The Nation Contested: Alevi Identity as a Response to Turkish Nationalism

samuel watters, princeton university (2015)

I. INTRODUCTION reverence for a figure so central to the Turkish state sense of anguish had replaced the exuberance struck me as a seeming contradiction. typical of the heart of the stanbul district Indeed, the Alevi population occupies a per- Be ikta . Streets that normally bustled with plexing place in modern Turkey. An estimated twenty Alively commotion sulked beneath banners,İ mourn- percent of the population, the Alevis comprise the ing martyrs,ş andş decrying complacency. The football second largest religious community in Turkey after matches and boisterous cheers that usually roared Sunni Muslims and one of its largest minorities, from nearby bars drowned under the cries of protes- alongside the Kurds.4 Despite the large proportion tors calling on the Turkish state to recognize and of the population that adheres to Alevism, the beliefs account for massacres that have occurred throughout and practices of the Sunni majority sharply diverge its history. Although the police officers surrounding from those of the Alevi population. Whereas Sunni this protest only observed silently, violent clashes practitioners pray separated by gender in mosques erupted between protestors and security forces else- led by imams trained by the state, Alevi men and where in the city.1 The protests across stanbul and women pray alongside one another in cemevis under the rest of Turkey on that hot July day commemo- the leadership of the dede (literally “grandfather”), rated the Sivas massacre, a 1993 incidentİ in which a figure determined by familial lineages of spiritual thirty-seven individuals—most of whom were Alevi authority.5 Beyond these forms of worship, Alevis re- intellectuals and artists—perished in a hotel set on vere a number of Shi’i and Sufi figures not recognized fire by a fundamentalist Sunni mob during an Alevi in Sunni Islam, such as Imam Ali and Hac Bekta cultural festival.2 Veli, and disregard many of the rituals and tradi- Only a short walk from this tense protest, how- tions held sacred by Sunni Muslims, such ası the dailyş ever, I encountered a strikingly different portrayal prayers and pilgrimage to Mecca.6 Alevis often attri- of relations between the Turkish state and the Alevi bute these differences to the emphasis Alevism places population. At the top of a steep hill in a nearby park on the allegorical and hidden dimensions of Islam, stood a nondescript building, its presence revealed rather than the legalistic and literal Sunni tradi- only by an occasional stream of people passing tion.7 As a result of these differences, the position of through its doors or a small group of children playing Alevism within Islam has proven controversial, with in its courtyard. Conversations with local residents some even contending that it is a separate religion.8 taught me that the modest building was a cemevi, a These religious divisions have inspired political house of worship and center of community organiz- tensions. As one of the largest groups to migrate from ing for Alevi communities. While its plain exterior Anatolia to the cities of western Turkey, Alevis have and lack of minarets distinguished the cemevi from grown increasingly visible in the country’s public and the grandiose mosques found across the city, it was political life in recent decades. This greater presence its interior that would truly impress upon me the gulf in Turkish society, coupled with the emergence of separating Alevism from the Sunni Islam observed the Alevi revival movement in the 1980s, has exacer- by the majority of the Turkish population and the bated historical tensions between the Alevi popula- complicated relationship between the Turkish state tion and the state that stretch back into the Ottoman and the Alevi population. Alongside portraits of the period as Alevis demand official recognition and religious figures Imam Ali and Hac Bekta Veli hung accommodation similar to those received by Sunni a portrait of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Islam.9 Due to increased pressure from the secular the Republic of Turkey.3 Having witnessedı ş the fiery opposition and the European Union in addition to protests on the anniversary of the Sivas massacre, this the Alevi revival movement itself, the Turkish state the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism has haltingly sought rapprochement with the Alevi identity as a facet of the Turkish and Sunni identity population, first in 2007 with the “Alevi Opening,” a privileged by the state, or does it pursue resistance series of workshops initiated by the dominant Adalet and challenged the state as a minority whose dif- ve Kalkınma Partisi (“Justice and Development Party,” ferences must be respected? Simply put, do Alevis hereafter referred to as the “AKP”) that aimed to respond to their ambivalent position in the Turkish address Alevi grievances, but was ultimately con- nation as insiders or outsiders? demned as a failure.10 Despite such moves, discrimi- At first glance, it appears that the Alevi revival nation by the state and resistance by the Alevi popu- movement does both. Many symbols and narratives lation continue. employed by the movement locate Alevism within Scholars turn to Turkish nationalism in order an ethnic conceptualization of Turkish identity and to better understand the contradictory behavior of identify Alevi beliefs with civic values. At the same the state toward its Alevi population. Although the time, however, Alevis resist assimilation by empha- new state, built atop the ruins of the fallen Ottoman sizing the stark differences between Alevi beliefs and Empire, was declared a secular republic, scholars practices and those of the Sunni Islam supported by conclude that the nation designed by that state took the state.15 Yet these seemingly contradictory ap- on an ethnic and religious identity—specifically, a proaches do not reflect an ambivalent response. In Turkish and Sunni one. As such, scholar of citizen- fact, the movement asserts that Alevis are an inte- ship and identity in Turkey Ba ak nce notes that, al- gral component of the Turkish nation rather than a though Turkish nationalism “appear[s] to be defined minority outside of it.16 In doing so, Alevi leaders as political nationalism based uponş İ citizenship…in and institutions contest the meaning of the Turkish reality an ethno-cultural nationalism based upon race nation itself, arguing that the religious dimension of is promoted,”11 while scholar of Turkish nationalism the Turkish identity fostered by the state is an aberra- ener Aktürk argues that the modern Turkish nation tion from the legitimate Turkish nation liberated by is a continuation of the Muslim millet from the Otto- Atatürk. This true nation, the movement contends, is manŞ period, a legal Muslim community that imposed one grounded in Turkish culture and ethnicity, and a Hanefi interpretation of Sunni Islam on all Muslims shaped by civic values and secular principles. in the Empire.12 Recognizing Alevis as ethnic Turks As symbols are fundamental to the identity but religious outsiders allows the state to portray the formation processes of social movements, such as the Alevis as, Aykan Erdemir writes, a “noble savage,” the Alevi revival movement, in the first chapter, I seek bearer of a genuine Turkish cultural tradition who to analyze what a symbol is. I begin the chapter by is nonetheless mired in antiquated superstition.13 reviewing the relevant literature to arrive at a suit- Reflecting on these conflicting views of the Alevi able definition of symbols. With this understanding, population, Fethi Açikel and Kazim Ate describe I then examine how states use symbols to construct Alevis as “ambivalent citizens” subject to “constant national or majoritarian identities and how minority oscillation… between genuine selfness andş heretical groups excluded from those identities respond. This otherness… a symptom of lack of recognition, but at analysis leads me to three courses of action available the same time… a symptom of lack of total exclu- to responding minority groups: assimilation, exit, or sion.”14 But while scholars explore the attitude of the resistance.17 This assessment offers us frameworks to Turkish state toward the Alevi population at length, understand the processes of identity formation at the only a few examine the response of the Alevi revival levels of the Turkish state as it constructs a national movement to the nationalism that shapes identity identity and the Alevi revival movement as it re- politics and state policy in Turkey. sponds with an Alevi identity. In this article, I seek to address this gap in the In the second chapter, I build on this under- literature by analyzing the identity formation process standing of symbols and identity in an examination within the Alevi revival movement as a response to of the symbols and narratives available to the Alevi Turkish nation-building policies. To do so, I ad- revival movement by reviewing the historical devel- dress the following question: to achieve recognition opment of the Alevi population. I examine three pe- by Turkish state and society, does the Alevi revival riods of time: the Ottoman period during which the movement pursue assimilation and present Alevi heterodox sects that would later give rise to modern

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Alevism took shape in Anatolia; the early Republican modern Turkey. period, stretching from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War to the de- II. THEORIES AND SYMBOLS OF IDENTITY mocratization of Turkish politics in 1950; and the de- Scholar of nationalism Ernest Gellner once cades following democratization, a period marked by remarked that “one of the most important traits the resurgence of religion in public and political life of a modern society” is “cultural homogeneity, the and the ascent of identity-based movements, includ- capacity for context-free communication, the stan- ing the Alevi revival movement. This review offers a dardization of expression and comprehension.”18 The greater context of the relationship between the Alevi cultural homogeneity Gellner describes results from population and the state and an understanding of the a shared symbolic discourse, a common cultural lan- symbols available to the Alevi revival movement as it guage that unifies the experiences, values, and beliefs articulates an Alevi identity. of a people. Yet despite the prominence of symbols Having described this history and its resulting in literature examining identity, symbol as a term symbols, I analyze Turkish nationalism in the third has become diluted and problematic. Reviewing this chapter. Turkish nationalism is articulated through literature, Zdislaw Mach thus observes that although two distinct understandings of identity, one ethnic “[i]t has become commonplace that…we think and Turkish and the other Sunni. What interests us here express our thoughts and feelings through symbols, is not only how the state constructs identity, but also and that culture is a symbolic construction… the how the population perceives and responds to that concept of symbol is not clearly defined and is un- identity. While scholarly literature recognizes the derstood in many different ways.”19 In this chapter, I ethnic and religious components of Turkish national- develop a definition of symbols that will allow us to ism, there is a third component absent from policy better understand the processes of identity formation but present in official rhetoric, a civic nationalism. In occurring at the levels of the Turkish state and the understanding national identity as political and rhe- Alevi revival movement. torical influence on the population, I offer a modified model of Turkish nationalism. a. Symbols In the fourth and final chapter, I return to the Two aspects comprise a symbol: an image that Alevi revival movement. To examine Alevi identity provides its form and a concept that defines its mean- as a response to Turkish nationalism, I turn to the ing. Whereas the image is simple and readily under- symbols utilized by the movement in the political stood, the complex, abstract concept that it signifies demands articulated by Alevi leaders, the cultural proves more evasive. C. J. Jung thus considers an figures and narratives lifted from history by Alevi image “symbolic when it means more than it denotes institutions, the poetry written by Alevi intellectuals, or expresses…has a wider ‘unconscious’ aspect—an and the beliefs and practices promoted by Alevi lead- aspect that can never be precisely defined or fully ers. This analysis of the substance of Alevi identity explained.”20 Because of this distance between the reveals instances of both assimilation and resistance, image and the concept, Roland Barthes describes the oftentimes by the same actors within the movement. image as “analogical and inadequate” for the concept, Although these processes seem contradictory at first, going on to write that, for example, “Christianity ‘ou- a more careful reading reveals that they complement truns’ the cross.”21 As such, the concepts that symbols one another as the Alevi revival movement contests communicate escape words due to their nuances, the meaning of Turkish identity. Disputing the role subtleties, and intricacies but can be conveyed or of religion in Turkish nationalism as an aberration implied through imagery. Although the traditions, from the nation liberated and led by Atatürk, the narratives, and values that comprise Christianity are movement depicts a nation defined by civic values, expansive and surpass the cross in significance, the secular principles, and a Turkish ethnic and cultural cross succinctly expresses the essential meaning and heritage—a nation in which the Alevis are a central ideas of Christianity. This disparity between the sim- component. With the growing prominence of the plicity of the image and the complexity of its implica- Alevi population in Turkish politics, an understand- tions defines the symbol and gives it importance. ing of the Alevis is critical to an understanding of Despite the importance of symbols in com-

94 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism munication, their meanings are not constant. Frank principle, which holds that the political and the na- Hartung writes that, “the meaning [of a symbol] is tional unit should be congruent…a theory of political derived from its [sociohistorical] context, and can- legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries not be derived from either its physical qualities or the should not cut across political ones.”26 What results sensory experience that it may cause.”22 A cross on from this principle, Benedict Anderson writes, is its own does not convey the concepts associated with an “imagined political community,” an understand- Christianity; rather, it has been adopted as a symbol ing among a population that it is united by a shared of Christianity due to its role in Christian narratives. national identity that is realized in a nation-state.27 Further, for those without access to the narratives Nationalism legitimizes the state and communicates that give the cross symbolic meaning for Christians, its power as it is seen as the political and territorial the cross has no religious significance. An image manifestation of the nation. As a result of this legiti- may gain symbolic meaning through happenstance macy, it is in the interest of the state to construct a or historical incidents, as is the case with the cross cohesive and homogenous nation. and Christianity, or a social or cultural group may The state thus acts as the agent of nationalism, deliberately seize upon a symbol and transform the developing the symbols that build national identity meanings associated with it. For example, though and propagating them throughout society in order to Mount Fuji was originally a sacred icon particular construct what Geisler calls a “shared mythic past,” to the religious traditions of its immediate region, it a narrative that presents citizens as part of a histori- was later adopted by the Meiji state as a symbol of cal community that ultimately culminates with the Japanese ethnic identity and the triumph of Japan state.28 The symbols that compose national identity over foreign domination.23 This fluidity of symbols is are drawn from historical or cultural sources and significant for identity formation as it allows social or constructed by the state itself, as Eric Hobsbawm ex- cultural groups to develop images that communicate plains: “[e]xisting customary traditional practices… the content of their identities. [are] modified, ritualized and institutionalized for the In addition to communicating the content of new national purposes” and “entirely new symbols identity, symbols also delineate its boundaries. Stuart and devices [come] into existence as part of national Hall explains that the process of identity formation movements and states, such as the national anthem… “operates across difference, it entails discursive work, the national flag…or the personification of ‘the -na the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries.”24 tion’ in symbol or image.”29 The variety of symbols Boundaries are necessary as, Hall continues, “iden- employed by states building nations is vast, demon- tities can function as points of identification and strated by the following expansive list of examples attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, offered by Anthony Smith: to leave out… Every identity has at its ‘margin’ an flags, anthems, parades, coinage, capital cities, excess, something more,” that excess being what he oaths, folk costumes, museums of folklore, war refers to as the “constitutive outside,” the cultural memorials, ceremonies of remembrance for the 25 other against which a group defines itself. As it national dead, passports, frontiers… national symbolizes the narrative of Christianity, the cross recreations, the countryside, popular heroes and suggests that those who do not follow that narrative heroines, fairy tales, forms of etiquette, styles of are not Christian. Similarly, Mount Fuji defines the architecture, arts and crafts, modes of town plan- constitutive outside of Japanese identity as “foreign,” ning, legal procedures, educational practices and that is, those who are not ethnically Japanese. Sym- military codes…30 bols thus not only communicate what an identity is, but also what it is not. These symbols crystallize identities around attributes such as religion, ethnicity, civic values, or territory, b. States and Nations and tether these attributes to historical and cultural 31 In the contemporary world, nationalism has narratives. These narratives, in turn, cultivate feel- emerged as the predominant force by which states ings of loyalty among citizens by placing them within cultivate popular loyalty. Gellner offers one of the a shared community bound together by a grandiose most enduring definitions of nationalism: “a political past and represented by the state, thus creating the nation. 95 columbia university journal of politics & society

