Introduction 1 the Corruption-Money Laundering Nexus
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NOTES Introduction 1. Baker, Capitlism’s Achilles Heel. 2. OECD, Bribery Awareness Handbook for Tax Examiners (Paris, 1999). 3. World Bank, Strengthening Bank Group Engagement, 66. 4. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, 20. 1 The Corruption-Money Laundering Nexus 1. Asian Development Bank, Anticorruption Policy, 3. 2. See the World Bank’s Literature Survey on Corruption 2000–2005, the extensive online bibliographies maintained by the World Bank Institute and Transparency International. For a sample of academic reviews, see the special edition of Public Administration and Development, 2007 and also Hopkin, “States, Markets and Corruption,” 574–590; Jain, “Corruption: A Review,” 1–51; Doig and McIvor, “Corruption and its Control in the Developmental Context,” 657–676. 3. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/World Bank, Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative. 4. See Levi and Reuter, “Money Laundering,” 325. 5. Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation. 6. Bukovansky, “The Hollowness of Anti-Corruption Discourse,” 186. 7. Webb, “United Nations Convention Against Corruption,” 192. 8. World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption; World Development Report. 9. For example, Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption; Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government; Corruption: A Study in Political Economy; Shleifer and Vishny, “Corruption,” 599–617; Tanzi, Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets,” 67. 10. IMF, “IMF Adopts Guidelines Regarding Governance Issues.” 11. World Bank website. 12. World Bank, Strengthening Bank Group Engagement, i. 200 Notes 13. World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption; Strengthening Bank Group Engagement. 14. Klitgaard, Tropical Gangsters; Filer, Dubash, and Kalit, The Thin Green Line; Larmour, “Conditionality, Coercion and other forms of ‘Power.’ ” 15. Larmour, “Civilizing Techniques.” 16. Lowenheim, “Examining the State: A Foucauldian Perspective on International ‘Governance Indicators,’ ” 255–274; Larmour, “Civil- izing Techniques.” 17. Nye, “Corruption and Political Development.” 18. For example, Alston, Eggertson, and North, Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. 19. Levi and Gilmore, “Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering, and the Rise and Rise of Mutual Evaluation”; Wechsler, “Follow the Money.” 20. Gilmore, Dirty Money; Levi, “Money Laundering and Its Regulation”; Levi and Gilmore “Money Laundering Terrorist Finance”; Levi and Reuter, “Money Laundering.” 21. FATF, FATF Annual Report. 22. FATF, Report on Non-Co-operative Countries or Territories. 23. FATF, First Review to Identify Non-Co-operative Countries or Territories. 24. FATF, Second Review to Identify Non-Co-operative Countries or Territories; Third Review to Identify Non-Co-operative Countries or Territories. 25. IMF, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Legal Department, “Report on the Outcome of the FATF Plenary Meeting.” 26. Sharman and Mistry, Considering the Consequences. 27. Cueller, “The Tenuous Relationship”; Rider, “Law: The War on Terror”; Levi and Reuter, “Money Laundering.” 28. Economist, May 25, 2006. 29. Sharman and Mistry, Considering the Consequences. 30. Sharman, “Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion”; “The Bark is the Bite.” 31. ESAAMLG, Strategic Plan 2005–2008, 12. 32. Reuter and Truman, Chasing Dirty Money, 184; Pieth and Aiolfi, A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering, entitle their chapter on the diffusion of these same rules “Spreading the Gospel,” 12. 33. OECD, Mid-Term Study of Phase 2 Reports. 34. Ibid. 35. Vanuatu Ombudsman, 1998.http://www.paclii.org/vu/ombudsman/1998/8. html., 36. Crossland, “The Ombudsman Role,” 6. 37. Ibid., 7. 38. Ibid. Notes 201 39. Vanuatu Ombudsman, 1997, http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/library/ Online/ombudsman/Vanuatu/Digest/digest_97–16.html. 40. Author’s interview, Vanuatu. 41. Transparency International, 2004. 42. http://www.mcc.gov/documents/score-fy08-vanuatu.pdf (Finance Minister Willie Jimmy is responsible for administering the $65 million grant). Author’s interviews, Vanuatu, Ombudsman of Vanuatu, 2001; Transparency International, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report Vanuatu; Crossland, “The Ombudsman Role.” 43. World Bank, Strengthening Bank Group Engagement, 68. 44. Reuter and Truman, Chasing Dirty Money, 7. 45. UNODC homepage, www.unodc.org. 46. Commonwealth Secretariat and Chatham House, Anti-Corruption Conference. 47. Sharman and Mistry, Considering the Consequences. 48. KPMG, Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey 2007, 8. 49. Ibid., 14. 50. Sharman and Mistry, Considering the Consequences. 51. KPMG, Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey 2007, 15. 52. Sharman and Mistry, Considering the Consequences. 53. Levi and Reuter, “Money Laundering.” 