Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Comment

Engagement with Science: A Necessary Condition for the Survival of Democracy†

** Gauhar Raza

Background: assembly, representative and monitory democracy When you enter ‘democracy’ into the search function of Google, the opening result leads to Wikipedia where the first sentence of the Wikipedia article states that: ‘Democracy is a form of government in which all eligible people have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives’.1 The article goes on to inform you that the Greek word Demokratia, from which it is derived, means ‘rule of the people’ and that this word combines two words: Demos or ‘people’ and Kartos or ‘power’. For most people this common description still reflects the essence of what ‘democracy’ should be. There has been little change to this origination myth2 since the days of Athens (5th and 4th century BC) or Aristotle. What has continuously changed over the years is the definition of ‘citizen’ and the criteria for eligibility to partake in democratic systems. Democracy has also shown that it can and will change with the times. Three major historical phases of democratic development are

† The article is based on a roundtable discussion organised between the Sustainable energy Technology and Research (SeTAR) Centre, Faculty of Science, University of Johannesburg and the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA) on 18 July 2011. ** Mr. Gauhar Raza, Scientist and Head of the Science Communication through Multi-media (SCM) unit, the National Institute of Science Communication and Information Resources (NISCAIR), New Delhi. 1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy [Accessed: 05.08.11]. 2 ‘The lamp of assembly-based democracy was first lit in the ‘East’, in lands that geographically correspond to contemporary Syria, Iraq and Iran. The custom of popular self-government was later transported eastwards, towards the Indian subcontinent, where sometime after 1500 BCE, in the early Vedic period, republics governed by assemblies were common. The custom also travelled westwards, first to Phoenician cities like Byblos and Sidon, then to Athens…’ John Keane, The life and death of democracy (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009, p.xi). 6 Pakistan Perspectives described by John Keane: The initial ‘Assembly Democracy’ (self- government through an assembly of equals) was followed by ‘Representative Democracy’ (elected representatives take decisions on behalf of the people) which today is being eroded by ‘Monitory Democracy’ (the people directly monitoring and influencing the efforts of elected representatives to ensure the democratic implementation of decisions).3 Further back in antiquity, we find the ‘agrarian revolution’ which changed the trajectory of human development in many ways – not all of them to the benefit of humanity.4 Be that as it may, all human civilizations were built on this adoption of agriculture. It was here that the notion of private property gave birth to the division of labour. Without going into detail it should be pointed out that it was also here that the original notion of equality amongst humans was relegated to the past. Historical materialism tells us that since the advent of human civilisation the evolution of society reflects the history of the struggle between two antagonistic classes: the ruling class and the ruled. However, even after the domestication of nature, the dream of human equality did not disappear with the demise of primitive

3 Assembly Democracy: 2500 BCE to 950 CE; from the Middle East of today through classical Greece and Rome including the world of early Islam. Ibid., p.xv. Representative Democracy: The belief that good government was government by representatives was introduced after revolutions in the Low Countries (1581), England (1644), Sweden (1720) and America (1776). Ibid., p.xvii. Monitory Democracy: Since 1945 power-monitoring and power- controlling devices have begun to … penetrate the corridors of government … extra-parliamentary forums, summits, regional parliaments, think tanks, peer review panels and human rights watch organisations play a role in shaping and determining the agendas of government. This new form of ‘deep democracy’ being fashioned today accentuates the point that democracies are capable of democratising themselves. Ibid., p.xxviii. 4 Now archaeology is demolishing another sacred belief: that human history over the past million years has been a long tale of progress. In particular, recent discoveries suggest that the adoption of agriculture, supposedly our most decisive step toward a better life, was in many ways a catastrophe from which we have never recovered. With agriculture came the gross social and sexual inequality, the disease and despotism, which curse our existence’. Jared Diamond, ‘The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race’. Discover, May 1987, pp.64–6. http://www.ditext.com/diam ond/mistake.html [Accessed: 05.08.11]. Engagement with Science: A Necessary… 7 communism.5 Throughout history it survived – vividly in smaller spaces and away from the civilised world – especially among tribal communities. Many times this notion asserted itself, with short duration, within civilised societies as well. The oppressed classes always aspired to equality between humans, and the ruling classes continuously extended their high-handed control of the masses through coercion. The two sets of ideas – for equality and against it – at all times clashed with each other, and in every walk of life. It is not difficult to find examples of strong assertion of the ideas of human equality in literature and even in religious beliefs. The emergence of proto forms of democracy at various points in history may be considered as an assertion of the same dream of human equality. In rare circumstances the ideas of equality became a material force within the civilised world and some democratic (social and political) structures were created. Most of these were short lived and were bulldozed by the burgeoning monarchy and theology of the Middle Ages (sometimes also called the ‘Dark Ages’). How was an individual enabled to share in the fruits of democracy? This seems to have been a difficult road to travel, especially for women. Athenian democracy excluded women, slaves, any citizen below 20 years of age and foreigners from the definition of a citizen. The first experiment with the idea of ‘universal suffrage’ was conducted in the Corsican Republic (1755).6 It was short lived. The British parliament was elected by only 3% of its citizens even as late as the last decades of the eighteenth century.7 Women were given voting rights in most European countries only after the First World War, and they had to struggle for it. In France resident male citizens were allowed to vote since 1848 but women were at last presented with the opportunity to vote

5 Primitive communism attained its peak of organizational development in the clan system, where productive relations were based on collective ownership of the means of production, while existing alongside of personal property (weapons, household articles, clothing, etc.). http://www.marxists. org/glossary/terms/c/o.htm [Accessed: 05.08.11]. 6 In November 1755, Pasquale Paoli proclaimed Corsica a sovereign nation, the Corsican Republic, independent from the Republic of Genoa. He created the Corsican constitution, which was the first constitution written under enlightenment principles, including the first implementation of female suffrage, later revoked by the French when they took over the island in 1769.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corsican_Republic0[Accessed: 05.08.11] 7 In Britain the 1928 The Equal Franchise Act finally brought about universal suffrage. All women over 21 gained the right to vote, bringing them in line with men. http://www.socialismtoday.org/120/suffrage.html [Accessed: 05. 08.11]. 8 Pakistan Perspectives in 1944 (and then they had to wait till 1946 to do just that). In Spain women were granted the right to vote in 1933 only for this privilege to be taken away during the Franco regime (1939–1975) and reinstated in 1977.8 Around three hundred years ago nation states emerged out of a divided and slowly awakening Europe. The modern notion of democracy is a product of the industrial revolution, scientific and technological innovation, enlightenment and the appearance of these nation states. In modern Europe it might appear as if these geo-political maps were carved out along linguistic boundaries,9 however broader cultural identity was central to the creation of these nation states. In other words national and cultural identities were synchronous. In many parts of the colonised world imperialism had to wipe out indigenous populations and or their culture and language to prepare the ground for the creation of nation states (the United States of America and Australia are but two examples). The rise of bourgeois democracies created grounds for universal suffrage but it did not come into being right away (as indicated above). It took time to become part of the universal social consciousness within the national boundaries of European countries and the United States of America and eventually on a broader international level. There are many examples where a clash of ideas was followed by clashes on the streets. The desire to control human beings, i.e. to control private property, natural resources, knowledge – in short, the entire human and natural wealth – did not vanish. During the first half of 20th century, fascism in Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Japan was an assertion of the philosophy that rejected human equality. Even though fascism was a short lived entry on the time-line of human history, it was a violent display of brutal power by the ruling classes and, in the final analysis the ultimate objective of the project was to control citizens with an iron fist.10 World War II has been analysed from many perspectives (it might

8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage [Accessed: 05.08.11]. 9 The origins and early history of nation-states are disputed. A major theoretical issue is: ‘Which came first – the nation or the nation state?’ At the time of the 1789 French Revolution, only half of the French people spoke some French and between 12 per cent to 13 per cent spoke it ‘fairly’, according to Eric Hobsbawm. During Italian unification, the number of people speaking the Italian language was even lower. http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Nation_state [Accessed: 15.08.11]. 10 ‘The historic function of fascism is to smash the working class, destroy its organizations, and stifle political liberties when the capitalists find themselves unable to govern and dominate with the help of democratic Engagement with Science: A Necessary… 9 even be the most studied episode in human history), however, what at first appears to have been a clash of opposing national states originating from a set of complex political and historical conflict potentialities is, in the final analysis, shown to be a clash of two dreams, two opposing sets of ideologies. The fascist dream of controlling humanity had come very close to victory. Its defeat had a profound impact on the dominant and shared human consciousness of the future.11 The death of fascism in Germany (and other countries) did not ensure the demise of the rejection of human equality as the basis for a world order, however. It still thrives in many forms in the present world. Then, in the late forties, representative democracy broke out of Europe and started its greatest experiment in India.12 A new post- Westminster democracy resulted and the people of India showed that democracy can take root outside of the west and transform itself into the largest electoral democracy that the world has seen.

The Indian experience Not once during the ancient period did a single emperor rule the entire landmass that today is known as the Indian subcontinent. Even during the medieval period large parts were ruled by kings, which were independent of the Delhi Empire (or Sultanate).13 The entire Indian landmass can be divided into large regions, which have nothing in

machinery’. — Leon Trotsky, ‘Fascism: What it is and how to fight it.’ http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1944/1944-fas.htm [Accessed: 05.08.11]. 11 ‘… in 1941 there were only eleven democracies left on the face of the earth … By 1950, with the military defeat of Nazism … there were twenty-two democracies … By the end of the twentieth century … 119 countries (out of a total of 192) could be described as ‘electoral democracies …’ John Keane quoting a Freedom in the World Report by Freedom House (an international NGO based in Washington, DC – note that almost 80% of its budget derives from the USA government). John Keane, op.cit., p.xxiv. 12 ‘Democrats in India demonstrated that unity within a highly diverse country could be built by respecting its differences; that, despite everything, the hand of democracy could be extended, to include potentially billions of people who were defined by a huge variety of histories and customs that had one thing in common: they were people who were not European’. Ibid., p.586. 13 The Delhi Sultanate is a term used to cover five short-lived Islamic kingdoms or sultanates of Turkic origin in medieval India. The sultanates ruled from Delhi between 1206 and 1526, when the last was replaced by the Mughal dynasty. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delhi_Sultanate [Accessed: 05.08.11]. 10 Pakistan Perspectives common. These regions were always geographically, culturally and socially diverse. Inhabitants of Punjab speak a language, which for Tamil, Tilagu or Malayalam speaking people is as alien as any other language in the world. There are more than 3 000 dialects that are spoken in India today. People differ in food habits, dress, habitat, and much more. There are numerous religions practiced in India. The list is long. There was really no ground for a common identity. However, the only common feature – the caste system,14 practiced in various forms – did cut across all and even religious boundaries. By mid 19th century the British had captured and ruled over almost the entire Indian population. It was a fragmented population displaying many varied identities. However, for governance and administrative purposes the entire region had to be given a single name. Initially the British referred to this part of the world as ‘the Indies’.15 Historians are divided on the question as to when the notion of an Indian nationhood was born. Some argue that it existed before the British came to India. Others firmly believe that it grew in response to colonial oppression. Even if we concede to the idea that a feeling of nationhood existed in this part of the world before colonisation, it is apparent that the Indian identity was quite weak in the nineteenth century. Caste, ancestry, religious and regional identities were some of

14 The Indian caste system is a system of social stratification and social restriction in India in which communities are defined by thousands of endogamous hereditary groups called Jatis. The Jatis were hypothetically and formally grouped by the Brahminical texts under the four well known categories (the varnas): viz Brahmins (scholars, teachers, fire priests), Vaishyas (agriculturists, cattle raisers, traders, bankers), Kshatriyas (kings, warriors, law enforcers, administrators), Shudras (artisans, craftsmen, service providers). Certain people like foreigners, nomads, forest tribes and the chandalas (who dealt with disposal of the dead) were excluded altogether and treated as untouchables. Although generally identified with Hinduism, the caste system was also observed among followers of other religions in the Indian subcontinent, including some groups of Muslims and Christians, most likely due to inherited cultural traits. There is, however, no universally accepted theory about the origins of the Indian caste system. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caste_system_in_India [Accessed: 05.08.11]. 15 The name ‘Indies’ is derived from the river Indus and is used to connote parts of Asia that come under Indian cultural influence. Used by European explorers from the 15th century and later (late 15th century) renamed ‘East Indies’ to differentiate from the then newly named ‘West Indies’. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indies [Accessed: 05.08.11]. Engagement with Science: A Necessary… 11 the markers which defined an Indian individual. Its abundant variety also indicated that nationhood was not a pre-colonial imperative. ‘The Sepoy16 Mutiny of 1857’, as it is called by the British or the ‘First War of Independence’, as it is remembered by Indians, was a major turning point in the history of India. The ground for this revolt was prepared by the oppression, loot and deceit unleashed in all parts of India by the British East India Company. By the mid-seventeen-nineties, the Company had consolidated its power over the entire Indian landmass and operated like a government ruling a country. One by one the warring princes were overcome and left powerless. The representatives of the Governor General of the British East India Company took over and managed their princely states. The Company forced Indian farmers to grow cash crops (mainly indigo dye and opium), imposed heavy taxes and usurped the land at the slightest pretext. Repeated outbreaks of cholera and plague all over the country and relentless looting caused widespread discontent. There were many small-scale peoples’ revolts during the first half of the 18th century. However there was no united effort made by Indians to throw the British out of the continent. People could not be rallied around any binding identity. During this period the British East India Company had become an international military force by raising a big army from indigenous manpower, primarily upper-caste Hindus and Muslims. After the two Afghan wars in which Indians had fought gallantly, the demobilised soldiers of the Bengal Native Infantry were sent back to India and treated badly. The resentment reached flash point and revolt started at the cantonment area of Meerut in 1857. It spread like wild fire throughout northern part of India. People joined the sepoys in large numbers. Many princes had scores to settle with the Company and they saw this revolt as an opportunity to take revenge. Some were forced by the mutinous soldiers to lead the revolt. The revolt continued for more than a year but ultimately the British were able to crush it. Of course it was not possible to quench this fire without the active help of large sections of natives. Substantial segments of the military (raised from other parts of India, like the Punjab and Madras) and feudal lords remained loyal to their British overlords. It was a fragmented society that rose against a technologically modern force. While the rebels fought against the British, they did not fight for a

16 Sepoy: an ‘infantry private’ – the lowest rank in the Indian Army. Came into use in 18th century in the British East India Company and still used today. 12 Pakistan Perspectives common cause: The feudal classes had nothing in common with the peasantry or the sepoys. Visible seeds of democratic thought sown in the proclamations issued at the behest of the War Council constituted in Delhi, just after the mutiny, must have made the feudal lords quite uneasy. The mutiny was crushed. What followed the defeat was shear barbarism. It was the biggest revolt of the century and had to be dealt with extreme brutality. A hundred thousand sepoys of the Bengal Native Infantry regiments had revolted and each one of them was killed. A million civilians were massacred.17 Cruelty exceeded all limits, many acts of savagery were declared as ‘un-Christian’ by moderate British commentators, both in India and in Britain. The imperialist had to teach the native population a lesson and it turned out to be a bitter one. But the oppressor also learnt something important which helped them rule over this country for the next almost one hundred years: divide and rule. Instilling fear is a necessary but not sufficient condition of rule. Soon after the 1857 mutiny the British parliament disbanded the British East India Company and India became an integral part of the countries ‘protected’ by the Crown. The leadership of the national freedom movement that subsequently emerged was divided right from the beginning. Some wanted to seek concession from the British and played the ‘game’ by the British rules of justice and respect. There were also those who wanted to use force and organise people to overthrow the British Raj. It is important to note that all the political and reformist groups that emerged realised the importance of building an overarching national identity which would form a common thread and bind all Indians. This will be an identity that cuts through all divisive identities, an identity that is based on a modern, secular and scientific value system. The British occupiers concerned themselves with convincing the natives that they had come to India carrying ‘the white-man’s burden’. They had a responsibility to civilise the uncivilised and it was in the

17 Roshan Taqui describes scenes of horror and looting that took place in Lucknow and one incident alone reports ‘…there was no law and no justice. The innocent Indians were falsely convicted and put in the mouth of Howitzer and fired, even a smartly worn turban or a dashing military style moustache would be taken as proof that the owner was a sepoy and thus a mutineer. Thousands were hanged, shot, blown away from guns, etc. There was no record how many’. The description of looting by the British fills pages – the looted palaces numbered 92 in the region spanning from Moosa Bagh to Bibiapur. (R. Taqui, Lucknow 1857. The two wars at Lucknow – the dusk of an era (Lucknow: New Royal Book CO, 2001), pp.264-67. Engagement with Science: A Necessary… 13 interest of the Indians to let them accomplish this. They did not stop at that message, it was also made amply clear that the British Raj, if need be, is capable of using brutal force to arrive at the completion of this project of local civilisation. They are omnipresent and immensely powerful. The writing on the wall was bold and clear: ‘The sun does not set on the British Empire’. All ‘selves’ are constructed against ‘the other’. In order to commence a struggle against a colossal ‘other’ an equally robust and gigantic identity of ‘the self’ must be created. The seeds of this identity, i.e., Indian identity, were already present in the universal subjugation of the Indian masses, including the former ruling classes. The emerging national leadership only had to chisel, carve and shape it. Without undermining the contribution of many heroes and martyrs of the Indian freedom struggle, the two larger than life sculptors who created the Indian identity were MK Gandhi18 and Jawaharlal Nehru.19 Next to their names, surely and without hesitation, must be placed the name of Shaheed Bhagat Singh,20 who was one of those who lit the fire of the Indian struggle for independence in the 1920s and gave his life for a free India in 1931. This Indian identity evolved during the freedom struggle, which continued for more than 90 years. The evolutionary process necessarily meant the propagation and inculcation of ideas, which were not rooted in Indian culture and philosophy. Notions of universal suffrage, equality of gender, education for all, jobs for all, science and technology for nation building, secular value systems and scientific temperament were borrowed from the west. The Indian freedom movement acted as the most potent channel of disseminating these ideas and over a period of time they became part of the discourse and shared social consciousness. It is remarkable that Indian identity was not constructed against the image of the white oppressors. It was not a racial movement. The ‘self’ was build against Imperialism. Therefore when the British left,

18 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi led India to independence and inspired movements for civil rights across the world. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Mohandas_Karamchand_Gandhi [Accessed: 17.08.11]. 19 Jawaharlal Nehru was the first and longest-serving Prime Minister of India (1947–1964) and one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru [Accessed: 17.08.11]. 20 Indian freedom fighter, marxist and anarchist. Shaheed Bhagat Singh is considered to be one of the most influential revolutionaries of the Indian independence movement – hanged in 1931 – his legacy prompted the struggle for independence and contributed to the rise of socialism in India. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhagat_Singh [Accessed: 17.08.11]. 14 Pakistan Perspectives

Indian identity did not shrink, it stood tall. As British imperialism weakened, the transition of ‘the other’ happened smoothly. US imperialism became ‘the other’. India and Jawaharlal Nehru unhesitatingly took up the leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. While the Indian freedom movement was struggling to carve an Indian identity, the British rulers were busy experimenting with their ‘divide and rule’ policy. They tried almost every possible way of enlarging divisive identities. Most projects did not yield large-scale results. However the British Raj succeeded in widening the religious split. There was a section of Muslim leadership, which was encouraged to think and argue that when the British occupiers leave, power should be passed on to the former rulers of India – ‘the Muslims’. At the same time they also encouraged Hindu fundamentalist to think and disseminate the old idea of the ‘tyranny of Muslim rule’: fifteen hundred years of Hindu slavery under the Muslims. Indian history was divided into three periods, Hindu, Muslim and British. Urdu was made the language of Muslims and Hindi became the language of Hindus. Violent Hindu-Muslim clashes were engineered with government funding, following the ‘divide and rule’ policy. Hindu and Muslim religious identities (and the divide) were encouraged to grow. No identity can grow larger than ‘the other’. Anti-science Hindu and Muslim antagonistic identities were constructed against each other. Therefore, both ‘selves’ remained as what may be termed as, ‘Pigmy Identities’. With active support of the British rulers these two identities succeeded dividing a not yet born nation in the minds of large sections of the population. The land mass and the population were partitioned. The two ‘Pigmy Identities’ played havoc during the time of partition and hundreds of thousands of Muslims and Hindu’s were butchered. Millions were forced to migrate. Next to the disastrous Second World War, the results of the Indian partition were the biggest human tragedy of recent times. In the month of August 1947, two blood soaked countries, two nation states were born, Pakistan and India. For Pakistan, the Hindu India was ‘the other’. Under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru, new- born traumatised India was struggling to mend the scarred ‘Indian Identity’. The anti-science and fundamentalist Hindu right-wing committed a big mistake soon after independence. They killed Gandhi. The backlash was so intense that not only those who believed in the right-wing ideology but the ideology itself had to retreat. During the years that followed (under the leadership of Nehru), the civil discourse on secularism and scientific temper intensified. It is Engagement with Science: A Necessary… 15 remarkable that in a country which was facing hunger and poverty, where the literacy level had not yet touched the 50 percent mark and a basic infrastructure was lacking, issues related to science and scientific temper were brought into the public debate. Indian identity during its formative years was constructed around modern ideas and the notion of scientific temper was one that played a major role during those years. After independence, on the one hand, the newly emerging bourgeois realised that without widespread acceptance of science it could not access public funds for technological development. On the other hand, the left of centre political formation used the popularisation of science to mobilise young activists and reach those sections of masses which otherwise could not have been approached. They also recognised that propagation of scientific ideas could help in raising the revolutionary consciousness of the masses. In short, the bourgeois, the state and revolutionaries together, for different reasons, helped the Indian society to engage with science. This helped in establishing a fairly strong basis for democratic consciousness. By no stretch of the imagination am I suggesting that this was the only factor in the development of post independence Indian democracy. What is being argued here is that the scientific temper debate, along with other factors, helped in building strong democratic traditions and it was because of this fact that India did not become a ‘Hindu Nation’. Instead, India became the first country to include the spreading a ‘scientific temper’ as a fundamental duty of its citizens. The Indian constitution was amended, by parliament, in 1976. Five years later, after a national debate, a document, which defined ‘Scientific Temper’, was prepared. Intellectuals drawn from various disciplines endorsed it. For the past more than 50 years India remains an island of democracy surrounded by nations which could not sustain a democratic structure. There is one thing in common amongst these surrounding nations: they did not base the construction of their national identity on secular and scientific values. Although the form and content of the Indian identity has also gone through ups and downs, these periods have been short lived. Fascistic ideas in the garb of religious identities have always remained corrosive and the biggest threat to Indian identity.

Fascists love technology but hate science A major distinguishing point between ‘science’ and ‘technology’ is that science embrace worldviews, while technology do not. Therefore science, especially in the public domain, provides a basis for democratic consciousness. It inculcates a spirit of enquiry and questioning. The intrusion of high level technology without a wider acceptance of 16 Pakistan Perspectives scientific ideas does not lead to a spirit of curiosity, instead, more often than not, it breeds fascism. Jacob Bronowski21 had remarked that ‘technology without science is magic’. One could also add that magic without explanation is totalitarian. I will dare to say that fascist, fundamentalists, and right-wing reactionaries of all shades hate science and love technology. Examples exist in history. Fascist in Germany burnt the books of Albert Einstein and denounced his work but the same fascists had no problem in trying to build a nuclear bomb. In the not so distant past when India exploded a nuclear bomb, Hindu fundamentalist were the first to celebrate it on the streets and called it their ‘Hindu bomb’. Subsequently when Pakistan did the same Muslim fundamentalists danced on street corners celebrating their ‘Islamic bomb’. The Taliban banned television when they came to power in Afghanistan, but their leader, Usama Bin Ladin, always used the latest in communication technology to project his messages. The world knows his face and message through ‘un-Islamic TV’. The Taliban, even now, have no problem in using the latest technology to kill people. The Christian terrorist, who recently attacked labour party workers in Oslo, Norway, also used modern weaponry to ‘kill’ multiculturalism, Islam and cultural Marxism. He was defending age-old Christianity with the help of the latest technology. As per his manifesto, he does not believe in the equality of human beings. He will without doubt also reject the conclusions of the genome project that indicates that his ancestors migrated to Europe from Africa. Scientific tenets do not fit into his hate driven ‘anti-migrant’ ideology.

Conclusion In this discussion I evoked the history and growth of democracy in India to demonstrate a unique set of circumstances that brought about this largest democracy in the world. By following the trajectory path of India in its achievement of a democracy that conquered the traumatic effects of British rule, I argued for the introduction of a methodology that is based on the promotion of a scientific temper amongst the population. Awareness and knowledge of science supports democracy since it allows space for growth within the scope of a nation’s worldview. Our work in the field of Public Understanding of Science (PUS) shows that the cognitive structure of a common citizen is constituted by

21 Jacob Bronowski (1908–1974) was a Polish-Jewish British mathematician, biologist, historian of science, theatre author, poet and inventor. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_Bronowski [Accessed: 17.08.11]. Engagement with Science: A Necessary… 17 two distinct spaces. The irrational and extra-scientific ideas occupy one part and the rational and scientific ideas reside in the other. The two coexist quite peacefully. Invocation of one or the other is a function of a complex mix of parameters including the historical, cultural and socio- economic circumstances in which a citizen is operating. In order to save and strengthen democracy, especially in culturally rich and varied countries (generally known as developing countries), constant engagement with science and thereby enlargement of scientific cognitive spaces is essential. A high level of technology and a low level of scientific temper is a threat to democracy, in any society. Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Challenges of Diversity and Democratic Opportunities for Pakistani Federalism†

Sharif al Mujahid*

First a word of acknowledgement. I am most grateful to Mr. Zafarullah Khan, Executive Director, Centre for Civic Education Pakistan, Islamabad, and Dr. Syed Jaffar Ahmed, the coordinator of the present workshop, for having asked me to present the key note address at this august gathering. As a Pakistani, I found the topic extremely interesting and challenging. Especially because Pakistan it self is organically linked to the end-result of the phenomenon of deep diversity, not only when it was born in 1947 but also when it was dismembered in 1971. Yet, inextricably though, Pakistan does not figure in the list of participants on the ‘Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries’ theme at the international level.1 In tandem only three or four Muslims figure in the list although this problem plagues not marginally, but substantially most of the OIC Muslim countries (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, and many others), besides Pakistan. And that indicates our dismal measure of interest and concern with problems that have a significant bearing on the politics, administration and overall development of a large segment of the Muslim states including Pakistan. The inherent tension between diversity and unity is not something peculiar or particular to Pakistan, though indeed, it has posed a traumatic problem to several federal polities in the world in recent decades. The Soviet Union ended up in disintegration in 1991, washing its hand off its dissident border states and getting itself shrunk to head the FIS. Czechoslovakia got bifurcated and ended up in two states. Former Yugoslavia descended into an orgy of a long drawn-out civil war

† This paper was presented as a key note address at a workshop in Karachi. * Sharif al Mujahid, an HEC Distinguished National Professor, has recently co-edited Unesco’s History of Humanity, Vol. VI and The Jinnah Anthology (2010), and edited In Quest of Jinnah (2007). 1 See Rufak Chatttopadhyay and Abigail Ostient Karos (eds.), Dialogues on Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries (Canada: Forum of Federations and International Association of Centers for Federal Studies, 2008). 20 Pakistan Perspectives between three claimants and majoritarian identities in their respective regions, ending up finally in three states, according to the Dayton Accord, in 1995. The residue Serbian Republic was subsequently confronted with the Albanian-oriented Kosovan problem in its western region, with Kosovo declaring its independence unilaterally but with UN blessings, three years ago. The Caucasian problem haunts the Soviet Union as an unending nightmare for the past seventeen years, with even Moscow being within the stretch of the Caucasian rebels’ outreach, even to this day. India has, in large part, addressed the diversity by crafting 22 states in the 1960s, and 28 states and four Union territories in 2000s out of the original eight provinces and a conglomeration of some 500 princely states and principalities, but still, besides the Telangana separatist movement in Andhara Pradesh, the ongoing anarchic Maoist movement and the separatist splinter groups in Assam claim large swathes of territories which are virtually beyond New Delhi’s writ. Not to speak of federal politics, even the so-called unitary states have not been altogether bereft of this tension. Cyprus presents a classical example of a 20% (Turkish) minority (in Northern Cyprus) holding itself against the Cypriot majority and crystallizing the Green Line between the two combatant components for the past thirty-eight years, and that with no viable solution in sight, despite continuous UN and international efforts. Spain is rocked off and on by a separatist Basque movement. Likewise, several of the OIC Muslim states are as well plagued by this problem – the failure to balance unity with diversity. Indonesia, the largest Muslim state, had to cede willy nilly the Christian-dominated Aceh region under UN pressure some years ago. Malaysia, though demographically a nominal Muslim country, faces the problem of some 40% Chinese and 6% Indian minorities, with the Indian component having become exceedingly activist, vocal and demanding in recent years with their litany of grievances. Iraq and Turkey are beset with the endemic Kurdish problem, and Lebanon, albeit having a nominally democratic structure, is still sharply divided into three identities. Tribalism rules the roost in Libya, and sectarian diversity is becoming articulate, activist and confrontationist in some other Arab countries. Although the unity-diversity tension is a global phenomena, nibbling at a large number of polities all over the world, Pakistan should have been more concerned in resolving the challenge of this tension, and the fall out of the outworking of diversity – especially for the reasons given below. At its best, I feel, the present paper may principally serve as a backgrounder, seeking to put into sharp focus how disastrously Challenges of Diversity and… 21 consequential is the dismal failure to balance unity with diversity. Being a student of history, I will attempt to dilate upon the historical dimension in the first three sections. And that in the firm hope that we do learn from history since those who do not heed or learn from history are bound to repeat the mistakes of the past, as George Santayana has said.

United India As noted above, Pakistan is the end-product of the phenomena of deep diversity in colonial India during the last seven decades of the Raj. It came about because of the monumental failure of the dominant Congress leadership in undivided India to meet the challenges of diversity during the freedom movement. For some thirteen years beginning with 1927, the acerbic issue on the constitutional plane was Muslim federalism vs Congress ‘unitarianism’ or a highly centralized state. The Nehru Report (1928), which presented the Congress’ blue print for the future Indian dispensation argued for an almost unitary state, which was ingeniously flaunted as a federal one – a federal one but only in name. The Muslim leaders presented several formulae to get a viable and workable federation for the entire subcontinent established on the ground, but to no avail. In particular mention may be made of the schemes put forward by Muhammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In adumbrating a consolidated North Western Muslim majority state in his Allahabad (1930) address, Iqbal, as he put it, was seeking to overcome or nullify the diversity in India’s body politic, represented by the Muslim penchant for a distinct identity and individuality, and that in a bid to offer a democratic solution. He sought to salvage ‘the life of Islam as a cultural force in the country’, the major thrust and source of diversity, by ‘its centralization in a specified territory’. He felt that ‘this centralization of the most living portion of the Muslims of India . . . will eventually solve the problem of India’, arguing that ‘without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect as culture, it will be difficult to create a harmonious nation’.2 That is, the Islamic diversity should be afforded full opportunities for development along its own lines without being thwarted or checkmated by the majoritarian culture and ethos in the rest of the subcontinent. Thus Iqbal stood for an integrated cultural mosaic or an inclusive salad plate solution as against the Congress’ assimilative melting pot approach, which shunned recognition and accommodation of non-Congress and non-Hindu

2 Muhammad Iqbal, Presidential Address (Delhi: All India Muslim League, 1945). See also Sharif al Mujahid, ‘Iqbal’s Allahabad address revisited’, Dawn, 13 December 2003. 22 Pakistan Perspectives identities. But this Iqbal’s viable panacea for meeting the monumental challenge of Muslim diversity and creating a harmonious and integrated Indian nation, with unity at the top and diversity at the bottom of India’s politico-cultural pyramid, was rejected out of hand on outrageously flimsy grounds. Likewise, in his 07 February 1935 address, Jinnah had asserted that ‘the combination of all these various elements – [viz.,] religion, culture, race, language, arts, music, and so forth – makes the minority a separate entity in the State, and . . . [that] separate entity as an entity wants safeguards’.3 Since the Muslims were distributed unevenly in the subcontinent, yielding to two demographically dominant Muslim regions in the northwest and the northeast, Jinnah suggested a territorial solution within an Indian federation. This he did in his Delhi Muslim Proposals of 1927 and his Fourteen Points of 1929. Therein he had demanded proportional representation and substance of power to Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal, separation of Sindh, and reforms in the NWFP and Balochistan.4 And the outright rejection of these proposals designed to meet the challenges of Muslim diversity, while meeting the dictates of balance on the unity-diversity continuum, at the Congress-sponsored All Parties National Convention (1928), at Calcutta, was by far the most serious setback to efforts at crafting a balance on that continuum. This was followed by Congress’ assertions to equate India with the Congress alone and the denial of any group, party or entity outside the Congress, which alone and by itself claimed to represent Indian nationalism. This, in essence, tantamounted to disclaiming, disowning and disdaining any alternative or competing stream in the Indian freedom movement. The climax was reached in 1937, when the Congress sought to implement its concept of equating India with it to the exclusion of all others. It established one-party governments in the Hindu majority provinces, thus offering only the Hobson’s choice of aborption into the Congress or political wilderness. This meant an assimilative melting pot solution with a vengeance, controverting the political realities on the ground. What made it so shattering was that it was in sharp contrast to the Muslim majority provinces which had all opted for coalition governments, under the 1935 Act. No wonder, all this had finally led Jinnah and the Muslim League to raise the antenna a little higher, three years later, and demand outright partition in 1940. Still, they were

3 Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusufi (ed.), Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam (Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1996), II:70. 4 For details, see Sharif al Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981), ch.IV. Challenges of Diversity and… 23 agreeable to accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946) which adroitly addressed Muslim majoritarian claims in the northwest and northeast by providing for compulsory grouping of provinces in these regions and the rest of India, and a limited centre. But Congress’ thoughtless nibbling at these provisions, climaxed by Pandit Nehru’s press conference statement of 10 July 1946, finally led Jinnah to rescind his earlier decision, and reaffirm his quest for a sovereign Pakistan.5 Thus, Pakistan came into being out of a welter of conflicting circumstances and bizarre developments, spawned by the non-recognition and non-accommodation of diversity in India’s body politic.

United Pakistan Normally speaking, the Pakistani rulers should have learned a lesson from the denouement spawned by the failure of Congress leadership to meet the challenge of diversity in undivided India. But they did not. In consequence, they failed to craft a viable federal structure, to meet the dictates of the two discontiguous wings of Pakistan. To start with, the Government of India Act, 1935, the basis for the Pakistani constitutional edifice in the formative years, was tilted towards a centralized structure. Apart from cultural, linguistic and socioeconomic factors, geographical discontinuity between East and West Pakistan should have prompted the leadership to work out a modus vivendi, enabling the two regions to develop along their own lines and providing opportunities for development and self sufficiency in each region. But they failed to learn from history. No wonder, dissenting voices from the East, beginning with their reaction to the Basic Principles Committee Report (1950) and their demand for accommodating Bengali as a second national language (1952), rose high and almost deafening during the early 1950s, culminating finally in the watershed rout of the ruling Muslim League party in the March 1954 provincial elections. The East Pakistani electorate had finally spoken, and that for the time being brought the rulers in Karachi to some sense. Thus, a compromise came to be affected during the next two years, and the major East Pakistani demands accepted. The 1956 constitution, which was agreed upon or countersigned by all the East Pakistani parties, represented a high water mark of aggregative and integrative effort, and represented a shift from an immoblist regime to a crisis liquidation one. Meantime, the accommodation of popular East Pakistani regional elites such as Fazlul Haq (d. 1961) and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (d. 1963) in the power structure at the Centre gave a sense of participation to the

5 Ibid. 24 Pakistan Perspectives eastern relevant political strata in the central decision-making process during 1955 and 1958. Especially during Suhrawardy’s regime during 1956-57 when political power, though not economic resources, seemed to be more or less equitably shared.6 And if democracy and democratic principles and practices had been upheld during the subsequent years, the efforts to finding a genuine and more viable federal structure could have as well succeeded, and the democratic process could have met the challenges of eastern diversity, resulting in a balance between unity and diversity. But even that would have been only so far as the East was concerned. Since the East-West tussle was chiefly perceived as a Bengal- Punjab tussle, little heed was paid to intra-wing diversity in West Pakistan itself. The imposition of One Unit on 14 October 1955 and the East-West parity formula, incorporated in the various constitutional formulae and retained in the 1956 constitution, which were obviously designed to strengthen Punjab against Bengal’s demographic clout, had, of course, papered the East-West cleavages, though only for the time being. But, on the other hand, the One Unit had caused greater havoc to intra wing solidarity in the West itself. Since the One Unit had been imposed through manoeuvrings and machinations and without the willing consent and consensus of West Pakistan’s three smaller provinces and the regional elites, it tended to fuel discontent and disillusionment, leading to alienation of the ethnic entities in these provinces. Instead of banishing regionalism and curbing parochial proclivities, its imposition had actually spawned provincial fears and ethnic jealousies, chiefly because it was perceived as a subtle Punjabi move by the smaller regions (Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan) to extend its hegemony over the entire West wing. Worse still, the residue of the quantum of antipathy towards Punjabi dominance built up during 1955- 70, persisted even after the disbandment of One Unit on 01 July 1970. Indeed, it seems to have aggravated several fold over the decades, chiefly due to the gross violation of democratic norms during the Bhutto era (1971-77) and the total decimation of the democratic process during the Zia years (1977-88). That apart, even the East-West balance between unity and diversity came to be totally nullified later, if only because of the 7 October 1958 coup. The imposition of martial law, the abandonment of the constitution, the dissolution of assemblies and parties, the banning of political activities, the suspension of fundamental rights, and the

6 Sharif al Mujahid, ‘Pakistan’s Political Culture During Ayub Era’, Scrutiny (Islamabad), I:1 (Jan.-June, 1974). Challenges of Diversity and… 25 establishment of a highly centralized state under the martial law (1958- 62) regime frittered away the residual goodwill between the two wings generated during 1955-58. The subsequent 1962 constitution was, in turn, designed to institutionalize Ayub’s personal hegemony while softening the martial law regulations, the intention being to convert the martial law ‘into a document which will form the basis for running the country’, to quote President Ayub Khan himself.7 And as Wayne Wilcox avers, coherence and political discipline were thus achieved – ‘but by narrowing popular participation in government at the cost of popular support and control over administration’.8 No wonder, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, a former Prime Minister (1955-56), had described the government, as it emerged under the 1962 constitution, as a Government of the President, by the President and for the President.9 One major outcome of the Ayub decade’s political developments was the downgrading and dispowerment of political elites, both in the East and the West – elites who had dominated the political landscape for the previous eleven years. This, buttressed by the draconian EBDO laws, disqualifying hitherto outstanding national leaders from doing politics, denuded them of commanding national stature, standing and clout. Under the Basic Democracy (BD) system, local issues, regional politics and rural ‘notables’ with an extremely limited focus gained ascendancy, and most parties got morphed off into more or less regional parties, albeit laying claim to a national status and retaining a nominal veneer of national orientation. Most parties during the 1950s, had emerged out of the bosom of the pre-partition nationalist coalition, the Muslim League, but no one was able to build an enduring organizational structure, and the capability and clout to aggregate diverse groups, process and articulate their interests, and channel their demands and grievances. Ayub’s ‘stable’ system, which precluded the emergence of alternate, competing, national political parties and leaders led to the provincialization of politics, with the once comprehensive parties getting split, and the splintered factions becoming largely identified with this or that province or region. Thus the Awami (Muslim) League, founded by Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, as a national all-Pakistan party in 1950, had coalesced with

7 Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.) I:58. See also Mohammad Ayub Khan, ‘Pakistan Perspective’, Foreign Affairs, 88: 4 (July 1960), p.58. 8 Wayne Wilcox, ‘New Elites of India and Pakistan’, Transaction, September 1967, p.43. 9 Dawn, 02 April 1963. 26 Pakistan Perspectives

Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani’s East Pakistan Awami Muslim League, Pir of Manki Sharif’s Frontier Awami Muslim League and Nawab of Mamdot’s Punjab-based Awami Muslim League, to transform itself into an all-Pakistan national party in the early 1950s, and as a viable alternative to the Pakistan Muslim League. Having also acquired increasing clout in the Punjab (1951), the Frontier (1952) and East Bengal (1954) elections, it had played a national role all through the 1950s. But it nevertheless became increasingly regionalized with the years, especially after Suhrawardy’s demise (1963), and finally got transformed into a regional, inward-looking, ethnocentrist body in 1966 under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Maulana Bhashani’s National Awami Party (NAP) came out of dissidence within the Awami League at the Kagmari Conference in 1957 and aspired to be a national party till it got splintered four fold during the mid-1960s – with NAP (Bhashani) identified with the East, NAP (Wali) with the Frontier and Balochistan, NAP (Pakhtoonkhwa) with Balochistan, and the Sindh United Front (SUF), an erstwhile NAP component, with Sindh. The Republican Party (f. 1956), born out of dissidence within the Pakistan Muslim League in 1956 on the issue of lending support to President Iskander Mirza and his protégé, West Pakistan premier, Dr. Khan Sahib, never really took off. It frantically attempted in 1963 to drape itself in the Conventionist Muslim League garb, with President Ayub Khan himself joining it on 22 May 1963. Its sole agenda was to sustain Ayub as President and get him re- elected, and in this it did succeed beyond measure: it secured 129 out of 152 seats in the March 1965 elections under the BD system. But Ayub’s exit in March 1969 sealed its fate, and it could secure only one seat in the December 1970 general elections. The only party that could have played the role that the Congress did in post-1947 India was the Pakistan Muslim League, but it miserably failed to assimilate oppositional tendencies within its organizational structure and orientation in the early years. Thus, it failed to aggregate, articulate and process diverse interests and demands, and get them converted into policy options. No wonder, this dismal failure spelled its doom as a comprehensive national party within seven years of Pakistan’s birth. It was, however, on its way to rejunevation during 1956-58 when Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (d. 1958) and, later, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan (d.1981) became President, but the 7 October coup subverted the on-going process. In 1962, it got split into an anti-Ayub Council Muslim League and a pro-Ayub Conventionist Muslim League, and by 1970 another splintered group, called Qayyum Muslim League, raised its factious head, this one confined largely to the NWFP and obsessed with a one-point agenda to decimate the NAP (Wali) at the hustings. The Challenges of Diversity and… 27

Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), founded by Zulfikar Aki Bhutto (1928- 1979) in November 1967, after his exit from the Ayub’s cabinet in 1966, albeit founded as a national party, severely confined itself to West Pakistan, acquiring its clout from its electoral strength in the Punjab more than in Sindh. (It had won 62 out of 82 seats in the Punjab and only 18 out of 27 in Sindh in 1970). Thus, the various parties that came to contest the first general elections December 1970 were all essentially regional/ provincial parties, despite their claims to the contrary. The prospects of first national, direct elections obviously led the number of parties to rise to 25. But only some 15 parties nominated candidates, and only 10, besides a host of independents, won any seats. And, except for two, all of them had a regional tilt.10 The rest of the ‘decade of development’ story need not detain us here for long. Briefly stated, during the Ayub regime (1958-69), Pakistan was to be only ‘a form of federation with the Provinces enjoying such autonomy as is consistent with the unity and interest of Pakistan as a whole’.11 Its raison d‘etre was by no means a federal state, but a unitary one, with a highly centralized structure. And an unitary state is an antithesis to the very concept, physical structure and taxonomy of Pakistan. Of course, the two provinces, as under the 1956 constitution, remained intact. So did the provincial assemblies, but they were elected indirectly, by the 40,000 BDs (Basic Democrats). Moreover, the quantum of autonomy conceded in the 1956 constitution had been disturbed, since under the 1962 constitution the provincial executives became directly responsible to the president rather than to the provincial legislatures. And because of this and the reduction in the powers and autonomy of legislatures (both at the national and provincial levels), the East Pakistan Assembly, unlike the situation during 1955-58, could not independently process, channel, regulate and convert the regional demands into policy outputs or responses at the provincial level; this (inability) denoting a relationship of subordination rather than of coordination between the federal and provincial levels of decision- making. All this obviously caused increasing frustration, and disenchantment with the constitutional division of powers between the

10 See Sharif al Mujahid, ‘Pakistan’s First Presidential Election’, Asian Survey, V:6 (June 1965); ‘The Assembly Elections in Pakistan’, ibid., V: II (Nov. 1965); and ‘Pakistan: The First General Election’, ibid., XI:2 (Feb. 1972). 11 See the Preamble to The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962). 28 Pakistan Perspectives centre (the national political system) and the provinces – in this case, especially East Pakistan. Thus, the consequent lack of a sense of participation on the one hand and a grievous sense of political underweightage on the other were chiefly responsible for augmenting alienation and crystallizing Bengali regionalism which, in its most extreme form, finally emerged in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Six-Point ‘Charter of Survival’ for East Pakistan.12 Moreover, for now, to the durable factors such as geography, culture and language, the transient explosive factor of a 30% inter-wing economic disparity was added, if only to finally disenchant the East from the West. A 30% disparity could not be wiped out overnight, although Ayub had made its liquidation a constitutional obligation. Although East Pakistan had as well complained of gross discrimination in resource allocation over the years, ‘no government has less adequately reflected Bengali political demands, nor more fully accepted Bengali economic demands, than the regime of Ayub Khan’, to quote Wayne Wilcox.13 In any case, the grievances, whether perceived or real, culminated in the demand for the ‘Six-Point Charter for Survival’, which the Awami League officially unfolded at the opposition conference on Tashkent in Lahore, in February 1966. What followed during the next five years is recent history and rather well known. Thus a continuing failure to meet the challenges of the Eastern wing’s diversity over the years had resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan and the hoisting of Bangladesh on the world’s map. That event represented a defining watershed in Pakistan’s existential career. She became the first country since World War II to become dismembered by internal revolt, backed by external intervention, even aggression by India with the tacit support of the Soviet Union whose Defence Minister stayed put in New Delhi till the fall of Dhaka on 16 December 1971.14 Equally important, Pakistan had been disowned

12 Mujibur Rahman, Our Charter for Survival: Six Point Programme (Dacca: Pioneer Press, 1966) and 6-Point Formula: Our Right to Live (Dacca: East Pakistan Awami League, 1966). 13 Wayne Wilcox, ‘Political Modernization in South Asia’, mimeographed (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, May 1968), p.43. 14 See M. S. Rajan, ‘Bangladesh and After’, Pacific Affairs, 45:2 (Summer 1972), pp.191–205; Imtiaz H. Bokhari, ‘Playing with a Weak Hand: Kissinger’s Management of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan Crisis’, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Affairs, xxii:1 (Fall 1998), pp.1–23; and Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Internal Strife and External Intervention: India’s Role in the Civil War in East Pakistan [Bangladesh] (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1981). For internal evidence, see the report by the Indian CIA, Challenges of Diversity and… 29 and abandoned by the demographically dominant Eastern wing in an emotional fit of sheer rage, revenge and euphoria, although it could as well have claimed Pakistan’s nomenclature, legacy, assets and international linkages, standing and clout. The residue West Pakistan became the successor to all this and much more, especially the nomenclature.

Bhuttos’s role and contribution Equally fortuitous was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s coming to the helm of affairs at this moment of truth, in post-Bangladesh Pakistan on 20 December 1971. At this traumatic hour, having won 81 out of 138 seats in the erstwhile West Pakistan in the 1970 elections, he had a democratic mandate to occupy the presidency in residue Pakistan as well. And he proved himself to be the man of the moment. Bold, energetic, pragmatic and visionary, he was a born leader, endowed with great qualities of head and heart. Patiently, indeed very patiently and methodically, he sought to pick up the pieces and tried to build up a ‘New Pakistan’, piece by piece, brick by brick. He took a series of measures to put the house in order internally and address the problems and pressures externally. And all the while, he was engaged in morale-boosting, facilitating and inducing Pakistanis to shed their slough of defeat and despondency, rise above the day-to-day rough and tumble to acquire a new pride, dream a new destiny and craft a new future, and in the process become active, vibrant, almost euphoric. The crafting of a new constitution by consensus in 1973 seemed to ensure the strengthening and streamlining of the extant polity with a democratic structure, appurtenances and ethos. And all this was the handiwork of one man – Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. That’s why I regard Bhutto as the man of the hour at that moment – the man who saved (West) Pakistan in that traumatic hour. But for him, with Wali Khan, Ghaus Bux Bizenjo and G. M. Syed sniping all the time from their ambushes ensconsced in the three smaller provinces and the success of the Bangladesh revolt serving as an incentive and inspiration, the still nebulous campaign for four Pakistans

the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW): Asok Raina, Inside RAW (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980). It acknowledges RAW’s involvement in the ‘Agartala conspiracy’ (middle 1960s) to separate East from West Pakistan; it claims establishing ‘RAW sanctuaries all along the Indo-East Pakistan border’ and training and guiding the ‘Mukti Bahini’ (the Bengali freedom fighters). In private conversation, Mujib had reportedly acknowledged his active involvement in the ‘Agartala conspiracy’, at the Round Table Conference in Rawalpindi, in March 1969. 30 Pakistan Perspectives in the West would surely have gathered force and momentum, with none in a position to forecast the denouement. It’s high time that Bhutto’s singular contribution in saving (residue) Pakistan be recognized, and that the myth of his being in part responsible for the dismemberment of Pakistan be laid to rest. Despite all these achievements, Bhutto could not avoid coming to a sticky end. That, in the ultimate analysis, should be put down to his own penchant for an animus dominandi role. Despite his rhetoric, despite tall claims, despite the crafting of the 1973 constitution, Bhutto was not inherently democracy oriented. His claims and the constitution proved to be a mere trapping, a mere façade without any solid democratic structure behind it except for the 1973 constitution, which Bhutto used to build himself up adroitly as an absolute ruler, the master of black and white. Otherwise, he would not have created the FSF as a private army owing allegiance to him alone, imposed minority PPP governments in the NAP- JUI dominated NWFP and Balochistan, initiated military action in the latter, banned the NAP and instituted the Hyderabad trial of the NAP leaders, downgraded, marginalized and persecuted the opposition groups and suppressed opposition newspapers and journals off and on, imposed emergency and Section 144 throughout his rule, rigged almost every by- election during the period and rigged massively the March 1997 general elections which proved itself as the last straw on the camel’s back. Of course, he was a democratically elected leader and the greatest leader that Pakistan had spawned during its sixty years’ existential career. He also had great opportunities and a fortuitous climate to put Pakistan on the road to a democratic destiny. But he failed to exploit those opportunities to establish a genuine democracy on the ground, if only because of his unquenchable penchant for absolute power. His high disdain for the sanctity of the ballot box finally proved to be his undoing. But for the massive rigging, the PNA movement would never have taken off and gathered momentum to sustain itself for over three months, and but for the PNA movement, the ground would not have been prepared for a Gen. Zia to step in. Bhutto’s sticking end is a tragedy of monumental proportions, but his exit represents a greater tragedy for Pakistan. For no one knows when Pakistan would be blessed with a leader with a vision, who approximates Bhutto. Of course, Bhutto did take a series of measures and established institutions to strengthen the forces of unity and commonalities among citizens and groups, yet he failed to address the problems of diversity, especially in the NAP-JUI strongholds of NWFP and Balochistan, and to balance diversity with unity. No doubt, his stress was on Pakistani identity but unless the inherent tension between unity and diversity is Challenges of Diversity and… 31 addressed, that identity fails to develop muscles and sinews to become an impregnable political reality. A good many commonalities in the Pakistani federal polity that exist today were initiated or strengthened during the Bhutto era. So also the diversities that threaten the very existence of Pakistan today as the paramount political unit.15

Commonalities: the thrust towards strengthening a federal polity Having explicated the historical dimension in order to alert you how monumentally consequential the non-recognition and non- accommodation of diversity could be, I now come to present day Pakistan. First, the commonalities in the Pakistani federal polity which provide a common space for one and all, whether it leaves enough room for diverse cultural practices, and for ethnic identities to exist and develop or not. Briefly indicted, these are:

1973 constitution: An agreed 1973 constitution which has stood the test during the past 38 years, despite political upheavals, military takeovers, inter and intra provincial discordance and dissidence, and low-intensity rebellions. Especially after the 18th amendment, which provides for devolution of power to the provinces and more equitable opportunities to the various provincial units.

NFC Award: The 2009 NFC Award which has been arrived at by consensus and which provides for considerable fiscal autonomy to the provincial units. The extant share of Rs. 550 billion has been raised to a total of Rs. 1,250 billion of financial resource (57.5% of the national pool) by the end of the fifth year of the Award’s announcement. The inclusion of other factors, besides population, has been finally recognized as the basis for allocations to various units and their share stands as follows: Punjab 51.74%; Sindh 24.55%; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 14.62%, and Balochistan 9.09% of the national pool. Population was given 82%, poverty 10.3%, revenue collection 2.5% and area 2.7% weightage. Except for the Punjab, the whipping boy in inter provincial discourse, all the provinces have gained an increase, with Balochistan topping the list. All this obviously makes the Award more equitable, and leaves room for further consensus.

15 See Sharif al Mujahid, ‘Balancing unity with diversity’, Dawn, Pakistan Day Supplement, 23 March 2011. 32 Pakistan Perspectives

National language/link language: Although Urdu is recognized as the national language, a linga franca represented by English for the elite, business and entreprenuer classes has been in vogue. In tandem, Urdu has served as the link language for the masses, and it has been immensely popularized by, especially, the electronic media. True: the nationalists have, often demanded the raising of the various languages in the various regions to a national language status, but that is no solution to the problem, if any, posed by Urdu as a national language – except for boosting the ego of the nationalists. For even when all the languages are designated as national languages, we would still need a link language for the masses across the regions – just as Hindi serves in India, although it is dominant only in two states: Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Equally important: Urdu’s claim and clout are buttressed not only by Jinnah’s patronage – after all, he had no earthly reason to do it except for national interest since he didn’t speak it at home, nor during his professional and political engagements – but, more important, by its ubiquity and universality: it is understood, if not spoken, throughout Pakistan. One major indicator is that the two most outstanding Urdu poets during the past six decades belonged to non-Urdu mother tongued regions – Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Ahmad Faraz. And it is the Pakistani symbolism represented by Urdu that had induced Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to speak in Urdu in his state banquet address in Dhaka, on 30 June 1974 during his official visit to Bangladesh.16 Of course, the Sindhis are extremely sensitive about their language, and have put in a strident demand for a national language status. But such recognition may well be catastrophic even from the Sindhi viewpoint in the long term. It may encourage interior Sindh to shy away from English and Urdu all the more, and demand opportunities and jobs on the basis of their expertise in Sindhi alone, leading ultimately to turning interior Sindh as a ghetto language-wise. Since no language bereft of increasing opportunities for employment and power has any future in the present globalized village, it is bound to fail to meet the basic utilitarian criteria for sheer survival. Ground realities rather than mere emotions should guide the Sindhi nationalists.

National & regional parties: The emergence of two major, though dynastically oriented, political parties – the PPP and the PML – on a national level which have alternated ruling Pakistan since 1988, besides strong sub-national parties within the constituent units (as in Belgium and Switzerland) – parties such as the MQM, ANP, JUI, BNP, JWP and

16 Dawn, 01 July 1974. Challenges of Diversity and… 33 other Baloch parties. PPP’s condescension to tolerate the PML-N government in the Punjab, although without abandoning its machinations and manoeurings to rock the PML-N boat since Salman Taseer’s appointment are as Governor in April 2008, is yet a vast improvement over the 1971-77 and 1988-99 approach when a split mandate in any province was seldom tolerated. But Taseer (d. 2011) and his successor, Sardar Latif Khosa, opting out for a PPP Jiyala role, turning the Governor House into a PPP den, indulging in rhetoric against the PML (N) and the Punjab government, of which the governor is the constitutional head, violate the sanctity and neutrality of that office as well as basic democratic norms. Likewise, MQM’s endeavour to shed its linguistic and urban Sindh origins, getting itself transformed incrementally into a Muttahida Qaumi Movement avatar and inducting itself into the mainstream politics, though generally unappreciated and misconstrued, is still a positive development. So is its sponsoring non-Urdu speaking candidates against Urdu speaking ones in some dominant Mohajir constituencies – such as against Javed Jabbar in the Federal ‘B’ Area cum North Karachi constituency in Karachi for a NA seat during the 2002 elections. (One wishes that the PPP takes a leaf out of it, and nominates a non-Sindhi to its traditional Lyari seat, if only to further buttress its claim as a truly federal party.) The MQM’s 30 January 2011 public rally at the Jinnah grounds, in Karachi, where it gathered speakers from various nationalities was a huge success, and may, hopefully, set a further positive trend for the future. Likewise, its 12 March 2011 public rally at Ranipur (near Sukkar), participated in by a large number of rural folks from neighbouring areas, and its second major rally at the Punjab Football Stadium at Lahore on 10 April 2011, whether it was a mammoth one or not. (The Punjab government’s denial of the Minar-i-Pakistan venue available to the MQM, while permitting it to be used by the sectarian Sunni Tehrik for its 17 April meeting, is by no means a positive development from a Pakistan perspective. If the MQM wishes to get out of its urban Sindh cacoon, its venture must be helped, not hindered.) The MQM had a token participation in the Gilgit–Baltistan (GB) elections two years ago, had two seats in the outgong AJK assembly and was also all set to participate fully in the 26 June 2011 Kashmir elections. But the uncalled for postponement of elections on two Karachi-based refugee seats because of the MQM’s refusal to withdraw on one seat in PPP’s favour led to an unexpected MQM’s knee-jerk reaction: it decided to boycott the elections, walk out of the coalition at the centre and in Sindh, and put in the resignations of its ministers and of the MQM-nominated Sindh governor. Ofcourse, this tantamounts to sheer blackmail at which 34 Pakistan Perspectives the MQM has proved itself to be an adept. But Karachi, having been so volatile, it should be more responsible for the sake of urban peace. But more important to note here is that despite MQM’s quirks and manipulations, the big picture over the past decade reveals a gradual shedding off of its erstwhile ethnocentric approach. So also MQM featuring a string of Pakistan flags at its recent rallies, affirming its Pakistani roots, besides its party loyalties and affiliation. Since the PPPs rise to power in the 1970s party flags have increasingly replaced Pakistan flags at public rallies, with other parties following suit – so that in recent years seldom does the Pakistan flag feature in most political rallies. The most basic, all inclusive identity has been sought to be shed in favour of a narrow particularist affiliation. At the height of his campaign to launch the PPP in treacherous circumstances, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had told Muzaffargarh’s Bar Association in January 1968 that ‘he had embarked on the formation of a new party’, which was a ‘progressive party’, yet ‘purely Pakistani in inspiration and direction’.17 It’s high time that his self professed legatees kept their covenant with their leader and mentor, not only by words but also through visual demonstration at their public rallies. If the foremost federal party like the PPP fails on that score what to expect of parochial, particularist and ethnocentric parties? The trouble with the MQM is that it has been a bit criminality- tainted18 (just as the PPP has been corruption tainted since the early 1970s).19 People outside urban Sindh are a little suspicious of MQM, although it has also tried to aggregate, articulate and process grievances and demands of other areas outside urban Sindh. Its contribution during the 2005 earthquake, its dynamism, discipline, and, above all, its middle class background are, however, widely acknowledged. If the PPP and the PML (N) and the ANP are downright dynastic, the MQM is severely monolithic and the ‘Quaid’ oriented (and dominated). Indeed, it is extremely difficult to get out of it once you are in formally. In the result, all three of them are bereft of internal democracy and that is bound to severely de-limit the chances for the eventual rise of a full fledged democratic order in Pakistan. Democracy, like charity, must begin at

17 Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (New York; Oxford University Press, 1993), p.116. 18 Abid Hussain, ‘Altafatism galore’, The Friday Times, 15-21 April 2011, p.9. 19 In 1977, the most telling PNA’s slogan was: Gali gali shore hai/Peoples Party chore hai (Street after street resonates with the outcry: that the Peoples Party is a highway robber). Challenges of Diversity and… 35 home; otherwise, you can’t expect to conform to democratic norms on the national lands cape. Ironically and inexplicably, the 18th Amendment, despite public uproar, did away with intra-party elections. As against these three parties, the ANP, also dynastic, has not been able to shed its Pakhtun origin and orientation. It claims 13 seats in the NA, a sizeable in the Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP) assembly, and two seats in Karachi, and heads the coalition alongwith the PPP in the KP. But it is yet stuck with a Pakhtun mindset all the way. Likewise, the JUI-F, though commanding some presence in other areas, is basically confined to PK and Balochistan.

Representation of various groups at the centre and in Administration: Although Punjab constitutes the largest province with about 56% population, the Pakistan polity has conceded more or less equal opportunities for parties from various provinces to stake their claim for power at the federal level. Otherwise, an originally Sindh based party like the PPP would have not ruled five times, totalling some 13 out of 18 years of civilian rule since 1970. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was President and Prime Minister for some 5 ½ years, Benazir Bhutto ruled twice for a total of five years and Asif Ali Zardari for over 3 years. And since 2008 the three top offices – that of the President, Senate Chairman and National Assembly Speaker – are occupied by three Sindhis: Zardari, Farook Naek and Fahmida Mirza.In tandem all the major nationalities except for the Baloch have occupied the presidential office since 1970. The rotation between the various provinces, though not by design, has also occurred at the apex in the judiciary. The polity provides a mechanism to guarantee various groups a place in the national decision making bodies. And this by the representation of most, if not all, groups and/or territories in the federal cabinets, and a separation and exclusivity of powers to own sources of revenue for the constituent units as per the 2009 NFC Award (as in Switzerland). The inclusion of some other factors, besides population, in the allocation of funds under the award makes it more equitable, but a complete consensus is still a long way off. The provincial quota in the services ensures representation of backward or less developed areas in the services. So does the rural-urban quota system in Sindh. However, the misuse of the quota system by the urban-based Sindhi middle class has conspired to make Sindhi urban-based candidates masque daring as ‘rural’ candidates – and thereby denuding the genuinely rural candidates of their legitimate share in jobs and opportunities under the rural quota mechanism. And because the newly educated Sindhi youth have tended to avail of this mechanism to get their educational degrees and plum jobs 36 Pakistan Perspectives in various sectors with little competition to face, they have been generally found to shirk competition and be less competitive, professionwise, in the private sector and on an all-Pakistan landscape. Otherwise, Sindhi doctors would not generally opt for routine and soft government jobs instead of competing for prestigious positions in private medical institutions, which are professionally demanding but carry a much higher pay package. At another level, women have been accorded 33% representation in the national and provincial assemblies, and a fair representation in the central and provincial cabinets.

Minorities’ participation: Despite the occasional inequities perpetrated on, especially, the Christian minority, the minorities have been more or less normally accommodated at various levels and in the electoral system. For the present, their seats are reserved, but they are nominated by the political parties as in the case of women’s quota of seats. However, it’s high time that the minorities’ demand for double voting and direct elections are conceded. At another level they have also been accommodated in the federal and Sindh cabinets. At another level, they have been conceded four seats in the Senate, one each for every province, and 5% quota in the Services. They have also had some representation in the judiciary cadre, with some of them being illustrious and high profiled – such as Justices Cornelius, Dorab Patel and Bhagwandas. These, in essence, are the positive indicators towards finding a right mix and balance between unity and diversity. For now, a look at the other side of the picture.

Diversity: the thrust against a viable federal polity Balochistan: Today Balochistan cries out for full jurisdiction over powers relevant to their ethnic survival, economic upliftment and nation building projects, and demands control over its resources. Indeed, Balochistan represents a classic case of the sharp divergence in economic development among the constituent units of Pakistan, and their cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations towards the national political system and the federal polity.20 This should not have happened in the first place – but for the tragic dearth of vision, political will and management capabilities on the leadership’s part, both federal and

20 On the criticality of these orientations, see Gabriel A. Almond and B. Gingham A Powell Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p.50. Challenges of Diversity and… 37 provincial. Zardari’s public apology coupled with the much publicised ‘Aghaz-i-Huqooq-i-Balochistan’ package has failed to make a dent in the province’s orientations towards the federal polity. On the other hand, the singular failure on the economic front is well illustrated by the Reko Diq copper-and-gold mines saga. These mines in Balochistan have reportedly the third largest reserves of world’s gold and copper, and under the raw material agreement Pakistan will get some 40 billion in 30 years. The Saindak mining project has been assigned to a Chile-Canadian consortium, which will give Pakistan only 50 per cent in royalties. Out of this the provincial government will receive only two per cent, which is obviously unfair. But if Pakistan itself is to mine and refine gold and bronze from Reko Diq, it will receive two billion dollars a year as against merely $160 million in royalties.21 Islamabad has put in a Rs. 29 billion claim before handing over the project to the province after the expiry of mining contract with the MCC, a Chinese company, in October 2012. Whereas the Reko Diq project encompasses gold and copper reserves worth 13 trillion, the mining company proposes to offer only five billion profits to the province in 56 years.22 Likewise, the Duddar Zinc and lead project tells the same tale. The province holds a miniscule share of 12.5 percent in the total return, Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation an equal share, and the rest going to the company.23 All this is grossly unfair and has obviously led to brewing discontent and increasing alienation. One wonders as to why the concerned institutions responsible for planning and development could have entered into such suicidal agreements – except for the kickbacks for the high and the mighty.

Punjab: The Punjab is often singled out as having ‘overrepresentation’ in the institutions of the federation’s public administrative, military, and judicial institutions, and in business and academic enterprises. But this complaint grossly ignores the ground reality that being a preponderant majority and the capability to build up capital formation, the Punjabis are bound to be more than visible in the various institutions. On the other hand, it is generally ignored that the Pathans almost command a monopoly over the transport system all the way from Khyber to Karachi, and the fruit and vegetable markets in Karachi and Hyderabad. The Mohajirs are considerably dominant in business enterprises, financial

21 Dawn, 15 January 2011. 22 Business Recorder (Karachi), 8 April 2011. 23 Dawn, 17 January 2011. 38 Pakistan Perspectives institutions, executive jobs and white collar cadres, if only because of their higher expertise, higher technical know-how, and their owning up the laisez-faire ethos – initiative, hard work, and a penchant for competition and a survival of the fittest approach. Generally speaking, they are the only ones willing to compete with the equally qualified but more resourceful Punjabis. However, for obvious reasons, they don’t find the turf even.