Despite the diversity of the symbols and attri- a reality.38 Discrepancies between the boundaries of butes that compose national identity, there are only the nation and the state produce minority groups— two fundamental varieties of nations. In his study those groups whose identities place them outside the of nationalism, Rogers Brubaker describes these national or majoritarian identity privileged by the types as a “state-centered and assimilationist” French state. Three courses of identity are available to minor- model of nationalism and a “Volk-centered and dif- ity groups confronted with this dilemma: assimila- ferentialist” German model of nationalism.32 The tion, exit, and resistance.39 French model, he writes, is grounded in “a political A minority group that pursues assimilation and territorial conception of nationhood,” which as- seeks to renounce attributes that separate it from the serts “that the state can turn strangers into citizens, national or majoritarian identity or emphasize its peasants—or immigrant workers—into Frenchmen” attributes that are congruent with that identity. In through assimilation into a set of values and norms.33 some cases, members of the minority group reject As such, the state develops symbols that emphasize the minority identity in its entirety and wholeheart- social and political values and the state as the center edly adopt the symbols and values of the national of national identity rather than ascriptive character- or majoritarian identity.40 Members of the minor- istics such as ethnicity, seeking to create what Cécile ity group may also pursue only partial assimilation, Laborde describes as a “superior public identity” that abandoning certain aspects of the minority identity requires citizens to “not only to leave behind, but while preserving others that are significant or not in often transcend, their particularisms.”34 In contrast, conflict with the national or majoritarian identity.41 the German model is based on ascriptive character- Nimmi Hutnik describes these individuals as those istics, the particularisms that the French model seeks “who may be well acculturated or even assimilated to escape. In German nationalist thought, Brubaker into the surrounding culture, but who may neverthe- writes, “nations are conceived as historically rooted, less feel very strongly identified with their ethnic mi- organically developed individualities, united by a nority group in terms of their self-categorization.”42 distinctive Volksgeist and by its infinitely ramifying Yet assimilation is not always possible. If a national expression in language, custom, law, culture, and the or majoritarian identity is grounded in ascriptive state.”35 One cannot assimilate into the German na- attributes, such as ethnicity or religion, individuals tion as descent determines membership. Whereas the without those traits cannot assimilate. Even some state stands at the center of the French nation, Smith supposedly civic nations exclude individuals based explains that the ethnic nationalism of German on such attributes, one prominent example being thought “start[s] from a pre-existent homogenous the repression of African-American citizens in the entity, a recognizable cultural unit,” and desires that United States.43 a state protect and privilege that group.36 Accord- A minority group that either refuses or is de- ingly, the symbols found in the German model seek nied assimilation may choose to exit the nation-state. to create ancient communities bound by blood and If mobility is not a barrier, members of the minority history.37 Whereas membership in the French civic group may physically exit and move to a more ac- nation is accessible to any individual who supports cepting place.44 Physical exit is not always an option, the values of the state, birth determines membership however, as the minority group may not have suf- in the German ethnic nation. ficient resources, or the land the minority group in- habits may have cultural or historical significance.45 c. Minority Groups and Movements When physical exit is not an option, the minority Of course, not all nationalist movements obtain group may pursue secession, which allows the group their own states, and the borders of states rarely align to exit the nation-state while retaining its territory, with their supposed nations. One need not look but requires it to legitimize its claims to statehood, further than Turkey, where the Kurdish nationalist convince the international community to support its movement contests the state for greater political au- claims, and wrest control of the territory from the tonomy, to understand that Gellner’s understanding nation-state—all difficult tasks.46 Instead of exiting of the nation-state as a congruence of the boundaries through emigration or secession, the minority group of the nation and that the state is more an ideal than may pursue sociocultural exit by remaining within

96 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism the boundaries of the nation-state but exiting public solidarity among citizens and loyalty toward the state and political life by isolating themselves into cultural as the representation of the people. For minority enclaves or masking their identities with dissimula- groups building movements in resistance, symbols tive practices. allow the minority group to distinguish itself from Minority groups may also pursue resistance by the national or majoritarian identity. This chapter articulating an identity distinct from the nation or offers frameworks through which we can analyze the majority and demanding accommodation from the nation-building policies of the Turkish state and the state. The nature of these demands varies with the identity formation process of the Alevi revival move- situation of the minority group, its level of organi- ment. In constructing a nation, the Turkish state may zation, and its relationship with the state. In many pursue an inclusive civic nation or an exclusive ethnic cases, the minority group may only pursue limited nation. In responding to that nation-building pro- objectives, such as autonomy in sociocultural mat- cess, the Alevi revival movement may pursue assimi- ters like the language of instruction in schools in lation, exit, or resistance. In the next chapter, I offer its territory.47 In some cases, however, the minority a review of the historical development of the Alevi group may demand and obtain great autonomy, seen population in Turkey in order to describe the poten- with the devolution of political power in the United tial symbols available to the Alevi revival movement Kingdom.48 To challenge the state for accommoda- and give greater context to the modern relations tion, the minority group must construct an identity between the Turkish state and the Alevi population. and build a movement around that identity capable of challenging the state. Critical for the success of this III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ALEVISM process of identity formation is the development of Before examining the historical development of social and political networks. Often grounded in re- Alevism, it is important to acknowledge that the term ligious associations and cultural organizations, these Alevi does not refer to a single, monolithic group, networks act similarly to a state as they articulate but rather to a multitude of groups that emerged in the content of identity, propagate their own symbols, Anatolia in the late Seljuk and early Ottoman peri- and provide the structure necessary to mobilize the ods. The term Alevi encompasses groups as varied as minority group.49 the Kurds of Dersim, who suffered violent reprisals Resisting minority groups develop the symbols by the Turkish state shortly after the war of inde- that constitute minority identity through three meth- pendence; the followers of the Mevlevi order, who ods. First, the minority group may draw symbols enjoyed privileged relations with Ottoman elites; from the attributes that separate it from the nation and the nomadic Turkmen tribes, who warred with or majority, such as language, religion, or ethnicity.50 the Ottoman state. Ideological and political cleav- Second, symbols may emerge out of interactions ages continue to fragment the Alevi population as between the minority group and the state or majority, their institutions struggle to find a shared definition which are often repressive or violent acts. These sym- of their identity.52 Since a comprehensive analysis of bols build solidarity among members of the attacked these varied groups exceeds the scope of this work, group, direct outrage from the incident toward the I focus on the historical and cultural developments state, and legitimize claims that the minority group that broadly affected the groups now considered to needs accommodation to defend itself.51 Third, the comprise the Alevi population. minority group may contest symbols used by the state or majority, particularly symbols that denigrate a. Islamic Heterodoxy in the Ottoman Empire the minority group, through means such as the recla- As much of the pre-Islamic traditions of the mation of terms or images. These methods of symbol Turkic peoples persist in modern Alevi beliefs and production cultivate feelings of solidarity among practices, distinguishing Alevis from Sunnis, it is the minority group and mobilize it as a movement necessary to first examine the ancestral traditions capable of challenging the state. of the Turkic peoples that migrated into Anatolia. Symbols are critical for identity formation. For These traditions were characterized by the belief states building nations, symbols comprise the foun- in the immanence of divinity in all things and the dation of national identity as they forge notions of veneration of nature.53 From these animistic beliefs

97 columbia university journal of politics & society emerged the “shaman,” a religious leader who per- orders exercised strong influence on the state despite formed rituals, provided medical treatment, and ideological conflict with the Sunniulema , as Küçük served as an intermediary between the living and the explains that “mysticism [became] a main element in dead.54 As nomadic peoples who migrated along the the thought of the Ottoman intellectual elite and was trade routes of Asia, the Turkic peoples encountered not confined to the popular beliefs of the Sufi -or Neoplatonism, Christianity, Manichaeism, Zoroas- ders.”61 The more syncretic and mystic Bekta i order, trianism, and Buddhism, among other religious and for example, gained popularity among the elite Janis- philosophical systems.55 This legacy remains visible sary corps as it expanded deep into the Balkans.ş 62 in Alevism, reflected in üH lya Küçük’s observa- The Mevlevi order enjoyed similar prestige among tion that, “incarnation, metamorphosis, battles with Ottoman bureaucrats.63 Despite a then-nominal sup- dragons and some motifs from the fire cult heavily port for the Hanefi interpretation of Sunni Islam, the influence these religions” while “‘watch your hand, Anatolian heterodoxies enjoyed wide support among tongue and sperm,’ one of the main moral principles both rural populations and urban elites. of Bek shism, is no different from the ‘Three Seals’in However, relations between the orders and Manichaeism.”56 the state would eventually sour. As the rural orders Fluidityā and syncretism thus defined the ap- viewed the centralized state with suspicion, economic proach of the Turkic peoples to religions they en- distress or political disputes often inspired rebel- countered, and Islam proved no exception. As the lions in the late Seljuk and early Ottoman periods.64 Turkic tribes that migrated into Anatolia in the medi- With the dramatic rise of the Safavid Empire under eval period converted to Islam, striking similarities the leadership of an order heavily influenced by emerged between the Turkic shamans and the Islamic Shi’i traditions to the east of Anatolia, these tensions mystics of Anatolia: they wore outfits adorned with adopted a religious character as the rural orders similar religious iconography, were both associated adopted Shi’i traditions, such as the veneration of with miracles connected to nature, and performed Imam Ali.65 Ultimately, the rural orders loyal to the shamanistic rituals even in opposition to Islamic Safavid state came to venerate its founder Isma’il as tenets.57 In addition to this continuation of pre- a messianic figure.66 Alongside this religious influ- Islamic practices, these Islamic mystics adopted the ence, troubles due to crop failures, plague, and rising syncretism of the Turkic traditions. The mystic poet taxation by the centralizing Ottoman state compelled Muhammad Jalal al-Din Balkhi (popularly known the Turkic tribes of the rural orders to support the as Rumi), for example, asserted that truth exists in Safavid Empire, and in 1511, the tribes instigated all religions.58 M. Hakan Yavuz similarly describes uprisings across Ottoman Anatolia.67 The response the Islam that emerged from these developments as by the Ottoman state was vicious, with the state rely- “nonliteral and inclusive,” one that emphasized belief ing on the orthodox Sunni ulema to condemn the over ritual and love over law.59 rural orders as heresy, legitimizing massacres of the With time, the syncretic traditions surrounding Turkic tribespeople that left tens of thousands dead.68 these wandering mystics coalesced into a number By the end of the sixteenth century, the Turkic tribes of orders (tarikats). High levels of variation already and rural orders had retreated into the mountains of existed among the orders, with some more closely Anatolia far from the reach of the Ottoman state.69 adhering to orthodox interpretations of Sunni Islam As the Ottoman state increasingly embraced ortho- and others more wholeheartedly embracing the dox Sunni Islam after these wars, the isolation of pre-Islamic Turkic traditions. Nevertheless, all of the the rural orders allowed them to develop the more orders generally exhibited the syncretic and fluid per- systematized, distinctive, and hereditary traditions spective of a “nonliteral and inclusive” Islam. Certain that would become modern Alevism.70 orders remained rural, flourishing among the Turkic tribes of central Anatolia and defined by secrecy and b. The National Struggle and the Early Republic a mistrust of centralized governance. Other orders The demise of the Ottoman Empire and the emerged in the urban centers of the Ottoman Em- proclamation of the Republic in the wake of the pire, constructing highly developed organizations First World War seemed to herald a new era of rela- and enjoying elite patronage.60 These more urban tions between the Alevi population and the state.

98 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism

The Turkish War of Independence, often known as in the first meeting of the National Assembly in 1920 the National Struggle (Milli Mücadele), crystallized to demonstrate their political support.78 In return, under the leadership of Atatürk in response to the Alevis hoped to witness the establishment of a state division of Ottoman territories by the Entente pow- that would welcome them as equal citizens rather ers and the Greek invasion of Anatolia in 1919.71 As than condemn them as heretics. the nationalist government that would become the Indeed, the republican state that emerged tri- Republic emerged in Anatolia, the Ottoman govern- umphant from the National Struggle sought to abol- ment remained in stanbul under heavy influence ish the institutions that represented the relationship by the Entente powers.72 The National Struggle thus between religion and state in the Ottoman Empire. became not only a İwar to seize territory from invad- In November 1922, the nationalist government ing powers, but also one to wrest sovereignty from a began to dismantle the Ottoman state by separating state that had for centuries legitimized itself through the Caliphate and the Sultanate and abolishing the military force and religious authority. latter.79 The Caliph was thus reduced to a powerless While the campaign against the Greeks revealed figurehead. Nonetheless, the Caliphate would meet the military prowess of the nationalists, Atatürk the same fate as the Sultanate, however, with the sought to build religious legitimacy to cement loyalty parliament abolishing it on March 3, 1924, less than among Muslims in Anatolia and abroad as well as to one year after the proclamation of the Republic.80 delegitimize the Ottoman Caliphate. To develop this The institutions that symbolized the religious identity legitimacy, nationalist elites frequently affirmed their of the state—the Şeyhülislam, the Ministry of Reli- loyalty to the Caliphate.73 Nationalist members of the gious Affairs and Pious Foundations Ş( eriya ve Evkaf ulema issued fetvas proclaiming the weakness of the Vekaleti), the şeriat courts, and the medreses—were Caliphate under European control, portraying the na- similarly abolished. The Directorate of Religious Af- tionalists as religious warriors fighting to save the in- fairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, hereafter referred to stitution of the Caliphate from infidels.74 At the same as the Diyanet), a new institution that represented time, the nationalists surrounded the burgeoning the power of the state over religion, replaced them.81 nationalist parliament in Anatolia, as Küçük writes: Upon adopting almost direct translations of the Swiss “Debates were conducted on whether it was suitable civil code and Italian penal code in 1926, the state to write verses and ḥadīths in newspapers or to make completed the abandonment of Islamic law for West- Friday a day of rest…Laws were made in accordance ern law.82 By 1937, laiklik, the aggressive secularism with the Sharī’a, such as the law to prevent the use of of Turkish thought, had become enshrined in the alcohol, and so on.”75 Although the Republic would constitution as a central tenet of the Republic.83 The later impose a harsh secularization, its foundations state no longer sought to implement religious tenets, rest in religious symbols and collaboration with reli- but rather to restrain and control religion. gious elites. This aggressive secularization did not remain While such appeals targeted the orthodox Sunni confined to political and legal institutions, but ulema, nationalist leaders also recognized the im- instead penetrated the whole of society. As Turkish portance of Alevi support. Atatürk advised military laiklik drew its inspiration from anticlerical French, commanders to forge alliances with Alevi authorities the state desired not only the removal of religious in- in Anatolia, and he even met with the two principle fluences from the state, but also, as Ioannis N. Grigo- leaders of the dominant branches of the Bekta i order riadis writes, “its eradication from the public sphere at their man lodge (tekke), earning their support for and its limitation into a very narrowly defined private the remainder of the war.76 As a result of this effort,ş s p h e re .” 84 While some policies prohibited numer- the Alevi population largely supported the national- ous Islamic symbols and practices such as the wear- ists, offering tekkes as spaces to support the smug- ing of the veil in public, others imposed a Western gling of arms and serve as hospitals and mobilizing lifestyle, such as the replacing of Islamic timekeeping Alevis to fight in the nationalist army.77 Beyond the with the Western calendar and international clock.85 military effort, Alevi leaders supported the political Denouncing the Arabic script used in Ottoman Turk- project of the nationalists. For example, nine promi- ish as “incomprehensible,” Mustafa Kemal initiated nent Alevi leaders from various orders participated language reforms that replaced the Arabic script with 99 columbia university journal of politics & society the Latin alphabet and purged it of many Arabic and promised egalitarianism and secularism.93 Tensions Persian influences, severing ties between Turkish citi- between leftists and ultranationalists grew through zens and the Ottoman past.86 Moving beyond social the 1970s, ultimately erupting into ideological war- practices, the state sought to crush Islamic institu- fare that bloodied Turkish cities and sectarian ten- tions with Law 677, which shut down the dervish sions in rural provinces between Alevis and Sunnis lodges, prohibited Islamic titles and dress, closed and Turks and Kurds.94 Many of these attacks direct- tombs of Sultans and mystic orders, abolished the ly targeted Alevis, the largest massacres occurring in profession of tomb-keeping, and imprisoned or fined Sivas in 1978, Kahramanmara in 1978, and Çorum anyone who transgressed these laws.87 As such, the in 1980.95 As the government proved incapable of aggressive secularization of the state brought about containing the violence, the stateş and society came a renewed repression of heterodox Islam. Krisztina to blame Alevis for this political instability.96 Seek- Kehl-Bodrogi explains that after the reforms, “state ing to restore stability, the military staged a coup on trespasses on Alevi religious gatherings occurred fre- September 12, 1980, ending democratic politics until quently” and “Alevi dedes, easily identifiable by their 1983 and leaving a curtailing of political freedoms long beards and untrimmed moustaches, were often that is long lasting.97 The state no longer perceived arrested because of illegal religious and ‘superstitious’ Alevis as a bastion of Kemalist support, but rather as activities.”88 Among state elites, debates emerged a grave threat. surrounding the closing of the lodges and orders and In response to the divisions that had erupted the prohibition of Anatolian Islamic practices—fo- in the years leading to the coup, the military gov- cusing on a perceived disloyalty of the orders and ernment adopted the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, a thus more reminiscent of the vitriolic rhetoric of the theory of Turkish identity developed in 1973 by the sixteenth-century Ottoman state than the nationalist nationalist and Islamist Aydınlar Ocağı (the Hearth government several years earlier during the National of Intellectuals). Mustafa en explains that “[t]he Struggle—and shaped policy toward religion.89 Yet basic assertion…is that Turkishness and Islam are for many Alevis, this period of transition was a pe- two essential componentsŞ of the national culture, and riod of hope as, after centuries of violent repression Islam is the best suited religion to Turkish culture by the Ottoman state, nationalist elites reached out and identity… Islam is the only religion in which to the Alevi population and invited them to join the Turkish culture found its best and the most correct project to build a new nation founded not on Sunni expression.”98 Abandoning the Kemalist repression Islam, but secular republicanism.90 of religion, the military government sought to foster a religious camaraderie that could transcend the c. Developments Since 1950 polarizing divisions of the 1970s.99 As such, the state The urbanization and democratization that oc- initiated the construction of numerous new mosques curred after 1950 fundamentally altered the place of and religious schools, increased its control over the the Alevi population in Turkish state and society. As messages given in religious texts and mosques, and mass migrations swept a significant proportion of the mandated religion courses that taught a nationalist Alevi population into the large and wealthier cities Sunni Islam.100 This welcoming of religion into pub- of western Turkey, village networks and traditional lic life by the state enabled the emergence of political institutions dissolved, leaving a weaker population Islam, first indicated by the dramatic success of the in the less developed provinces of central and east- Islamist Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) after ern Anatolia and a population without an organized the resumption of democratic politics.101 community in the urban western provinces.91 As A number of identity-based movements have democratization in 1950 encouraged political par- emerged alongside the Islamist movement since the ties to appeal to a largely Sunni Muslim population, resumption of democratic politics in 1983, however. political parties, particularly rightist parties, came Among these movements are the feminist move- to represent Sunni Islam.92 Left in the midst of a ment, Kurdish movement, and the Alevi revival predominantly Sunni society in the western cities movement examined here.102 Erman and Göker find and agitated by the return of Islam to politics, Al- three causes for the emergence of the Alevi revival evis overwhelmingly joined leftist organizations that movement: “the fall of Communism… the rise of

