Space Policies, Issues and Trends in 2015–2016 Report 61 November 2016 Cenan Al-Ekabi Short title: ESPI Report 61 ISSN: 2218-0931 (print), 2076-6688 (online) Published in November 2016 Editor and publisher: European Space Policy Institute, ESPI Schwarzenbergplatz 6 • 1030 Vienna • Austria http://www.espi.or.at Tel. +43 1 7181118-0; Fax -99 Rights reserved – No part of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or for any purpose with- out permission from ESPI. Citations and extracts to be published by other means are subject to mentioning “Source: ESPI Report 61; November 2016. All rights reserved” and sample transmission to ESPI before publish- ing. ESPI is not responsible for any losses, injury or damage caused to any person or property (including under contract, by negligence, product liability or otherwise) whether they may be direct or indirect, special, inciden- tal or consequential, resulting from the information contained in this publication. Design: Panthera.cc ESPI Report 61 2 November 2016 Space Policies, Issues and Trends in 2015–2016 Table of Contents Introduction 5 1. Global Political and Economic Trends 6 1.1 Global Economic Outlook 6 1.2 Political Developments 6 1.2.1 Geopolitics 6 1.2.2 Environment 8 1.2.3 Energy 9 1.2.4 Resources 10 1.2.5 Knowledge 10 1.2.6 Mobility 11 2. Global Space Economy 13 2.1 Global Space Budgets and Revenue 13 2.2 Overview of Institutional Space Budgets 13 2.3 Overview of Commercial Space Markets 17 2.3.1 Satellite Services 17 2.3.2 Satellite Manufacturing 18 2.3.3 Launch Sector 19 2.3.4 Ground Equipment 20 2.3.5 Insurance Sector 22 2.4 Sectoral Overview 22 2.4.1 Launch Sector 22 2.4.2 Manufacturing Sector 27 2.5 International Sectoral Comparison 30 2.5.1 Launch Sector 30 2.6 State of the European Industry 41 3. Space Industry Evolutions 44 3.1 Europe 44 3.2 United States 48 3.3 Russia 49 3.4 Japan 50 3.5 China 50 3.6 India 51 3.7 Rest of the World 51 4. European Institutional Market 54 4.1 Civilian Space Expenditure 54 4.2 European Space Agency (ESA) 55 4.3 EUMETSAT 58 4.4 National Agencies 60 4.4.1 France 60 4.4.2 Germany 61 4.4.3 Italy 62 4.5 European Union (EU) 62 ESPI Report 61 3 November 2016 5. The Defence Perspective 64 5.1 Trends in Military Expenditure 64 5.2 Europe 64 5.3 The United States 65 5.4 Russia 66 5.5 Japan 66 5.6 China 67 5.7 India 68 6. Space Policies and Strategies around the World 69 6.1 European Union 69 6.2 European Space Agency 70 6.3 EUMETSAT 71 6.4 National Governments 72 6.4.1 France 72 6.4.2 Germany 73 6.4.3 Italy 73 6.4.4 United Kingdom 74 6.5 United States of America 75 6.5.1 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 78 6.5.2 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 78 6.6 Canada 79 6.7 Russia 80 6.8 Japan 80 6.9 China 81 6.10 India 83 6.11 Brazil 84 List of Acronyms 85 Acknowledgements 91 About the Author 91 ESPI Report 61 4 November 2016 Space Policies, Issues and Trends in 2015–2016 Introduction When reading this issue of Space Policy, Is- very restrictive in providing institutional data, sues and Trends it should be kept in mind for instance on defence spending. that there are remarkable variations and lack Notwithstanding the many data uncertainties, of consistency in the publicly available figures this issue of Space Policy, Issues and Trends on space activity. This is attributable to dif- identifies important trends and develop- fering methodologies used by data providers, ments. As Winston Churchill noted, statistics currency conversion issues, and time period must be taken with a grain of salt, yet purely variances. The lack of consistency starts at by looking at relativities much can be the very top, where there can be differences learned. of tens of billions of Euros between estimates of the overall size of the global space econ- This is not a reason to be complacent about omy; and it continues down to company-to- the precision of figures. Space has great so- company comparisons, where different ac- cietal importance and the space community counting practices produce different sums. owes it to political decision makers to be able But it is, of course, commonplace that differ- to provide standardised, accurate figures. In ences in purchasing power in different this aspect, the United States is clearly ahead economies, and differences in wage and in- of the game, and Europe must perhaps con- frastructure cost make one-to-one compari- sider whether institutions such as Eurostat sons very difficult. Also, some countries are should not become more involved in data collection and processing for the space field ESPI Report 