DOCSLIB.ORG

The Chief Justice As Leader: the Case of Morrison Remick Waite

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Chief Justice As Leader: the Case of Morrison Remick Waite William & Mary Law Review Volume 14 (1972-1973) Issue 4 Article 6 May 1973 The Chief Justice as Leader: The Case of Morrison Remick Waite D. Grier Stephenson Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Legal Biography Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Repository Citation D. Grier Stephenson Jr., The Chief Justice as Leader: The Case of Morrison Remick Waite, 14 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 899 (1973), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss4/6 Copyright c 1973 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr THE CHIEF JUSTICE AS LEADER: THE CASE OF MORRISON REMICK WAITE D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.* What does all this mean? I suppose I shallrealize it all bye and bye. But it seems strangenow.' In recent years, social scientists have found the role of the Chief Justice of the United States to offer an intriguing example of leadership in small groups. Moreover, as political scientists become increasingly concerned with the influence which court conferences and intra-court social rela- tions have on judicial decision-making, it is necessary that the concept of judicial leadership be supplied a firmer empirical underpinning. Based in part on the earlier work of Professor Robert F. Bales,2 Profes- sor David Danelski in 1960 applied the concept of dual leadership func- tions-"task" and "social" leadership-to the judicial behavior of the Chief Justice.3 According to Danelski, a task leader presents his views with force and clarity; defends those views successfully in debate and discussion with his colleagues; provides guidance for perplexing ques- tions; and assumes substantial responsibility for making suggestions, orienting discussions, and writing opinions. A social leader relieves ten- sion, encourages solidarity and agreement, attends to the emotional needs of his colleagues (especially when their views are rejected by the majority), and is often the best-liked member of the Court.4 Character- *AB., Davidson College; MA., PhD., Princeton University. Associate Professor, Franklin and Marshall College. 1. Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Amelia Waite, March 13, 1874, on file in Mor- rison R. Waite Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter cited as Waite Papers]. Standardized spelling and punctuation have been supplied in material reproduced from the Waite papers. 2. See generally R. Balms, IN-zaAcnoN Paocss AxALvsis: A MEmToD Foa THF STUDY OF SMALL GROUPS (1950). 3. D. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court, 1960 (unpublished paper delivered at the 1960 meeting of the American Political Science Association). A shorter version of this paper was first reprinted in W. MuRarr & C. PRiTcHELr, COURTS, Juimns AND PoLtscs 497-508 (1961). More recently, the same version has appeared in J. KEssEL, G. CoLE & R. REMDIG, Micaopornrcs 266-74 (1970). 4. W. MuRnY & C. PRITcHl=r, supra note 3, at 497-98. [ 899] WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:899" izing leadership in terms of these task and social functions confirms "the common sense observation that a man who wishes to exert influence over his fellows can do so most effectually if he is both intellectually disci- plined and tactful in interpersonal relations." I Professor Walter Murphy has employed the same dichotomy, but has outlined the task and social functions in slightly different detail. The task leader, he says, is concerned with getting the job done. "He tends to ignore personal relations and instead to rivet his attention on the effi- cient solution of problems which confront the group." The social lead- er, maintains Murphy, "provides the warmth and friendliness which make interpersonal relations pleasant or even possible. He tends to raise the self-esteem of other members of the group, to accept suggestions readily, to be quick to relieve tensions with a laugh or a friendly joke." I One shortcoming in the descriptions of task leadership utilized by Danelski and Murphy is the combination of the roles of the Chief Justice as manager and as persuasive thinker. It is submitted that a division of the concept of task leadership into concepts of managerialand intellectual leadership can serve to produce additional insight into what a Chief Jus- tice must do in order to be considered a leader both by his colleagues and by the scholars of a later day.7 A Chief Justice as a managerial leader must stay abreast of the docket, maintain a maximum degree of court unity, provide