100 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism Sunni political Islam… and the military confronta- wing, which understands Alevism as a “pure form of tion between the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers Party) Islam” and desires reconciliation with the state, and and the Turkish forces.”103 Concerning the first, Reha the “modernist-secularist” wing, which sees Al- Çamuro lu writes, “socialism, which in the previ- evism as “outside Islam… a syncretic belief system, a ous two decades had an indisputable authority as philosophy, a culture as well as a lifestyle constructed an ideologicalğ alternative for the young and middle originally as the community interacted with various generations of Alevis, lost its former importance.”104 religions” and calls on the state to sever all ties with The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis contributes heavily to religion, although scholars recognize smaller branch- the second cause as the state opened space for the rise es as well, such as a Sufistic branch and another close of Islamism and imposed Sunni Islam on the Alevi to Iranian Shi’ism.111 Nonetheless, Soner and Tokta population through the construction of mosques in note that all branches of the movement “reject Sunni- Alevi villages, the imposition of mandatory religious Islamic principles, interpretations and practices.”112ş courses in schools that teach Sunni Islam, and the In other words, Sunni Islam forms the constitutive declaration that Alevis are Sunni Muslims with dif- outside that binds the movement together. fering practices, thus politicizing religious identity.105 The leadership of the Alevi revival movement is, As a sizeable proportion of the Alevi population is however, relatively homogeneous. Since the tradi- Kurdish, the emergence of the Kurdish movement tional village institutions disintegrated with the mass additionally contributed to politicization.106 Having migrations of Alevis into Turkish cities and the poor described the historical developments that have led languished after the collapse of the left, the urban to the modern Alevi revival movement, I will now Alevi elite in western Turkey and across Europe has conclude the chapter by describing the movement built the movement, its institutions, and its iden- itself. tity.113 With traditional leaders unable to adapt to The population the movement purports to rep- urban life, Vorhoff explains, the movement “was resent is divided along ethnic, geographic, and socio- not realized by the traditional Alevi institutions and economic lines. While the majority of Alevis identify religious elite but by a new, Western-educated elite, as ethnic Turks and reside in central Anatolia and via modern media and secular forms of organization; the cities of western Turkey, Kurds comprise twenty associations, foundations, concerts, staging of the percent of the population and are concentrated traditional rites, public conferences and, last but not primarily in eastern Anatolia, while a much smaller least, the huge mass of publications on Alevism.”114 Arab population exists in southern Turkey.107 The Sefa im ek thus describes the Alevi revival move- migration of many Alevis into western Turkey has ment as a “middle class movement” reliant on the introduced a new division between a rural popula- “materialŞ ş and intellectual resources [of] the educated tion confronted by the disintegration of their villages and better off Alevi.”115 This elite faces little competi- and an urban population building new institutions tion as Kurdish Alevis often identify with the Kurdish no longer reliant on village networks or traditional nationalist movement, traditional leaders flounder, dede figures.108 This urbanization also contributed to and poor Alevis support the egalitarian messages of a growing wealth disparity as the western provinces the leadership.116 As a result of this poor inclusion of prospered while eastern Anatolia lagged behind, Kurdish, rural, and lower class elements, many accuse resulting in the growth of an urban Alevi elite as the Alevi revival movement of exclusivity. Erman and many others suffered from poverty and downward Göker, for example, charge that “[w]ithout acknowl- mobility.109 These divisions manifest themselves in edging the class division, as well as the ethnic issue, ideological cleavages, represented by various institu- Alevi politics cannot be fully democratic.”117 Thus, tions in the movement, such as the Cem Foundation despite the diversity of the Alevi population, the (Cem Vakfı), known for its loyalty to Kemalist prin- image of Alevism presented by movement leaders is ciples, and the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association urban, Turkish, educated, and middle class. (Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği), which preserves With their return to public and political life, the the leftist sentiment of the 1970s.110 The largest Alevi population has suffered attacks from Sunni fun- division exists between what Bayram Ali Soner and damentalists. Whereas attacks before the 1980 coup ule Tokta describe as the “traditionalist-religious” were primarily motivated by ideology, attacks since

Ş ş 101 columbia university journal of politics & society then have been driven by religion as Sunni mobs pan-Turkish identity.125 Describing the nationalism perpetrated attacks on Alevi communities in Sivas in that resulted from these civic, ethnic, and religious 1993 and Gazi in 1995.118 Further, the attacks have currents, the Ottoman ideologue Ziya Gökalp wrote: become more threatening due to the perceived com- “the Turkish nation today belongs to the Ural-Altai plicity of the state. Anthropologist of Turkish Studies group of peoples, to the Islamic community, and the Martin van Bruinessen explains that in the 1993 Sivas West internationally.”126 massacre, “[t]he involvement of local police and civil With the proclamation of the Republic, how- authorities in the violence was also significant, as was ever, it seemed as if civic nationalism would triumph. the inability of the central government to neutral- Atatürk suggested so much during the National ize them.”119 Similarly, sociologist and researcher of Struggle, declaring to the parliament: “I am neither Turkish and Kurdish issues Jongerden finds that in a believer in a league of all the nations of Islam, nor the 1995 Gazi massacre in stanbul, “police delib- even in a league of the Turkish peoples.”127 Similarly, erately escalated a violent incident into a massacre” the early Republic defined the nation as a “politi- by antagonizing and firingİ on Alevi protestors after cal and social community formed by citizens bound a shooting at a coffee shop popular with Alevis.120 by the unity of language, culture and ideal”—a civic Examining language the police used, van Bruinessen conceptualization of the nation.128 Despite these asserts that, “many of the police were acting out of declarations of a civic nationalism, however, the aggressive hatred towards the Alevis.”121 The period ethnic and religious streams of thought present in since democratization has thus left the Alevi popula- late Ottoman nationalism persevered. This chapter tion with both a return to narratives of repression, describes these ethnic, religious, and civic dimen- but also the resources and levels of organization to sions of Turkish nationalism articulated by the state address that repression as a movement. With this and received by the population, to better describe understanding of the history surrounding Alevism, how Turkish nationalism affects the Alevi population the next chapter examines the Turkish nationalism and how Alevis understand the identity presented by that confronts the Alevi population. the state.

IV. TURKISH NATIONALISM AND SOCIETY a. Ethnic Nationalism Prior to the Ottoman Empire’s final century, the Despite proclamations of a civic nationalism, state made no effort to construct a national identity. Turkish nationalism quickly developed an ethnic Instead, the millet system divided the population into character as the state sought to present the Turk- communities delineated by faith that governed them- ish nation as a primordial community with ancient selves in accordance with their own religious laws.122 origins. To craft the narrative of this nation, Atatürk With the reforms of the Tanzimat era (1839–1876), established the Turkish Historical Society in 1931, however, the Ottoman state sought to introduce which developed the Turkish History Thesis, a fan- a civic nationalism by proclaiming legal equality tastical theory that asserted that the ancient Turks between Muslims and non-Muslims, abolishing heavily influenced early civilizations across the the millet system, and replacing religious identities world after their own ancient civilization in Central institutionalized by the millet system with Ottoman- Asia collapsed due to climatic disasters.129 With its ism, a superior public identity.123 In response to claims that the Sumerian and Hittite civilizations of these reforms, the reactionary Sultan Abdülhamit II ancient Anatolia were of Turkish origin, this theory (1876–1909) supported an Islamic religious national- transformed the Turks from a people that settled ism in an effort to strengthen the Caliphate and unite in Anatolia only in the medieval period to a people the Muslim populations of the Empire as national- with a long history in Anatolia that stretched into ist movements emerged in the Christian regions of time immemorial.130 The Sun Language Theory, the Empire.124 With the development of the ethnic developed by the Turkish Language Society after its nationalism of the German model, however, an foundation in 1932, offered a twin narrative, argu- ethnic Turkish nationalism developed alongside ing that all languages descended from the language religious nationalism, with intellectuals building ties of the ancient Turks, making modern Turkish, Hugh with Turks in Central Asia in order to construct a Poulton writes, “the most aristocratic, powerful,

102 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism lively and ancient of languages.”131 This reimagining Kurdish in speech, cultural performances, political of the Turks as an ancient race with Anatolia as their organizations, and other settings introduced after the adopted homeland built a nation united by territory, 1980 coup, and only lifted in 1991—expressly pro- history, and descent—an ethnic nation—despite the hibited minority languages.139 In order to belong as falseness of the claims. a member of the Turkish nation, one would have to As discussed in the first chapter, the ethnic na- adopt an ethnic identity defined by a shared history tion employs symbols that focus on this grand past and common language. and emphasize ascriptive characteristics. As such, This ethnic nationalism, however, does include the banks founded by the young republic bore names Alevis in the Turkish nation. As nationalists sought such as Sümerbank (Sumerian Bank) and Etibank to construct an ethnic nation, they viewed the Alevi (Hittite Bank) after the supposedly Turkish empires population as representations of a genuine Turkish- of ancient Anatolia.132 Similarly, the presidential seal ness untouched by Arab and Persian influences.140 adopted in 1922 and still in use today features sixteen In their efforts to reform the Turkish language, the stars that represent the “sixteen great Turkish em- nationalist elites thus adopted Alevi poetry and pires” that preceded the Republic of Turkey, present- music, bringing Alevi poetry and songs into the body ing the modern republic as the culmination of a long of Turkish national folklore.141 Nationalist elites history.133 The language reforms mentioned in the similarly viewed Alevism as a reflection of ancestral previous chapter sought to purge the “foreign” influ- Turkish beliefs and practices. To secular nationalists, ences from the Turkish language by replacing Arabic Açikel and Ate write, “the Alevi version of Islam was and Persian words and grammatical structures with the least Arabized and the least cosmopolitan and Turkic equivalents, imbuing the language with an one that kept intactş successfully the ancient demo- ethnic dimension in an effort to distinguish Turks cratic traditions of the Turks.”142 To a state search- from the Arabs, Persians, and Kurds.134 Such theories ing for ties to an ancestral past, the Alevi population and symbols were propagated throughout Turkish so- descended from the nomadic Turkic tribes offered ciety through academic conferences and institutions those connections. Although the significance of in which scholars sought historical evidence that ethnicity has waned, this stream of nationalism offers would support the Turkish History Thesis, school one pathway by which the Alevi population could and university curricula that taught these theories belong in the Turkish nation. to Turkish youth, and museums that propagated the Although the more extreme elements of ethnic claimed linkages between modern Turks and the nationalism have been gradually abandoned since ancient Sumerian and the Hittite empires.135 the death of Atatürk in 1938 and democratization in As ascriptive nationalisms, such as ethnic na- 1950, ethnic conceptions of Turkish identity continue tionalism, cannot accommodate assimilation by out- to shape Turkish nationalism. Even with the end of side groups, the ethnic stream of Turkish nationalism fanciful depictions of Turks as founders of world has proven hostile toward ethnic minority groups in civilization in the 1940s, F. Keyman and Tuba Kanc the country. Resettlement laws in the early years of explain that, “the focus on the ethnic origins of na- the Republic divided Anatolia into zones determined tional identity in the mythical motherland of centralı by ethnic composition in order to organize the re- Asia persist[s]” in textbooks, and “the geographi- settlement of Turks into the Kurdish east and non- cal territory of the state continue[s] to be imagined Turks into the ethnically Turkish west.136 Alongside as ethnically Turkish since time immemorial.”143 resettlement, the state used military service, “People’s Even as repressive policies of linguistic assimilation Houses,” which disseminated Turkish values and his- have been replaced by gradual reforms, such as 2013 tory, and schools to assimilate ethnic minorities into reforms permitting political parties to campaign a Turkish ethnic identity and transfer them to Turk- in languages other than Turkish and lifting restric- ish areas.137 Repressive language policies now domi- tions on the letters q, w, and x, the state continues to nate these ethnic nation-building policies. Article 42 discriminate against non-Turkish languages.144 A law of the Turkish constitution, for example, forbids the that allows private courses in Kurdish, for example, teaching of languages other than Turkish as a mother stipulates that those courses may only be taught by language.138 Other policies—such as the ban on native Turkish speakers for a maximum of eighteen