61 5 November 2016 1. Global Political and Economic Trends elevated inflation, reaching -3.8% and -2.8% in 2015 respectively.3 1.1 Global Economic Outlook Generally less restrictive fiscal and still ac- commodative monetary stances worldwide The United Nations Annual Report “World are likely to support WGP growth by 2.9% in Economic Situation and Prospects” reported a 2016 and 3.2% in 2017. That increased slight stumble in global growth by the end of growth is also predicated on the easing of 2015, as the persistent effects of the financial downward pressures on commodity prices crisis in 2007 continued to discourage in- and on the anticipated pace of normalization vestment and global growth. In mid-2015, of the United States monetary policy stance the growth of World Gross Product (WGP) that should help to reduce policy uncertain- was estimated to be 2.8%, yet weak aggre- ties. Yet, amid the moderate pace of global gate demand, falling commodity prices and growth and in an environment of weak in- increasing financial market volatility in major vestment, employment figures continue to economies resulted in a year-end revision of fall short of closing the gap in the employ- WGP growth to 2.4%.1 ment rate that had opened up during the Developed economies contributed more to global financial crisis. In developed econo- WGP growth, reaching a 1.9% increase in mies, particularly in the euro area, the pat- global output in 2015; they will likely con- tern of work has been shifting towards more tinue to pick up momentum in 2016, surpass- part-time employment, which raises concerns ing 2%, which has not been seen since 2010. about job security, working poverty, and low In the eurozone, new EU Members showed long-term earnings. Moreover, given the the most growth at 3.2%, while Western sharp economic slowdown and declining la- European economies continued to be the bour force participation in several economies main drivers of growth in the region with in the developing world, masked by large 1.8% for 2015; and the European Union as a informal sectors in these regions, employ- whole reached 1.9% for 2015. U.S. growth in ment opportunities in the developing world global output reached 2.4% in 2015, in line for 2015 are likely to have deteriorated. The with the 2.4% in 2014, and is expected to persistence of these factors may undermine contribute more in 2016. Japan’s global out- the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustain- put also increased by 0.5% in 2015, a nota- able Development, which focuses on promot- ble change from the 0.1% decrease in 2014; ing “inclusive and sustainable economic Japan’s GDP growth should reach 1.3% in growth, employment and decent work for 2016.2 all”.4 Growth slowed in developing and transition economies to 3.8% and -2.8% respectively in 2015, due to the earlier-mentioned head- 1.2 Political Developments winds (i.e. sharply lower commodity prices, large capital outflows, and increased financial market volatility). While China may have 1.2.1 Geopolitics contributed to a reduction of growth in East A number of significant world events in 2015 and South Asia, the region will likely remain remained unresolved by year’s end. the fasted growing as many of the region’s economies will benefit from importing low- While the United States sought to unseat cost oil, metals, and food commodities. In Islamic State (ISIS) terrorists from occupied contrast, Russia and Brazil were mired in territory in Syria throughout 2015, Russia’s severe economic downturns, accompanied by surprise airstrike intervention starting in Sep- tember 2015 worked to muddle the opera- 1 “World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016.” 30 Nov. 3 Ibid. 2015. United Nations 20 June 2016 4 “World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016.” 30 Nov. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wes 2015. United Nations 20 June 2016: 1-8 p_current/2016wesp_full_en.pdf>. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wes 2 Ibid. at 2. p_current/2016wesp_full_en.pdf>. ESPI Report 61 6 November 2016 Space Policies, Issues and Trends in 2015–2016 tion, as the U.S. targeted ISIS forces while out to 30 June 2015, it became apparent that Russian counterparts aimed at Syrian rebel Greece might default on its June payment if it groups seeking to oust Syria’s President and did not receive an infusion of cash from the long-time Russian ally, Bashar al-Assad. Rus- final bailout instalment. The deadline was not sia’s military operations were not coordinated met, and with Greek banks closed along with with the U.S.