expeditious direc- tion of the judicial conference, and assign opinions thoughtfully and with deliberation. Intellectual leadership may be found in a Chief Justice who presents his views forcefully and persuasively, is a principal source of ideas and doctrine, and provides tactical and strategic guidance in political dilemmas. As noted, these functions comprising managerial and intellectual lead- ership seem to lie within the broader concept of task leadership. The advantage of applying a trichotomy of managerial, intellectual, and so- cial leadership instead of a dichotomy of task and social leadership is especially apparent when the individual being studied appears to perform certain task functions better than others. This situation can arise when 5. Murphy, Marshaling the Court: Leadership, Bargaining, and the judicial Process, 29 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 640, 642 (1962). 6. Id. at 641. 7. As scholars make greater use of the papers of Justices of the Supreme Court, living Justices may wish to protect the privacy of their tombs by destroying certain docu- ments when they retire. See Mason, Charles Evans Hughes: An Appeal to the Bar of History, 6 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1952). J19731 CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE a Chief Justice reaches a bench already populated by at least one intel- lectual giant whose doctrinal and policy persuasions are shared by a majority of the sitting Justices. Under such circumstances, the new Chief Justice may never become an intellectuall'eader, even if he shares the same persuasions, but may nonetheless exhibit managerial talents of a high order. The trichotomy proposed here is thus intended as a refine- ment of the Danelski dichotomy, highlighting leadership in sharper detail by focusing on the Chief Justice in his managerial, intellectual, and so- cial functions. This trichotomy is especially appropriate for an exam- ination of Chief Justice Morrison Remick Waite. After a description of the functioning of the Court prior to Waite's appointment as Chief Justice and the political and personal consequences of that appointment, the discussion will focus upon the personalities of the Justices with whom Waite served. Next, Waite's social leadership, as manifested by Court harmony, will be examined. The inquiry then will focus upon the managerial leadership of the Chief Justice, with par- ticular emphasis on his assignment of opinions. Finally, Waite's intel- lectual leadership will be analyzed in the context of his opinion in the celebrated Munn v. Illinoiscase. THE WAITE ERA While first impressions are not necessarily lasting ones and the cir- cumstances surrounding the advent of a political or judicial chieftain do not necessarily control the development of his career, still it is entirely possible that conditions prevailing at the time of one's arrival in office can affect that environment out of which leadership arises. With these caveats in mind, an examination may be made of the position and prestige of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justiceship at the time of Waite's appointment, the circumstances of his appointment, and the Court per- sonnel during his tenure. A summary of these materials prepared for Mr. Waite in 1874 would have been something less than auspicious. The Supreme Court under Salmon P. Chase Although studies on the attitudes of the population toward Supreme Court Justices were unknown in Waite's day,8 there are indications that the Court by 1874 had not recovered fully from the diminished prestige 8. For a discussion -of attitudes toward today's Supreme Court see Kessel, The Su- preme Court and the American People, 10 MmwEsr J. PoL. Sci. 167 (1966). Note the discussion of other literature in G. ScautBET, TiR CoNsnTrioNAL PoLrrY 143-51 (1970). WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:899 suffered during the last years of Chief Justice Taney's tenure. Lincoln and Taney were great antagonists, in large part because Taney and sev- eral of the Justices had absented themselves from the "dominant national alliance." 9 Indeed, when Salmon P. Chase became Chief Justice in 1864, the Court appeared to some observers to be, at best, a "fossilized circle of venerable antiquities" 10 and to others, at worst, a group tainted by disloyal or even treasonous attitudes. The prestige of the Court "was at its lowest ebb. From Dred Scott through the Civil War, the Court suf- fered from acute public and official distrust. In case of another disaster, it had a very small inventory of public confidence to fall back on." 11 Several factors hindered the Court's recovery from the despondency of the war and immediate post-war years. Besides the obviously limiting factor of time-Chase's relatively short tenure was overshadowed by the six and a half decades during which Marshall and Taney had served- Chase manifested ambitions to be President. 