103 columbia university journal of politics & society hours each week for only ten weeks, while a policy al- mately 500,000 Muslims from Greece to Turkey and lowing the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation 1,500,000 Christians from Turkey to Greece, reveal- to broadcast in Kurdish restricts such broadcasts to ing religion as the determiner of Turkish identity and two hours each week.145 Although state rhetoric and reducing the non-Muslim population in Turkey.149 policy are now moving toward a greater openness Other policies similarly affirmed this relationship toward ethnic minority groups, continued appeals between Islam and Turkish identity, such as the rejec- to ethnic identity and setbacks confronting reforms tion of the Gagauz Turks (ethnically Turkish Chris- indicate that ethnicity remains a central component tians) and the acceptance of non-Turkish Muslims of the nationalism constructed by the state. from Europe.150 Non-Muslim citizens at the time suffered intimidation campaigns, harsh taxes, and b. Religious Nationalism discrimination in the state and military,151 despite re- Alongside ethnic nationalism, a similarly ascrip- quirements in the Treaty of Lausanne that the Turk- tive religious nationalism has historically guided ish state protect its religious minorities.152 Although Turkish nation-building policies as a product of the recent reforms pursued by the state are improving the particularly aggressive interpretation of French laïcité situation for non-Muslims, religious homogeniza- adopted by the Turkish state. As scholar of Alevism tion persists as the state interferes with non-Muslim Markus Dressler explains, Turkish secularism seeks religious institutions, prohibits the training of non- to not only expunge religion from public and political Muslim clergy, and allows discriminatory attacks to life, but also demonstrates an “interest in control- continue.153 ling the content and boundaries of religion.”146 To Unlike ethnic Turkish nationalism’s accommo- accomplish this objective, as described in the previ- dation of Alevis, however, religious nation-building ous chapter, the young republic both abolished the policies harshly reject Alevi identity. The Diyanet centuries-old religious institutions of the Ottoman distinguishes its interpretation of Islam from Anato- state and reached into society in order to institute lian traditions through the construction of symbols reforms proscribing religious practices and forbid- of what it defines as legitimate Islam. The most visible ding traditional Islamic institutions. In the place of symbol has been the mosque, which the Diyanet these Ottoman institutions, the state established the defines as the house of worship for Muslims regard- Diyanet, a large bureaucracy that seeks to develop less of sect.154 Turkish politicians show a similar an Islam supportive of Turkish nationalism and regard for the mosque, illustrated by comments from secularism, an Islam that Candas Pinar describes as AKP parliamentarians that “[n]either the cem houses “anti-clerical, Sunni (not Sufi or Alevi), Turkish (not nor mevlevihane are alternatives to the mosque.”155 Arab), progressive (not backward), and rational (not Açikel and Ate explain that the state’s stance to- superstitious).”147 As such, David Shankland explains ward Alevism is “similar to those discourses which that sermons in Turkish mosques, written by Di- perceived the Kurdsş as ethnic mountain Turks…the yanet officials and delivered by state-trained imams, religious nationalists implied that the Alevi were in emphasize “the importance of belief to the individual, fact ‘mountain Muslims’ who had lost touch with the the importance of respecting the secular basis of the genuine orthodox Sunni tradition.”156 This approach law of the land and the role of the mosque in foster- has resulted in what Karin Vorhoff describes as “quite ing a collective spirit in the community.”148 For these paternalistic attitudes, when [Sunni officials and writ- policies to succeed, however, citizens must adhere to ers] explain what Alevi as humble Anatolian country- the Sunni Islam espoused by the Diyanet, worship in men, cut off from Islamic civilization and learning, its mosques, and follow its values. As a result, Sunni got wrong in their understanding of Islam.”157 As Islam has become critical to Turkish nation-building. such, Janina Karolewski states, “[t]he Alevi tradi- Much as the ascriptive ethnic nationalism de- tion is not accepted…but the Alevis themselves are veloped by the Turkish state is hostile toward ethnic considered to be Muslims who would be accepted as minority groups, religious nation-building policies such if they only observed the obligations of Sunni are exclusive of religious minority groups. Popula- Is l am .” 158 Without doing so, Alevism is seen as a tion exchanges between Greece and Turkey after the heretical deviation, yet one that can be corrected by National Struggle, for example, transferred approxi- acceptance of the Islam of the Diyanet.159

104 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism With the democratization of Turkish politics language and ideal.164 in 1950 and the subsequent adoption of the Turk- Much like the civic nation that admits any individual ish-Islamic Synthesis after the 1980 military coup, who accepts the values of the state, this understand- religion has come to define the content of Turkish ing of nationalism in the early Republic seemingly nationalism. Prior to this period, religion determined admits anyone regardless of their ethnic or religious the boundaries of membership in the Turkish nation identity so long as they accept the language and val- but not its content. As described earlier, however, the ues of the Turkish nation. Decades after these early democratization of Turkish politics in 1950 required proclamations, Turkish politicians still express the political parties to respond to a conservative Muslim same sentiment today. From the earliest years of the population, thus reintroducing Islam into public and Republic to its most recent, notions of civic national- political life. The strength of this religious influence ism shape the official language of membership and rose with the adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Syn- belonging in the Turkish nation. thesis, which has been followed by a more aggres- Similarly, many national symbols cultivated by sive religious homogenization through the increased the Turkish state emphasize the state as the center construction of mosques, growth of the Diyanet, of identity. The Turkish flag represents the histori- and mandating of religion courses in primary and cal narrative of the establishment of the state—the 160 secondary schools. Islam is no longer an implicit field of red symbolizes the blood spilled by Turkish component of Turkish nationalism, but rather a cen- soldiers fighting against the invading forces in the tral means by which the state defines identity. First World War and National Struggle, during which the blood supposedly ran so deep on battlefields that c. Civic Nationalism it could reflect the moon and stars.165 Much like Despite these processes of homogenization, the the national anthems of civic nation-states such as state defines the nation in civic terms. Article 66 of the United States and France, the Turkish national the constitution defines Turkish citizenship as fol- anthem describes the warfare that led to the creation lows: “Everyone bound to the Turkish state through of the state and focuses on the flag as a symbol of the 161 the bond of citizenship is a Turk.” Further, the country rather than describing an ancestral commu- Turkish Citizenship Law states that citizenship may nity.166 The national holidays of the country also fo- be acquired by fulfilling certain criteria, none of cus on the history of the state as they commemorate 162 which concern ethnicity or religion. Neither the military victories, the establishment of the Republic, constitution nor the Turkish Citizenship Law refers and the death of its founder.167 These symbols seem to ethnic or religious identity in determining citizen- to depict a civic national identity. ship. Indeed, Article 10 of the constitution declares As the analysis of Turkish nationalism in this that “[e]veryone is equal before the law without chapter demonstrates, however, taken together, Turk- distinction as to language, race, colour, sex, political ish nation-building policies do not construct a civic opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any nationalism. The same state that proclaims it does not 163 such grounds.” State rhetoric also describes Turk- privilege one ethnic group over another continues to ish identity in civic terms. In 1931, Cumhuriyet Halk reject ethnic difference through repressive language Partisi (Republican People’s Party, hereafter referred policies and religious difference through assimilative to as the CHP) Secretary Recep Peker defined mem- religious policies. The same national iconography bership in the nation as follows: that contains the civic nationalist flag also contains We consider as ours all those of our citizens… the presidential seal that refers to an ethnic legacy who belong politically and socially to the Turkish of Turkish empires. The same textbooks that present nation and among whom ideas and feelings such Turkish students with the civic nationalist anthem as Kurdism, Circassianism, and even Lazism also define the nation as, nce writes, “a unity of and Pomakism have been implanted… We want language, religion, race, history, and culture.”168 Civic to state just as sincerely our opinion regarding nationalism, while presentİ in state rhetoric, is ab- our Jewish or Christian compatriots. Our party sent from policy as ethnic and religious nationalism considers these compatriots as absolutely Turk- guides Turkish nation-building. ish insofar as they belong to our community of The nationalism received by the population is 105 columbia university journal of politics & society not only ethnic and religious. Undoubtedly, the pop- But now, with Alevi actors and institutions growing ulation perceives these two components of Turkish increasingly visible in public and political life, it has nationalism. As evidenced, minorities have certainly become evident that exit has largely been abandoned. been made to understand that they fall outside the As such, I analyze the symbols and narratives used by Turkish nation. Similarly, the population responds the movement for signs of assimilation and resis- to the civic nationalism found in state rhetoric but tance. not policy, evidenced by protests against mandatory religion courses that utilize phrases such as, “[d] a. Resistance emocratic struggle against sectarian education.”169 The Alevi revival movement is fundamentally A model of Turkish nationalism is thus not simply a political as it challenges the state. Although the model of ethnic and religious nationalism, but rather reemergence of Alevi practices during the 1980s and one that includes ethnic, religious, and civic national- 1990s first represented an effort to construct cul- ism. As the identity built by the Alevi revival move- tural communities by urban Alevis bereft of tradi- ment is constructed in response to Turkish national- tional village ties and suffering discrimination by ism, it is crucial to recognize this difference between the Sunni majority of western Turkey, this growing the Turkish nationalism constructed by policy and awareness of Alevi identity developed into a politi- that received by the population. With this distinction, cal movement in response to the perceived threat in the fourth chapter I utilize the theories described posed by the dramatic rise of Islamism.170 Reflecting in the first chapter to assess identity formation within the politicization of Alevis in response to Islamism, the Alevi revival movement, drawing from the po- the Alevi manifesto that proclaimed the movement tential symbols examined in the second chapter in with its publication in the newspaper Cumhuriyet in relation to the Turkish nationalism described in this 1990 accused the Turkish state of privileging Sunni chapter. Islam and demanded that it cease the construction of mosques in Alevi villages, remove required religion V. RESISTANCE, ASSIMILATION, AND CONTESTA- courses from schools, and promote a greater under- TION standing of Alevi traditions in media and educa- Having examined the historical and cultural tion, among other demands.171 As the state has not development of the Alevi population and the nation- substantively addressed these Alevi demands with building policies confronting it, I now turn to the reforms, demands for accommodation rather than Alevi population and analyze the patterns of iden- cultural awareness or community building continue tity formation occurring within it. In this chapter, I to define the objectives of the movement, as indicated address the question posed at the beginning of this by this collection of demands presented by researcher work: Does the Alevi revival movement respond Fazilet Ahu Özmen: to the mixed messages of Turkish nationalism as Alevism must be accepted as an association of an insider or outsider of the nation? To answer this belief and must be secured against discrimination question, I survey a broad range of symbols circu- in all areas by the laws. lated prominently throughout the movement in the Compulsory religion classes must be abolished iconography and narratives of institutions, the de- (the fact that the lessons are only Sunni Islam- mands and slogans of Alevi political actors, and the oriented in this country poses a problem for the literature and art of Alevi intellectuals. I assess these Alevis. varied symbols found across the movement using Cem houses must be recognized as official places the framework of minority identity formation intro- of worship. duced in the first chapter, determining whether the The religion section of the identification cards Alevi movement demonstrates assimilation, exit, or must be removed. resistance. Throughout the period between the retreat Actual equality must be obtained by the laws and of the Turkic tribes into the mountains of Anatolia law enforcement. in the sixteenth century and the mass migration of ‘Religion and ethnics’ classes must be excluded Alevis to the urban centers of western Turkey in the from compulsory classes and must be established mid-twentieth century, Alevis largely pursued exit. as elective courses. 106 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism Building of mosques in Alevi settlements must be (such as the consumption of alcohol). Figures 1 and put to an end. 2, banners from websites for the Cem Foundation’s Tekkes must be taken from the Ministry of Tour- cemevi in Be ikta and the ahkulu Sultan Dervish ism and must be assigned to the management of Lodge (Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı) respectively, indicate Alevi foundations. this cultivationş ofş symbols thatŞ draw boundaries be- The presidency of Religious Affairs must be tween Alevism and Sunni Islam, with both featuring closed down or must integrated [sic] the Division the Shi’i figure Imam Ali and the medieval Anatolian of Religious Affairs of Alevism. mystic Hac Bekta Veli and the Cem Foundation The Sivas Mad mak Hotel must be made into a mu- banner including images of the semah dance. ı ş seum.172 Similarly, a poem written by a dede involved in As describedı in the first chapter, the develop- the movement during its early years defines Alevi ment of a movement based on minority identity in identity through references exclusively to those as- order to demand accommodation by the state reflects pects of Alevism that diverge from Sunni Islam: patterns of resistance. We (Biz) As the movement challenges the state and Sunni congregate together (cem eyleriz) majority for accommodation, it has sought to empha- We perform the ritual dances (semah yürürüz) size characteristics of Alevi identity that distinguish And play the ritual music (Saz çalarız). it from the Sunni Muslim identity it asserts that the We sing songs, hymns and incantations (Türkü, state privileges. As such, Alevi institutions adopt deyiş, nefes söyleriz). symbols representative of Shi’i Islam or the heterodox We drink wine (Dem içeriz) Anatolian mystic traditions separate from, and his- We mourn for the twelve imams (On iki imam torically persecuted by, the Turkish state and Sunni yası), majority. Similarly, the Alevi movement emphasizes We keep the Muharrem (Muharrem orucu), traditions found in Shi’i Islam but not Sunni Islam, And Hızır fasts (Hızır orucu tutarız). such as the mourning of the twelve imams or the bat- We perform the yearly sacrifice Y( ıl kurbanı), tle of Kerbala, rituals popular in Anatolian Islam but The votive sacrificeAdak ( kurbanı), not orthodox Sunni Islam (such as the semah dance The social sacrificeMusahiv ( kurbanı),

Figure 1. Banner for the Beşiktaş cemevi administered by the Cem Foundation (http://www.cemvakfibesiktas.org)

Figure 2. Banner for the Şahkulu Sultan Dervish Lodge (http://www.sahkulu.com/)

The sacrifice of atonementD ( üşkün kurbanı and accompanying saz, a traditional string instru- keseriz). ment, music), and practices forbidden by Sunni Islam We recognise no kadı (Biz kadı bilmeyiz). 107 columbia university journal of politics & society

Do not ask our sect (Sorma sofu bize mezhe- roles in officiating rituals and serving as a symbol of bimizi). social solidarity.176 But while these two components We recognise no sects (Biz mezhep bilmeyiz)ç of Alevi traditions transformed out of need, they We say, “we have our path” (Yolumuz vardır, also serve as symbols of resistance. As the Turkish deriz).173 state considers the mosque and the imam symbols The institutions and individuals within the move- of proper Islam, the development of the cemevi and ment thus employ symbols to construct the content dede as symbols of Alevism challenge the Sunni reli- of Alevi identity—its rituals, traditions, and icons— gious dimension of Turkish nationalism. while drawing sharp boundaries between it and its As the state institution responsible for imple- constitutive outside, its foreign other. For the move- menting policies of religious homogenization, the ment, that other is Sunni Islam. Diyanet has also been challenged as a symbol of iden- Some symbols employed by the movement to tity. As demonstrated in the demands of the move- distinguish Alevism from Sunni Islam have become ment, a desire to transform the Diyanet is common politicized themselves. On the one hand, the cemevi across all branches. Alevi institutions typically either and the dede are central institutions of Alevi identity accept the Diyanet as a legitimate institution and seek and community formation. As the rituals and tradi- the incorporation of Alevis or reject it and demand 177 tions of Alevism typically took place in private homes its abolishment. The Cem Foundation has even in Anatolian villages, the establishment of the cemevi responded to the Diyanet by constructing its own in cities resulted from the need for new spaces to symbol of institutionalized religion, the Directorate practice Alevi faith.174 As such, the cemevi serves as of Religious Services of Alevi Islam (Alevi İslam Din a location for both religious rituals and the articula- Hizmetleri Başkanlığı), an act Dressler states “chal- tion of Alevi identity with publications, discussions, lenges the monopoly of [the Diyanet] and is a reac- performances, and celebrations concerning Alevism, tion to the state’s refusal to formally acknowledge often open to Alevis and non-Alevis alike.175 The Alevis and provide them with a share of [Diyanet’s] 178 Alevi revival movement similarly reimagines the role competence and budget.” This rejection of the of the dede, discarding its social and legal functions Diyanet in its current form alongside efforts to ap- not suited to urban life and instead focusing on its propriate it for Alevi needs reflect the adoption and

