Clans and Democracy: A Mismatch? Author: Meaghan Lynne Krupa Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/515 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2007 Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. © Meaghan Krupa 2007 Abstract Clans are often viewed anachronistically in a world characterized by globalization. Yet, recent research highlights that clans not only determine how societies function, but play a central political role in many parts of the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. My analysis focuses on exploring clan alliances and their affect on the international system through the case of Uzbekistan. Clans and Democracy: A Mismatch? explores the presence of clans in Uzbekistan, deciphers to what extent they remain involved in politics, and determines how clan politics affects Uzbekistan’s future prospects for democratization. I conclude that clans continue to influence the political decision-making of the state and ultimately hinder democracy formation. In closing, I explore predications for the future stability and democracy of Uzbekistan, as well as suggest policy prescriptions for the United States vis-à-vis Uzbekistan and other clan- based states. Table of Contents Table of Contents………………………………………………………………..……i Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………….…….ii Introduction: Insight into the Instability Sown By Clans.............................................1 Chapter 1: A New Outlook on Clan Theory................................................................11 Chapter 2: A Historical Look at Clan in Uzbekistan...................................................29 Chapter 3: Klannovayapolitika and Democracy in Autonomous Uzbekistan.............66 Chapter 4: Clans and Democracy: A Mismatch?.......................................................103 Chapter 5: Uzbekistan’s Future: A Democratic One?................................................151 Appendix A: Partial Chronology................................................................................170 Appendix B: General Timeline of Clan Dominance during the Soviet era................172 Appendix C: Regional Map of Uzbekistan.................................................................173 Appendix D: Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Uzbekistan............................174 Glossary.......................................................................................................................175 Works Consulted..........................................................................................................180 i Acknowledgements I would like to thank Professor Kathleen Bailey, who has inspired me to study this region of the world. Before enrolling in Professor Bailey’s Fundamentals of Politics course freshmen year, I had never even heard of Uzbekistan or the other four Central Asian states. Now, I have not only finished my first large research project, but I am planning on dedicating my future towards educating others of the developing political, economic, and social situation in Uzbekistan. Professor Bailey is such an academic and personal role model of mine, and her guidance has been a great source of inspiration. I would like to thank my parents, my sister Bethany, and my Grammy. My parents raised me in an environment of love, and taught me through their action the values of hard-work and endless dedication. It is through my parents’ compassion for others that has inspired me to want to be a voice for the oppressed and marginalized in our global society. David, thank you for always being so supportive and encouraging. You truly inspire me in so many ways. I would also like to extend a thank you to Mrs. Cindy Perry at Portsmouth High School, and also Professors Paul Christensen, Hiroshi Nakazato, and Donald Hafner for providing inspiration and guidance during my four years at Boston College. ii Introduction Insight into the Instability Sown By Clans In 2005, twenty-three businessmen loyal to Kobiljon Obidov, the impeached governor of Andijan, Uzbekistan, were arrested, jailed, and charged with being members of the radical Islamic group, Akramiya. Supporters of the twenty-three jailed men gathered for several days outside the courtroom, quietly protesting the trial. On May 12th, armed individuals attempted and failed to free the twenty-three prisoners, and on May 13th, thousands of supporters came to Andijan to peacefully demonstrate for their release. Things quickly escalated into violence when government forces began firing on the large crowd. Death toll estimates range from one-hundred and seventy to one thousand deaths. The day following the massacre, President Islam Karimov warned the population that “a bullet will not choose who it shoots,” illustrating his support for the massacre and reiterating his authority over the state.1 While the arrest of the twenty-three entrepreneurs, fear of Islamic radicalism, and desolate economic and social conditions have all been attributed as reasons for the demonstration and consequent massacre, the role that clans played in the massacre of Andijan must be considered. In May 2004, Kobiljon Obidov, the provincial governor, or hokim, of Andijan, was impeached and replaced by Saydullo Begaliyev. While the decision to remove Obidov was ultimately made by the regional legislature, Karimov is thought to have “engineered” the reshuffle.2 This was a risky move, due to the fact that 1 Adolat Najimova. “Uzbekistan: President Karimov’s Limited Options” EurasiaNet May 21, 2005 <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp052105.shtml> (October 25, 2006.) 2 Ibid. 1 Obidov was heavily supported by his Ferghana clan, and Begaliyev represented another clan faction.3 Once hokim, Begaliyev, a former Minister of Agriculture and Water, immediately purged Obidov’s allies and cracked down on his supporters. These political developments, largely motivated by clan politics and regional alliances, were at the root of the massacre.4 Begaliyev’s crackdown led to the arrests of twenty-three businessmen who resisted, and the situation that followed quickly escalated into chaos. The massacre at Andijan highlights the instability and disorder that clan politics can reap within a society and illustrates the level of undemocratic development in Uzbekistan. While Uzbek authorities continue to claim that Islamic radicalism was the root of the massacre at Andijan, a recent reshuffle of political leaders supports the theory that events were in fact brought about by the system of clan politics in Uzbekistan.5 On October 13th, 2006, Begaliyev was removed as governor of Andijon and Obidov was moved from house arrest into a Tashkent prison. Karimov then appointed his trusted Security Lieutenant Akhmad Usmanov as the new hokim of Andijan. Two-years after the massacre at Andijan and Uzbekistan’s horrific display of state power, Karimov continues to engineer regional leadership in a way that subdues opposition and reinforces his own presidential power. Ultimately, this political maneuvering contributes to the instability and unpredictability of the region. Given Uzbekistan’s rising importance on the international stage, clan politics need to be studied in order to understand how they 3 Joanna Lillis. “Political Purge in Uzbekistan Indicates President is ‘Afraid of His Own Nation.” EurasiaNet October 19, 2006 <www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav101906.shtml> (October 24, 2006.) 4 Najimova. 5 Lillis. 2 function, how they influence the political decisions of the state, and how they color the future of the region. Clan Infiltration Central Asia is a small and newly independent region dominated by clan politics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, clans were able to reemerge as powerful actors within all five Central Asian states. In Uzbekistan, clan politics reasserted itself as a strong political force within the formal state structure. My thesis explores the presence of clans in Uzbekistan, decipher to what extent they remain involved in politics, and determine how clan politics affects Uzbekistan’s future prospects for democratization. I address the following question: How does the long-established phenomenon of clans affect attempts at democratic development across the globe? On one hand, clans can be deemed small civil societies that may promote plurality and democracy. On the other hand, clans are traditional, insular, and opaque social groups that actually impede the establishment of democracy. I explore three possible scenarios surrounding clans and their influence on democracy in Uzbekistan: first, that they encourage democracy; secondly, that they impede democratic development; and lastly, that they neither support nor prevent the process of democratization. Why Clans? This project is not only interesting for me, but it is a worthwhile subject in the realm of international relations. The pervasiveness of clan politics in Central Asia and other potentially volatile regions of the world present a diplomatic challenge for the United States. In many developing and transitional Middle Eastern, African, and Central 3 Asian societies, clans thrive as powerful social groups and influential political actors, increasingly affecting the political framework of interstate relations. The United States has vital economic and security interests in these areas of the world, and must learn to identify clans as important political actors. A deeper understanding of the dynamics and political