12 Moreover, a stroke in 1870 left Chase with physical infirmities which probably reduced his personal influence over his colleagues, some of whom were strong-willed and had political and judicial aspirations of their own. Justice Miller (who, to- gether with Justices Swayne and Strong, had eagerly sought to be Taney's successor) remarked that Swayne "artfully beslobbered the President" when Chase became ill, in the event that the Chief Justiceship should become vacant.'" Finally, Chase lost control of his Court when a majority made a sudden reversal on the legal tender question, 14 marking another "self-inflicted Wound" 15 for the institution still suffering from the reverberations of its Dred Scott decision.'6 On this and other major policy questions, Chase led the way only part of the time.17 Chase's 9.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Curriculum Vitae
    CURRICULUM VITAE JEFFREY B. MORRIS 234 Forest Road Touro College Little Neck, NY 11363 Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (718) 428-3507 225 Eastview Drive e-mail: [email protected] Central Islip, NY 11722 (631) 761-7135 [email protected] EDUCATION Ph.D. in Political Science, Columbia University 1972 J.D., School of Law, Columbia University 1965 B.A., Princeton University 1962 PROFESSIONAL TEACHING EXPERIENCE Professor of Law Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center 1995-Present Associate Professor of Law, 1990-95 Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center Visiting Associate Professor of Law, 1988-90 Brooklyn Law School Assistant Professor of Political Science, 1981-88 University of Pennsylvania Department of Political Science, 1968-74 The City College of the City University of New York (Lecturer, 1968-70; Instructor, 1970-72; Assistant Professor, 1972-74) Lecturer in Law, Baruch College, Summer 1967 City University of New York COURSES TAUGHT ABROAD, TOURO SUMMER PROGRAMS Israel Program – Comparative „Church-State‟ Law 2011 Germany Program – Comparative Constitutional Law 2004, 2005 India Program – Comparative Supreme Courts: U.S. and India 1999 ADJUNCT TEACHING Brooklyn Law School 2002 Honors College, Adelphi University 2004 HONORS Christian R. and Mary F. Lindback Award for Distinguished 1986 Teaching [for “teaching that is intellectually demanding, unusually coherent, and permanent in its effect”] at the University of Pennsylvania Selected as one of three Judicial Fellows in the United States 1976-77 JUDICIAL COMMITTEES AND CONFERENCES Member, Second Circuit Committee on Historical and 1995-2000 Commemorative Events Member, Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit 1990-92 ADDITIONAL PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Research Associate to the Administrative Assistant 1976-81 to the Chief Justice of the United States Research and analysis for the Chief Justice of the United States, Warren E.
    [Show full text]
  • Justice Sherman Minton and the Protection of Minority Rights, 34 Wash
    Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 34 | Issue 1 Article 6 Winter 1-1-1977 Justice Sherman Minton And The rP otection Of Minority Rights David N. Atkinson Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons Recommended Citation David N. Atkinson, Justice Sherman Minton And The Protection Of Minority Rights, 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 97 (1977), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol34/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. JUSTICE SHERMAN MINTON AND THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS* DAVID N. ATKINSON** Discrimination in education, in housing, and in employment brought cases before the Vinson Court which were often resolved by a nearly unanimous vote, but they frequently raised constitutional and institutional dilemmas of agonizing dimensions. A fundamental commitment of the Court at this time was accurately reflected by Justice Jackson's off-the-Court admonition to his colleagues on the inadvisability of seizing "the initiative in shaping the policy of the law, either by constitutional interpretation or by statutory construc- tion."' There were strong voices within the Vinson Court which held rigorously to Justice Holmes' dictum that "judges do and must legis- late, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." Institutional caution, theoretically at * This is the fifth and final of a series of articles written by Professor Atkinson dealing with the Supreme Court career of Justice Sherman Minton.