Figure 3. Above. An advertisement for a fund in honor of Berkin Elvan (“Berkin Elvan Bursu,” Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Associates USA, September 12, 2014, http://www.pirsultanusa.com/)

Figure 4. Right. A banner of Elvan with the phrase “Berkin Elvan is immortal” at June 2014 İstanbul protest for the Sivas massacre

108 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism transformation by the resisting minority group of Elvan as a symbol of oppression and solidarity. Call- symbols employed by the state or majority. ing Elvan “our brother Berkin” and providing the Alongside these symbols that distinguish narrative of his death, the advertisement for a fund Alevism from the Sunni majoritarian identity, the in his honor sponsored by the American branch of movement has developed symbols of repression the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association proclaims: by the state and majority. As explained in the first “May children not be murdered; may our children chapter, symbols representing repressive acts by the who are our future go to school and smile with hope state or majority strengthen a social movement by at the future!”184 Berkin Elvan thus does not repre- building solidarity, legitimizing demands for protec- sent a single incident, but rather the threat faced by tion, and preserving the feelings of outrage associ- all Alevis that suffer from persecution. Actors within ated with the instance of repression, thus creating a the movement combine the symbol of Elvan with im- more powerful and united movement. The massacres ages of the massacres described earlier, demonstrated perpetrated against Alevi communities by national- by the black banner featuring an image of Berkin El- ists, and Islamists have become some of the most van and the phrase “Berkin Elvan is immortal” hung prominent symbols of repression, with the 1993 Sivas at a protest commemorating the June 2014 Sivas massacre being the most frequently mentioned. Re- massacre shown in Figure 4. By combining images flecting the power of the Sivas massacre as a symbol of Alevis killed during the Gezi Park protests with of repression, protests occur across the country on its commemorations of past massacres, the Alevi revival anniversary (as mentioned at the beginning), while movement anchors its identity in an ongoing narra- Alevi institutions and leaders have long called for the tive of oppression. Mad mak Hotel attacked in the incident to be pre- Such narratives of oppression are not limited to served as a museum in its memory.179 Alevis killed in the years since the Alevi revival movement emerged, theseı massacres and other attacks have also become but rather reach far into history. The movement trac- prominent symbols, due to what Randall Collins es the origins of the Alevi population to the Turkic describes as their representation of the “the moral tribes that rose against Seljuk and Ottoman rule and power of the movement…the feeling that the move- faced persecution, as described in the second chap- ment will ultimately win out.”180 During protests ter.185 These narratives, Vorhoff writes, depict a commemorating the Sivas massacre, for example, the …society divided into two categories names of those who died are often read and protes- 181 of people: on the one side there are the tors often carry photos of them. The Gezi protests humble nomads, the modest farmers, the of 2013, while not tied directly to Alevi issues or workers, the urban poor, the weak and demands, have similarly produced martyrs adopted underprivileged. They all appear as inno- by the movement. During a 2013 protest com- cent, just, good, righteous and at the same memorating the Sivas massacre, for example, Alevis time as ready to suffer for their ideal—a ü ü chanted the name of Ethem Sar s l k, an Alevi killed democratic society based on equality, in Gezi Park protests in Ankara, along with slogans justice, freedom, and solidarity… these 182 ı denouncing the AKP. These symbols illustrate to men and the common people are the ones both the movement and those outside it that the state who are discriminated against, suppressed, and majority have proven hostile to the Alevi popula- exploited and murdered by an unscru- tion, and, as a result, the Alevi population must have pulous caste of despotic, cruel rulers and greater protections to defend its practice and identity. rich, treacherous merchants… every past Berkin Elvan has emerged as among the most era has produced its heroes and villains, potent of these symbols. Reflecting the importance each representing the opposing principles of these symbols in continued mobilization, Elvan’s of Good and Evil. In such a confronta- death nearly a year after the Gezi Park protests insti- tion, the oppressed appear most often as gated widespread protests denouncing the AKP and a non-Arab people, particularly Turks; police, featuring slogans that demonstrate the power 183 the oppressors are Arabs, or ‘degenerate’, of his memory such as “Berkin Elvan is immortal.” ‘decadent’ Turks such as the Seljuks or the As shown in Figure 3, Alevi institutions have adopted Ottomans.186 109 columbia university journal of politics & society

To the Alevi revival movement, Alevi identity is Bekta will inevitably leap to the eye.”193 Similarly, Pir thus grounded in the history of a people who suffered Sultan Abdal, whose legacy is celebrated in the names persecution by oppressive states that governed Ana- of multipleş Alevi institutions and an annual cultural tolia throughout their history and continuing into the festival in Sivas, is revered for not only his mystical present. Such historical narratives of oppression un- poetry, but also his manner of death—execution by der the Sunni majorities of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman state during the sixteenth century for modern Republic describe an ethnically unique Alevi rebellious behavior.194 Many of the legends that sur- people descended from the Turkic tribes, distinguish round Pir Sultan Abdal accordingly emphasize his the Alevi population as the oppressed beneath the rebellious rejection of the oppressive Sunni governor oppressive Sunni majority, and also incorporate Alevi of Sivas and his loyalty to Shah Isma’il of the Safavid preoccupations with class that linger from the left- Empire, transforming him into a symbol of both ist past of the Alevi population.187 Alevi institutions Alevi ethnic identity as a member of the rebellious develop religious narratives of persecution alongside Turkic tribes and Alevi religious identity as a mystic- these historical narratives by placing the Alevi popu- poet.195 Reflecting the themes of oppression and lation into Shi’i narratives of oppression by Sunni resistance and Shi’i imagery that feature heavily in his states. This religious persecution is often compared to celebrated poetry, an excerpt from one poem follows: present conditions, as demonstrated by this excerpt Ever enduring I die from this malady from an Alevi poem written about the Sivas massa- If you love Ali don’t touch my wound cre: I devote myself to the way of Ali The incident set the world in a state of turmoil, If you love Ali don’t touch my wound Wasn’t there a military regiment in Sivas? … People were burned and there was dancing, I am Pir Sultan, Haydar, we are Nesimi Why are you chasing [us], you bloody Yezid?188 Even from eternity we are given to the Shah As Figures 1 and 2 indicate, the central figure of The twelve imams, our place of dwelling 196 Shi’ism, Imam Ali, is also one of the most revered We are martyrs and Ali our commander figures in Alevism, figuring heavily into Alevi imag- These symbols surround narratives of oppression ery as depictions of him adorn cemevis as well as the with a past of resistance against injustice. The promi- private homes of Alevis.189 The movement interprets nence the Alevi revival movement gives these figures him as a symbol of resistance against injustice.190 reveals the centrality of rebellion against injustice With these narratives, Alevis in the movement thus to Alevi identity. Indicative of patterns of a minor- claim, Göner explains that, “Alevism [is] the cul- ity group resisting state and society in the pursuit tural echo of resistance to all kinds of inequality and of accommodation, the Alevi revival movement has injustice.”191 Ethnic narratives of the oppression of portrayed the Alevis as a group long oppressed by the Turkic people and these religious narratives of the Turkish states, but one with the will to challenge such oppression offer the movement narratives of resis- injustices. tance against oppression by Sunni states and societ- ies. b. Assimilation This focus on resistance as a central component Despite these patterns of resistance, the Alevi of Alevi history and identity is found in other promi- revival movement rejects classification as a minority nent symbols as well. The Anatolian mystic-poet Hac group. After a report by the European Union de- Bekta Veli, widely venerated by the movement, is scribed the Alevis as a “non-Sunni Muslim minority” described as a symbol of the triumph of good over ı in 2004, the Turkish state immediately protested the evil, aş symbol of hope and perseverance for a long- claim, with both Kemalist President Necdet Sezer and oppressed people.192 As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, Islamist Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo an of the Imam Ali, a symbol of resistance against injustice, time asserting that the Alevi population is not a mi- and Hac Bekta Veli, this symbol of the triumph of nority group but rather a part of the majority.ğ 197 That good, are central to Alevi identity. Indeed, Kehl-Bo- the state would oppose the classification of Alevis as drogi writes,ı “[e]nteringş the living room of a house a minority group should not be surprising given its inhabited by Alevis, colour prints of Ali and Hac denial of Alevi difference. Yet the Alevi revival move- 110 ı the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism ment also emphatically rejected this classification.198 cultivated by the state.203 The movement thus locates Some Alevis justify this claim by explaining that only Alevi identity within the Anatolian and Turkic iden- non-Muslim populations may be considered minor- tity promulgated by the state. ity groups in Turkey, often out of a fear that clas- The most widespread symbol of this identity sification as a minority group would lead to greater cultivated by the movement is Hac Bekta Veli, the suspicions that Alevis are not loyal to the state and, as celebrated medieval mystic-poet. As explained, his a result, increased discrimination.199 Leaders in the image is a central symbol within theı movement,ş movement have given an additional reason, however. found in Alevi websites, publications, institutions, Denouncing the classification of Alevis as a minority, festivals, and even homes. Elise Massicard explains zettin Do an, head of the Cem Foundation, pro- that he is so highly revered for a number of reasons: claimed that, “Alevis are not a minority, they are part İ ğ Hac Bekta is a central figure of Alevism, since of the founding elements of this country,” a sentiment it is through him that Anatolian Alevism can be 200 ı ş widely shared within the movement. Indeed, as most clearly distinguished from Syrian Alawism the Alevi revival movement resists Turkish nation- or from the Twelver Shi’ism in Iran; he also per- building policies, it seems to also assimilate into that mits the making of a direct link between Alevism Turkish national identity. and Bektashism, which are quite different socio- Although narratives developed by the move- logical realities. Moreover, he is also respected by ment portray the Alevi population as oppressed by Sunnis, which is important in relation to outside the Turkish state, it also describes Alevi identity society… he is also quite a consensual figure as Turkish. As stated in the preceding section, the among Alevis, because most of the other figures movement traces the origins of the Alevis to the Tur- of Alevism have a more precise significance: Pir kic tribes that migrated into Anatolia from Central Sultan Abdal is distinguished by a more left-wing Asia and employs Turkic mystic-poets and rebels connotation since the 1960s…204 as some of its most revered symbols, constructing an ancestral Turkic identity. This narrative comes Although there exist many competing narratives of as a response to the incorporation of Alevis into the his life as little is known for sure, the movement has ethnic Turkish nationalism discussed in the third broadly adopted Hac Bekta Veli as a symbol of the 205 chapter. This identification of Alevism as genuinely Turkish and Anatolian heritage of Alevi identity. ı ş Turkish does not stop at ethnicity, however, as Açikel In addition to representing the triumph of good over and Ate write that “[f]or secular ethno-cultural evil, the Alevi revival movement celebrates Hac nationalism, the Alevi’s understanding of the Islamic Bekta Veli for supposedly defending the Turkish ı faith representsş a specifically Turkish interpretation language from being submerged beneath and extin- ş of Islam…[as] the Alevi successfully conserved the guished by Arabic and Persian as he chose to write 206 spirit of the ancient Central Asian and Anatolian and deliver religious messages in Turkish. Further, belief systems.”201 Both Alevi institutions that con- although Hac Bekta Veli came to Anatolia in the sider Alevism an interpretation of Islam and those thirteenth century, Ataseven explains that Alevi insti- ı ş that consider it outside Islam portray Alevism as a tutions and leaders understand his “love message” to pure Turkish tradition in contrast with Sunni Islam, be “specifically Anatolian,” meaning that “Anatolian which they denounce as corrupted by Arabic and Turks are more related to the Hittites than the Cen- Persian influences in the Seljuk and Ottoman pe- tral Asian Turks, which suits the Kemalistic idea of a riods.202 The prominent Hac Bekta Veli Cultural clearly delineated nation with a rich cultural heritage 207 Association (Hacı Bektaş Veli Kültür Derneği), for specific for this geographic area.” Hac Bekta Veli example, describes Alevism ası a traditionş founded thus links the Central Asian and Anatolian legacies of ı ş in thirteenth century Anatolia with roots in Central this ethnic Turkish-Alevi identity in one symbol. Asian, Anatolian, and Near Eastern traditions, such Alongside ethnic narratives of identity, the Alevi as “Greek philosophy, Hittite and Mesopotamian revival movement also presents Alevism as central religions, ancient Turkic shamanism, ancient Iranian to the civic narratives of Turkish nation-building Mazdakism, Manichaeism, [and] Zoroastrianism,” a policies. As described in the second chapter, the tradition with the same roots as the Turkish identity Alevi population broadly supported the nationalist movement that would establish the Republic, hoping 111 columbia university journal of politics & society that the new state would bring an end to centuries of movement. As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrated earlier, repression. Although the reforms introduced by the his image is found on the banners of Alevi websites. republican state repressed Alevism, they also initially As seen in Figure 5, his image is even found in ceme- repressed public demonstrations of Sunni identity, vis alongside religious figures, such as Hac Bekta suggesting an equality of treatment under the new Veli and Imam Ali. Illustrating the extreme impor- state.208 With the incorporation of Alevis into politi- tance his image holds within these religiousı settings,ş cal life after centuries of exclusion and the destruc- the heads of the Hac Bekta Foundation, the Hubyar tion of institutions that repressed Alevism, the period Sultan Alevi Cultural Association, and even the left- of the National Struggle represents liberation from ist, anti-state Pir Sultanı Abdalş Cultural Association Ottoman oppression and unity as a nation. Excerpts balked at a suggestion that portraits of Atatürk be from a poem by an Alevi intellectual from the early removed from cemevis.212 This extraordinary rever- 1980s titled “The Epos of the Liberation” (“Kurtuluş ence for Atatürk comes from his symbolic role as Destanı”) thus follow: the liberator of the Alevi population. Indeed, Kehl- ü We were invincible, we became one and com- Bodrogi explains that Atat rk “stands for the end of a plete, period which began in the time of Shah Isma’il, when We were undividable, we were together with Alevism became a community nearly hermetically Ata[türk], sealed to the outside…the reign of Yezid seemed to Not as captives, if we had died we would have be over” with “the disintegration of the Ottoman Em- been free, pire and the disestablishment of the Islamic ulema” 213 The brave men said [this is] the time and place, he brought. There is in fact an almost religious ü and they became heroes. personage attached to Atat rk. One Bekta i poem written during the National Struggle, which uses the … ş Our Ata[türk] said: “Let slavery end”! word nefes (“hymn,” used for religious poetry) in the “Let the enemy go [back] the way he came!,” title, goes: “Let freedom smoke in the extinguished He saved this oppressed nation from all the hearths!,” chains of slavery, The hearths burned, his word became the prin- This is the hero of God who conducts holy con- ciple.209 quests in a way that moves the heart As reflected by this poem, the discourse surrounding This leader is the revered crown of the world of the National Struggle within Alevi narratives is one of liberation and national unity under the figure of Atatürk. The National Struggle represents a moment in which the population—both Alevi and Sunni— united as it rose against the collapsing Ottoman state and invading foreign forces. Ataseven explains that Alevi institutions thus assert that “the Turkish nation owes its existence largely to the Alevis” due to their role in the nationalist movement.210 Indicating this view and the importance of the National Struggle to understandings of Alevi identity, Alevi institutions Figure 5. An Ankara cemevi featuring the Atatürk, Hacı Bektaş Veli, and Ali (“Alevis divided on Atatürk portraits in cemevis,”) often include descriptions of the National Struggle in their websites and publications.211 As an integral component of the war that established the Republic, Islam, the Alevi revival movement contends, they are an This is the decree of fate for those enemies who integral component of the Turkish nation and not a were after him. minority group. Today the sun of independence, O As m, rose over the world of Islam, Owing to his role in the National Struggle and ı the establishment of the secular republic, Atatürk has And showed its fair face; what a beautiful be- become one of the most prominent symbols of the loved. 112 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism …This is just a prayer for Kemal Pa a [who is] of Alongside such nationalistic values, the Alevi revival pure character.214 movement promotes understandings of Alevism as ş ö Such religious themes surround the memory of a tradition that represents progressivism. As G ner Atatürk in modern Alevi poetry as well, with poems explains, since the rise of the Alevi revival move- referring to him as the “hero of the last days”, the ment, many Alevis have come to consider Alevism a Mahdi, or the “lion of God;” invocations of “[t]he law “universal religion…which defines itself in terms of of Atatürk” and his sword in opposition to Islamism; universal values, such as equality, democracy, justice, and demonstrations of yearning reverence for him human rights, freedom, cooperation, women’s rights, 219 in poetry written using mystic styles and themes.215 and environmentalism.” By characterizing Alevi Some Alevis consider Atatürk to have been an Alevi beliefs as representative of modern values, the Alevi himself, although many others do not support such revival movement locates Alevism within the stream theories. For the Alevi revival movement, Atatürk of civic nationalism present in state rhetoric. has thus become a central symbol as the liberator This new focus on the modernity of Alevi of the Alevis. By invoking his image as a symbol of beliefs and practices has even led to a redefinition liberation in the National Struggle, the Alevi revival of central Alevi symbols. Although Hac Bekta Veli movement locates the historical narratives surround- is celebrated as a symbol of ancestral Turkish val- ı ş ing Alevi identity in the heart of the civic narratives ues and traditions, Vorhoff writes, many within the of Turkish identity. movement claim that his message of love “include[s] Alongside portrayals of Alevi narratives of elements of every people, culture and faith that has identity as congruent with ethnic and civic national- ever flourished in Anatolia,” thus presenting him as “a ist narratives, the Alevi revival movement emphasizes man devoid of any racial marking, who was a master Alevi beliefs and practices that reflect the modern- of synthesis… melding [these peoples, cultures, and ist principles of Kemalism. Secular nationalists have faiths] into a deeply humanitarian, peace-loving and 220 long upheld Alevism as an example of liberal Islam, egalitarian faith and ethic.” The institution of the despite their dismissal of aspects they deem archaic dede has additionally come under attack by elements such as the dede or incompatible with state Islam in the Alevi revival movement due to its emphasis on such as the cemevi, illustrated by Pinar’s explana- lineages of descent, an institution many deem incom- tion that “Alevism embodies many of the virtues of patible with the modern and inclusive ideology they 221 Kemalist Islam…and the general liberalism of the seek to develop. Responding to these accusations, [Alevi] community, reflected in its stance on alcohol the Cem Foundation now offers courses that allow and gender relations, indicates a modernism that one to become a dede, redefining a position based on 222 impressed Kemalists.”216 Even in its earliest years the lineage into one anyone can attain. This opening Turkish state utilized Alevism to assert that, Erdemir of the institution of the dede signals a transition from writes, “the authentic values of the Turks were no ethnic, ascriptive conceptualizations of the dede— different from Western values.”217 Embracing this and by extension Alevism—to an understanding of positive reception by early nationalists, Alevi institu- the dede that embraces republican and civic values of tions present Alevi beliefs as similar to the principles inclusiveness. This new interpretation of Hac Bekta promoted by the state. In her analysis of modern Veli and criticism of dedes reflects the abandonment ı ş interpretations of Alevi values, Vorhoff offers one of attributes of the minority group incompatible with particularly compelling example of this practice: national or majoritarian identities as well as an em- phasis on attributes of minority congruent with that The central ethical norm of Alevism that de- identity, in this case a civic Turkish identity. mands ‘eline, diline, beline sahip ol’ (be master of Although women are not readily visible within your hands, your tongue and your loins” refers… the leadership of the movement, Alevis identify the not merely to the banning of theft, envy, lying, place of women in Alevism as symbolic of progres- telling of the secret teachings of Alevism, slander, sivism and adherence to civic values in a conservative adultery and intercourse with Sunnis, but also Sunni society. Unlike Sunni Islam, Alevism does not to the obligation to defend the fatherland (el), to demand the separation of men and women during preserve the (Turkish) mother tongue (dil) and to worship, nor does it mandate the headscarf; further, keep one’s own blood brothers (bel).218 113 columbia university journal of politics & society as the Alevi population practices monogamy rather an Alevi interpretation of the National Struggle that than polygamy and had lower rates of divorce, the describes the Alevis as integral actors. As the Alevi movement claims that it treats women in a modern revival movement locates Alevism within ethnic and manner in comparison to the comparatively con- civic streams of Turkish national identity, the process servative Sunni Islam that dominates majoritarian of identity formation occurring in the movement understandings of Turkish identity.223 In an inter- reflects patterns of assimilation. view, for example, Alevi activist Reha Çamuro lu explained that, “if a male Bekta i224 beats his wife c. Contestation you would be surprised. Because such a thing ğis not... At first glance, these findings leave us without possible in Bekta ism.”225 Assertingş the historical ac- a satisfying response to the question posed at the ceptance of women within Alevism as well as distin- beginning of this work: Does the Alevi revival move- guishing Alevi identityş from Sunni identity, an Alevi ment respond to the mixed message of Turkish na- institution based in Australia declares that, “[f]or tionalism as an insiders or an outsider of the Turkish over 2000 years women have been regarded as divine nation? The analysis of Alevi identity offered here -re within the Alevi/Bektashi order” and attributes the veals an apparent coexistence of resistance and assim- suppressed position of women in Turkish culture to ilation present across all branches of the movement. the “Arabic harem culture” that it claims corrupted On the one hand, institutions within the movement the Ottoman Empire.226 Within Turkey, Alevi insti- reject the Sunni identity constructed by the Turkish tutions demonstrate an open support for women, il- state. They emphasize those elements of Alevi beliefs, lustrated by Cem Foundation’s dedication of an entire practices, and history that distinguish it from Sunni section on its website to issues and events concerning Islam with some even locating Alevism outside Islam women.227 Through this emphasis on beliefs and entirely, reflecting a process of boundary formation practices considered more modern, the Alevi revival indicative of a resisting minority group. On the other movement seeks to locate itself within the civic values hand, however, the movement seems to assimilate supported by the secular and republican foundations into Turkish nationalism through the construction of the Turkish state as it rejects religious Turkish of symbols that present Alevi identity as congruent nationalism. with ethnic and civic Turkish nationalism. Looking Reflecting the emphatic assertions that the Alevi at this seeming contradiction, one might ask: Is the population does not constitute a minority group, Alevi revival movement pursuing both resistance and much of the symbolic discourse surrounding Al- assimilation? If so, how does this dualistic strategy evi identity indicates assimilation into the Turkish contribute to its goals of recognition and accommo- identity constructed by the state. In response to the dation? embrace of Alevism by Turkish secular nationalists Perhaps the Alevi revival movement is pursu- as a Turkish Islam untouched by Arab or Persian ing neither. Reflecting on the analysis of apparent influences, the movement emphasizes the Turkic and resistance and assimilation within the Alevi revival Anatolian roots of Alevism. Symbols such as Hac movement undertaken in this work, I contend that Bekta Veli and discourses on elements of Alevism, the movement is neither resisting against the national such as its syncretic aspects thus describe an ethnicı identity constructed by the Turkish state nor assimi- narrativeş of Alevi identity grounded in Anatolia and lating into it. Both processes require the minority Central Asia and a religious narrative depicting a group to recognize that it exists outside the national faith loyal to Turkish values. Understanding these or majoritarian identity of the nation-state, that it Turkish values to be the modern, republican values is instead part of its constitutive outside. In many of civic Turkish nationalism, the Alevi revival move- ways, the Alevi population is a minority group, as it ment assimilates into a civic Turkish identity as it is significantly smaller than the Sunni majority and, identifies those attributes of Alevism that are congru- much like a minority group building a social move- ent with this civic identity. These processes of civic ment, seeks to construct an identity distinct from that assimilation have also led the movement to renounce majority. Yet Alevi institutions couch their narratives or redefine certain symbols. This understanding of and demands in a majoritarian rhetoric that empha- Alevism as central to Turkish nationalism has led to sizes Alevi belonging within ethnic and civic concep-