Ethnic federalism and faultlines: In essence, Pakistan represents an ethnic federalism, which is largely territory based. The constituent units, though generally set up chiefly for administrative reasons and convenience, are more or less along ethnic and/or linguistic lines, despite a lingua franca and a link language (as in Russia, India, Nigeria and Ethiopia). Also, as in India, Belgium and Ethopia, Pakistan makes visible the territorial distribution of ethnic groups with some faultlines – such as in Balochistan, southern Punjab (the Sarakai belt) and to a much lesser extent in Karachi and Hyderabad in Sindh. Hence the demand for more provinces. Generally speaking, more provinces lessen intra provincial grievances and hostility and facilitate greater integration since they extend greater opportunities to the various regions to develop along their own lines and become self sufficient and self reliant, instead of making the major component in the larger province a whipping boy for all their local ailments and failures. India which had only eight provinces in 1947, besides princely states and principalities, now comprises 28 states and four Union territories, and it is certainly not on the way to disintegration. However, demography in Balochistan cuts across ethnicity, with Pathans constituting a significant integral component. During the past few years, Baloch ethnicity and sub-nationalism have spiralled to new heights, serving not only the long-resident Punjabis and the Mohajirs but also Pathans to flee the smouldering volcano. Nearly 1,200 settlers have been reportedly killed since 2008, and those fleeing are estimated to number somewhere between 100,000 to 200,000 by various bodies, including Balochistan Punjabi Ittehat. Even Pakhtuns have been forced to find shelter in non-Baloch quarters of Quetta.24 The Seraiki belt in southern Punjab also cuts across ethnicity, but its demand for a provincial status within viable and self-sustaining boundaries cannot be long delayed. And to a lesser extent Sindh also represents a provincial unit where ethnicity cuts across territory, and may well pose a problem in the future unless the Mohajirs and the Sindhis

24 See the series of articles entitled, ‘Balochistan in focus’ by Cyril Almeida and Nasir Jamal, in Dawn, 26-30 June 2011. Challenges of Diversity and… 39 shed their particularisms and claims, and work for a modus vivendi for the province as a whole. In any case, the mere creation of more provinces is no solution for local grievances, failures and demands, per se. Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani’s endorsement of a Seraiki province is, however, not altogether based on its merits, but is meant to dent the PML (N) at its base in the Punjab. In any case, the Seraiki demand bids fair to loom large among the hotly contested issues between the two major parties in the next elections, with the MQM and the ANP poised to back it up. Seraiki may well be self-sustaining economically, but it is a bit unwieldy territorially if it claims all the Saraiki speaking areas including these in the KP and Sindh. And, then, what about Hazara which the ANP dominated KP government has recently divided into two divisions, if only to foil the Hazara’s bid for a provincial status. At another level of administrative complexity, how to carve out the Pukhtun dominated areas in Balochistan into a province? If Prime Minsiter Gilani plays politics with his Saraiki card, the Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, without even MQM’s prompting, has displayed the Karachi card. The furore over his statement, and Sindhi rhetoric over the graffiti calling for a Karachi province in some areas of the megapolis on 11 July 2011 provides a pointer to the sort of Sindhi reaction such a demand would spark. Above all, it should be recognized that mini provinces are bound to be administratively costly and economically unviable. Look at the federal and provincial cabinets, with their hordes of ministers and advisers. Every member of the Balochistan Assembly, for that matter, has been accommodated, either as a minister or as an adviser. This bad precedent the mini provinces are bound to follow – possibly with a one- point agenda to make the local notables fatter through corruption, nepotism and favouritism, as is the fashion at the federal and provincial levels at present. In any case, the hard reality is that the demand for more provinces hurt the smaller provinces as much as the Punjab. Neither Sindh, nor KP, nor Balochistan want to devolve. To provide the various regions a sense of participation, a more rational solution will be to strengthen the local bodies (LBs) financially and make them autonomous, which alone could bring democracy and development at the threshold of every hearth and home. Paradoxically, the PPP, despite its avowal for LBs in its manifesto, has always been antipathetic to the empowerment of local bodies all along, and, for now, the PML (N) seems o have fallen in line. But why? Is it because autonomous LBs deny them some lucrative channels of corruption and favouritism? But, remember, LBs everywhere in the world constitute the 40 Pakistan Perspectives base tier of democracy, with the provincial/state assemblies being the middle tier and the national assembly at the apex.

Karachi: The Sindhi speaking population has perhaps an extremely slim majority in the province as a whole while the Urdu speaking Mohajirs do not command an absolute majority in Karachi. Due to internal migration over the decades, Pakhtuns constitute about 25% of Karachi’s population, with Karachi being the largest Pathan metropolis in the world. More important, the ANP has successfully staked its claim, and sought to make a serious dent in the MQM’s stronghold. The MQM- ANP’s running feud is, of course, at the bottom of the periodic violence and target killing for the past few years. The violence, though ostensibly spurred on by ethnicity, actually stems from a power struggle over Pakistan’s economic and financial hub. The Pathans, powerfully buttressed by the IDP hordes from the north, and covertly backed by the PPP, seem determined to dent the MQM’s hold and assume a god-father like role over Karachi. Whatever the course this turf war may take in future, for the present this periodic political violence has had a domino effect on the quantum of crime, sector-wise. Just imagine Karachi hosting 1,452 murders, 1,211 rioting incidents, 29 gang rapes, 4 bank robberies, snatching/stealing of 14,941 motor bikes and 4,388 cars. And all this in 2010 alone, representing only reported cases.25 A Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) report claimed that a total of 1,138 people were killed in Karachi during January-June 2011, including 490 people felling in targeted killing on political, sectarian and ethnic grounds.26 And early in July, violence rose to new murderous heights, enveloping most of the city, with 97 persons killed, with grenade and rocket attacks, and with over a score of houses, shops and cars torched during just four days (5-8 July 2011). And all the while, the provincial government remained unmoved. But why? Was Karachi being punished for the MQM’s ‘crime’ of walking out of the coalition on 26 June, on the AJK’s election postponement issue? In any case, the countrywide outcry on the Karachi mayhem finally forced the government to send in the Rangers and the police to the troubled areas on 8 July evening and peace was restored within fifteen hours. This could have been easily done on the first day, within hours. Why did the government wait for full four days before moving its little finger? In any case, the end-result was simply horrible: Dawn claims that in terms of target killings and

25 The Friday Times, 28 Jan.-03 Feb. 2011, p. 8. 26 Dawn, 06 July 2011. Challenges of Diversity and… 41 insecurity, 2011 has proved to be the worst year in Karachi’s annals. It reported over 1,700 dead while The Friday Times put the toll at 1,891.27 As if all this was and is not sufficient to make Karachi, Pakistan’s chief economic artery, a veritable powderkeg, in had stepped the Lyari’s Peoples Aman Committee (PAC) since 2010. Lyari has for long been notorious as a hub of criminal activities and gang warfare and beyond the government’s writ. The PAC was originally founded in 2008 under Sindh’s Home Minister Dr. Zulfiqar Mirza’s patronage, to bring about and sustain a ceasefire between Lyari’s warring gangs, engulfed in warfare since 2001. It did, of course, end bloodshed in 2009, but subsequently had reportedly turned to extortion, kidnappings and robberies, to quote LEAs and market associations’ reps. It had also a sort of official PPP patronage. In response came the setting up of the Katchi Rabita Committee (KRC) comprising the oldest natives of Karachi, mainly comprising Memons, Gujeratis and Kathiawari speaking people.28 PPP’s inherent suspicions of the MQM and its electoral clout, despite its partnership with the latter both at the federal and provincial levels, have induced the PPP to come out in open support of the PAC. Zulfiqar Mirza, one of President Zardari’s confidents, called the PAC a ‘sister organization’, at a public meeting at Malir, Karachi, on 6 March 2011, and this led to a PPP-MQM spat, with the latter finally pressurizing Zardari to restrain Mirza MQM’s boycott of the National and Sindh Assembly.29 Meantime, the PPP members in the Sindh Assembly accorded Mirza a rousing reception twice, pledging him support for his patronage of the PAC and urging him to move forward.

27 ‘2011: The Year of Intrigue’, ibid., Supplement, 31 December 2011; The Friday Times, 06-12 Jan. 2012, p.4. Incredibly, political violence was ‘at its peak during the first eight months’: 129 people killed in January, 94 in February, 215 in March, 178 in April, 143 in May, 174 in June, 324 in July and 229 in August. While the violence, however, dramatically came down after President Zardari’s intervention and the resignation of anti-MQM Home Minister Zulfiqar Mirza. (Ibid.) That indicates how critical was Mirza’s presence in the corridors of power. 28 Dawn, 08 March 2011. The state of insecurity and gangsterism ruling the roost in Lyari generally was dramatically demonstrated by the en masse resignation of some 300 employees from the faculty in all the 13 departments of the Benazir Medical College on 01 October 2011, citing serious concerns about their security and alleging, among other things, physical abuse and sexual harassment. The alleged threats mostly affected female members, constituting 70% of the faculty. Ibid., 02 October 2011; and The Friday Times, 04-10 November 2011, p.15. 29 Dawn, 08 March 2011. 42 Pakistan Perspectives

This PPP’s stance created a first rate crisis among Sindh’s major coalition partners, but it was somehow fortuitously averted by Zardari’s timely intervention to calm the rough and troubled waters. The PAC has been dissolved with its members joining the PPP, and its patron, Dr. Mirza, induced to go on ‘long leave’.30 But when he did come back he ignited yet another crisis by (what Dawn calls) his ‘irresponsible and inflammatory statements’ – this time at ANP’s Shahi Syed’s reception on 13 July, wherein he called ‘an entire community, the Urdu. speaking people of Sindh,... as a whole worthy of condemnation’, and the progeny of bhuka aur nanga immigrants into Sindh at partition time. The huge conflagration it stoked across urban Sindh was somehow doused by a presidential intervention and MQM Chief Altaf Husain’s appeal for calling off the ‘spontaneous’ strike across urban Sindh, some seventeen hours later.31 Target killing is, for now, confined to Mohajirs, Pakhtuns and the Baloch, and some 250 MQM workers as against ANP’s 70 have been killed, reports The Friday Times. But the Home Ministry, when pressed by the MQM to come up with a list of target killers, leaked a list of names that was ‘entirely made up and targeted the MQM alone, confirmed a joint investigation committee member. It omitted other political parties and mafia gangs and was disowned by other constituents of the joint committee’.32 The HRCP report, cited above, also gives the affiliation of those falling prey to targeted killing. Topping the list is MQM with its 77 activists gunned down, followed by ANP (29) and the PPP (26).33 A Free and Fair Election Network (Fafen) report claimed that 595 people fell victim to political violence throughout the country during March-May 2011, and that the MQM was ‘the most targeted political party’.34 These three reports from credible sources indicate MQM as the worst sufferer in target killing and yet Mirza’s Home Ministry would put the MQM as the major target killers and not the most target-killed. This means that the PPP never misses an opportunity to get its major coalition partner’s clout and credibility eroded.

30 Ibid., 07-18 March 2011, se also The Friday Times, 28 January-03 Feb. 2011, p.8. 31 See ‘Needless provocation’ – editorial, Dawn, 15 July 2011; and Business Recorder, 15 July 2011, esp. editorial: ‘Please get your facts right Dr. Zulfiqar Mirza’. 32 The Friday Times, 28 Jan.-03 Feb. 2011, p.8. 33 Dawn, 06 July 2011, p.15. 34 Ibid., p.3. Challenges of Diversity and… 43

The provincial government is altogether devoid of vision, viable options, efficiency, and political will, to effectively call a halt to this continuing internecine warfare. Moreover, of late the most effective trouble shooter, Federal Interior Minister Rahman Malik, also seems to have taken a back seat since his ‘interference’ in Karachi had ruffled the feathers of the provincial rulers. Hence, unless the federal government effectively steps in with a viable strategy to evaluate, process and accommodate the claims and counter claims of the contending parties, the economic hub of Pakistan is bound to continue smouldering.

Executive-judiciary tussle: For two years now, the executive-judiciary relationship at the national level has followed a roller coaster course. Since Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry’s restoration as Chief Justice on 16 March 2009, the Supreme Court (SC) has handed down several rulings against government’s appointments and decisions, besides ruling out as illegal the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), promulgated by General (Retd.) Musharraf in 2007 to enable the PPP leaders to return and participate in the upcoming elections. Sometime the government meekly surrenders, and at other times the Supreme Court simply turns the blind eye, on the government’s failure to carry out its directives, and abstains from a follow-up – if only to avert a complete breakdown and confrontation between the two major organs of the governmental structure. The most recent clash between them got initiated on 10 March 2011, when the SC had declared the appointment of Justice (Retd.) Syed Deedar Hussain Shah as National Accountability Bureau (NAB) chairman as ‘illegal’, and ordered him to relinquish his post immediately. This, of course, he did but the SC ruling also initiated a new round of confrontation between the executive and the judiciary. Taj Haidar, Sindh PPP’s Secretary General, and Sharjeel Memon, Sindh Chief Ministers advisor, called for a strike on 11 March throughout the Sindh province, and Karachi, as usual, descended into an orgy of death and destruction. More provocative: the provincial assembly took the step of passing a resolution against the SC ruling and Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly. The undertone behind the protest and the resolution was, however, implicit: that Sindh was being penalized. Of course, Chief Minister Syed Qaim Ali Shah, as usual, indulged in suppression veri and suggestio falsi: he denied the PPP or the Sindh government having had anything to do with the 11 March strike, although the PPP’s Secretary-General and Sindh government’s advisor were actively involved in it. And perhaps as a reward for organizing a ‘successful’ riposte Memon was sworn in as Minsiter for Information subsequently. Memon was charged with 44 Pakistan Perspectives contempt on 26 March, and he came out with the plea that his was ‘merely a fair and healthy comment on the decision of the honourable court’. Inter alia, his submission alleged, ‘But judgments always came against popular leaders from Sindh and other small provinces’.35 And herein lies the rub: the PPP is still obsessed with playing the Sindh card. In any case, this episode calls for special notice since the SC rulings have been brought to the street, and this by the government of the day. Not only unprecedented, but also violative of democratic norms, this confrontationist posture poses a new hurdle towards strengthening the federal polity. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the emergent judicialism of politics is not an unmixed bag. It bids fair to cause a profound shift in power from the elected and accountable institutions, and hence poses a threat to the survival and consolidation of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. The judiciary needs to avoid taking nitty gritty and nuts and bolt issues such as fixing commodity prices, Haj quotas, executive appointments at the lower levels and the like, and needs to restrain its activism from playing out an instrumentalist role in the country’s politics. More so because it may well ‘trigger a struggle for supremacy between the judiciary and the other two branches of government’. Moreover, because the judiciary itself may get ‘politicised if its decisions pertaining to partisan politics fail to secure public acceptance’.36 And as far as the recurring executive- judicial confrontation is concerned, it’s high time both the organs heeded The Friday Times, warning: ‘The only same course is for both the SC and Zardari government to step back from the brink, take a deep breath each and survey their declining graphs. The masses are alienated from the courts for denying them quick justice and from the government for pushing them over the povertyline’.37

Conclusion Finally, to sum up our discussion. The problem of how to balance diversity with unity plagues all federal polities, and Pakistan is no exception to it. The inherent tension between diversity and unity does affect federal governance in a large measure, and since federalism cannot flourish without full fledged democracy there is an organic relationship between federalism and democracy. After all, a democratic polity alone

35 Ibid., 11,12 and 18 March 2011, and 06 July 2011, p.14. 36 See Mushtaq Gaadi, ‘Politics and the Judiciary’, in ibid., 05 July 2011. 37 Editorial: ‘What an extraordinary week’, The Friday Times, 22-28 Oct. 2010. Challenges of Diversity and… 45 can accommodate diversity via the conduct of public policy including ongoing claims for rectification of past wrongs. Successful management of differences call for a democratic culture, an equitable share in power, decision making and resources, and development of backward areas and communities on a preferential basis. The case of East Pakistan during the 1950s and the 1960s and the case of present day Balochistan indicate that the attributes listed above are in the nature of a must to balance diversity with unity. Other than long standing tensions, there is a need, at once imperative and immediate, to recognize differences and to respect them while promoting unity, trust and solidarity among citizens and groups. In essence, this means that there is scant need to assimilate or get assimilated into other cultures but to respect them for what they are. Translated into mundane terms, it means that it is not absolutely necessary to flaunt a Sindhi topi at the Sindh Cultural Festival, if only because you are used to be attired differently, but to respect the Sindhi topi for what it is worth – as a symbol of Sindhi culture. The same goes for the Sindhi ajrak as well. (Following the Sindhi leaders, Isfandayar Wali Khan and his cohorts have begun sporting a cap with an ANP emblem – for instance, at the Bachha Khan-Wali Khan death anniversary in Peshawar, in late January 2011.) Likewise, personal participation in the Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai’s Urs is not a must but respecting him as a mystic poet and Sufi is. On my part, I have taken to the western attire because it is more convenient, more functional and more universal. In tandem, I have taken to English, not because I love my mother tongue and other Pakistani languages less, but because English brings me to the threshold of an ocean of knowledge and unlimited opportunities. Attire, language and the like are guided and determined by certain utilitarian values and prerequisites, which we are obliged to adhere to for sheer survival in a laize-faire-based cosmos. Although the endeavour to balance diversity with unity is a continuous process, there is a dire need to develop multiple identities. Whatever be one’s racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious identity, everyone inhabiting Pakistan is first and foremost a Pakistani, and his Pakistani identity comes first. Remember, what Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate in the US 1952 presidential elections said early in November 1952, while conceding victory to General. Eisenhower: ‘that which unites us as Americans is greater than that which divides us into parties’. Translated into our context, it means that that which unites us as Pakistanis is greater than that which divides us into a motley crowd of sub-identities, cultural and linguistic entities and ethnicities. There’s no earthly reason why anyone should opt for an exclusive single identity. 46 Pakistan Perspectives

Multiple identities are the law of life, and the ruling passion with the globalized village. No wonder, Amartya Sen (Identity and Violence: the Illusion of Destiny) recommends the cultivation of multiple identities, more so because it makes a person generous and tolerant as opposed to one with only a single identity which solely determines what he ‘includes’ and what he ‘excludes’. This, however, does not call for downgrading or wiping out any of the sub-identities. Remember: diversity is not inherently a threat, ab initio or ipso facto, to the survival and prosperity of a federal country like Pakistan. More important, the recognition, accommodation and integration of ethnic, linguistic, racial and/or religious minorities are compatible with legitimacy, national unity and social cohesion. Above all, this denotes greater integration rather than disintegration. Hence it is high time that we went in for an inclusive, rather than an exclusive, approach – both in precept and practice. Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Historical Images of British India Facts and Fantasies

Salim al-Din Quraishi*

Abstract When the East India Company’s servants first arrived in Bengal in the beginning of the seventeenth century they portrayed themselves, what Hastings later described as ‘the humble and undreaded character of trading adventurers’ - their sole aim being to earn hefty profits before returning to England. They had brought with them teams of writers to record transactions of their trades as well as to write down details of their adventures in a strange land. With them also came men who would collect specimen of manufactured and agricultural products, local flora and fauna, crafts, costumes etc. They were followed by those who could draw and paint scenes of everyday life in towns and countryside, pictures of native men and women belonging to various races, tribes, professions, trades, their social and religious customs, etc, which could either be exploited for trade by their countrymen or which could be sold in the growing market of curiosities brought to England from foreign lands. ––––––––– The East India Company also commissioned a number of artists who, in order to meet the growing demand for such works at home produced a large quantity of drawings and prints illustrating trades, occupations, tools and economic processes etc to illustrate the economy and technology of a traditional civilization which was fast disappearing under the onslaught of cheap and mass produced products manufactured by industrially advanced countries of Europe. The British painters were also assisted by a number of Indian artists and painters, who, working under their patronage and adapting their traditional skills to new European tastes and techniques, were able to produce a large number of paintings and drawing on similar themes. With the steady growth of company’s power and expansion of its territories, British officials also began commissioning and patronizing paintings and drawings of various important events, places as well as portraits of important personalities in India. Individual artists, travelers, and officials also added to this collection impressions of their personal

* Salim al-Din Quraishi, Former Head, Modern South Asian languages section, Oriental and India Office collections, The British Library, London. 48 Pakistan Perspectives experiences in the subcontinent. With the advent of photography these collections were greatly augmented by the works of a number of famous photographers, such as Samuel Bourne, Johnstone, Hoffman, Deen Dayal etc. In addition to all these the company officials also acquired a large number of Mughal masterpieces of the Akbar and Jahangir’s period, including the famous Dara Shikoh Album as well as many important portraits of the eighteenth century rulers, famous personalities, landscapes, seascapes and battle scenes. Specimen of such drawings, paintings, prints and photographs can be found in a large number of private collections, museums, archives, and libraries in the subcontinent, in Europe and in America - the largest single such collections being in the Prints and Drawings Section of the Oriental and India Office Collections of the British Library in London. For the people of the subcontinent these collections represent sometimes the only surviving record of the arts, crafts, costumes, monuments, people etc of this period, and provide glimpses of the social and cultural life their ancestors enjoyed during the 18th and early part of the 19th century. To the British public at large they provide an Aladdin’s cave to arouse nostalgic memories of their imperial past. The importance of these collections acquires extra importance when one realizes the paucity of contemporary published accounts of this bloodstained and tumultuous period of the subcontinent’s history which had witnessed the final collapse of the once glorious Mughal empire and the foundation of the British empire in India. The result is that there are many aspects of our past history and details of life, character and contributions of various native rulers and individuals which remains obscure from our eyes. This is particularly true of the period between 1700 and 1857 during which the British had achieved almost a complete domination over India. For example there is hardly any contemporary published account of the Mughal emperor Shah Alam’s life by a native author.1

1 Jean Law De Lauriston’s Memoire de L’Empire Mogol, Paris, 1913; A.L.H. Polier‘s Shah Alam and his court, Calcutta, 1947; K.K.Datta, Shah Alam and the East India Company, 1965; Michael Edward’s King of the World, London, 1970 are a few other works which have been produced during the subsequent two hundred years. In addition one can perhaps glean some additional information on this subject from A.K. Majumdar’s Raja Rammohun Roy and the last Moguls, Calcutta, 1939; Percieval Spear’s Twilight of the Mughals, Cambridge, 1951, Jadunath Sarkar’s Fall of the Mughal empire and Datta's Later Mughals. Bahadur Shah II, the last of the Mughal emperors has attracted a little more attention, but with the exception of Munshi Faiz Uddin’s eye-witness Historical Images of British India Facts and Fantasies 49

The only exception being Francklin’s History of the reign of Shah Aulum (London, 1798) which is based on the Persian manuscript Shah Alam-namah, or A’in Alamshahi by Ghulam Ali. It is, however, incomplete as it ends in 1793. If we look for any account of the life of Shah Alam’s son and successor Akbar Shah II (1806 – 1837) who ruled for nearly thirty one years there is not a single work available either in Persian or Urdu or for that matter even in English. The lack of interest in this period by historians is, I believe, not due to the absence of primary sources, for there exists in the Oriental and India Office Collections of the British Library, as well as in various archives in India and Pakistan a vast amount of material, including original correspondence of Shah Alam, Akbar Shah and Bahadur Shah II with the British and some contemporary Persian accounts by native authors which could keep a large number of researchers occupied for years to come. I believe it is because the time has marched on and the historians find it much more rewarding to write on the freedom movement and political heroes of the immediate past than on the tragic lives of the last Mughal emperors of India. The result is that with the exception of Ghulam Husain Tabatabai’s sketchy and anecdotal account of this period, Siyar al-mutakhirin [Calcutta, 1833] our perception and understanding of events of this period is, more or less solely based on one-sided, and often jaundiced accounts of events and personalities published by the British during the heyday of the British raj. Similarly, in many instances, the visual images of historical events and personalities produced during this period are based on complete ignorance, mistaken identities or simply to boost the ego of some company official in the eyes of his compatriots at home. For example during his stay in India Lord Clive had commissioned a number of paintings of events in which he had played a leading role. This includes a well-known painting, entitled, ‘Lord Clive receiving the Diwani of Bengal, Behar and Orissa from Shah Alam in August 1765’. The painting shows Shah Alam 11, robed in gold-coloured satin with turban to match, seated on his throne under a large canopy in the Diwan-I Khas of the Red Fort at Delhi conveying the grant of Diwani, or fiscal administration of Bengal, Behar and Orissa to Lord Clive. He is

account of the social and cultural life at his court, entitled Bazm-i Akhir, Mahdi Hasan’s Bahadur Shah II and the War of 1857, Rais Ahmad Jafari’s Bahadur Shah and Burke and Quraishi’s Bahadur Shah II almost all other works deal mainly with his life as a poet or his role in the Mutiny of 1857. 50 Pakistan Perspectives accompanied, on his right, by his second in command, General Carnac, followed by Captain Swinton, Major Pearson and other officers in full uniform. Behind these are the banners of the Mughal emperor and some elephants. The original painting was at one time the property of Lord Plymouth and was kept at Oakley Park. A copy, painted by Benjamin West on a canvass of approximately 285 x 375 cm was presented by the First Earl of Powis and the son of Lord Clive, to the India Office in 1820. This painting was first reproduced as an illustration in Michael Edwardes’ Plasssey: the founding of an empire (London, 1969) and recently as a dustcover of The British Raj: an historical review by S. M. Burke and Salim al-Din Quraishi (Karachi, OUP, 1993). Assuming it to be a true representation of an actual historical event a number of historians have added fanciful details to make their version of events credible. The fact of the matter is that, ‘no such ceremony ever took place – the firman and the Khillat were merely dispatched to Major Carnac at Patna to be forwarded to Clive.2 Describing it as a treaty signed between Shah Alam and Lord Clive and without citing any sources to support their assertion, some later historians have added imaginative details to prove the authenticity of their remarks. W.H. Davenport Adams,3 for example, advocates that: the treaty was signed by Shah Alam on ‘August 12, 1765, in Clive’s own tent, the imperial throne being represented by a chair supported upon a couple of tables’. Michael Edwardes4 adds the following details to the above account: ‘On 12 August the emperor seated himself in Clive’s tent on a throne made from an armchair, covered with brocade and mounted on a dining–table. He then formally handed to Clive the written allocation of the revenue. The British were now, de jure, a part of the Mughal empire’. Edwardes also quotes the opinion of a contemporary Indian historian who, while commenting on the haste and ease with which this deal was concluded, declares ‘at any other time [this] would have required the sending of wise ambassadors and able negotiators, as well as a deal of parley and conference with Company and the king of England, and much negotiations and contentions with the ministers, was done and

2 See a note accompanying the above mentioned painting by Benjamin West in the India Office Library. 3 W.H. Davenport Adams, The Makers of British India, London, 1954, p.79. 4 Michael Edward, King of the World, London, 1970. Historical Images of British India Facts and Fantasies 51 finished in a less time than would have been taken up for the sale of a jackass, or a beast of burden, or of a herd of cattle’. As a matter of fact the treaty of 1765 referred to above by Adams, Edwardes, Smith etc (see picture) was concluded on 26 Safar, 1179 AH/ 16 August, 1765 not between Shah Alam and Lord Clive but between Shuja al-Daulah, the estranged [The emperor had deprived Shuja al-Daulah of his office of wazir after the battle of Buxur] Nawab Wazir of Oudh, and the teen-aged Nawab Mir Najm al-Daulah, the Navab of Bengal on one hand and Lord Clive and General Carnac on the other. Shah Alam’s name is mentioned in this treaty only in clause ten where it is agreed between the two parties that the East India Company would withdraw its forces from all areas and only a small force which may be required for the personal protection of the Emperor Shah Alam, will be kept, if he so desires, in the fort of Allahabad, and that it could be recalled by Nawab Shuja al-Daulah whenever he may like to do so. The treaty is written in English and Persian, but bears the official seals of the following signatories in Persian only:5 1. On the right-large round seal with the inscription: Vazir al-Mumalik, Umdat al-Mulk, Madar al-Maham, Umdat al-Daulah, Asafjah, Burhan al-mulk, Shujah al-Daulah, Abu al-Mansur Khan Bahadur Safdar Jang, Yar-I vafadar, sipah-salar, fidvi-yi Shah Alam Badshah Ghazi. [Minister of State, noble of country, chancellor of exchequer; faithful companion, commander-in-chief of the Imperial army, a servant of Shah Alam Badshah Ghazi]. 2. On the left top - oblong seal with the inscription: Zubdat al-Mulk, Mansur al-Daulah Lord Clive Sabitjang Bahadur, Fidvi-yi Shah Alam Badshah Ghazi.[the cream of state, defender of state, Lord Clive, firm in war, servant of Shah Alam Badshah Ghazi]. 3. On the bottom left - round seal with the inscription: Mansur al-Mulk, Rukn al-Daulah Major John Carnac Bahadur, Bahadur Jang, Fidvi-yi khas Shah Alam. [Defender of State, Pillar of State, Major John Carnac Bahadur, Valiant in war, most devoted servant of Shah Alam Badshah Ghazi].

5 It was reproduced in the Journal of Indian Art for July 1890; also in the Relics of the Honourable East India Company (1909). For some time it was in the possession of Sir John Kaye [see his letter in the Pall Mall Gazette of 27th April 1875, William Foster, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Paintings, Statues etc in the India Office, 5th ed, London, 1924, p.77. 52 Pakistan Perspectives

Plate: 1

Historical Images of British India Facts and Fantasies 53

The text of the concluding paragraph of the treaty in Persian reads: Nawab Shuja al-Daulah Bahadur, Safdar Jang va Navab Lord Clive Bahadur Sabitjang, va Navab General Carnac Bahadur, Bahadur Jang, batarikh-I bist va shashum shahr-I Safar al-Muzaffar, Sanah-i Julus-I vala, mutabiq Sanah 1179, yak hazar va yak sad va haftad va nau Hijri, ba- mushafihah mayan dar muqam-I Allahabad bar-in ‘ahd- namah dastkhatt va muhr kardand va qasm-I din va a’in-I khud numudand. [Navab Shuja al-Daulah, Lord Clive and General Carnac concluded this agreement after their meeting in person at Allahabad on 26th Safar, 1179 Hijri, and have signed and affixed their seals on this document on that date and took oaths of their religion and laws to abide by this agreement]. This statement is followed by impressions of two small personal seals of two witnesses, Muhammad Umar and Salamat Allah. The English text is witnessed by Messer. Edmund Masculine, Archibald Swinton and George Navistar. It is interesting to note here that on their personal seals, Clive and the other British officials proudly declare their subservience, allegiance and loyalty to the Mughal emperor and claim themselves to be the most devoted servant of Shah Alam and not that of the East India Company. Similarly, in his correspondence with Clive, Carnac and Lord Lake the emperor addresses them as his most sincere or obedient servants. For example Major John Carnac is addressed as: Amárat va iyålat-i martabat, Fidvi-yi khas ba-ikhlas, daulatkhvah-i bargah-i badshahi, qabil-i ‘atufat va al-ihsan, hizabr arsah-yi dilavari, Mansur al-Mulk, Rukn al-Daulah Major John Carnac Bahadur, Bahadur Jang. [Commander and governor of distinction, favourite and sincere servant, well-wisher of the prosperity of the state, worthy of affection and kindness, the lion of valour]. Shah Alam, in his correspondence with Lord Clive, addresses him as: Amárat va iyålát-i martabat, hashmat va shaukat-I manzilat, Fidvi-yi khas, Rasikh al-burhan, Umdat al-Khvanin, Buland Makan, La’iq al-‘inayat va al-ihsan, Zubdat al-Mulk, Amir al-Mumalik, Nasir al-Daulah, Lord Clive Bahadur Sabitjang. 54 Pakistan Perspectives

As far as the grant of Diwani by Shah Alam to Lord Clive is concerned it was ‘essentially a fraud’.6 First of all Clive, as an officer of the Mughal empire knew very well that he owed allegiance to the Mughal emperor. He also very well knew that the emperor was not in a position do so and if he did agree it would not be valid under the scrutiny of any national or international convention or law. Vincent Smith,7 for example, calling it a treaty between the East India Company and the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam, admits: the titular emperor, who was not in a position to have a will of his own and was thankful to get what he could, was provided for by the treaty of Allahabad, ...so far as he could, conferred on the Company the appointment of Diwan or coadjutor to the Nawab in all matters connected with the revenue. Clive had promised that out of the revenue collected from Bengal, Bihar and Orrisa the emperor would be paid a monthly sum of over two-and-a-half million rupees in future and would receive the territories of Allahabad and Kora which were detached from Oudh. At the same time the emperor had reminded Clive that Bengal owed the imperial treasury a considerable arrears of revenue. In conferring the grant of Diwani to Lord Clive, Shah Alam, in his opinion, had appointed yet another British nominee as Nawab of Bengal and assigned to him the right to collect the revenue because, as far as he was concerned, the British were no more than another greedier faction in the imperial war game. He had seen French, Dutch, Italian and German soldiers of fortune training the native armies of various nawabs and kings all around him and winning victories on their behalf. He himself had earlier employed a German soldier of fortune, Reinhardt, commonly known because of his dark complexion by the name of Sombre. At one time some of Shah Alam’s army was lead by an English soldier of fortune named Walker. No doubt they had become very powerful and occupied a large part of the country but so was the case with Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah Abdali/Durrani, Maharajah Sindhia, the Jats, and the Rohillas who were equally powerful at one time but had not dared to remove him from the seat of his empire.

6 Sir Pendere, Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, London, 1998, p.124. 7 Vincent A. Smith, The Oxford history of India, 2nd ed. OUP, 1923, p.503. Historical Images of British India Facts and Fantasies 55

Moreover the British officials had repeatedly assured him of their loyalty and attachment towards him. For example in a letter to Shah Alam on 8 August 1803 Lord Lake assures Shah Alam; I am cordially disposed to render your Majesty every demonstration of my loyalty and attachment and I consider it to be a distinguished honour as well as peculiar happiness to execute your Majesty’s command. And the resident was directed to use all forms of respect considered to be due to the Emperor of Hindustan. Another painting which Clive had commissioned while he was in India is entitled: ‘receiving from the Nawab of Bengal [probably Nawab Najm al-Daulah, Mir Ja’far’s son and successor] the Grant of the Sum of Money’ [five Lacs] in 1770. The amount was used to establish the Fund for Disabled Officers and Soldiers, known as Lord Clive’s Fund. The painting was commissioned to adorn the Military Fund Office created for that purpose. It is 120 cm by 180 cm and was completed by Edward Penny on 3rd February 1773. Penny was paid a handsome amount of 200 Guineas, out of the Contingent Military Fund. The picture was first reproduced in William’s edition of Macauley’s Essays on Clive (p.78) and later in Michael Edwardes’ Plasssey: the founding of an empire (London, 1969). Historically there is no record of any such ceremony ever taking place. In fact, the warrant for the money was handed over to Lord Clive by the widow of Mir Jafar ‘after much persuasion and cajoling’ nearly a year later.8 The above-mentioned two examples are given here to show a willful effort to misrepresent history in order to boost ones own image and to impress ones compatriots. There are other paintings where the artist, out of sheer ignorance and mistaken identity has portrayed important events and personalities in a distasteful manner. For example Mrs. Colin Mackenzie, who was the wife of Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Mackenzie, (1753–1821), Surveyor General of India, 1816 – 1821, along with her male companion, Mr. Ryley, visited the Royal Palace at Delhi on 1 January 1850 and took pictures of various people and places, including those of the Queen Zinat Mahal and her son and heir-apparent Jawan Bakht.

8 W. Foster, A descriptive catalogue of the paintings, statues, etc. in the India Office. 5th ed. London, 1924, p.32. 56 Pakistan Perspectives

Plate: 2

Historical Images of British India Facts and Fantasies 57

These were included in her Life in the Mission, the Camp and the Zenana, or Six years in India9 - a work which enjoys a special place amongst the historical and cultural chronicles of this period and is widely quoted by later historians and writers alike. Bahadur Shah had married the young and beautiful Zinat Mahal on 19 November 1840. He was born on 24 October 1775, making him sixty-five years old at the time of his marriage. The marriage document or the nikah namah, of Zinat Mahal and Bahadur Shah now preserved in the Oriental and Indian Office Collections of the British Library records various other details about the bride and the bride-groom but not their ages or dates of births. However, she was reported to be in her early sixties when she died in Rangoon on 17 July 1886, making her between eighteen or twenty at the time of her marriage in 1840. Their son, Jawan Bakht, whom they both wished to appoint as heir-apparent, died at the young age of forty in Rangoon in 1884. He must have been six or seven in 1850 when Mrs. Mackenzie visited the palace. We have quite a detailed description of Mrs. Mackenzie’s visit to the royal family which was submitted as Court Intelligence to the British Resident, Metcalfe, and recorded by him in his diary of 1851: It was reported that a lady and a gentleman were employed in sketching views of Summan Burj. When the lady had finished sketching Bilal Ali Khan eunuch, waited on His Majesty and spoke in High terms of the lady’s talent to the King and Zinat Mahal Begam. They requested a visit from the lady, who took likeness of the Prince Mirza Jawan Bakht and the Zinat Mahal Begam. The likeness not having been finished the King requested the lady to come again and finish them. Mrs Mackenzie’s own version of these events is as follows: They introduced me to the Chief woman, Zinat Mahal Begum, or ‘Ornament of the Palace’ who struck me as old and ugly, and they lead me to the Kings apartment, where the old monarch was smoking his Huqqa. He is slender and feeble looking, but with a simple kindly face, though he took no notice of me when I came in, which I suppose is etiquette. His bedstead with four silver posts was with him; one old woman was rubbing his feet. No one was handsomely dressed. The old king wore a gold scull cap and a cotton

9 Mrs Colin Mackenzie, Life in the Mission, the Camp and the Zenana, or Six years in India, 2nd ed, London, 1854, Vol. 2, pp.182-84 & 194. 58 Pakistan Perspectives

chapkan. … The old king seemed pleased and asked me to draw the queen, to which I willingly agreed. She was so long in dressing herself, that it was dark soon after I began. She continues details of her observations in her account of the next visit: The Zinat Mahal Begum, or ‘Ornament of the Palace’ is the favourite wife of the present King of Delhi. This prince (the representative of the Great Moghal Emperors) has no authority beyond the precincts of the palace, where he vegetates on an allowance of about £130,000 from the British. The Queen, as we may call this lady, is a Hindustani and much darker than the King, whose fairer complexion testifies to his northern origin. She would by no means consent to be drawn in her usual plain attire, but changed it for one of red muslin, spotted with gold. She puts on about five pair of ear-rings, several necklaces, and an ornament of pearls like a tassel spread out upon the head. Her eyebrows were thickly painted. She seemed to spend her time in smoking, surrounded by a train of female servants, sitting on the floor and doing nothing. Two of them stood behind her with bundles of peacocks’ feathers, a mark of royalty both among Hindus and Musalmans in India. Her little son, as soon as I offered to sketch him, was hurried away to change his cotton chapkan or coat, for one of green velvet, richly embroidered in gold, with an aigrette of jewels in gold cap. The old King wished to have this little prince proclaimed heir apparent to his titular royalty, but the British Government refused their consent, as he has ten or twelve sons older than this one. Except when the chief eunuch brought them to order, the noise and chattering of the assembled women were deafening; they showed no signs of respect when the King entered, but remained sitting, and jested freely with him, the Queen laughing very loudly with her mouth wide open. This sketch was taken on New Years Day, [18]50, at the request of the King, who was much pleased with the likeness. Fortunately, we have another picture of the King and the Queen in the shape of miniatures painted on ivory by a portrait painter of the King of Delhi in circa 1850. Marked as a ‘beautiful specimen of native art’ these miniatures were first reproduced in the official history of the Mutiny by Sir John Kaye.10 We also have a photograph of Zinat Mahal

10 Sir John Kaye, A History of the Sepoy War in India, 3 Vols., London, 1870. Historical Images of British India Facts and Fantasies 59 which was taken when she was in prison with her husband and child in Rangoon. Both these picture clearly show that the women Mrs Mackezie had painted in the palace in 1850 was not the queen, but most probably Jawan Bakht’s ayah or perhaps the queen mother.

Plate: 3

60 Pakistan Perspectives

Not being fully aware of the court etiquettes and it seems without much knowledge of Urdu, not to mention the peculiar dialect spoken by the ladies of the court, Mrs. Mackenzie’s has made some other amusing comments on the court life in her work. For example, her description of the palace guards. ‘Some of H.M's Guards marched in; most of them were boys, almost children’ shows her complete ignorance of the fact that adult males were not allowed in the palace harem and that the guards she saw were not young men or boys, but young women of various nationalities trained and dressed up in guard uniforms of the royal palace. Munshi Faiz Uddin in his Bazm-I Akhir,11 which has an introduction by Prince Muhammad Sulaiman Shah Gorgani, head of the Timurid family and son of Bahadur Shah II, gives us a detailed description of these palace guards: After eating breakfast the king made a round of the palace. He was carried in palanquin accompanied by house guards dressed in male uniforms with turbans on their heads and scarves round their waist and lances in their hands. Then followed other African, Turkish and Indian female soldiers carrying lances. The Munshi further on adds: The King arrived in an open palanquin carried by female soldiers and accompanied by eunuchs holding fans and carrying hubble-bubbles. They were followed by Turkish and African female soldiers. Similarly, without respecting the sanctity of the Dewan-I Khas, where the peacock throne used to stand and where the King would not allow even the Governor General to sit, she asks Captain Robertson, Commander of the palace guard to provide her a chair to sit. The reaction of the palace servants when the chair was brought to her is described by her in these words: ‘immediately the servants of the palace were in a great fright, and begged me not to sit on it, or they would be turned off. However, they sent a message to the King on the subject, who said I might have a stool but not a chair, and according sent me a very rude little bench’. A classic case of mistaken identity by an author in giving a wrong caption to a picture is in Makers of British India by W.H. Davenport Adams where the Jami Masjid or the Central Mosque in Delhi has been presented to the readers as ‘The palace of Delhi’.

11 Munshi Faiz Uddin, Bazm-I akhir, Lahore, 1965. Historical Images of British India Facts and Fantasies 61

I am sure that there may be similar examples one may find in some other works of the artists and authors of this period but not doubt they are only a few and far between and these examples do not in any way diminish the importance of the vast collections of such material, including the records of archaeological surveys, landscapes, architecture, engineering projects, social scenes and portraits which are available to scholars in the India Office collection as well as in various other institution in the world. Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Civil Society, Democratic Governance and Development: The Case of Pakistan

Anwar Shaheen*

Abstract The civil society in Pakistan largely comprises NGOs, professional organizations and trade unions. The number of NGOs has been steadily rising in Pakistan, but the boom came in the 1980s. The performance of the NGOs has been commended as well as condemned. NGOs have been trying to ensure good governance, despite many problems inherent in the sector itself, emerging from their dependence on donors, internal management, lack of trust of the people, and political pressures. The government-NGOs relations have been strained at times. Other components of the civil society have been active only occasionally. On the whole the civil society in Pakistan has remained a weak entity if compared with other countries of South Asia. Therefore, it’s most significant area of operation – ensuring democracy – has also been deficient. The weakness of both the civil society and democracy has been deep-rooted. The paper is aimed at analyzing the interface among the major issues of social development, and limitations of the civil society organizations. This paper is based on primary data collected about role of the NGOs, from the NGO functionaries and social experts, along with using secondary sources about the role of civil society as a whole. ––––––––– Introduction The Pakistani society is undergoing an enormous change in almost all areas of its existence. However, the pace of change is varied and one may notice stark contrasts existing with each other. There are tribal institutions operating side by side with the transnational corporations. The globalized economic structures are functioning in the presence of feudal mode of production. The old is certainly dwindling to give way to the new; the process seems to be a complex one and thus the comprehension of this phenomenon is also not so simple. The role of both governmental and non-governmental actors has been important in this regard. The quality of governance has also been varying, yet, if judged from the perspective of realizing the ideals of equitable and

* Dr. Anwar Shaheen, Assistant Professor, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi. 64 Pakistan Perspectives sustainable development and prosperity, has largely remained on the weaker side. Democracy has not been fully realized yet, and achievements of Pakistan in democratic governance are also not satisfactory.1 The state itself has been quite lacking in providing basic needs and security to all the citizens. If one looks at the civil society as a counter-veiling force to the excesses the state, on the other hand, as a critic of its failures, Pakistan yet has to go miles to be able to claim that it has a vibrant civil society. Being a poor nation, according to the UNDP ranking, Pakistan has to rely heavily on whatever resources – human, organizational, physical, or cultural – it has for becoming a really independent and prosperous nation. This paper delineates the argument that a vibrant civil society is crucial for maintaining a pace of development which is normally expected of a democratic polity. This assertion, of course, cannot be free of contextual factors, such as the level of development of the society, infrastructure for delivering development goals, nature of the state apparatus, dominant approaches towards development, and socio- demographic characteristics of the population. In this context, Pakistan being an underdeveloped country, with a high incidence of poverty, and having different sets of socio-cultural norms in various regions, presents an interesting case for study. The circular argument of ‘a weak democracy leading to a weak civil society and vice versa’ can lead us no where. However, in a fast changing socio-political milieu and under the influence of information revolution, one cannot expect that the demand for democracy would be less significant or made in a casual manner, even in a poor country. Rather Pakistan is a country where democracy has been idealized, despite the fact that it has been mostly governed by un-democratic and dictatorial regimes. Even, such regimes have tried to adopt a democratic façade for a certain length of time in order to satisfy the popular demand for democracy. There have been large movements of the civil society for restoration of democracy, so it is hard to say that democracy is not embedded in the societal norms or ethos. One can, though, point out certain features of the polity which have been persistently hampering democratic governance, yet these cannot belittle the useful linkages between the working of the civil society and the process of development, negotiated through the institutions both in the governmental and non-governmental sectors.

1 This has been documented and analyzed by SDSA Team, State of Democracy in South Asia, A Report (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008). The report confirms a widespread aspiration for democracy, giving rise to new demands but it fails to meet them. Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 65

This paper particularly focuses the role of NGOs in enhancing development and creating awareness about socio-political rights of the masses. Both of these goals are interlinked, and have an interface with the issues of democratic governance in Pakistan. The first part of the paper explains the concepts of civil society, NGOs and democratic governance. It also explains the nature of state and issues of democratic governance in Pakistan. The second part is based on quantitative and qualitative analysis of data collected to judge the contribution of the NGOs towards realizing the cherished ideals of development and democracy. The data presented in tables and graphs, is based on an un- published study made by the author. One conclusion drawn from this study is that the issues of democratic governance and development of NGO sector have a good deal of similarity, yet the NGO sector and other civil society organizations are trying to expand their own space, and the space for democracy, too.

Methodology This paper presents findings of a survey. It has two sections; the first one is based on secondary sources, and the second one draws upon primary data collected through the survey. The first group of respondents comprised 120 NGO functionaries representing 93 NGOs, which have been working in all the four provinces, Federal Capital Area and Azad Kashmir. There were 3 international, 34 national, and 56 provincial/local level NGOs. They were asked to respond to questions with reference to their own NGOs. The second group of respondents included 60 social experts, selected to elicit their views on the performance of the NGO sector as a whole. They included 27 social scientists, 15 human rights activists, 11 journalists and 7 government employees of the social welfare department. They responded to the same matrix of questions as the NGO functionaries did, except for a few additional questions. Both the groups of respondents were asked to judge the contribution of the NGOs towards social change, development, democratic values and prospects for NGOs in Pakistan. The indicators were drawn in the context of modernization theory, dependency theory and the world- systems theory. Selected data from this study is presented in this paper in tables and figures. I Theoretical framework a. Defining civil society The modern social science literature assumes three major divisions of the society: state, business, and the voluntary/non-profit sector, also called the ‘third sector’. The three are linked together. The elements usually 66 Pakistan Perspectives counted in the third sector are called ‘civil society’, as well as non-state actors. The liberal school of thought presents civil society as an arena of social relations whereas the Marxist theory explains the way economic contexts and relationships determine a civil society.2 According to Haynes, civil society encompasses ‘the collectivities of non-state organizations, interest groups and associations – such as trade unions, professional associations, further and higher education students and religious bodies, and the media – which collectively help maintain a check on the power and totalizing tendency of the state.’3 A range of development organizations, and welfare and rehabilitation organizations, included in it are grouped together to be named as ‘NGOs’ (non- governmental organizations), while the rest of the list is also non- governmental in nature, but customarily not called ‘NGOs’. According to James, the non-state actors may include a large number of diverse elements, some of them are known as ‘voluntary agencies, action groups, grass roots organizations, non-governmental organizations, non- governmental development organizations, international development cooperation institutions, private philanthropic foundations, non-party political formations’.4 These are largely voluntary and service-oriented organizations and they lay emphasis on an approach ensuring them the identity of being people-centered and participatory organizations. Generally the NGOs are supposed to be non-political as per rules in Pakistan, but the action groups engaged in right-based activities are definitely and compulsorily political even if they do not claim to be. The implications of development and welfare also reveal ‘empowerment’ of a certain level resulting out of such activities, which means that all such activities, are political to a certain extent. This is basically an anomaly with the registration law, which demands the non-governmental organizations to be apolitical, and that assurance has rarely affected NGOs’ work to empower people, as their history shows. However, the onslaught of the state on the NGOs in Pakistan has been largely due to the same ‘empowering functions’ which enables people to challenge the established power structures. It is also due to the NGOs’ open criticism of government policies and actions, and demands for a favorable change

2 Oscar Rojas, ‘The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Sustainable Development’, in, CIVICUS, Civil Society at the Millennium (West Hartford (Connecticut): 2005), First South Asian Edition, p.88. 3 Jeff Haynes, Democracy and Civil Society in the Third World Politics and New Political Movements (Malden (USA): Polity Press, 1997), p.16. 4 P.J. James, Non-Governmental Voluntary Organisations, The True Mission (Kollam Ketal: Mass Line Publications, 1995), p.1. Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 67 from the powerful ranks of the society. The non-state actors also include action groups and pressure groups, which sometimes operate like NGOs.5 b. Evolution of civil society Historically, the fall of communist regime in the Soviet Union triggered and facilitated many changes in the world social and political systems. This engendered a change which transformed the state-civil society relations. The new set of relations, also called ‘co-governance’, meant ‘that power is no longer concentrated in the State. The State and its instruments of government remain of central importance; but it is no longer the sole actor in determining the direction of society.’6 One of the significant developments has been the introduction of neo-liberal thinking. In the post-1989 world, according to Zaidi: Market-friendliness, privatization, deregulation, devolution, and democracy are now the key cliches forming the mix (and fix) for societies that have hitherto been deviant from the norm adhered to in the West. With the demise of the bipolar world, the unipolar world now sees itself as an elongated extension of the West to the non-West. The measuring rod for success and achievement is now the ability to ape developed western countries, in order to make development ‘sustainable’. Governance, democracy, and devolution form a critical union to make development sustainable, and are said to manifest the key prerequisites for progress.7 Zaidi also explains that in the post-1989 world, devolution became a buzz word, declaring participation as a means to progress. Khan describes four stated objectives of devolution as: 1) building real democracy, 2) empowering institutional structure, 3) cost-effective

5 NGOs usually have defined objectives, vision and mission, some governing body or key individuals deciding the matters, and some program for work. To fulfill the registration prerequisites, they have to organize themselves, whereas pressure groups are loosely formed and sometimes do not operate regularly but only when the need arises. One famous example in Pakistan is that of WAF (Women Action Forum), which is often mistaken as an NGO. 6 Ezra Mbogori and Hope Chigudu, ‘Civil Society and Government: A Continuum of Possibilities’, in CIVICUS, op.cit., p.109. 7 S. Akbar Zaidi, The New Development Paradigm Papers on Institutions, NGOs, Gender and Local Government (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.4. 68 Pakistan Perspectives service delivery, and, 4) justice at the doorstep.8 Under the devolution policies adopted by the Musharraf regime in Pakistan, a bigger role was delegated to the local tiers of government, private sector and the NGOs for development, therefore, the state structures based on centralization started dismantling and weakening. Zaidi explains that ‘… the need for less bureaucracy, more efficient and timely delivery of services, and a closer and more direct access to the beneficiaries of development-related projects, have become an important consideration in this shift in thinking and strategy’.9 Spread of democracy was another important development of the post-1989 years, since many military regimes in the Third World countries and the command economies in the East European countries were replaced with democratic regimes. With rising devolution, more powers were delegated to the districts and municipal level governments. On the economic front, the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s reduced the role of the government. During the implementation of financial policies and amidst crises of the1980s and the 1990s, more budget cuts and cuts in grants to lower level governments, caused another source of pressure for the state to open up the social sector development to the private sector and the NGOs. Thus the decades of 1980s and the 1990s, saw an unprecedented growth and an increasing role of the non-governmental sector in development and planning. Ultimately it was a shift towards more democratization of the society hence real participation of the civil society groups was enhanced. They ‘demanded and obtained, new constitutions, and decentralized and local governments. The role of non-governmental organizations as important players in ‘civil society’ in these more mature states also helped to increase participation, with more control and involvement by organized groups’.10 By time, the government’s role became more active as a facilitator instead of a provider. The years after 1975 saw a series of awareness programs which resulted in a demand for realization of democratic and civil rights. To achieve that, civil society organizations grew in number, and they particularly took up the task of advocacy for human rights. It goes without saying that the governments of an authoritarian state could have never done that. Various other projects taken up by the NGOs focused upon service delivery as well, thus they

8 Shahrukh Rafi Khan, ‘Promoting Democratic Governance: The Case of Pakistan’, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 92. 9 Ibid., pp.4-5. 10 S.Akbar Zaidi, op.cit., p.7. Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 69 helped in development – a need much more easily realized by the people than the need for awareness-raising or advocacy for rights. The state has been receding and among its reasons were included its inefficiency and corruption. The output of development aid given to the governments for many decades was not found satisfactory, thus the approach of donors was changed. Since the day donors started insisting on giving fund directly to the NGOs, and not through the government, the NGOs have become, for some people, a lucrative business. Moreover, the access to the state, whoever enjoys it, is manipulated successfully to divert fund to their own NGOs, hence a large number of NGOs are run by retired bureaucrats, politicians or politically well-connected persons. This issue has direct linkage with the question of democratic governance and NGOs. Situating the emergence of civil society in the 1990s in Pakistan, Pasha refers to its potential as: ‘the expansion of civil society means democratic advance’, but he also warns of a blind faith in it, because ‘While promising new channels of ‘interest articulation’ and personal freedom, civil society also congeals a new form of social power which requires a stronger, not weaker, state to counteract. The prospects of democracy are, for better or worse, depending upon the manner in which civil society is stabilized by the state, …’11 thus democracy is having a synergic effect for civil society. Analyzing the structure and function of the civil society in Pakistan, Sattar and Baig explain the conception of civil society that is generally accepted in Pakistan, and which, to them is: ‘… an umbrella term for a range of non-state and non- market citizen organisations and initiatives, networks and alliances operating in a broad spectrum of social, economic and cultural fields. These include formal institutions such as … nongovernmental organisations, trade unions, professional associations, philanthropies, academia, independent and quasi-independent pressure groups, think tanks, and traditional, informal formations such as faith- based organisations, shrines, seminaries, neighbourhood associations, burial societies, … and savings groups’.12

11 Mustapha Kamal Pasha, ‘The ‘Hyper-Extended’ State: Civil Society and Democracy’ in, Rasul Bakhsh Rais (ed.), State, Society, and Democratic Change in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.185-6. 12 Adnan Sattar and Rabia Baig, Civil Society in Pakistan (Karachi, NGORC, 2001), p.11. 70 Pakistan Perspectives

Moreover, the authors opine that Pakistan’s civil society is made up of hybrid forms, different kinds of inheritances and ‘unresolved struggle between the practices and values of pre-capitalist society and new modes of social life, between authoritarian legacies and democratic aspirations’. They add that cultural manifestations of this civil society appear as ‘a collection of incoherent voices, conflicting worldviews and opposing interests’. Moreover, old social forms of jirga, neighbourhood associations and shrines have been operative since centuries, while many new groups have also emerged. ‘Such are the dynamics of an evolving civil society, caught between the throes of a dying social order and the birth pangs of a new one’.13 c. Democratic governance The World Bank defines governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources. It involves ‘the exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society's problems and affairs’.14 According to the UNDP, ‘democratic governance refers to the management of societal affairs in accordance with the universal principles of democracy as a system of rules that maximizes popular consent and participation, the legitimacy and accountability of rulers, and the responsiveness of the latter to the expressed interests and needs of the public’.15 The UNDP has identified three major characteristics of democratic governance as follows. (a) Democratic governance itself is ‘a moral imperative consistent with the permanent aspiration of human beings for freedom and for a better social and political order, one that is more humane and more or less egalitarian’. (b) It is ‘a continuous process of expanding the political space to ensure for everyone equal access to basic rights and liberties’. (c) It is a ‘form of political practice based on universal principles of rule of law, popular legitimacy, participation and the accountability and alternance of rulers’.16 Good governance is an expansive concept of governance and democratic governance. According to the UNIFEM, the concept prescribes an

13 Ibid. 14 http://www-ds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/I B/2006/03/07/000090341_20060307104630/Rendered/PDF/34899.pdf accessed 5-9- 2010. 15 http://undp.org.pk/, accessed 14-10-2010. 16 http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs04/DEMOCRATIC_GOVERNANCE _AND_HUMAN%20RIGHTS_IN_THE_INTERNATIONAL_FRAMEW ORK.pdf accessed 5-9-2010. Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 71 agenda for participation, human rights and social justice. It highlights the nature of social relations which undermine women’s capacity to take part in public decisions and call for reforms in governance which are gender- neutral, in order to avoid reproducing existing patterns of exclusion and gender biases and policies of exclusion in the affairs of public management.17 Following the same lines, a group of Canadian agencies (2006)18 has explained democratic governance in terms of ‘two of the main pillars of the liberal democratic tradition: citizen participation in the determination of government itself and in the broader decision-making processes by which communities are governed; and a rights ‘platform’ that supports and protects the role of individuals and minorities in the governance process’.19 In this sense it is a democratic polity which could guarantee participation of people in decision making at the governmental level. Moreover, governance is ensured by local associations, voluntary or non-governmental organizations, and other networks of the civil society. All these agencies help the masses in voicing their concern and taking active part in deciding the issues, at least the ones which are bound to affect an individual’s life. The issues of ‘supporting’ and ‘protecting’ rights to participate, especially those of the disadvantaged groups (religious and indigenous ethnic minorities, labour, peasants, women, children, prisoners, disabled, sick, elderly, etc.), certainly need platforms to address them. In today’s world, these platforms are provided by the civil society organizations and media organizations, which of course are gaining strength in this age of cultural globalization and information revolution. The very easily identifiable agents for such activities are NGOs, who have been engaged in the field of rights of the disadvantaged groups in a large number. This paper has particularly focused the role of NGOs in ensuring democratic governance in Pakistan. Undoubtedly, the NGO sector here is linked with global agents

17 Good Governance–a Gender-Responsive Definition’, http://www.unifem. org/progress/2008/whoFS_box1a.html, accessed 5-9-2010. 18 ‘Elements of Democratic Governance’ Discussion Paper, June 2006, http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/assets/pdfs/cip-pic/library/Discussion %20Paper%20-%20Elements%20of%20Democratic%20Governance.pdf, p.2, accessed 4-9-2010. This paper reflects discussions amongst the Democracy Council including: Elections Canada, International Development Research Council, Parliamentary Centre, Forum of Federations, National Judicial Institute, Rights and Democracy, Canadian International Development Agency, and Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. 19 Ibid. 72 Pakistan Perspectives of change, global civil society organizations, and global governance agencies. Thus, in an environment, in which ‘some core liberal democratic values are taken to have intrinsic merit and [are taken as] to be universal in scope,20 one should expect these values to bring about ‘peace, security, prosperity, and development dividends … while the participation and protection of individuals, aforementioned as basic elements of governance, are taken to be valuable in their own right, and are increasingly perceived as key components of state legitimacy’.21 A discussion paper focusing ‘Elements of Democratic Governance’, provides an insight into the challenges faced by democracy, and points out that if democracy is young it cannot deliver. The assertion is worth consideration in the case of Pakistan, as is discussed below.

State, governance and civil society in Pakistan The two interrelated concepts – state being the actor and governance being its action – need to be understood together because the qualities of state are bound to reflect in its action. State in Pakistan, needs to be understood in its two aspects: the nature/structure of the state, and the functioning of the state. Regarding nature of the state in Pakistan, Malik asserts that it is inherently centralized, denying participatory politics owing to its colonial heritage. Here the rural based chiefs, known as waderas, jagirdars, or pirs, have been acting as intermediaries between the people and the state. They have been taking political parties as ‘convenient vehicles for the promotion of narrow dynastic interests’.22 One can imagine, such vested interest groups cannot allow any emancipating process among the masses, be it mass education, migration, integration within the globalized economy and culture, awareness about gender injustices, promotion of modern media, infusion of urban-political tendencies, or growing political activism in their rural bases.23 According to Malik, the ‘thin basis of Pakistan’s state structure’ has been exposed. This state has characteristics of a typical Third World state, because it generously allocates to non-development sectors, leaves the vital social sectors in doldrums, hence damages the basis of the civil society. The state, often, had also not been willing to accept the verdict of the electorates, while on the other hand those who enjoyed this electoral legitimacy, when formed governments, they were never really

20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Iftikhar H. Malik, ‘Ethnic Politics in Sindh’, in Rasul Bukhsh Rais (ed.), op.cit., p.161. 23 Ibid. Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 73 allowed to be ‘in power’ thus they were dismissed very soon, on various pretexts. Anyhow, it has happened in Pakistan that as a result of the actions of the state, as well as non-state agencies and certain international factors, urban middle class and the bourgeoisie started establishing itself, and the rural communities established closer contacts with the urban communities and this process started changing the traditional state structures. In the mean time, the middle class professionals, industrialists and technocrats started to make their way into the political leadership at local and national levels. Pakistan is a highly diversified country. Regarding its function, the state here faces the challenge of creating harmony and maintaining a social order which could fulfill the aspirations of peoples, who belong to different ethnicities, are in different social structures, at different levels of development, and follow different sociopolitical norms. The elitist state preserves ethnic distinctions, and contrary to a pluralist system fails to promote accountability. Rais explains that the Pakistani politicians have been socialized in an environment having two parallel political ideologies of dictatorship and democracy. He comments that: Politicians of all shades and opinion, though with varying degrees of commitment, subscribe to the democratic principles of government—constitutionalism, individual freedom, competitive politics and peaceful change. This is not to suggest that when in power, or even out of it, they have strictly upheld these principles; quite often they have not. But philosophically, they are a distinct political category as they seek power through a democratic process and on the basis of popular legitimacy.24 Some significant questions about feasibility of democratic governance in Pakistan, relate to the fact that democracy itself has been questioned in Pakistan as a viable style of polity.25 Thus ‘state formation, fissiparous tendencies, and fall-out from inter-ethnic dissensions have undermined efforts for democratization and centralization. To a greater degree, the recurring dilemma of Pakistan’s governability is rooted in the dichotomous relationship between an all-powerful, ever-transcendent, and vetoing state structure and a feeble, ill-organized, and vulnerable civil society’. The discourse on state and development has been elaborating the dynamics of political economy which involves non-state actors evolved

24 Rasul Bukhsh Rais (ed.), op.cit., Introduction. xiii. 25 Ibid. 74 Pakistan Perspectives in the past. Sobhan (2002) highlights the role of state as an important factor in development outcomes.26 He explains that the steel frame of the British colonial Raj was inherited by the bureaucracy in South Asian civil services. Alavi (2002) explains that the growing size of the state machinery took over the neocolonial societies, but this unnecessarily hyper control of bureaucracy and military over economic classes is an outcome of colonial Raj. These two institutions are not answerable to any one, and no evidence of corruption was found in these institutions under the colonial administration.27 But in the post-colonial stage, the military bureaucracy alliance has been instrumental in promoting corruption at all levels of government, especially at the middle and lower levels of government, since the state policies and programs can be implemented only with the assistance of bureaucracy. Alavi adds that such officers misuse their powers unabatedly, and curb the activities related to expression and dialogue in the public meetings. They also set irrational priorities and invite foreign experts to formulate monetary and financial policies which are deleterious for the economy at large. These officers have wasted a great deal of national resources. Public-service institutions can be established only with enormous amount of effort, commitment and diligence, while they can be destroyed easily. In this context, it is unfortunate because the civil-military bureaucratic alliance is incapable of building new institutions.28 Ahmed elaborates the process of formation of the alliance of civil military bureaucracy in Pakistan, and shows how this alliance has played pivotal role in making the state

26 Rehman Sobhan, ‘State and Governance as Factors in Development: In Search of a Theory’, in S. M. Naseem and Khalid Nadvi (eds.), The Post- Colonial State and Social Transformation in India and Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.3-19. 26 Hamza Alavi, trans. Tahir Kamran, Pakistan Riyasat Aur ooska Bohran (Lahore: Fiction House, 2002), pp.12-3. The article was written in 1972 and appeared first as, ‘The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh’, in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma (eds.), Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (New York/London: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp.145-73. 27 Even till August 1959, corruption was not detected in higher bureaucracy. Anwar Iqbal Qureshi, Economic History of Pakistan (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1978), p.262. 28 Hamza Alavi, trans. Tahir Kamran, Pakistan Riyasat…, op.cit., pp.12-3. The article was written in 1972 and appeared first as, ‘The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh’, in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma (eds.), Imperialism and Revolution…, pp.145-73. Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 75 highly centralized, autocratic and authoritarian.29 Both the military and bureaucracy have antithetical relations with democracy, thus an over- centralized state under bureaucratic decisions kept shadowing the democratic features of the polity. A number of political economists have tried to explain how the social forces which dominate the state try to design the development strategies which could serve their own interests. However, with changing composition or control of these forces, the development strategies can also be changed. Alavi has written at length about how the post-colonial state has been instrumental for accumulating sufficient power within the state apparatus which has led to the growth of certain classes.30 Sobhan explains this in the context of South Asia.31 In his effort to summarize the theories and models explaining relationship of the state and development, Sobhan concludes that the dynamics of successful development remains unexplained. So he holds that: ‘We have given these forces driving successful development the name of ‘governance’. It is the absence of any understanding of the dynamic of governance that thus leaves development literature in search of a satisfactory theory of governance’.32 Sobhan also discusses aid dependency as a significant outcome of the donors’ help coming to the post-colonial state in non-socialist developing countries. He explains that higher the ratio of foreign aid, greater was the power of the state, which gradually grew its power over the traditional and prospective elite groups. Feroz Ahmed holds that foreign aid to Pakistan has been a device of safeguarding imperialist interests in the region and this dependence on foreign aid has kept Pakistan in a perpetual state of backwardness.33 It is partially true for Pakistan, that land became no more a source of

29 Syed Jaffar Ahmed, ‘Defeating Independence: Genesis of Authoritarian State in Pakistan’, Pakistan Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp.92-107, and, ‘Consolidation of Authoritarianism in Pakistan: 1951-58’, Pakistan Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.49-77. 30 See Hamza Alavi, op.cit., for the articles, ‘Nauabadiyati Mo’ashron mein Riyasati Control: Pakistan aur Bangladesh’, ‘Pakistan mein Mutlaq-ul- Ananiyat aur Riyasati Iqtidar ka Jawaz’, and ‘Riyasat Bohran ki Zad mein’. 31 Rehman Sobhan, R., op.cit. p.6. 32 Ibid., p.17. 33 Feroz Ahmed, translated and upaccessed by Kashif Faraz Ahmed, Samraj aur Pakistan 1947 say 2002 tak (Lahore: Takhleeqat, 2003). Its Chapter Two discusses this issue at length while other chapters explain how this process took place since 1954. 76 Pakistan Perspectives differentiation and sociopolitical power,34 however new elites emerged who were empowered due to their links with the state.35 Interestingly these elites have been actively engaged in running NGOs, or at least patronizing them. While the hired staff is actually doing the work, the guidance, vision, policies, budgeting, and decision-making is controlled by these NGO elites. Programs like structural adjustment have been disempowering the state in the Third World, but according to Sobhan, ‘a disempowered state with access to a large volume of aid offers as an inducement to its disempowerment, rapidly degenerates into a predatory state, where state bureaucrats evolve into private entrepreneurs, often without retiring from service, and use their command over the disposition of aid funds for self- enrichment rather than state empowerment’.36 Following the explanations by Alavi about the role of the state in class formation, Sobhan also points out that state has become a source of empowerment and class formation, because through its control over resources and policy intervention the state has stimulated growth of capitalist bourgeoisie. Sobhan holds that: This process of state empowerment was encouraged by the aid donors, channeling aid to and through the state, which was transmitted to privileged factions of the bourgeoisie through the development finance institutions (DFI). Aid- driven patronage to the new bourgeoisie, in the form of project contracts, commission agencies, consultancies, etc all served to empower the state and make accessibility to the state the critical route to financial advancement for individuals, and eventually, classes.37

Democratic governance and NGOs The experience of Pakistan regarding democratic governance has been miserable owing to the factors highlighted above. One of its dimensions – realization of human rights of the citizens – has been a terrible mess. The details are available in the media reports, scholarly books and

34 A well-rounded debate on the issue is found in Pakistan Perspectives, Special Issue: Feudalism in Pakistan, Vol. 8, Nos. 1 & 2, January-December 2003. The predominant view is that feudalism is not dwindling in its power, but certain notes of difference are also presented in it. 35 Ibid., pp.4-9. 36 Rehman Sobhan, op.cit., p.14. 37 Ibid., p.9. Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 77 particularly in the reports of human rights organizations.38 The issue of non-Muslims’ rights as citizens of the state of Pakistan has also been a very complicated one, presenting a dismal picture due to the ideological tilt of the state and the consequent formation of socio-religious groups and networks in the country. The state has, no doubt, played a highly questionable role regarding protection of the minorities in Pakistan if one looks into the history of their sufferings since 1947. Women, as a traditionally dominated section of population in a highly patriarchal culture, have been at disadvantage due to a number of state policies which have been patriarchal in essence since the colonial time. Though women were granted certain rights through legislations in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, their overall status remained poor due to overwhelmingly oppressive cultures, and bias inherent in the social institutions. Undoubtedly, both the civil-military bureaucracy, and the ever-growing religious section, could not establish their intentions and inclination for the uplift of women to the satisfaction of the women rights groups or the international community. That was the environment in which the international movement for women’s rights started creating ripples since the mid 1970s. In the years following 1975, a large number of NGOs were formed to work for women’s rights and today the NGO movement in Pakistan has its large contingent working for realizing women’s rights which a genuine democratic society should offer. Moreover, the NGO sector in Pakistan has been analyzed in its various dimensions by NGORC,39 AKDN,40 Khan,41 Islam,42 and Shaheen,43

38 The Human Rights Commission f Pakistan is one such leading and most respected organization which has produced a volume of literature regarding human rights in Pakistan. Its annual reports (State of Human Rights in Pakistan) document such details on yearly basis, while its newsletters disseminate such details periodically in English and Urdu. 39 For details see NGO Resource Centre’s studies and surveys about the NGOs. These include: The State of the Citizen Sector in Pakistan, Sahafat aur Awami Tanzeemain, Civil Society in Pakistan, Samaj kay Rahnuma, Making it Happen, and quarterly newsletters NGORC Journal (English) and Akhbar (Urdu), apart from directories about NGOs, and some support material for NGOs and for those working with NGOs. 40 AKDN, Philanthropy in Pakistan, A Profile, Harvesting Philanthropy for Development (Islamabad: Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy, Monograph Series, 2002). 41 Mahmood Hasan Khan, Climbing the Development Ladder with NGO Support (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 42 Zahid Islam, Logon kay Sath Sath (Lahore: Citizens’ Network for Good Governance, 2001). 78 Pakistan Perspectives among others. Among major contributions of the NGOs to society, the ones particularly mentioned include upholding the rights of the disadvantaged sections and service delivery for basic needs.44 The power of media, undeniably growing in the recent decades, has also been curbed at many points of time in Pakistan. It is not a story of military regimes only; it started from the very first year of independence – 1947 – and continues to date. The highhandedness of the government can be checked only by civil society organizations, and among these media has proved itself to be very strong. The chronicles of curbs on the print media, as related by Niazi,45 provide ample proof to the fact that the centralized and weak regimes bent upon suppressing the channels of expression for the masses. Such regimes have been in crisis due to many reasons, the want of legitimacy being the foremost; and the fear of rising fissiparous ethnic tendencies being no less important in this matter. A genuine democracy has to deliver equitable prosperity, development and security. Moreover, it has to impart awareness of rights, and to build and reinforce a mechanism which could lead to realization of a whole range of rights generally acknowledged in that society. NGOs engaged in development, service delivery and right-based activism, can lead the society to a higher level of satisfaction of such needs and provision of goods necessary for a democratic society. In this way they can be a tool of achieving democratic governance. It is estimated that there are about 15,000 NGOs actively working in Pakistan, whereas the total number of non-profit organizations is over 56,000. In a sense, this can be taken to suggest that a process is going on

43 Anwar Shaheen, ‘An Analysis of the Public Perception about the NGOs’ Problems and Prospects in Pakistan’ (Karachi: University of Karachi, Pakistan Study Centre, 2000), unpublished monograph. 44 Anwar Shaheen, ‘Changing Cultural Patterns in Pakistan: 1972-2006, With Special Reference to the Role and Perceptions of the Non-governmental Actors of Change’, University of Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, 2010. PhD. Dissertation, unpublished. 45 Zamir Niazi has explained and documented such events in his books, namely: Press in Chain (Karachi: Karachi Press Club, 1986), translated as Sahafat Paaband-e-Salasal (Karachi: Aaj ki Kitabain, 1994, 1st edn., Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2006, 2nd edn.), The Press Under Siege (Karachi: Karachi Press Club, 1992, 1st edn., Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2006, 2nd edn.), The Web of Censorship (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), and Fettered Freedom (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2006, 1st edn.). Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 79 to promote democratization. It, however, would be a partial truth only, because an in-depth analysis of the nature of the state, and the government-NGO relations reveal that a section of the NGOs has also been serving the vested interests and is appended to the powerful groups who have linkages with the state institutions. This helps such NGOs to have a continuous inflow of funds for their survival in a political environment where they have to work for development as well as advocacy. Unless they are not embedded in the power echelons NGOs cannot serve as a link between the donors (local, governmental, foreign), and the beneficiaries. The last three decades of NGO activism in Pakistan show that NGOs have confronted with the state (e.g. the military regime of Zia-ul- Haq) on many issues. These issues included in particular the rights of women, children, minorities, peasants and workers. The lawyers’ movement for restoration of judiciary in the year 2008, however, presents a different case. It was led by the bar associations, and supported by a variety of civil society groups, including the NGOs though they were not playing a very prominent role. An analyst describes its reasons to be the non-availability of funds to the NGOs for this purpose, since it is generally understood that NGOs have now become totally fund-driven. They work on an issue as long as funds are available, and defer it when funds for it dry up. This aspect, however, needs further investigation, but one thing is clear, and it is this that voluntarism has weakened and now NGOs are basically project-oriented organizations.46 That is why they cannot launch any movement unless they are funded for it. They are not ready to put that amount of effort and show commitment to the public interest which is badly needed in the present day society of Pakistan.47 This inaction and weaknesses of the civil society have been elaborated by I.A Rehman48 and Ahmed49 in their articles.