    [Show full text]
  • DID the FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN HAVE a BLACK BROTHER? James W
    Western New England Law Review Volume 15 15 (1993) Article 1 Issue 2 1-1-1993 DID THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN HAVE A BLACK BROTHER? James W. Gordon Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation James W. Gordon, DID THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN HAVE A BLACK BROTHER?, 15 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 159 (1993), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Volume 15 Issue 2 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND 1993 LAW REVIEW DID THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN HAVE A BLACK BROTHER? JAMES W. GORDON· INTRODUCTION On September 18, 1848, James Harlan, father of future Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, appeared in the Franklin County Court for the purpose of freeing his mulatto slave, Robert Harlan.! This appearance formalized Robert's free status and exposed a re­ • Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1974; Ph.D., University of Kentucky, 1981; B.A., University of Louisville, 1971. The author wishes to thank Howard I. Kalodner, Dean of Western New England College School of Law, for supporting this project with a summer research grant. The author also wishes to thank Catherine Jones, Stephanie Levin, Donald Korobkin, and Arthur Wolf for their detailed critiques and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
    [Show full text]
  • The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility
    Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 28 Number 2 Symposium on Civility and Judicial Ethics in the 1990s: Professionalism in the pp.583-646 Practice of Law Symposium on Civility and Judicial Ethics in the 1990s: Professionalism in the Practice of Law The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility Edward McGlynn Gaffney Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Edward McGlynn Gaffney Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 583 (1994). Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss2/5 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at [email protected]. Gaffney: The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility THE IMPORTANCE OF DISSENT AND THE IMPERATIVE OF JUDICIAL CIVILITY EDWARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR.* A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the errorinto which the dissentingjudge believes the court to have been betrayed... Independence does not mean cantankerousness and ajudge may be a strongjudge without being an impossibleperson. Nothing is more distressing on any bench than the exhibition of a captious, impatient, querulous spirit.' Charles Evans Hughes I. INTRODUCTION Charles Evans Hughes served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1910 to 1916 and as Chief Justice of the United States from 1930 to 1941.
    [Show full text]
  • Rare Books & Special Collections Tarlton Law Library University Of
    Rare Books & Special Collections Tarlton Law Library University of Texas at Austin 727 E. 26th St., Austin, Texas 78705-3224 512/471-7263 SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS RESEARCH FILES, 1823-1955, Bulk 1860-1939 Inventory Date printed: SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS RESEARCH FILES Inventory Extent: 1.25 linear ft. (3 boxes). Frank, John P., 1917-2002- John P. Frank, a noted attorney and constitutional scholar, was born in 1917. He received his LL.B. at the University of Wisconsin, and his J.S.D. from Yale University. He was law clerk to Justice Hugo L. Black at the October, 1942 term, among other prominent positions. He taught law from 1946 to 1954 at Indiana and Yale Universities. He has authored 12 books on the Supreme Court, the Constitution and constitutional law. A senior partner with the Phoenix firm of Lewis and Roca, which he joined in 1954, Frank was lead counsel on the ground-breaking Miranda v. Arizona case, and served as counsel to Anita Hill during the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings. While serving on the Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank led a group that worked on drafting revisions to Rule 11 attorney sanctions. Frank also served from 1960 to 1970 on the Advisory Committee of Civil Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Scope and Content: The collection consists of research into U.S. Supreme Court nominations of the 19th and 20th centuries, and includes 8 inches of printed materials and 7 microfilm reels (35mm), 1823-1939 (bulk 1860-1939), collected by Frank, for a research project concerning Supreme Court nominations.
    [Show full text]
  • Abington School District V. Schempp 1 Ableman V. Booth 1 Abortion 2
    TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 1 Bill of Rights 66 Birth Control and Contraception 71 Abington School District v. Schempp 1 Hugo L. Black 73 Ableman v. Booth 1 Harry A. Blackmun 75 Abortion 2 John Blair, Jr. 77 Adamson v. California 8 Samuel Blatchford 78 Adarand Constructors v. Peña 8 Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell 79 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 10 Bob Jones University v. United States 80 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 13 Boerne v. Flores 81 Advisory Opinions 15 Bolling v. Sharpe 81 Affirmative Action 15 Bond v. United States 82 Afroyim v. Rusk 21 Boumediene v. Bush 83 Age Discrimination 22 Bowers v. Hardwick 84 Samuel A. Alito, Jr. 24 Boyd v. United States 86 Allgeyer v. Louisiana 26 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 86 Americans with Disabilities Act 27 Joseph P. Bradley 87 Antitrust Law 29 Bradwell v. Illinois 89 Appellate Jurisdiction 33 Louis D. Brandeis 90 Argersinger v. Hamlin 36 Brandenburg v. Ohio 92 Arizona v. United States 36 William J. Brennan, Jr. 92 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing David J. Brewer 96 Development Corporation 37 Stephen G. Breyer 97 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 38 Briefs 99 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 38 Bronson v. Kinzie 101 Assembly and Association, Freedom of 39 Henry B. Brown 101 Arizona v. Gant 42 Brown v. Board of Education 102 Atkins v. Virginia 43 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association 104 Automobile Searches 45 Brown v. Maryland 106 Brown v. Mississippi 106 Bad Tendency Test 46 Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company 107 Bail 47 Buchanan v.