114 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism tualizations of the Turkish nation while rejecting the pressed Turcoman tribes and symbols of Turcoman religious Sunni dimension of Turkish nationalism. A resistance such as Pir Sultan Abdal. According to careful reading of the symbolic discourse surround- these narratives, a bleak reality dominated for much ing Alevi identity reveals that, instead of resisting or of the history of this constructed Alevi people. assimilating, the Alevi revival movement contests The Alevi revival movement states that the bal- the meaning of the Turkish nation, arguing that the ance between the oppressor and the oppressed only Alevis represent the genuine Turkish nation built by shifted with the emergence of Atatürk as the liberator Atatürk and the state is the deviant that has veered of this Turkish people. Indeed, as the poems provided away from this true Turkish nation and receded back earlier in this chapter demonstrate, Mustafa Kemal into the oppression of the Ottoman period. I will now is not simply the founder of a new state, but rather a analyze together the symbolic narratives of resistance liberator of the Turkish people from not only invad- and assimilation described above to elucidate this ing foreign forces but also centuries of oppression. process of contestation. As such, the vice president of an Alevi foundation As described in the analysis of patterns of resis- comments: “The Alevis have only come out victori- tance in the Alevi revival movement presented earlier ous once. We won one time with Mustafa Kemal in this chapter, the discourse surrounding Alevi Atatürk… Atatürk saved us from the sultanate, identity is depicted in a dualistic framework between religious bigotry, and economic and political oppres- the oppressed and the oppressor. As Vorhoff explains, sion.”231 The symbolic discourse surrounding Alevi the narrative of Alevi history described by the move- narrative thus locates the Alevi people in the Turkish ment “evokes a kind of Manichaean world view… nation-state established following the National Strug- the oppressed appear most often as a non-Arab gle and takes Mustafa Kemal as the sacred symbol of people, particularly Turks; the oppressors are Arabs, the liberation of that nation. or ‘degenerate,’ ‘decadent’ Turks such as the Seljuks As described in the third chapter, Turkish or Ottomans… [that] no longer counted as Turkish nationalism during the early republic was ethnic, ter- because they uncritically adopted Arabic and Persian ritorial, and ferociously secular. The Turkish nation- culture and despised Turkishness in every respect.”228 building policies and the fantastical theories of the To the ideologues of the Alevi revival movement, the Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language Theory un- Islam of this historical oppressive elite is therefore derpinning them portrayed the Turkish nation as one not the Islam of the Turks; as the preceding analy- with origins in an ancestral Turkic people that left ses indicate, the movement asserts that Alevism is their original homeland in Central Asia to establish a the interpretation of Islam that genuinely represents new one in Anatolia. This early nationalism married Turkish values. Instead, the movement contends that these ethnic beliefs with civic nationalism by assert- the Sunni Islam of these elites is a corruption intro- ing that ancestral Turkish values are the beliefs in duced by the Umayyad Empire. As one dede states: republicanism and modernism that guide the Turkish “The Umayyad family introduced political controver- state. As demonstrated in the analysis of patterns of sies to the religion and they corrupted the Prophet’s assimilation within the Alevi revival movement, it is path… Sunni Islam is the Arabic and Umayyad un- the ethnic and civic dimensions of Turkish nation- derstanding of Islam.”229 To defend this claim, Alevi alism that the movement embraces. Although the ideologues argue that Sunni practices such as daily movement today considers this period to represent prayers were introduced for social control rather than the liberation of the Turkish people and thus locates by the Prophet Muhammad and that the Koran is in- itself within this nationalist discourse, incidents that complete as many references to Imam Ali have been occurred under Atatürk such as the Dersim opera- purged, among other assertions.230 On the other tion, during which the Turkish military massacred an side of this historical divide exist the Turkish people, estimated ten percent of the population of the prov- represented by the Turcoman tribes with an ethnic ince to pacify rebelling Alevi Kurds, and the closing legacy in Central Asia and a religious legacy stretch- of the dervish lodges with Law 677, which continues ing to Imam Ali. As described, the Alevi revival to prohibit state recognition of cemevis and dedes,232 movement constructs this identity through narratives make obvious that that the Kemalist nation-building that identify the oppressed Alevis as the once-op- project was not as friendly to the Alevi people as the

115 columbia university journal of politics & society movement suggests. For this reason, leftist elements interpretation in a comment on the debate on the in the movement have become critical of this period headscarf, one Alevi institution asks: “Is it not so of time and argue that the oppression of the Alevis ironic that today’s incumbent AKP government in returned while Atatürk was still alive.233 Nonethe- power are [sic] taking Turkish stature back to the less, such perspectives are marginalized, reflected by dark days of fourteen centuries?”238 Condemning a broad denial that Atatürk was involved in incidents AKP efforts to build relations with the Alevi popu- such as the Dersim operation while Alevis accept lation through the Alevi opening, the chairman of religious repression so long as all religious expres- another Alevi institution similarly declares: “It is an sion is proscribed.234 The movement thus locates the AKP project that portends new steps towards Sharia- genuine Turkish nation within the nationalism of the type rule,” the Islamic law abolished by Mustafa early republic. Kemal.239 For the Alevi revival movement, Islamism Because the genuine Turkish nation is taken symbolizes the return to Ottoman oppression. by the Alevi revival movement to be an aggressively In its rhetoric and discourse surrounding iden- ethnic and staunchly secular interpretation of Turk- tity, the Alevi revival movement thus responds to ish nationalism, the movement identifies the reemer- Turkish nationalism by locating Alevi identity as con- gence of Islam as a political force that occurred with structed through symbols and historical narratives democratization as the point at which the oppressive produced by the movement within what it considers forces of the past engulfed the Turkish nation once to be the Turkish nation. The Turkish state since the again. Reflecting on the ascent of Islamism, one Alevi democratization of Turkish politics in 1950 is thus at- poet laments, “The Arabs drag the country into dark- tacked as an illegitimate representation of this nation, ness… [Atatürk’s] country is buried in darkness.”235 a state that does not represent its people but rather Indeed, Köse explains that the most prominent view the forces that have historically oppressed them. of the movement asserts that, “the Turks’ understand- To meet this objective, the Alevi revival movement ing of Islam was Sunnified, politicised and contami- emphasizes aspects of Alevi identity congruent with nated during the Seljukid period, Ottoman times and the ethnic and civic streams of Turkish nationalism the multi-party period of Republican Turkey, starting that dominated the early discourses of the Republic

Figure 6. An Alevi protest against compulory religious courses in schools (“Alevis protest compulsory religion classes at Turkish schools,” Today’s Zaman, October 12, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/) from the early 1950s and continuing after the 1980 while rejecting religious aspects introduced with the military coup.”236 As such, Alevis claim that Islamists Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, reflecting a pattern of con- are the heirs of the oppressive Ottoman, Seljuk, and testation that rejects this religious nationalism as the ultimately Umayyad traditions..237 Reflecting this resurgence of Ottoman forces. Its political demands