46 These are views of Arif Hasan, who has authored a number of books on social change, and highlighted the role of NGOs, especially the Orangi Pilot Project, a reputed NGO based in Karachi since the early 1980s. Regarding unwillingness of NGOs to fight for women’s rights and to protest against abuses of women, similar views were expressed by Tahira Shahid Khan, author of Beyond Honour (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 47 This view was expressed by Asma Jahangir, a renowned human rights activist of Pakistan, in her lecture delivered in Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, May 2010. 48 I.A. Rehman, ‘Civil Society aur ooska Bohran’, in Syed Jaffar Ahmed (ed.), Hamza Wahid aur Jehd-e-Hayat (Karachi: Irtiqa Institute of Social Sciences, 2007), pp.190-204. 80 Pakistan Perspectives

Democratic governance in Pakistan a. The fate of democracy in Pakistan The post-colonial state in Pakistan adopted many features – laws, institutions, and policies – of the colonial administration. The first constitution of the country was developed nine years after its independence. Out of total 64 years (1947-2011), Pakistan has been under direct military rule for about 33 years, though the military leaders have been changing their postures from military to civilian form, or trying to devolve power to the local levels in order to claim legitimacy and create a constituency for them. When the elected representatives of people were in power, the effective role of army in decision-making was behind the scene, but it was very much there. Pakistan started its journey with a parliamentary form of government, but various governments during the period of 1947-1971 could hardly be characterized as ‘parliamentary democracy’. For the first time a parliamentary system was established following the adoption of 1973 constitution. Asserting this, Alavi (1983) describes that change in the government in the 1950s led to either a ‘civilian coup d’etat’, or a military coup d’etat (1958). It adopted a civilian character under the military ruler–General Ayub Khan in the post-1962 years, whereas the regime under General Yahya Khan was a military regime though his cabinet included the civilian ministers. The elected government of the PPP (1971-77) weakened the elite character of the bureaucracy, but the army continued to remain a powerful institution; it demonstrated its power and position when it dethroned the PPP government in July 1977. Once in power, the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq tempered with the constitution and made it presidential from a parliamentary one. The General Musharraf regime (1999-2008) did the same. It also changed the constitution from parliamentary to presidential one. It also introduced a devolution plan in 2000. Since the ultimate objective of devolution is to ensure a ‘just, efficient, accountable, transparent, cost-effective and economical (in an aggregate sense) service that promotes democratic governance and enhances human security’,50 the devolution plan was welcomed by a sizable section of the civil society.51 Its success needs to be evaluated in this context, though it is beyond the scope of this paper. The civil society

49 Syed Jaffar Ahmed, Civil Society ki yeh Khamoshi Kiyon? (Karachi: Pakistan Peace Coalition, 2003). 50 Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Foqia Sadiq Khan and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan Ignoring the Power Structure (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.6. 51 Ibid., p.140. Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 81 organizations, later on, participated enthusiastically in imparting awareness about, ensuring participation in the local bodies’ elections, and enhancing capability of he elected representatives at the grass roots level. b. Declining power of the state In the recent two decades, the worsening conditions of security inside and outside the country have put question marks on the competence of the state to hold its territories under control. Since the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, involvement of Pakistan in its affairs and the war against the Soviet forces, and later the situation emerging after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre in the US, have contributed to the weakening of the state’s capacity to deliver. It is true regarding human security, development, welfare and uplift of the poor sections, and maintaining law and order in the country, which is essential to ensure success of the development process at work. Abundance of literature is available on growing menace of terrorism, religious extremism, and discrimination on ethnic, gender, sectarian and racial basis. The problems associated with indulgence of the state in a cross-border war are no more confined to the borders. The militancy and lawlessness have been curbing civil liberties and now the state itself is in crisis. It is not able to establish its writ in the areas where the militants have got control. Though the security forces have been launching operations in such areas, the situation is still not under total control. Not only the state of uncertainty, threats to life and property, and fears about future have been checking investments in the country and healthy functioning of the economy, but the very fact of growing militancy and insecurity has rapidly undermined the efforts to combat such anti-development processes. c. The crisis of democracy in Pakistan Democracy in Pakistan has been suffering due to many reasons. Alavi (1983, 2002), Feroz Ahmed (2003),52 Waseem (2005),53 Kamran (2008),54 Masood (2009),55 and many others have analyzed the nature of

52 Feroz Ahmed, op.cit. 53 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Causes of Democratic Downslide’, in Veena Kukreja and M.P. Singh (eds.), Pakistan Democracy, Development and Security Issues (Karachi: Paramount Publishing Enterprise, 2005), pp.39- 58. 54 Tahir Kamran, Governance and Development in Pakistan (Lahore: South Asia Partnership-Pakistan, 2008). 82 Pakistan Perspectives state and the problems of democracy in Pakistan. Mubarak Ali (2009)56 has elaborated the crisis in the context of the ideology adopted by the state after the demise of its founder. Qureshi (2005) explains the confusion related to choice between secular or theocratic, and a democratic or militaristic ideology for the state, since ideology defines the very nature of a state. He declares that the threat of describing Pakistan as a failed state is one major reason lying in this confusion of ideology.57 Rehman (2009), analyzing the nature of the state in Pakistan, asserts that state in Pakistan was in the image of a colonial state at the time of its creation, where a highly centralized bureaucratic network controlled it. This model lasted only till 1958, when all hopes of democracy were shunned and Pakistan became a garrison state, which also collapsed in 1969. He adds that failure of the state to safeguard its boundaries and its people resulted in its dismemberment in 1971, when it shrunk physically, by losing a part of it, which now is an independent country, Bangladesh.58 As major reasons behind democratic failure, one may refer to the high incidence of corruption and denial of merit in government sector employment. Though the parliament is there and an elected government is in the office, yet the challenges faced by the government to ensure the continuity of democratic governance and an unhindered process of development are growing to enormous proportions. The issue of rising militancy in Pakistan due to its involvement in the Afghan war since 1979 and the growing menace of Talibanization have been crucial factors in undermining the state’s capacity for democratic governance. These are discussed by various authors, including Jalal (2008),59 Masood (2009),60 Yousuzai (2009),61 Siddiqua (2005),62 and Ziring (2005).63 In the year

55 Wajahat Masood, Pakistani Riyasat ko Darpesh Bohran (Karachi: Pakistan Peace Coalition, 2010), Education for Peace Project, Essay No. 9. 56 Mubarak Ali, Pakistan in Search of Identity (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2009). 57 Saleem M.M. Qureshi, ‘Pakistan: Islamic Ideology and the Failed State?’ in Kukreja and Singh (eds.), op.cit., pp.87-107. 58 I.A. Rehman, ‘Pakistan at 61: Neither a Nation nor a State’, Pakistan Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 2, p.19. 59 Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah, Jihad in South Asia (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2008). 60 Wajahat Masood, Taliban ya Jamhooriyat Pakistan Dorahay Par (Lahore: Nigarshat, 2009). 61 Aqeel Yousufzai, Talibanization, Afghanistan say FATA, Swat aur Pakistan tak (Lahore: Nigarshat, 2009). Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 83

2011, one would find Pakistan in the grip of terrorist forces, anti-state elements, which have established their control in large parts of its tribal areas, as well as have infused into the length and breadth of the settled areas. The capacity of the state to exercise authority over the people inhabiting its territory is fast declining. It happened so because in the post-1971 phase the state forsake caring for the interests of the communities and classes inhabiting its territory. It gradually became more and more oppressive; its writ was challenged in Balochistan and FATA. Here one can refer to Rehman’s conclusion that, ‘Pakistan no longer qualifies as a state as defined in Westphalian papers because it does not have monopoly of power to enforce law and order throughout its territory’.64 Therefore, the democratic character of the polity has been dwindling, and the sovereignty of people has been totally lost. Moreover, the state is facing difficulty in delivering what under a democratic order is naturally expected. Thus this role would ultimately be delegated to other sectors of the society. The civil society, no doubt, depending on its vibrancy, has the capacity to maintain a balance in the society. The NGO sector, as a component of it, can ensure good governance, development and human rights, provided it could overcome its own weaknesses which emerge from the environment it works in as well as from its own internal characteristics.

Limitations of the civil society (1980-2010) The civil society in Pakistan has also been under-developed. The major reasons behind this have primarily been of two types: one related to nature of the state, and the other related to the nature of the society. The state, owing to its authoritarian character, has been suppressing some of the most sincere efforts of the civil society, be it for the religious minorities, human rights, freedom of press or judiciary, or to the plight of the under-privileged. There were also movements launched in favour of peace, and against arms race in the region. Violations of women’s rights have been protested off and on. The worth-mentioning achievements of the civil society have been in the domain of women’s rights, and to some extent children’s rights. Landmark examples from the history of civil society action in Pakistan have been those of the students’ and labour movements of the 1960s, 1970s, and the lawyers’ movement of the

62 Ayesha Siddiqua, ‘Pakistan: Political Economy of National Security’, in Kukreja and Singh (eds.), op. cit., pp.123-36. 63 Lawrence Ziring, ‘Pakistan: Terrorism in Historical Perspective’, in Kukreja and Singh (eds.), ibid., pp.168-206. 64 I.A. Rehman, op.cit., p.20. 84 Pakistan Perspectives recent years. There have been movements for upholding political rights as well, when the state was outright violating them. The movements against the martial law regime of Ayub Khan in the early and late 1960s, and those against the Bhutto regime, all had their focus upon restoring democracy, thus civil society has been asserting its character as a guardian of democracy at various times.

The development scenario 2012 Pakistan has poor development indicators. It is the sixth largest nation in terms of population—as of 184.7 million in mid year 2011-12— but is 145th in the UNDP ranking of Human Development Index.65 According to the UNDP data for 2011, Pakistan’s life expectancy has fallen from 67.2 years in 2010 to 65.4 years. While 23 per cent of the total population was undernourished; the government was spending only 0.8 per cent of GDP on health in 2010. Despite high food insecurity situation Pakistan is among the nine countries which will contribute to the half of the world projected population increase, and is expected to have 309 million people by 2050.66 The infant mortality rate and maternal mortality rate are among the highest in the region and the world. Combined gross enrolment ratio in education is 39.3 per cent, while mean years of schooling for adults is 4.9. The government was spending 2.9 per cent of GDP on education. The proportion of people living blow 1.25 dollar a day was 22.59 per cent. Gender inequality indicators are

65 This index called ‘HDI represents a push for a broader definition of well- being and provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income’. The UNDP annual report for 2011 ranked Pakistan at 145 among 187 nations, and its ranking has bit lowered as compared with the previous year, however performance regarding multidimensional poverty, which is the fate of 49.4% population in Pakistan, is reported to be encouraging, though another 11% are at the risk of slipping into this category due to precarious conditions. Intense deprivation is fate of 53.4% people, while 27.4% are living in severe poverty.http://tribune.com.pk/story/299822/pakistan-slips-down-developme nt-ranking-un-report/, accessed 12 July 2012. Population projections are confusing due to the official figure estimated as 180.71 million as of mid- year 2011-12. Pakistan Economic Survey 2011-12, p.162. Pakistan’s fertility rate at 3.4 and population growth rate at 2.03 per cent are the highest in South Asian region and Asia, ibid., pp.163-4. 66 Cf. UNO, ‘Projections of Population Growth’, Dawn, World Population Day Supplement 2012, 11 July 2012, p.1. Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 85 also depressing as being ranked 115 among 187 nations.67 The official figures are slightly different from those of the UNFPA and UNDP. The rate of GDP growth in the year 2011 was lower than the growth rate of population (2.05%), whereas the growth of GDP in the recent decade (2000-2010) has not been inclusive and pro-poor, so it could not reduce the absolute number of poor people. Inflation was 20.77 per cent in 2008-9, and increased steadily rising in the following years. In the same period, food inflation has gone high, poor governance68 and floods being the major two reasons. The massive floods during 2010 and have also crippled the growth of the economy, and it is likely to continue affecting for many years due to rebuilding and rehabilitation expenditures. The damage estimate of 2010 floods has been of 855 billion rupees,69 while the 2011 floods inflicted another loss worth 324.5 billion rupees70 The target of MDGs for reducing poverty to 22.6 per cent till 2015 is not achievable, not only in view of the recent shocks to the economy, but also due to the poor state of governance.

II This section discusses the issue of democratic governance and the role of the NGOs in Pakistan in the last four decades. It largely relies on the data collected for an unpublished thesis of the author, dealing with implications of the role of the non-governmental actors in Pakistan from 1972-2006.71 The findings of the study are presented in the following pages.

67 http://tribune.com.pk/story/299822/pakistan-slips-down-development- ranking-un-report/, accessed 12 July 2012. 68 Authorities and controlling network of the food items (wheat, sugar, milk, cereals, fruit, cooking oil, etc.) have either jointly mismanaged to gain high profit, or failed to check smuggling, or made wrong decisions about the amount of storing and exporting staple food items. Some other factors related to import prices of fuel and food items. Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11 (Islamabad: Finance Division, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Government of Pakistan, 2011), pp.94-5. 69 The flood has caused damage to housing, agriculture, environment and the infrastructure of governance, transport, communication, irrigation, energy, education, health, water and sanitation, and financial sector. For details see ibid., pp.221-2. 70 Pakistan Economic Survey 2011-12, op.cit., p.254. 71 Anwar Shaheen, ‘Changing Cultural Patterns ...’, op.cit. 86 Pakistan Perspectives

1. Rise of the NGO sector in Pakistan It is generally understood that the NGO sector has grown at a fast pace largely due to political factors operating at the domestic and international levels particularly in the mid-1970s and afterward. The process was boosted by the participatory development paradigm of the 1980s, both at micro and macro levels. At the macro level the neo-liberal policies favored its growth while at the micro level an NGO was taken as an enterprise in the new environment hence the sector continued expanding and was diversifying. Though NGOs have been facing certain hindrances, coming in their way mostly from the government and the conservative religious sections who wished to curtail, regulate, or undermine NGOs’ activities, since they suspected the NGOs of having a hidden agenda. Nevertheless, such discouragement could not restrict the NGOs’ growth and working significantly. (See Figure A). The data presented in Figure B shows perception of the social analysts about overall contribution of the NGOs to various aspects of change and development. It shows that the foremost areas of NGOs’ activity have been women’s rights, education and health.

2. Development issues in Pakistan Like most other Third World countries, the issue of development in Pakistan is related to social, psychological, political, economic, cultural, religious, and gender-related factors. Moreover, the governments try to hide their weaknesses in their documents showing performance of the economy and achievements of the development programs and their distributional impacts. The politically designed income support programs also present a challenge to assess their real impacts.

3. Role of the NGO sector in enhancing development in Pakistan Data presented in Table 1 shows perception of the NGO functionaries regarding trends of change in development-related aspects. The data presented in the column labeled as ‘Situation in Pakistan’, can be explained as follows:  Definite increase has been perceived in mechanization of the production process; modern technical knowledge and training for production; poverty; entrepreneurship training; access to market; trend of seeking jobs abroad; women working in un-conventional fields; and trend of self-help.  Moderate increase has been perceived in the following aspects: use of modern sources of energy; expansion in employment opportunities; role of middleman; easy availability of credit; trend of saving and development of underdeveloped regions. (See Figure D). Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 87

Role of NGOs in this change has been given in the following. The ‘response percent’ is obtained by calculating the percentage of total responses in favour out of total responses (for or against) a particular category, thus the effect of ‘no response’ is eliminated. The percentage of responses favouring the indicators is given in descending order. The shades of opinion are listed under ‘very much role’, ‘somewhat role’ and ‘no role’, as follows.

Role of the NGO sector in changing development-related aspects of Pakistan as perceived by the NGO functionaries a. Very much role Response Percent Trend of self-help 48.3 Women working in non-conventional fields 45.8 Trend of saving 41.7 Easy availability of credit 40.8 Development of backward regions 40.0 Entrepreneurship training 38.3 Expansion in employment opportunities 37.4 Modern technical knowledge and training for production 28.3 Access to market 25.0 Poverty 24.2 Mechanization of the production process 23.3 Role of middleman 20.8 Use of modern sources of energy 11.7 Trend of seeking jobs abroad 10.8 b. Somewhat role Access to market 49.2 Mechanization of the production process 44.2 Entrepreneurship training 43.3 Modern technical knowledge and training for production 40.6 Expansion in employment opportunities 40.6 Role of middleman 40.0 Development of backward regions 39.2 Use of modern sources of energy 39.2 Easy availability of credit 38.3 Trend of seeking jobs abroad 38.3 Trend of saving 33.3 Trend of self-help 32.5 Women working in unconventional fields 32.5 Poverty 30.0 88 Pakistan Perspectives c. No role Trend of seeking jobs abroad 37.5 Use of modern sources of energy 28.3 Poverty 23.3 Mechanization of the production process 19.2 Role of middleman 19.2 Modern technical knowledge and training for production 16.7 Easy availability of credit 11.7 Access to market 10.8 Trend of saving 10.0 Expansion in employment opportunities 9.2 Development of backward regions 9.2 Trend of self-help 7.5 Entrepreneurship training 6.7 Women working in unconventional fields 0.8

Role of the NGO sector in changing development-related aspects of Pakistan as perceived by the social analysts a. Very much role Response Percent 1. Trend of self-help 28.6 2. Role of middleman 20.4 3. Women working in unconventional fields 18.4 4. Entrepreneurship training 16.3 5. Trend of seeking jobs abroad 14.3 6. Expansion in employment opportunities 12.2 7. Use of modern sources of energy 12.2 8. Poverty 10.2 9. Easy availability of credit 10.2 10. Trend of saving 8.2 11. Development of backward regions 8.2 12. Mechanization of the production process 8.2 13. Modern technical knowledge and training for production 6.1 14. Access to market 6.1 b. Somewhat role 1. Access to market 55.1 2. Entrepreneurship training 53.1 3. Women working in unconventional fields 49.0 4. Easy availability of credit 49.0 5. Development of backward regions 44.9 6. Tend of self-help 38.8 Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 89

7. Modern technical knowledge and training for production 36.7 8. Expansion in employment opportunities 32.7 9. Role of middleman 30.6 10. Poverty 30.6 11. Trend of saving 30.6 12. Use of modern sources of energy 28.6 13. Mechanization of the production process 26.5 14. Trend of seeking jobs abroad 24.5 c. No role 1. Mechanization of the production process 42.9 2. Trend of seeking jobs abroad 38.8 3. Trend of saving 38.8 4. Poverty 36.7 5. Expansion in employment opportunities 36.7 6. Use of modern sources of energy 34.7 7. Development of backward regions 24.5 8. Easy availability of credit 22.4 9. Access to market 18.4 10. Trend of self-help 12.2 11. Entrepreneurship training 12.2 12. Women working in unconventional fields 10.2 13. Role of middleman 0.6 14. Modern technical knowledge and training for production 0.6

Data presented in Table 3 and Figure C shows the following trends are perceived by the NGO functionaries in socio-political aspects of Pakistani society.  Definite increase has been perceived in: preventive health measures; modern methods of treatment; modern educational facilities; modern housing facilities: investment in children’s education; rural-urban migration; problems of katchi abadis (illegal, low-income settlements); use of items of comfort and luxury; class- consciousness; people’s participation in development programs; social mobility; awareness of rights among the people; freedom of thought; and voluntary social service.  Moderate increase has been perceived in: better standard of nutrition; new patterns of recreation; awareness of environmental issues; power of the weak sections; economic opportunities for disadvantaged regions; improved opportunities for the minorities; democratic attitude; control of traditional power structure; control of 90 Pakistan Perspectives

family/clan on individual‘s life; access to legal justice; sectarianism; social cohesion, unity and harmony.  Moderate decrease has been perceived in: promoting merit in place of nepotism; religious tolerance; and the practicing of moral values. According to the perception of social analysts given in Table 4, and Figure D the following trends are seen.  Definite increase has been perceived in: modern educational facilities; rural-urban migration; awareness of environmental issues; sectarianism; using items of comfort and luxury; and, awareness of rights among the people.  Moderate increase has been perceived in: preventive health measures; modern methods of treatment; investment in children’s education; problems of katchi abadis (illegal, low-income settlements); freedom of thought; voluntary social service; class consciousness; people’s participation in development programs; social mobility; modern housing facilities; new patterns of recreation; improved opportunities for the minorities; democratic attitudes; and, dominance of traditional power structure.  Moderate decrease has been perceived in the following aspects: promoting merit in place of nepotism; economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes; power of the weak sections; control of family/clan on individual‘s life; social cohesion, unity and harmony; religious tolerance; practicing the moral and values.  Weak increase in access to legal justice is perceived.  Unclear trend is perceived in better standard of nutrition.

4. Role of the NGO sector in changing the socio-political aspects in Pakistan Data illustrated in Figures, E, F, G, and H shows the role of NGOs in enhancing development and socio-political situation regarding rights and opportunities for the people. It is further explained in the following as well.

Role of the NGO sector in changing socio-political aspects of Pakistan as perceived by the NGO functionaries a. Very much role Response Percent 1. Voluntary social service 61.7 2. People’s participation in development programs 50.0 3. Awareness of rights among the people 45.8 4. Freedom of thought 44.2 Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 91

5. Social mobility 42.5 6. Awareness of environmental issues 40.0 7. Preventive health measures 40.0 8. Modern educational facilities 38.8 9. Modern methods of treatment 36.7 10. Investment in children’s education 35.8 11. Problems of katchi abadis 33.3 12. Improved opportunities for the minorities 30.0 13. Democratic attitude 30.0 14. Social cohesion, unity and harmony 30.0 15. Access to legal justice 26.7 16. Practicing the moral values 26.7 17. Class-consciousness 25.8 18. Better standard of nutrition 25.8 19. Power of the weak sections 25.0 20. Religious tolerance 23.3 21. Control of traditional power structure 22.5 22. Control of family/clan on individual‘s life 22.5 23. New patterns of recreation 21.7 24. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged regions 20.0 25. Promoting merit in place of nepotism 15.8 26. Rural-urban migration 15.0 27. Using items of comfort and luxury 14.2 28. Modern housing facilities 14.2 29. Sectarianism 13.3 b. Somewhat role 1. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged regions 49.2 2. Control of family/clan on individual‘s life 44.2 3. Better standard of nutrition 43.3 4. Power of the weak sections 43.3 5. Democratic attitudes 40.8 6. Access to legal justice 39.2 7. Religious tolerance 38.3 8. Modern methods of treatment 38.3 9. Preventive health measures 36.7 10. Class-consciousness 36.7 11. Awareness of rights among the people 36.7 12. Promoting merit in place of nepotism 36.7 13. Problems of katchi abadis 35.8 14. Awareness of environmental issues 35.8 15. Control of traditional power structure 35.8 92 Pakistan Perspectives

16. Improved opportunities for the minorities 35.0 17. People’s participation in development programs 33.3 18. Modern educational facilities 32.5 19. Using items of comfort and luxury 31.7 20. Social cohesion, unity and harmony 31.2 21. Rural-urban migration 30.8 22. Practicing the moral values 30.8 23. Freedom of thought 30.8 24. Modern housing facilities 30.0 25. Social mobility 30.0 26. New patterns of recreation 30.0 27. Investment in children’s education 29.2 28. Sectarianism 25.8 29. Voluntary social service 21.6 c. No role 1. Sectarianism 33.3 2. Problems of katchi abadis 30.8 3. Using items of comfort and luxury 26.7 4. Promoting merit in place of nepotism 26.7 5. Modern housing facilities 25.8 6. Investment in children’s education 25.8 7. Religious tolerance 20.0 8. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged regions 20.0 9. Class-consciousness 19.2 10. Practicing the moral values 19.2 11. Control of traditional power structure 19.2 12. New patterns of recreation 17.5 13. Rural-urban migration 15.0 14. Access to legal justice 14.2 15. Control of family/clan on individual‘s life 14.2 16. Social cohesion, unity and harmony 14.2 17. Power of the weak sections 13.3 18. Better standard of nutrition 11.7 19. Democratic attitudes 10.0 20. Freedom of thought 8.3 21. Modern educational facilities 7.5 22. Modern methods of treatment 5.8 23. Social mobility 5.8 24. People’s participation in development programs 4.2 25. Preventive health measures 4.2 26. Awareness of environmental issues 4.2 Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 93

27. Voluntary social service 2.5 28. Awareness of rights among the people 0.5 29. Improved opportunities for the minorities 0.5

Role of the NGO sector in changing socio-political aspects of Pakistan as perceived by the social analysts a. Very much role Response Percent 1. Awareness of environmental issues 34.7 2. People’s participation in development programs 30.6 3. Awareness of rights among the people 28.6 4. Voluntary social service 28.6 5. Improved opportunities for the minorities 24.5 6. Democratic attitude 24.5 7. Access to legal justice 24.5 8. Social mobility 24.5 9. Sectarianism 24.5 10. Modern educational facilities 22.4 11. Dominance of traditional power structure 21.7 12. Problems of katchi abadis 20.4 13. Control of family/clan on individual‘s life 20.4 14. Preventive health measures 20.2 15. Investment in children’s education 18.4 16. Social cohesion, unity and harmony 16.3 17. Religious tolerance 16.3 18. Power of the weak sections 12.2 19. Freedom of thought 12.2 20. Modern methods of treatment 10.2 21. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes 10.2 22. Rural-urban migration 10.2 23. Using items of comfort and luxury 10.2 24. Modern housing facilities 10.2 25. Better standard of nutrition 8.2 26. New patterns of recreation 8.2 27. Class consciousness 6.1 28. Practicing the moral values 4.1 29. Promoting merit in place of nepotism 4.1 b. Somewhat role 1. Better standard of nutrition 46.9 2. Problems of katchi abadis 46.9 3. Preventive health measures 42.9 94 Pakistan Perspectives

4. Modern educational facilities 42.9 5. Modern methods of treatment 40.8 6. Freedom of thought 40.8 7. Class consciousness 38.8 8. Power of the weak sections 36.7 9. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes 34.7 10. Investment in children’s education 34.7 11. Awareness of environmental issues 34.7 12. Voluntary social service 34.7 13. New patterns of recreation 34.7 14. Awareness of rights among the people 34.7 15. Access to legal justice 32.7 16. Religious tolerance 32.7 17. Social cohesion, unity and harmony 32.7 18. Dominance of traditional power structure 31.3 19. People’s participation in development programs 30.6 20. Rural-urban migration 30.6 21. Sectarianism 28.7 22. Modern housing facilities 28.7 23. Promoting merit in place of nepotism 28.6 24. Improved opportunities for the minorities 28.6 25. Practicing the moral values 28.6 26. Democratic attitudes 26.5 27. Control of family/clan on individual‘s life 26.5 28. Social mobility 26.5 29. Using items of comfort and luxury 22.4 c. No role 1. Using items of comfort and luxury 44.9 2. Promoting merit in place of nepotism 42.9 3. Modern housing facilities 38.8 4. Rural-urban migration 34.7 5. Practicing the moral values 30.6 6. New patterns of recreation 28.6 7. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes 28.6 8. Power of the weak sections 26.5 9. Control of family/clan on individual‘s life 26.5 10. Religious tolerance 26.5 11. Investment in children’s education 24.5 12. Class consciousness 24.5 13. Social cohesion, unity and harmony 22.4 14. Democratic attitudes 22.4 Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 95

15. Freedom of thought 22.4 16. Modern methods of treatment 22.4 17. Social mobility 22.4 18. Better standard of nutrition 22.4 19. Improved opportunities for the minorities 22.4 20. Dominance of traditional power structure 17.4 21. Sectarianism 15.3 22. People’s participation in development programs 14.3 23. Problems of katchi abadis 14.3 24. Access to legal justice 14.3 25. Voluntary social service 12.2 26. Modern educational facilities 12.2 27. Preventive health measures 12.2 28. Awareness of environmental issues 10.2 29. Awareness of rights among the people 10.2

Discussion The study quoted in the preceding pages has tried to evaluate the NGO sector from different angles. In a situation where the present level and pace of development is unsatisfactory and the factors further deteriorating this situation are emerging from many sources (human; nature; citizens; government; international environment, etc.), as shown in Figure I, role of any agency which has the potential to improve the situation is important. The NGOs are providing a good range of practical needs to the people. They are also active for their strategic needs which ultimately result in empowerment for demanding good governance. (See Figure J). As democratic governance requires awareness, assertion, and realization of rights, the role of NGOs is found important. Moreover, on many other counts, such as contact between the government and people, access to legal justice, awareness of rights, and opportunities for the minorities and disadvantaged regions, The NGOs have made noteworthy contribution. In view of multifaceted and interlinked nature of the processes of democracy, governance, and access to grassroots communities, the NGOs have adopted different approaches and strategies to fulfill their goals. Since the role of governmental agencies is not satisfactory for what they have done so far in provision of both practical and strategic needs, NGOs deserve real approbation. The NGOs have created awareness and confidence among the people and their benefits have become known in the communities, more efforts for setting up NGOs and achieving needs have been seen hence the process is escalated and the sector is expanding under its own momentum. NGOs have also changed the order of values in the cultural map of the society. The values 96 Pakistan Perspectives undergone change due to the effect of NGOs or civil society organizations are related to the family, elders’ control, role of religion, morality, tolerance, voluntarism, self-help, patriarchy, gender equity, son-preference, access to power and justice, tolerance, wealth, class consciousness, and economic and political participation. NGOs’ contribution in promoting gender equity has also been well documented by this study, rather gender has been identified as the most significant area of the NGOs’ activity, in terms of decreasing discrimination, deprivation, and exploitation, and promoting women’s equal rights as human beings. The main focus of NGOs has been to end violence against women in all its forms and to increase women’s participation in various economic, political, social, cultural, and community activities. The prospects for NGOs are also expected to be considerably bright.

Conclusion This paper can be concluded on the note that whether it is through devolution, or empowering the grassroots organizations, or strengthening of the civil society at large, democratic governance can be the only or the most effective way to promote development activities which are sustainable, participatory, equitable, and gender-neutral. The NGOs can deliver best in a democratic environment but the governments, which make NGOs as their appendages, should look into the internal dynamics of the sector in order to push for correcting the imbalances inherent in it. To this end, the people should be imparted the ideas of self-organization and self-help, coupled with realization of their basic rights by the state. For this purpose, there should be a sufficient number of well functioning institutions in both the governmental and the non-governmental sectors.

Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 97

Appendix

Table: 1 Extent and Nature of Change in Development-related Aspects of the Pakistani Society and Role of the NGO Sector in It: Perception of the NGO Functionaries (percentages, N = 120) Nature of Change in Your S.No. Development-related Situation in Pakistan Role of the NGO Sector NGO’s Aspects (Response in favor of) (Response in favor of) Role Increase Decrease No Very Some- Nil Yes change Much what 1 Mechanization of the production process 85.8 3.3 5.0 23.3 44.2 19.2 25.8 2 Modern technical knowledge and 81.7 5.0 5.8 28.3 40.6 16.7 37.5 training for production 3 Use of modern sources of energy 61.7 10.0 20.8 11.7 39.2 28.3 18.3 (solar, bio-gas, etc.) 4 Expansion in employment 63.3 15.8 16.7 37.5 40.6 9.2 46.7 opportunities 5 Role of middleman 40.8 37.5 12.5 20.8 40.0 19.2 23.3 6 Poverty 66.7 19.2 10.8 24.2 30.0 23.3 36.7 7 Easy availability of credit 77.5 10.8 0.5 40.8 38.3 11.7 30.0 8 Entrepreneurship training 75.8 6.7 11.7 38.3 43.3 6.7 41.7 9 Access to market 75.8 9.2 9.2 25.0 49.2 10.8 32.5 10 Trend of seeking jobs abroad 79.2 8.3 5.8 10.8 38.3 37.5 11.7 11 Women working in unconventional fields 82.5 7.5 0.5 45.8 32.5 0.8 40.0 12 Trend of self-help 73.3 12.5 0.5 48.3 32.5 7.5 59.2 13 Trend of saving 66.7 15.0 9.2 41.7 33.3 10.0 40.0 14 Development of 69.2 8.3 14.2 40.0 39.2 9.2 49.2 underdeveloped regions

98 Pakistan Perspectives

Table: 2 Extent and Nature of Change in Development-related Aspects in the Pakistani Society and Role of the NGOs in It: Perception of the Social Analysts (percentages*, N = 60) Situation in Pakistan Role of the NGO Sector S.No. Nature of Change in (Response in favor of) (Response in favor of) Development-related Increase Decreas No Very Some- Nil Aspects e change Much What 1 Mechanization of the 85.0 0.0 6.7 10.0 27.0 41.7 production process 2 Modern technical 85.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 40.0 27.0 knowledge and training for production 3 Use of modern sources of 61.7 6.7 20.0 11.7 13.3 36.7 energy (solar, bio-gas, etc.) 4 Expansion in employment 56.7 27.3 6.7 13.3 36.7 33.3 opportunities 5 Role of middleman 53.3 10.0 20.0 26.7 26.7 28.3 6 Poverty 73.3 16.7 3.3 10.0 33.3 38.3 7 Easy availability of credit 56.7 20.0 13.3 0.8 46.7 27.0 8 Entrepreneurship training 70.0 0.8 13.3 16.7 53.3 15.0 9 Access to market 71.7 0.8 10.0 6.7 53.3 23.3 10 Trend of seeking jobs 80.0 0.8 8.2 11.7 28.3 41.7 abroad 11 Women working in un- 76.7 0.5 10.0 20.0 21.7 10.0 conventional fields 12 Trend of self-help 71.7 0.8 6.7 28.3 46.7 11.7 13 Trend of saving 55.0 20.0 15.0 0.8 31.7 41.7 14 Development of under- 55.0 13.3 21.7 10.0 46.7 25.0 developed regions  Note: Percentages in the sets of columns under each item do not add up to 100 due to no responses, not shown in the table.

Table: 3 Extent and Nature of Change in Socio-political Aspects of the Pakistani Society and Role of the NGO Sector in It: Perception of the NGO Functionaries (percentage, N = 120) S.No. Nature of Change in Situation in Pakistan Role of the NGO Sector Your Socio-political Aspects (Response in favor of) (Response in favor of) NGO’s Role Increase Decrease No Very Some Yes change Much what Nil 1 Better standard of nutrition 44.2 27.5 14.2 25.8 43.3 11.7 37.5 2 Preventive health measures 69.2 14.2 8.3 40.0 36.7 4.2 51.7 Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 99

3 Modern methods of treatment 75.8 7.5 6.7 36.7 38.3 5.8 44.2 Modern educational 4 facilities 73.3 8.3 9.2 38.8 32.5 7.5 46.7 5 Modern housing facilities 66.7 11.7 11.7 14.2 30.0 25.8 17.5 Investment in children’s 6 education 67.5 10.8 0.5 35.8 29.2 10.0 42.5 7 New patterns of recreation 58.3 13.3 15.0 21.7 30.0 17.5 22.5 Awareness of 8 environmental issues 62.5 10.8 12.5 40.0 35.8 4.2 45.0 9 Rural-urban migration 84.2 0.5 3.3 15.0 30.8 30.8 10.8 10 Problems of katchi abadis 70.0 14.2 6.7 33.3 35.8 10.8 27.5 Using items of comfort 11 and luxury 76.7 10.8 3.3 14.2 31.7 26.7 12.5 Promoting merit in place 12 of nepotism 30.8 38.3 25.0 15.8 36.7 26.7 31.7 13 Power of the weak sections 43.3 25.0 25.8 25.0 43.3 13.3 34.2 Economic opportunities 14 for disadvantaged 35.8 26.7 26.7 20.0 49.2 13.3 31.7 regions 15 Class- consciousness 66.6 13.3 11.7 25.8 36.7 19.2 36.7 People’s participation in 16 development programs 73.3 10.0 10.0 50.0 33.3 4.2 47.5 17 Social mobility 68.3 10.8 10.0 42.5 30.0 5.8 36.7 Improved opportunities 18 for the minorities 59.2 8.3 25.8 30.0 42.5 10.8 36.7 19 Religious tolerance 33.3 44.2 15.8 23.3 38.3 20.0 33.3 Awareness of rights 20 among the people 81.7 6.7 8.3 45.8 35.0 0.5 51.7 21 Democratic attitudes 49.2 25.8 16.7 30.0 40.8 10.0 40.0 Control of traditional 22 power structure 42.5 33.3 15.0 22.5 35.8 19.2 31.7 23 Freedom of thought 70.8 12.5 11.7 44.2 30.8 8.3 45.0 24 Volunteer social service 70.8 15.8 6.7 61.7 21.6 2.5 59.2 Control of family/clan 25 on individual’s life 25.0 56.7 13.3 22.5 44.2 14.2 32.5 26 Access to legal justice 35.0 31.7 25.0 26.7 39.2 14.2 28.3 27 Sectarianism 65.0 18.3 8.3 13.3 25.8 33.3 25.0 Social cohesion, unity 28 and harmony 35.0 32.5 25.0 30.0 31.2 14.2 37.5 29 Practicing the moral 25.8 49.2 18.3 26.7 30.8 19.2 40.0 values

100 Pakistan Perspectives

Figure: A

NGOFs' Perception about Nature of Change in Socio-political Aspects in Pakistan (1972-2006)

Practicing moral values Social cohesion, unity and harmony Sectarianism Access to legal justice Control of family/clan on individual's life Volunteer social service Freedom of thought Control of traditional power structure Democratic attitudes Awareness of rights among the people Religious tolerance Improved opportunities for the minorities Social mobility Increase People's participation in development Decrease programs No change Class-consciousness Economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes Power of the weak sections Promoting merit in place of nepotism Using items of comfort and luxury Problems of katchi abadis Rural-urban migration Awareness of environmental issues New patterns of recreation Investment in children's education Modern housing facilities Modern educational facilities Modern methods of treatment Preventive health measures Better standard of nutrition

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 101

Table: 4 Extent and Nature of Change in Socio-political Aspects of the Pakistani Society and Role of the NGOs in It: Perception of the Social Analysts (percentages*, N= 60) Situation in Pakistan Role of the NGO S. Nature of Change in (Response in favor of) Sector No. Socio-political Aspects (Response in favor of) Increase Decrease No Very Some Nil change Much what 1 Better standard of nutrition 41.7 35.0 10.0 11.7 48.3 21.7 2 Preventive health measures 58.3 15.0 10.0 20.0 48.3 10.0 3 Modern methods of treatment 66.7 11.7 0.5 10.0 50.0 18.3 4 Modern educational facilities 70.0 11.7 3.3 23.3 48.3 10.0 5 Modern housing facilities 66.7 13.3 0.5 11.7 36.7 33.3 6 Investment in children’s ducation 66.7 10.0 0.8 23.3 36.7 21.7 7 New patterns of recreation 66.7 0.8 10.0 10.0 36.7 17.0 8 Awareness of environmental issues 75.0 3.3 0.8 31.7 41.7 10.0 9 Rural-urban migration 83.3 3.3 1.7 10.0 35.0 35.0 10 Problems of katchi abadis 66.7 18.3 3.3 23.3 5.0 16.7 11 Using items of comforts and luxuries 71.7 10.0 0.5 10.0 27.0 41.7 12 Promoting merit in place of nepotism 23.3 42.3 21.7 0.5 31.7 42.3 13 Power of the weak sections 35.0 40.0 13.3 13.3 40.0 28.3 14 Economic opportunities for 55.0 18.3 13.3 13.3 38.3 26.7 disadvantaged classes 15 Class consciousness 55.0 15.0 18.3 16.7 38.3 20.0 16 People’s participation in development 61.7 20.0 0.5 27.0 36.7 13.3 programs 17 Social mobility 40.0 23.3 25.0 21.7 36.7 20.0 18 Improved opportunities for the 33.3 43.3 11.7 21.7 33.3 25.0 minorities 19 Religious tolerance 33.3 43.3 11.7 13.3 36.7 23.3 20 Awareness of rights among the people 73.3 0.8 0.5 26.7 41.7 11.7 21 Democratic attitudes 45.0 28.3 15.0 20.0 33.3 25.0 22 Control of traditional power structure 50.0 23.3 15.0 18.3 38.3 23.3 23 Freedom of thought 45.0 23.3 20.0 15.0 45.0 20.0 24 Volunteer social service 60.0 13.3 0.8 33.3 35.0 11.7 25 Control of family/clan on individual’s 23.3 41.7 15.0 26.7 26.7 21.7 life 26 Access to legal justice 38.3 23.3 15.0 21.7 38.3 13.3 27 Sectarianism 60.0 13.3 0.5 20.0 35.0 20.0 28 Social cohesion, unity and harmony 30.0 40.0 0.8 16.7 38.3 21.7 29 Practicing the moral values 21.7 45.0 13.3 3.3 35.0 31.7  Note: Percentages in the sets of columns under each item do not add up to 100 due to no responses, not shown in the table.

102 Pakistan Perspectives

Figure: B

Social Analysts' Perception About Change in Socio-political Aspects in Pakistan (1972- 2006)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Better standard of nutrition Preventive health measures

Modern methods of treatment

Modern educational facilities Modern housing facilities

Investment in children's education New patterns of recreation

Awareness of environmental issues Rural-urban migration

Problems of katchi abadis Using items of comfort and luxury Promoting merit in place of nepotism

Power of the weak sections Economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes Increase Class-consciousness Decrease People's participation in development programs No Change Social mobility Improved opportunities for the minorities Religious tolerance

Awareness of rights among the people

Democratic attitudes Control of traditional power structure

Freedom of thought Volunteer social service

Control of family/clan on individual's life Access to legal justice

Sectarianism

Social cohesion, unity and harmony Practicing moral values

Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 103

Figure: C

NGOFs' Perception about Role of NGOs in Changing Development-related Aspects in Pakistan

Development of underdeveloped regions

Trend of saving

Trend of self-help

Women working in un-conventional fields

Trend of seeking jobs abroad

Access to market

Entrepreneurship training Very Much N Somewhat Easy availability of credit No Role

Poverty

Role of middleman

Expansion in employment opportunities

Use of modern sources of energy (solar, bio-gas, etc.)

Modern technical knowledge and training for production

Mechanization of the production process

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

104 Pakistan Perspectives

Figure: D

Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 105

Figure: E

NGOFs' Perception about Role of the NGOs in Changing Socio- political Aspects in Pakistan

Practicing moral values

Social cohesion, unity and harmony

Sectarianism

Access to legal justice

Control of family/clan on individual's life

Volunteer social service

Freedom of thought

Control of traditional pow er structure

Democratic attitudes

Aw areness of rights among the people

Religious tolerance

Improved opportunities for the minorities

Social mobility

People's participation in development programs Very Much Class-consciousness Somewhat

Economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes No Role

Pow er of the w eak sections

Promoting merit in place of nepotism

Using items of comfort and luxury

Problems of katchi abadis

Rural-urban migration

Aw areness of environmental issues

New patterns of recreation

Investment in children's education

Modern housing facilities

Modern educational facilities

Modern methods of treatment

Preventive health measures

Better standard of nutrition

0 20 40 60 80 100

106 Pakistan Perspectives

Figure: F

Civil Society, Democratic Governance… 107

Figure: G

Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam

Muhammad Naeem-ul-Haq Chishti*

Abstract Feminist human rights advocates often criticise Islam for having a discriminatory attitude towards women especially in matters of family law. In support of this criticism, they refer to various practices of Islam to argue that gender inequality is inbuilt in the Islamic social system. With this criticism in view, the present research paper analytically examines the issue of gender equality in Islam with particular reference to the position of Islamic law on polygamy, endogamy, divorce, inheritance and evidential capacity of women. The paper focuses on the argument that the basic principles of Islamic law are not inconsistent with modern human rights as contained in the UDHR, ICCPR and CEDAW. The paper also makes suitable recommendations for the development of Islamic law to bring it in complete conformity with the needs of modern times without compromising on basic principles of Islam. ––––––––– Article 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)1 declares: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant’.2 The underlying aim of the Article is to ensure gender equality or ‘equal rights of men and women’. The reason set forth in the Article for ensuring this equality is to enable both sexes to enjoy their civil and political rights under modern human rights. A minute study of the Article would make it clear that it lays down two fundamental principles: equality and non-discrimination.

* Dr. Muhammad Naeem-ul-Haq Chishti, Advocate of High Court and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England & Wales, and Adjunct Faculty, Punjab Law College, Lahore. 1 The ICCPR was adopted by the UN General Assembly through Resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16 December 1966. 2 Article 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Full text of the Covenant may be read at the UN International Human Rights Instruments Website: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ intlinst.htm. 110 Pakistan Perspectives

Although both these terms are usually used as synonyms, the former refers to a positive right while the latter refers to a negative right. When put together both these rights aim at ensuring impartiality in the treatment of individuals, particularly women, in a state. As such, the rights of equality and non-discrimination are often described as ‘the most fundamental of the rights of man’ and ‘the starting point of all liberties’.3 The principle of equality, as enshrined in the ICCPR, has been derived from Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)4 which declares that ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’.5 Similarly, the principle of non-discrimination has been derived from Article 2 of the UDHR, which states that the enjoyment of human rights shall be ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.6 The obligation of equality and non-discrimination as envisaged in Article 3 of the ICCPR requires the member states not only to protect women but also to take appropriate action through legislation for their enlightenment and education so that they are able to enjoy equal rights with men. This aspect has also been highlighted in the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which emphasises upon total elimination of discrimination against women and the achievement of total equality between genders.7 While Article 3 generally aims at gender equality, Article 23 of the ICCPR provides specific guarantees for gender equality in connection with the institution of family. The ICCPR does not provide a definition of the word ‘family’. However, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), which works as the supervisory machinery under the ICCPR and is responsible for the execution of the Covenant, has stated in this regard as follows: ‘In giving effect to recognition of the family in the context of Article 23, it is important to accept the concept of the various forms of family, including unmarried couples and their

3 A.F. Bayefsky, ‘The Principle of Equality or non-Discrimination in International Law’, 11 Human Rights Law Journal, 1990, p.1. 4 The UDHR was adopted by the UN General Assembly through Resolution 217A (III) on 10 December 1948. 5 Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 6 Ibid., article 2. 7 The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979, p.13. Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam 111 children and single parents and their children and to ensure the equal treatment of women in these contexts’.8 The importance and recognition of the family as an institution under Islamic law is a well-established fact. However, in Islam, marriage is the legitimate means of founding a family. In this sense, Article 23 is in full agreement with Islamic law. Nonetheless, there are some apparent differences between the thresholds of Islamic law and modern human rights as contained in Article 23 of the ICCPR. These differences are particularly pertinent in connection with the presumed superiority of men over women, polygamy, endogamy, divorce and inheritance which are discussed below under separate heads:

Presumed superiority of men over women It is a well-established though a sad fact that in Muslim societies men are generally given preferential treatment over women. Although reasons for this preferential treatment are mostly cultural and socioeconomic rather than religious, their continued existence is often justified with the help of Islamic law. In this regard, the following two verses of the Qur’an are often cited to prove that men have a divine right of superiority over women:9 a. ‘And women have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable; but men have a degree over them’.10 (Al-Qur’an 2:228) b. ‘Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, since Allah has made some of them excel the other, and because they have spent of their wealth’.11 (Al-Qur’an 4:34) Almost all writers, both classical and modern, have interpreted these two verses variously. For example, Abdullah Yousaf Ali has translated the first verse as ‘men have a degree (of advantage) over women’;12 but Muhsin Khan has translated it as ‘men have a degree (of responsibility) over them’.13 Addition of the words ‘of advantage’ and

8 United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 22, para 5. 9 Emphasis added. 10 Al-Quran, ‘Surah Al-Baqarah’, 2:228. 11 Ibid., ‘Surah An-Nisa’, 4:34. 12 A.Y. Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an (Maryland: Amana Corporation, 1992), p.92. 13 M. Muhsin Khan and M. Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali, Interpretation of the Meanings of the Noble Qur’an in the English Language: A Summarized Version of Al-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi and Ibn Kathir with Comments from Sahih-al-Bukhari (Riyadh: Darussalam Publishers, 1996), p.57. 112 Pakistan Perspectives

‘of responsibility’ by the two interpreters makes it manifestly clear that those are not express statements of the Qur’an. Rather, those interpretations are based on the understanding of the content by the interpreters. Ibn Qadamah, in his famous treatise al-Mugni, has argued that both men and women have equal rights in Islam. According to him, the two genders have a complementary role but the husband’s role is greater than the wife’s because God says that ‘men have a degree (of superiority) over them’. He has also referred to a Tradition in which the Prophet is reported to have said that if it was lawful for a human being to prostrate before another, wives would have been ordered to prostrate before husbands due to the rights of husbands over them.14 Therefore, although he does not attribute more rights to men, he does declare men to be superior to women. While the first verse (Al-Qur’an 2:228) is often quoted to argue that men have a degree of superiority over women, the second verse (Al- Qur’an 4:34) is usually presented to explain the reason for the presumed superiority. This second verse gives two reasons: firstly, men are the maintainers of their wives; and secondly, they have spent of their wealth to acquire them. Therefore, while the contemporary Muslim jurists tend to agree that men and women have equal rights in Islam they insist that men have a degree of superiority over women in family matters for the two aforesaid economic reasons mentioned in verse 4:34. If that argument is accepted, it would mean that the sole reason for men’s superiority over women is their economic role in the family and they lose that role they will have no superiority over women. Conversely, women will become superior if men are dependent upon them. What is exactly meant by degree in the first verse quoted above (Al-Qur’an 2:228) is unclear as the Qur’an does not specify anything in this regard. Therefore, one approach would be not to put any meanings in an open ended verse which the Divine Author Himself did not do. That would mean that both sexes have equal rights subject to their inherent strengths and weaknesses. The other approach would be to interpret the two verses with reference to their context. Both the verses have been revealed in the context of the institution of family. Therefore, even if the two verses are linked together, instead of advocating the superiority of one gender over the other, the two verses must be understood in the context of their different roles in the family. Like all other things in the universe, this

14 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mugni (Arabic) (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Riyadh al- Hadithah, 1981) Vol.7, p.223. Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam 113 role is also subject to change from time to time. While in the past the women were economically dependent upon men, in the future the position could be quite opposite. Therefore, the degree of difference mentioned in the first verse (Al-Qur’an 2:228) possibly refers to the role of leadership that was traditionally available to men in all societies. From sociological perspective, authority and power are essential elements of any group structure. Similarly, from psychological perspective, whenever two persons come in contact with each other, there is an ascendance-submission or dominance-compliance relationship between them. In simple words, whenever a team comprising two or more members comes into existence, it inevitably requires one of them to be the leader, especially when there are any targets to be achieved. This explains why Islam emphasises upon leadership in every group activity to ensure smooth functioning of the team and cohesion in the relationship. It is for this reason that when two or more people get together to perform congregational prayers, the one more suited for the role is designated as Imam or leader. In such situations, the leader is not considered as being superior to others but he is assigned the role only to ensure smooth functioning of the team. Likewise, there arises the need to differentiate and identify roles within the family structure in order to enhance the success of the family life. The husband would certainly be more suitable for certain roles while the wife would be more effective in others. Thus, the degree of responsibility or presumed authority or the leadership role of men over women is a consequence of their structural role in the family. Islamic concept of the man being the leader of the family however does not mean that man is superior to woman or he has more rights than the other. Apart from the leadership role, which too is restricted to the institution of family and in which he is accountable to other team members, both men and women have equal rights against each other and none of them is to be discriminated on the basis of sex alone.

Polygamy Islam does not promote celibacy and also prohibits sexual relations outside wedlock. As such, marriage and the family are very strong institutions of Islam. There is a famous Tradition reported in Sahih al- Bukhari in which the Prophet described marriage as his Sunnah and asked his followers not to neglect it.15 Therefore, Esposito rightly

15 Al-Asqalni, Ibn Hajar, Bulugh al-Maram, 1996, p.342, Hadith 825. 114 Pakistan Perspectives reached the following conclusion: ‘Islam considers marriage, which is an important safeguard for chastity, to be incumbent on every Muslim man and woman unless they are physically or financially unable to lead conjugal life’.16 While Islam encourages marriage, it does not grant recognition as a family to unmarried couples living together and to civil partnerships between the same sex and the opposite sex partners, as is recognized in most of the Western countries. Under Islamic law, all sexual relationships outside wedlock, even if freely and fully consented by the parties, fall under the definition of ‘zina’ and, if the offence is proved according to the evidential requirements prescribed by the Shariah, the offenders are liable to the punishment of hadd, which in the case of married persons is rajm or stoning to death and in the case of unmarried persons is a hundred stripes.17 Such a punishment from the standpoint of modern human rights is not only a violation of Articles 7 and 23 of the ICCPR but is also against the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1951. Every year, many people from Muslim states seek asylum in the Western countries on this ground. While in such cases of unmarried relationships and civil partnerships Muslim states are often criticized for their failure to introduce necessary legislation, in case of polygamy and endogamy they are often criticized for their failure not to undo relevant laws. Article 23(4), as discussed above, stipulates that: ‘States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution’. In the light of the provisions of this sub-article, the Human Rights Committee observed in its General Comment 28 that polygamy is incompatible with equality of rights under the ICCPR and that ‘it should be definitely abolished where it continues to exist’.18 Since

16 Esposito, J.L., Women in Muslim Family Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), p.15. 17 The punishment of rajm is based on the Sunnah. Otherwise, the Qur’an does not make any distinction between the offenders and prescribes the same penalty for zina irrespective of the fact whether the offenders are married or unmarried: ‘The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication, flog each of them with a hundred stripes: Let not compassion move you in their case, in a matter prescribed by Allah, if ye believe in Allah and the Last Day: and let a party of the Believers witness their punishment’. Al-Qur’an, Surah An-Nur, 24:2. 18 United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 28, para 24. Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam 115 polygamy is generally prevalent in Muslim states, they were the obvious target. There is no denying the fact that Islam allows polygamy. However, it is not an absolute right but a qualified one which means that it can be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and that too after fulfillment of necessary conditions. The permissibility of polygamy in Islamic law is based on the following Qur’anic verse: ‘If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry women of your choice, Two or three or four; but if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess, that will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice’.19 It is clear from the above verse that though, under Islamic law, men are allowed to have a maximum of four wives at a time, subject to the following conditions: 1. The polygamous marriage is allowed only with widows who have orphan children; 2. The main purpose of the marriage is to be able to deal justly with the orphans in question; 3. The marriage will be allowed only if the man is able to deal with all the spouses justly. Both classical and modern Muslim jurists agree that the ability to treat them justly is a sine qua non for the second or the subsequent marriages. However, Imam Shafi’i did not regard the ability to do justice between the wives as a pre-requisite for later marriages. In his view, ‘dealing justly’ is not a precondition or a legal requirement but only a moral exhortation for the guidance of the husband’s moral conscience which he may choose to ignore at his own peril at the cost of wrath by Almighty Allah. Some modern Muslim jurists and scholars, such as the nineteenth century Egyptian jurist Muhammad Abduh, argue that last part of the above-quoted Qur’anic verse ‘that will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice’ makes it clear that monogamy is the rule while polygamy is only an exception. According to them, when this part of the verse 4:3 is read with verse 4:129 (‘You will never be able to do perfect justice between wives even if it is your ardent desire’.) one comes to the conclusion that polygamy is actually prohibited under Islamic law. The combined interpretation of verses 4:3 and 4:129 was subsequently relied upon by Tunisia and Morocco. Tunisia banned

19 Al-Quran, ‘Surah An-Nisa’, 4:3. 116 Pakistan Perspectives polygamy in 1956 through the Tunisian Code of Personal Status which declared: ‘Polygamy is forbidden. Any person who, having entered into a bond of marriage, contracts another marriage before the dissolution of the preceding one, is liable to one year’s imprisonment or to fine’.20 Moroccan Code of Personal Status of 1958 also contained similar provisions. Iraq also followed the prohibitive approach adopted by Tunisia and Morocco in the fifties and banned polygamy in 1959. However, due to lack of political will and in view of strong opposition and non- compliance by Muslims who considered it to be contrary to express Qur’anic injunctions, this law was revised in 1963 and the article prohibiting polygamy was consequently removed. The Tunisian and Moroccan Codes are however still operative despite similar opposition faced by Iraq. Unlike Tunisia, Morocco and Iraq, Syria adopted a restrictive approach and instead of banning it altogether linked the right of polygamy to obtaining approval from the family court. Article 17 of the Syrian Code, which is still in force, declares: ‘The Judge is empowered to refuse permission to a married man to marry another woman if it is established that he is not in a position to support two wives’.21 Although the only test required in the Syrian law is a man’s ability to support two wives, nevertheless it is a right step in the right direction. In Pakistan, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance was promulgated by President General Muhammad Ayub Khan in 1965 which still continues to be force without any major amendments. Under this Ordinance, a husband is required to seek permission from his existing wife or wives, as the case may be, before entering into marriage with another woman. His failure to do so could make him liable for six months’ imprisonment or with fine or both. However, this provision has failed to protect women’s scant family rights in Pakistan as most of them are hardly able to confront men in this male dominated society. In many Muslim states where polygamy is permitted, the prerequisite of being able to do justice between co-wives is seldom given any consideration by men. Due to widespread corruption in most of the Muslim states coupled with their poor record on the rule of law, the permissibility of polygamy is often abused in a way that actually works against the family institution itself. Therefore, its permissibility needs to

20 Article 18 of the Tunisian Code of Personal Status that came into force on 13 August 1956. 21 T. Mahmood, Statutes of Personal Law in Islamic Countries: History, Texts and Analysis (Delhi: India and Islam Research Council, 1995), pp.246-48. Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam 117 be controlled under Islamic law for reasons of welfare under the principle of Maslahah, which is well-established in Islamic Jurisprudence. The prohibitive approach as adopted in Tunisia, Morocco and Iraq has been controversial under traditional Islamic law and has been criticized by many scholars as contravening the Qur’an.22 On the contrary, the restrictive approach adopted by Syria, despite being limited, has been more successful as it has been able to redress the root cause of the evil without invoking much criticism. The time has come when the Muslim States, including Pakistan, should introduce similar changes in their family laws with appropriate checks and balances. In view of inherent loopholes in the judicial systems of some of the Muslim states including Pakistan, it is proposed that, in addition to linking polygamy with permission from the Family Court, the relevant family laws may be amended suitably with a view to give Muslim women an optional right of automatic divorce if they are not satisfied with the permission granted by the Family Court. Such a right can be granted to them under the principles of tafwid-al-talaq or delegated divorce and taliq-al-talaq or suspended divorce, which should be made a part of every contract of marriage between the parties. There is consensus among Muslim jurists that polygamy is only a permissible act and it cannot be imposed on a man or a woman compulsorily. Also, most of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence, except Shi’ah, endorse the doctrines of tafwid-al-talq and taliq-al-talaq. Under the first principle of tafwid-al-talq or delegated divorce, the husband gives the right to the wife to divorce herself in stipulated circumstances which may include second marriage. In such a case, the wife can divorce her husband just like the husband can divorce her. Under the second principle of taliq-al-talaq or suspended divorce, the husband stipulates at the time of marriage that the marriage will become automatically repudiated if he does certain things which may include entering into another marriage. It is hoped that by restricting polygamous marriages to widows with orphans, by making prior permission of the Court compulsory and by making tafwid-al-talq or delegated divorce and taliq-al-talaq or suspended divorce essential of a contract of marriage, Islamic states will be able not only to ensure compliance with Article 23 of the ICCPR but they will also be able to follow the true spirit of the Islamic law allowing polygamous relationships only for good reasons such as demographic

22 A.A. Qadri, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World (New Delhi: Taj Company, 1986), pp.341-58. 118 Pakistan Perspectives needs, economic factors, barrenness or chronic illness of the wife, etc. Aspiring for another marriage without any valid reason is contrary to the Qur’anic philosophy of marriage. According to the Qur’an, a believer enters into a bond of marriage ‘desiring chastity, not lust’.23 This theme has been reiterated in Al-Quran 5:5 which has been discussed below in connection with endogamy.