    [Show full text]
  • Supreme Court Justices
    The Supreme Court Justices Supreme Court Justices *asterick denotes chief justice John Jay* (1789-95) Robert C. Grier (1846-70) John Rutledge* (1790-91; 1795) Benjamin R. Curtis (1851-57) William Cushing (1790-1810) John A. Campbell (1853-61) James Wilson (1789-98) Nathan Clifford (1858-81) John Blair, Jr. (1790-96) Noah Haynes Swayne (1862-81) James Iredell (1790-99) Samuel F. Miller (1862-90) Thomas Johnson (1792-93) David Davis (1862-77) William Paterson (1793-1806) Stephen J. Field (1863-97) Samuel Chase (1796-1811) Salmon P. Chase* (1864-73) Olliver Ellsworth* (1796-1800) William Strong (1870-80) ___________________ ___________________ Bushrod Washington (1799-1829) Joseph P. Bradley (1870-92) Alfred Moore (1800-1804) Ward Hunt (1873-82) John Marshall* (1801-35) Morrison R. Waite* (1874-88) William Johnson (1804-34) John M. Harlan (1877-1911) Henry B. Livingston (1807-23) William B. Woods (1881-87) Thomas Todd (1807-26) Stanley Matthews (1881-89) Gabriel Duvall (1811-35) Horace Gray (1882-1902) Joseph Story (1812-45) Samuel Blatchford (1882-93) Smith Thompson (1823-43) Lucius Q.C. Lamar (1883-93) Robert Trimble (1826-28) Melville W. Fuller* (1888-1910) ___________________ ___________________ John McLean (1830-61) David J. Brewer (1890-1910) Henry Baldwin (1830-44) Henry B. Brown (1891-1906) James Moore Wayne (1835-67) George Shiras, Jr. (1892-1903) Roger B. Taney* (1836-64) Howell E. Jackson (1893-95) Philip P. Barbour (1836-41) Edward D. White* (1894-1921) John Catron (1837-65) Rufus W. Peckham (1896-1909) John McKinley (1838-52) Joseph McKenna (1898-1925) Peter Vivian Daniel (1842-60) Oliver W.
    [Show full text]
  • Justice Sherman Minton and the Balance of Liberty
    Indiana Law Journal Volume 50 Issue 1 Article 4 Fall 1974 Justice Sherman Minton and the Balance of Liberty David N. Atkinson University of Missouri-Kansas City Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj Part of the Judges Commons, and the Legal Biography Commons Recommended Citation Atkinson, David N. (1974) "Justice Sherman Minton and the Balance of Liberty," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 50 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol50/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Justice Sherman Minton and the Balance of Liberty DAVID N. ATKINSONt INTRODUCTION The behavior of any Justice may be in part determined by how he perceives the Supreme Court's institutional role within the political system. Justice Sherman Minton very definitely had trenchant views on the institutional role of the Supreme Court in American government, and on the function of the judge in the judicial process as well. Justice Minton believed that the Supreme Court's role in American government is circumscribed by the classic theory of the separation of powers. Although he acknowledged that the Constitution prohibits the executive and legislative branches from certain kinds of activities, he was inclined to resolve questions as to the legitimacy of executive or legislative acts in favor of their constitutionality.