116 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism attack institutions and practices that affiliate the state minority groups confronted by national or majori- with religion. As Figure 6 shows, the symbols sur- tarian identities. As I described, the minority group rounding political demands thus reflect notions of may assimilate into that identity by either renouncing belonging in the Turkish nation through the Turkish those attributes that distinguish it from the major- flag and rejection of the Sunni identity increasingly ity or identifying attributes of the minority identity adopted by the state through symbols of a distinct Al- with the majority. A minority group that does not or evi religious identity understood to be an ethnically cannot pursue assimilation may exit the nation-state, Turkish identity. Although we may conclude that the abandoning the national or majoritarian community Alevi revival movement is a movement of resistance through either physical migration, secession, or a so- that seeks accommodation like a minority group, ciocultural exit in which the minority group isolates unlike a minority group, the identity it constructs in itself from the majoritarian community. Lastly, the response to the national or majoritarian identity is minority group may pursue resistance, forming a col- not one of separation, but rather one of belonging in lective identity and challenging the state for accom- a redefined nation. modation. Although the Alevi population pursued exit for much of its history since the massacres of VI. CONCLUSION the sixteenth century, with the formation of a social The Alevi revival movement thus offers a case movement active in public and political life, it can no study of the relationship a minority group may forge longer do so. But does this social movement pursue with the nation-state in which it resides. In many assimilation or resistance? ways, the Alevi revival movement is a resisting mi- The effort to address this question took me nority group. With most estimates considering the through the historical development of the Alevi Alevi population to compose between fifteen and population in Turkey as well as the evolving Turkish twenty-five percent of the Turkish population, the nationalism that shapes the relationship between the Alevis are by no means an insignificant component state and this religious community. This first analysis of the Turkish population.240 Similarly, a long history of the history surrounding the Alevi population pro- of exclusion by Anatolian states that identify with duced numerous potential symbols of identity that Sunni Islam—the Republic included—and a popula- told both a history of brutal repression by the former tion hostile to Alevism indicates that the majoritarian Ottoman Empire and modern Republic as well as a community of the country considers the Alevi popu- history of cultural and philosophical development lation to be a rejected minority group. Indeed, even built on a foundation of syncretism and mysticism as the Turkish state claims that the Alevi population that makes itself known through a rich body of po- is a component of the majority, it only permits Alevis etry and traditions. This second analysis developed a to enter the majoritarian community if they renounce model of Turkish nationalism as it acts on the Turk- aspects of their religious identity that separate them ish population and is received by that population. from official interpretations of Sunni Islam. The Alevi This nationalism is one grounded in first an ancestral, revival movement itself behaves like a resisting mi- sometimes fantastical, Turkish nation stretching far nority group, constructing an identity around those back into time and united by the shared language, attributes that distinguish Alevi identity from the ma- descent, and civic values attached to that primordial jority. Yet with assimilationist imagery and rhetoric identity. As the Turkish state democratized, however, also featuring in Alevi conceptualizations of identity, it came to respond to the character of its predomi- it is not so clear how the Alevi revival movement nantly conservative Sunni population. By building an understands Alevism relative to the majority, to the identity defined by Sunni Islam, the state has con- Turkish nation. This work thus asks: does the Alevi demned assimilative practices associated with its eth- revival movement assimilate or resist? nic nationalism. With this shift, the Alevi population To address this question, I first examined the saw itself change from a perceived member of the role of symbols in the formation of identity within ethnic nation as the descendants of the Turkic tribes states building nations and minority groups building to a part of the constitutive outside of that nation as social movements. This analysis resulted in a model a heterodox sect. Although such religious practices that describes three potential courses of response to have always been present in Turkish nationalism, as

117 columbia university journal of politics & society explained in the second and third chapters, under revival movement has chosen its rhetoric of belong- the early Republic, religion defined the boundaries of ing in a nation no longer represented by the state, it membership in the nation whereas ethnic attributes is this symbolic discourse of contestation that defines defined identity. In other words, before 1950 and the the process of identity formation in the Alevi revival later adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the movement today. 1980s, to be a member of the Turkish meant to be a As the Alevi population has become increasing- Muslim, but to be Turkish itself meant to be part of ly prominent in Turkish politics, with both political an ethnic group reaching to the Turkic peoples of actors inside Turkey, such as the Kemalist CHP and Central Asia. outside Turkey, such as the European Union, ac- With this transformation of conceptualizations knowledging Alevi demands and calling on the Turk- of Turkish nationalism came the rise of the Alevi ish state to respond, this analysis of the Alevi identity revival movement to protest these perceived changes. formation is vital to understanding the dynamics of Indeed, one scholar of the movement comments, the Alevi revival movement. This analysis allows us to “What pushed [the Alevi population] into this situa- better recognize the perspective of this social move- tion is a fear that Sunni Islam may come to power.”241 ment as it challenges the state so that we may more But does the Alevi revival movement respond to this thoroughly understand the nature of their demands changing nationalist discourse? Examined with the and how the Turkish state may pragmatically respond model of minority group response, the symbols and to them. Beyond Turkish politics, however, this pro- narratives the Alevi revival movement draws from cess of Alevi identity formation offers a unique case its history, religious beliefs, and cultural traditions to study of simultaneous assimilation and resistance construct an Alevi identity seem to suggest that the that could assist us with interpreting the politics sur- movement pursues both assimilation and resistance. rounding “ambivalent citizens”—those citizens Açikel Upon closer analysis, however, it becomes appar- and Ate defined as simultaneously existing inside ent that the Alevi revival movement utilizes these and outside the national identity constructed by the processes of identity formation not to situate itself state—elsewhere.ş 242 Moreover, it demonstrates the outside national identity and demand accommoda- malleability of not only symbols and identities within tion, but rather to situate itself within the Turkish a given state, but also the malleability of the nation nation and condemn the Turkish state as having supposedly uniting that state. As such, this work may succumbed to the historical forces that once op- hopefully provide a foundation for future research pressed this Turkish people with the reentry of Islam into the identity formation process and politics of the into Turkish public and political life. As a result, the increasingly important Alevi revival movement as Alevi revival movement identifies its identity with the well as an understanding of the contestation of sym- ethnic identity of early Turkish nationalism while at bols and identities surrounding minority groups and the same time harshly condemning and resisting the other sociocultural communities in similarly trouble- Sunni religious identity that the state has constructed some situations. since the 1980 military coup. Emphasizing the re- Works Cited pressive aspects of laiklik rather than its assimilation- ist aspects and describing the Turkish nation as an . “Police clash with protesters in stanbul on anniversary of Sivas mas- sacre,” Cihan News Agency, July 3, 2014, http://www.en.cihan.com.tr/. ethnic people once oppressed by Sunni empires, the 1. Joost Jongerden, “Violation of Humanİ Rights and the Alevis in Tur- Alevi revival movement denies the position of Sunni key,” in Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, ed., Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: 2 A Comprehensive Overview (Koninklijke Brill: Leiden, 2003), pp. 85– Islam within Turkish identity. Perhaps the Alevi 87. revival movement pursues this rhetoric as a reaction . Imam Ali is the son-in-law of the Muhammad and fourth Caliph, a highly revered figure in Shi’i Islam, while Hac Bekta Veli is an Ana- to the intense assimilation of Turkish nationalism, 3 tolian mystic who lived during the thirteenth century; neither figure which led the state to privilege discourses of unity is significant in Sunni Islam. The deep reverenceı forş Mustafa Kemal and belonging, or perhaps it is out of a fear that demonstrated above alongside these two figures is common within Alevi communities (Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis: identification as a minority group could lead to the A Holy Alliance?” in Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, ed., Turkey’s same violent social, political, and economic exclu- Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview (Koninklijke Brill: Leiden, 2003), p. 53. sion that has almost wiped out non-Islamic minority . Because the census conducted by the Turkish state does not account groups in Turkey. Regardless of the reasons the Alevi for religion, there are no official statistics regarding the Alevi popula- 4 tion. Most estimates place the Alevi population between fifteen and 118 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism

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Bernardİş Lewis, The Emergenceı of Modern Turkey, p. 267; Ayl n Özman, irin, “Analyzing the Determinantsı ı of Group Identity among Alevis in “Law, Ideology and Modernization in Turkey: Kemalist Legal Reforms Turkey,” p. 75. ğ 82 in Perspective,” Social & Legal Studies 19:1 (2010), pp. 70–73.ı . ŞDavid Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey., pp. 135–153; ehriban ahin, . kru Hanio lu, Atatürk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, “The Rise of Alevism as a Public Religion,” pp. 470–471. 2011), pp. 104–105. 108. Reha Çamuro lu, “Alevi Revivalism in Turkey,” p. 79;Ş Ay e BetŞül Çe- 83. ŞüIoannis N. Grigoriadis,ğ “Islam and Democratization in Turkey: Secu- lik, “Alevis, Kurds and Hemşehris,” pp. 145; Tahire Erman and Emrah larism and Trust in a Divided Society,” Democratization 16:6 (2009), p. 109 Göker, “Alevi ğPolitics in Contemporary Turkey,” pp. 100–101.ş 84 1194. . ehriban ahin, “The Rise of Alevism as a Public Religion,” p. 472. . Carter Vaughn Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, p. . Faruk Bilici, “The Function of Alevi Bektashi Theology in Modern 252.; lter Turan, “Atatürk’s Reforms as a Nation and State Building 110 Turkey,”Ş pp.Ş 51–57; B. A. Soner and . Tokta , “Alevis and Alevism in 85 Process,” Southeastern Europe 11:1 (1984), pp. 180–181. 111 the Changing Context,” pp. 423–425. . Frankİ Tachau, “Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform,” The . B. A. Soner and . Tokta , “Alevis andŞ Alevismş in the Changing Con- Review of Politics 26:2 (1964): pp. 194–198; Millî Eğ. Söylev, i. 32–333, text,” p. 425. 86 quoted in Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 272. 112. ehriban ahin, Ş“The Riseş of Alevism as a Public Religion,” pp. 472– . Ira Friedlander, The Whirling Dervishes: Being an account of the Sufi -or 474. der known as the Mevlevis and its founder the poet and mystic Mevlana 113. ŞKarin Vorhoff,Ş “Past in the Future,” p. 97. 87 Jalalu’ddin Rumi (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1975), p. 117. . Sefa im ek, “New Social Movements in Turkey Since 1980,” p. 130. . Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis,” p. 64. 114. Fuat Bozkurt, “State–Community Relations in the Restructuring of . Hülya Küçük, The Role of the Bektāshīs in Turkey’s National Struggle, 115 Alevism,”Ş ş in Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Özdalga, and Catharina Raudvere, 88 pp. 234–235. 116 eds., Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives (Istan- 89. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis,” pp. 57–58. bul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1998), pp. 85–92; Reha . David Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey: The Emergence of a Secular Çamuro lu, “Alevi Revivalism in Turkey,” p. 80; Ay e Betül Çelik, “Al- 90 Islamic Tradition (RoutledgeCurzon: London, 2003), p. 31. evis, Kurds and Hemşehris,” pp. 146–149; Markus Dressler, “Religio– 91 ğ ş 120 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism

Secular Metamorphoses: The Re–Making of Turkish Alevism,”Jour - Package,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 22, nal of the American Academy of Religion 76:2 (2008), p. 285; ”Tahire 2013, http://www.gmfus.org/. Erman and Emrah Göker, “Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey,” . For more examples of such caveats and only partially–liberalizing pp. 100–102; Çi dem V. irin, “Analyzing the Determinants of Group policies, please see: Welat Zeydanl o lu, “Turkey’s Kurdish Language Identity among Alevis in Turkey,” pp. 85–87. 145 Policy,” pp. 113–120. . Tahire Erman andğ EmrahŞ Göker, “Alevi Politics in Contemporary Tur- . Markus Dressler, Writing Religion, p.ı ğ219. key,” p. 115. . Candas Pinar, “Religion–State Relations in Turkey since the AKP,” p. 117. Ba ak nce, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey, p. 152; 146 509. . Martin van Bruinessen, “Kurds, Turks and the Alevi Revival in Tur- 147. David Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey, p. 62. 118 ke y,”ş Middleİ East Report, no. 200 (1996): p. 9. . Biray Kolluo lu, “Excesses of nationalism: Greco–Turkish population 119. Joost Jongerden, “Violation of Human Rights and the Alevis in Tur- 148 exchange,” Nations and Nationalism 19:3 (2013), p. 539. key,” pp. 85–86. 149. Ba ak nce, Citizenshipğ and Identity in Turkey, pp. 49–53. 120. Martin van Bruinessen, “Kurds, Turks and the Alevi Revival in Tur- . Examples include the Thrace Incident, a series of attacks and boycotts key,” p. 10. 150 targetingş İ the Jewish community of Thrace in 1934, and the Wealth Tax 121. Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish National- 151 during the Second World War, which sought to crush religious mi- ism and the Turkish Republic (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), pp. norities with tax rates upwards of ten times their assets ( ener Aktürk, 122 43–49. “Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy,” p. 898–902; . Ibid., pp. 50–52; David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, Carter Vaughn Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, andŞ Modernity, p. 1876–1908 (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 3. 266; Ba ak nce, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey, pp. 58-59). 123. Carter Vaughn Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, pp. . Ye im Bayar, “In pursuit of homogeneity: the Lausanne Conference, 142–150. minoritiesş andİ the Turkish Nation,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal 124. Sina Ak in, Turkey: from Empire to Revolutionary Republic, trans. 152 of şNationalism and Ethnicity, 42:1 (2014), pp. 114–115. Dexter H. Mursalo lu (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), pp. 84-87; . Ba ak nce, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey, pp. 158–164. 125 Ay e Kadş o lu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Con- . Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, “A ÇIKLAMA – Alevilik,” December 19, struction of Officialğ Identity,” p. 184; David Kushner, The Rise of Turk- 153 2008,ş http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/.İ ishş Nationalismı ğ , pp. 7–14. 154. M. Çiçek, T.B.M.M., January, 2007, quoted in Candas Pinar, “Religion– . Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation, trans. Ni- State Relations in Turkey,” 516. yazi Berkes (London: Geo. Allen and Unwin, 1959), quoted in Hugh 155. Fethi Açikel and Kazim Ate , “Ambivalent Citizens,” p. 726. 126 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, p. 77. . Karin Vorhoff, “Academic and Journalistic Publications on the Al- . Harold C. Armstrong, Grey Wolf: Mustafa Kemal—An Intimate Study 156 evi and Bektashi of Turkey,”ş in Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Özdalga, and of a Dictator (London: Arthur Barker, 1932), pp. 218–219, quoted in 157 Catharina Raudvere, eds., Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social 127 Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, p. 93. Perspectives (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1998), p. . Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Programı (Ankara: T.B.M.M. Matbaas , 33. 1931), pp. 123–124, quoted in Ba ak nce, Citizenship and Identity in . Janina Karolewski, “What is Heterodox About Alevism?” p. 455. 128 Turkey, p. 42. ı . Fethi Açikel and Kazim Ate , “Ambivalent Citizens,” pp. 726–727. . krü Hanio lu, Atatürk, pp. 164–165;ş İ Ba ak nce, Citizenship and 158. Ba ak nce, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey, p. 150; Gönül Koca, Identity in Turkey, p. 69; Ergün Yildirim, Hüsamettin Inaç, and Ah- 159 “Only Christian, Jewish childrenş exempt from Turkey’s religious edu- 129 metŞü Uysal, “Symbolicğ construction of the Turkishş İ national identity as 160 cation,”ş İ Hürriyet Daily News, February 10, 2015, http://www.hurriyet- a factor of international management,” Problems and Perspectives in dailynews.com/; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasas , m. 174. Management 7:1 (2009), pp. 248–251. . Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasas , m. 66. . Sina Ak in, Turkey: from Empire to Revolutionary Republic, pp. 211– . Turkish Citizenship Law, Law 5901 (2009): articleı 11. 212; Ergün Yildirim, Hüsamettin Inaç, and Ahmet Uysal, “Symbolic 161. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, m. 10. 130 constructionş of the Turkish national identity,” p. 248. 162. Recep Peker, CHP Programının İzahı (Ankara: Ulus Matbaas , 1931), . Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, p. 111. 163 p. 10, quoted in Ba ak nce, Citizenshipı and Identity in Turkey, p. 42. . Ba ak nce, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey, p. 69. 164. Although the crescent is a common Islamic symbol, the foundingı 131. “Cumhurba kanl Forsu,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başkanlığı, http:// myth of the Turkishş nation–stateİ describes it in nonreligious terms as 132 www.tccb.gov.tr/.ş İ 165 seen above. (Talip Kucukcan, “Sacralization of the State and Secular 133. Frank Tachau,ş “Languageığı and Politics: Turkish Language Reform,” pp. Nationalism: Foundations of Civil Religion in Turkey,” George Wash- 196–198. ington International Law Review 41:4 (2010), p. 971; David Straw, Hu- 134. Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, pp. 104–109; Deniz man Rights Violation in Turkey: Rethinking Sociological Perspectives Ünsal, “Museum Establishments and Cultural Policy in Turkey,” in (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 21). 135 Serhan Ada and H. Ayça nce, eds., Introduction to Cultural Policy in . “İstiklal Mar ,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başkanlığı, http://www.tccb.gov. Turkey ( stanbul: stanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009), pp. 163–165. tr/. . Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Greyİ Wolf and Crescent, pp. 115–116; Mesut 166. Talip Kucukcan,şı “Sacralization of the State and Secular Nationalism,” Ye en, “‘Prospectiveİ İ Turks’ or ‘Pseudo–Citizens:’ Kurds in Turkey,” p. 973. 136 Middle East Journal 63:4 (2009), pp. 603–604. 167. Ba ak nce, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey, p. 177. . Senemğ Aslan, “Everyday Forms of State Power and the Kurds in the . “Alevis protest compulsory religion classes,” Hürriyet Daily News, Sep- Early Turkish Republic,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 168 temberş İ 23, 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/. 137 43:1 (2011), pp. 77–82; Mesut Ye en, “‘Prospective Turks’ or ‘Pseudo– 169. Özlem Göner, “The Transformation of the Alevi Collective Identity,” Citizens:’ Kurds in Turkey,” pp. 603–605. pp. 120–121; Karin Vorhoff, “Past in the Future,” pp. 94–95. . Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasas ,ğ m. 42. 170. Hamburg Alevi Derne i, “Alevilik Bildirgesi,” Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, . Welat Zeydanl o lu, “Turkey’s Kurdish Language Policy,” p. 112. May 15, 1990, p. 15. 138. Fethi Açikel and Kazim Ate , “Ambivalentı Citizens,” pp. 722–723. 171. Fazilet Ahu Özmen, “Theğ Alevi Identity and Civil Rights in the Twen- 139. ener Aktürk, ı“Persistenceğ of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Leg- ty–First Century,” in Rasim Ösgür Dönmez and Pinar Enneli, eds., 140 acy,” p. 903; Carter Vaughnş Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and 172 Societal Peace and Ideal Citizenship for Turkey (Plymouth: Lexington 141 ModernityŞ , p. 381. Books, 2011), p. 86. . Fethi Açikel and Kazim Ate , “Ambivalent Citizens,” p. 723. . Ali Haydar Cilasun, Alevilik Bir Sır Değildir, Ceylan Ofset, (no place . E. F. Keyman and Tuba Kanc , “A tale of ambiguity: citizenship, nation- of publication), 1995, quoted in Faruk Bilici, “The Function of Alevi 142 alism and democracy in Turkey,”ş Nations and Nationalism 17:2 (2011), 173 Bektashi Theology in Modern Turkey,” p. 53. 143 pp. 325–326. ı . ehriban ahin, “The Rise of Alevism as a Public Religion,” p. 472. . lter Turan, “Democratization from Above: Erdo an’s Democracy . David Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey, p. 169. 174 Ş Ş 144 İ ğ 175 121 columbia university journal of politics & society

