACs is to 1) facilitate the exchange of information at the federal, state, and local levels and between the public and private sectors; 2) conduct counterterrorism training; and 3) coordinate terrorism prosecutorial and investigative strategies within the Department. The Attorney General directed that each of the 93 U.S. Attorneys operate an ATAC. The Counterterrorism Section (CTS) of the Department’s Criminal Division provides assistance to ATAC Coordinators in the development, coordination, and prosecution of terrorism cases. The Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) provides administrative support to the ATACs. U.S. Department of Justice i Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs): The JTTFs are operational units that conduct field investigations of actual or potential terrorism threats. Unlike the other entities reviewed in this report, the JTTFs existed before September 11, 2001. The FBI has established 103 JTTFs nationwide. FBI’s National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF): The NJTTF provides administrative, logistical, and training support to the JTTFs. The NJTTF also coordinates special information and intelligence gathering initiatives assigned by FBI headquarters and synthesizes terrorism intelligence for use by the JTTFs, member agencies, and other agencies in the intelligence community. FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF): The FTTTF provides data to the JTTFs, NJTTF, and other government agencies that 1) prevents terrorists and their supporters from entering the United States, 2) locates those who are already present, and 3) facilitates the terrorism investigative process. RESULTS IN BRIEF PROGRESS MADE The Task Forces and Councils Contribute to the Department’s Counterterrorism Efforts. We found that the Department’s terrorism task forces and advisory councils generally function as intended, without significant duplication of effort, and they contribute to the Department’s goal to prevent terrorism and promote national security. The task forces and advisory councils provide distinct yet complementary forums for sharing terrorism-related information and intelligence and investigating terrorist threats. The task forces and councils also have strengthened the Department’s infrastructure devoted to counterterrorism and have developed a national network of representatives from federal, state, and local agencies, and private industry to work on terrorism prevention efforts. In addition, the task forces have taken steps to ensure that a broader group of law enforcement officials have the security clearances needed to receive and share information about terrorism issues and that information is disseminated through meetings or electronic forums. The various federal, state, and local agency members are important “force multipliers” in the Department’s counterterrorism efforts. They have facilitated the development U.S. Department of Justice ii Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division of human assets to collect terrorism-related intelligence, and have assisted in investigations of leads against terrorist groups. Although the task forces and councils have aided the Department’s counterterrorism efforts, we believe that improvements to the operations of the task forces and councils can be made. IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED FOR FURTHER PROGRESS The NSCC’S Role is Unclear for Long-Term Counterterrorism Planning, Centralizing and Coordinating Counterterrorism Policy and Operations, and Monitoring Policy Implementation by the Components. Current and former Deputy Attorneys General and NSCC members told us that the NSCC serves as a forum for Department agency heads to share counterterrorism information and advance the Department’s position on national security issues. However, the NSCC does not fully perform its long- term planning, policy, and monitoring functions, as established in Attorney General guidance. The NSCC members provided us with two examples of past or present policy coordination, but could not provide any examples of the NSCC’s role in centralizing counterterrorism policy and operations, conducting long-term counterterrorism planning, or monitoring the implementation of counterterrorism policy in the Department. The FBI, CTS, and EOUSA Have No National Training Plans for the Task Forces and Councils, Notification of Available Training Is Ad Hoc, and Non-FBI Task Force Members Believe That FBI Members Get Preferential Treatment for Training. The majority of task force and council members we interviewed or surveyed had no prior experience with counterterrorism before joining the task force or advisory council. Identifying terrorists and terrorist threats, conducting a terrorism investigation, developing sources, or planning for terrorist incidents were all new subjects for most of them. More than half (51 percent) of the survey respondents reported that they required training in counterterrorism to better perform their task force and council responsibilities. Although many training courses are available to task force and advisory council members, FBI, CTS, and EOUSA officials stated that they had not developed national training plans for members. Without national training plans, counterterrorism training for task force and council members has been determined locally and has varied widely. There are no training standards for task force members that define minimum mandatory training. The lack of U.S. Department of Justice iii Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division standards may affect the members’ receipt of training. Although the FBI has trained many task force members in counterterrorism, our survey results showed that 29 percent of all JTTF, NJTTF, and FTTTF members had not received any counterterrorism training since becoming members. Many of the non-FBI task force members we interviewed and surveyed stated that they received no notification of training and were unaware of what training was available. To make training information and courses more available to task force members, the FBI has now included training on its intranet website, which is accessible to all members. However, some non-FBI task force members believed that FBI agents were offered more opportunities for counterterrorism training or believed that training was available only to FBI members. The ATAC Coordinators we interviewed stated that they want guidance on the type of training that should be offered to ATAC members and on how to identify trainers. ATAC Coordinators stated that the provision of training, particularly training on terrorism prevention and planning, to law enforcement personnel and community members is a new responsibility for them. Therefore, the ATAC Coordinators need guidance and assistance from national leaders. The FBI Has No Structured, Systemwide Orientation Program for New Task Force Members and Has Not Defined the Roles and Responsibilities of its Task Force Members in Writing. Approximately 40 percent of both FBI and non-FBI JTTF, NJTTF, and FTTTF survey respondents did not receive an orientation to the task force. When an orientation was provided, the type of orientation varied widely and the content was inconsistent. Given the rapid pace with which the NJTTF, FTTTF, and many of the JTTFs started up after September 11, 2001, the lack of a formal orientation was understandable. However, three years later, a formal standardized orientation still does not exist
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