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Missouri Law Review Missouri Law Review Volume 29 Issue 1 Winter 1964 Article 15 Winter 1964 Book Review Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Book Review , 29 MO. L. REV. (1964) Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss1/15 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. et al.: Book Review Book Review MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER. By C. Peter Magrath. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963. Pp. 321. $10.00. This is the story of a Chief Justice in a time of profound change, when America was in transition from an agrarian mercantile society to an urban in- dustrialized society. It is a story of the Court's response to the post-Civil War forces which eventually crystalized into our second Constitution, an industrial one designed for the new order. The book reveals what has been known for some time, at least since 1937, that the United States Supreme Court is a political institution whose judicial philosophy is not authored by it but ghost-written in lines of power by various elite groups in our pluralistic society. From the beginning. to the end, we witness the industrial amending of the Constitution. It is only fair to say that this is not the author's contention; he maintains that the Waite Court successfully and courageously defended the Constitution against the vast aggregates of wealth at least along the path of due process. The first third of this book portrays with a rather wide brush the uneventful life of Morrison R. Waite to the time he was suddenly catapulted by President Grant to the chief justiceship of the United States Supreme Court. Born in Con- necticut in 1816 of a father who was later to become a supreme court justice of that state, he attended Yale Law School and then left his rural state for the com- mercial midwest. In 1838 he took a position in the law office of Samuel M. Young, a Maumee, Ohio, attorney, who was later to become "Toledo's leading en- trepreneur."' Attracted by the young lawyer's flair for property and commercial law, the senior lawyer offered him a partnership and the sage advice that the nearby city of Toledo had a more promising future for the practice of law than Maumee. Waite met with little success in local politics. Prodded by the business com- munity who was attracted by his whiggish mind and his success as a railroad lawyer, he served uneasy terms on the Toledo City Council and in the Ohio State Legislature. He found it difficult to attune his legal temperament to the free- wheeling legislative process. Twice he lost bids for election to Congress. But Morri- son R. Waite's path to power and fame was not in the direction of the electoral process, but rather in the direction of the appointive process. His first national appointment came in 1871 when President Grant appointed him to the Geneva Commission whose function was to settle claims over the destruction wrought by the English constructed warship "Alabama" during the Civil War. The success of the American delegation brought national praise to the committee and con- stituted probably the most successful act of the Grant administration. His second national appointment came three years later, when Grant, after having offered 1. Magrath, 'MorrisonR. Waite: The Triumph of Character (1963), p. 37. (123) Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1964 1 Missouri Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1964], Art. 15 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 the position to five or seven other men who rejected it, appointed him Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The nation, thankful that Grant "did not pick up some old acquaintance, who was a stage driver or bartender for the place,"2 did not look too closely at Waite's qualifications, for unlike most of the other candidates, he possessed both "geography" and "character." At this stage, the author points out, "the record remains unimpressive. Waite's state of Ohio had hundreds of men with similar records, most of whom were forgotten within a few years of their death. Had Morrison Waite not gone on the Supreme Court, he, unlike William Evarts or Caleb Cushing, would soon have been consigned to oblivion." 3 Even more eloquently, at the time of his appointment, a colleague told him that he was "that luckiest of all individuals known to the law, an innocent third party without notice." 4 The rest of the book is devoted to an analysis of Waite's opinions and to the proposition that he redeemed himself on the bench from his previous role as a railroad lawyer. It is necessary, however, before discussing this portion of the book to recall the temper of the Gilded Age. For it was that age, especially its formative years from 1883 to 1888--the time of Chief Justice Waite's tenure on the Court- that gave birth to the permanent crisis of our times, the problem of the coexistence of personal and institutional freedom in an industrial society. The Civil War destroyed more than the institution of slavery; it destroyed an old order, a society based upon an agrarian tradition and a mercantile authority, integrated in status and function by the market place. It produced a new group, a powerful industrial middle class whose faith rested in the unrestrained accumula- tion of wealth and whose goal was an industrial feudalism in which all obligations which formerly ran to the states and the aristocratic farmers would run to it and its industrial complex. This new order marched under the banners of centralization, industrialization and mechanistic science and the nation, intoxicated by the spell of the industrial revolution, followed until America became urbanized, industrialized, and technologically centered. The victory of the new culture was inevitable; that was not the problem. The question was what authoritative body could contain the new industrial force which threatened to supplant popular sovereignty for economic sovereignty. This was a period of weak executives and weak Congresses. It was a time of conciliation, a time when the country was willing to compromise personal rights, those of the citizen and the Negro, for economic rights and institutional liberties. It was a time of consolidation, a time of group unity when the vested interests of the North urged the vested interests of the South to join its crusade to the "Great Barbecue"r5 and close ranks against the enemy-the radical third parties, such as the Grangers, the Greenbacks, etc. Perhaps at no other time in its history, except possibly the age of Marshall, did the Supreme Court have a greater oppor- 2. Id. at 2. 3. Id. at 72. 4. Id. at 97. 5. Parrington, Vernon L., Main Currents in American Thought, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1930, Book III, p. 23. https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss1/15 2 et al.: Book Review 1964] BOOK REVIEW tunity to define the new industrial relationships among the person, the institution and the state than during this Gilded Age. The eighteenth century Constitution, not fashioned in an industrial mold, simply could not cope with the new dynamic problems and large scale organiza- tions unleashed by the industrial revolution. Both Marshall and Taney had left the interstate commerce clause open-ended-anything could be read into it. The edge of the contract clause had been blunted. Meaning had to be poured into the new war amendments. The circumstances of the age cast the Court of the seventies and eighties into a creative role. With no compass or chartered course to follow, it could either drift with the prevailing gales of power or follow the stars. No mat- ter which course it took, it would be writing a second Constitution, an industrial one in which the dynamo would replace the hoe. The author's thesis is that the Waite Court rose to the occasion and steered the nation through this period of crisis. With Grant's inaugural speech "Let us have peace,"6 he avers, began a new era-that of conciliation with the South and consolidation with economic groups--"in 1876 reconciliation was in the air .. !,r and "Stateways cannot change folkways."" In the compromise of 1877 the nation tacitly agreed to withdraw troops from the South and return the Negro problem to the states if the states, or more properly the vested interests in them, would support economic nationalization. It was understood that the Supreme Court would supervise this arrangement through such legal doctrines as the war amend- ments and the interstate commerce and due process clauses. The Court "saw to it that the bargain was not violated."9 With a splendid form of constitutional violence, in a series of eight cases within the span of eight years, it chipped away at the war amendments leaving nothing but a shell which encased only added guarantees to rights already pro- tected. When the scalpel failed, the Court took to the sledge hammer, declaring unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which protected Negroes from the violence and the economic strategies of the Ku Klux Klan and other hostile private groups. "With the exception of one or two decisions ... , the Negro became the forgotten man of American constitutional law.
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