. Markus Dressler, “Religio–Secular Metamorphoses,” pp. 295–297; and Cultural Memory: “Multiculturalism” as a Literary Theme after Karin Vorhoff, “Past in the Future,” p. 102. 1980 (Göttingen: Hubert & Co., 2009), p. 24. 176. “Alevis voice unease over lack of promised rights,” Hürriyet Daily . Fethi Açikel and Kazim Ate , “Ambivalent Citizens,” p. 722. News, December 16, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/; Yonca . Talha Köse, “Ideological or religious?” pp. 583–587. 177 Poyraz Do an, “Alevi leader Kenano lu: Discrimination against Alevis 201. “Alevi–Bekta ili in kökenleri,ş Anadolu’nun antik ça , eski yunan increased in 2013,” Today’s Zaman, December 22, 2013, http://www. 202 do a filozoflar , Hitit ve Mezopotamya inançlar , eski Türk inanc todayszaman.com/;ğ B. A. Soner and ğ . Tokta , “Alevis and Alevism in 203 amanizm, eskiş ğ ran inanc Mazdek, Mani, Zerd ğtlük, Budizm, the Changing Context,” pp. 424–425. ayrğca Yahudi, ıH ristyan be slam’i senkretik–gnostik...”ı (“Alevilik–ı . Markus Dressler, “Religio–Secular Metamorphoses,”Ş ş pp. 291–292 BektaŞ ilik nedir?”İ Hacı Bektaı ş Veli Kültür Derneği, Februaryüş 8, 2012, . For two examples, refer to the following news articles: “Sivas massa- http://www.hacibektasdernegi.com/).ı ı İ 178 cre and anniversary sees mourning and protest ban,” Today’s Zaman, . Elise şMassicard, “Alevism as a Productive Misunderstanding: The 179 July 3, 2011, http://www.todayszaman.com/; “Turkey commemorates Hac bekta Festival,” in Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, eds., Tur- 15th anniversary of Sivas massacre,” Hürriyet Daily News, July 3, 2008, 204 key’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview (Koninklijke Brill: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/. Leiden,ı 2003),ş p. 132. . Randall Collins, “Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional At- . Massicard lists socialist and Kemalist imaginings of Hac Bekta Veli tention,” p. 33. as only two examples (Ibid., p. 133). 180. “Thousands march in Sivas for anniversary massacre,” Hürriyet Daily 205. Karin Vorhoff, “Past in the Future.” ı ş News, July 2, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/; “Crowds . lhan Ataseven, The Alevi–Betktaşi Legacy, pp. 142–143. 181 gather across Turkey to commemorate 20th anniversary of Sivas mas- 206. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis,” p. 57. sacre,” Hürriyet Daily News. 207. İ“Yenilmezdik birlik çıkmış vurmuş başına tacı,/Bölünmezdil ATA ile . “Thousands march in Sivas for anniversary massacre,” Hürriyet Daily 208 bir idik/Tutsak deüilölsek dahi hür idik/Erler merydan dedi merdan News. 209 olmuştu/…/Ata’mız dede ki ‘Kölelik bitsin’/’Düşman nasıl geldi, öyl- 182. Elvan is an Alevi teenager who was struck unconscious by a gas can- ece gitsin’/’Sönen ocaklarda özgürlük tütsün’/Yandı ocak sözü erkân ister fired by security forces during a July 2013 protest while buying olmuştu” (Atalay, quoted in Markus Dressler, “Turkish Alevi Poetry in 183 bread. Later, in March 2014, he passed away, sparking mass protests by the Twentieth Century,” pp. 121–122, 143–144). Alevis and leftists (Sebnem Arsu, “Across Turkey, New Unrest as Teen- . lhan Ataseven, The Alevi–Betktaşi Legacy,” p. 9. age Boy Is Buried,” The New York Times, March 12, 2014, http://www. . For examples of Alevi institutions emphasizing the participation in nytimes.com/). 210 theİ National Struggle, see: “Aleviler’in Atatürk Sevgisi,” Cem Vakfı, . See Figure 3. 211 http://www.cemvakfi.org.tr; “Kurtulu Sava nda Alevilerin Rolü,” . The Alevi revival movement further builds on notions of an ancestral Cem Vakfı Beşiktaş, 2008, http://www.cemvakfibesiktas.org/v1/; “Tari- 184 community by emphasizing the ties of dedes to the Prophet Muham- hçemiz,” Şahkulu Sultan Dergah , http://www.sahkulu.com/ş şı 185 mad through his son–in–law Imam Ali, his second grandson Hüseyin, . “Alevis divided on Atatürk portraits in cemevis,” Today’s Zaman, De- the Twelve Imams revered in Shi’i Islam, or Hac Bekta Veli, although cember 6, 2011, http://www.todayszaman.com.ı such claims have come under attack by elements within the movement 212. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis,” 57–58. (Talha Köse, “Ideological or religious? Contendingı visionsş on the fu- . “Şåu mazlûm milleti kurtardı her kayd–i esâretten/Dilberâne gazâlar ture of Alevi identity,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 213 eyleyen merd–i Hudâ’dır bu/O sever âlem–i İslâma sertâc–ı müker- 19:5 (2012): pp. 583, 591; Karin Vorhoff, “Past in the Future,” p. 100). 214 remdir/Ana kasdeyleyen düşmanlara hükm–ü kazâdır bu/Bu gün . Karin Vorhoff, “Past in the Future,” p. 104. hurşîd–i istiklâl Âşım mülk–ü İslâma/Çıkup arz–ı cemâl etti ne hoş bır . Tahire Erman and Emrah Göker, “Alevi Politics in Contemporary Tur- dil–rübâdır bu/...Kemâl Pâşâ–yı pâk tıynete ancak duâdır bu” (As m 186 key,” pp. 103–104. Kemter Dervi ( zmir: 1922), quoted in Markus Dressler, “Turkish Al- 187. “Dünya’yı ayağa kaldırdı olay/Sivas’da yokmuydu askeri alay/Yakıldı evi Poetry in the Twentieth Century,” pp. 123–124, 145). ı insanlar çekildi halay/Niçin kast edersin ey kanlı yezid[?]” (Fevzi Aslan, . Markus Dressler,ş İ “Turkish Alevi Poetry in the Twentieth Century,” pp. 188 Pir 1:2 (1995), p. 20, quoted in Markus Dressler, “Turkish Alevi Poetry 130, 134, 147–148; Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis,” in the Twentieth Century,” pp. 127, 146). 215 p. 62. David Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey, p. 21. . Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis,” p. 53. . Fethi Açikel and Kazim Ate , “Ambivalent Citizens,” p. 727; Candas . Karin Vorhoff, “Past in the Future,” p. 104. Pinar, “Religion–State Relations in Turkey since the AKP,” p. 512. 189. Özlem Göner, “The Transformation of the Alevi Collective Identity,” p. 216. Aykan Erdemir, “Tradition andş Modernity,” p. 939. 190 125. . Karin Vorhoff, “Past in the Future,” p. 101. 191. lhan Ataseven, The Alevi–Betktaşi Legacy, p. 142; Karin Vorhoff, “Past 217. Özlem Göner, “The Transformation of the Alevi Collective Identity,” p. in the Future,” p. 100. 218 123. 192. İKrisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis,” p. 53. 219. Karin Vorhoff, “Past in the Future,” p. 102. . Paul Koerbin, “Pir Sultan Abdal: Encounters with Persona in Alevi . Ibid., p. 99; Reha Çamuro lu, “Alevi Revivalism in Turkey,” pp. 82–83. 193 Lyric Song,” Oral Tradition 26:1 (2011), p. 195. 220. Özlem Göner, “The Transformation of the Alevi Collective Identity,” p. 194. Ibid., pp. 199–202. 221 122. ğ . “Çeke çeke ben bu dertten ölürüm/Seversen Ali’yi değme yarama/ 222. Markus Dressler, “Religio–Secular Metamorphoses,” p. 298; Gürcan 195 Ali’nin yoluna serim veririm/Seversen Ali’yi değme yarama/…/Pir Koçan and Ahmet Öncü, “Citizen Alevi in Turkey: Beyond Confir- 196 Sultan’ım Haydar Nesimî’yiz/Tâ ezelden Şah’a kurban serimiz/On İki 223 mation and Denial,” Journal of Historical Sociology 17:4 (2004), pp. İmamlar dâr meydanımız/Biz şehidiz Ali’dir serdârımız” (Quoted in: 475–476. Ibid., p. 2014). . Although the Bekta i order is a specific order and not considered . Esra Özyürek, “Beyond Integration and Recognition: Diasporic Con- entirely equivalent with Alevism, the Alevi revival movement and structions of Alevi Muslim Identity between Germany and Turkey,” 224 Turkish society moreş broadly consider them together as general “het- 197 in Thomas J. Csordas, ed., Transnational Transcendence: Essays on erodox” groups influenced by Anatolian mysticism, evidenced by the Religion and Globalization (Oakland: University of California Press, existence of institutions such as the Alevi–Bekta i Federation. 2009), pp. 134–135. . lhan Ataseven, The Alevi–Betktaşi Legacy, p. 195. . Ibid., p. 135; Özlem Göner, “The Transformation of the Alevi Collec- . Veyis Haydardedeoglu, “Women in Alevi Order,”ş Haydar–ı Sultan tive Identity,” p. 128. 225 Ocaİ ğı, 2007, http://www.alevilik.com.au/. 198. Fazilet Ahu Özmen, “The Alevi Identity and Civil Rights in the Twen- 226. “Kad n Kollar ,” Cem Vakfı, continuously updated, http://www.cem- ty–First Century,” p. 72; Esra Özyürek, “Beyond Integration and Rec- vakfi.org.tr/category/kadin–kollari/. 199 ognition,” pp. 135–136. 227. Karinı Vorhoff,ı “Past in the Future,” p. 104. . zettin Do an, quoted in Béatrice Hendrich, “Remembering Culture(s) . Talha Köse, “Ideological or religious?” p. 585. in Turkey – A Brief Survey,” in Catharina Dufft, ed.,Turkish Literature 228. Tahire Erman and Emrah Göker, “Alevi Politics in Contemporary Tur- 200 İ ğ 229 122 230 the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism

key,” p. 112; Karin Vorhoff, “Past in the Future,” p. 105. . MK, vice president of an Alevi foundation, quoted in Talha Köse, “Ideological or religious?” p. 586. 231. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis,” p. 66; Harald Schül- er, “Secularism and Ethnicity: Alevis and Social Democrats in Search 232 of an Alliance,” in Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert, and Karin Vorhoff, eds.,Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Politi- cal Culture in Contemporary Turkey ( stanbul: Orient–Institut, 2000), pp. 210–211. . Anonymous Alevi academic, quoted inİ Talha Köse, “Ideological or re- ligious?” p. 591. 233. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis,” pp. 66–68. . Yaz c o lu (1994), quoted in Markus Dressler, “Turkish Alevi Poetry 234 in the Twentieth Century,” pp. 128, 146. 235. Talhaı ı Kğöse, “Ideological or religious?” p. 584. . Talha Köse, “Between Nationalism, Modernism and Secularism: The 236 Ambivalent Place of ‘Alevi Identities,’” Middle Eastern Studies 49:4 237 (2013), p. 602. . Veyis Haydardedeoglu, “Women in Alevi Order.” . Ali Balk z, quoted in James W. Warhola and Egemen B. Bezci, “Re- 238 ligion and State in Contemporary Turkey: Recent Developments in 239 Laiklik,” ıJournal of Church and State 52:3 (2010), p. 446. . Tahire Erman and Emrah Göker, “Alevi Politics in Contemporary Tur- key,” p. 99 240. N. Özkan, “Kemalizm Alevilere hale Ediliyor,” Nefes (1995), quoted in Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, “Atatürk and the Alevis: A Holy Alliance?” p. 241 68. İ . Fethi Açikel and Kazim Ate , “Ambivalent Citizens,” p. 729.

242 ş

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