Endogamy The Qur’an permits Muslim men to marry ‘women of the people of the book’, i.e. Christian and Jewish women, in the following verse of Surah Al-Ma’idah: ‘This day are (all) things good and pure made lawful unto you. The food of the People of the Book is lawful unto you and yours is lawful unto them. (Lawful unto you in marriage) are (not only) chaste women who are believers, but (also) chaste women among the People of the Book, revealed before your time,- when ye give them their due dowers, and desire chastity, not lewdness, nor secret intrigues if any one rejects faith, fruitless is his work, and in the Hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost (all spiritual good)’. (Al-Quran 5:5)24 Although a Muslim man is permitted to marrying a Christian or Jewish woman, there is consensus among both Sunni and Shi’ah jurists that a Muslim woman is prohibited from marrying a non-Muslim man. This prohibition is based on the basis of the following two verses of the Qur’an: a. ‘Do not marry unbelieving women (idolaters), until they believe: A slave woman who believes is better than an unbelieving woman, even though she allures you. Nor marry (your girls) to unbelievers until they believe: A man slave who believes is better than an unbeliever, even though he allures you’.25 b. ‘O you who believe! When there come to you believing women refugees, examine (and test) them: Allah knows best as to their Faith: if you ascertain that they are Believers, then send them not back to the Unbelievers. They are not lawful (wives) for the Unbelievers, nor are the (Unbelievers) lawful (husbands) for them.But pay the Unbelievers what they have spent (on their dower), and there will be no blame on you if you marry them on payment of their dower to them’.26

23 Al-Quran, ‘Surah An-Nisa’, 4:24. 24 Ibid., ‘Surah Al-Ma’idah’, 5:5. 25 Ibid., ‘Surah Al-Baqarah’, 2:221. 26 Ibid., ‘Surah Al-Mumtahnah’, 60:10. Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam 119

Allowing Muslim men to marry Christian and Jewish women but disallowing Muslim women to marry Christian men and Jewish men is often considered against modern human rights being discriminatory against Muslim women. Therefore, the HRC observed as follows: ‘The right to choose one’s spouse may be restricted by laws or practices that prevent the marriage of a woman of a particular religion with a man who professes no religion or a different religion. States should provide information on these laws and practices and on the measures take to abolish the law and practices’.27 Muslim jurists have tried to defend the female endogamy under Islamic law. Their first and the foremost defence is as follows: ‘While Islam guarantees freedom of belief and practice to the Christian and Jewish wife of a Muslim, safeguarding her rights according to her own faith, other religions, such as Judaism and Christianity, do not guarantee the wife of a different faith freedom of belief and practice, nor do they safeguard her rights’.28 The prohibition under Islamic law may, on some occasions, prevent a Muslim woman from marrying a Christian or a Jewish man she loves. Therefore, this preferential treatment has been found discriminatory under modern human rights. The supporters of Islamic faith may however argue that the non-Muslim man may convert to Islam if he really loves her. Love being one of the most abused words in the world; that does not solve the problem. Besides, it is the question of the Muslim woman’s rights and not vice versa. The prohibition of Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims therefore is one of the areas where achieving complete equality seems difficult between Islamic law and modern human rights. Perhaps, that is why no non-secular Muslim state has so far enacted any law to abrogate the prohibition on Muslim woman’s right to marry a non-Muslim thereby bringing them at par with their Muslim counterparts. The juristic view of some contemporary Muslim scholars on the issue is that since Muslim women are prohibited completely from marrying non-Muslims, the Muslim men could also be temporarily prohibited from marrying women of the ‘people of the book’ where there is apprehension of a high number of Muslim women remaining

27 UNHRC, General Comment 28, para 24. 28 Y. Al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam (Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Students Organizations, 1984), pp.184- 86. 120 Pakistan Perspectives unmarried until the situation is remedied. This is based on the doctrine of public welfare or maslahah under Islamic law.29 Alternatively, necessary legislation may be made by Muslim states, as discussed above in connection with polygamy, allowing to incorporate a condition in favour of women that the husband shall not marry a Christian or a Jewish woman and if he does so she will be entitled to tafwid-al-talq or delegated divorce and taliq-al-talaq or suspended divorce, as the case may be. Another solution in the circumstances could be to make such a marriage conditional with obtaining permission from the Family Court as is presently done in Syria in the case of polygamous marriages.

Divorce Article 23(4) of the ICCPR stipulated: ‘States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution’. Therefore, in its General Comment 28, the HRC observed that in the dissolution of marriages member states must ensure that ‘grounds for divorce and annulment should be the same for men and women’.30 In plain words, in terms of modern human rights, both men and women have equal rights of divorce and the member states are required to amend their laws accordingly in terms of Article 23(4) of the ICCPR. Under Islamic law, marriage may be dissolved in one of the following ways: 1. Unilateral repudiation by husband, which is commonly known as talaq; 2. Discharge at wife’s request called khula; 3. Dissolution by mutual agreement of the parties known as mubara’ah, 4. Dissolution through judicial order termed as fasakh. The first type, i.e. unilateral repudiation or talaq, is a right of the husband while the other three forms khula, mubara’ah and fasakh can be invoked only by the wife. Unilateral repudiation or talaq however is the simplest and the most common method of dissolving the marriage. This can be exercised exclusively by the husband at his discretion for any or no reason at all. Although divorce is permitted in Islam, Muslims are strongly advised to follow this action as a last resort because it is one of those permissible acts which do not find favour with Almighty Allah.

29 Ibid. 30 UNHRC General Comment 28, para 26. Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam 121

It may be morally wrong, or even sinful in some circumstances, a husband can divorce his wife under Islamic law by a single pronouncement such as ‘I divorce you’. On the contrary, a woman can seek dissolution of marriage only in one of the three ways mentioned above and that too on limited grounds. Therefore, while it may be a misconception to state that men have an exclusive right of dissolving the marriage under Islamic law it will also be equally misleading to suggest that men and women have equal or the same rights of divorce under Islamic law. The fact is that, under traditional Islamic law, men certainly have an advantage over women in the procedure of marriage dissolution. Therefore, the Qur’an admonishes them to safeguard their wives’ welfare.31 Yet there is evidence of this right of unilateral repudiation or talaq being abused by men at a large scale in the Muslim countries. Furthermore, even though divorced women are free to remarry under Islamic law, men in many Muslim countries consider it a taboo to marry divorced women. As such, they are often subjected to misery and destitution. Even in the exercise of the right to discharge or khula by a wife, some men do in bad faith withhold consent and thus continue to punish the woman and keep her under retention. In this way, the woman is left only with the alternative of seeking a judicial order of dissolution or fasakh which she may not be able to obtain if her grounds of dissolution fall outside the traditional legal limits for granting such order. This situation is contrary to the spirit of Islamic law. Therefore, there is dire need to combine the moral content with the procedural aspect of dissolution of marriage under Islamic law. Some Muslim states have already looked into the problem and introduced new provisions in their Personal Status Laws that modify, in a variety of ways, the traditional rules of dissolution of marriage under Islamic law. The most radical modifications prohibit the husband’s right to divorce his wife extra-judicially through unilateral repudiation or talaq. For example, Article 30 of the Tunisian Code of Personal Conduct, 1956, provides that: ‘Divorce outside a court of law is without legal effect’. Article 49 of the Algerian Family Code of 1988 also has a similar provision. The above changes were made by the concerned Muslim states placing their reliance on the following verse of the Qur’an: ‘If you fear a breach between the two of them (husband and wife), appoint two

31 Al-Quran, ‘Surah Al-Baqarah’, 2:229-32. 122 Pakistan Perspectives arbiters’.32 Although Islamic law requires two arbiters, one from the husband’s family and the other from the wife’s family, in the above examples the state considered it appropriate to take over that role through its courts on grounds of public interest. In this way, the court is placed in the position of two arbiters to ensure a combination of the moral content and procedural aspect of the divorce bringing the parties on the same procedural footing in matters of dissolution of marriage. In some other countries such as Morocco, Syria, Algeria and Iran, amendments have been made in the Muslim Family Law empowering the court to order the husband to pay compensation to the wife where the unilateral repudiation (talaq) is for no just cause.33 In Pakistan, unilateral repudiation (talaq) by the husband becomes effective only after 90 days after it has been reported to an Arbitration Council, which tries to reunite the couple during this period. This is more like a supervisory role over the traditional waiting period under Islamic law after the talaq has been pronounced. Considering the consensus of Muslim jurists that divorce is recommended only as a last resort when it has become clearly impossible for the spouses to remain together, coupled with evidence that the procedural advantage enjoyed by men over women in the matter of divorce has been abused, the judicial control of marriage dissolution by the state can also be justified under the doctrine of public welfare (maslahah).34 The doctrine is used as a ‘basis of rationality and extendibility of Islamic law to changing circumstances as a fundamental principle for the universality and certainty of Islamic law.35 The doctrine of hisbah could also be relied upon here so that the state would be seen as encouraging good and preventing evil by such judicial control whereby the dissolution of marriage is restricted to dissolution by judicial order to facilitate the amalgamation of both the moral and legal content of the rules of divorce. Since dissolution by judicial order (faskh) is a method already sanctioned by Islamic law, this will not amount to making any new law but the removal of a procedural advantage which has been generally subjected to abuse.

32 Ibid., ‘Surah An-Nisa’, 4:35. 33 Article 49 of the Algerian Family Code of 1988 and Article 117 of the Syrian Code of Personal Status of 1953 have such provisions. 34 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Islam and Justice (New York: LCHR, 1997), pp.122-23. 35 M.K. Masud, Shatibi’s Philosophy of Islamic Law (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1995), p.viii. Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam 123

An alternative approach is giving the right of divorce to women by inserting or deeming a provision in the contract of marriage. Such a right is known in Islamic law as khiyar al-talaq, i.e. option of the wife to divorce. Under traditional Islamic law, the wife has a right to stipulate in the marriage contract that the husband delegates to her, absolutely or conditionally, the right of unilateral repudiation (talaq) whereby she will have a right to invoke it when necessary. This does not however divest the husband of his own original right to divorce. This will bring the spouses at par as far as right of divorce is concerned. That means the wife will have a statutory right of divorce in the contract of marriage unless she agrees to exclude it specifically. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the courts will presume that such a condition always existed in a contract of marriage. Supplementary to that is the need to create awareness among women of their legal rights under Islamic law.36 There is nothing under the Shari’ah that prohibits the state from ensuring that women are adequately informed about their legal rights and duties. In fact, women are encouraged under Islamic law to get education.

Inheritance: Advocates of Islamic law assert that the ‘Islamic inheritance scheme contains one of the most comprehensive and detailed systems of succession known to the world’.37 However, the feminist human rights advocates believe that the females’ share in the Islamic law of inheritance is inconsistent with the principle of equality for women under international human rights law. According to the HRC, ‘Women should have equal inheritance rights to those of men when the dissolution of marriage is caused by the death of one of the spouses’.38 Under Islamic law, the male heir generally receives double the share of the female heir. This is based on the following verse of the Qur’an: ‘God directs you as regards your children’s (inheritance): To the male a portion equal to that of two females’.39 Therefore, if a person dies intestate, under Islamic law, his estate will be distributed among his children in the ratio of two portions for a male and one portion for a

36 Tanzil-ru-Rahman, A Code of Muslim Personal Law (Karachi: Hamdard Academy, 1978), Vol.I, pp.339-42. 37 Z. Chaudry, ‘The Myth of Misogyny: A Re-analysis of Women’s Inheritance in Islamic Law’ 61 Albany Law Review, 1997, 61, p.527. 38 United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 28, para 26. 39 Al-Quran, ‘Surah An-Nisa’, 4:11. 124 Pakistan Perspectives female. In other words, on the death of their father, two sisters will get the same share which one brother gets from the property of their deceased father. However, this rule of double share for the male does not apply in all cases under Islamic law. There are some instances where the female gets the same share of inheritance as the male. For example, a father and a mother get equal share (a sixth each) when they survive and inherit from their deceased son in the same capacity as parents; the uterine sister gets equal share (in the same capacity) with her uterine brother; and where the sole inheritors are a husband and a full sister of the deceased each one of them equally gets one-half.40 There are also instances where the female can receive double the share of the male. An instance is where the inheritors are a husband, one daughter and full brother. In this case, the husband gets one quarter of the estate, the daughter as the only child gets one-half and the full brother gets the remaining one quarter.41 The female will also receive the entire estate if she inherits alone.42 This contradicts any emphatic allegation of unqualified discrimination on grounds of sex alone in the scheme of Islamic inheritance. Historically, Islamic law was the first legal system to grant women a fixed portion in the inheritance either as a mother, wife, daughter, or sister at a time when such a right was not available to them in any civilization or under any legal system. This was on the basis of the following verse of the Qur’an which provided that: ‘From what is left by parents and those nearest related, there is a share for men and a share for women, whether the property be small or large, a determinate share’.43 The fact is that at the time when the Qur’an gave right of inheritance to women, they were themselves being treated as chattel in some parts of the world and were passed on to the heirs of a deceased person on his death. Therefore, Muslim scholars argue that Islamic law must actually be seen as having removed the pre-Islamic discrimination which the female was subjected to in every society which had denied her any inheritance alongside her male counterpart. The fact that there are instances when the female obtains equal share in the same capacity with the male, and can also obtain a higher share than the male in some instances, shows that the basic rule of

40 Ibid., Verses 11-12. 41 Ibid. 42 J.J. Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status (London: Graham & Tortman, 2002), 3rd Ed., 2002, p.223. 43 Al-Quran, ‘Surah An-Nisa’, 4:7. Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam 125 double share for the male is not an indication of superiority of the male above the female nor discrimination on grounds of sex but a recognition of their respective responsibilities. Therefore, under Islamic law, variation in inheritance rights is consistent with the variations in financial responsibilities of the two sexes in a Muslim society. Under Islamic law, man is fully responsible for the maintenance of his wife, his children, and in some cases of his needy relatives, especially the females. Woman, on the other hand, is far less burdened with any economic responsibilities or claims on her possessions. Her possessions before marriage do not transfer to her husband. She has no obligation to spend on her family out of such properties or out of her income after marriage. She is entitled to ‘Mahr’ (dowry) which she takes from her husband at the time of marriage. If she is divorced, she may get alimony from her ex-husband.44 This indicates that Islam takes the overall family structure into consideration while prescribing various shares under the law of inheritance. An in-depth study of the Islamic law of inheritance would, therefore, reveal not only justice but also an abundance of compassion for woman. Thus, while the share of the male and the female, where the double share applies, appears arithmetically unequal, Muslim scholars argue that the shares are normally equitable in the final analysis, considering the varied financial responsibilities of each gender.45 People usually prefer to distribute their estate as it pleases them. What Islamic law has successfully established through the fixed shares is to ensure that certain close relations are not disinherited by the testator. That does not however prevent testators from exercising their discretion to make a gift of any part of their estate during their lifetime to any of their heirs, male or female, through the doctrine of hibah (gift) which is an inbuilt mechanism in Islamic law for legally tilting the balance of the fixed shares as one pleases during one’s lifetime.46 In 1959, Iraq enacted the Personal Status Act giving equal shares to males and females in all cases. Due to its unpopularity, the provision was abrogated in 1963 and the Shari’ah provision was restored.47 Today, Islamic inheritance rules continue to apply to Muslims within the

44 H. Abd al Ati, The Family Structure in Islam (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1977), p.268. 45 Ibid., pp.269-70. 46 J.J. Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status (London: Graham & Tortman, 1990), 3rd Ed., 2002, pp.249-55. 47 T. Mahmood, Statutes of Personal Law in Islamic Countries: History, Texts and Analysis (Delhi: India and Islam Research Council, 1995), pp.246-48. 126 Pakistan Perspectives personal law codes of many Muslim states. It is the belief in the divine basis of the Shari’ah rules on Islamic inheritance that keeps Muslims attached to it. Therefore, instead of reversing these rules altogether, it would be more appropriate to develop the law to plug the loopholes, if any. Evidential capacity of women: In its General Comment 28, the HRC directed the member states to ensure that in their legal systems women give evidence as witnesses ‘on the same terms as men’ under Article 14. This direction brings the evidential capacity of women under Islamic law into issue as a matter concerning the gender equality under human rights. The rules of evidence under Islamic Law require in some cases the evidence of two men or alternatively one man and two women, i.e. two women replacing one man. This is based on the following verse of the Holy Quran: ‘O ye who believe! When ye deal with each other, in transactions involving future obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing. Let a scribe write down faithfully as between the parties: let not the scribe refuse to write: as Allah Has taught him, so let him write. Let him who incurs the liability dictate, but let him fear His Lord Allah, and not diminish aught of what he owes. If the party liable is mentally deficient, or weak, or unable himself to dictate, Let his guardian dictate faithfully, and get two witnesses, out of your own men, and if there are not two men, then a man and two women, such as ye choose, for witnesses, so that if one of them errs, the other can remind her’.48 The phrase ‘if there are not two men, then a man and two women’ is often used to argue that in Islam a woman’s evidence is only half evidence as two women’s evidence is equal to the evidence given by one man. This certainly raises a question of gender inequality and discrimination on grounds of sex under international human rights law. Although the evidentiary rule contained in this verse is traditionally imposed on all testamentary evidence under Islamic law, it is clear from the above verse that it is applicable only in ‘transactions involving future obligations in a fixed period of time. These transactions are generally in the nature of private civil debts. At the most, the meaning can be stretched to include, if at all that can be rightly done, to testimony in business transactions and commercial contracts.

48 Al-Quran, ‘Surah Al-Baqarah’, 2:282. Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam 127

The evidential rule laid down in the above verse, rather than being discriminatory, is only precautionary and is applicable to the transactions between Muslims. The business transactions were seldom dealt with by women in those olden days. As such, they ordinarily did not have enough experience in the intricacies involved in financial matters and were more likely to err while giving evidence at a formal forum. Therefore, the above verse clearly lays down the reason for requiring two women witnesses in place of one man: ‘so that if one of them errs, the other can remind her’. Another factor that supports the above interpretation is that the Holy Qur’an does not differentiate between male and female in any other verse concerning the procurement of evidence. For example, for evidence in divorce cases, the Holy Qur’an requires two persons from amongst ‘just’ Muslims as witnesses who may be male or female or a mixture of the two: Thus when they fulfil their term appointed, either take them back on equitable terms or part with them on equitable terms; and take for witness two persons from among you, endued with justice, and establish the evidence (as) before Allah.49 (Emphasis added) Similarly, the Holy Qur’an requires testimony of two persons In connection with matters relating to inheritance or succession: O ye who believe! When death approaches any of you, (take) witnesses among yourselves when making bequests,- two just men of your own (brotherhood) or others from outside if ye are journeying through the earth, and the chance of death befalls you (thus)’.50 (Emphasis added). As is evident, the requirement in this case is two ‘just’ Muslims who may be from either sex. However, the requirement of faith can be dispensed with in appropriate circumstances when Muslim witnesses are not available. Again, in evidence for cases of ‘zina’ (fornication or adultery), the Holy Qur’an requires testimony of four witnesses: If any of your women are guilty of lewdness, take the evidence of four witnesses from amongst you against them; and if they testify, confine them to houses until death do claim them, or Allah ordain for them some (other) way’.51 (Emphasis added).

49 Al-Quran, ‘Surah At-Tal’aq’, 65:2. 50 Ibid., ‘Surah Al-Ma’ida’, 5:106. 51 Ibid., ‘Surah An-Nisa’, 4:15. 128 Pakistan Perspectives

It is clear that in this case, the evidence required is that of four Muslim witnesses who do not necessarily have to be men or women but all or some of them may be male or female, without any distinction. It is crystal clear from the verses quoted above that Islam does not discriminate between male and female witnesses in any case except the one involving financial transactions. The practice of requiring two female witnesses in place of one male witness in other cases is contrary to the express provisions of Islam as contained in verse 282 of Surah Al- Baqarah. This practice might have arisen from the traditional position of women in society. As for the admissibility of female evidence, there is consensus among the Muslim jurists that female evidence alone is admissible in cases where men lack adequate knowledge or where it is impossible for anyone to have knowledge except women.52 Islamic law generally concedes to the principle of gender equality though it also takes specific social needs into consideration which may arise in certain contexts.53 The underlying aim of Islamic legal system is to do substantive justice. That is why, in order to avoid miscarriage of justice, the requirement of two women witnesses in place of one man occurs only in business transactions in which the women did not have enough knowledge and experience. This may give rise to the question: can the requirement of two female witnesses in place of one male witness be dispensed with in case of women proficient in business matters and vice versa? This question was answered in affirmative by the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan in the case of Ansar Burney v. Federation of Pakistan.54

Conclusion While it is true that the male gender enjoys a degree of advantage in family matters under Islamic law, this advantage is meant for the cohesion and the success of the family. Conversely, there are inbuilt rights within Islamic law that may be activated for the benefit of the female gender whenever there is apprehension of abuse of the advantage enjoyed by the male. However, the alarming factor is that women are generally ignorant of their rights and men often callously abuse that

52 A.A. Qadri, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World (New Delhi: Taj Company, 1986), p.505. 53 W.B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.184. 54 Ansar Burney v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1983, FSC, p.73. Gender Equality: Human Rights v. Islam 129 ignorance. Both these issues need to be addressed through appropriate legislation. There is also need for complementary understanding of these issues. Muslim jurists need to understand that their religion was the first in the world to grant rights to women. As such, they must allow the development of Islamic law in accordance with the needs of the modern times. Feminist human rights advocates also need to appreciate the importance of the institution of family to Islamic society and the importance of the female gender to its subsistence. Therefore, they must also dispassionately examine the socio-legal justifications put forward by Muslim jurists in good faith focusing on the core issue of gender inequality. However, it is important not to swing from one extreme to another in a manner that may create a conflict of cultures or portray the arguments as an attack against Islamic institutions rather than against non-justifiable discriminations. At the same time, contemporary Muslim jurists and scholars need to understand that Islam is not a stagnant religion. If they believe that the Qur’an has been revealed for all people and for all times, they must translate their belief into action and allow development of Islamic law so that it can keep pace with modern times. Their failure to do so will not be a service, but a disservice, to Islam. Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement

* Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat

Abstract Most of the histories written on the independence movement of Pakistan do not properly highlight the fact that this movement was constitutional, political and non-violent. Likewise, these historical narratives rarely, if ever, refer to the unarmed Pashtun resistance against the British Raj in the Pashtun belt of British India in the northwestern part of contemporary Pakistan. By any account or criterion, the unarmed struggle of the Pashtuns under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan—perhaps the greatest Pashtun of all times and certainly one of the most important nonviolent leaders of the twentieth century—is a very important chapter of the history of nonviolent movement against the British rule. It was, doubtless, a remarkable movement transforming the Pashtun community into a dedicated, nonviolent, progressive nation. It was politically a nonviolent and proactive campaign against British colonialism in this part of the world. This paper focuses on the unarmed struggle of the Pashtuns, especially in the final phase of Indian liberation movement and assess its importance in the over all context of the struggle for freedom from British colonialism. It is divided into three parts. First part discusses the origin and evolution of this resistance movement under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan; the second part offers a historical account of the Pashtun nonviolent movement during the 1930s and 1940s; and the third and final part discusses the nonviolent techniques and strategies of the unarmed Pashtun resistance and explains why and how this movement got transformed into a powerful mass movement. While deliberating upon different related issues and events, this paper revolves around the leadership and contribution of the great nonviolent leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. ––––––––– Introduction: What crimes have the gentle Pakhtuns committed that they should be erased from the pages of history, deprived of their land and through serfdom pushed to their doom!… For

* Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, Chairman, Khyber Pukhtunkhawa Text book Board. 132 Pakistan Perspectives

centuries they have known no peace. They have been repeatedly ravaged by bombardment, war and massacre. Their territory is a war zone, a training ground for imperialist powers … All the necessities of life are denied to them … I wonder what the pathetic world expects of them! I want them to stand on their legs with head erect, and then want to throw this challenge: 'Show me another decent, gentle and cultured race like them!' Faith is a battle. The faithful fights to the end. He needs no weapon. Abdul Ghaffar Khan1 During the early decades of the 20th century the world was reshaping itself out of disorder. In the Indian subcontinent, this century opened with a new era of revolutionary liberation movements – Pan-Islamism, nationalism, liberalism, modernism, constitutionalism, reforms and above all political and literary renaissance – with its dual goal of freedom and development. In the North-West Frontier Province of the British India, despite all these political cross currents, the socio- economic set-up of the Pashtun society was traditional, tribal and Islamic, urban and rural, agricultural and pastoral, settled and nomadic, peaceful and violent, motivated by political fusion and fission, conservative and inward looking. Like other parts of Asia, the dormant Pashtun society was shaken as well by the First World War.2 When the war ended India rose up with

1 D.G Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is Battle, (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1967), pp.8, 9, 530. 2 The North-West Frontier Province was separated from Punjab in 1901.In the literary circles it was known as Pakhtunkhwa since the days of Mughals. The demand of the Pashtun nationalists for the change of name culminated in the form of resolutions in the Provincial Assembly (NWFP) in 1980s and 90s but rejected by the central government. Anyhow, Pakhtunkhwa means ‘the land of the Pakhtuns’ or in soft Pashtu Pashtuns or Afghan or Pathans and is one of the oldest names of the Pashtun land now covering Afghanistan, NWFP, FATA, PATA and the Pashtun area of Balochistan. Bayzid Ansari (Pir Rokhan), Akhuand Darweza, Khushal Khan Khattak and Ahmad Shah Durrani mentioned Pakhtunkhwa in their poems and writings. For more detail see Dost Muhammad Khan Kamil Mohmand, A Foreign Approach to Khushal Khan Khattak-A Critic of Caroe and Howell (Peshawar: Maktaba Shaheen, 1968), p.117. Roh is an obsolete term signifying a mountain. It was almost invariably used in the Persian writings of the Mughal period, and sometimes the Pakhtuns also used it, as an alternative name of their country and particularly for the southeastern part of Afghanistan, which is mostly mountainous in character. The word Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 133 new political consciousness and self-confidence. It was after the war that the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 were introduced in India and not extended to the NWFP. The Russian Revolutions (1905/1917), the Ghadr Party (Rebel Party), the Chamerkandi Mujahideen, First World War, Turko-German Mission in Kabul (1915), the Balkan War, rise of King Amanullah in Afghanistan and the third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) created a unique situation in NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) which saw the Soviet Union and Great Britain, as well as a number of Asian competitors with conflicting interests, in another ‘Great Game’ in South and Central Asia. Khokand, Khiva, Bukhara, Turkey, Iran, India, and Afghanistan were each in search of identity in the new political order. Movements with Pan-Turkic, Pan-Turanian, Pan-Afghanic and Pan-Islamic3 objectives

‘Rohilla’, derived from it, was applied to Afghans, who settled in India. Ibid., p.117. Among the other names, Ariana is perhaps the oldest name used by most of the classical writers for Afghanistan. It means ‘the land of Aryans’. Mir Ghulam Muhammad Ghubar, Afghanistan dar Masir-e-Tarikh [Afghanistan through History] (Qum: Piam-e-Mahajer, Iran, 1981), p.9. Paktia or Pactiya too is an old term used for the first time by Herodotus, the famous Greek historian of the fifth century BC. Ibid., p.1. Also see Dr. Muhammad Hassan Kakar, Afghan, Afghanistan, Kabul, 1978, pp.22, 23; H. W. Bellew, The Races of Afghanistan, Lahore, 1976, pp.57-9. The other name for this area was Khurasan (the land of the rising sun) was applied to the country by the early Muslim writers. It included the territories to the northwest of the massive range of the Hindu Kush up to Persia, ibid., p.1. Also see Dr. Muhammad Hassan Kakar, Afghanistan: A Study in Internal Political Development (1880-96), Kabul, 1971, p.1. 3 In Ottoman Turkey, the `Young Turks’ were active against the authoritarian regime of the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II. The Young Khivans and the Young Bukharans were young radical Turkestani intellectuals, some of whom had been educated in Istanbul (Turkey) All these were active in Khiva and Bukhara respectively. See Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia (A Study in Political Development), (Peshawar: EMJAY Books International, 1985). In 1920, Hizbi-Tudeh-Iran (Masses Party of Iran), Firqah-i-Adalat (Justice Party) and Firqah-i-Koministi-i-Iran (Communist Party of Iran) were founded by those liberal-democratic nationalist elements of Iran which were active in the movement for constitutionalism in 1906. These socialist parties were suppressed by Raza Khan but re-emerged in 1941, when Raza Khan left his country. Just like the Young Turks, the Young Khivans and the Young Bukharans the educated, nationalist, anti-British Afghans organized in different groups and factions for Mashroota (constitutionalism) and independence of the country during the reign of Amir Habibullah and onward. For details see chapter III of Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, 134 Pakistan Perspectives were contenders which hoped to fill the vacuum created by the downfall of Tsarist Russia. As a result of forced Anglo-Afghan treaties (Gandamak and Durand Line Agreements) Afghanistan was deprived of its sovereignty, half of its Pashtun population and fertile lands of the Peshawar Valley, present day tribal area, Pashtun belt of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP) province of Pakistan. Sovereignty was regained by the Afghans in 1919 but for regaining of Pashtun land and people they started a movement within and outside Afghanistan. Further the arbitrary division of the lower Pakhtunkhwa into variety of administrative units i.e. tribal areas, Frontier Regions (FRs), settled districts, British Balochistan, and native states (Swat, Dir, Chitral & Amb) led to socio-economic stagnation. This imperialist agenda hampered the nation-building process among the Pashtun and profoundly affected its political structure, social order and contributed to the consolidation of tribalism, mullahism, feudalism and conservatism. The shift of power from centralized authority to fanatics and reactionaries caused great harm to the modernization and development of the region. Throughout the British rule, the aim of government in the Frontier (northern Pakhtunkhwa) was security, not revenue or development. This fact was recognized by Sir William Barton by stating: ‘The policy of forcing the Pathan tribal system into the administrative mould of British India accounts in great measure for the British failure to

Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan: 1917-79, An Appraisal (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1997). About Pan-Afghanism, Dr.Ghani, a contemporary writer and a close associate of Amanullah in his book describes not only the prevailing situation in the country but also the aim and goal of the new Amir by writing: ‘...He (Amanullah) broke the foreign chains that had bound her (Afghanistan), and is naturally anxious to include in her all the Afghan (Pashtu) speaking races. He has Pan- Afghanic notions, which form the basis of his policy. His ambition is legitimate, though the present conditions of the world may not favour its fulfillment’. See Dr.Abdul Ghani, A Review of the Political Situation in Central Asia, Lahore, 1980, p.137. The word Pan-Islamism, in its various forms, is apparently of European coinage and was probably adopted in imitation of Pan-Slavism that was current in the 1870s. In the 19th century, a progressive Muslim scholar, Jamaluddin Afghani (1838-97), launched a movement for Islamic brotherhood - Kullun Muslimun Ikhwatun. It was later introduced to English Pan-Islamism. See for more detail Dr. Fazal-ur- Rahim Marwat, op.cit. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 135 assimilate the Pathans into the Indian political system’.4 Last but not the least, the ‘Great Game’ followed by the Cold War and ‘Iron Curtain’ of the Soviet regime if, on the one hand, isolated Central Asia from the outside world, it also detached the Pashtuns from its socio-cultural roots and pushed them towards Indian subcontinent where they naturally faced the crisis of identity. This crisis of identity further developed with the British intrigues, suppression and exploitation of Pakhtunkhwa.

The formation of NWFP The North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) has played a significant role in the shaping and re-shaping of the Indian history. Its strategic location made it not only the Frontier of India but also an international frontier of great importance from the military point of view for the whole British Empire. Field-Marshal Sir Claude Jacob said: The safety of the Indian Empire and also that of the British Empire depends on whether or not we hold the North-West Frontier of India. If Frontier goes, India goes, and, if India goes, it means serious loss and damage to the British Empire as well. We should always bear that in mind.5 Keeping in mind the old security paradigm of the British government, Lord Curzon was appointed as new Viceroy of India in 1899 to deal with two problems of Indian NWFP: reorganization of military defenses, and reform of the administration of the trans-frontier districts. After his arrival, he introduced certain administrative changes to guarantee internal invulnerability of the Frontier. On 9 November 1901 the NWFP, as new province, was separated from the Punjab. However, Curzon not only recognized the military defenses, but also adopted measures for improving relations with the tribes. On the success of his frontier policy Curzon wrote: My Frontier scheme is finished and done at last, I feel like an Eton boy who has got through trails. Be kind to it and help on. It would break my heart if it were now to fall through.6 The British separated NWFP from Punjab due to some reasons. First, the Russian expansion in Central Asia and its advance towards the border of

4 Sir William Barton, India’s North-West Frontier (London: John Murray, 1939), p.83. 5 Abdul Karim Khan, The Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) / Red Shirt Movement in the North-West Frontier Province of British India, 1927-1947, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1997, p.13. 6 Lal Baha, NWFP Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), p.23. 136 Pakistan Perspectives

Afghanistan alarmed the British. Consequently the defense of India had to be organized.7 Secondly, the problem which the Punjab government faced in the so called settled districts was of civil administration. During Punjab government’s rule, of over half a century, over the frontier districts, various branches of administration, like the police, justice, land services, public works, and education made slow progress and were less developed than other areas of the Punjab.8 In the field of education the frontier districts were by far the least advanced. In the nutshell, in 1901, at the time of the formation of the North-West Frontier Province under Curzon, all aspects of administration were much less developed in the frontier districts than in the other districts of the Punjab. It was 35 years later that the Government of India Act 1935 was passed on 2 August 1935 and the NWFP province was made a Governor’s province under Section 46 of the same Act. Railway lines were laid and roads constructed for the timely and speedy transportation of forces to the troubled spots. Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) was promulgated under which punishment like ‘transportation’ for life without any trial could be accorded. The political agent or the jirga formed by the political agent or deputy commissioner was to hear cases. In these decades, there was thus hardly any educational progress. The percentage of literacy amongst the Pashtuns9 fell from 5.5 in 1901 to 5.1 in 1911.10 The policies served the interests of the colonial authorities and they intentionally countered the introduction of unwelcome political ideas and growth in the province. In brief NWFP was made a police state with no rights for the indigenous populace. In the words of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan ‘our fault is that our province is the gateway to India. We were born in the frontier. This is

7 Ibid., p.6. 8 Another striking feature of the administration of the province was that it always had a deficit budget. From 1901 to 1910, the revenue and expenditure of the province was wholly imperial. The large excess of expenditure over revenue was attributed to the geographical position and political importance of the province, considerations of imperial policy. See ibid., pp.28,29. 9 James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (The Hague: Mouton & Co. 963), p.125. 10 Lal Baha, op.cit., p.198. On page 194 of the same book she quotes from British documents that in 1901-2, there were 927 private schools in the settled districts with 13,636 students. Primary schools for boys were 154 in the entire province. 131 of these schools were maintained by local boards. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 137 why we were doomed’.11 In 1922, a special North-West Frontier inquiry committee summed up more than a century of British policy in the frontier and tribal area in the following words: …the ultimate aim of our whole frontier policy is the security of India. The immediate object of our North-West Frontier policy is to control the trans-frontier tribes as to secure life and property in our frontier districts.12 British imperialism used NWFP as a base for operation up north to the Central Asia. Every time, when the British India took a step on the road to constitutional reforms, the NWFP like Balochistan was purposely left out of the scheme. Not a word was wasted on this province in the Minto-Morely Reforms (1909), nor in the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms (1919).13 The British knew that Pashtuns were proud people and conscious of the fact that they had enjoyed the freedom to live as they liked, for centuries. Strategically they were the defenders and guardians of all north-western passes or the gateways to Indian subcontinent. This was the reason why the British wanted to subdue them. Their conception of NWFP was that …the frontier was likened to a gunpowder magazine, and to introduce reforms in such a land as this, it was asserted, was like holding a match to the gunpowder. As explosion was, of course inevitable.14

11 Farhad Jan, Khudai-Khidmatgar Movement in NWFP, its Nature and Direction, M. Phil thesis, University of Peshawar, n.d, p.13. 12 James W. Spain, op.cit., p.123, quoted from Government of India, Report of the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee and Minutes of Dissent by Mr. T. Rangachariar and Mr. N.M. Samarth (Delhi: Government Central Press, 1934), p.6. 13 In the same year in April at Jalianwala Bagh, Amritsar, the British army killed 379 and wounded 1208 as a result of the countrywide agitation against the Rowlatt Act. On the other hand, the Muslims of India were perturbed by the war against Turkey and the pending peace negotiations. The result was the emergence of the historical Khilafat movement, a unique experience for the political pundits of India. Consequently, it took form of the Hijrat movement. The Hijrat movement was one of the significant events of Indo-Pakistan history. It developed out of internal and external political crosscurrents in the region including the Khilafat agitation in British India in 1920. Thousands of people migrated from India to Afghanistan. Contemporary writers have written many books and articles in Urdu, Pashtu and English, with their own perspective and experience, on this mass migration from India. 14 Abdul Qayum Khan, Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier (Bombay: Hind Kitab, 1945), p.26. 138 Pakistan Perspectives

Origin and evolution of Khudai-Khidmatgars (Servants of God) The years 1918, 1919 and the 1920 were the most important in the history of NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), India and Afghanistan. During these years many new political movements were launched with new strategies of protesting against the high handedness of the British officers and of fighting for the freedom of their country. In the NWFP the response to the British and other challenges was in the form of the Khilafatists or Black Shirt movement.15 Radical nationalist like Haji Sahib of Turangzai and Faqir of Ipi,16 the Marxist- Leninist movement of Maulana Abdur Rahim Popalzai and Sanober Hussain Kakaji,17 the Woror Pashtun (Pashtun Brotherhood) of Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai in southern Pakhtunkhwa on non-violent principles18 and the Khudai Khidmatgar movement of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Makhfi Sahib.19 The political situation of the world and that of the NWFP greatly inspired Ghaffar Khan and motivated him to participate in political activities. To understand the origin, evolution and various other dimensions of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, it seems pertinent to know about the person, and his struggle in various spheres, who initiated it and remained as its moving spirit. Abdul Ghaffar Khan popularly known as Baacha Khan or Badsha Khan (King Khan) and Fakher-i-Afghan (Pride of Afghan) devoted his whole life to the service of humanity in general and to the Pashtuns in particular. He was born in 1890 at village

15 The Khilifatists in our province were mostly wearing black shirts. 16 Faqir of Ipi, Mirza Ali Khan, was born in 1901 in a hamlet called Kurta (Maddi Khel) at a distance of about one kilometer from Khajuri Camp on the Bannu-Miranshah Road. He remained a controversial figure and legendary character throughout the history as his life had many facets, both overt and covert. While the local tribes believed, as they believe even today, that he was a pious man with all the qualifying attributes of a pir, faqir, ghaus and qutub,16 to the British he was a ‘devil incarnate’. To a Muslim Assistant Political Agent he is a ‘Saint Warrior’, but to his detractors he was a plunderer, hypocrite and a ‘Pseudo-saint who sold Islam down the river at the altar of Pukhtun jingoism’. See Fazal-ur- Rahim Marwat, ‘The Faqir of Ipi-A Mystic Warrior of Waziristan’, Pakistan Perspectives, Karachi, 11:2 (July-December, 2006), pp.45-68. 17 See for details Dr.Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat & Dr. Parvaz Toru, Celebrities of NWFP (Peshawar: Pakistan Study Centre 2005). 18 For Woror Pashtun see Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim’s Pashtu article ‘Khan Abdul Samad Khan Shaheed: Da Pakhtanu da Milli Shinakht Pa Talash Kee’, Pakhtun, July, 2007, pp.13-7. 19 For Maulvi Fazal Mahmud Makhfi see Celebrities of NWFP, pp.37-57. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 139

Utmanzai (Charsadda), situated at a distance of about 30 kilometers in the northeast of Peshawar.20 He started his movement in his own village as a social reformer in 1912. He wanted to educate the people, as they had the lowest ratio of literacy. But on this front he faced a strong opposition from the local mullahs, Khans and the landlords. There was a verse which blocked the way of mass education: Those who study at schools, do it for the love of money.There is no room for them in paradise; instead they will find themselves in hell.21 The British had implanted this idea that if the Pashtuns were to become educated, conscious of identity and aware of economic and political exploitation of the ruling class, the mullahs would lose their businesses which were used as leverage by the British in controlling the masses, for making or breaking of government in Afghanistan and all Pashtun/Afghan areas. In order to combat these formidable fronts i.e. the British government, the mullahs and the landlords, Ghaffar Khan established on 10 April 1921, the Azad (Independent) Islamia School at Utmanzai and then established similar institutions throughout the province. To enlighten the Pashtuns and to eradicate bad habits like telling lies, slandering, backbiting and using obscene language, religious, ethical and cultural education was made an integral part of the curriculum of Azad schools. Pashtu was the medium of instruction in all schools. Vocational education, like tailoring, shoemaking, handicrafts and weaving, was compulsory in these schools.22

20 Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s character was shaped and molded by rich cultural heritage. His own hometown was once the cradle of Gandahara culture and civilization; Buddaha’s temples, stupas and universities at Taxila and Adda (near Jalalabad, Afghanistan), giant statues of Buddaha in Swat and Bamiyan, the birth of Zoroaster in Balkh (Afghanistan). Pannini who wrote Sansikirit grammer was born in Swabi not very far from Ghaffar Khan’s village and in his own words ‘when Islam reached to this place it had already lost its true spiritual light and the divine fire. The result was that our splendid culture was taken away from us, but they did not give us, in its place the true spirit of Islam’. Ghaffar Khan also took inspiration from his grand fathers, his father, teachers of mission school, Haji Sahib of Turangzai, Makhfi Sahib, Amir Amanullah Khan and Enver Pasha etc. See for more details his auto biography in Pashtu. 21 Abdul Ghaffar, Zama Zhawand-Aw-JadoJuhid, Kabul, 1983, p.15. 22 Monthly Pakhtun, December, 1948, p.40. See also Abdul Akbar Khan Akbar, Da Bersaghir Pak-wa Hind Pa Azadi Kay Da Pakhtanu Brakha (biography) (Peshawar: University Publishers, 2009), pp.18-9. 140 Pakistan Perspectives

Anjuman-i-Islahul-Afaghina (The Afghan Reformation Society) In 1924, Abdul Ghaffar Khan established Anjumani-Islahul-Afaghina. The motto of the organization was a verse from the Holy Quran: You are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoying what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God.23 The Journal Pakhtun records the following verses about this reformation society: Those sacrificing their lives and property in the way of Allah, are the ones upon whom Allah has his blessings. Those who joined this association were to subscribe to its monthly journal, The Pakhtun. The objective of this association which was based in Hashtnagar in the name of Afaghina was to selflessly work and strive for the sake of Allah.24 The Anjuman not only worked to induce Pashtuns to acquire education and avoid evil social practices but it also conveyed the grievances of the people to the government. It appraised the government of the inability of people to pay for the land revenue on account of bad harvests in 1928; the increase in the land revenue on account of land settlement of 1895-96, and the tax imposed on walking by canals banks.25 Dr. Abdul Karim Khan quoting British secret intelligence abstract of the 17 August 1929 quotes that ‘the Anjuman helped Afghan students returning from Europe en route to Kabul’. About 13 students were reportedly accommodated in the Azad High School at Utmanzai.26

The Pakhtun journal – 1928 The formation and activities of Anjuman-i-Islahul-Afaghina irritated the British government and as a result Ghaffar Khan was arrested and imprisoned for three years. After his release he realized that only tours and meetings were not sufficient to revitalize the social organism. Therefore in 1928 he started the monthly journal Pakhtun in Pashtu language. The journal touched upon every aspect (moral social, political, religious, economic, cultural, current events, personalities, national and

23 Abdul Karim Khan, The Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God), Red Shirt Movement in the North-West Frontier Province of British India, 1927-1947, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1997, p.53. 24 The Pakhtun, October, 1928, pp.14-20. 25 Ibid., pp.23-9. 26 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., p.54. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 141 international affairs) of the Afghans/Pashtuns life.27 Freedom from the British rule was the clear clarion call of the Pakhtun journal and Ghaffar Khan wanted to infuse a new sense of political awareness among the Pashtuns. Through this journal Ghaffar Khan achieved two objectives: he championed the cause of Pashtuns/Afghans and provided a literary platform for the poets and writers on both sides of the Durand Line to promote the cause of Pashtu and Pashtuns.

Suba Sarhad Zalmo Jirga (the Frontier Youth League or the Afghan Jirga) The Anjuman-i-Islahul-Afaghina and Pakhtun journal were followed by a more coherent organization known as ‘Frontier Youth League’ on first September 1929 at Utmanzai. According to Syed Wiqar Ali Shah Kaka Khel, Mian Akbar Shah (1899-1990), an active member of the Anjuman, and former student of Islamia College, Peshawar, who had gone as far as Soviet Union in connection with the liberation of motherland, proposed the formation of a youth league on the pattern of the Young Turks, Young Bukharan,Young Khivans, Young Afghans and other similar organizations outside India. Abdul Akbar Khan became the President and Mian Akbar Shah its Secretary. Its membership was open to every youth without any discrimination of caste, creed or religion, provided he was literate, and that he had not participated in any form of communalism. Pashtu was made the official language for Jirga’s proceeding.28 The aims and objects of this organization were to work for complete independence of India, Hindu-Muslim unity, reformation and political awakening of the Pashtun society.29 The Jirga soon gained a large number of followers in the rural areas around Peshawar as well as at several places in other districts. These jirgas were linked together through a network of jirgas for the areas, tappas and districts and at the top was the Loya Jirga or grand assembly for the whole province. The Frontier Youth League later on assumed the name of Khudai Khidmatgaran.

Women participation No civilization or society can thrive unless its women folk are reformed and empowered, and women can be empowered only when they are educated. Ever since the first issue of the Pakhtun in May 1928, Ghaffar Khan had been encouraging women to participate in ‘national affairs’

27 Farhad Jan, op.cit., p.69. 28 Maulvi Fazal Marwat Mufti, op.cit., p.109. 29 Farhad Jan, op.cit., pp.33-4. 142 Pakistan Perspectives and speak up for their rights. For the first time in the history of the Pashtuns, about 400 women participated in a mass meeting of 2,000 people on 23 August 1928 at Tangi (Charsadda sub-division).30 He also encouraged women to write for the Pakhtun journal to highlight the women’s problems and solutions. Abdul Ghaffar Khan had long lamented the traditional purdah system which restricts Muslim women from playing a useful role in society. He encouraged them to discard the veil, as the women in his own family had done. His sister became increasingly active in his movement. He also stressed female education and encouraged Pashtun to do so. Ghaffar Khan first sent his own daughter to school, despite the strong opposition of their relatives. She was the first women from NWFP to graduate herself from Allahabad University. The noticeable role of Pashtun women in the 1930-31 movement (among women who addressed meetings were the sisters of the Khan brothers) was connected to the non-violence movement. At a meeting organized by women, in June or July 1931, in the frontier village of Bhaizai, Ghaffar Khan said: Whenever I went to India and saw the national awakening and patriotism of the Hindu and the Parsi women, I used to say to myself, would such a time come when our Pashtun women would also awake? Thank God today I see my desire fulfilled.31

Economic strategy and reforms To encourage economic improvements in the Frontier, Khan Sahib particularly stressed upon the Pashtuns to adopt professions other than agriculture, since 83% people were dependent on agriculture and there was not enough land to support them all as farmers. He even opened a shop at Utmanzai to set an example to his fellow people. He encouraged the use of local cotton and country spinning wheels. He prohibited the people from unnecessary extravagance in marriage, circumcision and engagement ceremonies. He educated the Pashtuns to wear simple dress and home spun khaddar and to adopt the profession of trade and commerce. Moreover the movement attracted the illiterate and hard-heated Pashtuns towards manual labor through examples from the lives of the

30 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., p.54. 31 Rajmohan Ghandi, Ghaffar Khan Non violent Badshah of the Pukhtuns (New Delhi: Penguin Viking Group, 2004), pp.97-8. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 143

Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), who said that ‘Allah befriends workers’.32

Stage dramas and literary circles Ghaffar Khan was the pioneer who started stage dramas in schools. He taught that the real cause of the slavery of Pashtuns was their disorganization, foreign rule, the Khans (here referred for landlord and chief) and the mullahs etc. He aroused the independent spirited Pashtuns against slavery of foreign rule, cultivated in them zeal for freedom of speech and expression, hatred against the agents of foreign rulers and their autocracy and to develop amongst them love for democracy and justice. It was no use to beg before British for anything. Sacrifices were necessary to attain self-government and liberty. He inflamed the Pashtun’s honour through various political dramas like ‘Dard’ (Pain), ‘Shaheed Sakina’ (Martyr Sakina), ‘Dree Yithiman’ (Three Orphans) etc. which quite often irritated the government. Dree Yatiman (Three Orphans) drama was written in 1928 by Abdul Akbar Khan Akbar. Khan Akbar was a close companion of Ghaffar Khan and was amongst those who went to Afghanistan in Hijrat movement and later on to Taskent and met with M. N. Roy and all other Indian revolutionaries based in Tashkent and other cities of Bolshevik Russia. It should be noted that eminent poet Abdul Ghani Khan and Khan Abdul Wali Khan (both sons of Ghaffar Khan), played with another boy the role of the three orphans which moved the audience to such a degree that, at the end, an old man came on to the stage and patted Wali Khan on his head and, while still wiping his tears, he offered two rupees to Wali Khan, saying, ‘Don't be distressed son! Take flour for yourself with this money’.33 In one drama a conference between the governor and his officials were shown to discus measures to deal with the civil disobedience movement. A Deputy Commissioner was shown paying large sums of money to a pir and Khan to quell the movement. The final scene shows the struggle between the police and Khudai Khidmatgars in Peshawar and Mardan on the occasion of the arrest of Ghaffar Khan. In a letter dated 9/3/1938 to the Inspector General of Police, NWFP, A.I.G, C.I.P. requests to ask the Chief Minister: ‘to persuade the Red shirts not to enact a number of dramas depicting various phases of civil disobedience movement, such as manufacture of salt, the picketing of liquor shops, lathi charges by the police and various scenes in Haripur Jail. Such things as depicting lathi charge by the police can do nothing

32 Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Zama Zhwand au Jaddu Jihid, Kabul, p.92. 33 Pakhtun, August 1938, p.10. Interview with Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, Peshawar, 2 April 1995. 144 Pakistan Perspectives but harm’.34 Pashtu mushairas (literary gatherings) were organized on various themes, and literary circles (Adabi Toleny) were formed in different villages and towns to promote the cause of the movement and Pashtun language and literature. Study circles for reading of newspapers and other literature were other popular methods of propagating awareness among the masses. Common Pashtun hujras (where guest are served) and weekly melas were also used for propaganda. Thus the political consciousness created through multi- dimensional methods turned the ferocious, illiterate, hard-headed but hot blooded and freedom loving Pashtuns in to an organized and non-violent fighting force.

Formation of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement The Anjuman-i-Islahul-Afaghina was converted into Afghan Youth League, a semi–political party with its branches established throughout the province. When the Afghan King Amanullah Khan was deposed, the Afghan Youth League stirred the Pashtun ethnicity by staging demonstrations and criticizing British ‘Forward Policy’.35 Later the replacement of Nadir Khan (father of King Zahir Shah) as new Amir (King) in Afghanistan was followed by celebration and jubilation by the Afghan Youth League on the annual day of the Azad Islamia School, Utmanzai. This close ethnic linkage was watched by the civil military oligarchy with grave concern. But as far sighted nationalist, Ghaffar Khan, in the light of the existing situation, introduced a novel change in his organization in December 1929. The Afghan Jirga was reinforced by ‘troops, uniformed but unarmed, as the Khudai Khidmatgar, or servants of God’.

Aims and objectives of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement Although the ultimate goal of the movement was to get freedom from British rule, its leaders mobilized their Pashtun followers towards their goal through socio-religious reforms and economic modernization.

34 Farhad Jan, op.cit., p.86. 35 To counter Russian expansion in Central Asia and advances towards Afghanistan British changed its policy from ‘close-border’ to forward policy. After Second Anglo-Afghan War Khyber Pass was controlled and in 1878 Khyber Agency was created and in 1890 Gomal Pass in South Waziristan was opened for traffic. The British called it ‘scientific frontier’ based on the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line. See for more details, Lal Baha, op.cit., pp.5-6. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 145

Ghaffar Khan, in almost every speech, untiringly emphasized certain fundamental objectives of the movement (a) ‘Pashtun’ national unity,(b) Hindu- Muslim brotherhood,(c) service of humanity, and (d) freedom through non–violence’.36 Some of the aims and objectives summarized in the Pakhtun journal, a mouthpiece of Khudai Khidmatgars were: 1: To inspire love for education amongst the Pashtuns. This education should include both theoretical and practical aspects of knowledge towards the understanding of science and religion. 2: To inculcate and foster amongst the Muslims in general and the Pashtuns in particular, the feeling of unity, love, affection and sympathy. 3: To persuade the people to give up un-Islamic customs, rites and traditions. 4: To settle their disputes in the light of Shariat than to go to the British courts. 5: To instil amongst the Pashtuns love for freedom.37

Some other objectives were highlighted by Muhammad Yonus in his book as under: 1: The real objective of the movement was the unity and organization of Pashtuns and to infuse in them the sense of selfless service of their people and country. 2: To educate the brave and chivalrous Pashtuns in the philosophy of non violence. 3: To teach them to act fearlessly and steadfastly in the face of force whenever it might be applied against them. 4: To refrain from the habit of taking revenge. 5: To restrain them from anti-social customs, practices and evils and to live simple life. 6: To build good character and good habits. 7: To refrain from internal feuds and personals rivalries. 8: To forgive the oppressed and treat them kindly.38 However, it was a multidimensional movement and its objectives and agenda, embodied diverse element from Islamic exhortations, social

36 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., p.359. 37 Pakhtun, October 1928, pp.14-20. 38 Muhammad Yunus, an eminent Khudai Khidmatgar was shifted after independence to India and died in Delhi. He was the relative of Ghaffar Khan. He in his book Frontier Speaks (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1947), pp.150-51 mentioned the above cited objective of the Khudai Khidmatgar. 146 Pakistan Perspectives ethics, women, peasant, and minorities rights, national reconstruction, religious moderation and harmony, to universal brotherhood based on love, care and service of humanity irrespective of any condition or consideration. For Ghaffar Khan social responsibility lead to political freedom and this was the reason that he interchanges his means with the ends, achieving political freedom through social-reforms. He always said ‘thou shalt not kill thy brother and the British’.39 Ghaffar Khan mobilized the Khudai Khidmatgars towards political power on the basis of their training in personal piety and social responsibility: 1: Insan Khidmat Aw Meena (service and love of humanity); 2: Sabro-o-Salah (patience and prayers); 3: Ittihad Aw Adm-i-Tashaddud (unity and non violence).40 He considered all people living in Pashtunkhwa as Afghans/Pashtuns whether they were Hindus, Sikh, Christian, mullah, Mian, Khan, barber, rich or poor. In this new brotherhood, he was trying to unite all tribes and clans of Pashtuns i.e. Mohmands, Khalils, Muhammdzai, Marwat, Wazirs, Masud, Kakars and Khattak etc.41

Structure of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement Since there was no organized political party in the NWFP based on mass support, the association of the Khudai Khidmatgar was the first of its kind to emerge as coherent and disciplined body. Shaped exactly as an effective and democratic organization, this association started from the grass root level. In every village there was ‘village jirga’ (village council) and many villages together in an area formed tappa jirga. The representatives of tappa jirga elected a tehsil jirga. The members of tehsil jirgas elected the district jirga and the district jirga elected the provincial jirga. Each jirga from the bottom to top elected from its own members the following office bearers: president (Loy Mashar), vice- president one or more as the case may be, general secretary (Mashar Nazim), joint secretary (Kashar Nazim), one or more as the case may be and treasurer.42

Volunteer corps or the army of God The leaders had put great emphasis on discipline. The volunteers were organized and drilled in military fashion after winning 1936 elections

39 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., p.265. 40 Ibid., p.270. 41 Farhad Jan, op.cit., p.40. 42 Ibid., p.41. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 147 and formation of Congress ministry under Dr. Khan Sahib. It was a semi- military wing of the organization of Khudai Khidmatgars. The volunteers had their own red colour flag, in the beginning, later tri- colored, and bands, bag pipe and drums. They not only drilled with the beat of the drum and danced like a snake with the sound of a bag pipe, but they took long military style marches into the hills and rivers and were given training to lie before the vehicles.43 It reflected somewhat a military hierarchal structure as is shown by the ranks in it i.e. lieutenant, captain, major, colonel and general etc. When they marched, of course without arms, weapons and even without lathis they sang: We are the army of God by death or wealth unmoved. We march our leader and we ready to die. We serve and we love our people and our cause. Freedom is our goal our lives the price we pay.44 With such a training and discipline the illiterate, rough and the hard headed Pashtuns plunged into the field of independence movement. One could see how Ghaffar Khan, as early as the 1930, was trying to combine factors of history, geography, culture and language to transform the relatively backward, divided and disorganized Pashtuns into a national community. The uniform of the Khudai Khidmatgars was of red colour but the British authorities in its propaganda drive called them as Red Shirts (Surkh Posh) and tried to equate them with the Bolsheviks, and even dubbed them as Soviet agents.45

The pledge For communal harmony in the province, the membership of Khudai Khidmatgars was kept open to all, irrespective of any discrimination of caste, community or religion. However, Abdul Ghaffar Khan clearly told that no one should call himself a Khudai Khidmatgars unless he considered all the Pashtuns as one nation, discarded social ills and adopted non violence as way of life.

43 Ibid., pp.41-2. 44 Ibid. 45 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., p.288. Speaking to a woman’ unity club in Bombay on 29 October 1934, Ghaffar Khan castigated the Frontier authorities false propaganda about the Khudai Khidmatgars whom the British called the ‘Red Shirts’. He said: ‘I want to tell you that our movement is unique and you will not find a similar movement with the same creed and principle anywhere in the whole world. Our Khudai Khidmatgars movement is based on universal brotherhood and service of humanity’. 148 Pakistan Perspectives

The oath of the Khudai Khidmatgasr was: In the presence of God, I solemnly affirm that: 1. I hereby honestly and sincerely offer myself for enrollment as a Khudai Khidmatgar. 2. I shall be ever ready to sacrifice personnel comfort, property, and even life itself to serve the nation and for the attainment of my country’s freedom. 3. I shall not participate in factions, nor pickup a quarrel with or bear enmity towards any body. I shall always protect the oppressed against the tyranny of the oppressor. 4. I shall not become member of any other organization, and shall not furnish security or tender apology in the course of the non violent fight. 5. I shall always obey every legitimate order of my superior officers. 6. I shall always live up to the principle of non-violence. 7. I shall serve all humanity equally. The chief objects of my life shall be attainment of complete independence and religious freedom. 8. I shall always observe truth and purity in all my actions. 9. I shall expect no remuneration for my services. 10. All my services shall be dedicated to God; they shall not be for attaining rank or for show.46

Non-violence and Khudai Khidmatgar movement The violent method, before the birth of Khudai Khidmatgar movement, adopted about three or four decades ago, as a means for achieving independence added to the agonies of the people. The violent movement created hatred in the hearts of the people …. If a British was killed, not only the culprit was punished but the whole village and entire region suffered for it.47 Therefore, the radical ideology of non violence was followed in the light of peculiar socio-politico and religio- psychological background in the NWFP. Because Ghaffar Khan was convinced that armed resistance would bring disaster and ruin upon the Pashtuns, who were already

46 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., pp.269-70 quoted Harijan, 15 October 1938 with translation by Gandhiji. See also E. Eknath, A Man to Match his Mountains, Nilghi Press, second Printing, 1985, pp.11-2. S. Fida Younas, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Pashtunistan and Afghanistan (Peshawar: Hayyatabad, 2003), p.7 gives another version of the pledge. 47 Farhad Jan, p.43. See for more details D.G Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is Battle. op.cit., pp.61-2. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 149 facing lot of miseries being the inhabitants of a politically and strategically sensitive area. Non violence created a sense of identity and pushed the ignorant Pashtuns out of darkness. Moreover, since its proponent in the 20th century was Gandhiji, a Hindu, it was presented by All India Muslim League as one more of his tricks to rob Indian Muslims of their fighting strength. The Frontier Muslim League leaders blamed Ghaffar Khan for preaching non violence as nothing but to convert the Pashtuns to Hinduism. They call him ‘Abdul Kufur’ (slave of the infidels i.e. Hindus) and the Frontier Governor Sir. George Cunningham’s favorite pejorative name for him was ‘Gandhi Chela’ (sheepish follower of Gandhi).48 Most of the non-Pashtun biographers of Abdul Ghaffar Khan wrongly attributed Khan’s non violence to Gandhiji, and argue that it was a variant of the same non violence preached by Gandhiji in the rest of India. Actually Gandhian non violence had, literally speaking, very little effect on the Pashtun mind. ‘Abdul Ghaffar Khan had developed his own perception of adopting non-violence since early 1910s. This being one of the main reasons that he disapproved the armed struggle of the Haji Sahib of Turangzai, launched against the Raj.49 Ghaffar Khan was convinced that the armed resistance would bring disaster and ruin upon the Pashtuns, who were already facing a lot of miseries being the inhabitants of a politically and strategically sensitive area. He claims it to be an original concept as he says: It is not a new creed. It was followed fourteen hundred years ago by the Prophet (PBUH) all the time. He was in Makkah, and it has since then been followed by all those who wanted to throw off an oppressive yoke, but we have so far forgotten it that when Gandhi Ji, placed it before us we thought he was sponsoring a novel creed.50 J. S. Bright, a contemporary biographer of Ghaffar Khan has also supported this argument. According to him: Ghaffar Khan is in complete accord with the principle of

48 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., pp.274-75. 49 Dr. Syed Wiqar Ali Shah in his article states ‘The number of Congress members in the NWFP, before its merger with the Khudai Khidmatgars, was fewer than even required for a separate Congress Committee. Subsequent events during war years and after proved that the Khudai Khidmatgars were the followers of Ghaffar Khan and not Gandhi’, Maulvi Fazal Marwat Mufti, op.cit., p.111. 50 Dr. Hayder Lashari, Safeer-Insaneet (Karachi: G.M. Syeed Studies Board, 2008), p.81. See also Farhad Jan, op.cit., p.43. 150 Pakistan Perspectives

non-violence. But he has not borrowed his outlook from Mahatma Gandhi. He has reached it and reached it independently. Independently like a struggler after truth. No doubt, his deep study of Koran has influenced his doctrine of love…Hence if Ghaffar Khan has arrived at the philosophy of non-violence, it is absolutely no wonder. Of the two, Ghaffar Khan and Mahatma Gandhi, my personal view is that the former has achieved a higher level of spirituality. The Khan has reached heaven, while the Pandit is firmly on the earth but ironically enough, the Mahatma is struggling in the air! Ghaffar Khan, like Shelley, has come from heaven to the earth, while Mahatma Gandhi, like Keats, is going from earth to the heaven. Hence, I do not understand why Ghaffar Khan should be called the Frontier Gandhi. There is no other reason except this that the Mahatma was earlier in the field, more ambitious than spiritual, and has been able to capture, somehow or the other, a greater publicity. If we judge a person by spiritual qualities, Mahatma Gandhi should rather be called the Indian Khan than Ghaffar Khan the Frontier Gandhi: true, there the matter ends.51 Even Gandhiji himself says: I do not know how for the Khan Sahib (Abdul Ghaffar Khan) has succeeded in carrying his message to his people. This I know that with him non violence is a matter not intellectual conviction but of intuitive faith. Nothing can therefore, shake it. About his followers he cannot say how far they will adhere to it. But that doesn’t worry him. He was to do his duty which he owes his ahimsa from the Holy Quran. He is a devout Mussalman. He offered his Namaz (prayers) and his Ramzan fast except when he was ill. But his devotion to Islam doesn’t mean disrespect for other faiths.52

The concept of non violence had two clear aims First, non cooperation with the alien rulers and second, constructive social program comprising achievement of communal unity, abolition of un-touchability, prohibition of liquor, propagation of khadi and other cottage industries. The Khudai Khidmatgar movement struggled against the

51 J.S. Bright, Frontier and its Gandhi, Lahore, 1944, pp.103-04. 52 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., p.243. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 151 theocratic approach to Islam and tried to acquaint Muslims with its true spirit. It demanded selfless service only in the name of God because all Prophets declared in unequivocal terms: ‘I ask for no reward in return of these services. I ask compensation from none except God’.53 This religious call rekindled the religious emotions of the Pashtuns and thus guided them towards Khudai Khidmatgars, but the British declared it a ‘fanatical hostility’ and an attempt to overthrow the government. No other movement had ever received such a tremendous response, as did the Khudai Khidmatgars of Ghaffar Khan. It raised more than 100,000 non violent Khudai Khidmatgars in reaction to the policy input of the British military and civil bureaucracy. The British had come to India, not only for the institutionalization of the western liberal values but also for thorough going economic and political exploitation. The British, right from the inception of the Khudai Khidmatgars movement sensed ‘that it aims at political revolution and not at religious and social reformation’. But infact, the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was in reality a kind of salvation army raised by Ghaffar Khan for the religious, moral and social uplift of the Pashtun nation. However, the Khudai Khidmatgars for obtaining these goals suffered untold miseries under British rule. The gruesome and woeful stories of Khudai Khidmatgars can form the subject matter of long and voluminous books. In a population of twenty six lakhs there were three lakh Khudai Khidmatgars. However, the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was ostensibly a reformation movement, it strived to get its covert goal of independence through multidimensional reforms package. Although the ultimate goal of the movement was to get freedom from British rule, its leader mobilized their Pashtun follower towards their goal through socio-religious reforms and economic modernization. It was a multidimensional movement and its agenda and aims embodied diverse elements from Islamic exhortations, social ethics, women, peasant and minority rights, national reconstruction, religious moderation, and harmony to a universal brotherhood based on love, care and service of humanity irrespective of any condition or consideration.