    [Show full text]
  • The Hughes Court Docket Books: the Late Terms, 1937–1940, 55 Am
    Notre Dame Law School NDLScholarship Journal Articles Publications 2015 The uH ghes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 1937–1940 Barry Cushman Notre Dame Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 1937–1940, 55 Am. J. Legal Hist. 361 (2015). Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1300 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 1937-1940 by BARRY CUSHMAN* ABSTRACT For many years, the docket books kept by a number of the justices of the Hughes Court have been held by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Yet the existence of these docket books was not widely known, and access to them was highly restricted. Recently, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase access to the docket books for researchers. This article offers the first-ever examination of the available docket book entries relevant to what scholars commonly regard as the major decisions of rendered during the late years of the Hughes Court, from the 1937 through the 1940 Terms. The decisions examined concern the Commerce Clause, the dormant Commerce Clause, substantive due process, equal protection, the general law, anti- trust, labor relations, intergovernmental tax immunities, criminal procedure, civil rights, and civil liberties.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation William G
    Marquette Law Review Volume 79 Article 2 Issue 2 Winter 1996 The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation William G. Ross Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 401 (1996). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol79/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW Volume 79 Winter 1996 Number 2 THE RATINGS GAME: FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE JUDICIAL REPUTATION WILLIAM G. ROSS* INTRODUCTION The rating of United States Supreme Court justices is an increasingly favorite pastime among scholars, judges, journalists, students, and practicing attorneys. Once the domain of a few pundits who made personal lists of the all-time "greatest" justices,' surveys are becoming more formal and are embracing more participants. The most extensive * Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law of Samford University; A.B., Stanford, 1976; J.D., Harvard, 1979. The author was one of the scholars polled in the 1993 Blaustein- Mersky survey that is discussed in this Article. The author thanks Professor Roy M. Mersky of the University of Texas for advice and encouragement in connection with this Article and for his permission to publish the results of that survey as an appendix to this Article.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rededication of Court of Appeals Hall
    The Rededication of the Court of Appeals "The Rededication of the Court of Appeals" The Rededication of COURT OF APPEALS HALL Albany, New York October Fifth, 1959 The Historical Society of the Courts of the State of New York New York State Judicial Institute 84 North Broadway, White Plains, NY 10603 phone: (914) 682-3222 The Rededication of the Court of Appeals "The Rededication of the Court of Appeals" IN THE RESTORATION and modernization of Court of Appeals Hall, formerly the old State Hall, erected in 1842, and occupied by the Court since January 8, 1917, we have had the utmost co-operation and the devoted services of many persons in public and private life. We are especially grateful to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, former Governor Averell Harriman, the members of our State Legislature, the Attorney General, the State Comptroller, the Directors of the Budget, the Superintendents of Public Works and their staffs, the State Architect, the Appellate Division of the Third Department, the Mayor of Albany and his Commissioners, the consulting architects, the general contractor, the subcontractors, and the many skilled craftsmen and co-workers. The restoration of this 117 year old building to its original architectural beauty, and its modernization to cope with the business of the Court, will aid in serving the cause of justice for many years, and Court of Appeals Hall will be a monument to which not only the People of Albany but those of our Empire State may point with pride. CHIEF JUDGE The Rededication of the Court of Appeals "The Rededication of the Court of Appeals" COURT OF APPEALS HALL TODAY The Rededication of the Court of Appeals "The Rededication of the Court of Appeals" Rededication Presiding HON.
    [Show full text]
  • Come Back to the Nickel and Five:* Tracing the Warren Court's Pursuit of Equal Justice Under Law Jim Chen
    Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 59 | Issue 4 Article 7 Fall 9-1-2002 Come Back to the Nickel and Five:* Tracing the Warren Court's Pursuit of Equal Justice Under Law Jim Chen Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons Recommended Citation Jim Chen, Come Back to the Nickel and Five:* Tracing the Warren Court's Pursuit of Equal Justice Under Law, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1203 (2002), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol59/ iss4/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Come Back to the Nickel and Five:* Tracing the Warren Court's Pursuit of Equal Justice Under Law Jim Chen** Table of Contents I. The Korematsu Conundrum ......................... 1204 II. The Nickel and Five ............................... 1212 A. The "Nickel": Fifth Amendment Due Process and "Reverse Incorporation" ...................... 1215 B. The "Five": Civil Rights Enforcement Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment ........... 1228 C. Main Street U.S.A .............................. 1244 III. The Nixonburger Interregnum ........................ 1248 A. Nixon as Nemesis ........ ................. 1249 B. The Nickel and Five Survives ..................... 1251 C. Affirmative Action as Armageddon ................. 1264 IV. The Grand Rehnquisition ............................ 1280 V. The Fall of the House of Warren ...................... 1294 * It is somewhat deflating to explain the cultural allusion that inspired the title of one's law review article, but editing conventions dictate a word or two of clarification.
    [Show full text]