54. Reuters and Truman, Chasing Dirty Money, 184. 2 International Responses to Corruption and Money Laundering 1. OECD, Mid-Term Study of Phase 2 Reports, 87. 2. Ibid., 87. 3. Ibid., 87–88. 4. Ibid., 88. 5. Checkel, “Why Comply?” 6. Levi and Gilmore, “Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual Evaluation”; Pagani, “Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change.” 7. Lacey and George, “Crackdown on Money Laundering”; Webb, “United Nations Convention Against Corruption.” 8. Pagani, “Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change,” 4. 9. Levi and Gillmore, “Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual Evaluation,” 347. 10. March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. 11. Pagani, “Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change.” 12. Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap.” 13. OECD, Mid-Term Study of Phase 2 Reports, 108. 14. OECD, Bribery Awareness Handbook for Tax Examiners. 202 Notes 15. Ibid., 6. 16. OECD, Access for Tax Authorities to Information. 17. OECD, Integrity in Public Procurement, 9. 18. Ibid.; OECD, Bribery in Public Procurement. 19. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, 20. 20. Ibid., 432. 21. Blum et al., “Financial Havens.” 22. Webb, “United Nations Convention Against Corruption.” 23. Commonwealth Secretariat and Chatham House, Anti-Corruption Conference, 5; Reuter and Truman, Chasing Dirty Money, 152; Transparency International, 2008. Monitoring UNCAC. 24. International Chamber of Commerce, “Business Objectives for UNCAC.” 25. Webb, “United Nations Convention Against Corruption,” 218. 26. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/World Bank, Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative, 28. 27. Authors’ interviews. 28. Pagani, “Peer Review a Tool for Co-operation and Change.” 29. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/World Bank, Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative, 1. 30. Ibid., 11. 31. Transparency International, Global Corruption Report. 32. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/World Bank, Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative, 33. 33. Commonwealth Expert Working Group, Asset Repatriation. 34. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/World Bank, Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative, 36. 35. See World Bank, Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement. 36. Williams, “Governance, Security and ‘Development.’ ” 37. World Bank, Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement, 68. 38. Ibid, 68. 39. “Double-Edged Sword,” Economist, September 14, 2006. 40. “Wolfowitz’s New War,” Economist, May 2, 2006. 41. Asian Development Bank/OECD, Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement, 58. 42. Asian Development Bank/OECD, Mutual Legal Assistance, 2008, 91. 43. Author’s interview, International Organization of Securities Comissions, 2008. 44. Asian Development Bank/OECD, Denying Safe Haven to the Corrupt, 20. 45. Asian Development Bank/OECD, Mutual Legal Assistance, 2007, 6. 46. Takats, “A Theory of ‘Crying Wolf.’ ” 47. OECD, Towards a Level Playing Field. Notes 203 48. Transparency International, 2004. 49. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/World Bank, Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative, 10–11. 50. See Kennedy, “Putting Robin Hood Out of Business,” 19–26.; Sproat, “UK’s Anti-Money Laundering,” 169–184. 51. Authors’ interview, US Justice Department, 2007. 52. ESAAMLG, Strategic Plan 2005–2008; GIABA, Money Laundering in West Africa. 3 Points of Vulnerability 1. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Legislative Guide. 2. Asian Development Bank/OECD, Denying Safe Haven to the Corrupt. 3. International Chamber of Commerce, Private Commercial Bribery. 4. Asian Development Bank/OECD, Mutual Legal Assistance, 90. 5. Asia Development Bank/OECD, Denying Safe Haven to the Corrupt, 37. 6. Authors’ interviews. 7. Larmour, Foreign Flowers; Commonwealth, “Developmental Impact of Anti-Money Laundering.” 8. Lai, “Building Public Confidence.” 9. Bhargava and Bolongaita, Challenging Corruption in Asia, 239; see also Larmour, “Evaluating International Action.” 10. See the literature review and bibliography in McCusker, Review of Anti-Corruption Strategies; Asian Development Bank. 2004. Anti- Corruption Policies in Asia. 11. Lai, “Building Public Confidence”; Heilbrunn, Anti-Corruption Commissions; Doig, Watt, Williams, “Understanding the Three Dilemmas.” 12. Heilbrunn, Anti-Corruption Commissions; Michael, “What do Donor-Sponsored Anti-Corruption Programs Teach Us,” 320–345. 13. Authors’ interviews, UNODC, World Bank. 14. Shah, Performance and Accountability. 15. Asian Development Bank/OECD, Denying Safe Haven to the Corrupt, 9–10. 16. Authors’ interviews; Larbi, “Between Spin and Reality”; a forthcom- ing World Bank study, on using AML information for anticorrup- tion purposes, may well provide more systematic evidence on this matter. 17. Authors’ interview. 18. Authors’ interview. 19. Authors’