The year 1930 – a period of repression and civil disobedience The year 1930, nostalgically remembered by the late Ghaffar Khan and his followers as san-tees (the year 1930), is a watershed year in the history of the Indian subcontinent. But san-tees, in the Frontier stands for ‘sacrifice’ which the people offered in Qissa Khwani Bazaar (Peshawar city), Utmanzai, Hatikhel (Bannu), Kohat, Takkar (Mardan) and tribal

53 Farhad Jan, op.cit., p.74. 152 Pakistan Perspectives belt against the British. Before 1930, no political party had raised their voice to demand complete independence. They only wanted dominion status for India. In December 1929, Ghaffar Khan and other prominent Khudai Khidmatgars attended the Lahore session of Indian National Congress. In this session, the Congress adopted complete independence for India, as their objective. On their return to Peshawar, Ghaffar Khan along with other Khudai Khidmatgars visited almost every village of the province, and organized the people on the pattern of Congress organization. Since the Congress in its Lahore session had already declared complete independence as its immediate goal, therefore to achieve this goal through non-violence and non-cooperation, ‘freedom day’ was be observed all over India on 26 January 1930. Ghaffar Khan also endorsed the Congress program of ‘complete independence’, non-cooperation and non-payment of taxes and revenues. On 15 April 1930 the provincial Congress workers brought special clay (salty clay) from Pabbi and defied the government by manufacturing salt. Next step was the picketing of liquor shops and April 23 was selected for this purpose. To intensify the struggle Ghaffar Khan summoned a large representative gathering of the eminent leaders of Congress committee at Utmanzai from 19 April to 21 April, ostensibly to celebrate the anniversary of Azad schools. The main items of the meeting were the performance of a seditious play calculated to bring government into hatred and contempt, and a mushaira.54 Two days after the meeting at Azad School was over, the authorities decided to arrest all the prominent leaders of provincial Congress working committee and the news of their arrest spread like a wild fire in the city and it seemed as if the whole city had burst out before the gate of Kabali thana (police station), Peshawar. These people were shouting Inqilab Zindabad and asking for the release of the arrested leaders. This worsened the situation and led to indiscriminate firing of the troops on unarmed Congress/Khudai Khidmatgars at Qissa Khwani Bazaar (Peshawar) which continued from 11:00am to 3:00 pm.55 The death toll, according to Ghaffar Khan ran into 200 to 250, the Jalianawala action was replayed. The list, furnished by Farigh Bukhari

54 Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Bacha Khan Awe Khudai Khidmatgari, Vol.1, Peshawar; 1993, p.94. 55 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.32. See also Farhad Jan, op.cit., p.100; Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., pp.100-03 for both official and non-official versions of the tragedy, Anwer Khan Dewana, Kia ye loogh Pagal Tee, Peshawar,1995. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 153

57 persons were found dead on the sport, 38 corpses were buried by the hospital authorities, 24 bodies including a woman were taken to different villages and about 500 injured were admitted into different hospitals in the province.56 Ghaffar Khan, on his way to Peshawar on 23 April, was arrested at village Naqi on charge of subversive activities and sentenced to three years rigors imprisonment and was sent to Gujrat jail in the Punjab. The Qissa Khwani massacre was followed by a second firing incident at Peshawar on 31 May, killing twelve persons. On 16 May, Utmanzai was besieged by eight hundred British soldiers who set on fire the office of the Khudai Khidmatgars and ravaged the whole village. The siege of Utmanzai was followed by similar sieges of village Prang and Charsadda, where curfew was imposed. The people were not even allowed to go to the mosques for prayer. The 24 day siege not only created food shortage, but also many cattle also died out of hunger.57 On 28 May 1930, the Khudai Khidmatgars held a protest meeting at Takkar which was given a blood bath in the wink of an eye. The machine guns silenced 20 persons and injured 40. The army then set ablaze the hujras, houses and destroyed the grain stocks.58 On the 16 June 1930 village Swal Dher was besieged and villagers brutally handled. Grain stores were totally destroyed. On the 29 Jalbai area (Tehsil Mardan) was besieged and the inhabitants received the same fate as their other village brothers. Such was the case with the village Lund Khwar. On 24 December 1930 the British fired at a meeting at village Tugh, Kohat, which resulted in killing and injuring many Khudai Khidmatgars. On 24 August, a peaceful mob at Hathikhel (Bannu) was fired upon, killing seventy persons on the spot. The Khudai Khidmatgars and Frontier Provincial Congress Committee were banned. Martial law was declared and the province was cut off from all sorts of communication with the rest of the subcontinent. Frequent firing and lathi charges on the unarmed, non violent Khudai Khidmatgars became a routine. Besides killing, all sort of means were used to root out the movement.59

56 Ibid., p.103. 57 Farigh Bukhari, Tehrik-i-Azadi Awe Bacha Khan (Lahore: Fiction House, 1991), p.55. 58 Allah Bakhsh Yusafi, The Frontier Tragedy (Karachi: Mohammad Ali Education Society, 1986), p.45. 59 Farhad Jan, op.cit., p.108. The Imperial Gazetteer of India reported that fifty-four expeditions were undertaken against the frontier tribes between 154 Pakistan Perspectives

Khudai Khidmatgars affiliation with the Congress The mass popularity of the Khudai Khidmatgars movement, led the British government to perpetrate unimaginable brutalities upon its leaders and their workers. The British also tried to prove their connection with the Bolsheviks. The Deputy Commissioner’s ‘note on Red Shirt’ dated 30-5-1930 states that modeled on the Bolshevik Soviet systems, the movement ‘was known to be in strict accordance with instructions received from the Bolsheviks themselves’.60 Severity of repression and lack of outside help obliged Khudai Khidmatgars to seek affiliation with a party. Two prominent Khudai Khidmatgars Mian Jaffar Shah and Abdullah Shah met with Ghaffar Khan in jail and informed him about government repression. To avoid further government repression it was decided that the organization should be affiliated with an all India political body. The Khudai Khidmatgars first choice was All India Muslim League but the latter refused such help against the British government; their next choice, the Indian National Congress, readily agreed and welcomed them in the fight against British imperialism. Ghaffar Khan justified this affiliation with the Indian Congress on political as well as religious grounds. He contended that the British were common enemy of both the Hindus and Pashtuns alike, the Hindus would ‘catch one of the legs of our powerful enemy and we catch him by his second and in this way tear him in two’.61 This decision of Ghaffar Khan to affiliate with the Congress was questioned by some of his colleagues, but he defended his decision in these words: Hindus as well as Muslims, to guard the deceit and diplomacy …of the mischief mongers (the British) whose Raj survived due to their divide and rule policy which resulted in Hindu Muslim disunity.62 On another occasion he said: If you can point out any other party like the Congress, I am prepared to cooperate with it. We want freedom; we want to drive out the British from our country because they have exhausted our patience. We would, therefore, side with a

1849 and 1902. A similar number of expeditions took place between 1902 and 1947, J.W. Spain, op.cit., p.176. 60 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam, p.33; J.W Spain, ibid., p.110. 61 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., p.230. See also Muhammad Yunus, Frontier Speaks, pp.158-59. 62 Ibid., p.231. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 155

party which has the same goal as we have.63 The Khudai Khidmatgars, after their merger with the Congress, got popularity on an all-India level. Furthermore, Ghaffar Khan assured his critics that they would not lose their national identity in the Congress and that the old names and terms of Jirga and Khudai Khidmatgars would be remain unchanged. And if the Congress betrayed them he would be the first to leave the Congress. He also explained that the relationship of Congress with the Khudai Khidmatgars would be only of friendship (dostanah) and would not subordinate or replace the latter.64 On 5 March 1931, Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed between the Government and Congress. As a result of the pact, all the political prisoners were released except Ghaffar Khan because the government wanted a separate deal with him. But he refused on the ground that Gandhi was the sole representative of both the Congress and Khudai Khidmatgars. Thus all the political prisoners in NWFP were released on 11 March 1931. On his release Ghaffar Khan had declared Gandhi-Irwin Pact as temporary truce and this was confirmed by the hanging of Sardar Bhagat Singh which sent waves of resentment in the length and breath of India.65 In NWFP, the Khudai Khidmatgars resumed their work to organize and discipline the Khudai Khidmatgars. The government broke the truce by arresting two of them in Deh Bahadur. The Khudai Khidmatgars once again raised voice against the government and as per Congress program started propaganda against the Round Table Conference to be held in London. The British government therefore arrested Ghaffar Khan on 25 December 1931 and declared that, in the NWFP, the Khudai Khidmatgars and Congress with all its affiliated branches were unlawful associations. In December 1931, in the Second Round Table Conference, failure of talks between Gandhiji and the British was followed by mass arrest which roughly sent about 17 thousand Razakars (voluntaries) to different jails. The British government wanted to crush the Red Shirts. As thousands of arrested Khudai Khidmatgars were not only beaten, thrown into icy cold water but put in such filthy cells that they refused to take food in such conditions.65 The arrest of Ghaffar Khan and Nehru in December 1931 was followed by the declaration of civil disobedience movement by the Congress. The arrest of Gandhiji on 4 January 1932

63 Farhad Jan, op.cit., p.111. 64 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., p.232. 65 For biographical sketch of Bhagat Singh see Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 156 Pakistan Perspectives added fuel to the already inflamed situations. In order to divert the attention of the people from their national struggle, the government declared elections in April 1932. The Khudai Khidmatgars boycotted the elections. The boycott almost everywhere in the province was so successful that the whole Charsadda sub-division recorded only one vote.66 On 27 August 1934, Ghaffar Khan was released but banned to enter the Punjab and NWFP, therefore, he was invited by Gandhiji to stay with him. The significant event of the year 1934 was government’s decision to elect only one member from NWFP to the Central Legislative Assembly. Earlier, the Pashtuns of NWFP were represented in the assembly by a nominated member. In pursuance of the government decision, the Khudai Khidmatgars formed a delegation to go to Wardah for consulting the disbanded Khan brothers (Ghaffar Khan and his elder brother Dr.Khan Sahib) and convince Dr. Khan Sahib to contest the election. Ghaffar Khan agreed to contest the election and won. The Khudai Khidmatgars also obtained grand victory in the district board elections.67 On 7 December 1934, Ghaffar Khan was re-arrested and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment on charges of inciting people against the British Raj. On 1st August 1937 he was released but once again prohibited to enter Punjab and NWFP until 29th November. However, in the last week of August 1937 he was allowed to enter these areas. When he arrived in his home province, the NWFP, the political horizon was totally changed. The confrontational politics had given way to parliamentary politics and the Congress was participating fully in the new developments. However, the most significant aspect of the civil disobedience movement in Frontier during this period was the strict adherence of the Khudai Khidmatgars to non violence.

Elections of 1937 Under the 1935 Act in 1937 elections were announced. In NWFP election for a 50 member’s provincial assembly was held in February 1937. The Khudai Khidmatgars won 19 seats out of 35 (contested seats) in 50 members legislature. The Hindu-Sikh Party got 8 seats, the Independents were 16 and the Azad Party had 3 seats.68 Despite being the largest party, the Congress did not command an absolute majority and thus was not in a position to form the government. Seeing the

66 Farhad Jan, op.cit., p.115. 67 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, op.cit., p.37. See also Farhad Jan, op.cit., p.120. 68 Ibid., p.134. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 157 uncertain position of various parties in the assembly, Sir Abdul Qayyum Khan succeeded in forming the government. However, the ministry of Sir Abdul Qayyum Khan could not survive for long. At the session of the Legislative Assembly on 3 September 1937, a motion of no-confidence was passed by 27 votes to 22. Cunningham, therefore, asked Dr. Khan, on 4 September, to form a ministry, and two days later, on 7 September, Dr. Khan Sahib handed in the list of his cabinet.69

The Khudai Khidmatgars in office The Khudai Khidmatgar and Congress ministries were in office for a little less than two years, but during this short period several important issues were settled. The objective of the government should be the service of the people. The functionaries of the government, including the ministers, should be their servants and not masters. This declaration went long away in the removal of fear from the hearts of the long suppressed Pashtuns and made them bold and daring. Once a young fellow held Dr. Khan Sahib by his collar and asked him what he had done for Pashtuns. The police constable jumped at that excited young man and pressed his throat in order to release the Chief Minister from his grip. Dr. Khan instead held the police constable from his neck and cried angrily, ‘wretched! I strive to create and develop courage amongst the Pashtuns so that they may put their hands into the collars of those who usurp their rights even if that be the Chief Minister, and you suppress that courage’.70 Many repressive laws were withdrawn. The principle of nomination in the municipal committees and other local bodies were replaced by the principle of election. In the field of services and scholarships, status was replaced by merit. During this period in Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, communal violence occurred. Gandhiji paid a visit to these panic stricken areas in order to restore confidence amongst the Hindus and Sikhs. The ministry, on personal assurance, persuaded those Hindus and Sikhs who had left their homes to their return home and settle peacefully.71 On 3 September 1939 Second World War broke out. Britain declared war on Germany. The Khudai Khidmatgar authors condemned the Europeans for not learning any lesson from the First World War’s destruction and were again preparing for another terrible destruction. The irony is that all this is done for peace. Hitler and

69 Ibid., p.135. 70 Ibid., p.136. 71 Ibid., p.139. 158 Pakistan Perspectives

Mussolini too are talking peace but through guns. The British are killing Palestinians and bombing Wazirs (Pashtun tribes of Waziristan) for peace. The Japanese are attacking Chinese for peace. If this is peace, burn it…world peace can be established only with love and not guns.72 On 11 September, the Viceroy made the declaration of war without consulting Indian leaders or legislatures. The Congress, at this stage demanded some constitutional concessions in return for their support and assistance. The British refused and wanted unconditional support which the Congress rejected. On 22 September the Congress directed the provincial ministries to resign. The NWFP ministry ultimately resigned on 7 November 1939. In September 1939, the All India Congress’ Poona offer of conditional support to the British war stuck Ghaffar Khan badly. He resigned the Congress working committee by saying: The Congress party has thus discarded the sacred path of non violence and set on the dirty path of violence which is completely against the Khudai Khidmatgar principles. Our way is that of peace and love. We don’t believe in war and hatred. We have no quarrel or enmity with any nation of the world. Our task is to serve and love all the people of the world … that is why I resign from the (Congress) working committee.73 By his resignation Ghaffar Khan proved himself to be a firm believer in non violence. But when the all Indian Congress committee adopted a resolution at Ramgarh, opposing Indian war efforts, Ghaffar Khan rejoined the Congress. This was a brief story of the struggle for freedom from British of the Khudai Khidmatgars through non violence from 1929-1940.

Conclusion The British objective in Frontier province was just to use its people as tool and fodder of war and its land as base or frontline against its overt and covert designs in the region in general, and against Russia (later on Soviet Union) and Afghanistan, in particular. They never tried to introduce the liberal, pluralistic value system of the West based on democratic norms in the new province but rather old colonial political and economic exploitative structures were sustained. Ghaffar Khan spent 34 years out of 98 in the British and

72 Abdul Karim Khan, op.cit., p.490. 73 Ibid., p.240. Orgins, Growth and Consolidation of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement 159

Pakistani jails, solitary confinements and house arrests because of his non violent struggle against the British Raj, pseudo-mullahs and saints. In the 1930-31 disturbances in the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), the Khudai Khidmatgar emerged as the main opponent of the British Raj and powerful champion of Pashtun nationalism and identity. Even in the 1980s Afghan War, Ghaffar Khan was preaching non violence and peace and declared the war as super powers rivalry’ and proposed Loya Jirga (grand assembly) for the resolution of the conflict. Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A Comparative Study of Selected Urdu Newspapers

Seemi Naghmana Tahir & Babrak Niaz*

Abstract This paper attempts to examine the role of selected newspapers in taking sectarian clashes in Balochistan to the public agenda.

Along with the content analysis of the selected newspapers the authors have also conducted a survey on peoples’ perception on related issues. The correlation between the content of the selected newspapers and popular beliefs raises new questions and yields a unique insight into the complex issue of Balochistan. ––––––––– Introduction The capacity and strength of mass media in addressing the issues confronting the societies, needs no extra emphasis. Technological developments in the field of information distribution have increased the pace and scope of mass media’s impact many folds. It has been a popular belief for quite sometimes that media provides information and knowledge crucial for social development and help solve social, political and economic problems in the course of modernization.1 The process of globalization has opened up new venues to accelerate the process of transformation of societies. The emerging global markets are distributing all kinds of products including cultural artifacts but it is also a way of engaging with certain assumptions about the role of ideas, images and

* Prof. Dr. Seemi Naghmana Tahir, Department of Mass Communication & Dean Faculty of Arts, Federal Urdu University, Karachi. Babrak Niaz, Lecturer Department of Media & Journalism, University of Balochistan Quetta. 1 Zhen Wang Guang & Vijay K. Pillai, ‘Communication and Social Development’, in K. Mahadevan, Kiran Prasad etal (eds.), Communication Modernization and Social Development, India, BR Publishing Corporation, 2002, p.26. 162 Pakistan Perspectives believes and how they are created to unite or divide societies.2 On the one hand every regional, local and internal issue is being internationalized within seconds; on the other most of the nation states of the world are faced with the dilemmas of internal conflicts which hinders the peace and prosperity of the nations as a whole. The editorial control of media houses is shifting from professionals to market department which is raising new questions about the relevance of content to society’s specific issues. Many media scholars of today support the retention of public service programming in order to provide those ingredients which the nation might think imperative for it but which the market will not provide.3 In such an era when television contents are produced to address much larger audience than ever before, print and radio sounds more appropriate forums to address issues confronting the local audience. This research study is based on the content analysis of local Urdu newspapers to evaluate the way these selected newspapers have reported news and written opinion pieces on sectarian clashes which took place in Balochistan during 2003-2006 vis-à-vis public perception obtained through survey method of data collection. The other questions regarding choosing print media, selection of sample for survey and rationale of study and detailed methodology may not be explained without having an insight of the press of this region.

Distinct features of mass media in Balochistan The genesis of mass media in Balochistan is linked with the reading and writing traditions of the province. During its early period it was adopted as a barrowed tradition introduced by the elite of Balochistan for purposes like projection of identity, culture, language, image building and putting Balochistan on the media map of the country.4 Balochistan was in fact an area with no scope for journalism due to its negligible literacy ratio and little readership. The literacy rate in Balochistan is lowest in Pakistan which according to Census Report of 1998 was estimated at 25% but later in 2004 estimation by Government of

2 Richard Michael & French David, ‘Globalization, Television and Asia’, in Richard Michael and French David (eds.), Television in Asia (New Delhi: Sage Publications), 2000, pp.16-7. 3 D.H. Brown, ‘The Academys’response to the call for a new marketplace approach to broadcasting regulations’, Critical Studies Mass Communication, 1994, p.262. 4 Fahim Baloch, ‘Mass Media, Cultural Diversity and Provincial Harmony in Balochistan’, unpublished M.Phil dissertation, Department of Media & Journalism (Quetta: University of Balochistan, 2010). Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 163

Balochistan reflects some progress and assessed the overall literacy rate in the province at 28%.5 Due to this, circulation of newspapers is also limited and according to one estimate the total circulation of print media is merely 35000 copies altogether. Today Balochistan has 124 years’ history of press commencing from 1888. Radio and television remained a state monopoly in the country till the year 2002 when Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance was promulgated, paving the way for establishment of radio and television in private sector.6 Although FM radio and satellite television in private sector made inroads very quickly in major cities of Pakistan but it took Balochistan many years to have first private FM radio station in 2006.7 During the period 2003- 2006 print media was the only independent source of information and opinion formation which had a direct focus on the issues confronting the local population. Ethnic diversity is another important feature of the area which has a direct linkage with the media as well as with the selection of newspapers for this study. Balochistan houses more cultures and ethnic groups than any other region in the country. The province is multi- lingual: Balochi, Pashto and Brahui are the main area languages but due to very thin population (6.5 million) no single area language is capable of dominating the mass media scenario as a whole. Instead of that the national language Urdu dominates both the print and electronic media in Balochistan.8 Language wise break up of daily newspapers in Balochistan also verifies the significance of Urdu press in the region. According to media list of Directorate of Public Relations Government of Balochistan, in 2009, the number of Balochi daily newspapers was 11, English 12, Pashto3, Brahui none, multi-lingual 7 and number of Urdu daily newspapers coming out from Balochistan was 88.9 Quetta city is the main centre of press in Balochistan. All newspapers and magazines from the province are clustered in the capital city of Quetta due to various reasons. Concentration of most of the higher education

5 Government of Balochistan, Balochistan MICS 2004, p.29. 6 Seemi Naghmana Tahir, History and Development of Mass Media in Balochistan (Balochistan Mein Ablagh-e-Amma Agha-wa-Irtiqa), (Islamabad: National Language Authority, 2006), p.465. 7 Sadaf Naqvi, ‘Role of FM Radio in Bringing Social Change in Balochistan’ unpublished M.Phil dissertation, Department of Media & Journalism, University of Balochistan, 2010. 8 Ibid., p.101. 9 Seemi Naghmana Tahir, ‘Ethnic Diversity and Multi-lingual Press in Balochistan 1938-2009’, Historicus, the quarterly Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, LVIII:2 (April-June 2010), pp.68-71. 164 Pakistan Perspectives institutions in Quetta is one of them which provide readership for newspapers. The globalization, the I.T revolution, satellite system and internet-connectivity have virtually broadened the awareness of people in Balochistan now and have promoted a sense of identity and diversity. On the one hand, the new phenomenon has brought new opportunities; on the other, it has increased the sense of deprivation among the people of the province, suffering from prolonged disparity. Awareness through media has re-enforced the demand for cultural as well as political autonomy of the province. Besides political strives going on in the province, increased violence on sectarian grounds has virtually challenged the wisdom of social and political scientists to find the causes and suggest remedies for bringing peace and harmony in the region.

Sectarian clashes and coverage in newspapers: An analysis of public opinion The aim of this research is to study the issue of sectarian violence in Balochistan, keeping in mind various geographical, historical and political factors and with major focus on the role of print media in Balochistan. The research work would be focused on measuring perceived public opinion on the sectarian unease in Balochistan and the role of daily newspapers highlighting the issue. The mass media as an agent of social change enjoys the capacity and strength to change or modify the existing attitude and behaviors in the society they operate. All communication has to take place through a medium of some kind, and that medium will limit the communication in some ways, and permit various features to exist at the same time.10 Thus main objectives of this study include: 1. To analyze the coverage of sectarian issue in local print media 2. To study public opinion in Balochistan on sectarian clashes and the way print media constructs and presents this issue in news and opinion pieces.

Methodology The research method proceeded through descriptive and analytical approaches, survey and content analysis methods were used for collection of data. A closed ended questionnaire was developed to conduct the survey, a format that limits respondents with a list of choices

10 Williams Noel, How to get a 2:1 in Media, Communication and Cultural Studies (London: SAGE Publications, 2004), p.118. Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 165 to answer the question.11 The choices were ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’.

Population and sampling The population of the study was inhabitants of Balochistan province of Pakistan. A research population is generally a large collection of individuals or objects that is the main focus of a scientific inquiry. Due to the large sizes of populations, researchers often cannot test every individual in the population because it is too expensive and time- consuming. This is the reason why researchers rely on sampling techniques.12 For this survey, probability and stratified methods of sampling were used to ensure maximum representation of the population. A probability sampling method is any method of sampling that utilizes some form of random selection. In order to have a random selection method, you must set up some process or procedure that assures that the different units in your population have equal probabilities of being chosen.13 The act of dividing a larger population into subgroups using systematic sampling is called stratified sampling, whereas, random sampling can frequently minimize the sampling error in the population. This in turn increases the precision of any estimation methods used, but one should ensure selection of relevant variables for the grouping process. This method of sampling with any given population could vary significantly depending on the grouping and uniformity of the grouping.14 There may be factors which divide the population into sub- populations (groups / strata) and we may expect the measurements of variables to vary among the different sub-populations. For this study this objective was achieved by stratified sampling. A stratified sample is obtained by taking samples from each stratum or sub-group of a population.15 The respondents were categorized as intellectuals, religious scholars, university teachers, lawyers, doctors, politicians, journalists and university level students, so that cross section of society and maximum stakeholder’s opinion may be attained.

11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closed-ended_question. 12 http://www.experiment-resources.com/research-population.html#ixzz1x1X SiQIo. 13 http://www.sixsigmaspc.com/dictionary/stratified-sampling.html 14 Ibid. 15 http://www.encyclo.co.uk/define/Stratified%20sampling 166 Pakistan Perspectives

The sample of the study was collected from Quetta city because (i) concentration of readers here, (ii) due to the reason that most of the incidents of sectarian violence have taken place in Quetta; and (iii) because of clustered Shia population in the city. Moreover being the commercial, administrative and educational centre of the province students, government officials including doctors and teachers from all over the province live in Quetta and a sample drawn from this city ensures the representation from the whole province.

Procedure of data collection & data analysis Data was collected through questionnaire which was physically handed over to all the respondents. Total 301 copies of questionnaires were distributed and received. The researchers used following statistical method to analyze the data: I. Total score of each item of questionnaire was calculated. II. Mean score of each item of questionnaire was calculated. III. Percentage of the every response was also calculated. The data was tabulated in the form of frequency distribution. Total frequencies and percentage of each response was interpreted and tabulated accordingly.

Content analysis Content analysis is any systematic procedure devised to examine the content of recorded information. Krippendorf calls it a research technique for making replicable and valid references from data to their context. Kerlinger describes content analysis a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables.16 The same method was used to draw comparison of newspapers. Content of front and editorial pages of selected newspapers were selected as sample for analysis to manage the study in a given time period and also because all accidents or carnage news are generally reported on front pages. Quetta has limited capacity of generating news stories that could hit the headlines due to lesser business and social activities as compared to other major cities of the country, however, accidents and terrorists activities always hit front page headlines. For analyzing opinion pieces editorial pages were selected as sample of study. Editorial page contains editorials, columns and articles, where writer can give his/her viewpoint and opinion about any issue.

16 Wimmer D. Roger, ‘Dominick R. Joseph, ‘Mass Media Research: An Introduction’ in Thomas Wadsworth, 9th Edition, p.140. Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 167

Following three newspapers were selected for analysis:  Daily Jang Quetta  Daily Mashriq Quetta  Daily Bakhabar Quetta Four factors were kept in view before selecting the above mentioned newspapers for the study:  Distribution or circulation  Influence on decision makers  Quality of news content Since the topic of study focuses on a local issue, therefore, newspapers largely circulated among the local readers were selected. All three newspapers originate from Quetta and are expected to address issues that directly influence the lives and property of their readers. The daily Jang was selected due to its popularity and highest circulation in Quetta. The daily Mashriq is the second largest circulating newspaper, but is not a part of a large newspaper conglomerate like daily Jang and thus expected to be more liberal and focused on local issues. Both these newspapers are pioneer of modern journalism in Balochistan. The other common feature of these two newspapers is that their ownership lies with the non-locals; the people who belong to other places than Balochistan are often blamed of being less concerned about the local sensitivities and more about their business interests. The daily Bakhabar, on the other hand, is the largest circulating daily among the newspapers that are owned and controlled by locals of Balochistan. The diverse features of all these papers will help in drawing comparative conclusions.

Coding entity Headline of all news items on front page were taken as coding unit for identifying the topics in this particular study. Similarly, on the editorial pages the whole appearance of the item was also measured as coding entity and each item was studied and coded as sympathetic, harsh or unbiased. If the content of the whole item reflected positive angle, it was coded as sympathetic while the negative reflection was coded as harsh and the items neither having sympathetic angle nor harsh were coded as unbiased. The contents analyses of the selected newspapers were done from year 2003 to year 2006. The reason of selecting year 2003 to 2006 was intensity in the reoccurrences of sectarian clashes during this period. The comparison was drawn on the basis of news items published in each newspaper after the incidents took place and overall coverage of news 168 Pakistan Perspectives items related to sectarian nature. Beside coverage of news item, the size of news item was also compared on the basis of newspapers columns inches. Editorials, columns and articles published during 2003 and 2006 in these newspapers were also compared. The comparison of the editorials, articles, columns, pictures and news item were also made on the basis of its nature i.e whether it had sympathetic, harsh or unbiased impact on the readers. The analysis of the data is in the form of tables and each table is also interpreted.

Emergence of sectarian divide in Muslim community The history of mankind has seen the rise and decline of vast empires and civilizations, the growth of Islamic civilization, both for the speed and breadth of its geographic expansion as well as for the development of its unique cultural heritage is today an important part of history of mankind. Islam produced one of the greatest civilizations the world has ever known. While Europe wallowed in the mire of the Dark Ages, Islam produced advances in science, mathematics, literature, medicine, architecture, religion as well as many other fields of discipline. Islamic cities such as Baghdad were the premier centers of learning and folks flocked there from all over the world to study.17 Similarly after the death of Prophet Mohammad in 632 AD, the Islamic empire began new expansions from the Arabian Peninsula, conquered Iran in 641 and Egypt in 642. By the eighth century all of northern Africa and Iberian Peninsula, India and Indonesia had become Islamic land.18 This geographical expansion gave birth to Islamic civilization, which in a very short span of time turned into first true global civilization.19 There is no doubt that Islam worldwide has given a way of life to Muslims with a complete package of directions to cover every aspect of human society. However, in modern period (late ninetieth and twentieth century), the Islamic tradition has encountered great political and ideological challenges. Seventh century Arabia saw the advent of a movement that spread across the Middle East, Europe, Asia and Africa and which today includes over 750 million adherents. The central fact and inspiration of this cohesion is the one, true God (Allah) and his

17 Peter N. Stearns, Islam From The Beginning to 1300, International World History Project, A collection of World History Related Essays, 1992, p.1. 18 Matt Rosenberg, Islamic Geography in the Middle East, About.com, updated August 6, 2007. 19 S.B Schwartz, Michael Adas, Jason M. Gilbert and Peter N. Stearns, World Civilizations, 4th edition Pearson, 1995, p.117. Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 169 revelations to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), which were recorded in the Quran, the final complete revelation of God’s will for whole humanity. The death of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) after a brief illness confronted the emerging Islamic community (Ummah) with the crisis of succession. It marks the beginning of what eventually developed into permanent Sunni-Shia divide in the Islamic community.20 Sunnis are the largest group of Muslim community in the world. According to one estimate, the group comprises 80 to 85% of all Muslims. The word Sunni came from the term Sunnah, which refers to the words and actions of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).21 Those who did not support the political succession of Ali, the first cousin and son- in- law of Prophet Mohammad after his death, opposed succession based on bloodline to the Prophet and recognized the authority of all four caliphs were later called Sunnis.22 Shia Muslims believe that the descendents from Muhammad through his daughter Fatima Zahra and his son in law Ali (the Imam) were the best source of knowledge about the Quran and Islam. According to Shia Islam Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) designated his succession to ‘Ali, who later became the fourth Caliph of Islam.23 The problem of political succession may be said to be the element that crystallized the Shiites into a distinct group, and political suppression in later periods, especially the martyrdom of Imam Hussain accentuated the tendency of the Shiites to see themselves as a separate community within Islamic world.24 The intra-Muslim divide between Shiaism and Sunnism is one of the most important divide in the modern day Islam. It has also encouraged further division of Muslims into many other smaller but equally important groups. The critical areas within the religion and ethnic groups have been politically exploited by different actors and states in various geographical locations in history resulting in intra Muslim conflicts and wars. The Islamic revolution of Iran greatly contributed to strengthen Shia political thought in the contemporary period. Ayatullah Khomeni reportedly attempted to export his Islamic revolution worldwide.25

20 Farhad Daftary, The Ismailis-Their history and doctrines, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.34. 21 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sunni. 22 Ibid. 23 Laurence Louer, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in Gulf, Columbia Universiy Press, 2008, p.5. 24 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shiaism. 25 Laurence Louer, op.cit. 170 Pakistan Perspectives

Balochistan and sectarian conflicts The province of Balochistan enjoys a significant strategic position on world map. For centuries it was used as a cross road from west to east and east to west. Aryans, Scathians, Apthilities and Kushan crossed this region when they moved to Sindh, Punjab and Northern India. Muslims were interested in Balochistan because of its trade and military gates towards the subcontinent such as Bolan Pass, Moola Pass and so on. The province shares borders with Iran and Afghanistan.26 From early history up to the emergence of Pakistan, Balochistan has seen many ups and downs. The main objectives of this study are to pin point the causes of outbreak of sectarian clashes in Pakistan with special focus on Balochistan, particularly during last fifteen years, and also to attain public opinion on the coverage, construction and presentation of sectarian issues on print media as well as public perception on prevailing sectarian violence in the province. To scientifically analyze increasing incidents of sectarian violence and pin point various factors and actors responsible for accelerating these incidences is one of the important objectives of this study. Apart from commonly believed religious reasons, there are geographical, historical and economic dimensions which are needed to be focused upon to develop a true perspective of this sensitive and yet important issue. Determining the role of mass media will be the major focus of this research study but to crystallize the problem, first a brief look at the back ground of sectarian clashes in Pakistan.

Outbreak of sectarian violence in Pakistan The first reported incident of sectarian violence occurred in Pakistan in the year 1950 during Moharram in Hyderabad Sindh, in which nine Mahajirs were killed in police firing. The eruption of violence was caused by a rumours that a Sindhi Shia had kidnapped a Sunni Mahajir child during the Ashura procession.27 However, the first major sectarian clash took place in Lahore in 1953 during the movement against the Ahmadis which was engineered by different religious political parties and Majlis-e-Khatme Nabuwwat. Leaders of the groups wanted Ahmadi’s to be declared as non-Muslims, removal of Foreign Minister,

26 Sayed Abdul Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan (Lahore: Feroz Sons Pvt. Ltd., 1990), p.1. 27 Saroosh Irfani, ‘Pakistans’ Sectarian Violence: Between the Arabist Shift and Indo-Persian Culture, Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p.153. Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 171

Zafarullah Khan, who was Ahmadi by faith and imposition of ban on employment of Ahmadi’s in government services. The unrest resulted in martial law in Punjab.28 Sectarian clashes remained controlled during Ayub era, and only one such incident was reported during his regime that took place near Khairpur in Sindh. In subsequent eras in Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had to face many challenges in mid 1970s’ which includes rise of Punjabi and Sindhi nationalism in the country and a military operation against Baloch nationalist forces. The right wing political and religious parties forced Bhutto government to pronounce Ahmadis as non-Muslims. In the subsequent years, as a result of alliance between right wing religious political parties and military, Bhuttos’ government was toppled down on 5 July 1977 by the then army chief, General Ziaul Haq.29 Zia had strong inclination towards the teaching and political thoughts of Maulana Maudoodi, the founder of Jammat-e- Islami. During his tenure he developed very cordial relations with the Ameer-e-Jammat- e-Islami, Maulana Tufail Mohammad, and also with the followers of Tehreek-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat. In the year 1978 Tehreek-e-Khatam-e- Nabuwwat demanded Zia to declare Zikris of Makran as non- Muslims. Keeping in view strict opposition from somewhat secular Baloch leadership, Ziaul Haq restrained himself from taking any action on this demand. The promulgation of Zakat and Ushr Ordinance by Ziaul Haq further deepened the already existing Sunni-Shia divide in the country, Zakat (poor tax) and Ushr (tax on agriculture produce) were introduced on 21 June 1980 to help the needy people.30 The basic aim of this law was the introduction of Islamic economic system in the country. As these laws were in line with the Sunni sect only, therefore a strong reaction was demonstrated from the people who belonged to the Shia sect. Thousands of Shias turned to Islamabad against these laws which were in conflict with their faith. Another major contributing factors was Iranian revolution which took place in 1979.

Sectarianism and role of regional forces The military government of General Zia faced a wave of Shia activism more openly than ever before which was said to be supported by Islamic

28 Mehtab Shah Ali, Sectarianism—A Threat to Human Security: A Case Study of Pakistan, Rouledge Publications, 2005, p.614. 29 Ibid., p.615. 30 www.awamipolitics.com/zakat-ushr-ordinance-in-pakistan-4196.html Zakat & Ushr Ordinance In Pakistan. Posted by Arshad Hameed on April 2, 2012. 172 Pakistan Perspectives

Republic of Iran. After the enforcement of Zakat and Ushr regulation in Pakistan by General Zia a controversy erupted and TNFJ and Imamia Students Organization (ISO) started resisting the decision made by Zia government. Federal Secretariat was occupied by members of TNFJ and ISO. Ultimately their demands were accepted by Zia. Khomeni’s role cannot be denied in resolving the issue though. Later TNFJ was recognized as the sole representative of Shia community in Pakistan. The formation of TNFJ consequently led to the formation of Anjuman-e- Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP) in 1985 by Deobandi Ulema which was later renamed as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).31 To comprehend roots of sectarian violence in Balochistan, it is significant to sketch the effects of international and national forces at the local level. Some of the sectarian incidents in rural Punjab were said to be engineered by TNFJ with the active support of the Iranian government. It is said that Iran’s’ radicals were keen on promoting Islamic militancy; revolution gave a new sense of identity to Pakistan’s Shia community ….Iran provided funds to Pakistani Shias… paid for many young clerics, mostly from Pashtun tribal areas of Gilgit and Baltistan’.32 After Iran there were other regional players having their share in accelerating sectarianism in the country. Saudi Arab and some Gulf states supported and funded Sunni organizations to contain the Iranian influence. These countries provided enormous funds for building and running of madarsas in rural Pakistan. Later the students of these madarsas took part in war against Russian occupation of Afghanistan. These madarsas were eventually converted into breeding grounds for US sponsored war against USSR in Afghanistan. Both Saudi Arab and Iran remained the main financers of various Sunni and Shia organizations and the madarsas run by them. The curriculum of these madarsa are also believed to be one of the main causes of sectarianism in the country.33 The role of madarsas in providing education to underpreviliged in the country can never be undermined especially in far flung rural areas, but the way these institutions proliferated during Zia period is no less critical. According to one source some 1151 new madarsas were

31 Saroosh Irfani, op.cit., p.158. 32 Fre´de´ Grare ric, ‘The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of Islamic Violence’, South Asia, Journal of South Asian Studies, April 2007, XXX, p.130, 33 Suba Chandran, ‘Sectarian Violence in Pakistan’, ACDIS, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Journal, New Delhi, 2007. Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 173 established and registered during 1979-88 in the country.34 These madarasa also served many purposes for the then regime. They played role in domestic politics by creating different outfits of different sects in the country. Further to achieve their objectives they mobilized public opinion and produced literature based on philosophy of hatred and intolerance for those who differ or were different. Various Madrassas, especially in Punjab and Karachi, accentuated existing sectarian cleavage. Each Sunni schism (Deobandi, Brelvi, and Wahabi) and Shias ran their own Madrassas for providing basic education. The curriculum was decided by the Madaris. As a result, when sectarian fault lines got pronounced, a hate campaign was introduced vis-à- vis the other sect.35 According to the findings of an empirical study, sectarian activities in areas of greater madarsas density per population was found to be higher including incidents of violence on sectarian basis.36 The other major cause or contributing factor for rise of sectarianism in Pakistan was Afghan War of 1980s against the Russian occupation. Pakistan no doubt was made nursery or breeding ground for Afghan mujahideen who were fighting with Russian forces at the behest of United States. It is believed that thousands of Afghan mujahideen and militants from all over the world were trained to fight with Russian forces in Afghanistan. All these militants were sponsored, financed and supervised by American CIA in coordination with Pakistani agencies.37 The exploitation of Islamic fundamentalists by the United States to halt Russian aggression in Afghanistan had far reaching impact not only for regional security but for the security of the entire globe. Process of training and sending the mujahid continued till the Russian retreat from Afghanistan. As per one estimate at least 85000 Afghan mujahideen were trained to take part in guerilla war against Russian forces and this big number of highly trained and motivated people was left without any assignment after the withdrawal of Russian forces from the region when the financial support from CIA was also withdrawn.38 Most of them returned to Pakistan and continued their mission to fight in

34 Fre´de´ Grare ric, op.cit., p.133. 35 Suba Chandran, op.cit. 36 H. Saleem Ali, ‘Pakistani Madarsas and Rural Underdevelopment’, in Malik Jamal’s (ed) Madarsas in South Asia Teaching Terror, Routledge, 2008, p.98. 37 Amir Mir, The true face of Jihadis (Lahore: Mashal publishers), 2004, p.19. 38 Ibid. 174 Pakistan Perspectives

Kashmir. The active fighting between them and Indian Army continued till India and Pakistan reached a point of reconciliation through confidence building measures. Indian government urged Islamabad to stop cross border infiltration. Since then these forces adopted another role; to execute missions within the country in the form of sectarian clashes. Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for siding with US sponsored Afghan mujahideen that eventually resulted in internal unrest, disharmony and lawlessness. Increasing incidents of sectarian violence is another reflection of the presence of this militant element in the country. Balochistan due to its geographical proximity had to suffer more because of political turmoil in neighboring Afghanistan which ultimately took many forms and shapes.

Sectarian clashes in Balochistan: from past to present Balochistan has seen sectarian clashes since long. The violence of sectarian nature in Balochistan started in early 1980’s. The rate of sectarian violence in Balochistan has increased tremendously in recent years. The suicide blast on Ashura procession killed number of Shia Muslims in the year 2003. The attack on Imam Bargah in Quetta during Friday prayer killed many Shia Muslims; the attack on recruits van on Sariab road Quetta killed many young Shia boys, these are just few examples to mention. Since 2003 the nature of sectarian violence turns down to targeting influential personalities of the particular sect. Many scholars, doctors, teachers and political personalities have been killed since 2003. As part of the ongoing target killings in the troubled province which though said to be associated with political motives have acquired an ethnic and sectarian expression at the same time. According to Balochistan police records, there were 256 incidents of target killings in Balochistan in 2009 that killed 200 people and injured 387. In 2010, 231 incidents were reported that killed 255 and injured 498. In the first three months of 2011, at least 39 incidents have occurred, which killed 38 and injured sixty six people.39 Balochistan which was still striving to attain its political rights provided in the constitution of the country was made the battle ground of another war. The first major outbreak of Shia-Sunni clash was witnessed in July 1985 which eventually turned into Hazara-police clash, claimed many lives and curfew had to be imposed in Quetta. As compared to Pashtun society, Baloch society has always been moderate and liberal in respect of religion. However, radicalism had made inroads, particularly

39 Daily Express Tribune, 24 April 2011. Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 175 in ethnic groups. Before the revolution in Iran, there were very rare cases of inter-sect conversion. Even open preaching for the respective sect was not observed. After the revolution in Iran, many scholars and members of TNFJ and ISO were sent to Iran where they were given training and guidance for propagation of Shiaism. There were reports of Sunni Balochs becoming Shias. The conversion rate (from Sunni to Shias) was found to be higher in District Naseerabad as compared to any other cities of Balochistan. To counter this, platform of Sipah Sahaba was used by religious scholars of Sunni sect.40 Apart from Quetta, few other cities of Balochistan are also significant in terms of jihadi activities. Youth were trained under the supervision of Taliban and many dead bodies were brought into Balochistan from Afghanistan during war against terror in Afghanistan. The connections between jihadi outfits are very obvious; they support each others’ cause in one or the other way. The violence of sectarian nature in Balochistan has increased after year 2002, which is notable because of commencement of war on terror in Afghanistan. After the pressure from US and Allied forces mounted on Taliban they started fleeing to Quetta via Qandhar and Spin Buldok. The ideal choice for them was Quetta, Chaman and other small towns close to border areas. A major sectarian attack was on Ashura procession in 2003, in which a suicide bomber blew him in the middle of a procession. The nature of attack was very similar to attacks on US forces in Afghanistan. The unrest in Balochistan can easily be linked with the changes taking place in the region. Many scholars from Balochistan believe that the geographical and strategic location of this province is one of the potential cause of most of its problems. Munir Ahmad Marri is very clear in his view that the decreasing natural resources and their increasing demand throughout the world, and the presence of vast deposits of these resources in Balochistan had always invited external aggression towards Balochistan.41 The province which occupies more than 43% of total land mass of the country is bestowed with boundless natural resources including, natural gas, numerous minerals, precious stones, iron, copper, uranium, chromites, barites, marble, oil and coal.42

Genocide of Hazara community: Is history being repeated? A large number of targeted Shias belonged to Hazara Shia community

40 Undelying causes of sectarian violence’s CDP report. 41 Munir Ahmad Marri, Balochistan Siyasi Kashmakash, Muzmeraat aur Rujhanat (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab 1989), p.79. 42 Syed Abdul Quddus, op.cit., p.161. 176 Pakistan Perspectives living in the province peacefully since decades. Majority of Hazaras live in east and west of Quetta city. The community can be bifurcated into two visible lines: those who have been living in Quetta city for generations while another group of Hazaras migrated from Afghanistan after Russian intervention in Afghanistan. Leaders from Hazara community often blame Iranian and Saudi Arabia’s involvement in fueling sectarianism in Pakistan. These leaders complain that members of their community now faced serious discrimination in access to jobs and even in the amount of bribe Hazara traders were asked to pay at the Pak-Afghan border.43 According to new report since September 2010, 395 people have been killed in 40 incidents of sectarian violence. Over a 100 people have been killed in Quetta alone, and 216 have been injured in the provincial capital and Khuzdar. Four days after the massacre of 26 Hazaras in Mastung, three Hazara Shias were shot dead while en route to Sibi. The community was targeted again barely two weeks later on October 4, when a bus carrying 20 passengers was targeted by gunmen near Quetta. Twelve Hazara Shias were killed in the incident.44 Although the recent wave of target killings of people of Shia community include all ethnic groups. But numerically speaking the biggest sufferer is Hazara Shia community of Balochistan. Most of the Hazara families have shifted their male members and businesses to other parts of the country in search of safe heavens while a large number of them are leaving Pakistan legally or otherwise as they want to secure their lives. This is the third genocide of the same community with in a short span of 120 years. In an era when most of the world’s long standing issues have been resolved through political and diplomatic means, like the end of apartheid in South Africa, the reunification of East and West Germany and many more, the poor communities of Hazaras have become the victim of literal genocide for the third time. At first they were made target during the reign of Amir Abdul Rahman in Afghanistan and started migrating to (then) India in around 1880s. Vartan Gregorian in Emergence of Modern Afghanistan mentions their plight during the period of Amir Abdul Rahman and says that due to political turmoil, social discrimination and economic deprivation they were facing, Hazaras had to quit their traditional homeland in central Afghanistan and

43 Balochistan Blinkered Slide into Chaos, Report of the HRCP fact-finding mission. 44 Imtiaz Saba, Poisoned Minds; Fueling the Massacre of Shias in Pakistan, Reseach conducted at Jinnah Institute. Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 177 some of them moved to Quetta in Balochistan. Former Governor Balochistan General Musa, who also belonged to the Hazara community, explained in his autobiography From Jawan to General how his father migrated to India in 1890 due to tyrannical policies of Amir Abdul Rahman towards Hazara tribes.45 The Pashtun king killed 62% of the Hazara population and forced the rest to quit Afghanistan. The second time the same community became the target of discrimination and genocide in Afghanistan was under the rule of Taliban who considered Hazaras as their worst enemies because Hazaras always opposed their political domination in the country.46 During this period they had to face the worst kind of economic and social discrimination at the hands of ruling Taliban. The political tilt of Hazaras towards Northern Alliance is due to sectarian reasons and affinity.

Mashroom growth of religious/ militant/ jihadi organizations in Pakistan During and after the Zia regime the militant outfits of religious fanatics organized offices in every nook and corner of the country. They used to collect money from different sources from within and outside the country. Religious outfits like Jaishe Muhammad, Lashkare Jhangvi, Sipah Sahaba and many more had been held responsible, and many times they themselves have accepted responsibility for sectarian unease within Pakistan. Followig tables reflect the expansion of various religious/ militant/ jihadi organizations in Pakistan till 2006.

Table 1: Network of jihadi organizations at provincial level Provincial Office of Jihadi Organizations

S.No. Name of Organization Punjab KPK Sindh Balochistan Islamabad Total 1 Hizbul Mujahideen 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 Jaishe Mohammad 1 1 1 1 1 5 3 Al Badar Mujahideen 1 1 1 1 1 5 4 Jama’atul Dawa (Lashkare Taiba) 1 1 1 1 - 4 5 Harkatul Mujahideen 1 1 1 1 1 5 6 Tehreekul Mujahideen 1 1 1 1 1 5 7 Harkatul Jehad-e-Islami 1 1 1 1 1 5 (Harkatul Ansar) 8 Sunni Jehad Council 1 - 1 - - 2 9 Tehreek Jehad 1 - 1 - - 2

45 Seemi Naghmana Tahir, Balochistan Mein Iblagh-e-Amma, (Islamabad: National language Authority 2006), p.93. 46 Clements Frank, Conflict in Afghanistan: a historical encyclopedia, ABC- CLIO. Santa Barbra 2003, p.106. 178 Pakistan Perspectives

Total 09 07 09 07 06 38 Source: Mohammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organization in Pakistan, Mashal Books, 2006, p.579.

Table 2: Organization created on the basis of sect S.No. Organization Punjab KPK Sindh Balochistan Islamabad Total 1 Markazi Jamiat 1 1 1 - 1 4 Ahle Hadess 2 Jamiat-e-Ghurba- 1 - 1 - - 2 e-Ahle Hadees 3 Tehreek-e-Jafferia 1 1 1 1 - 4 (Defunct) 4 Sipah Sahaba 1 1 1 1 - 4 (Defunct) 5 Jama’at Ahle 1 1 1 1 1 5 Sunnat 6 Ahle Hadess 1 1 1 1 - 4 Youth Force Total 6 5 6 4 2 23 Source: Mohammad Amir Rana, p.582.

Table 3: Parties, organizations and groups involved in sectarian strife in Pakistan S.No. Deobandi Shia Barelvi Ahle Hadees 1 Sipah-e- Sahaba Tehreek-e-Jafferia Sunni Tehreek Ahl-e- Hadees Youth Force 2 Lashkare Jhangvi (R) Fiqah Jafferia Saiful Mujahideen Shaban-e-Ahle (Mauswi) Hadees 3 Lashkare Jhangvi (Qari Sipah Mohammad Lashkar-e-Ahle - Group) Sunnat 4 Jhangvi Tigers Imamia Student Hizb-e-Azeemat - Organization 5 Al Haq Tigers Hizbullah Tigers Sunni Yakjehti - Forum 6 Al Badr Federation Pasban-e-Islam - - 7 Al Farooq Mukhtar Force - - 8 Allah-O- Akbar Anjuman-e- - - Lashkar Hanafia 9 Sipah-e- Sahaba Stduents Janisar Ahle Bait - - 10 Tanzeemul Haq Al-Askari League - - 11 Tehreek Difai Sahaba Sipah Abbas - - 12 Naujawanan-e-Tauheed Zarb-e-Hyder - - Ahle Sunnat 13 Jamiat Muhiban-e- Sahaba Lashkar-e- Ali - - 14 Idara Tahafuz-e-Namoos-e- Tanzeem Imamia - - Sahaba 15 - Hussaini Tigers - - 16 - Al-Abbas Force - - 17 - Al- Mujahid - - Total Total Total Total 14 17 05 02 Source: Mohammad Amir Rana, p.584.

Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 179

Tabel 4: Sectarian violences in Pakistan from year 1990 to 2002. Year Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Islamabad

1990 159 39 23 3 1

1991 110 35 12 1

1992 39 42 19

1993 34 21 19 4 1

1994 88 39 17

1995 34 18 5 2

1996 23 12 7 1

1997 23 14 2 5

1998 47 10 18

1999 21 16 8

2000 11 10 3

2001 18 10 5 3

2002 3 7

Source: Rana Amir Mohammad, p.587.

The table states that 16 people were killed between 1990 and 2002 in sectarian clashes in Balochistan. But when it comes to 2003 and onwards the statistics varies by a large number. Important and notable point is the occurrences of these attacks in Quetta city. The data collected through questionnaire is tabulated in the form of frequency distribution. Total frequencies and percentage of each response was interpreted. The survey results are presented in following table:

Table 5: Survey results University Religious University Doctors Journalis Level Intellectuals (43) Scholars Teachers Lawyers (43) (43) ts (43) Students (43) (43) (43) 1. Sectarian clash is a religious phenomenon

YES = 105 = 35% NO = 126 = 42% DON’T KNOW = 70 = 23% TOTAL = 301 = 100% 180 Pakistan Perspectives

2. Sectarian clash is a political phenomenon

YES = 118 = 39% NO = 112 =37 % DON’T KNOW =71 = 24% TOTAL = 301 = 100% 3. Ethnicity is the principle cause of sectarian rift YES = 92 = 30% NO = 174 = 58% DON’T KNOW = 35= 12% TOTAL = 301= 100% 4. The range of religious sensitivity exists in large scale in Pakistan

YES = 115= 38% NO = 117 = 39% DON’T KNOW = 69 = 23% TOTAL = 301= 100% 5. The incident of sectarian clash in Balochistan overwhelming reflects as indigenous issue YES = 57= 19% NO = 226 = 76% DON’T KNOW = 18= 05% TOTAL = 301= 100% 6. The political factors from Sunni and Shia sects are chiefly responsible for the incidents of clash in Balochistan for last 15 years YES =168 = 56% NO = 96 = 32% DON’T KNOW = 37 = 12% TOTAL = 301= 100% 7. Zia’s Islamization regime further aggravated the sectarian fault lines in Pakistan YES = 167= 55% NO = 99 = 33% DON’T KNOW = 35 = 12% TOTAL = 301= 100% 8. Have you ever been affected by the sectarian prejudices

YES = 131= 43% NO = 144 = 48% DON’T KNOW = 26 = 9% TOTAL = 301= 100% 9. Are you content with the media coverage of sectarian clashes?

YES = 193= 64% NO = 77= 26% DON’T KNOW = 31 = 10% TOTAL = 301= 100% 10. Do you hold media responsible for augmenting sectarian rift in Balochistan YES =109 = 36% NO = 150= 50% DON’T KNOW = 42 = 14% TOTAL = 301= 100% 11. To your part of wisdom is it possible for media to bridge the sects?

YES = 192 = 64% NO = 78= 26% DON’T KNOW = 31= 10% TOTAL = 301= 100% 12. Do you believe on any foreign engagement on behest of sectarian clash in Pakistan

YES = 255 = 85% NO = 29= 09% DON’T KNOW = 17 = 06% TOTAL = 301= 100% 13. Is liberalism is the panacea for the religious conflict YES = 150 = 50% NO = 124= 41% DON’T KNOW = 27 = 09 % TOTAL = 301= 100% 14. Do you presume that some sections of the clash happen due to religious media? YES = 123 = 41% NO = 159 = 53% DON’T KNOW = 19 = 06% TOTAL = 301= 100% 15. Do you anticipate religious harmony in near future

YES = 216 = 72% NO = 71 = 23 % DON’T KNOW = 14 = 05 % TOTAL = 301= 100%

Sectarian clashes and public perception An important angle to understand the different dimensions of the issue of sectarianism in Balochistan is to access cross section of society and seek the opinion of people on it. For this purpose a survey was conducted to collect opinion of different sections of society against fifteen basic but related questions. The result of the survey indicates that  At least less than half 42% people believe that sectarianism is not a religious phenomena, where as 35% consider its a religious phenomena, while 23% have no idea whether it is religious or not. Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 181

 A thin majority of 39% respondents believe that sectarianism is a political phenomena, while 37% believe that it is not a political phenomena, further 24% have no clear idea whether it is political or not.  Answering the question whether ethnicity is the principal cause of sectarianism only 30% responded in affirmative while a clear majority of respondents 52% say ethnicity is not the principal cause of sectarianism and only 12% say they do not know.  To a question whether range of religious sensitivity exists in large scale in Pakistan 38% say yes it exists a close 39% believe it does not, while 23% say they do not know.  Whether the incidents of sectarian clash in Balochistan reflect is an indigenous issue, only 19% agreed to this statement while a vast majority 76% denied it as an indigenous issue only 5% says they do not know.  Whether political factors from both the sects are chiefly responsible for these clashes in Balochistan, 56% believe that yes these are while 32% disagree with this statement and 12% had no idea.  Whether Zia’s Islamization further aggravated the sectarian faultline in the country a majority of 55% people agreed 33% disagreed and 12% had no idea.  On a question whether the respondent has ever been affected by sectarian prejudices 43% responded in affirmative 48% in negative and 26% did not express anything.  On a question about the media coverage of sectarian issues, 64% expressed that they are content with coverage of sectarian issues on media, 26% are not content while 14% did not express any opinion.  On a question on, whether media be hold responsible for augmenting the sectarian rift in Balochistan, only 36% agreed to this perception while 50% responded disagreed with this perception and 14% did not give any opinion.  On a question whether media can bridge the two sects, a majority of 64% respondents showed their optimism on role of media while 26% think media can not bridge the gap between the two sects, 10% did not know.  On a very critical question whether there any foreign hand involved or engaged in sectarian clashes in Pakistan a vast majority i.e. 85% believe that it is, only a thin 9% did not agree while a mere 9% say they do not know. 182 Pakistan Perspectives

 In the last question whether they anticipate religious harmony in near future, a 72% respondents reflected their optimism while 23% said they do not see it in near future only 05% said they do not know.

Content analysis A method of content analysis was used for the comparison of three Urdu daily newspapers. Daily Jang, Quetta, the largest circulating newspaper of the province that is likely to have the greatest potential to influence public opinion but at the same time being part of the biggest newspaper group of the country is often blamed for ignoring local issues. Daily Mashriq Quetta , remained the second largest circulating daily of the province for about 24 years under the government ownership and control, but since 1996 is privately owned and coming out as a local newspaper and thus is more likely to voice local concerns strongly. Daily Bakhabar Quetta, Urdu daily under local ownership and thus is believed to give more coverage to the local issues than the above two news papers.47

Tabel 6: Content analysis of selected newspapers Samples and Operational Definitions of Units of Analysis Topic Universe Sample Unit of Analysis News items of All news of sectarian All news on front Every news related sectarian clash and clash and related to page of selected to sectarian clashes, related news, sectarian issue on front newspapers from editorials and editorials and page of selected 2003 to 2006 and columns on columns on newspapers (Daily Jang editorials and editorial page of editorial page of Quetta, Daily Mashriq columns on editorial selected selected Quetta and Daily page of selected newspapers. newspapers. Bakhabar Quetta) and newspapers from editorial page of selected 2003 to 2006. newspapers.

Tabel 7: Categorization of news item News related to sectarian clash is further categorized into following categories Carnage Arrest Injured News Related News Given by News Given By Other News News News to Government Shia Sunni stance on Representatives Representatives Sectarian Clash Daily Jang News Coverage on Sectarian Clashes 2003 to 2006

47 According to data provided by The Directorate of Public Relations Government of Balochistan, 15 June 2003. Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 183

Tabel 8: Front page and editorial page S/No No of News Photographs Editorials Columns Items 2003 63 21 01 01 2004 44 23 01 03 2005 05 05 - - 2006 05 - - - Total 117 49 02 04

Tabel 9: Categorization of sectarian clash news item published in Daily Jang Quetta2003-06 Carnage Arrest Injured News News Related News Given by News Given By Other News News to Government Shia Sunni stance on Representatives Representatives Sectarian Clash 2003 7 14 12 14 5 8 3 2004 5 9 8 9 8 3 2 2005 2 - - 1 2 - - 2006 3 - - - 2 - - Total 17 23 20 24 17 11 5 Daily Mashriq News Coverage on Sectarian Clashes 2003 to 2006.

Tabel 10: Front page and editorial page S/No No of News Items Photographs Editorials Columns

2003 142 29 13 11 2004 19 24 02 04 2005 37 07 - 02 2006 06 03 - 01 Total 204 63 15

Tabel 11: Categorization of sectarian clash news item published in Daily Mashriq Quetta203-06 Year Carnage Arrest Injured News News Given by News Given By Others News News News Related to Shia Sunni Government Representatives Representatives stance on Sectarian Clash 2003 16 42 20 28 23 7 6 2004 5 4 3 3 4 - - 2005 5 9 2 5 9 4 3 2006 4 - - - 2 - - Total 30 55 25 36 38 11 9 Daily Bakhabar News Coverage on Sectarian Clashes 2003 to 2006.

184 Pakistan Perspectives

Tabel 12: Front page and editorial page S/No No of News Photographs Editorials Columns Items

2003 117 97 11 6 2004 24 21 05 - 2005 02 - - - 2006 12 03 - - Total 155 121 16 6

Categorization of sectarian clash news item published in Daily Bakhabar Quetta2003-2006 Year Carnage Arrest Injured News Related News Given by News Given by Other News News News to Government Shia Sunni stance on Representatives Representatives Sectarian Clash

2003 12 23 17 26 21 11 7 2004 5 7 4 4 5 - - 2005 2 ------2006 4 1 2 1 3 - - Total 23 31 23 31 29 11 7

The following chart is a graphical representation of sectarian clash news items categorization published during 2003 by selected newspapers.

Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 185

The following chart is a graphical representation of sectarian clash news items categorization published during 2004 by selected newspapers.

The following chart is a graphical representation of sectarian clash news items categorization published during 2005 by selected newspapers.

186 Pakistan Perspectives

The following chart is a graphical representation of Sectarian Clash news items categorization published during 2006 by selected newspapers.

Content analysis of news reporting The statistics indicates that the Daily Mashriq Quetta gave more coverage to sectarian clashes news than other two newspapers which were selected for content analysis. From incident to statements every aspect was covered carefully keeping in view importance of selection of words to selection of photos. Daily Bakhabar Quetta is also a local newspaper, but when it comes to the coverage of sectarian clashes daily Bakhabar gave less coverage than daily Mashriq but more coverage than daily Jang. Daily Jang though more popular and established newspaper than the other two but it gave less coverage to the news of sectarian violence, which verifies the general opinion that being part of Karachi based largest newspaper conglomerate, the paper is less sensitive about local issues and sets priorities according to its business interest.

Content analysis of editorial pages The results of content analysis of editorial pages of all three selected newspapers indicate that Daily Jang, Daily Mashriq and Daily Bakhabar tried to remain unbiased and avoid siding with any of the religious sect especially when sectarian issues were on the peak. They tried to calm down the issue and presented opinion with caution. The tone of the editorials remained sympathetic rather than critical. All three newspapers avoid sensationalized presentation of views. Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 187

Total of 33 editorials were published during 2003-2006 by selected newspapers out of which 17 (52%) editorials were sympathetic, 5(15%) harsh and 11(33%) were published as unbiased. When it comes to columns on editorial page, 28 columns were published during 2003- 2006, columns published as sympathetic were 17(47%), while harsh columns were 6(21%) and columns published as unbiased on editorial page were 9(32%).

188 Pakistan Perspectives

Editorials published by Daily Jang Quetta during 2003-2006 regarding sectarian clashes in Balochistan were 50% sympathetic, while 50% were harsh. Daily Jang Quetta has published 50% sympathetic columns, 25% columns were harsh, while 25% columns were unbiased.

Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 189

Editorials published by Daily Mashriq Quetta during 2003-2006 regarding sectarian clash in Balochistan were 53% sympathetic, 20% were harsh and 27% editorials published by Daily Mashriq were unbiased. Daily Mashriq Quetta has published 44% sympathetic columns, 17% columns were harsh, while 39% columns were unbiased published during 2003-2006.

190 Pakistan Perspectives

Editorials published by Daily Bakhabar Quetta during 2003-2006 regarding sectarian clash in Balochistan were 50% sympathetic, 6% were harsh and 44% editorials published by Daily Bakhabar were unbiased. Daily Bakhabar Quetta has published 50% sympathetic columns; 17% columns were harsh, while 33% columns were unbiased during 2003- 2006.

Sectarian Clashes and Public Opinion in Balochistan: A… 191

Findings & conclusion The purpose of the study was to study the issues related to increasing sectarian clashes in Balochistan with special reference to role and capacity of print media in addressing this issue. For this purpose the content analysis of three leading Urdu dailies for four consecutive years 2003-2006 was completed. Further to obtain the public perception regarding these clashes a survey was also conducted. Since both the techniques of data collection were employed having different objectives in mind, therefore, it is difficult to analyze the convergence and divergence effects of both the results. There are some points where the result of both complement each other and at certain points results of both sources contradict each other. For example 64% people are found contend with the coverage of sectarian issues on print media but the result of content analysis reflect that this issue occupied print media space only when any act of violence took place otherwise print media remains silent and indifferent. Similarly a vast majority of respondents believe that media can bridge the gap between the two sects and 50% of them believe that some clashes took place due to presence of religious media. The content analysis of the newspapers does not indicate any effort to bridge the differences on part of the newspapers. The other findings of the study on the basis of data analysis and interpretation suggest that sectarian clash is more a political phenomenon than religious. Data showed that 39% of the respondents believe that sectarian clash is political issue while 35% think that it is a religious issue and ethnicity is not a major cause of sectarian clash. The data also reveals that sectarian sensitivity exists throughout Pakistan. A great number of respondents (76%) believe that sectarian issue is not an indigenous issue, while 19% people think that it is a local issue. It has also been found that majority of people (56%) believe that sectarian clashes happen due to the political forces which support either of the sects. Most of the respondents hold Zia regime responsible for increase in sectarian violence in Pakistan. The data showed that 43% people were affected by sectarian prejudices in one or in other way. Regarding coverage of these clashes on print media, 64% people are satisfied with media coverage on sectarian clashes. However 36% people think that media is not responsibly augmenting sectarian issue. People believe that media can play a vital role by bridging the communication gap between the people of both sects however a large number of respondents (85%) think that foreign hand is involved in sectarian rift in Pakistan. The study reveals that 72% people anticipate religious harmony in future. 192 Pakistan Perspectives

The intensity of conflict is also proportional to lawlessness and absence of dialogue among the people of different sects. Reducing lawlessness can help in reducing conflict but to root out the problem there is a need to address the prevalent hatred among both sects for each other. Dialogue can play the foremost role in minimizing the sectarian conflict in any country including Pakistan. Unlike most of the Muslim countries Pakistan has a vibrant, and dynamic and most free media within the Muslim world it can harmony, between the different seats which is a dire need of the time. It appears that the sectarian split in Pakistan cannot be detached without practicing a policy of practical pragmatism. A policy of passive coexistence and settlement is vital so as to manage, if not resolve, sectarian conflicts in Pakistan. The repeated violence on sectarian grounds in Balochistan is closely linked with its geography, ethnicity, polity and most of all its tribal background vis-à- vis level of socio-economic development. In a region with only 28% literacy, print media has a limited role to play in conflict management and resolution. Similarly the two leading daily newspapers daily Jang and Mashriq had also faced a lot of pressure and violence from various political and religious forces for better coverage, in the past also. During Baloch and Pashtun conflicts for political and numerical domination in mid seventies both the newspapers adopted a policy of equal coverage.48 This careful option was later confronted by both the ethnic forces on the pretext that newspapers by giving equal coverage to them are trying to give their own verdict on the issue. The role of print media will remain limited unless the overall socio-economic level is improved. Commencement of FM Radio, however, can be seen as an alternative source if it is allowed to operate as community radio which also requires political will and a shift in policies to resolve the various issues Balochistan is confronting today including religious extremism, political discontentment and sectarian violence.

48 Seemi Naghmana Tahir, op.cit., p.359. Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Role of Nur Jahan: The Mughal Empress of India

Muhammad Zia-ud-Din*

Abstract The history of Nur Jahan is, in part, a story of ambition, power, military skill, and courtly endurance. Nur Jahan can easily be distinguished from any other comparable women of the medieval period like Raziyya Sultana, Rani Durgavati, Chand Bibi, and Mumtaz Mahal. By the exceptional good fortune of her circumstances, she married the most powerful man in India, and lived at a time of great cosmopolitan and international diversity. She had an exceptionally intimate relationship with her husband, Jahangir. As far as her role as Mughal empress is concerned, her personal abilities extended beyond politics and economics, into the areas of art and architecture, literature and religion, travel and gardening and were such that the range of her contributions to Indian culture remains almost unparalleled by any other person even today. Her interest in jewelry and textile design, verses which she wrote with superb wit and imagery, boundlessness and munificence of her charity, all endure as a dynamic and indisputable undercurrent in the Mughal heritage of India. ––––––––– Introduction The Mughal empire was one of the largest centralized states known in pre-modern world history. This empire was a dynamic and multifaceted entity in the sixteenth and seventeenth century and Nur Jahan was one of its most fascinating figure. Also known by her original name, Mehrunnisa, Nur Jahan remains the only queen, in the history of subcontinent, whose name was struck on the coin alongside that of the emperor. Nur Jahan ruled not only over the heart but also over the empire of Jahangir, and these were two very difficult territories to kept under control simultaneously. For the heart of Jahangir was as full of contradictions as the kaleidoscopic country that he ruled. Jahangir owes his long years of peaceful rule to Nur Jahan just as much as he owes his ill health and frailty to his habit of alcohol abuse. In this research paper descriptive and analytical methods have being used to bring into light the relevant facts.

* Dr. Muhammad Zia-ud-Din, Assistant Professor, Department of General History, Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science & Technology, Karachi. 194 Pakistan Perspectives

Early life Nur Jahan was born in 1577 A.D., near Qandahar, when her father Mirza Ghiyas Baig, after having some misfortune in Persia, fled with his family from Tehran to India. She was given the name of Mehrunnissa, a name which her future title of Nur Jahan has almost brought into oblivion. Mirza Ghiyas got some jagir (property) from Akbar and, on account of his hard work and honesty, he rose to the high position of diwan of Kabul. He rose further in rank, and continued in service later during Jahangir’s reign with the title Itimad-ud-Daullah or ‘pillar of the state’. In 1594 A.D., at the age of seventeen, Mehrunnisa was given in marriage to Ali Quli Khan Istajlu, a Persian adventurer. Ali Quli had been a safarchi, or table attendant, to Safawi monarch Shah Ismail-II of Persia, but on the Persian king’s assassination he fled through Qandahar to India.1 He was given the rank of a high noble in Bengal and also bestowed the title of Sher Afgan (the lion killer) by the Jahangir. Soon Jahangir came to know that Sher Afgan was an insubordinate and disposed to be rebellion. Consequently, Qutub-ud-Din Kokultash, the foster brother of Jahangir, and the new Governor of Bengal, was directed to chastise him. When Qutub-ud-Din went to carry out orders, he was killed by Sher Afgan who himself was put to death by the attendants of Qutub-ud-Din.2 In 1607 A.D., Sher Afgan’s widow Mehrunnissa and her little daughter Ladli Begum was brought to Agra as royal detainees. When she was merely a noblewoman at court, and until she was thirty-four years old, there was nothing in her life that gave an indication of how famous, or powerful, she would eventually become. In March 1611 A.D., Jahangir saw Mehrunnissa in the new year’s feast and married her on 25 May of the same year. Afterwards, Jahangir proclaimed her a partner in his powers and gave her the title of ‘Nur Mahal’ (light of the palace) and later on, she was given the title of ‘Nur Jahan’ (light of the world). Undoubtedly, she proved to be the light of the emperor’s eyes. Her inclusion in the harem introduced a new force into the life of the court. ‘Slowly but steadily she spread her influence to every nook and corner’.3

1 B.E Findly, Nur Jahan: Empress of Mughal India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.14. 2 V.D Mahajan, Mughal Rule in India (New Dehli: S. Chand & Company Ltd., 1992), p.128. 3 B.P Saksena, History of Shahjahan of Dehli (Allahabad: Central Book Depot., 1962), p.13. Role of Nur Jahan: The Mughal Empress of India 195

How far Jahangir was responsible for the murder of Sher Afgan? There has been a lot of controversy regarding the circumstances of the death of Sher Afgan and the marriage of her widow Mehrunnissa with Jahangir. Most of the historians are of the opinion that Prince Salim (Jahangir) loved Mehrunnissa and was responsible for the murder of her husband, Sher Afgan. This love story has a lot of prominence in Indian history. Dr. Beni Prasad, the author of his monumental work on Jahangir, writes that Prince Salim had never seen Mehrunnissa before 1611 A.D. He maintains that no contemporary Persian source has supported the view that Jahangir as a prince desired to marry Mehrunnissa, or Jahangir, in any way, was responsible for the murder of Sher Afgan. Likewise, the contemporary European travelers and missionaries are also silent on this point.4 It was purely an accident during the execution of an administrative issue in which Sher Afgan and Qutub-ud-Din, both were killed in a rival situation.

Nur Jahan’s personality and her dimensional role Nur Jahan complemented Jahangir’s shortcoming in many ways. She had a perfect balance between mind and heart. According to Jahangir Nur Jahan won his heart with her devotion.5 Nur Jahan married Jahangir at the age of 34. She gave him no heirs, yet Jahangir loved her so deeply and obsessively that he transferred his powers of sovereignty to her. With her natural beauty she combined the most fascinating manners and high intellectual attainments. Her quick wit, charming and refined conversation, elegant manners, graceful and dignified deportment and keen intelligence made her the most welcome companion in the circle of the ladies of rank and the royal family. Nur Jahan was fluent in many languages and was an excellent conversationalist. She came from a family that had a strong background in literary and scholarly accomplishments. She wrote poems and prose and opted the pseudonym of ‘Makhfi’ (the veiled one) as a poetess. Mughal women were physically confined behind the walls of a harem, lived behind a veil, and were thought of as being inconsequential in the country’s politics or even in their own social circles. The ladies of the harem did not generally participate in outdoor games both because of parda (veil) and the physical exertion involved. As a queen, Nur Jahan did not observe parda, her portraits too are probably after her own model. ‘Nur Jahan is probably the lone example among harem women who shot tigers and

4 Beni Prasad, History of Jahangir, Urdu Tr. Rehem Ali Hashmi (New Dehli: Taraqi-e-Urdu Bureau, 1984), p.180. 5 K.S Lal, The Mughal Harem (New Dehli: Aditya Prakashan, 1988), p.3. 196 Pakistan Perspectives lions’.6 She challenged the social and cultural conventions of her day and pushed them to the greatest limits with out breaking them. Nur Jahan had a preference for representational art perhaps reflecting the more emblematic art in her homeland, Persia, and also brought new subject matter into the Mughal fabric. She combined her artistic ideas with influences from the secular subjects coming in from Europe, creating many new paintings with subject matter that had not previously been rendered in Mughal India. Nur Jahan was a woman of great distinction and many interests; she excelled at playing musical instruments and singing. Her accomplishments made her an irresistible companion and her taste extended beyond the patronage of painting and architecture to the designing and creation of new patterns in palace interiors, room-decorations, gold ornaments, brocades, carpets, lace, gowns and dresses so that the fashion in women’s clothing adopted in her time were still in vogue.7 Women’s clothes also went through a change at this time because of Nur Jahan, who was responsible for bringing in a number of new materials and styles from all over the world. These new materials were for both the royalty and the populace. Many new patterns and stitches were invented by Nur Jahan. A particular brocade of pattern called nur-mahali, do-dami, panchatolia, badha, and kinari are still famous. A custom introduced by her, that is still current in India and Pakistan is the white floor cloth commonly known as ‘farsh-i- chandani’ (white floor sheet).8 The thrust of Nur Jahan’s innovation was on providing something that could be used by the rich and the poor alike. She was careful to bring out and introduce items that not only had a large group appeal but which were relatively inexpensive. Jahangir was a lover of fashion and new designs. His clothes and turbans are said to have been extremely more elaborate and luxurious than any of the other previous emperors. The new fashions and designs that he wore were accounted for during the time of his life with Nur Jahan. Nur Jahan was fond of arranging great feasts and had become a model for the royal ladies. She also cared for the poor and the dispossessed, and made the cause of orphan girls especially her own.9 She was supposed to be a social worker, a generous patron of many

6 Ibid., p.128. 7 G. Hambly, Cities of Mughal India: Dehli, Agra and Fatehpur Sikri (London: Paul Elek Productions Ltd., 1977), p.83. 8 Mohammad Yasin, A Social History of Islamic India 1605-1748 (Lucknow: D. W Publishers, 1958), p.41. 9 S. Crowe & S. Haywood, The Gardens of Mughul India (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972), p.92. Role of Nur Jahan: The Mughal Empress of India 197 needy suppliants, especially of dowry less girls. Through her influence the Mughal court was filled with great nobles from Persia.10 Nur Jahan’s mother Asmat Begum also invented ‘itr-e-gulab’ (rose perfume) which was named ‘itr-e-Jahangiri’11 and has been erroneously regarded as Nur Jahan’s invention. The Persian influence on the Mughal architecture, as in other spheres of contemporary life, had been mounting with the domination of Mirza Ghiyas Beg and his daughter, the Queen, Nur Jahan, in the court.12 Jahangir’s court, particularly under the influence of his imperious consort, Nur Jahan, patronized a culture, no doubt eclectic in character, in which the foreign especially the Persian element predominated.13 She supported and illustrated wall-carvings in the buildings with the different types of patterns and styles of embroidery. She was also responsible, almost single-handedly, for many artistic, architectural, and cultural achievements of the Jahangir era. Her cultural and artistic achievements, derived largely from the immense resources at her command, were also, in equal measure, due to her unflagging energy and the keenness of her aesthetic vision. Jahangir and his queen, Nur Jahan, made the famous Gardens of Nishat and Shalimar.14 Her architectural achievements include Nur Mahal Sarai at Jalandhar, the Moghul Gardens of Kashmir and Agra, and the tomb of her father Itmaduddaula, also in Agra. Nur Jahan built this tomb after her father’s death in January 1622 A.D. It took six years to finish the tomb and 1.35 million rupees (1,350,000) to pay for it. The tomb built was in her father’s gardens on the east bank of the Yamuna (Jamna) River across Agra. It was the first example of the use of white marble embellished with the precise inlay of precious stones into the surface of marble facing, and technically said to be ahead of even the construction of Taj Mahal. Nur Jahan also created many different gardens throughout the empire, both public and private. Unfortunately may have been lost with time. Keeping a garden healthy and tended for five hundred years is a task that is not easily

10 N. Manucci, Storia Do Mogor, Eng Tr. William Irvine, Mogul India, Vol.I (London: John Murray Albemarle Co. Ltd., 1906), p.164. 11 N.M Jahangir, Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, Eng Tr. Alexander Rojers, The Memoirs of Jahangir (New Dehli: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers (Pvt) Ltd., 1978), pp.270-71. 12 R. Nath, Colour Decoration in Mughal Architecture (India Pakistan) (Jaipur: The Historical Research Documentation Programme, 1989), p.27. 13 Sir J.N Sarkar & S.K Saraswati, Glimpses of Mughal Architecture (Calcutta: Gossain & Company, 1953), p.41. 14 R. Godden, Gulbadan: Portrait of a Rose Princess at the Mughal Court (New York: The Viking Press, 1981), 145. 198 Pakistan Perspectives accomplished. All that remains are accounts of what they would have looked like and what species they may have contained. Nur Jahan created a tradition in the gardens design of using water to accentuate the layout with fountains, pools and channels.

Her political role Nur Jahan was a woman of unusual ability. Acquiring a great ascendancy over her husband, she became the joint ruler of the kingdom and exercised political authority with intelligence, courage and astuteness. Jahangir was weakened by alcohol and asthma; by 1620 he could not dominate affairs of the court. Nur Jahan exercised a good influence on her husband and got mammoth power in the court. Her husband took on less and less responsibility as he sank further and further into clouds of opium smoke. She gained dominance at the court and soon became a powerful, resourceful and honored woman over a relatively short period of time. Her success raised her ambitions and, in course of time, her influence and active participation in state affairs increased. Nur Jahan was a woman of great judgment and, of a verity, worthy to be a queen. ‘Jahangir struck coins in her name, which had for symbol the twelve signs of the zodiac, and in her time these were current money’.15 The royal seal also contained her signature.16 This was the first time in Indian history that a woman had ever been allowed to do this. Jahangir’s heavy gold coin of unit 1000 muhar has now become world’s heritage and remains unrivalled world wide. Though the author is still unknown, his couplet about this gigantic decorated muhar is worth of being reproduced below: Ba Hukm Shah Jahangir yaft sad zewer Banam Nur Jahan Badshah Begum zar It means by the order of Jahangir, gold attained a hundred times its beauty when the name of Nur Jahan, the first lady of the court, was impressed upon it. All her relations and connections were raised to honor and wealth. Mirza Ghiyasuddin in consequences of his daughter’s marriage with the emperor was made Vakil-i-kul or prime-minister, and a commander of 6,000, 3,000 horse. He also received a flag and a drum, and was later allowed to beat his drum at court, which was a rare

15 N. Manucci, op.cit., p.162. 16 Sir J.N Sarkar, Mughal Polity (Delhi: Idarah-i-Adabiyat-e-Dehli, 1984), p.82. Role of Nur Jahan: The Mughal Empress of India 199 privilege.17 Nur Jahan’s relatives had been in high offices in the reign of Jahangir and Shah Jahan.18 Nur Jahan’s role in the rise of her family’s fortune was significant; it is true that before 1611 A.D., none of her family member held a provincial governorship under Jahangir, and between 1611 and 1627 A.D., about twelve of her family members held such posts.19 The significance of this family lies in their hold and dominance at the Mughal court as well as on Jahangir, as he writes in his Tuzuk that ‘I presented Itiqad Khan (Asaf Khan) with one of my special swords called Sar-andaz (thrower of heads)’.20 Likewise Sadiq Khan, the nephew of Itimad-ud-Dowllah, who was permanently employed as Bakhshi, was honored with the title of ‘Khan’. The family in general and Nur Jahan in particular also contributed to the extravagant lifestyle of both Jahangir and Shah Jahan; which inspired the subsequent use of the word ‘Moghal’ in the English language.21 There is no doubt that until Asaf Khan’s death in 1641 A.D, for over three decades, this obscure family from Iran wielded enormous power in the Mughal empire and exerted significant influence on the politics and culture of their time. It is said that Shia and Persian influence spread fast in Hindustan during the ascendancy of Nur Jahan’.22 In view of Nur Jahan’s influence which she exercised in the affairs of the state, many historians have recognized the domination of her small family clique during 1622-27 A.D; while others have postulated the existence of Nur Jahan’s junta for the period 1611-22 A.D. Junta, was an specific team which included Nur Jahan’s mother, Ismat Begum, her father, Itimadud Daulah, her brother, Asaf Khan and Jahangir’s second son, Prince Khurram23 who was married to Arjumand Banu Begum, daughter of Asaf Khan in 1612 A.D. This junta roused the jealousy of older nobles like Mahabat Khan and others. The entire Mughal nobility was divided into two factions: the adherents of Nur Jahan junta and their opponents.24 While the theory of Nur Jahan’s junta has rightly been disputed, it is difficult to deny the fact of her ascendancy during the last five years of Jahangir’s reign when

17 Abul Fazl, Ain-i-Akbari, Eng Tr. H. Balochmann (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Benga, 1927), p.573. 18 K.S Lal, op.cit., p.194. 19 B.E. Findly, op.cit., p.3. 20 N.M Jahangir, op.cit., p.203. 21 P. Pal, J. Leoshko, J.M Dye & S. Markel, Romance of the Taj Mahal (London: Thames and Hudson, 1989), p.24. 22 Mohammad Yasin, op.cit., p.163. 23 G.H.R Tillotson, Mughal India (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p.89. 24 S.A.I. Tirmizi, Edicts from the Mughal Harem (New Dehli: Idarah-i- Adabiyat-i-Dehli, 1979), pp.xii-xiii. 200 Pakistan Perspectives

‘she actively participated in the politics of her time as is evident from a number of hukms (royal orders) issued by her. These hukms had either of the two seals of Nur Jahan: one refers to her as queen-consort, while another mentions her as empress, which is quite significant in determining her ascendancy’.25 The power of junta was substantial and could be carried, as it often was, to extreme excess up to impossible advancement. Nevertheless, the group managed, by an intricate network of communication and vested interest, to promote their own concerns while at the same time protecting the king from unnecessary responsibility. According to Pelsaert Francisco, a Portuguese traveler during the Jahangir’s era, the junta worked as follows: If anyone with a request to make at Court obtains an audience or is allowed to speak, the King hears him indeed, but will give no definite answer of Yes or No, referring him promptly to Asaf Khan, who in the same way will dispose of no important matter without communicating with his sister, the Queen, … who regulates his attitude in such a way that the authority of neither of them may be diminished. Anyone then who obtains a favor must thank them for it, and not the King.26 Thence, ‘the first open indication of the new shuffling of political parties was given in December 1620 A.D., when Shahryar was betrothed to Ladli Begum. Jahangir’s incapable youngest son, henceforward became Nur Jahan’s candidate for heir ship to the imperial throne’.27 It is said that Nur Jahan tried her very best to marry Ladli Begum, first to Khusrau, Jahangir’s eldest, then to Khurram, but neither could be made to take an interest in Ladli. Shahryar was then an immature young man with dissolute inclinations, whose mother had been a concubine. The formal betrothal took place at Lahore to be followed by a wedding at Agra.28 Thereafter, the seed of trouble between her and Khurram was sown. It was naturally presumed that she would throw her

25 Ibid., p.xxxiv. 26 Pelsaert, The Remonstrantie of Francisco Pelsaert, Eng Tr. W.H Moreland and Geyl, P., as Jahangir’s India (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., 1925), pp.50-1. 27 Riaz-ul-Islam, Indo-Persian Relations (Lahore: Iranian Culture Foundation, 1970), pp.81-2. 28 The Cambridge History of India, Vol-IV (New Dehli: S. Chand & Company, 1957), p.168. Role of Nur Jahan: The Mughal Empress of India 201 influence on the side of her son-in-law.29 Khurram’s marriage with Arjumand Bano Begum (Mumtaz Mahal) daughter of Asaf Khan may have been the cause of some ill-feeling between Khurram and Nur Jahan. The interests of Nur Jahan and Asaf Khan were at variance; Asaf Khan supported the cause of his son-in-law Khurram and the energies of Nur Jahan were at work to promote the cause of her son-in-law Shahryar. Thereafter, they ceased to work in unison as their interests clashed.30 The situation has already become fluid as consequence of these marriages. Subsequently, Nur Jahan started to create difficulties for Khurram who was then tackling for the extension of the Mughal empire in Daccan, and have already earned from Jahangir the title of ‘Shah Jahan’ (the king of the world). In 1622 A.D., the news reached to Mughal Court that Shah Abbas-I of Persia have besieged Qandahar, which had already been, from hundred years, a bone of contention between Mughal and Safawid empires. Nur Jahan, now securely in power herself, with decisions for the administration of the empire almost totally in her hands, saw Qandahar as a way to get Shah Jahan into trouble. Consequently, Shah Jahan was ordered by Jahangir to proceed to Qandahar to aid in its defense. These orders were actually instigated by Nur Jahan who wanted to place him in a difficult situation. Shah Jahan was then left with no choice except that of rebellion. Emperor quickly retorted by giving the leadership of Qandahar campaign to his unskilled son Shahriyar and depriving Shah Jahan of his jagirs in Hissar and Doab.31 Soon Shah Jahan’s revolt was crushed and it seemed that his chances of ever regaining sufficient power to contest the succession had been irretrievably damaged.32 During this troublesome period, Nur Jahan remained busy in safeguarding her interest of getting the future throne to her son-in-law. It is true that Shah Jahan fell into rebellion gradually, and all that happened was mainly due to Nur Jahan’s nefarious policy of pushing him aside and forcing him out of the lines of power. In this tussle Mughal empire had to loose on two sides, one was Daccan and the other Qandahar. Nur Jahan, however, did not stop here. She also wanted to ruin General Mahabat Khan who apparently was a hurdle in her authority and

29 R.P Tripathi, Rise and Fall of the Moghal Empire (Allahbad: Central Book Depot., 1960), p.392. 30 Afzal Husain, The Nobility under Akbar and Jahangir, A Study of Family Groups (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1999), pp.188-89. 31 R.P Tripathi, op.cit., p.395. 32 I.H Qureshi, The Administration of the Mughal Empire (Karachi: The Director of Publications, University of Karachi, 1966), pp.7-8. 202 Pakistan Perspectives efforts of grasping the throne for Shahriyar. To implement her ambitious designs, she tried to kneel down and humiliate Mahabat Khan in numerous ways and finally she accused him of embezzlement and disloyalty. He was called upon to clear his position. Under these circumstances, uprising of Mahabat Khan in 1626 A.D., yielded disastrous results. Mahabat Khan had the impunity to tell the empire in no ambiguous words that it did not befit a man to become subordinate to a woman. Finding his advice insufficient to move the emperor, eventually, the situation became so bad that Mahabat Khan even had to capture the emperor when the imperial camp was crossing River Jehlum for Kashmir. Nur Jahan then went to Mahabat Khan and made peace with him; Jahangir was released but died soon afterwards.33 The death of Jahangir on 29 October 1627 A.D., brought the question of the succession to the fore. Nur Jahan, in expectation of the crisis, had for a long time been making almost frantic efforts to perpetuate her domination. In a final bid to retain her power, Nur Jahan ‘hurriedly sent a messenger to her son-in-law, Shahriyar, to prepare for a struggle, and even tried to imprison her brother. But Asaf Khan was quite alert, and proved too astute to fall a prey to her machinations’.34 It may be mentioned here that on the eve of the death of Jahangir’s son Prince Pervaiz on 18 October 1626 A.D., Shah Abbas-I, the Safawid ruler of Persia, had sent a condolatory embassy under Takhta Beg with four letters; two were for Jahangir, one for Prince Shahriyar and the most interesting one was addressed to Nur Jahan Begum. This letter which makes a brief mention of recent Persian victories against the Turks, condolence over Pervaiz’s demise, and finally, making a reference to his (Shah’s) close friendship with Jahangir, says: If your majesty were to consider this House (Persian Dynasty) as your own and were to assign to servants of this dynasty any business at this end, it would further augment mutual amity and union.35 This is a unique letter, being addressed by a king to a foreign queen; the only one of its kind in Indo-Persian state correspondence. The letter also indicates the understanding of Shah Abbas towards Nur Jahan’s dominant position in the Mughal empire.

33 S.F Mahmud, A Concise History of Indo-Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.151. 34 B.P Saksena, op.cit., p.57. 35 Riaz-ul-Islam, A Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations, Vol. I (Tehran: Iranian Culture Foundation, 1979), p.220. Role of Nur Jahan: The Mughal Empress of India 203

At the time of political crisis in 1627 A.D., after the death of Jahangir, Shahriyar, at the instigation of Nur Jahan, proclaimed himself emperor at Lahore. In these unacceptable circumstances Asaf Khan played a very important role in securing the succession for his son-in- law, Shah Jahan. After his accession in January, 1628, Shah Jahan confirmed Asaf Khan in the post of wazir/vakil-i-kul (prime minister) which he held till his death in 1641 A.D.36 Nur Jahan’s power came to an end after Shah Jahan became the emperor. She worked against the interests of Shah Jahan in the lifetime of Jahangir and after his death for the intention of lifting up Shahriyar to the throne. If a man had done it, he would have paid the last penalty and been executed, but Nur Jahan was given a handsome pension and treated with consideration. She also had the good sense of retiring completely from the political arena. Nur Jahan had ruled India for nearly sixteen years and lived afterwards for another eighteen years, till 1645 A.D., when she died at Lahore and was buried by the side of her husband Jahangir. Yet we know almost nothing about this long period of her life. We have general information that she never wore any color except white after Jahangir’s death, and that her days were spent in extending charity to the needy and the poor. However, there is one powerful testimony to recall those days, it is probably her tomb.

Conclusion No women had wielded more power and for such a long time in Indian history as Nur Jahan. She played a hefty role in influencing and shaping the Mughal empire, which encompassed almost entire modern-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and a massive chunk of northern and central India. The manner, in which Nur Jahan came in Indian history, as only a widow with a child, to don the robes of an empress, is worth noticing. A vast change can be observed in Nur Jahan’s circumstances, from being the wife of a Persian soldier to an wife of the emperor, on her way to become the most powerful woman of the Mughal dynasty. The empress Nur Jahan was not formally a partner in sovereignty; she was neither enthroned nor crowned but she took an active part in the politics of the empire and became quite powerful; her influence can be felt in every segment of her era. In fact, she was the real sovereign, the power behind Jahangir’s throne. She was able to influence political decisions, coins, designs in materials, architecture, the structure and layouts of gardens, traded with foreign countries, owned ships that

36 A. Dadvar, Iranians in Mughal Politics and Society (1606-1658) (New Dehli: Gyan Publishing House, 2000), p.89. 204 Pakistan Perspectives plied the Arabian Sea routes and influenced many other aspects of Mughal life as well. Nur Jahan, was in contrast to her ambitious also mother to orphans of the poor, a leader of female society and generous to the needy people. Her ambition to rule the empire and her intrigues to safeguard her dominance created troubles during the last few years of Jahangir’s reign. To some extent; the reaction to the rise of the family of Nur Jahan, the rivalry among princes, and groups of court nobles, all helped to shake the stability of the Mughal empire.37 Nevertheless, she proved herself more than a match for the ablest personnel and politicians of her age. The facts stated above leads to the conclusion that Nur Jahan’s role at the Mughal court was immense. Once, Jahangir said that Nur Jahan was wise enough to conduct the business of state, and additionally, Jahangir used to say ‘that he had handed her the country in return for a cup of wine and a few pieces of mutton’.38 She reaped as a widow what she had sown as the empress. Her distress at the death-bed was a measure of her disillusionment with destiny. She died wiser than she was at any stage of her ascendancy.39

37 Afzal Husain, op.cit., p.10. 38 S.M Ikram, History of Muslim Civilization in India and Pakistan (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 2000), p.384. 39 Munshi Lal, Mughal Glory (Delhi: Vanguard Books (Pvt.) Ltd., 1988), p.78. Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Notes

The Musaddas of Hali – a Reinterpretation

* Syed Munir Wasti

Whereas there has been a revival of interest in Hali‟s famous poem titled Musaddas-i-madd-u jazr-i-Islam, commonly called the Musaddas – as evidenced by two1 recent translations, i.e., that by Christopher Shackle and Jawed Majeed 1997 (called „Shackle-Majeed‟ henceforth) and the one by Syeda Saiyidain Hameed [2003], this has not been accompanied by a concomitant trend to hail Hali as a precursor of Islamic renaissance or revival in South Asia. There appears to be a sinister attempt to tone down his revolutionary or revivalist role and even to show him as a docile acceptor of the imperial status quo. The two translations have been reviewed by the present writer in Pakistan Perspectives Vol.9, No.2, July-December 2004; Vol.11, No.1, January-June 2006, where the idiosyncratic approach of the translators has been analyzed. The two translations are marked by the remarkable omission of the final „arz-i- hal‟ or petition to the Holy Prophet on the grounds that it was a later addition and not organically related to the original poem. This, too, is a false assumption. If the original poem ended on a note of gloom and despair, then for a Muslim there is always hope by throwing oneself at the threshold of the Holy Prophet and pleading for his assistance to his beleaguered community. It appears that the translators wish to ignore or minimize this pivotal role of the Holy Prophet and to show that the Muslims have arrived at a dead-end devoid of any remedy, spiritual succour or spark of hope. The degenerate condition of the Muslims [as described by Hali] came about as a result of the Muslims abandoning the truths and tenets of their faith. If they are to reclaim their glorious heritage and continue their divinely-ordained mission, this could only be

* Dr. Syed Munir Wasti, former Chairman, Department of English, University of Karachi. 1 Hali’s Musaddas: the Flow and Ebb of Islam translated with a critical introduction by Christopher Shackle and Javed Majeed (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997). The other translation is Hali’s Musaddas: a story in verse of the ebb and tide of Islam by Syeda Saiyidain Hameed (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2003). 206 Pakistan Perspectives done by a return to their religion and its fundamentals. But a „conspiracy of silence‟ engulfs this vital point. The impression created is that the Muslims were and are doomed to a state of perpetual subjugation and black despair. In the nineteenth century, there was also a fundamentalist revival among various Hindu groups resulting in the emergence and establishment of the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj, the Dev Samaj, and the Prarthana Samaj – all of whom wished to restore Hinduism to its purity as they imagined it to be. No prescient pundit – political or other – predicted that all such movements were foredoomed to failure. But this proclamation of despair is attributed to Hali so that the soul-stirring self- realization on the part of dormant Muslims should not pose a threat to anyone, nor result in a cohesive movement based on unified religious identity. The two introductions [of 1879 and 1886] to the Musaddas indicate, in truly poetical terms, the „growth of a poet‟s mind‟ in the Wordsworthian sense. In the second Introduction, Hali clearly states that his purpose is prescriptive and not descriptive alone. We quote from the translation of Shackle-Majeed: „Such thoughts [that the Muslims are aware of their predicament and working for its removal] have been strengthened by the inspiration provided by some friends, and a supplement suitable to the requirements of the present situation has been added to the end of the original Musaddas’. This makes it clear that Hali was not indulging in a disparate diagnosis of the ills of the Muslim ummah but was also a capable physician who could prescribe the antidote needed by the „sick man of India‟ to revive his flagging spirits. Hali prefaces his second Introduction by quoting this Persian verse: Hadis-i-dard-i-dilawaiz dastaney hast Ki zauq beesh dihad chun daraz tar gardad

[The mention of a tale of heartfelt suffering Increases the desire to know its end the longer it grows!]

As Iqbal said in his famous 1930 address: „In times of crisis, it is Islam that has come to the help of the Muslims and not vice versa‟. The „arz-i-hal‟, far from being „prosaic‟ (Shackle-Majeed p.80), is a poignant but powerful plea to the Holy Prophet for his intercession to awaken again the dormant souls of the Muslims so as to regain their lost glory. It is remarkable that the Muslim political renaissance began within the lifetime of Hali [d.1914]. Within a few decades, the Muslims, influenced by a fellow poet-seer [Iqbal] and a genuine leader [Jinnah] had achieved their separate homeland with the apparently invincible imperialists The Musaddas of Hali – a Reinterpretation 207 departing in defeat and disgrace. This brilliant triumph of the Muslims negates the despondent tone that the three translators wish to convey by „stopping‟ the poem prior to the „arz-i-hal.‟ No matter what material advancement has been made by the West, it remains spiritually undernourished. But for Muslims, fair or foul, there is always recourse to the Holy Prophet. As Hali himself writes:

There is no strategy to remedy our [condition] Yes! There is your prayer which is acceptable to God.

The negative role of Jawed Majeed in supporting this false and fallacious argument is most objectionable. Similarly, the misinterpretation of Sayyaidain Hameed, divesting the term „quom‟ to a non-political entity and reducing it to a caste like telis [oil-pressers] etc., is deliberate distortion. In this essay, wherever the terms „nation‟ and „national‟ have been used or quoted, the meaning is synonymous with „Muslims‟ and „Islamic‟. The „arz-i-hal‟ written in the form of a ghazel does not indicate Hali‟s disapproval of its strictures but in his capable hands it became a remarkable instrument for the enunciation of the universal message of Muslim revival. Hali‟s study of the contemporary degeneration of Muslims is not confined to South Asia but takes for its purview the entire Muslim world. It is obvious that he was advocating universal, not partial, Muslim revival. As Aziz Ahmad2 writes in the introduction of the book Muslim self-statement in India and Pakistan 1857-1968, „[Hali] wrote his famous Musaddas-i-madd-u jazr-i-Islam, popularly known as the Musaddas-i-Hali which ushered in the era of political and pan-Islamic poetry in Urdu. It…has a nostalgic, revivalistic strain extolling the greatness of the message and the role of Islam historically interpreted; it ends with a strain of hope‟. The same writer, Aziz Ahmad, in his Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964 states: „the Muslim community had only to strive harder and more persistently, to regain the heights of the past….‟ The poem ends with an invocation to God to guide the Muslim community, to teach itself to prepare itself for a better and happier future for the sake of its Prophet who came as a blessing to all mankind…‟.3

2 Aziz Ahmad, Muslim Self-statement in India and Pakistan 1857-1964, Wiesbaden, 1970, p.12. 3 Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.100. 208 Pakistan Perspectives

An early critical account highlights the political revivalist nature of the poem: „It is perhaps for the first time that a complete history of the rise and fall of the Muslims had been presented to them in the most personal and direct way‟.4 The same writer, M. Jamil Tahir, writes: „The Musaddas….took the country by storm….Its stanzas are often quoted by the speakers on political platforms or preachers on the pulpit…‟.5 The famous scholar Moulvi Abdul Haq, writing about the Musaddas in the 1930s, has this to say about the revivalist element in the poem: „Although Hali has described the degeneration of the Muslims under a pall of gloom that brings forth our tears, he still in an Arab spirit [of resilience] wishes to reform this ruined state and rebuild it anew‟.6 The eminent critic, Malik Ram, in his study of Hali, has this pertinent observation to make about the Musaddas: „[Hali] dilates upon the achievements of yore and the lasting contribution made by them to world civilization and culture. He ends up with their present degeneration and impotence which is the result of their having gone astray from the path chalked out by the teachings of Islam and their Prophet. He exhorts them to bestir themselves and mend their ways and return to the path of righteousness and morality‟. 7 After this soul- searching, the way ahead was open. In the introduction to his selection of Hali‟s poetry and prose, Professor Hamid Ahmad Khan states that Hali was basically a „teacher of morality‟ [mu‘allim-i-akhlaq] and the purpose of his writing an elegiac poem on the Muslim way of life [the Musaddas] was to restore the standards of their morality to erstwhile glory. This glory was best manifest when Muslims were in charge of their destiny and not subject to the decrees of others.8 A descendant of Hali, Saleha Abid Husain, in her memoir writes that the impact of the Musaddas on the Muslim public was electrifying. Preachers used its moral instruction in their sermons and national leaders used its message to vivify their listeners….‟ The Musaddas was a beacon-light that summoned a demoralized nation to its original source of strength and enlightenment….its message was universal and addressed across all shades of Muslim opinion.9 The mass appeal of the Musaddas

4 M. Tahir Jamil, Hali’s Poetry: a study, Bombay, 1938, p.52. 5 Ibid., p.82. 6 Abdul Haq, Afkar-i-Hali, Karachi, 1976, p.112. 7 Malik Ram, Hali, Delhi, p.56. 8 Hamid Ahmad Khan, Armaghan-i-Hali, Lahore, 1971, p.25. 9 Saleha Abid Husain, Yadgar-i-Hali, Delhi, 1975, p.213 [1st edition 1949]. The Musaddas of Hali – a Reinterpretation 209 was to galvanize the Muslims towards restoration of their lost sovereignty. In his appealing address to the Muslims, writes Ijaz Ahmad Khan, Hali reminds one of Attar and Sanai, Omar Khayyam and Saadi and Ghalib. By reading the Musaddas, one receives the impression that Hali is at once a statesman, a critic, a moralist, an eloquent speaker, a teacher and a courteous counsellor.10 In his magisterial survey of Urdu literature, Dr Muhammad Sadiq writes about Hali in the context of the Aligarh Movement of Syed Ahmad Khan. He writes: „It was Sayyid Ahmad‟s mission that actually awoke him from his dogmatic slumber, filled him with moral earnestness, and made him the poet of the Islamic Renaissance in India……It [Musaddas] took the public by storm and ran through six editions…in different parts of India‟.11 The editor of the definitive Kulliyat-i-Nazm-i-Hali, Dr Iftikar Ahmad Siddiqui writes unequivocally: „The Musaddas is the fountainhead of our national life and national poetry‟.12 Dr. Anwar Sadeed in his monumental study, Urdu adab ki tehreekein, sees the role of Hali as being part of the Aligarh movement.13 In his authoritative study, Tahrik-i-azadi mein Urdu ka hissa, Dr. M. Aqeel states that the Musaddas paved the way for Muslim reform by analyzing the causes of its decay. The Aligarh movement was successful because of the Musaddas and not the other way round. Certainly, the opinion of Dr. Aqeel holds more weight. The Musaddas caused the intellectual growth of Islamic thought and this was its greatest contribution.14 Sir Abdul Qadir in his series of lectures on prominent personalities of Urdu literature does not dilate on the excellences of the Musaddas stating merely that it is unrivalled.15 Dr. Ghulam Mustafa Khan mentions in the events of 1879 the publication of the poem. He quotes a letter written by Sir Syed to Hali appreciating the achievement. The reference by Sir Syed to his desire to

10 Ijaz Ahmad Khan, Hali – Musaddas ke ainey mein, in Hali Number, Allama Iqbal College magazine, Karachi, n.d., pp.285-86. 11 Muhammad Sadiq, A History of Urdu Literature (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.347. 12 Iftikhar Ahmad Siddiqui, Kulliyat-i-nazm-i-Hali, Lahore, 1967, Vol.1, p.62. 13 Anwar Sadeed, Urdu adab ki tehreekein, Karachi, 1999, pp.295-349. 14 Moinuddin Aqeel, Tahrik-i-Azadi mein Urdu ka Hissa, Lahore, 2008, pp.185-88. 15 Abdul Qadir, Prominent Personalities of Urdu Literature, Lahore, 1921, p.21. 210 Pakistan Perspectives have the poem sung by professional female singers is not in good taste keeping in view the sanctity of its contents.16 Dr. Abid Hussain in his essay on Hali writes: „The Musaddas is such a poem that gives new life to dead nations….the poet found his nation and the nation its poet. Now Hali would devote his life to his nation‟. 17 The nation responded with renewed energy and worked towards its realizable goal of freedom. In the earliest survey of Urdu literature by Ram Babu Saksena [1927], the author has the following to say regarding of the Musaddas: It was a revelation, a landmark in the literary history of Urdu language. A new star swam into the ken of Urdu poets. It gave a lead to the national and patriotic poems of India…..The poem was printed and distributed…and sung in assemblies, pulpits, mosques, and conferences‟.18 Dr. Mohammad Hasan, writing about Thought Patterns of 19th century literature of North India expresses this opinion about the Musaddas: The most important poetic achievement symptomatic of the contemporary mood was Hali‟s….Musaddas……It begins with a description of the glory of the past and traces it to the present downfall of the Muslims reminding them that it was Islam which led the battle for social equality, human emancipation by transmitting the knowledge of Greece and Rome to the Dark Ages. The second part shows the way out of the pervading gloom and despondency... [the Muslims‟] future could still be bright. Shibli‟s political poetry and Iqbal‟s and Chakbast‟s poems were the contribution of Hali, though greatly enriched and enlarged.19 In his essay written for the Urdu Encyclopedia of Islam, Moulvi Abdul Haq writes about the Musaddas thus: „In this poem, Hali has presented an impressive picture of the lost glory of the Muslims….The decline of the Muslims [presented here] creates a great turbulence in the heart…No other poem of the 19th century was so popular… [Hali] was the best representative of Muslim culture in India‟. 20 Muslim culture

16 Ghulam Mustafa Khan, Hali ka zehni irtiqa, Lahore, 1960, p.127. 17 Abid Husain, Insha’iyat, Lahore, n.d., pp.62-4. 18 Ram Babu Saksena, A History of Urdu Literature, Allahabad, 1940, pp.215- 16 [1st edition 1927]. 19 Muhammad Hasan, Thought Patterns of XIX century Literature in North India, Karachi, 1990, pp.108-09. 20 Abdul Haq, Urdu Encyclopedia of Islam, Lahore, Vol.7, pp.835-40. The Musaddas of Hali – a Reinterpretation 211 manifested its finest flowering when it was supported by political power. Hali was mourning the decline of Muslim culture because of the erosion of Muslim political power. The political character of the Musaddas is thus brought out by Aziz Ahmad: „The work revolutionized Urdu poetry by introducing into it the dynamics of Pan-Islamic revivalism and paved the way for Urdu and Indo-Persian political poems which became a powerful means of religio-political propaganda in Muslim India‟.21 In his book 22 Dr. Moin Ahsan Jazbi traces out the gradual evolution of Hali from a quiescent follower of the sulh-i-kul [universal peace] policy of Sir Syed to an independent voice articulating a revolutionary stance vis-à-vis the British. He writes that after 1857 Hali was more and more concerned about the state of Muslim decline and he devoted himself [especially after 1874] to the affairs of the Muslims. The revivalist thought of Shah Wali Allah and Syed Ahmad Barelvi influenced him. Hali even uses the English word „nation‟ in his Urdu poetry for Muslims. Here we see the early appearance of the „two-nation‟ theory. Hali relates the link between Indian Muslims and the early Muslim Arabs and expresses pride in the achievements of the Abbasid rulers as though he was their subject. Hali‟s indignation rises at seeing his nation [the Muslims] at the mercy of their conqueror. He urges a movement for freedom saying that no nation can progress in a state of slavery. His pan-Islamic sympathies are also seen in later poems composed on the occasion of the Balkan Wars and the Tripoli War. By favouring the Hindus at the cost of the Muslims [as in the annulment of the Partition of Bengal], the British had shown that they could never be sincere to the Indian Muslims and, by extension, to the larger Muslim world. Frances W. Pritchett also brings out Hali‟s „strong nationalistic stance‟.23 Francis Robinson in an essay defines the Musaddas in the context of Pan-Islamic revivalism.24

21 Aziz Ahmad, Encyclopedia of Islam [2nd edition], Leiden, 1993, Vol.3, p.93. 22 Moin Ahsan Jazbi, Hali ka siyasi shu’ur, Lahore, 1962, pp.183-256. 23 Frances W. Pritchett, Nets of Awareness: Urdu Poetry and its Critics, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.43. 24 Francis Robinson, The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol.8 [1998], pp.271-89. See also his Separatism among Indian Muslims: the Politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims 1860-1923, Oxford University Press, 1993, p.124 where he writes that the Musaddas „awakened generations of Indian Muslims to the decline of their political influence‟. 212 Pakistan Perspectives

A detailed assessment of the pivotal role of Hali and the Musaddas in fanning the fires of Muslim historical and political awareness has been given by Ikram.25 He equates the importance of the Musaddas with that of the foundation of the Aligarh College. Even Sir Syed has said that when God asks him about the good he did on the earth he would reply: “I got Hali to write the Musaddas, and nothing more!” Ikram mentions a paragraph written by Hali some six or seven years after the appearance of the Musaddas in 1879. Hali himself is quoted as saying: But really the fame and popularity achieved by this poem in six years is truly amazing… In this short space of time, this poem has spread on all sides and in all directions of the country. It has run into seven editions. Its stanzas are read out in many educational institutions. Many people on reading it break down and shed tears. It is quoted by religious preachers in their sermons… Peter Hardy, writing about the Muslims of British India, refers to the Musaddas as an evocation „of Indian Muslim nostalgia for the time when Islam was the great world force‟. No doubt the memories of past greatness revived the feeling of longing for their restoration.26 The famous savant Hafiz Mahmud Shirani, in an essay on the Musaddas, gives this opinion on its revivalist character: „[The poem] created a tumult among the Muslims. In every house, it was quoted. It woke up those asleep and impelled the awake to action‟.27 In the Tarikh-i-nazm-o-nasr-Urdu [1938] by Agha Muhammad Baqir, this is stated about the Musaddas: This is that composition of Hali which has retained till today its early popularity. It is the basis of national poetry in India…It can be called an inspired book. It is an address to the Muslims to rise up and regain their lost glory…..28 Hali‟s grandson, Khwaja Ghulam-us-Saiyidain, in an introduction to an edition of the Musaddas, writes as follows: After 1857, there was no cohesive movement that could reorganize the Muslims….Hali became the voice of revival

25 Shaikh Mohammad Ikram, Mauj-e-Kausar, Lahore, 2007, pp.123–28. 26 Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge, 1972, p.120. 27 Hafiz Mahmud Shirani, Maqalat, Vol.3, Lahore, 1969, p.325. 28 Agha Muhammad Baqir, Tarikh nazm-o-nasr-i-Urdu, Lahore, 1938, pp.171-172. The Musaddas of Hali – a Reinterpretation 213

who reached out to the masses. This was done by his immortal Musaddas….29 The famous professor of Urdu at Aligarh University, Aal-i- Ahmad Surur, in an address titled Yadgar-i-Hali, makes these insightful observations on the Musaddas: The Musaddas is the sum-total of Hali‟s creative faculties, his religious foresight and his life-blood [khun-i-jigar]. It is the first lengthy poem in Urdu and the foundation-stone of national poetry…..The Musaddas is a religious poem….. It was written only for Muslims…..By virtue of its great subject [Muslim revival] and the perpetual truth of its contents, it has become imperishable….It contains the full history of Islam stressing those aspects that are worthy of pride. The Holy Prophet‟s life and teachings are put forward in a style unmatched. The life of the early Muslims, the greatness of Islamic culture, promotion and its patronage has been realistically presented without trying to sermonize. The control of feeling creates its great effect….He realizes from what great height his community has fallen. He holds a mirror to Muslim society….Hali promotes a mental revolution initially. …. Hali was the forerunner of Iqbal.30 This is indeed a perceptive tracing out of the path of revolution as envisaged by Hali. Every revolution is fired by an ideology and in this case the ideology is Islam. It is Islam which comes as a great liberator of humans from mental and physical shackles and takes them to unrealized glory. According to Dr. Ghulam Husain Zulfiqar, Sir Syed paid attention to the uplift of the Muslims as a community. Hali‟s Musaddas presented the past as a glorious preamble to the future uplift of the Muslims. This past glory was unique to the Muslims so the future unborn glory would also be unique to the Muslims.31 In his critical analysis of Urdu poetry, Idris Siddiqui states that the Musaddas is „the torchlight of our national poetry.‟ The glorious past beckons to a glorious future. The torch ignited by Hali led to a fiery

29 Khawaja Ghulam-us-Saiyidain, Introduction to the Musaddas, Lahore, 1973, pp.10-11. 30 Aal-e-Ahmad Surur, Tanqid kya hai aur doosray mazamin, Delhi, 1959 [5th edition], pp.25-30. 31 Ghulam Husain Zulfiqar, Urdu sha’iri ka siyasi aur samaji pasmanzar, Lahore, 1998, pp.350-67. 214 Pakistan Perspectives blaze in his Shikoh-i-Hind written after the Musaddas stressing the separate distinction of Indian Muslims.32 After quoting from the „arz-i-hal‟, the famous Urdu man-of- letters, Abdul Majid Daryabadi, expresses this concise verdict: „If immortality is not for such poetry, then what is it for?‟33 It will be seen from the various quotations given above by the most eminent critics of Urdu literature that the primary aim of Hali was not to write an elegiac poem lamenting the downfall and decline of Muslim might and glory but to indicate to the „fallen angels‟ the road to recovery and revival. The political message of the poem is obvious. Islam is not a personal matter of the individual but embraces all aspects of life on earth. The flourishing of Islam and its development of the vast range of arts and sciences could only be done in a state of independence from foreign control. In spite of the temporary peace resulting from the British control of India for their own interests, Islam could never rise to its previous state of glory if it was subjected to external control fulfilling the agenda of a foreign power. The message of Hali to the Muslims was to break out of this state of subjection and regain their former distinction. Spain under the Muslim rulers was taken to unimaginable heights of advanced civilization whereas the British government in India reduced its status from an empire to a colony and did nothing to nurture its indigenous heritage or genius. The popularity of Hali‟s poem among the masses has been repeatedly stressed. It was the beginning of an Islamic renaissance in South Asia which, impelled by the anguished cries of a fellow poet Muhammad Iqbal in his Shikwa and Jawab-e-Shikwa, mobilized the masses to the fulfillment of their destiny in the shape of a new Muslim state.

32 Idris Siddiqui, Urdu sha’iri ka tanqidi ja’iza, Karachi, 1985, pp.351-55. 33 Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Maqalat, Lahore, 1948, p.226. Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Notes

India and Pakistan: Together Forging a New Way Forward

Huma Naz Siddiqi Baqai, Hashir Ibne Irshad, * Jerome Joseph, Simrit Kaur & Robert E. McNulty

For too long the people of Pakistan and India have been held hostage to a conflict that should have been resolved decades ago. As a result, countless lives have been lost, millions of people have been kept in a state of insecurity and poverty, economic opportunities have been squandered, and the goodwill of cultural exchanges has been sacrificed. This sorry state of affairs has global implications, especially since both countries are nuclear powers. Too much ransom has been paid. The time has come to forge a new way forward, based on direct people-to-people cooperation that serves the mutual benefit of both countries, the region, and the world. With this mind, we, the five authors of this essay, came together for a week at Bentley University in Massachusetts, USA, to discuss how we in business and academia could work to advance peace at the direct people-to-people level. What follows are our initial thoughts.

A dire situation The current state of affairs in our countries, and especially Pakistan, is critical. For the last three years the economy of Pakistan has crept along at under 4%, while according to the United Nations, about half of its population lives in poverty. India has been growing more than twice as fast, but according to the most recent World Bank statistics

* Prof. Huma Naz Siddiqi Baqai, Associate Professor and Chairperson, Social Science Department, Institute of Buiness Administration, Karachi, Pakistan; Prof. Hashir Ibne Irshad, Assistant Professor of Finance, FAST National University and Head, Fast Consulting, Islamabad, Pakistan; Prof. Jerome Joseph, Senior Professor of Personnel and Industrial Relations, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India; Prof. Simrit Kaur, Professor of Public Policy, Faculty of Management Studies, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India; Prof. Robert E. McNulty, Director of Programs and Executive Director, Centre for Business Ethics, Bentley University, Waltham, Massachusetts, USA and Executive Director, Applied Ethics, Inc.

216 Pakistan Perspectives approximately 32% of India’s population lives below the poverty line.1 Given India’s population of 1.2 billion, that number remains unacceptably high. Both countries suffer from widespread corruption, an extremely unequal distribution of wealth, and scarcity of food, water and housing. And yet, rather than treating poverty as our common enemy, we pour our precious resources into maintaining two of the largest armies in the world. To secure advantages, our countries have fought wars directly or by proxy, indulged in propaganda campaigns, and rarely missed an opportunity to impede constructive relations. While for decades, through technology and international trade, the world has seemed to shrink, India and Pakistan have only grown farther apart. And for what we lacked in authentic knowledge and understanding of each other, we have filled in with stereotypes and conspiracy theories. After so many wars and battles, both countries have repeatedly awoken to the need to move beyond conflict. On five occasions over the last half century, we have pulled back from the brink by engaging in peace talks. High level talks have been held in October 2003 when Pakistan and India entered the composite dialogue, at the time of the Agra Summit of 2001, the Lahore declaration of 1999, Simla Agreement of 1972, and Tashkent Agreement of 1966. Whenever it seemed that cooler heads might prevail, the peace dialogues were disrupted by skirmishes, adventurism, acts of terrorism by non-state actors, and the failures of internal politics of both countries. Time and again, we have found ourselves paralyzed by inertia, as well as a lack of vision and the courage to seize the opportunities for peace. However, if history teaches us anything, it is that if we don’t move forward, we will slide backwards into our habitual mistrust. And with every new failure, the wounds to our memories deepened and the chasm of distrust widened, until our relations reached their lowest ebb after Mumbai attacks. The time for wake up calls has long since passed. If we have any concern for the upcoming generation, we must not pass on to them this miserable condition, especially when healthy Pakistan-India relations have so much to offer.

A renewed push for peace Some analysts interpreted certain recent developments in Pakistan-India political, military, economic, and cultural relations as portending of a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s policies toward India. India too has been

1 http://go.worldbank.org/ZUIBUQT360

India and Pakistan: Together Forging a New Way Forward 217 reciprocating. A notable example occurred recently when a group of Pakistan journalists were invited to participate in a tour of India and a few weeks prior to that, the second Aman Ki Asha Pakistan-India Economic Conference was held under the joint sponsorship of the Jang Group Pakistan and the Times of India. These are steps in the right directions. However, it is time to move beyond tepid ‘Confidence Building Measures’ and seek a real, full, and lasting peace between Pakistan and India. Why? The benefits of peace are too numerous to list, but let’s mention just a few.  Economic: The most obvious and tangible benefits of peace are economic. Peace is essential for our two countries to realize their economic potential. Over the last decade in regions around the globe, we have seen a strong trend toward free trade and economic integration and highly positive benefits. For example, after the countries of Canada, the United States, and Mexico ratified the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), trade more than quadrupled, from about $297 billion in 1993 to $1.6 trillion in 2009.2 While both India and Pakistan have established free-trade agreements with some of our neighbors, we lack one with each other. And yet, according to some economists, a functioning free-trade agreement between our countries could lead to a twenty-fold increase in bilateral trade. Add to this the expected increase in bilateral investment, and the economic benefits to our economies cold be enormous. Given the extreme poverty that afflicts so many of our compatriots, we should be working vigorously to seize this opportunity.  Security: We have been too ready to resort to military actions when issues between our countries could be better resolved through diplomacy. However, especially now that both nations are nuclear powers, we can no longer afford to have any serious miscommunications or needless provocations. There are problems in every community and the same is true between countries. Yet, based on the lessons of countries from South Africa to Northern Ireland, we now understand better how to move from states of conflict to peace. These lessons should not be lost in the efforts to advance India-Pakistan reconciliation.

2 For 1993 figures, see http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/fact sheets/2006/asset_upload_file242_9156.pdf. For 2009, see http://www.ustr. gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agre ement-nafta.

218 Pakistan Perspectives

 Culture: What better way to help recover our forgotten brotherhood than by sharing with each other the riches of our respective cultures from the visual and performing arts to music and literature?  Education: As discussed below, our futures will be mapped out in our schools and universities, and it is through them that we can take great strides in demonstrating the power of peaceful relations through cooperative educational initiatives.  Sports: It is hard to imagine how much people in both countries would enjoy seeing a return of competition in cricket, football, and hockey. Whether one’s team wins or loses, when our teams compete, both countries are winners.

Business for peace Can the private sector play a role in peace-building? There is overwhelming evidence that the answer is ‘yes’. Surprisingly, while the role of the private sector in economic development is universally recognized, its role in conflict resolution remains rather unexplored. According to recent research, companies that are most effective in contributing to peace have a ‘conflict sensitivity’ perspective.3 That is, they adopt policies/elements that lower tension and minimize violence within their area of influence. It is in this context that the private sectors of the two countries have a lot to learn from international experience. Direct participation of the corporate sector in negotiating for peace in the countries of El Salvador and Guatemala is a case in point. Several lessons can also be drawn from interventions of the private sector towards peace-building in countries such as Mozambique, Colombia and Sri Lanka. Private sectors corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives in promoting health and education; generating employment, paying special attention to victims of human rights violations, and internally displaced persons shall go a long way toward peace-building. Collier-Hoeffler’s ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ theory suggests that rebels conduct civil wars for ‘loot-seeking’ and ‘justice-seeking’ reasons. To the extent the private sector generates productive employment, it tends to lower grievances amongst the youth, thereby de-motivating them to join violent extremist groups. Also, if higher growth due to enhanced private

3 According to Simrit, ‘The volume ‘CSR in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments: from Risk Management to Value Creation’ offers a survey of the different approaches taken by the private sector towards peace- building in countries in conflict and post-conflict’ However, I could not locate this book.

India and Pakistan: Together Forging a New Way Forward 219 sector investments increases per capita incomes, the opportunity cost for a household to become an anti-state actor rises. Successful businesses not only lower the greed factor, but also simultaneously lower the rational for the grievance that foments extremism. This certainly justifies the need for a vibrant participation of the private sector. Yet, the private sector in both India and Pakistan operates in a poor business climate. According to the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’, among 183 countries, Pakistan currently ranks at 105, while India ranks at 132.4 Undoubtedly, much needs to be done in making the investment climate friendlier in the two nations. This does not require bilateral talks-that may even fail, such as was the case with the high profile Vajpayee-Musharraf talks in Agra, as also several others that failed to generate the desired outcome. There are huge obstacles to overcome. When there are so many alternative profitable and less intimidating destinations for investments, there is a pronounced reluctance to engage because businesses generally do not see themselves as agents of social transformation but generators of products and services, stocks and markets, profits and bonuses. Fortunately, much evidence on the role of business in advancing peace has been collected in recent years. Similar to the global trend of ‘privatization of goods and services’ that became so widespread few decades ago, scholars are now talking about ‘privatization of peace’. Cessation of violence generates a peace dividend and the sooner the private sector realizes it the faster will be the ‘production of peace’. However, in our case, our businesses have for too long been denied the peace dividends they should expect. As auspicious as it was, the aforementioned Aman Ki Asha Indo-Pak Economic Conference remains more of an aberration than the norm. To our business leaders, rather than settling for passively supporting the status quo through a ‘business-as-usual’ outlook, we need a new spirit of ‘business-as-unusual’. With business as usual, businesses would confine themselves to doing what they have traditionally done – invest, strategize market expansions, employ, create value, appropriate value, pay taxes, export, and import. However, when faced with political turmoil, ethnic strife, cross border tensions, war – violence, death, destruction, displacement – the policy generally has been to head for the exits. But according to the business as unusual people-to-people

4 World Bank. (2011). Doing Business. Washington DC: The World Bank. Retrieved from http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings#, Accessed on 3 June 2012.

220 Pakistan Perspectives peacemaking that we are advocating, businesses leaders should also to be moral leaders who muster their courage and show that through business they can seek profits while also serving a higher purpose. In this commitment of business for peace, we can see clearly that in the shared successes of our businesses, we are stronger when we act together as friends and partners rather than strangers and enemies.

A people-to-people approach to peacemaking The approach to peacemaking we are calling for does not depend on summit meetings, ambassadors, or peace treaties. Rather, the approach we are advocating is direct, people-to-people peacemaking that goes by the name ‘Pax Populi’. According to this approach, rather than negotiating a cessation of violence between hostile parties, we look to ordinary people working through education and economic development within a context of human rights to pursue constructive exchanges among parties to a conflict. In this way, peace is seen as both the logical context and sustaining climate for healthy relations. Just as happiness cannot be forced, but is an outcome of a life well lived, so too, peace is an outcome of respectful relations among people of goodwill. Can such relations exist between the peoples of India and Pakistan? We must not lose sight of the fact that positive relations can and they already do exist among many of our citizens. It is time to stop fabricating impediments to normal relations, and instead do whatever we can to rediscover our brotherhood forcibly suppressed through fear and selfishness.

A special role for academia Although there is an especially important role for business, the Pax Populi people-to-people peacemaking applies to all sectors of society, and especially to those of us in academia. It is a sad fact that since Partition not only have our commercial exchanges suffered, our academic interactions have been restricted by visa regimes that prevent rather than facilitating free travel and interactions. There is no concept of research visas between our two countries. If anything, it has been discouraged. And yet, the more that we can share information and work together, the better we can advance our research and build our respective institutions. Our youths can be especially vulnerable to the poisonous climate of violent extremism. As every parent knows, the most powerful way to communicate values is to model them ourselves. We as teachers can do that by working collaboratively across borders. And likewise, our students will benefit if we can afford them opportunities to learn together by participating in educational exchanges.

India and Pakistan: Together Forging a New Way Forward 221

Let us provide opportunities for the youths of both our countries to demonstrate their leadership potential. They are smart and motivated. If we want to see Pakistan’s economy grow at levels similar to India, let’s open the doors to cooperation among our youths; with a decade of free cooperation among Indian and Pakistani youths, they will show their elders what we could not achieve in a half century. It will be our children who model for us the brotherhood we should never have let slip away.

From dream to reality It’s time to stop thinking that peace as if it were an impossible dream. It is not. Peace is the condition in which both of our peoples will grow and flourish. What is unnatural is our current state of conflict. For our own sake and that of our children, this must change. We cannot speak of peace without knowing that the specter of violence is never far away. But rather than letting our destinies to be controlled by the forces of hatred, let us heed of words of Abraham Lincoln: ‘We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory will swell when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature’. In our hearts, we all know that our two peoples are better and stronger as friends, and as friends we are much better able to find solutions to even the most difficult problems. For reasons that none of us are disputing, sixty-five years ago, the subcontinent was partitioned into two countries. This was a painful experience and many individuals and families suffered enormously as a consequence. That suffering continues to intrude into the lives of our two people and overwhelm our relations. Sadly, we have become so accustomed to this story of painful brokenness that we fail to see what has remained intact, which is that despite our independence, we remain part of the same family, with more in common than probably any two countries on earth. We urgently need to embrace a new shared narrative; rather than a tragedy, built on a bitter story of hatred, mistrust, and conflict, let us commit ourselves to a new story in which the triumph of brotherhood brings with it the fruits of trust, cooperation, and a shared prosperity. In doing so, we the people of Pakistan and India can assume a new role in the great unfolding story of human civilization — one in which, through the power of reconciliation and friendship, a divided family was mended and the extraordinary potential of our remarkable people was set free.

Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Notes

Autumn of discontent

* Ashfaq Saleem Mirza

Arab Spring of rejoicing for the West has suddenly turned into autumn of discontent. In most of the famous cities of the world, practicing liberal economies, people are protesting against capitalism. There is a general wave of disappointment with the system. Wall Street, considered to be the pinnacle of capitalist hegemony, is thronged with people from every walk of life to exhibit there resentment. Some of the members of the ruling Democratic party from Capitol Hill are also participating in the protest rallies. The general mood in Zuccoti Park in New York to Phoenix and Sydney Australia vibrate with demands. Demands and demands are everywhere but not a single unanimous manifesto to present. They want forests would not be mowed down, the air won’t be polluted, banks won’t be double crossing their clients and citizens should be totally engaged in running of public life. They say that power concedes nothing without demand. They are also dissatisfied with employment, education, taxation system, corporate personhood, bailing out of banking executives and property tycoons, state of human rights and what not. A protestor says, ‘If we do not make demands political parties will make them for us. We have to get it right this time’. Each gathering bubbles up from its own particular city’s stew of circumstances and grievances. Protestors bring along their pantheon of saints and villains. But there is one common threat; anger, some have looked for jobs for months, others have lost their homes to foreclosure, angry they all are. The reasons behind the mass unrest are mostly related to economy. Protesters on Wall Street argue that financially powerful are rarely held accountable for their mismanagements of the U.S economy, while the masses must suffer the consequences of those failed policies.

* Mr. Ashfaq Saleem Mirza, Author Suggestions for Discourse on History, Philosophy and Society. 224 Pakistan Perspectives

What does it entail? Is this movement progressing towards some revolution or it is merely a rudderless rebuke. Its spontaneity only reflects a general dissatisfaction which for the time being does not present any alternative. Perhaps it is all half baked. Since its birth capitalism has absorbed many shocks. Not only that but as they claim, it has the capacity to neutralize rather devour communism. When I am discussing it, I am not saying that it is not infallible or it represents the end of history or this meta narrative will live forever but it has sustained the test of time. It has passed through many critical periods since 1848 when Marx wrote Communist Manifesto. The change was on the agenda and Paris commune was an objectification. Any how capitalism survived. The great October Revolution of 1917 was the greatest shock it confronted, when the dream, hidden somewhere in Marx’s writings; was realized by the Bolsheviks under the leadership of Lenin. The October revolution, though apparently ditching capitalism gave it a new life. Like a cunning and vigilant adversary, it started two- pronged action i.e. will to survive and destabilizing the enemy. Ultimately it succeeded with the fall of Soviet Union. During this period it also felt minor tremors of 1930’s recession and Second World War. It lived with bipolarism in the arena of power politics. The leftist were always jubilant to see capitalism being dislodged, one way or the other. You may name it as their optimism. They have gone through this mood of optimism many times after 1848, but there dream was never realized in the total defeat of capitalism. In the recent past a new hope came which was demonstrated in the slogan ‘Another world is possible’ popularized by World Social Forum. In May 2000, the city of Algere in Brazil saw the birth of World Social Forum exposing the bankruptcy of globalization at philosophical, political, ecological and economic level. This truth was repeatedly paraphrased in various cities of the World after Algere. In those times I summed it as gatherings of Bohemians who had no substantial and positive agenda in their bags which they carried on their shoulders. My ideological friends were not happy with me. They were under the spell of this new wave of anti-capitalism. The euphoric mood gradually fizzled out. Nobody can deny, another world is not possible. Yes, it is possible but it does not come riding on fantasy. It does come along with all its material conditions. Orthodox socialists, all over the world, still believe inevitability of revolution and proletariat changing guards with capitalists. As Terry Eagleton says, ‘Marx appears to regard the advent of socialism as inevitable. He says so more than once…in Communist Manifesto the fall of capitalist class and the victory of working class are described as Autumn of discontent 225 equally inevitable. But he is also apprehensive when he says that the class struggle may result in the common ruination of the contending classes’. Here intervention of Eduard Bernstein seems to be quite appropriate. This founder of Social Democracy differs with orthodox Marxism on various theoretical issues and demise of capitalism was one of them. Though he was pilloried as revisionist but whatever he said was supported by historical evidence. In his reformist mood he was of the opinion that the prospects of socialism did not depend on a major crises bringing about the collapse of capitalism. Such crises were less and less possible as capitalism grew more capable of adopting itself to market difficulties. How far this would go, nobody can predict. No system is inevitable. History does not have very kind words for prediction nor do I have. However, euphoria has no accommodation in the annals of history. Pakistan Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Book Reviews

The Jinnah Anthology, edited by Liaquat H. Merchant and Sharif al Mujahid, published by Oxford University Press, Karachi, 3rd edition, 2010, pages 334, price Pak Rupees 1800.

Doing a Jinnah anthology is by no means an easy undertaking. Sifting facts from fiction, which abound in the case of the founder of the nation, is one task; selecting from a huge corpus of literature the best stuff, is another. A more difficult task is to present the real Jinnah and to put his politics in right perspective. The real challenge, though, comes from the subject itself; given his peculiar positions and stances, and his unique personal traits which do not allow him to be stereotyped easily, Jinnah has perplexed the historians since long. Eqbal Ahmad, perhaps, was not wrong when he described him as an enigma of modern history. The editors of the present work deserve commendation for compiling a rich set of articles, essays, personal recollections, quotations, etc., which together give useful clues to resolve the riddle of Jinnah‟s personality and politics. Presented in an elegant manner on art paper with numerous pictures, though only partially with captions, the volume also meets the delicate standards of a coffee-table book or those of a collector‟s item, but, its contents infact overshadow its look and make it a compulsory reading both for the academics and the general readers. The price of the book is also reasonable keeping its quality and standard of production in mind. It may not be possible for one to comment on all the entries yet the glimpses of a few would certainly not be out of order and would, perhaps, sufficiently highlight the scholarly worth of the work. Within one volume are assembled historians like H.V. Hodson, S.M. Burke, A.G. Noorani, Sharif al Mujahid, Ayesha Jalal, Ajeet Jawed and Sikandar Hayat; biographers like Stanley Wolpert; statesmen and diplomats like John Kenneth Galbraith, Aga Khan III, Muhammad Yusuf 228 Pakistan Perspectives

Buch and Shaharyar M. Khan; politicians like Sarojini Naidu, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, M.A.H. Ispahani, Sahabzada Yaqoob Khan, and Yousuf A. Haroon; journalists like Kuldip Nayar, Altaf Husain, Ardeshir Cowasjee and Muhammad Ali Siddiqui; and scholars like Eqbal Ahmad, Y.U.V. Gankovsky; etc. This wide range of participants of the anthology may well suggest the scope of the work. They together bring width as well as depth to the book and also radiate the width and the depth of the subject, that is, Jinnah. What is it that makes Jinnah Jinnah. To respond to this, one would wish to put another question: why is it that Jinnah had made it difficult for others to define him. First, let us attempt this second question. In the analysis of historical figures, it is generally assumed that either the leaders create the situations, demands or political platforms, and, above all, shape the history, or, as the opposite view has it, the situations and the events create their own leaders. Both of these ways of looking at the history fall short of explaining a number of happenings which do not corroborate with these formulations. A number of historians and political analysts succumb to another mistake by trying to analyze a historical event or a past leader in the light of their preconceived notions. In the case of Jinnah this has happened quite often. There was a time when the Jamiat-ul Ulema-e Hind rejected Jinnah‟s position on Muslim nationalism on the assumption that nations are built around the states or countries and that religion may not be an adequate facilitator of nationhood. Another set of religious ulema regarded him as a westernized liberal and nationalist whose concept of nationhood could at best have brought about a nation state of Muslims which might not have qualified to be designated as an Islamic state. This view, held by Abul Ala Mawdudi prevented him from supporting the Pakistan demand. Jinnah‟s detractors in the All India National Congress denounced him as a communalist. They alleged that he was using religion to bifurcate a united Indian nation. Quite curiously, the different explanations of Jinnah had one thing in common, and that was their assumption that political occurrences and realities were the outcome of, or always correspond to, the nomenclature associated with them. Thus, they thought that, for instance, nations should correspond to the countries and states because this happened in most of the nation states in Europe and America, or, that employing religious symbols and identity for political purposes, makes the objective religious and, thus, again curiously, communal. Similarly, for a long time it was believed that nations were primordial and permanent entities. What the upholders of all these positions missed was the unusualness of what was happening in India and what Jinnah was Book Reviews 229 actually trying to do. As S.M. Burke writes in his article included in the book, Jinnah „not only won independence for an existing country, but also performed the extraordinary feat of bringing an altogether new independent county into existence against impossible odds‟ (emphasis added) (p.17). It is the failure to understand this unique nature of Indian situation and the originality of Jinnah‟s position which has made Jinnah and his politics a riddle. In literary criticism a new piece of valuable literature or a big work of art demands a new level of critical enquiry to appreciate the newness of that piece and the greatness of that work. Similarly, Jinnah, perhaps, also needs to be analysed along non- traditional criteria as he defies the traditional yardsticks. In contrast with the European and American experiences, India‟s exposure to the representative institutions had a particular background. These institutions did not come into existence in India amidst an indigenous process of political evolution; these were, in fact, grafted over the Indian society by a colonial power for its own purposes which might have indirectly served some of Indian long-term interests, too. But, the introduction of representative institutions entailed Muslim separatism, a political platform to ensure, a respectable size of representation which could prevent them from becoming an ineffective and subdued minority. The feeling was more pronounced in the Muslim middle class, which was confronted with the possibility of being defeated in a competitive environment. It was not prepared to enter into competition with other communities of India without proper safeguards. Jinnah came to advocate this case. To gauge the people‟s aspirations which others had failed to comprehend and which even a large number of people, themselves, had not yet been able to consciously discover, let alone aggregate and articulate, was a difficult undertaking. The secret of Jinnah‟s successful leadership was his ability to convincingly demonstrate to the Muslim masses what was in their interest and what even they have not fully realized. Jinnah gave voice to Indian Muslims‟ aspirations and did so in a language and through logic heard and understood by the British. A number of articles in the book help understand in different ways the unique historical role of Jinnah. Sikandar Hayat traces the personal traits of Jinnah and argues how they suited the mission he had chosen for him to achieve. He observes that, „While there can be many angularities, there is no denying that his success was due to the confluence of his extraordinary „personality‟ and the worsening „situation‟ as India advanced towards freedom‟ (p.35). Kuldip Nayar realized that Jinnah was not communal when he first read Jinnah‟s speech of 11 August 1947. It seems that around the creation of the 230 Pakistan Perspectives country Jinnah had realized that his invoking of the Islamic identity for ensuring the socio-political rights of the Muslim community would be used to mislead the people, after independence by those who would like to build a theocratic state in the country. Jinnah took pains to convince that this was not his objective. As Ajeet Jawed shows, Jinnah had this to say to Ghaffar Khan: „I am a very much misunderstood man. I never wanted all this blood-shed. I want peace, believe me so that I can do something for the masses‟. Upon Ghaffar Khan‟s objection that League was not a secular body Jinnah explained: „I have been myself anxious to convert the League into National League, open to every loyal citizen of Pakistan. But I am being attacked by mad Mullahs and extremists who are out to create trouble for me. That is exactly why I want you and your colleagues to join the League and help me in ousting these dangerous elements‟ (p.168). It was this secular status of Jinnah which encourages Muhammad Ali Siddiqui to build an analogy between him and Mustafa Kamal Ataturk: „Jinnah and Ataturk both were down to earth realists. Both were extremely secular in their outlook and conduct, and despised obscurantism. However, the nature of their struggle was diametrically opposite, because the challenges they faced were different. Ataturk, all along, had military challenges before him; Jinnah had political and constitutional puzzles to solve‟ (p.111). Two articles by Sharif al Mujahid help us most in understanding the personality and the political role of Jinnah. Written with rich historical understanding of Indian politics and with an exemplary command on comparative historical developments, Mujahid positions Jinnah in a wider historio political canvas. He traces the events which shaped Jinnah and also how he influenced the events. Mujahid also delves into Hector Bolitho‟s Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan, the official biography of the founder of the nation. He recounts the merits of the book and also discusses in detail its weaknesses. He also questions to what extent Bolitho was the right choice to pen down Jinnah‟s official biography. But he concludes by saying: „All said and done, however, Bolitho will continue to hold the field so long as Jinnah, both as a human person and as a political leader, excites interests among researchers and intelligent readers curious about the personal life, style, tastes, likes and dislikes of outstanding world leaders…. Thus, Bolitho alone was able to recreate Jinnah—a singular contribution indeed that can by no means be ignored‟ (pp.57-8). A major contribution to the understanding of how the colonial state transformed into the post-colonial one, and how the two maintained organic linkage, is the article by Ayesha Jalal, „Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah Book Reviews 231 and the Governor-Generalship Issue‟ (pp.59-75). Written way back in 1985, it was one of the pioneering works explaining Pakistan‟s slipping into an authoritarian mould right in the beginning. Jalal discusses the fluid situation Pakistan found itself in at partition, accompanied with un- disciplined political leadership and uncertain regional loyalties to the new state. She argues that to secure some semblance of stability and to discipline the un-disciplined polity, Pakistan needed a strong arm of the state that came in the form of bureaucratic control of the state‟s power structure this control was realised in the available framework of the viceregal system provided by the interim constitution, based on the 1935 Government of India Act. Jinnah‟s decision to become the governor- general of the country gave to the system some credibility which it needed desperately. A few articles shed light on different aspects of Jinnah‟s leadership and vision. S. Sharifuddin Pirzada looks into the constitutional vision of Pakistan as visualized by Jinnah. A.G. Noorani discusses Jinnah‟s views on civil liberty. Shaharyar M. Khan chooses to discuss Jinnah‟s policies towards the Princley states. Liaquat H. Merchant revisits the perception of Sir Sultan Mohammad Shah Aga Khan III about Jinnah and his leadership. Sharif al Mujahid discusses Jinnah‟s views on women‟s emancipation. In short, the book under review is full of carefully selected and, perhaps, also, most representative articles, reminiscences, impressions, etc., about the founder of Pakistan. Though it does not look fair to identify what other things could be included in the book as it is already a big volume yet one cannot help resist the temptation to suggest that perhaps inclusion of Faiz Ahmed Faiz‟s editorial in The Pakistan Times on the death of Quaid-i-Azam would have been a notable item. It is hoped that the present book would continue to excite interest among scholars and students venturing to understand the political dynamics of the partition of India and the role played in it by Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Pakistan Study Centre Syed Jaffar Ahmed University of Karachi.

Comparing Cities: The Middle East and South Asia, edited by Kamran Asdar Ali and Martina Rieker, published by Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2009, pp.349, price, not mentioned.

This edited volume is in fact an outcome of the workshop entitled, „Comparing Urban Landscapes‟ held in Lahore University of 232 Pakistan Perspectives

Management Sciences, in April 2004. The papers reproduced in this book make 11 chapters, divided in four parts, namely: Citing Cities; Narrating Urban Pasts/Presents; The Actualities of Everyday Life; and Urban Governmentalities. The postscript by Partha Chatterjee composes 12th chapter and part five of the book. In total five cities of India (Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata and Bangalore), one each from Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel are taken for their social history. Two chapters are written about Delhi, Karachi, and Beirut. The very first chapter deals with partial experience of a metropolis, Mumbai, by Vohra,1 who has tried to explain how she felt to experience Mumbai visually, yet the essay contains a lot of audatory and interactive contents. In fact, she has tried to see the city as it is seen in documentary films. The sights and sounds of that glamorous city could never be experienced in reality by her. What she experienced was the reality named as „Leave and License‟. The troubles, challenges, accommodative ways, of the communities living in low-income quarters of Mumbai, are explained through experiencing it. The community lives in PMGP, a public sector replacement for the slums, with one room houses having common bathrooms and one balcony. The characters making living in this colony feasible include the property agent, telephone booth operator and bank manager. Here the author describes how working women and single mothers of poor class live their home, religious and economic life Further she allude to their recreations, passions, and love affairs. She also explains how a person loses his/her class culture by living in another class community. Both the visual and audatory profile of the area is combined here with a sociological profile as well of the neighbours who have come together from diverse backgrounds only to save themselves from the stigma of living in a slum, but could hardly afford living beyond that. Tamari has based his article on the memoirs of Wasif Jawhariyyeh, „a reluctant soldier, civil servant, musician, flâneur, bon vivant, satirist, and witness to his era‟, when Palestinian people went through a state of administrative and legal flux. This was the time of the surrender of Jerusalem to the Ottoman governor and till the beginning of British Mandate in 1921. As a close witness who has mentioned both significant and insignificant aspects of personal and public life, happenings of the Jerusalem upper class, the foibles of Ottoman and

1 Paromita Vohra, „No Man‟s Land: A Visual Essay (Mumbai)‟, in Kamran Asdar Ali and Martina Rieker (eds.), Comparing Cities: The Middle East and South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University, 2009), pp.3-22. Book Reviews 233

British military and political leaders, as well as the ordinary people. The diaries are generally a piece of self-reflection. These provide scandalous material about the city nobles. The war-time Jerusalem (1917-1921) sets the scene for this article but his description goes to 1948 defeat of Palestinians and beyond, when a collective tragedy forced everyone to give priority to family security, and the personal love affairs meant little. The memoirs of Jawhariyyeh are supported by other memoires of the same period, such as that of Ronald Storrs (1881-1955). The two narratives present „two divergent discourses—native and colonial—on Jerusalem‟s modernity‟.2 The memoirs are a testament of the history of urban planning of Jerusalem as well. The article explains the interplay of politics, civil administration, ethnic and religious diversity, land owning and land alienation, colonial bureaucracy, dreams for a Jewish Home, communal strife, and religious clashes. Since war had disrupted all the communities, possibility for developing a new urban lifestyle was enhanced. New urban sensibilities gave rise to expansion, modernization, secularization, and individualism during the Mandate period. Jawhariyyeh‟s memoirs and the article based on it is a blend of all such processes happening in an ancient city. The evolutionary profile of Karachi is explained by Ali3 to highlight the role of state in impinging upon the citizens a sense of insecurity and uncertainty in the face of escalated violence, which especially affected the urban poor. With the help of narratives of childhood by Hisam Ali explains how Karachi was once a peaceful city, with butterflies, blossoms and fruits. Later on, poverty, uncertainty, risk, and state oppression combined to make the urban workforce uncertain and oppressed. The differences of ethnicity and gender undermined solidarity based on class. Yet the poor managed to live and share the public and domestic space despite such dissensions endemic to their class. Visual density and visual modernity of Karachi is discussed by Dadi,4 to highlight the complex relationship between the popular folk culture and mass media exploited by various groups in the modern urban sites. He finds two case studies. One of the posters of Saddam Hussain displayed around year 2002, showing various aspects of the ideas behind

2 Salim Tamari, „City of Riffraff: Crowds, Public Space, and New Urban Sensibilities in War-Time Jerusalem, 1917-1921‟, in Ali and Rieker, op.cit., p.25. 3 Kamran Asdar Ali, „Men and Their „Problems‟: Notes on Contemporary Karachi‟, in Ali and Rieker, op.cit., pp.49-64. 4 Iftikhar Dadi, „Ghostly Sufis and Ornamental Shadows: Spectral Visualities in Karachi‟s Public Sphere‟, in Ali and Rieker, op.cit., pp.159-93. 234 Pakistan Perspectives it. He questions: „Is the image of Saddam with a sufi saint bestowing spiritual power and protection on him forever, a trace of folk art, still persisting in urbanized mass culture?‟ Discussing relationship between the folk art and contemporary industrial mass culture, he opines that the position taken by Jameson to tell that the two have noting common, can be contested, as in South Asia „popular folk modernities must be seen as both complicit with and discrepant with mass culture.‟ He finds it compatible with the Latin American situation. In the margins of West, various actors operate in the popular public sphere and transform the public sphere in the face of state oppression. The antecedents of Saddam‟s images are linked to Zia-ul-Haq‟s image and martyrs of the 1965 Indo-Pak war. When the Government of Pakistan supported the US against the popular will, the street became a visual and performative site to express difference. The second case study by Dadi is of Nazia Khan‟s „Henna Hands‟, a series of artwork screened directly onto the walls, in which silhouettes of complete or fractured female body composed of screened henna hands, show how the stenciled henna patterns in the urban public space of various localities, show „presence of the woman in public space, but without denying her a gendered aesthetic specificity‟. Dadi appreciates the social significance of this form of artistic activity which „draws upon craft traditions as its traces their contemporary transformations in order to poetically reclaim public space and utilize the city skin itself as a site for artistic intervention‟. The article by Dadi concludes that the popular activities non-state urban actors expressed through symbolic and aestheticized characters as the formal channels of expressions are blocked for them. These activities need to be studies even further. Sundaram explains Delhi‟s media urbanism, with the help of the concept of „everyday life‟. He defines „everyday‟ to refer to: „the habitual, the mundane and the world outside specialized activity, the visible world of routine and repetition, a residual space outside the rationalized realm‟.5 Though „everyday‟ has been considered „insignificant‟ but it became significant when it was targeted by advertisements, community culture, theoretical debate around evolution of everyday present and modernity. Sundaram refers post-World War France (1940s) movements, and theoretical understanding presented by Simmel, Weber, Benjamin, Kristin Ross, Barthes, Baudrillard, Morin and Lefebvre. Sundaram reports that experience of living in Delhi

5 Ravi Sundaram, „Re-Visiting „Everyday Life‟: The Experience of Delhi‟s Media Urbanism‟, in Ali and Rieker, op.cit., p.131. Book Reviews 235 nowadays has been much different from that of Europe in 1920s and 1930s. He calls this particular form of change as media urbanization. He feels that under the influence of the modern, „[t]he burial of the “ordinary man” as the icon of the everyday may well be a signpost to the turbulence and the terror of the 21st century city in India‟.6 In the Third World, illegal housing has been a feature of a number of large cities mostly due to poor socio-economic conditions of the immigrants and the nexus between the political and speculating agencies. This aspect gives cities a dual face: legal and illegal. There happen two different processes of city production, where public and private agencies operate in their own ways, the latter mostly defying the former‟s rules. In this context Fawaz7 explains the complex process going on in Hayy el Sellom (Beirut), to show that large scale involvement of people in illegal practices should not be dismissed by just declaring them as „exceptional and corrupt‟, since these are inherent part of the urban governance. Rather the legal and illegal practices of public rulings need to be re-written, and investigated into their co-existence and collaboration. It is found that the entitlements of different populations differ due to differential treatment given by the public agencies hence illegal practices are adopted. In the framework of environmental history Sharan8 discusses issues of work and pollution both physical and moral, and poses question about the history and pre-history of environment, and continuity of meaning of the word „environment‟ itself. Premising so his research in Dehli, he investigates into the idea of „margin‟; „inside‟ and „outside‟; „core‟ and „periphery‟ of the post-colonial city of Delhi. The vision of Delhi as a modern national capital has been questioned as well. Regarding production of culture in urban environment, Gambetti argues that building and monuments do create a material environment, but the way space is ordered, is also important. The identity and relationship of people with space within the city depends upon the label or reputation they acquire such as, bourgeois or proletarian, male or females, sacred or profane, identical or different,…‟.9 Thus a city can offer various narratives, types of struggles, and memories depending

6 Ibid., p.154. 7 Mona Fawaz, „The State and the Production of Illegal Housing: Public Practices in Hayy el Sellom Beirut-Lebanon‟, in Ali and Rieker, op.cit., pp.197-215. 8 Awadhendra Sharan, „Spaces of Work/Sites of Danger: Environment and Urban Landscape in Modern Delhi‟, in Ali and Rieker, op.cit., pp.221-49. 9 Zeynep Gambetti, „Decolonizing Diyarbakir: Culture, Identity and the Struggle to appropriate Urban Space‟, in Ali and Rieker, op.cit., p.97. 236 Pakistan Perspectives upon the types of space one belongs to. Diyarbakir is a Turkish city, an informal capital of the southeast region, where the Kurd resistance movement resulted in capturing of the municipality in 1999. Kurds have been excluded from the Turkish nation-building projects due to emphasizing state-sponsored notion of denying ethic heterogeneity, religious sentiments, feudal structure, modernization and bureaucratic unity. The model presented by Oktem, referred here, explains the politics of creating otherness in southeastern Turkey. The situation of Diyarbakir can be explained with the help of this model, as the author believes. Beirut of post-war recovery has been the focus of essay by Arif,10 especially the downtown site which holds the city‟s most spectacular buildings. Rafik Hariri‟s burial place added to the character of the area, and also caused reformulation of the former reconstruction programs. The series of demonstrations held in connection with the 30th anniversary of the beginning of the fifteen years long civil war, added new meanings to the complex polysemy of this area. The urban recovery phenomena are found closely associated with „the complex of social, historical and spatial practices that continually add meanings what recovery can entail in urban contexts‟.11 What the author finds is that the planners tried to re-code the visual landscape of destructed city centre to give it a new façade preserving past architectural legacy enmeshed with embodied desires for the future, thus the city centre became a symbol of material identity for Beirut and its and its chequered history. Chatterjee12 discusses various approaches to social history of cities and emphasizes the specific historical genealogies of cities instead of generalizing as both the modern megacities as well as smaller cities vary in many respects. He finds that general theories have „little historical depth‟. He, focusing on Kolkata, not a very old rather a colonial city, points out difference between the early modern forms of urbanity and the colonial modernity, social structure of urban and rural Bengalades 0f the pre-colonial urban centers of northern India. He refers to associations of wealthy class, political parties led by upper caste, and subordination of the urban poor and artisans to the armed men of wealthy magnates in early 19th century—the early modern phase. Devoid of legitimacy, there emerged new powerful persons supported by the

10 Yasmeen Arif, „A Landscape of Recovery: The Polysemy of Spaces/Places in Downtown Beirut‟, in Ali and Rieker, op.cit., pp.274-302. 11 Ibid. 12 Partha Chatterjee, „A Postscript from Kolkata: An Equal Right to the City‟, in ibid., pp.306-24. Book Reviews 237 colonial ruler. Chatterjee also discusses main features of colonial modernity starting from the mid 19th century. The author elaborate the process of colonial modernity, and as to how different social groups adopted different strategies to claim their equal share of urban public domain. Referring particularly to soccer, the author shows how the refugees asserted their claim to the city. The slums and middle class neighborhoods of Kolkata are now being replaced by shopping malls and high-rise apartments. Chatterjee concludes that in the pursuit of equality, many unsuspected strategies may be adopted in future. On the whole this edited volume deals with the debates in sociologies of space, modernity, media and globalization. It offers very interesting and exciting research-based material for those interested in urban sociology, urban anthropology and urban social history. The field has been largely unexplored, especially if we see the case of Pakistan. A testimony to this is absence of any piece on Lahore, the second largest city with a glorious past and a vibrating present, too. All essays contain a good theoretical discussion to formulate new concepts or modify the existing ones. The well-known authors have contributed findings of their research in a compact form in this book, a quality which makes it a must for the institutions working in the areas of social sciences, architecture, urban development and history.

Pakistan Study Centre Anwar Shaheen University of Karachi.

Replicating Dreams, A Comparative Study of Grameen Bank and its Replication, Kashf Foundation, Pakistan, by Nabiha Syed, published by, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2009, pages: 138, price: not mentioned.

Micro-credit has been sought after as a sure solution to the problems faced by poor people who have no capital but only human skills to earn their living. Its universal recognition has encouraged many development planners to experiment with the idea, which was accomplished successfully by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, so much so that their model got replicated in about 200 other countries or populations. The model known as, Grameen Bank Solidarity Group Lending Model, as many such other experiments in the developing world inspired many other actors in similar disadvantaged conditions, Kashf Foundations of Pakistan has been regarded as „the most successful Grameen replication in the country‟. The book under review outlines the basic structure of 238 Pakistan Perspectives

Grameen and Kashf Bank, and discusses potential of micro-credit as tool of empowerment in both economic and social sense. This study, apparently brief as is reported in this book, has used extensive amount of available theoretical material. The conceptual framework used by the author has included concepts of empowerment, feminization of poverty and double bottom-line success through micro- credit eliminating gender discrimination, and economies of scope. Moreover is applied Sen‟s conception of capability as freedom and development enhancing one‟s freedom to choose, Bandura‟s concept of self-efficacy, used here, suggests that higher the self-efficacy, higher the goals and commitment to achieve them. Also used is Antonovsky‟s sense of coherence (among one‟s comprehensibility, manageability, and meaningfulness), enhanced by credit availability, enhancing one‟s entrepreneurship and thus empowerment. Mayoux‟s conceptualization of empowerment as having economic, social, political and legal dimensions and the economic empowerment dominating rather ensuring all other dimensions of empowerment as its effects has also helped analyze the case in point. The models used in this study include: financial self- sustainability model, poverty-alleviation model, feminist empowerment model, however, the Grameen Bank is found to be adopting the „self- sustainability model that ultimately appropriated some concerns of the poverty alleviation model‟.13 Above all group solidarity, particularly the Solidarity Group Lending Approach has been cardinal as been adopted by the Grameen Bank. The Kashf Foundation has however, used only the poverty-alleviation along with using some ingredients of feminist empowerment model. To achieve these goals it has tried to enhance trust, solidarity and social interaction. The study by Nabiha Syed focuses upon describing the two institutions, Grameen and Kashf, in their operating style and impact in terms of women‟s empowerment, The Grameen Bank has not merely money-disbursing institution, interested in figures and profits. It is a name of a revolution, a social engineering miracle, and a cataclysmic change in the lives of people who got into its fold. It has been a grand plan to root out poverty. It rightly deserved Nobel prizes and be an inspiring model for millions other destitute on the face of the globe. Taking off in a newly liberated country, through the liberated genius of its people, the Bank has made

13 Nabiha Syed, Replicating Dreams A Comparative Study of Grameen Bank and its Replication, Kashf Foundation, Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.77. Book Reviews 239 history. This was made possible through the 16 basic mottos, called „decisions‟. These guide its clients to ensure discipline in their personal life (unity, courage, hard work), will to get prosperity and improve living conditions (nutrition, exercise, housing, small family norms, hygiene, sanitation, saving, education, clean environment, etc.). Moreover, these principles of social reform agenda included certain pressure on repudiating creating social practice of dowry, or acting to crush injustice, and reinforcing mutual help, institutional discipline at the local centre, as well as looking forward to bigger investment for bigger income. Such have been the basic corollaries of development planned for the rural Bangladesh people. One may say this did not require any exemplary genius to devise such an agenda and to tag it with the loan scheme of a bank. The crux of the matter is that it was made a reality, and a very big reality which transformed lives of millions, who could never look beyond two meals a day. One can find scores of similar sets of recommendations and highly wishful plans with the governments of the poor countries but they need the wisdom to be realized especially without the state help, since state in the last two decades has been receding fairly obviously, whereas it is not totally absent yet seems to be impotent regarding improvement in the poverty indices and ground realities encompassing it. In this backdrop, Kashf has pursued three major goals: „empowerment involving change within the household, within the community, and at a broader institutional or policy-making level‟.14 Regarding the aspect of empowerment it is found as a multi- dimension myriad process. It must be understood with reference to specificities of women‟s references and life circumstances, the author holds. It is because of multiple material conditions in which it happens. Some important points to note are to ensure responsive methodology of empowerment, i.e. asking the participants about improvement in their lives, encouraging them to voice their concerns, and doing independent assessment of client satisfaction which must involve their lived experience and contextual evidence rather than focusing on their work output. Likewise, the matter of trust is understood by the author as a cause and effect of relations, leading to social capital crucial for financial and entrepreneurial activities. Operationlizing trust is discussed by the author in its two aspects: personalized and institutionalized trust. The marketing aspect is elaborated with special focus on the role of field staff.

14 Ibid. 240 Pakistan Perspectives

Women prove better target in terms of timely paying back, and distributing benefits among their family, therefore the choice of Grameen and Kashf was to focus women. When one sees the situation of the poor in Pakistan and find replication of the Grameen model, most notably in Kashf Foundation, established in 1996, totally outside the state or semi- state microfinance infrastructure, would find the success of self-help model, at least in the lives of 136,015 people only in the Punjab province. Can this be taken as an automatic gaining of self-confidence, empowerment and autonomy, has been an old question mostly asked about the micro-credit interventions. How the double bottom line of financial and social empowerment can be actualized, was the specific question before the author, as she went on to explore the cases of Grameen and Kashf. She concludes that micro-credit institutions which want to expand their network of beneficiaries, should avoid being monoliths; despite adopting a depth in approach these should indeed have a tailored approach to suit diverse needs of their clients. That would espouse empowerment as choice freedom. Women should also be made aware of the available options in the micro-credit market, or for getting out of poverty to enable them select the best suiting them. A long-term trust building is of cardinal importance in this regard. Grameen tried to become a brand of trust, by being present everywhere holding its activities, thus creating a niche for itself in the public space, so it garnered individual trust. At the collective level, however, a common outlook emerges among clients who come together through their affiliation among one institution. Thus group solidarity grows from instrumental solidarity to outcome-oriented solidarity. Solidarity developed among women is accepted as a powerful tool for incremental social change if it fosters an outlook to criticize the dominant cultural ideologies leading to growth of structured empowerment-oriented activities. A common sense of civic responsibility thus develops as a forerunner of social reform and a holistic human development. However, one should be wary of other research findings in Pakistan15 as well, indicating that micro-credit intervention does not affect the bargaining power of women within the household regarding a broad range of matters related to children issues, health, and decisions affecting about economic and social mobility. This held true for all econometric groups.

15 Salman Asim, Evaluating the Impact of Microcredit on Women’s Empowerment in Pakistan (Lahore: Centre for Research in Economics and Business, Lahore School of Economics, 2009), CREB Working Paper No. 03-09, pp. 44-5. Book Reviews 241

Thus empowerment also needs to be further explicated and understood at the personal and group levels.

Pakistan Study Centre Anwar Shaheen University of Karachi. Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 17, No. 1, January-June 2012

Documents January-June 2012

I. Foreign Policy

A. AFGHANISTAN, IRAN & PAKISTAN Joint Statement of Trilateral Summit on ‘Enhancing Trilateral Cooperation’

1. Within the framework of trilateral cooperation His Excellency Hamid Karzai President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, His Excellency Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and His Excellency Asif Ali Zardari, President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan held the Third Trilateral Summit in Islamabad on 17 February 2012. 2. The three Presidents pledged to enhance cooperation among the countries comprehensively for realizing the shared aspiration of their peoples for peace, security, stability and economic prosperity. 3. The three Presidents stressed the need for implementation of the earlier decisions taken at the Trilateral Summits held at Tehran in May 2009 and June 2011 respectively. While underscoring that the three countries were bound by ties of history, geography, culture and religion, the three sides agreed as follows: i. To develop framework of comprehensive cooperation and to take pragmatic steps for realizing mutually beneficial cooperation to promote stability, peace and shared prosperity. ii. Ensure respect for sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity, as enshrined in the UN Charter. iii. To proceed on the basis of mutual interest, mutual respect, non interference and non intervention in internal affairs. iv. Not to allow any threat emanating from their respective territories against each other. All parties agreed to commence trilateral consultations on an agreement in this regard. v. Contribute to the development and reconstruction in Afghanistan. vi. Broaden cooperation in the political, security, economic, cultural, social and educational fields and enhance people to people contacts including exchange visits of parliamentarians, academicians and journalists. vii. Strengthen cooperation for eradicating extremism, terrorism and militancy and to address the root causes of these menaces, 242 Pakistan Perspectives

condemning the killings of civilians as well as any kind of assassinations. viii. Cooperate in combating the problems of narcotic drugs production and trafficking and in combating transnational organized crimes. ix. Prioritize cooperation for socio-economic development. x. Enhance three-way trade by facilitation measures, including preferential tariff and free trade arrangements as well as barter trade. xi. Also expressed commitment to expand trade in transit and encourage the private sector to invest in the three countries. xii. Enhance connectivity by promoting project cooperation in infrastructure, road and rail links, transport and communications. xiii. Develop mutually beneficial cooperation in the energy, mining and minerals, agriculture and other sectors. xiv. Cooperate for the safe, voluntary and early return of Afghan refugees to their homeland in honour and dignity. xv. Emphasized the need for enhancing their cooperation at international level, especially within the United Nations system. xvi. Mandated the Foreign Ministers to prepare and coordinate a Road Map for Trilateral Cooperation for submission to the next Summit. xvii. Also mandated the Interior/Security Ministers to develop a framework of trilateral cooperation particularly in the areas of counter terrorism, counter-narcotics and border management within six months. xviii. Further mandated the Commerce Ministers to outline steps for enhancing three-way economic cooperation. xix. Mandated senior officials (Deputy Foreign Minister level) to meet regularly to monitor the implementation of the decisions taken by the Trilateral Summits. xx. Decided that the Fourth Trilateral Summit shall be held in Kabul by the end of 2012. The exact dates will be communicated through diplomatic channels. 4. Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan reiterated their full support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned inclusive process of peace and reconciliation. They assured the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan that they would extend full cooperation and stressed that any initiative in this regard must have authentic Afghan ownership. 5. His Excellency Mahmood Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan expressed profound gratitude to President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the warm hospitality extended to both delegations and for excellent arrangements made for the Third Trilateral Summit.

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6. In witness whereof the Presidents of the three countries have signed this document. 7. Done in Islamabad on 17 February 2012 in three originals in English, Persian/Dari, all texts being equally authentic. Hamid Karzai Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Asif Ali Zardari President of I.R.of President of I.R.of President of I.R. of Afghanistan Iran Pakistan

17 February 2012. Source: www.mofa.gov.pk

B. AFGHANISTAN Statement of Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani on Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a brotherly country, close neighbour, with which Pakistan has multiple bonds of affinity. We value, deeply, our friendly and brotherly relations with the people of Afghanistan. Pakistan wishes to have the best of relations with Afghanistan. Stability, peace and national reconciliation in Afghanistan is indeed critical for regional peace and stability. We are mindful of the importance of ensuring that the processes of peace and reconciliation succeed and thus contribute to the welfare and well-being of the Afghan people. A sovereign and independent Afghanistan, well on the road to a peaceful and prosperous future, is indeed critical for Pakistan and for our region, as a whole. It is in this context that Pakistan has been supportive of all efforts to promote peace, national reconciliation and development. I am happy to state that our relations with Afghanistan have witnessed important positive developments at all levels during the recent years. Pakistan firmly believes that respect for Afghanistan‟s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity as well as adherence to the principles of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan are of critical importance. We also believe that the process of national reconciliation must be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. It is imperative to promote an intra-Afghan consensus for a durable political settlement that accords with the aspirations of the people of Afghanistan, as a whole. The President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, His Excellency Hamid Karzai, in an important statement on 21 February 2012, has appealed to Pakistan to support the peace process in Afghanistan. This is an important statement and Pakistan is duty bound to respond positively to the appeal of President Karzai. Pakistan has always held that there is no military solution to the problems of Afghanistan. We have also stated that it is important to create

244 Pakistan Perspectives conditions conducive for a grand intra-Afghan settlement, based on national reconciliation that involves the Afghan people without any distinction. It is now time to turn a new leaf and open a new chapter in the history of Afghanistan. It is time to now combine the strengths of the Afghan people in a true spirit of our noble religion – Islam and in accordance with the glorious traditions of the Afghans to build peace and bring prosperity to Afghanistan. In this spirit, I would like to appeal to the Taliban leadership as well as to all other Afghan groups, including Hizb-e-Islami, to participate in an intra- Afghan process for national reconciliation and peace. It is our sincere hope that the Taliban leadership, Hizb-e-Islami and all other Afghan political leaders will respond positively to my appeal and agree to enter into direct negotiations in the framework of an intra-Afghan process for reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan, on its part, will support such an authentic Afghan process and is prepared to do whatever it can for its success. I would like to appeal to the international community to support, fully, national reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan. We are appreciative of the important initiative taken by President Hamid Karzai and wish the intra-Afghan process every success.

24 February 2012. Source: www.mofa.gov.pk.

C. CHINA Foreign Office Statement on acts of terrorism in Xinjiang

The Government of Pakistan strongly condemns the recent acts of terrorism in Xinjiang in which a number of innocent persons lost their lives. The Government and people of Pakistan express their full solidarity and support to the people and Government of China and are confident that they will succeed in eliminating terrorism. As a victim of terrorism itself, the people of Pakistan feel the pain and the sufferings of our Chinese brothers.

01 March 2012. Source: www.mofa.gov.pk

D. EUROPEAN UNION Statement of the Foreign Office on Pakistan-European Union Strategic Dialogue

The first Pakistan-European Union Strategic Dialogue was held in Islamabad on 05 June 2012. The Pakistan side was led by Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar and the European Union delegation was led by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton. The two sides expressed their deep satisfaction at the launching of the Strategic Dialogue, reflecting the comprehensive and forward looking nature of

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EU-Pakistan relations. This dialogue is the result of decisions taken at the 2009 and 2010 Pakistan-EU Summits. Both sides also welcomed the new Five-Year Engagement Plan that demonstrates the strength and diversity of this long term and broad based partnership. The two sides engaged in constructive and detailed discussions on enhancing bilateral cooperation and shared views on regional and international issues of mutual concern. Foreign Minister Khar expressed appreciation for the package of Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATPs) for Pakistan offered by the EU in the aftermath of the devastating 2010 floods. High Representative Ashton conveyed that the process was nearing completion in Brussels, and that the package would be implemented soon. They also discussed the GSP+ scheme and Foreign Minister Khar hoped that Pakistan could be considered for this favourable trading scheme in 2014. The Dialogue provided an opportunity to review EU development cooperation including the broad parameters of the second EU Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) for 2007-2013, which included projects for rural development and natural resource management, education and human resource management, governance and human rights, and trade development. The European Union also reiterated its commitment for area-based community development, particularly in the Malakand Division. High Representative Ashton welcomed the steps Pakistan had taken in implementing its international human rights commitments in national laws in many important areas, including the rights of women, and the establishment of an independent Human Rights Commission. Both sides agreed to work closely in this regard. Foreign Minister Khar reiterated that the Government of Pakistan was committed to holding free and fair elections in accordance with the Constitution. Furthermore, in keeping with Pakistan‟s tradition of welcoming election observers, High Representative Ashton confirmed that the European Union was willing to send an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Pakistan for the forthcoming elections. Pakistan and the EU reaffirmed their shared commitment to work together to combat terrorism. High Representative Ashton expressed appreciation for the enormous sacrifices made by the people of Pakistan in fighting terrorism and extremism. In order to enhance the existing close cooperation on counter-terrorism, the two sides agreed to the establishment of a Pakistan-EU Steering Committee on Counterterrorism. Foreign Minister Khar and High Representative Ashton held in-depth discussions on regional and international issues. They underlined the importance of peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and reaffirmed their support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process. They also underscored the need for the sustained commitment of the international community during the transformation phase in Afghanistan, and agreed to continue working closely in this regard.

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Foreign Minister Khar also briefed High Representative Ashton on the ongoing Pakistan-India peace process and the efforts made by Pakistan to normalize relations with India. Pakistan had reached out to its neighbours to create peace and prosperity in the region. The EU High Representative also expressed support for the ongoing and result-oriented dialogue between Pakistan and India, including the significant progress on liberalizing trade. The two sides agreed that the second round of the Pakistan-EU Strategic Dialogue would be held in Brussels at mutually convenient dates next year.

Islamabad, 05 June 2012, Source: www.mofa.gov.pk.

E. INDIA 1. Joint press statement issued at the fifth meeting of the India-Pakistan committee on prisoners

1. Members of the India-Pakistan Judicial Committee on Prisoners visited Indian Jails in Delhi, Jaipur and Amritsar from 23-27 January 2012. The members of the Committee, Justice (Retd.) Mr A.S Gill and Justice (Retd) Mr. M.A Khan from the Indian side and Justice (Retd.) Mr. Nasir Aslam Zahid and Justice (Retd.) Mian Muhammad Ajmal from Pakistan side visited the Jails. 2. 46 Pakistani Prisoners at Central Jail Tihar, New Delhi, 98 Pakistani Prisoners at Central Jail, Jaipur and 45 Pakistani Prisoners at Central Jail, Amritsar were presented before the Committee. 3. On the conclusion of the visit, the Committee made following recommendations: a) The “Consular Access Agreement” of May 2008 signed between two government must be implemented fully. Consular access must be provided within three months of the arrest and repatriation must take place within one month of confirmation of national status and completion of sentences; b) Consular access must be provided at the earliest to all those prisoners who have not been given consular access so far and the process of nationality confirmation should start immediately after consular access is provided; c) A mechanism should be developed for compassionate and humanitarian consideration to be given to women, juvenile, mentally challenged, old aged and all those prisoners suffering from serious illness/permanent physical disability; d) It was also recommended that serious/terminally and mentally challenged prisoners must be kept in hospitals irrespective of confirmation of their national status and offence;

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e) Prisoners involved in minor offences like violation of Foreigners‟ Act, visa violation and inadvertent border crossing deserve compassion from both the sides; f) The Committee noted that the respective courts must be requested for expeditious trial of all “under trial” prisoners. Provision of legal aid/attorneys to prisoners must be ensured at all stages of their cases; g) The Committee also endorsed the recommendations of the Home/Interior Secretary level talks held on 28-29 March 2011 at New Delhi to task the Pakistani Maritime Security Agency and Coast Guard of India to work on setting up a mechanism for release of inadvertent crossers (fishermen) and their boats, on the same lines as the inadvertent crossers on land; It was recommended that the fishermen should be repatriated by sea lanes along with their boats; h) It was suggested that the next visit of the Committee to Pakistani jails be arranged during the second half of April 2012; i) The Committee will review the action taken report on the earlier recommendations when the Committee meets next in Pakistan. Justice (Retd.) A.S. Gill Justice (Retd.) Nasir Aslam Zahid Justice (Retd.) M.A. Khan Justice (Retd.) Mian Muhammad Ajmal

Islamabad, 27 January 2012.

2. Extension of Pakistan-India ‘Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons’

Pursuant to the understanding reached during the sixth round of Pakistan-India Expert level talks on Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), held in Islamabad on 27 December 2011, the two sides have agreed to extend the validity of the “Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons” for another five years, with effect from 21 February 2012. The Agreement had entered into force on 21 February 2007 for an initial duration of five years. It aims at reducing the risk from accidents related to nuclear weapons. Islamabad, 21 February 2012

3. Joint Statement on India-Pakistan home/ interior secretary talks

1. Under the resumed bilateral dialogue, the second round of India-Pakistan Home/Interior Secretary Talks was held in Islamabad on May 24-25, 2012. The Pakistan delegation was led by Mr. K. M. Siddiq Akbar, Interior Secretary, and the Indian Delegation was led by Shri Raj Kumar Singh, Home Secretary of India. 2. The meeting was held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. 3. Both sides exchanged views on the decisions taken in the last round of Home/ Interior Secretary Talks held in New Delhi in March 2011.

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4. Both sides agreed that terrorism poses a continuing threat to peace and security and full normalization of bilateral relations. They reiterated the firm and undiluted commitment of the two countries to fight and eliminate this scourge in all its forms and manifestations and bring those responsible for such crimes to justice. 5. The Pakistan side provided an update on the ongoing trial and investigation in Pakistan on the Mumbai Terror Attacks. Both sides discussed Judicial Commission‟s visit to India from March 14-21, 2012. Pakistan side noted that it had agreed in principle to receive a Judicial Commission from India. In this regard, modalities, mandate and composition of the Commission will be worked out through diplomatic channels. Pakistan side reiterated its commitment to bring all the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks to justice expeditiously in accordance with due process of law. 6. The Home and the Interior Secretaries agreed to enhance cooperation between the NIA of India and the FIA of Pakistan on issues of mutual concern, including Mumbai terror attacks investigation. 7. India provided information on the on-going Samjhauta Express blast case investigation. It was mentioned by the Indian side that investigation in this case is still ongoing and updated information will be shared with the Pakistan authorities concerned when the investigation is completed. The Indian side agreed to forward updated information on the investigation through diplomatic channel. 8. The Pakistan side noted the technical parameters, suggested by the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), Government of India for establishing a hotline between the Home Secretary of India and the Interior Secretary of Pakistan. Pakistan side would examine the technical parameters and revert. 9. Both sides welcomed the signing of the „MoU on Drug Demand Reduction and Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics Drugs/Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals and related matters‟, during the Eighth Director General level talks between Narcotics Control Bureau of India and Anti Narcotics Force of Pakistan on Drugs Trafficking in September 2011. They expressed the hope that the MoU will help enhance mutual cooperation between India and Pakistan through effective and sustained steps to control the growing menace of drug trafficking. In this context, they also welcomed the outcome of the DG level talks, held at Rawalpindi on September 12-13, 2011, and noted the decision to hold DG level talks on Drugs Trafficking annually. 10. It was decided that CBI and FIA will schedule a meeting at an early date to work out the technical details of moving forward on issues of human trafficking, counterfeit currency, cyber crimes and Red Notices (RNs). Both sides agreed to expeditiously execute all pending RNs. Pakistan side agreed to examine issues pertaining to Letters Rogatory. 11. Both sides welcomed the finalization of the Visa Agreement and agreed to sign it at an early date. The Pakistan side informed that some internal

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approvals were under process and the Agreement will be signed once they are in place. 12. Both sides welcomed the release of prisoners and fishermen, including those suffering from ailments, since the last round of Home/ Interior Secretary Talks. They noted the need to fully implement the understanding reached during the previous Home/ Interior Secretary Talks in March 2011 so that the fishermen and the civilian prisoners who have completed their sentence, and whose nationality status has been confirmed by the respective Governments and whose travel documents have been received, are released without delay. It was also agreed that those fishermen who have completed their sentences will be released by both sides within three months along with their boats, except where the boats have been lost, damaged or confiscated by the courts. It was decided that those prisoners, whose nationality status could not be confirmed either due to lack of information or due to the physical disabilities of the prisoner concerned, would be transferred to charitable institutions in India and Pakistan pending confirmation of their nationality status. 13. Both sides commended the work done by the Judicial Committee on Prisoners and agreed that their work should continue. They also agreed on the need for implementing the 2008 Consular Agreement in letter and spirit. 14. The Secretaries also exchanged views on the issue of inadvertent crossing of fishermen from both sides. The Pakistan side noted the invitation extended by the Indian Coast Guards for a meeting with the Pakistan Maritime Agency in June 2012 in New Delhi. 15. In order to strengthen mutual cooperation in criminal matters, the two sides agreed in principle to initiate negotiations on a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT). In this regard, it was agreed that Pakistan side would examine the draft of the MLAT handed over by the Indian side and revert with comments. 16. The Home Secretary of India thanked the Interior Secretary of Pakistan for the warm hospitality extended to the Indian delegation and the arrangements made for the visit. He invited the Interior Secretary of Pakistan to visit India for the next Home / Interior Secretary level Talks. The invitation was accepted.

Bhurban, May 25, 2012.

4. Joint Statement on defence secretary level talks on Siachen

1. The Defence Secretary level talks between Pakistan and India on Siachen were held at the Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi from 11-12 June 2012. The Pakistan delegation was headed by Ms. Nargis Sethi, Secretary Defence. The Indian delegation was headed by Mr. Shashi Kant Sharma, Defence Secretary of India.

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2. The Defence Secretary of India called on the Minister for Defence Syed Naveed Qamar. 3. The talks were held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. Both sides reaffirmed their resolve to make serious, sustained and result oriented efforts for seeking an amicable resolution of Siachen. It was agreed to continue the dialogue on Siachen in keeping with the desire of the leaders of both countries for early resolution of all outstanding issues. Both sides acknowledged that the ceasefire was holding since 2003. 4. It was agreed that the next round of talks on Siachen will be held in New Delhi on mutually convenient dates, to be fixed through diplomatic channels.

Rawalpindi, 12 June 2012. Source: www.mofa.gov.pk.

F. KASHMIR Message from President Asif Ali Zardari on Kashmir Solidarity Day

The Government and the people of Pakistan observe the Kashmir Solidarity Day by renewing their unswerving support for the just struggle of the Kashmiri people for the realization of their fundamental and inalienable rights. For over six decades, the Kashmiri people have rendered countless sacrifices for upholding their dignity and freedom, pleading for equity and justice and the fulfillment of the promise for the effective exercise of their right to self-determination, as envisaged in the relevant UN resolutions. It is indeed imperative that the noble principles and values, that underpin the just Kashmiri cause, are upheld and supported by all justice and freedom-loving peoples across the world. It is also important that the fundamental human rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir are respected and promoted. In recent years, the peaceful struggle of the people of Jammu and Kashmir has gained in strength and intensity. A new generation of the Kashmiris, including men, women and children, continue to wage a heroic struggle for the realization of their fundamental rights. While seeking a peaceful settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute, Pakistan will continue to express its complete solidarity with the Kashmiris and extend its fullest political, moral and diplomatic support to their just cause.

Islamabad, 5 February 2012. Source: www.mofa.gov.pk.

G. TURKEY Joint declaration of the second meeting of Pakistan-Turkey High Level Cooperation Council

Reaffirming close, friendly and brotherly ties which are deeply rooted in history, and a shared culture;

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Acknowledging that these brotherly bonds which have stood the test of time and transcend geographical distances are developing into a robust, strong and strategic partnership;

Recognizing that the two countries share a common vision and desire for peace and prosperity of their people and their region;

Recalling the Joint Political Declaration on Intensified Cooperation and Establishment of High Level Cooperation Council signed in Islamabad in October 2009 and the Joint Declaration on Enhancing Pakistan-Turkey Partnership signed in Ankara in December 2010;

Desirous of giving further impetus to the excellent relations between the two countries and for translating the gains arising out of their partnership for peace and prosperity into a more meaningful, mutually beneficial, long term cooperation in the economic and commercial areas;

Endorsing the results of the meetings of Joint Working Groups of the High Level Cooperation Council held in Islamabad on 19 and 20 May 2012 and at the 14th Joint Economic Commission held in in Islamabad on 21 May 2012, We as the co-chairs of the Second Meeting of High Level Cooperation Council held in Islamabad, on 22nd May 2012 with the participation of H.E. Bekir Bozdağ, Deputy Prime Minister, H.E. Erdoğan Bayraktar, Minister of Environment and Urban Planning, H.E. Zafer Çağlayan, Minister of Economy, H.E. Taner Yıldız, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, H.E. Binali Yıldırım, Minister of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications, H.E. Mr. Makhdoom Amin Fahim, Minister of Commerce, H.E. Dr. Abdul Hafeez Sheikh, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, H.E. Syed Naveed Qamar, Minister for Water and Power, H.E. Dr. Arbab Alamgir Khan, Minister for Communications, H.E. Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira, Minister for Information and Broadcasting, H.E. Ms. Samina Khalid Ghurki, Minister for National Heritage and Integration, H.E. Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani, Minister for Inter Provincial Coordination, H.E. Mr. Nazar Mohammad Gondal, Minister for CADD, Minister-in-Waiting, H.E. Mr. Salim H. Mandviwalla, Chairman Board of Investment, H.E. Nawabzada Malik Amad, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Members of Parliaments as well as other prominent dignitaries and officials, Agreed as follows:

Political Cooperation The High Level Cooperation Council shall continue to be utilized as a major political forum to steer bilateral relations in all spheres

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Intensive exchanges at the leadership level, parliamentarians, media representatives and businessmen shall be furthered. Mutual support at regional and international forums shall be continued. Annual consultations at the level of Foreign Ministers would be held alternately in Ankara and Islamabad. The first meeting will be hosted by Pakistan in Islamabad in the last quarter of 2012.

Security and Defence Cooperation Cooperation between the security agencies of the two countries would be broadened in the fields of counter terrorism and drug trafficking especially in the areas of capacity building and exchange of experience. The armed forces of the two countries would intensify their ongoing cooperation while defence related industries would focus on joint defence production and related research and development activities.

Finance and Banking Cooperation in the following areas shall be extended through exchange of information and experience: Banking sector including Islamic banking, microfinance banking, trainings and exchange visits; Insurance sector including insurance information center, catastrophe insurance, insurance arbitration methods and private pension system; Capital market regulation, instruments and their implementation; Public debt and risk management systems; Budget (Performance Based Budgeting), Financial Reporting and Internal Financial Control. Cooperation between the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) of Turkey and Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) of Pakistan in the field of anti money laundering and terrorism financing shall be strengthened by sharing information. Means of collaboration between Istanbul Stock Exchange and Karachi Stock Exchange with a view to facilitate cross border listing and portfolio investment, and establishing an electronic exchange link to have trading in stocks listed at both exchanges shall be explored. Implementation of the Currency Swap Arrangement for mutual cooperation signed between the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and the State Bank of Pakistan shall be furthered to maximize benefits.

Trade The existing volume of trade between the two countries does not reflect the real potential of their respective economies. Therefore, all possible efforts to further promote and diversification of bilateral trade shall be exerted, including facilitation of transportation of merchandise as well as conclusion of bilateral Preferential Trade Agreement.

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In order to create mutually agreed facilitative frameworks to substantially enhance economic and commercial relations, the concerned Ministries of the two countries were directed to conclude their technical discussions expeditiously in order to finalize a comprehensive PTA as soon as possible, which would provide comparative advantage to entrepreneurs from both sides. Welcome the conclusion of the treaty on Protection and Promotion of Investments. Call on the corporate sectors of the two countries to invest through joint ventures in the fields of energy, construction, steel production, urban development and agro based industry. Exchange of delegations with a view to enhance bilateral trade and investment in textile and textile machinery, automotive and agricultural industry, food processing industry and all other potential trade and investment sectors shall be encouraged. Pakistan will provide special incentive packages and establish Exclusive Investment Zones for the Turkish companies desirous of investing in Pakistan. Mutual cooperation for further development of economic ties with the Central Asian countries and smooth functioning of regional cooperation initiatives shall be continued. Next meeting of the Turkey-Pakistan Joint Business Council shall be held in September 2012 or in March 2013 in Turkey which will bring up new trade and investment opportunities in both countries.

Railways and Communications Bilateral cooperation to facilitate transit trade and improvement of transport corridors, ship building and repairs, Vessel Tracking System, road construction projects, up-gradation of railway rolling stock and locomotives shall be further enhanced. Training of transport officials for capacity building and exchange of visits of technical experts shall be supported. An improved and efficient rail and road network was important for the promotion of trade and economic linkages. In this respect, operations of Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul Container Train (ECO Train) on a regular and timely basis with the participation of private sectors should be ensured. Turkey‟s strength and expertise in the area of road transport would be utilized for further cooperation in this field. The two countries would explore possibilities of cooperation in the field of Railways including running of High Speed Trains as well as production and repair of passenger and cargo wagons.

Energy Cooperation in power generation shall be developed through strengthening of information sharing on energy projects and facilitation of private sector involvement.

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A meeting will be held in Turkey before the end of 2012 to develop cooperation in the field of renewable energy. Cooperation in the field of geothermal sources, geo-information systems (GIS) and remote sensing shall be developed through exchange of scientific and technical information, exchange of expertise, study visits and training. Cooperation in the fields of coal mining and trade of petroleum products shall be strengthened. A Plan of Action on cooperation in the energy sector would be drawn up as agreed during the meeting of the President of the Republic of Turkey and the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in Islamabad on 2 April 2010. The Joint Working Group on Energy would work on the Plan of Action and would present its recommendations to the next HLCC. The private Pakistani and Turkish companies would be encouraged to set up hydro electric power stations and sub stations on turn-key basis. The two countries would collaborate in the field of renewable and clean energy including wind, solar, geothermal and biogas. The MoU on cooperation in the field of renewable energy signed during the 2nd meeting of HLCC would serve as the basis for this cooperation.

Education Turkey shall supply teachers, curriculum and training materials for Turkish language courses, provided that the Turkish language be introduced in curriculum in Pakistan. Turkey shall provide for training of trainers for general as well as technical and vocational education. Experience shall be shared on developing curricula and list of standards, training materials for use in vocational and technical training schools. A Joint Working Group on Technical and Vocational Training will be constituted and the Terms of Reference will be mutually decided through diplomatic channels. A new exchange programme for civil experts in fields such as energy, transport, agriculture, security services and public administration shall be initiated. This programme shall provide on the job training opportunities to contribute capacity building. Scholarships schemes would be reviewed keeping in view the needs of the students and to place more focus on science and technology education. The proposal to set up Techno parks through cooperation between universities and the corporate sector would be pursued vigorously.

Culture and Tourism The years 2013-2014 shall be celebrated as cultural years in both the countries with a view to underline cultural commonalties and historic relations of their people.

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Cooperation in the field of media should be strengthened through sharing of news and information, exchanges of television programmes and documentaries. In this respect, the MoUs already signed between the state media should be vigorously followed. Film days and exchange of cultural troupes to promote performing arts of two nations and exhibitions of paintings, calligraphies, miniature arts, photographs and folks crafts shall be organized in both countries. Direct contact between museums and institutions as well as exchange of literary work, publication and translation of respective literature of Turkey and Pakistan shall be encouraged The Government of Pakistan shall offer a free ethnographic corner to Turkey in Pakistani museums. Turkey intends to open a cultural center in Pakistan in near future and welcomes the same initiative from Pakistan. Keeping in view their diversified cultures and geographical features Turkey and Pakistan shall cooperate in the area of tourism. In this framework, Turkey and Pakistan shall participate in tourism fairs organized in both countries. Both sides shall invite their tour operators to familiarize them with their touristic destination. Turkey offers training for managers and officials in tourism sector of Pakistan.

Implementation Modalities The seven Joint Working Groups of the High Level Cooperation Council shall continue their work to develop specific programmes and projects. During the Second Meeting of High Level Cooperation Council, a number of MoUs/agreements on cooperation in various fields were signed. The list is annexed. The next meeting of the High Level Cooperation Council shall be held in Ankara in 2013. The dates shall be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. Done in Islamabad on 22 May 2012 in Turkish and English languages, both texts being equally authentic. Recep Tayyip Erdogan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani Prime Minister of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey Islamic Republic of Pakistan

List of MoUs/Agreements 1. Memorandum of Understanding on Solid Waste Management between Karachi Municipality and Albayrak Holding. 2. Protocol between Middle East Technical University and Quaid-i Azam University. 3. Protocol on Cooperation in the Field of Archives between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

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4. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments. 5. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in the Field of Urbanization. 6. Framework Document Between Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications of the Republic of Turkey and Ministry of Communications of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Concerning Cooperation in the Field of International Road Transport. 7. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Cooperation in the Field of Renewable Energy. 8. Joint Economic Commission Protocol. 9. Joint Declaration of the Second Meeting of Turkey-Pakistan High Level Cooperation Council.

24 May 2012, Source: www.mofa.gov.pk.

H. UK 1. Joint Statement issue on the occasion of the first annual summit of the UK-Pakistan Enhanced Strategic Dialogue

1. Prime Minister Gilani of Pakistan and Prime Minister Cameron of the UK today reviewed the significant progress made under the Enhanced Strategic Dialogue between Pakistan and the UK that underscores the enduring partnership between the two countries.

2. The two Prime Ministers noted that since its launch in 2011 the dialogue between the UK and Pakistan has become deeper and broader. At the Summit, the two Prime Ministers reviewed the practical co-operation on shared interests which has intensified across the five areas covered by the Enhanced Strategic Dialogue, including trade, economic growth and development, cultural co-operation, security and education.

Trade and Investment 3. Today Prime Minister Gilani and Prime Minister Cameron launched a Trade and Investment Roadmap, setting out the steps both governments will take to promote investment, support business and achieve the target of increasing bilateral trade to £2.5 billion by 2015. Both Prime Ministers challenged UK companies to look at the opportunities the Pakistan market presents and build on the success of the over 100 UK-based companies already doing business in Pakistan. Prime Minister Gilani pledged his government‟s full support in ensuring an enabling business environment to attract and sustain UK trade with, and investment in, Pakistan.

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4. Prime Minister Gilani expressed appreciation for the UK‟s consistent support to Pakistan for enhanced market access to the European Union. He hoped that the UK would continue to support Pakistan‟s request for GSP+ and early finalization of Autonomous Trade Preferences package. Prime Minister Cameron assured UK‟s continued support in this regard, and also encouraged Pakistani businesses to look at the opportunities the UK offers and its role as a gateway to Europe.

Economics and Development 5. The two Prime Ministers also noted that the global economic crisis requires both countries to make tough decisions in order to deliver future growth and prosperity. They agreed to continue the regular dialogue between their governments on economic reform recognising that economic stability and setting the conditions for enduring growth are key priorities to ensure prosperity for future generations. Both Prime Ministers agreed to a continued close partnership to help lift millions of people out of poverty and build a stable, prosperous and democratic future for Pakistan. Prime Minister Gilani reiterated his personal commitment to improving the quality of education in Pakistan and welcomed UK support in this regard.

6. Prime Minister Cameron reaffirmed that the UK is open for genuine migrants who are coming to the UK to do a legitimate job or study at a genuine institution. Both Prime Ministers committed to preventing illegal migration as it harms people both in Pakistan and the UK. They agreed to continue to work closely under existing agreements on returning to Pakistan individuals who have no legal right to remain in the UK.

Security and Defence 7. Pakistan and the UK have an unwavering commitment to work together to combat the menace of terrorism and extremism which threatens the people of both countries. Prime Minister Cameron recognised the huge sacrifices being made by the people of Pakistan. Both Prime Ministers committed to enhance the already strong co-operation on countering improvised explosive devices, which cause so many of the needless deaths in Pakistan.

8. The two Prime Ministers held in-depth discussions on regional and international issues of mutual interest. They underscored the importance of peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and reaffirmed their support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process. They discussed the remaining challenges and agreed to continue working closely on Afghanistan. Prime Minister Gilani briefed Prime Minister Cameron on the recommendations approved by the Parliament regarding reengagement with the US and also briefed him on the ongoing Pakistan-India Peace process.

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9. Prime Minister Cameron pledged his support for a return to international cricket being played in Pakistan and offered to share the UK's experience in protecting large sporting events. The visiting delegation was briefed on the UK's preparations for the Olympics on a tour of the UK's Crisis Response Centre, the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR).

Democracy 10. This is an important time for Pakistan. The current government is the longest serving civilian government in Pakistan‟s history. Prime Minister Gilani stated that his Government was committed to holding free and fair elections in accordance with the constitution.

Cultural Co-operation 11. The UK and Pakistan enjoy uniquely rich people-to-people links and growing cultural exchange. British Pakistanis continue to make a positive and active contribution to life in the UK. As part of celebrating the connections between the two countries the Prime Ministers welcomed the Cultural Roadmap that would further intensify the vibrant links between school children, students, young professionals, cultural institutions and higher education sectors.

12. The close personal connections between the citizens of the two countries are just one of the many distinctive characteristics in UK – Pakistan relations. Pakistan‟s future matters greatly to the UK and the UK will be an enduring friend to the government and people of Pakistan. Both countries are committed to working together as equals to create the conditions for greater prosperity and security in Pakistan and the UK.

10 May 2012.

2. Press statement on the visit of the prime minister’s to the uk for the first annual review of the pakistan-uk enhanced strategic dialogue (10 may 2012)

 Prime Minister Gilani has completed a very successful and productive visit to the UK from the 8th of May to the 13th of May 2012. Last year, during his trip to Pakistan, Prime Minister Cameron referred to the relationship as being unbreakable. Pakistan is equally committed to the relationship with the UK.  The primary purpose of the visit was to reaffirm the partnership and take it to the next level by conducting the first Summit-level annual review of the Enhanced Strategic Dialogue (ESD) between Pakistan and the UK.  The ESD constitutes the five key areas of the Pakistan-UK relationship, namely trade & investment, economic growth & development, security, education and cultural cooperation.

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 Prime Minister Gilani had extensive and constructive discussions with Prime Minister David Cameron around these core issues. They also exchanged views on regional and international issues of mutual interest, including the peace and stability in Afghanistan.  Prime Minster Gilani also had useful interactions with a range of other British leaders, including the Opposition Leader Edward Miliband as well as UK Cabinet members including the Ministers for i. Foreign Affairs, ii. Defence, iii. Trade and Investment, iv. Development, v. Interior, vi. and Energy.  The most substantive outcomes of the summit-level annual review of the ESD was the joint launching of two roadmaps by Prime Minister Gilani and Prime Minister Cameron. i. “Trade and Investment Roadmap” and ii. the Roadmap on Cultural and educational exchange.  The Trade and Investment Roadmap envisages increasing bilateral trade to £ 2.5 billion by 2015. To kick-start the Roadmap, Prime Minister Gilani met with select businessmen and investors both at the London Stock Exchange and at the Standard Chartered Bank.  The Cultural & Educational exchange roadmap seeks to deepen and advance the people to people relationship between the two countries. Over one million Britons are of Pakistani origin or descent. They represent a tremendous asset to their own country, the UK as well as to the country of their origin.  The UK‟s development assistance is among the better harmonized and aligned in Pakistan. It tends to reflect the development priorities of Pakistan. The UK has committed almost £ 1.4 billion over four years (2011- 2015), with a large share of this investment in primary education in Pakistan.  One of the foundations of the Pakistan UK relationships is our shared commitment to democracy and democratic institutions. The visit also afforded a good opportunity for parliamentary contacts. Prime Minister Gilani addressed parliamentarians from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. He also met members of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.  Prime Minister David Cameron joined Prime Minister Gilani at the launch of the “Conservative Party Friends of Pakistan” – a welcome initiative by Baroness Saeeda Warsi to enhance existing parliamentary ties.  The Prime Minister also met with the Pakistani community – which is as large and vibrant a Pakistani diaspora as any in the world. He addressed the British Pakistan Foundation, laid the Foundation stone of the Consular Hall

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at our High Commission and met with members of the Pakistani media, as well as British media that focus on the Pakistani community.  To enhance linkages between institutions of higher education, the Prime Minister addressed a Roundtable with Vice Chancellors of British Universities.  The Prime Minister also extended an invitation to Prime Minister Cameron to visit Pakistan next year for the second Summit level review.  It is hard for us to overstate the value and importance that we place on our ties with the United Kingdom. We tend to agree with Prime Minister Cameron‟s description of our relationship as being “unbreakable”. For reasons of mutual interest, mutual benefit, mutual history and a mutual future, the Pakistan-UK relationship is indeed unbreakable. The visit to the UK, helped reaffirm its strength and vitality.  I look forward to your questions

Islamabad, 14 May 2012, Source: www.mofa.gov.pk.

I. USA Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar’s reported statement on draft resolution in the US House of Representatives on Balochistan

In a statement, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar took a strong exception to a draft resolution submitted in the US House of Representatives on Balochsitan, yesterday. She said that, though an isolated move by a few individuals, the draft resolution was contrary to the principles of UN Charter and international law. The Foreign Minister said that the draft resolution was also against the very fundamentals of the long-standing Pakistan-US relations. The National Assembly of Pakistan had unanimously adopted a resolution condemning a recent open hearing on Balochistan by the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on Oversight and Investigations. The National Assembly resolution had clearly represented the legitimate reaction of the people of Pakistan. The Foreign Minister said that such an unfriendly and irresponsible attempt by a few individuals in Washington was aimed to create distrust between the peoples of the two countries. She expressed the hope that this latest tendentious move will not be allowed to sail through the House by a vast majority of US Congressmen who continued to support friendly relations between the two countries.

Islamabad, 18 February 2012, Source: www.mofa.gov.pk.

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II: Judiciary

1. Text of Supreme Court Order in NRO Case in the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Appellate Jurisdiction)

PRESENT: Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa Mr. Justice Ejaz Afzal Khan Mr. Justice Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry Mr. Justice Gulzar Ahmed Mr. Justice Muhammad Ather Saeed

Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 486 of 2010 in Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 2002 AND

Adnan A. Khawaja … Appellant versus The State … Respondent Suo Moto Case No. 4 of 2010 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1080 of 2010 AND Civil Miscellaneous Applications No. 1238 and 1239 of 2010

(Suo Moto action regarding appointment of convicted person namely Ahmed Riaz Sheikh (NRO Beneficiary), as Additional Director General, Federal Investigation Agency

Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1253 of 2010 in Suo Moto Case No. 4 of 2010

(Report submitted in Court by Attorney General regarding Facts Finding Inquiry in the case of Missing Letter No. PS/DG/FIA/ 2009/504749 dated 17.11.2009)

Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1254 of 2010 in Suo Moto Case No. 4 of 2010 AND

(Additional Documents comprising of Interim Report filed by Secretary Law dated 04.04.2010, pointes formulated by Secretary for Hon`ble Court, Advice of Former Attorney-General and Authorization letter in favour of Mr. Hassan Wasim Afzal, Joint Secretary of Ehtisab Bureau dated 20.05.1998)

Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1082 of 2010

(Report/Minutes of Hon`ble Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, Lahore)

For Federation: Moulvi Anwar-ul-Haq, Attorney General for Pakistan

On behalf of National Accountability Bureau:

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Mr. K.K. Agha, Prosecutor-General National Accountability Bureau Mr. Fasih A. Bokhari, Chairman National Accountability Bureau Mr. Akbar Tarar, Addl. PG. NAB Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Addl. PG. NAB Sheikh Muhammad Shoaib, Assistant Director, NAB Mr. Mohsin Ali Khan, Assistant Director, NAB

In attendance: Mr. Ahsan Raja, Ex. Additional Secretary Ministry of Interior along with his counsel Raja Zulgarnain, ASC

For Ahmad Riaz Sheikh: Dr. A. Basit, Sr. ASC

On behalf of Secretary Law: Nemo

Date of hearing: 10.01.2012

ORDER Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J.: 1. This order may be read in continuation of the order passed by this Court on the last date of hearing, i.e. 03.01.2012. 2. We have heard the learned Attorney-General for Pakistan, the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau and the learned Prosecutor-General Accountability and have been dismayed by the fact no progress worth any mention has been made by all concerned in the matters mentioned in the order dated 03.01.2012. The learned Prosecutor-General Accountability has submitted and read out two reports dated 09.01.2012 wherein it has categorically been concluded that the National Accountability Bureau has decided not to proceed in the matters of Mr. Adnan Khawaja and Mr. Ahmad Riaz Sheikh despite clear directions issued by this Court in those regards earlier on. The said reports have been found by us to be utterly unsatisfactory and we find that an attempt has been made through the said reports to screen, shield and protect all those in public offices who were involved in appointments/promotion of the said convicted persons. Upon our query the learned Prosecutor-General Accountability has confirmed the fact that in the reports mentioned above a clear conclusion about lack of criminal intent of all concerned and involved has been recorded without even holding a formal inquiry or investigation, which we have found to be strange and unusual. The learned Prosecutor-General Accountability has gone on to submit that even in the matter of proceeding against Malik Muhammad Qayyum, a former Attorney-General for Pakistan, a decision has been taken by the National Accountability Bureau not to initiate or take any proceeding despite a clear direction having been issued by this Court in that respect.

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The Chairman, National Accountability Bureau has not only owned the above mentioned reports but has adopted a defiant attitude by stating before us that the decision whether to proceed against any person under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 or not is a decision which falls within his exclusive jurisdiction and he has decided not to proceed against any person in the matters of Mr. Adnan Khawaja, Mr. Ahmad Riaz Sheikh and Malik Muhammad Qayyum. He has stated before us in most categorical terms that no inquiry or investigation is warranted in those matters and he has stated so in contemptuous disregard of the fact that this Court has already passed an order for taking proceedings in those matters. We have particularly noticed the defiant posture and position adopted by the Chairman and have been struck by his willful disobedience to the earlier directions issued by this Court. It appears that instead of obeying the directions of this Court he (chairman, NAB) has decided to take this Court head on, which attitude we find to be contumacious, to say the least. The Federal Secretary Law, Justice and Human Rights Division was absent from this Court on the last date of hearing on account of being abroad and even today he has failed to appear and we have been informed that he is unwell and is receiving medical treatment but nothing has been produced before us to substantiate the same. It appears that he prefers foreign sojourns upon his commitments before the highest Court of the country. The learned Attorney-General for Pakistan has stated that there is no change in the situation since the last date of hearing and no step in furtherance of this Court`s earlier directions has been taken by anybody during the interregnum. We have also heard Mr. Ahsan Raja who has tried to convince us that he had no malicious intent in the matter of promotion of Mr. Ahmad Riaz Sheikh. 3. The judgment in the case of Dr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 265) had been passed by this Court way back on 16.12.2009 and in that judgment this Court had issued some very clear and specific directions to the Federal Government and others which were required by the Court to be implemented and executed immediately. Later on a review petition filed against that judgment was dismissed by this Court and orders were again issued to the Federal Government and others to carry out the directions of this Court without any further loss of time. However, various interim orders passed by this Court in the present and other proceedings bear ample testimony to the unfortunate fact that over the last about two years the Federal Government has demonstrated no interest in carrying out some of the directions of this Court. It is quite clear to us by now that the Federal Government and the National Accountability Bureau are not serious in the matter at all and those concerned are only interested in delaying and prolonging the matter on one pretext or the other. On the last date of hearing it had been made clear to all concerned that they were being given the last and final opportunity till today and it appears that they have consciously decided to defy and disobey this Court.

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This Court has already shown a lot of grace and magnanimity in the matter and has demonstrated a lot of patience and restraint in this regard over the last about two years but in the present dismal and most unfortunate state of affairs the Court is left with no other option but to, as warned in categorical terms on the last date of hearing, take appropriate actions in order to uphold and maintain the dignity of this Court and to salvage and restore the delicately poised constitutional balance in accord with the norms of constitutional democracy. [We are conscious that the actions we propose to take are quite unpleasant but maintaining the necessary constitutional poise and balance is a part of our duties,....] particularly when we have made an oath before Allah Almighty to `preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan` and to `in all circumstances do right to all manner of people, according to law, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will`. 4. When the Objectives Resolution of 1949,made a substantive part of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 by Article 2A thereof, mandates that `the independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured` and when Article 37(d) of the Constitution stipulates it as a Principle of Policy that the State shall `ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice` the Constitution does not contemplate an `independent` judiciary whose decisions may be flouted with impunity or implementation of whose judgments may be left to the whims or caprice of an indifferent Executive. Likewise, when Article 189 of the Constitution gives the decisions of the Supreme Court `binding` effect and when Article 190 of the Constitution commands in no uncertain terms that `All executive and judicial authorities throughout Pakistan shall act in aid of the Supreme Court` the Constitution does not envision an Executive professing only `respect` towards the decisions of the Supreme Court but at the same time derisively or disdainfully paying little or no heed to implementation or execution of such decisions. [Obedience to the command of a court, and that too of the Apex Court of the country, is not a game of chess or a game of hide and seek.] It is, of course, a serious business and governance of the State and maintaining the constitutional balance and equilibrium cannot be allowed to be held hostage to political tomfoolery or shenanigans. Article 5 of the Constitution declares in most unambiguous terms that `(1) Loyalty to the State is the basic duty of every citizen. (2) Obedience to the Constitution and law is the inviolable obligation of every citizen`. In a recent interview with Mr. Hamid Mir on Geo Television the Co-Chairperson of the major political party in the ruling coalition at the federal level, who also happens to be the President of Pakistan, has categorically stated that under his Co- Chairpersonship his political party has taken a political decision not to obey some part of the judgment handed down by this Court in the case of Dr. Mobashir Hassan (supra). Even the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Federal Minister for Law, Justice and Human Rights Division have been harping on the same theme for quite some time on different occasions

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through speeches made on the floors of the National Assembly and the Senate and also through print and electronic media. Their conduct in the matter also goes a long way in confirming what they have been proclaiming. [Such an attitude, approach and conduct prima facie shows that the Co-Chairperson of the said political party, the Prime Minister and the Federal Minister for Law, Justice and Human Rights Division have allowed loyalty to a political party and its decisions to outweigh and outrun their loyalty to the State and their `inviolable obligation` to obey the Constitution and all its commands.] We may unhesitatingly observe that in our country governed by a Constitution political loyalty cannot be accepted as stronger than loyalty to the State and dictates of a political master or party cannot be allowed to be put up as a defence to failure to obey the Constitution. The old sage Aristotle had once observed that `When laws do not rule, there is no Constitution`. Justice Louis Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court had observed in the case of Olmstead v. United States (227 U.S. 438, 485) that `In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy‟. As already observed above, we the Judges of the Supreme Court have made an oath before Allah Almighty to `preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan` and, thus, it is our bounden duty to take appropriate action whenever we find that the Constitution is not being obeyed or its express commands are, wittingly or otherwise, being disregarded. Let nobody forget that in the not too distant past we stuck to our commitment to the Constitution and constitutionalism and were not shy of giving personal sacrifices for fulfillment of that commitment. 5. This brings us to the actions we may take against willful disobedience to and non-compliance of some parts of the judgment rendered and some of the directions issued by this Court in the case of Dr. Mobashir Hassan (supra). This Court has inter alia the following options available with it in this regard:

Option No. 1: [In such a case of a brazen and blatant failure or refusal of the Federal Government to obey and execute the relevant judgment and directions of this Court the buck stops at the office of the Chief Executive of the Federation, i.e. the Prime Minister.] At the time of entering upon his exalted office the Prime Minister had made an oath that „– I am a Muslim and believe in the Unity and Oneness of Almighty Allah, the Books of Allah, the Holy Quran being the last of them, – the Day of Judgment, and all the requirements and

266 Pakistan Perspectives teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah`. He had further sworn before Allah Almighty that `as Prime Minister of Pakistan, I will discharge my duties, and perform my functions, honestly, to the best of my ability, faithfully in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the law` and that `I will not allow my personal interest to influence my official conduct or my official decisions`. While invoking the name of Allah, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful, and also seeking His help and guidance, the Prime Minister had also made an oath that `I will preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan`. It is evident that in his oath the Prime Minister had made an unambiguous commitment with Allah Almighty not only to conduct himself completely in accord with the commands and requirements of the Constitution, including those of Articles 2A, 37(d), 189 and 190 thereof, but also totally in sync with the requirements and teachings of the Holy Quran. In the matter of making of oaths the Holy Quran has inter alia ordained as follows:

`And make not Allah`s name an excuse in your oaths against doing good, or acting rightly, or making peace between persons; For Allah is One who heareth and knoweth all things. Allah will not call you to account for thoughtlessness in your oaths, but for the intention in your heart; And He is oft-forgiving, most forbearing.` (S. II: 224-225) `Allah will not call you to account for what is futile in your oaths, but He will call you to account for your deliberate oaths: – But keep to your oaths. Thus Allah makes clear to you His signs, that ye may be grateful‟. `And take not your oaths, to practise deception between yourselves, with the result that somebody`s foot may slip after it was firmly planted, and ye may have to taste the evil consequences of having hindered men from the path of Allah, and a mighty wrath descend on you‟. (S. XVI: 94) „They swear their strongest oaths by Allah that, if only thou wouldst command them, they would leave their homes. Say: Swear ye not; Obedience is more reasonable; Verily Allah is well acquainted with all ye do.` (S. XXIV: 53) `God has already ordained for you, (O men), the dissolution of your oaths (in some cases): and God is your protector, and He is full of knowledge and wisdom.` (S. LXVI: 2) `Heed not the type of despicable man, -ready with oaths` (S. LXVIII: 10) According to clause (f) of Article 62(1) of the Constitution `A person shall not be qualified to be elected or chosen as a member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) unless – he is sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest and ameen, there beine no declaration to the contrary by a court of law` (underlining has been supplied for emphasis). By virtue of Article 113 of the Constitution the same qualifications are also required for election to or being chosen as a member of a Provincial Assembly. In the above mentioned backdrop the apparent persistent, obstinate and contumacious resistance, failure or refusal of the Chief Executive of the Federation, i.e. the Prime Minister to completely obey, carry out or execute the directions issued by this Court in the case of Dr. Mobashir Hassan (supra) reflects, at least prima facie, that he may not be an `honest` person on account of his not being honest to the oath of his office and

Documents 267 seemingly he may not be an `ameen` due to his persistent betrayal of the trust reposed in him as a person responsible for preserving, protecting and defending the Constitution and also on account of allowing his personal political interest to influence his official conduct and decisions. According to the Preamble to the Constitution `sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust` and `the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people`. [A chosen representative of the people deliberately violating such a sacred trust and disregarding his commitment in that regard with Allah Almighty may hardly qualify to be accepted as `ameen`.] In the circumstances of this case mentioned above this Court has an option to record a finding in the above mentioned regards and it may hand down a declaration to that effect in terms of clause (f) of Article 62(1) of the Constitution which finding or declaration may have the effect of a permanent clog on the Prime Minister`s qualification for election to or being chosen as a member of Majlise Shoora (Parliament) or a Provincial Assembly. Somewhat similar oaths had also been made by the Co-Chairperson of the relevant political party before entering upon the office of the President of Pakistan and by the Federal Minister for Law, Justice and Human Rights Division before entering upon the office of a Federal Minister and apparent breaches of their oaths may also entail the same consequences.

Option No. 2: Proceedings may be initiated against the Chief Executive of the Federation, i.e. the Prime Minister, the Federal Minister for Law, Justice and Human Rights Division and the Federal Secretary Law, Justice and Human Rights Division for committing contempt of this Court by persistently, obstinately and contumaciously resisting, failing or refusing to implement or execute in full the directions issued by this Court in its judgment delivered in the case of Dr. Mobashir Hassan (supra). It may not be lost sight of that, apart from the other consequences, by virtue of the provisions of clauses (g) and (h) of Article 63(1) read with Article 113 of the Constitution a possible conviction on such a charge may entail a disqualification from being elected or chosen as, and from being, a member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) or a Provincial Assembly for at least a period of five years.

Option No. 3: In exercise of its powers under Article 187 of the Constitution read with Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 and all other enabling provisions this Court may appoint a Commission to execute the relevant parts of the judgment passed and directions issued in the case of Dr. Mobashir Hassan (supra).

Option No. 4: Although in the present proceedings nobody has so far raised the issue pertaining to the protections contemplated by Article 248 of the Constitution yet if anybody likely to be affected by exercise of these options by

268 Pakistan Perspectives this Court wishes to be heard on that question then an opportunity may be afforded to him in that respect before exercise of any of these options.

Option No. 5: It is a statutory duty of the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 to proceed against any person prima facie involved in misuse of authority while holding a public office. On the last date of hearing, i.e. 03.01.2012 this Court had directed the Chairman to attend to the matters of appointment of Mr. Adnan Khawaja as Managing Director of the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) against merit and appointment/promotion of Mr. Ahmed Riaz Sheikh as Additional Director, Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) at a time when both of them were convicted persons and to proceed against all those who were responsible for such appointments/promotion. The Chairman has also failed so far to initiate any action against Malik Muhammad Qayyum, former Attorney General for Pakistan, in view of the direction issued in that regard in the judgment passed in the case of Dr Mobashir Hassan (supra), as modified in review to his extent. Today the Chairman has appeared before this Court in person and he has not only failed to advance any satisfactory explanation for his inaction in the above mentioned regards but has also manifested defiance towards this Court by categorically refusing to carry out the earlier directions issued by this Court qua proceeding in the matter of the above mentioned persons. Such inaction on his part in derogation of his statutory duty prima facie amounts to misconduct attracting the last part of section 6(b)(i) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 dealing with removal of the Chairman from his office. Apart from that we have gathered an impression that he has attempted to screen, shield and protect the relevant persons from criminal charges which may attract consequences in some criminal and other laws. In these circumstances appropriate recommendations or directions may be made or issued by this Court in such regards.

Option No. 6: The constitutional balance vis-àvis trichotomy and separation of powers between the Legislature, the Judiciary and the Executive is very delicately poised and if in a given situation the Executive is bent upon defying a final judicial verdict and is ready to go to any limit in such defiance then instead of insisting upon the Executive to implement the judicial verdict and thereby running the risk of bringing down the constitutional structure itself this Court may exercise judicial restraint and leave the matter to the better judgment of the people of the country or their representatives in the Parliament to appropriately deal with the delinquent. After all the ultimate ownership of the Constitution and of its organs, institutions, mechanisms and processes rests with the people of the country and there may be situations where the people themselves may be better suited to force a recalcitrant to obey the Constitution. It may be advantageous to reproduce here the relevant words of the Preamble to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973: `we, the people of Pakistan – Do hereby,

Documents 269 through our representatives in the National Assembly, adopt, enact and give to ourselves, this Constitution`. 6. The learned Attorney-General for Pakistan is hereby put on notice to address arguments before this Court on the next date of hearing, after obtaining instructions from those concerned, as to why any of the above mentioned options may not be exercised by us in these matters. It goes without saying that any person likely to be affected by exercise of the above mentioned options may appear before this Court on the next date of hearing and address this Court in the relevant regard so that he may not be able to complain in future that he had been condemned by this Court unheard. The learned Attorney-General for Pakistan is directed to inform all such persons mentioned above about the passage of this order and also about the next date of hearing. 7. On account of constitutional importance of these matters the Honourable Chief Justice is requested to consider the desirability of hearing of these matters on the next date of hearing by a Larger Bench of this Court. 8. Adjourned to 16.01.2012 on which date the learned Attorney-General for Pakistan, the Federal Secretary Law, Justice and Human Rights Division, the Chairman National Accountability Bureau and the learned Prosecutor- General Accountability shall appear before this Court in person.

Islamabad, 10th January 2012, Source: Dawn News, Karachi 11 January 2012.

2. Text of Supreme Court Order in Balochistan Case

(Original Jurisdiction) Present. Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, HCJ Mr. Justice Khilji Arif Hussain Mr. Justice Tariq Parvez Const. P.77 of 2010 and HRCs No.13124-P, 40303-P, 40220-G and 43103- B/2011 And C.M.A. 42-43/2012 President Balochistan High Court Bar Association Petitioner VERSUS Federation of Pakistan & others Respondents AND C.M.A NO.431 OF 2012 In Const. Petition No.77 of 2010 (Gruesome & Sensational Murder of wife and daughter of Mir Bakhtiar Domki at Karachi on 30.01.2012) AND C.M.A NO.178-Q OF 2012 In Const. P.No.77 of 2010 (Appeal for missing persons cases of Balochistan) For the petitioner (s): Syed Ayaz Zahoor, Sr. ASC

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Mr. Hadi Shakeel Ahmed, ASC Mr. Kamran Murtaza, ASC Syed Qair Shah, ASC Malik Zahoor Shahwani, Adv. President Balochistan High Court Bar Complainants: Mr. Nasrullah Baloch, Voice for Baloch Missing Persons Ms. Sumaira Baloch, Azam Khan and Ms. Rukhsana Baloch On Court Notice: Malik Sikandar Khan, DAG For Govt. of Balochistan: Mr. Amanullah Kanrani, Advocate General Mr. Naseebullah Bazai, Secy. Home Deptt. Rao Amin Hashim, I.G. P. Mr. Ahsan Mahboob, CCPO, Quetta Mr. Hamid Shakeel, DIG Quetta Qazi Abdul Wahid, DIG Operation Mr. Noshed Younis, AIG Crime/Focal Person for Missing Persons. Mr. Fared Barech, SP Operation Fayaz Bhatti, SP Investigation Muhammad Tariq, SP City Noor Muhammad, SHO Zafar Iqbal, Dy.Dir. Home Deptt. For FC Maj.Gen.Obaidullah, IG For Sindh Police: Mr. Mushtaq Mahr, DIG. CID Mr. Naeem Sheikh, SSP For M/o Defence & IB: Nemo Date of Hearing: 06-04-2012

ORDER 1. In pursuance of earlier order of this Court dated 05.04.2012, the learned Deputy Attorney General, in respect of the statement made by the Provincial Ministers namely M/s Sadiq Umrani and Ali Madad Jattak, dated 06.02.2012, on the floor of House of Provincial Assembly, whereby they involved FC Personnel in kidnapping two persons and consequently murdering them in the area of Mastung, has submitted that such statement

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has been contradicted by the PRO of Inspector General of FC on 07.02.2012 and this report also appeared in various Newspapers. 2. Apparently, the allegations are of very serious nature and entail independent consequences in terms of Article 63(1)(g) of the Constitution, which reads as under:- 63(1) A person shall be disqualified from being elected or chosen as, and from being, member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), if- (a) .... (b) .... (c) .... (d) .... (e) .... (f) .... (g) he has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction for propagating any opinion, or acting in any manner, prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan, or the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or the integrity, or independence of the judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings into ridicule the judiciary or the Armed Forces of Pakistan, unless a period of five years has lapsed since his release; We prima-facie are of the opinion that contradiction on behalf of Inspector General of FC itself is not sufficient, as compared to the statements of two chosen representatives on the floor of the House of Assembly because presumption is that a representative, who takes oath under the Constitution, is fully aware of consequences of the statement, whichever is being made. 3. We had directed the learned Attorney General for Pakistan to appear before this Court in the instant case, particularly, in the context of said statements to provide assistance that how the controversy can be resolved because on the one hand there is a Force i.e. FC, which has been called out to assist the civil administration and on the other hand there is a statement on the floor of the Assembly made by the representatives, but he has not attended the Court and sent a request for adjournment stating that he could not reach Quetta. In view of the importance of the matter regarding law & order situation, prevailing in Balochistan Province, it was his duty to be present here because he is the person, who represents the Federation and for such reason he should have made arrangements before time to reach Quetta to attend this Court instead of giving preference to other matters at Islamabad and thereby he has not given any importance to this Court. Therefore, we record our displeasure and direct him to be careful in future to attend this Court instead of giving preference to his other professional engagements. However, we postpone this case with direction that he should collect necessary documents and provide assistance in this behalf. 4. Meanwhile, the learned Advocate General is also put to notice to look into this aspect carefully and provide assistance to pass an appropriate order in this behalf.

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5. The learned Deputy Attorney General has stated that directions relating to the Federal Government shall be adequately responded to before the next date of hearing, as on account of non-availability of the learned Attorney General instructions have not been obtained from the concerned quarters. 6. Mr. Hamid Shakeel, Acting DIG (Investigation) has stated that he would submit a comprehensive report about the status/position of Hafiz Saeed-ur- Rehman S/o Allah Bakhsh, who is missing since 2003 and in view of the letter dated 06.06.2009, received from Ministry of Interior, National Crisis Management Cell, Islamabad, he is undergoing imprisonment in Gujranwala Jail. He is directed to collect a report and submit the same to the Registrar of this Court by Monday i.e. 09.04.2012 through fax for our perusal in Chambers. A copy of the same shall also be handed over to the President, Balochistan High Court of Bar Association. 7. Similarly, the Inspector General of Police and Home Secretary, Balochistan are directed to collect the names of the missing persons from the President of Balochistan High Court Bar Association, who would prepare a list on the basis of the reports received from Pakistan Human Rights Commission and make all necessary efforts to trace out them. Needless to observe, if any one of them is found involved in the cases relating to any offence, they should be charged according to the relevant provisions of law instead of illegally detaining them by any of the agencies. We have repeated time and again that as far as the detention of such persons/missing persons is concerned, it cannot be condoned unless it is proved that they are involved in some of the cases. 8. It is also to be noted that in the list prepared by the Home Secretary about 265 persons have died in target killings on sectarian reasons and only few persons have been arrested and so far no breakthrough has been made either by the police or by the Levies, although such incidents are being repeated off and on as during the last 10 days two incidents took place and prior to it, 15; 39; 81; 118; and 10 persons have been killed in 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; and 2012, respectively. Both the agencies are directed to probe into the matters, bring the accused persons into book so they may face trial before the Courts of law. In this behalf, they are also directed to take interest in tracing out the accused persons, who are involved in the commission of offence because prima facie it seems that in number of cases the accused persons have not been traced out so far and the cases are pending investigation without any progress. 9. It has been informed by the Home Secretary that 227 Personnel of Frontier Corps have been killed during this period on account of target killings. The IGP should also point out that as to whether FIRs of such cases have been registered and if so, what is the progress of the cases, and if any accused is involved therein then as to whether he has been tried by the Courts and what are the results of the trial. 10. During the course of hearing, we have noted with great concern that two persons had died in the area of Saryab and an FIR to this effect was

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registered against unknown persons, but the police without showing much interest except registering the case had not made any progress. Similarly, it has been reported that in the same manner two persons were found dead today in the area of Mastung, one of them has been identified as Hafiz Munawar. The Home Secretary and Inspector General of Police, Balochistan are directed to look into this case as well and trace out the culprits. 11. We may point out that as far as commission of the ordinary offences is concerned, the same do take place in the society on account of different considerations between the inhabitants, but in the cases where there are target killings; kidnappings/abductions for ransom; missing persons; and dead bodies are found, the law enforcement agencies are not taking interest otherwise we are of the opinion, as also observed in order dated 05.04.2012, that they are capable to deliver, however, it seems that interest with commitment is not being shown and such matters are taken by them lightly. 12. It is to be noted that in view of the grave situation of law and order, prevailing in the Province lot of problems are generated and as there are allegations and counter allegations against different sects and persons, therefore, the Provincial Administration as well as Federal Government must take interest and ensure that the rule of law is fully restored without any concession to any one whosoever be he, otherwise it would entail its own consequences. 13. No report has been submitted in respect of Dr. Din Muhammad, missing since long. The Inspector General of Police is directed to take all necessary steps to effect his recovery as prima facie there is sufficient clue available on record to trace him out and in this behalf, if need be, the IGP may hold a meeting with other law enforcement agencies like FC and secrete agencies working in the Province for the purpose and ensure that all those persons, who are missing, are traced out without further wastage of time. 14. Vide order dated 05.04.2012, directions were also issued to recover and produce the persons, who are missing with effect from 01.03.2012 from the area of New Saryab. In compliance of the order Muhammad Javed, Hazar Khan and Mazar Khan Sons of Habib Khan Murree and Malik Sher S/o Amir Khan Murree have been produced and according to the SHO, PS New Saryab FIR No.36 of 2012 dated 05.04.2012 has been registered against them under Sections 34, 365, 147, 148 & 149, PPC. It has also been stated in the report that on 22.03.2012 Muhammad Sher and Muhammad Hanif Sons of Habib Khan and Laal Muhammad S/o Doran Khan and Mir Khan S/o Amir Khan, who were also included in the missing persons, have returned to their homes. Mst. Sumaira, who is one of the relatives of the aforesaid missing persons, has confirmed that they have already come back, but so far as Amir Khan s/o Gul Bahar, Gul Mir and Mir Khan are concerned, they have not been produced. According to the report submitted by SHO, they are making efforts to effect their recoveries.

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The Home Secretary and IG Police are directed to effect their recovery and submit report by fax on or before 10th April, 2012 to the Registrar of this Court for our perusal in Chambers and passing appropriate orders, if need be. 15. One Adam Khan son of Haji Sher Muhammad appeared and stated that his brother Mazar Khan was picked up by some persons in presence of Noor Muhammad, SHO and despite of his hue and cry, the SHO has not listen to him and so far his brother has not been recovered. The SHO, present in Court, in connection with some other cases, has stated that without prejudice to the plea of the applicant, he may be allowed an opportunity to recover his brother. He is allowed to do so and submit report through his IG Police to the Registrar of this Court by tomorrow i.e. 07.04.2012, which shall be put up in Chambers for our perusal and passing appropriate orders, if need be. 16. One Ms. Rukhsana Baloch has appeared and stated that on 03.04.2012 his brother Dr. Naseer alongwith his two friends namely Akhtar Lango and Hafeez Rodaini were picked up from a Hotel near their house and that the matter has been reported to the police, but so far no action has been taken. When inquired from the IG Police, he stated that as per the version of Muhammad Tariq, SP City, Quetta, a report has been registered in the daily Roznamcha about the missing of three persons. However, when asked as to why FIR has not been registered, he stated that as the complainant Ali Muhammad Baloch has nominated the officials, therefore, FIR was not registered. The explanation offered by him is not acceptable because he should have proceeded in accordance with law. We failed to understand that how and under what authority from an area where the police has jurisdiction, the citizens are being picked up in the manner, as it has been stated before us by various complainants. However, the IG Police ensures us that recovery of these persons shall be affected and the law shall take its own course. Intimation in this behalf shall be submitted to the Registrar of this Court by 10.04.2012 for our perusal in Chambers. 17. Mr. Sajid Tareen, Vice President of Balochistan High Court Bar Association has submitted an application wherein he stated that in the month of February, 2012 thirty (30) persons were picked up in presence of Azam Bazai, Tehsildar from the area of Tutak Sub Tehsil Baghbana, District Khuzdar and their properties were also set on fire. However, later on 14 persons have been released, but 16 persons are still missing. Notice of this application be given to the Home Secretary with direction to take all necessary steps to effect recovery of the aforesaid 16 persons. Meanwhile, Home Secretary shall also examine the Tehsildar and record his statement. He should complete this exercise and submit report to the Registrar on or before 16th April, 2012 for our perusal. Copy of this application be also sent to Tehsildar for his explanation/reply. On receipt of reply, if filed by him, copies shall be given to Mr. Zahoor Shahwani and Mr. Sajid Tareen,

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President and Vice President of High Court Bar Association, Balochistan, respectively. 18. It has been informed that investigation in the murder case of granddaughter of Nawab Akbar Bhugti has been handed over to Mushtaq Ahmad Mahr, DIG, CID because Shabbir Sheikh, Additional IG, who was earlier conducting the investigation has left the country for America for a departmental course over there, although in view of the importance of the case we had not allowed him to leave the country before completion of the investigation of the case. It has been stated that IG Police, Sindh himself is conducting the investigation, which is likely to achieve the result within a short time. However, we are not satisfied with this report. Let the IG Police, Sindh appear and explain. He should also examine that if need be, Shabbir Sheikh shall be called back so that investigation of the case may come to its logical conclusion. 19. In response to our order dated 05.04.2012, the learned Advocate General, Balochistan, has placed on record a report on behalf of the Secretary Local Government with regard to non holding of elections. No such report has been received from other provinces, perhaps, on account of non-attending the Court by the learned Attorney General for Pakistan. Same process be repeated to the learned Attorney General and meanwhile notice be also issued to all the Chief Secretaries that they should appear, in person, under instructions to make the statement as to why provisions of the Constitution in terms of Articles 32 and 140-A are not being complied with, on the next date of hearing. 20. As question relating to maintaining the law and order situation in the prevailing circumstances in the Province of Balochistan has attained much significance, and the activities noted hereinabove as well as in order dated 05.04.2012 relate to denial of the fundamental rights of the citizens enshrined in Articles 9, 14, 15 18 and 24 of the Constitution, therefore, not only it is the duty of the Provincial Government to take necessary steps but at the same time in terms of Article 148(3) of the Constitution, the Federal Government is also equally responsible to assist the Provincial Government in maintaining the law & order situation; restoring the peace; and to protect the lives and properties of its citizens, as it has already been observed by this Court while deciding the case of law and order situation in Karachi reported as Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 Supreme Court 997). For sake of convenience, a relevant portion therefrom is reproduced hereinbelow: “Declare that recent violence in Karachi represents unimaginable brutalities, bloodshed, kidnapping and throwing away dead bodies and torsos in bags; as illustration, indicating toll of 306 live in one month; detection of torture cells video of which has been produced; receiving Bhatta to strengthen the ranks of one group against the other; grabbing land during mafia etc., destroying

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moveable and immovable properties of the citizens, establishes that the Fundamental Rights of the citizens enshrined in Articles 9,14,15,18 and 24 of the Constitution have not been protected/enforced by the Provincial Government/executive authority and this failure has made the lives and properties of the citizens insecure, inasmuch as Federal Government/executive has also not protected Province of Sindh against internal disturbance, thus the government of Province of Sindh, on this account, too, failed to carry out functions in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution [Article 148(3)].” The Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and Inspector General of Police, Balochistan, may go through the same and follow them in order to ensure restoration of peace in the Province of Balochistan. 21. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the order dated 5.4.2012 and the instant order be sent to the Prime Minister through Principal Secretary, Secretary Establishment, Secretary Interior, and the Secretary Defence as well as Governor, Chief Minister/Chief Executive, Government of Balochistan for perusal and taking necessary steps under the Constitution to enforce the constitutional provisions and to protect the citizens from atrocities, which they are facing in the province of Balochistan. Learned Attorney General shall ensure that orders are duly conveyed to the functionaries noted hereinabove. 22. Let this case be fixed on 12.04.2012 at Islamabad at Sr.No.1 to ascertain the compliance of the directions made hereinabove as well as in order dated 05.04.2012 and thereafter for further hearing, the case shall be heard at Quetta Branch Registry of this Court in the week commencing from 30th instant. The learned Attorney General for Pakistan and learned Advocate General, Balochistan are required to remain in attendance.

Chief Justice Judge Judge QUETTA 06.04.2012 2 Constitution Petition No.77 of 2010, etc.

09 April 2012, Source: The News International Karachi.

3. Ruling of the Speaker National Assembly in the matter of Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani, Prime Minister of Pakistan, under clause (2) of Article 63 of the Constitution 1. The Criminal Petition No.06 of 2012 in Suo Motu case No.4 of 2010 was decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan vide Short Order dated 26.4.2012 whereby the Prime Minister of Pakistan was punished under Section 5 of Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 (Ordinance V of 2003) with

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imprisonment till the rising of the Court. Sentence was executed forthwith. The detailed judgment was released on 8.5.2012. Both the Orders have been conveyed to me. 2. Meanwhile, on 30.4.2012, a reference under clause (2) of Article 63 by Moulvi Iqbal Haider was also received in my office. He prayed for referring the question of disqualification of Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani from being a member, to the Election Commission, as he has become disqualified from being a member of the Assembly due to his conviction by the Supreme Court of Pakistan under Contempt of Court Law. 3. I have gone through the said reference application, the Short Order and detailed judgment of the Supreme Court. I have also gone through the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003. 4. Before proceeding further, I may like to show my serious concerns regarding letters through which Short Order and detailed judgment of the Supreme Court were separately conveyed by the Assistant Registrar writing for Registrar and addressed directly to the Speaker. The Speaker holds a constitutional position. She is an elected head of the House and guardian of the rights of 342 Members of the country, representing the will of the people of Pakistan. The provision of clause (2) of Article 72 of the Constitution confers the privilege upon the Speaker to preside over a Joint Sittings of the Majlis-e-Shora (Parliament), comprising 446 members. She may often require to perform the functions of the President of Pakistan under Article 49. The Speaker is placed in Article 2 of Warrant of Precedence. In view of the above, the office of the Speaker demands the highest respect from other organs of the State and functionaries of the Government. The contents of the letters are in bad taste and also against the parliamentary norms and traditions. 5. Now coming to the point as to whether any question arises for disqualification of a member from being a Member of Parliament under clause (2) of Article 63 of the Constitution on the basis of material and information placed before me and the powers and jurisdiction of the Speaker under the said Article. I may like to reproduce the provision of clause (2) of Article 63 as under:- “If any question arises whether a member of the Majlis-e- Shoora (Parliament) has become disqualified from being a member, the Speaker or, as the case may be, the Chairman shall, unless he decides that no such question has arisen, refer the question to the Election Commission within thirty days and if he fails to do so within the aforesaid period it shall be deemed to have been referred to the Election Commission.” 6. It would be advantageous here to quote the case law on the subject. It has been held in Kanwar Intizar Muhammad Khan VS Federation of Pakistan and others reported in 1995 MLD Lahore 1903 that the Speaker while examining a reference under Article 63 (2) of the Constitution is not

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supposed to act merely as post office. If a reference is submitted to him, he is not bound to forward/transmit the same, to the Chief Election Commissioner for decision forthwith. The Speaker has to apply his own mind judiciously after fully taking into consideration the relevant provisions on the subject and then decide as to whether “any question” in the nature of disqualification has “arisen” which may justify the making of reference to the Chief Election Commissioner.” The same view was also expressed by Supreme Court of Pakistan in PLD 2005 SC 52. 7. The Supreme Court framed the following charge against Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani, Prime Minister of Pakistan:- “That you, Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, have willfully flouted, disregarded and disobeyed the direction given by this Court in para 178 in case of Dr. Mobashir Hassan v Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 265)” to revive the request by the Government of Pakistan for mutual legal assistance and status of civil party and the claims lodged to the allegedly laundered moneys lying in foreign countries, including Switzerland, which were unauthorizedly withdrawn by communication by Malik Muhammad Qayyum, former Attorney General for Pakistan to the concerned authorities, which direction you were legally bound to obey and thereby committed contempt of Court within the meanings of Article 204 (2) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 read with section 3 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance (Ordinance V of 2003), punishable under Section 5 of the Ordinance and within the cognizance of this Court. We hereby direct that you be tried by this Court on the above said charge.” 8. It appears from above, that no specific charge regarding the propagation of any opinion or acting in any manner against the independence of the judiciary or defaming or ridiculing the judiciary as contemplated under Article 63 (1) (g) has been framed.9. I may like to cite here the case of Mr. Makhdoom Javed Hashmi, the then MNA who, vide judgment dated: 12th April, 2004 passed by Sessions Judge, Islamabad in Session case No.52 of 2003 was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of 19 years in aggregate under sections124-A/131/109/505 (a)/ 468/471/500/469, PPC. 9. Makhdoom Javed Hashmi, MNA on 26.08.2004 filed three separate nomination papers as candidate for ascertainment of the Leader of the House. The Government side raised objection that Mr. Hashmi being convicted is no more Member of National Assembly as he has become disqualified under Article 63 (1) (g) for propagating and defaming the Armed Forces of Pakistan, therefore, he cannot be a candidate for ascertainment of the Leader of the House and his nomination papers be rejected. However the former Speaker of the National Assembly overruled the objection and accepted the nomination papers of Mr. Hashmi on

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26.08.2004 and accordingly the Secretariat made all the arrangements/preparations for ascertainment of the Leader of the House for 27.8.2004 between two contesting candidates i.e. Mr. Shoukat Aziz and Makhdoom Javed Hashmi. 10. In the light of what has been stated above, I am of the view that the charges against Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani are not relatable to the grounds mentioned in paragraph (g) or (h) of clause (1) of Article 63, therefore, no question of disqualification of Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani from being a member arises under clause (2) of Article 63 of the Constitution. The letters of the Assistant Registrar (IMP) for Registrar of the Supreme Court stands answered accordingly. Furthermore, the petition of Moulvi Iqbal Haider, Advocate being without any merit, is not maintainable and accordingly rejected.

Sd/ DR. FEHMIDA MIRZA SpeakerNational Assembly Dated: 24th May, 2012 Islamabad

Source: http://dawn.com/2012/05/25/full-text-of-speakers-ruling/

III: Human Rights

Highlights of State of Human Rights in Pakistan in 2011 Law and law-making  Fresh legislation was not high on government‟s priorities in 2011 and some of the reasons, including its battle for survival, were obvious.  The most remarkable feature of the legislative work that could be managed was the enactment of women-friendly laws and t he government‟s trend- setting practice of supporting private members‟ bills.  The need for domestic legislation required for the implementation of international instruments, including the newly ratified Covenants and the Convention against Torture, was left unrealized.  Most of the 29 Acts adopted during the year revived or amended old statues, one prominent exception being the 19 Amendment.

Administration of justice  The Supreme Court‟s bid to clean up the administration of corrupt and irregular practices overshadowed the judicial system‟s functioning in 2011.  The judiciary and the executive remained on a collision course for most of the time.  The SC rejected the government‟s review petition against the NRO verdict of 2009 and all the cases disposed of under that measure stood reopened.

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 The cases of disappearance were heard throughout the year but no breakthrough was possible.  The National Judicial Conference‟s recommendation on public interest litigation and suo motu action could not be implemented.  Nobody was hanged in 2011 but the government could not formalise the moratorium on execution, the number of people awarded death sentence was lower than in 2010.

Law and order  1,715 people were killed in sudden flare-ups of violence in Karachi.  Crime remained rampant while poor investigative methods prevented bringing criminals to justice.  Extrajudicial killings included 517 people killed in drone attacks, 337 in police encounters and 173 people abducted and murdered in Balochistan.  2,307 people were killed and 4,341 injured in terrorist raids, including suicide and sectarian attacks.

Jails and prisoners  An overwhelming majority of the nearly 78,000 people being held in Pakistan‟s prisons were under trial.  92 inmates died in prisons across Pakistan in 2011.  The plight of Pakistani and Indian fishermen detained and jailed for fishing in the other country‟s waters continued.  313 people were sentenced to death by various courts in 2011, including six women.  HRCP was able to verify 62 new cases of enforced disappearance, 35 of these disappearances occurred in Balochistan and 20 in Sindh.  Dead bodies of 173 victims of enforced disappearance were recovered in Balochistan.

Freedom of movement  Military operations and actions of extremist militants prevented the citizens from venturing into large parts of the country. Ethnic, sectarian and political violence and crime feuds made parts of Karachi no-go zones for large sections of the population.  Despite official claims of putting in practice rules for regulating the Exit Control List, arbitrary restrictions on travel were reported. Excessive delays in issuance of passports proved a hindrance for those who wished to go abroad.  600 clerics were barred from various districts during Muharram in a bid to prevent sectarian tensions.  The population of Kurram Agency remained besieged amid regular attacks by militants on the road connecting the region to the rest of the country.  Escalating fuel cost and lack of public transport also made movement difficult and magnified the distances.

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Freedom of thought, conscience and religion  389 people were killed and 601 injured in incidents of violence targeted against various Muslim sects in 2011.  More than 100 Hazara Shias were killed in targeted attacks in Balochistan and a large number were reported to be fleeing the province.  At least six Ahmedis were murdered in target killings on account of their faith.  The Hindu community‟s concerns over t he abduct ion and subsequent forced conversion of girls and young women were not addressed.  At least eight people were booked under the blasphemy law. Another three were given capital punishment under that law.

Freedom of expression  16 journalists were killed in the country in 2011.  Training for media men and women to understand and avoid risks in the field remained largely absent.  In addition to the considerable risks, journalists often had to contend with non-payment of their salaries for months and sudden retrenchment without any severance pay.  Besides journalists, others exposed to intimidation or violence for expressing their views included human rights defenders, political activists and progressive religious leaders.

Freedom of assembly  The people increasingly used public gatherings to draw attention towards their pressing concerns including, crime, and gas and electricity shortages.  12 people were killed and 343 injured in police action to break up public gatherings or in attacks by non-state actors on rallies.  Over 1,500 protesters were arrested and at least 4,962 people were booked on various charges following protests and sit-ins.  Several political parties were able to hold big public meetings in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Threats of terror attacks had rendered such political gatherings impossible in recent years.

Freedom of association  The extension of the Political Parties Act to FATA enabled political parties in Pakistan to formally work in the region and for political parties to be formed in FATA for the first time. There was no judicial forum in FATA to enforce the workers‟ constitutional rights.  Certain labour laws contributed to limiting the freedom of association for workers.  Nothing concrete was done to revive elected students unions at higher education institutions and hooligans continued to masquerade as student unions.

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 NGOs and aid workers faced threats, attacks and abductions from militant groups.

Political participation  45 percent of the registered votes were determined to be bogus. Nearly as many new votes added to the voters‟ list were yet to be verified.  Women were barred from exercising their right to vote in by elections in at least two constituencies.  The local government system could not be revived in 2011.  Women parliamentarians introduced 70 percent of the 115 private member‟s bills submitted from June 2008 to August 2011.  329 political activists were killed in violence in Karachi.

Women  At least 943 women were killed in the name of honour, of which 93 were minors. Among the victims were seven Christian and two Hindu women.  701 women committed suicide and 428 tried to end their lives.  Near 4,500 cases of domestic violence against women were reported.  The country‟s first woman ombudsperson was appointed to receive and examine complaints of sexual harassment and other grievances.  The provisions of Sexual Harassment Act had not been implemented by many ministries. Only three hospitals nationwide had adopted the law.

Children  In flood-affected households, many children were pushed into hazardous labour or beggary because of a lack of any means of sustenance. As a result of floods, nearly 500,000 children under the age of five were at risk of contracting serious diseases.  Chronic malnutrition among children in Punjab increased to 39 percent in 2011 from 32.5 percent in 2001. In Sindh, 17.5 percent of children under five years suffered from acute malnutrition, and nearly seven percent were severely malnourished. 15.1 percent children in the country faced absolute food scarcity.  Infant mortality rate was 63.3 deaths per 1,000 births. The under five mortality rate was 89 deaths per 1,000 children. The ratio seemed too high to meet the MDG on child mortality.  Over one thousand children languished in juvenile prisons across the country in 2011. No special courts were set up to exclusively hear juvenile cases.

Labour  The total workforce was 57.3 million people by official count, out of which 51.9 million were said to be employed. Unemployment rose to 6 percent from 5.6 percent in 2009-10. However, a senior official put unemployment at 35 percent of the total workforce.

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 Minimum wage remained unchanged at Rs 7,000 a month, and large numbers of domestic workers and other labourers did not even get that meagre amount. Non-payment of salaries, pensions and inordinate delays in payment were extensively reported.  One in every 30 employed persons reported some occupational injury/disease within 12 months preceding an official survey.  3,407 bonded labourers were released in Sindh where debt bondage in agriculture remained endemic.  Federal and provincial governments allocated Rs 54.81 billion for social security and social welfare in the budgets for 2010-11. Only Rs 39.36 billion were spent.

Education  At least 33 percent children were believed to be out of school, and drop-out rate from primary to secondary schooling was nearly 50 percent.  At least 33 percent children were believed to be out of school, and drop-out rate from primary to secondary schooling was nearly 50 percent.  542 primary schools for boys and 108 schools for girls were dysfunctional in FATA due to threats by extremist militants.  Only 16 percent rural women in Sindh completed primary schooling and only 8 percent women did so in Balochistan.

Health  The public healthcare system remained far from adequate. The 37-day doctors‟ strike in Punjab followed by a strike by nurses‟ contributed to people‟s problems. Lady health workers demanding regularisation of their service faced batons and tear-gas from police.  The health budget was as low as 0.23 percent of the federal budget, the lowest in over ten years. 47 percent of that went unutilised.  31,655 victims contracted the dengue virus, of which 347 died.  197 polio cases were reported across the country.  At least 2,131 people committed suicide and another 1,153 attempted it.

Housing  With 37 percent of the population living in cities, Pakistan was the most urbanised country in South Asia. Over half of the urban population lived in slums.  Housing finance from a formal source remained lacking for the overwhelming majority of the people.  1.5 million houses in Sindh and over 7,000 houses in Balochistan were destroyed or damaged in the floods in 2011.  12,279 houses were destroyed or damaged in the militancy-hit Bajaur and Mohmand districts of FATA.  At least 137 people were killed and 291 injured in the collapse of poorly constructed and maintained structures.

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 Of Rs 2.94 allocated in the federal and provincial budgets of 2010-11 on low-cost housing, only Rs 1.92 billion were spent.

Environment  The draft of National Policy on Climate Change awaited the federal cabinet‟s approval. How Pakistan‟s international obligations would be affected by devolution of the subject of environment remained unaddressed.  Pakistan was considerably lagging on indicator s of MDG 7 (ensuring environmental sustainability).  The murder of two activists working to protect the mangroves highlighted the dangers of advocating for protecting the environment.  1.04 billion trees had been planted in official campaigns since 2001 but the total forest area in the country stood at 4.21 million hectares. The forest cover in Balochistan declined to 1.2 percent.  Over half the country‟s population lacked access to safe drinking water. Noise and air pollution levels in big cities exceeded permissible limits.

Refugees  The number of the internally displaced persons in relief camps across the country peaked at over 1.2 million people. There were 470,000 displaced persons in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at the end of 2011, down from around 1.1 million people the previous year.  Over nine million people were displaced or otherwise affected by flooding in Sindh, and over 350,000 in parts of Balochistan.  365,000 people were expected to be displaced if a military operation was launched in North Waziristan.  The ordeal of over a quarter of a million Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh since 1971 continued without an end in sight.  52,096 Afghan refugees were repatriated to their country. Approximately 2 million registered Afghans remained in Pakistan.

Source: http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/AR2011/Complete.pdf

IV: Economy

Executive Summary of Economic Survey 2012 The Government remained focused on maintaining macroeconomic stability, growth, mobilizing domestic resources and increasing exports, balanced regional development and providing safety nets for the vulnerable groups. Despite numerous challenges, the economy performed better in 2011-12 than many developed and developing economies. These included sharp increase in fuel and commodity prices, recessionary trend globally and weak inflows. Domestically, economy was struck by heavy rains in Sindh and parts of

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Balochistan costing $3.7 billion. Notwithstanding these challenges, the Gross Domestic Product growth this year is estimated at 3.7 percent as compared to 3.0 percent last year. In comparison, the global recovery is threatened by intensifying strains in the euro area and fragilities elsewhere. International Monetary Fund has maintained its growth forecast of 2.1 percent for United States in the year 2012, negative 0.3 percent for Euro area, 0.8 percent for United Kingdom, 5.7 percent for Emerging and Developing Economies after factoring China (8.2 percent) and India (6.9 percent) and 2.0 percent for Japan. Despite global slowdown, Pakistan has managed to maintain its exports during July-April 2012 to last year‟s level which saw a phenomenal growth. Remittances remained buoyant and estimated at close to $13 billion, an increase of 16 percent. Recessionary trend globally have, however, impacted capital flows to Pakistan. Current account balance was affected due to sharp increase in oil prices and import of 1.2 million metric tons of fertilizer. Tax measures enforced by the Government in April 2011 has yielded dividend. July-April 2012 growth in FBR tax revenues demonstrated a growth of 24 percent with Rs. 1445 billion as compared to 1250 billion last year. Efforts are underway to reach the ambitious target of 1952 billion. Non-tax receipts have been less due to non disbursement of anticipated coalition support funds and delaying the expected auction of 3 G license to a later part of summer.

Growth and Stabilization The economy is now showing signs of modest recovery. GDP growth for 2011- 12 has been estimated 3.7 percent as compared to 3.0 percent in the previous fiscal year 2011. The Agriculture sector recorded a growth of 3.1 percent against 2.4 percent last year. The Large Scale Manufacturing (LSM) growth is 1.1 percent during July-March 2011-12 against 1.0 percent last year. Overall, the commodity producing sectors and especially the Agriculture sector have performed better. The Services sector recorded growth of 4.0 percent in 2011- 12.

Flood Impact Assessment This performance has been achieved despite severe monsoon rains triggered floods of an unprecedented scale in Southern Pakistan, engulfing 23 districts of Sindh Province and adjoining areas of northern Balochistan causing damages to crops, infrastructure and human settlements, thus adversely affecting national economy. According to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA) Report, approximately, 9.6 million people were affected in Sindh and Balochistan as a result of these rains. The total damages estimated to Agriculture, Energy, Transport and Communication, Health, Environment as well as the Forestry, Water Supply and Sanitation

286 Pakistan Perspectives amount to Rs. 324.5 billion (US $3.7 billion).The rehabilitation and Cost of recovery is estimated at Rs. 239 billion (US $2.8 billion). This is in addition to damages of $10 billion to the economy during 2010 floods.

Commodity Producing Sector: The commodity producing sector has performed better in the outgoing fiscal year as compared to last year. Its growth rate this year was 3.3 percent against 1.5 percent during last year.

Agriculture Sector is a key sector of the economy and accounts for 21 percent of GDP. The supportive policies of the government resulted in a growth of 3.1 percent against 2.4 percent last year. Major Crops registered an accelerating growth of 3.2 percent compared to a negative growth of 0.2 percent last year. The major crops including Cotton, Sugarcane and Rice witnessed growth in production of 18.6 percent, 4.9 percent and 27.7 percent respectively. However, preliminary estimates of wheat production showed a negative growth due to late receding of flood waters in lower Sindh which hampered the timely cultivation of the wheat crop. Livestock has witnessed a marginally higher growth of 4.0 percent against the growth of 3.97 percent last year. Fisheries sector showed a growth of 1.8 percent. Forestry recorded a growth of 0.95 percent as compared to the contraction of 0.40 percent last year.

Manufacturing Sector: The growth of the manufacturing sector is estimated at 3.6 percent compared to 3.1 percent last year. Small scale manufacturing maintained its growth of last year at 7.5 percent and slaughtering growth is estimated at 4.5 percent against 4.4 percent last year. Large Scale Manufacturing (LSM) has shown a growth of 1.1 percent during July-March 2011-12 against 1.0 percent last year. The Construction Sector has shown 6.5 percent growth as compared to negative growth of 7.1 percent last year. Mining and Quarrying sector recorded a positive growth of 4.4 percent during July-March of the fiscal year 2011-12 against negative growth of 1.3 percent last year. Electricity and gas distribution witnessed a negative growth of 1.6 percent against - 7.3 percent last year.

Services Sector: The Services sector has registered a growth rate of 4.0 percent during July-March of the fiscal year 2011-12 against 4.4 percent last year. It is dominated by Finance and Insurance at 6.5 percent, Social and Community Services 6.8 percent and Wholesale and Retail Trade 3.6 percent.

Consumption: Real private consumption grew at 11.6 percent in fiscal year 2011-12 as compared to 3.7 percent growth last year and real government consumption grew at 8.2 percent as compared to 5.2 percent last year. Private consumption expenditure has reached 75 percent of GDP; whereas public

Documents 287 consumption expenditures are 13 percent of GDP. Private consumption has increased on the back of sustained growth in remittances. Total consumption has reached 88.4 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2011-12 as compared to 83 percent last fiscal year. Furthermore, increase in rural income due to higher production of crops and sharp increase in commodity prices also supported the consumption demand.

Per capita real income grew at 2.3 percent in 2011-12 as compared to 1.3 percent growth last year. In dollar terms, it increased from $1258 in 2010-11 to $1372 in 2011-12.

Real Investment has declined from 13.1 percent of GDP last year to 12.5 percent of GDP in 2011-12; fixed investment has declined to 10.9 percent of GDP in 2011-12 from 11.5 percent of GDP last year. Similarly Private investment also contracted to 7.9 percent of GDP in 2011-12 as compared to 8.6 percent of GDP last year. Public investment as a percent of GDP is 3.0 percent in 2011-12 against the 2.9 percent last year. National savings are 10.7 percent of GDP in 2011-12 as compared to 13.2 percent in 2010-11.

Foreign Direct Investment stood at $668 million during July-April 2011-12 as against $1293 million last year. The capital flows were affected because of global financial crunch and euro zone crisis. Oil and Gas Exploration remained the major sector for foreign investors. The share of Oil and Gas Exploration in total FDI during July-April 2011-12 stood at 70 percent.

Workers’s Remittances witnessed a strong growth of 25.8 percent in 2011 over the previous year 2010. During July-April 2011-12, worker‟s remittances grew by 20.2 percent at $10.9 billion. The buoyancy in remittances is largely attributed to the government‟s efforts to divert remittances from informal to formal channel. Data on remittances suggests that the monthly average for the period of July-April 2011-12 stood at $1.09 billion compared to $0.90 billion during the corresponding period last year. The upsurge in the remittances is attributed to the government‟s efforts of redirecting these flows from informal to formal channels.

Fiscal Development: The Medium Term Budgetary Framework has improved the budget preparation process. Medium-term fiscal framework and budget policies have been incorporated into a medium-term Budget Strategy Paper on rolling basis, which include medium-term indicative budget ceilings for the recurrent and development budgets, and provides an opportunity to discuss the budget between technical and political levels prior to the presentation of the annual budget. The political level involvement includes Cabinet, Standing

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Committees on Finance & Revenue, and political parties. The Output Based Budget (OBB) has also been institutionalized in the federal government which presents policies of the ministries in the shape of goals, outcomes, outputs and medium-term budgets. The OBB also presents key performance indicators for the outputs to introduce government wide monitoring system. 18th amendment in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was an historic step forward abolishing the concurrent list transferring additional functions to the Provinces. It was combined with a path breaking 7th National Finance Commission Award in 2010. In addition, the Government resolved long standing demands of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa relating to Net Hydel Profit and Royalty and Gas Development Surcharge of Sindh and Balochistan. The award also acknowledged multiple criteria for transfer of resources. Share of Balochistan has increased from 5.1 to 9.0 percent. Likewise, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been assigned 1 percent of the total divisible pool to mitigate the impact of campaign against extremism. This has allowed transfer of 70 percent of the divisible pool to the provinces and FATA and Gilgit-Baltistan. During the last two years, Federal Government has transferred over Rs. 800 billion additional over 2009-10 resource transfer of Rs. 633 billion. This should help the provinces to earmark more resources to social sectors and development of infrastructure. Government continued its efforts to broaden the tax base and simplifying the tax structure. Efforts are underway to move towards two main taxes, i.e. income tax and sales tax. As a result, Special Excise Duties and Regulatory Duties have been abolished. A three years plan to phase out Federal Excise Duties is under implementation. Capital Gain Tax has been levied on sales of securities in the stock exchange. Sales tax exemptions and zero ratings have been withdrawn on all items including textile, leather, fertilizer, pesticides, sports goods and tractors except food items, health, education and agriculture produce. The Government has strengthened automated e-filing and electronic payment and refund system to ensure expeditious settlement of refund claims expeditiously. For this, a centralized sales tax refund cheque issuance system is now operational in the Federal Board of Revenue. Broadening the tax base identifying potential taxpayers has remained a key focus for which a dedicated unit has been established in the FBR. These efforts are now paying dividend. Federal Board of Revenue target for 2011-12 was set at Rs. 1952 billion. During first ten months, tax collection stood at Rs. 1,426.0 billion against Rs. 1,149.8 billion in the comparable period of last year, showing an increase of 24 percent. It does not include Rs. 19 billion collected by Sindh province on GST on services. Efforts are being made to manage the fiscal deficit within acceptable level through an expenditure management strategy, austerity measures and reforms in public sector enterprises. The government is committed to

Documents 289 simplification of tax regime, broadening the tax and mobilizing domestic resources. The operational expenditure of the federal ministries was reduced by 20 percent. A general ban was placed on recruitment and purchase of durable goods. Official transport assigned to entitled officers of BPS-20 to 22 was monetized to reduce expenditure on POL and repair and maintenance as well as drivers. Subsidy expenditure was rationalized. As a result of these efforts, overall fiscal deficit was at 5.0 percent of GDP in July-April 2012 against 5.5 percent of GDP of the comparable period of last year. It is noteworthy that containing the deficit during the period under review was quite challenging as the burden of financing fell directly on domestic sources due to the non materialization of external inflows. Unlike the past, it was for the first time in many years that Public Sector Development Program did not face any cut. Despite huge financial constraints, the Government made a special effort to fully fund the PSDP. Accordingly, Rs. 304 billion were released that facilitated in completion of 200 projects. The Government efforts can be gauged from the fact that Rs. 2.2 trillion were provided during the last four years for PSDP.

Money and Credit: The SBP lowered the discount rate by cumulative 200 bps points to 12 percent during the first half of fiscal year 2011-12 in line with inflationary trend in the country. During the first eleven months of the current fiscal year (June 2011-11th May 2012) broad money (M2) witnessed an expansion of 9.1 percent as compared to 11.47 percent as compared to last year. The deceleration in money supply is primarily driven by the significant fall in the Net Foreign Assets of the banking system along with increased government borrowing and a one-off settlement of circular debt. Net Domestic Assets (NDA) during July 2011 - 11th May 2012 stood at Rs. 880.9 billion against Rs. 481.6 billion during the same period last year. The expansion in NDA is mainly contributed by a rise in demand for private sector credit and government borrowings. Conversely, Net Foreign Assets (NFA) witnessed a contraction. During July2011-11th May, 2012, credit to the private sector witnessed a net increase of Rs. 234.8 billion compared to Rs. 107.8 billion in the same period last year. Year-on-year growth in private sector credit was up 7.5 percent by 11th May, 2012. The weighted average lending rate (including zero mark-up) on outstanding loans stood at 12.8 percent while the weighted average deposit rate (including zero mark-up) stood at 6.98 percent in March 2012. This resulted in a spread of 5.8 percent. The decline in the weighted average lending rate is due to the lag involved in contracting fresh loans in the new declining interest rate environment and the decline in banks return on government securities. It is pertinent to mention that since the SBP was following a tight monetary policy

290 Pakistan Perspectives till August 2011 and the interest rates were moving up, the banking spread remained high.

Capital Markets: The KSE 100 index stood at 12,496 on June 20, 2011. It crossed the barrier of 14,000 and closed at 14,618 on 7th May, 2012, the highest level seen in last four years showing a growth of 17 percent over the closing index of last financial year. The Government has now levied Capital Gain Tax on securities. The net investment by the foreign investors in Pakistan‟s Stock Markets during July-March, 2011-12 reflected a net outflow of US$176 million. This indicates that bullish trend observed in Pakistani equity market is due to the restoration of the confidence of local investors and institutions. During fiscal year 2011-12, the leading stock markets indices of the world observed mixed trends with negative growth of 18.1 percent in China to 19.03 percent positive growth in case of Philippines. Pakistani Stock market performed well as compared to markets of the world during the current fiscal year. This was mainly due to the steps taken by the government to boost the confidence of the equity market investors which included reforms in the Capital gains tax, etc. The Government has enacted Stock Exchanges (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 2012 which will further strengthen the country‟s stock markets. The law requires stock exchanges to be demutualized within 119 days of its promulgation in accordance with timelines specified for completion of various milestones involved in demutualization exercise. Corporatization, demutualization of stock exchanges would entail converting their structure from non- profit, mutually owned organization to for-profit entities owned by shareholders. Demutualization would result in increased transparency at stock exchanges and greater balance between interests of various stakeholders by clear segregation of commercial, regulatory functions and separation of trading rights and ownership rights. Demutualization is well-established global trend and almost all stock exchanges worldwide operate in demutualized set up. The enactment of this law has brought Pakistan capital market at par with other international jurisdictions like India, Malaysia, Singapore, USA, UK, Germany, Australia, Hong Kong, Turkey among others. It will help expand market outreach, attract new investors, improve liquidity and enable stock exchange to attract international strategic partners.

Inflation: Price stability remained the priority of the government. The Government has constituted a National Price Monitoring Committee headed by the Finance Secretary with representatives of Federal Ministries and Provincial departments. The Committee meets every month. In addition, the Cabinet and the Economic Committee of the Cabinet monitors the prices of essential items

Documents 291 and take corrective measures to ensure that prices remain under check. These efforts have yielded results. Inflation has declined for the third consecutive year. CPI was 10.8 percent during July-April, 2012 from a high of 25 percent in October 2008. It was in single digit in December 2012. This has been achieved despite sharp increase in international oil prices, effect of upward adjustment in the administered prices of electricity and gas, supply disruptions due to devastating floods of 2010 and heavy rains of 2011 and bank borrowings. Food and non-food inflation averaged 11.1 percent and 10.7 percent respectively against 18.8 percent and 10.8 percent in the same period of last year.

Trade and Payments: The Government pursued vigorously to secure concessional duties package on 75 items from the European Union. The World Trade Organization approved the package this year. It is expected that this will boost Pakistan‟s exports to EU, one of the major trading partner of Pakistan. Exports witnessed a strong performance last year attaining the highest level ever of $25 billion showing a growth of 30 percent. It reflected both the price and quantity effect. Despite euro zone crisis, impacting the demand for Pakistan goods, Pakistan has successfully maintained its exports at last year‟s until April this year. Exports during July-April 2012 were $20.5 million compared to $20.46 billion last year. The Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) has encouraged formal trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the volume has risen to around $2.5 billion annually. Efforts are underway to formalize Free Trade Agreements and Preferential Trade Agreements with many countries. It will help boosting Pakistan‟s exports. Efforts are also in hand to normalize trade relations with India. Imports grew by 14.5 percent and stood at $33.1 billion during July- April 2012. The current account deficit stood at $3.4 billion in the same period. It was largely as a result of high oil prices and import of fertilizers. Continued support from current transfers in the form of workers‟ remittances helped in containing current account balance. Pakistan has witnessed some geographical diversification in exports. During 2005-06, 47.2 percent of the country‟s exports were concentrated in five markets (USA, UK, Germany, Hong Kong and U.A.E.) of the world and remaining share of all other countries was 52.8 percent. This concentration is on continuous decline since 2005-06 and recently the share of these five markets stood at 35.7 percent whereas the share of all other countries increased to 64.3 percent during July-December 2011-12. This improvement in geographical diversification was mainly the result of Strategic Trade Policy Framework (STPF-2009-12) introduced by the government and the resulting increase in exports to China, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Pakistan‟s foreign exchange reserves reached to $16.5 billion at the

292 Pakistan Perspectives end-April 2012 compared to $17.0 billion at end-April 2011. The exchange rate averaged at Rs. 85.50/US$ during July-April 2010-11, whereas it averaged at Rs. 88.55/US$ during July-April 2011-12. The Pak Rupee depreciated by 3.4 percent during July-April 2011-12 over the depreciation of 2.2 percent in July- April 2010-11 period.

Public Debt: Pakistan‟s public debt stood at Rs. 12,024 billion as of March 31, 2012. During first nine months of the ongoing fiscal year, total public debt registered an increase of Rs. 1,315 billion which includes Rs. 391 billion consolidated by the Government into public debt against outstanding previous year‟s subsidies related to food and energy sectors. Public debt as a percent of GDP stood at 58.2 percent by end-March 2012. During July-March 2012, $179 million was added to the EDL stock. At the end of March 2012, servicing of the public debt stood at Rs.720.3 billion against the budget amount of Rs. 1034.2 billion.

Population, Labour Force and Employment: Pakistan is endowed with demographic dividend with a bulging young population. They can be a productive asset of the country if put to proper training and skill development. Pakistan is also facing rapid urbanization. The population in urban areas has increased from 65.3 million in 2010-11 to 67.5 million in 2011-12. Accordingly, cities development is one of the key pillars of Pakistan‟s growth framework. According to the Labour Force Survey 2010-11, Pakistan has a labour force of 57.2 million people which is 0.9 million more than the last year. Out of this potential labour force, the total number of people were employed during 2010-11were 53.8 million, which is 0.6 million more than the last year. The total labour force working in the agricultural sector remained unchanged during the period 2008-2011. In manufacturing sector, the participation rate has increased from 13.2 percent in 2009-10 to 13.7 percent in 2010-11. Efforts are being made to develop an efficient, equitable and rights based labour market that provides the mechanisms for productivity growth in the economy which results in real wage increases. The government is making sincere efforts to boost overseas employment which will not only reduce the unemployment burden in the country but will also enhance remittances. In this regard, MoUs have been signed with number of labour importing countries such as Malaysia, Kuwait, and Qatar etc. Emigrants sent abroad in 2010 were 0.4 million and 0.5 million in 2011. Saudi Arabia, Gulf State including United Arab Emirate (UAE), Oman and Kuwait are the largest market of Pakistani workers.

Transport and Communication: The transport and communication sector is a

Documents 293 major contributor to government revenues. Sustainable economic development is dependent on a robust and low cost transport system. Enhanced export competitiveness is also contingent upon the efficient performance of this sector. The government is committed to implementing a comprehensive and modernizing transport and logistics sector through continuous reforms in all of its sub sectors. The Ministry of Communications has prepared a draft National Transport Policy which covers all modes of transport sectors i.e. (i) Roads, (ii) Railways, (iii) Ports and Shipping and (iv) Aviation. This policy also includes the National Transport Corridor Improvement Program (NTCIP) to make it more productive and environment friendly. The National Highway Authority completed 12 projects of flyovers, bridges, interchanges and the upgrading of roads during the last one year at a cost of Rs. 19.6 billion. At present, 46 development projects of roads covering 2,985 kms are ongoing costing Rs. 245 billion in different sections/packages. These projects include construction of roads, river bridges, tunnels, flyovers and interchanges. NHA has also launched and awarded 16 new development projects covering over 500 kms, including construction of a number of bridges, flyovers and interchanges costing Rs. 71 billion. NHA is simultaneously constructing 12 bridges across the rivers. These are: on river Chenab 4, on river Sutlej 2, on river Swan 1 and on river Indus 5. The Cabinet Committee of Restructuring (CCOR) approved a restructuring framework for Pakistan Railways (PR). New Board of Directors of PR has been instituted, involving academia, management professionals, rail experts and executive functionaries. The Government arranged Rs. 6 billion loan for repair of locomotives and freight operations are also being prioritized for revenue generation. PR is being provided Rs. 2.3 billion per month from the budget to finance pay and pensions of Railway employees. An Asset Management Company is being established for optimum utilization of PR‟s assets. Private sector involvement is the focus moving forward, the Chamber of Commerce and Industries Lahore has been engaged for their freight transportation from Karachi to Lahore. Commercial management of rail operations and outsourcing of non-core functions is being initiated with an aim to improve efficiency of rail operations. Private Sector is also running a passenger train. During the financial year, 16 kms of track was rehabilitated on the Pakistan Railways network besides doubling the previous 15 kms of track. Construction of a D Class railway station at new Multan City, renovation of Khudian Khas, Usmanwala, Raiwind and Kanganpur railway stations was carried out. Signaling system of four railway stations damaged during the riots of 2007 was rehabilitated during the period. During February 2012, 52 new design passenger coaches were imported from China. Remaining 150 passenger

294 Pakistan Perspectives coaches will be manufactured at Pakistan Railway Carriage Factory Islamabad by June 30, 2013. In addition, 22 passenger coaches have been rehabilitated at the Pakistan Railway Carriage Factory Islamabad during the last year. A new dry port was set up at Prem Nagar near Raiwind industrial area, Lahore through public-private partnership. Teledensity in the country has increased by 68.3 percent in April 2012, showing 6.7 percent growth as compared to the previous year. Mobile penetration rose to 64.9 percent in 2011-12 against 60.4 percent in 2010-11. Fixed Local Loop teledensity now stands at 1.93 percent. Total mobile subscribers has reached 118.3 million by the end of March 2012. Subscribers of Local Loop (FLL + WLL) are 5.9 million, out of which 3.10 million belong to FLL and 2.8 million belong to WLL. Broadband subscribers reached 1.9 million at the end of February 2012. There has been a cumulative investment of approximately US $2.5 billion in the electronic media industry in Pakistan. More than 200,000 new jobs with diversified skills and qualifications have been provided. Additionally, over 7 million people have been accommodated through indirect employment. With the current growth rate of more than seven percent per annum in this sector, it is estimated that the cumulative investment in the electronic media industry will reach above $3.0 billion by the end of the current financial year.

Energy: Energy is considered to be the lifeline of economic development. Pakistan‟s economy has been growing at an average growth rate of almost 3 percent for the last four years and demand of energy both at the production and consumer end is increasing rapidly. The Energy Committee headed by the Finance Minister presented a well articulated Energy Recovery Plan to the Cabinet in November 2011 which was approved after due deliberations. The Plan focused on: (i) improving governance structure: it included dissolution of PEPCO and replaced by Central Power Purchase Authority, constituting new Boards of Directors (BODs) of 8 DISCOs and NTDC comprising professionals, issuance of explicit guidelines of professionalizing the BOD, hiring professional CEOs for DISCOs, GENCOs and CPPA, and business plans for each DISCO and GENCO to be developed by the newly hired CEO and approved by the new Board; (ii) Supportive legislative framework: NEPRA law was amended authorizing NEPRA to notify fuel adjustment, Cabinet has approved amendment making electricity theft a serious crime; (iii) Financial Sustainability of the System: the Government has increased electricity tariff by 90 percent and Rs. 1.25 per kwh very recently to recover the full cost of electricity supply which is still Rs. 3 per kwh below the determined tariff; (iv) Resolution of Circular Debt: the Government has provided Rs. 1122 billion from the budget during the last four years to resolve circular debt issue.

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However, extremely low collection than required (90 percent of the billed amount) by DISCOs always leaves a high balance as receivables; (v) Supply Side Management: reduction in transmission and distribution losses as well as running the most efficient plants; (vi) Demand Side Management: Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) issued for recovery of private receivables, a limit of 45 days for payment overdue has been set for disconnection, Loss mapping in each DISCO initiated to identify losses and their sources, Government facilitating recovery of dues of Provincial and Federal Government departments, and Media campaign for prudent use of electricity; (vii) Promoting Private Sector Participation (viii) changing fuel mix and (ix) changing energy mix moving towards hydel and coal based generation. In addition, the Government has launched a major energy conservancy program that includes two holiday a week, closing the markets at 8:00 pm, lighting alternate pole of the Municipalities and using air conditioners in offices after 11:00 p.m. The contribution of Hydel in electricity generation increased to 33.6 percent in 2011. Karachi Electricity Supply Corporation (KESC) contributed 8.3 percent, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) 3.6 percent, Kot Addu Power Company (KAPCO) 6.2 and the Hub Power Company (HUBCO) 9.1 percent to total electricity generation. Independent Power Producers (IPPs) have contributed almost 25 percent. The Government is implementing a number of priority hydel projects such as 969 MW-Neelum Jhelum, 1410 MW-Tarbela 4th Extension, and Patrind in the private sector. Almost 96 percent of the work on the main dam at Mangla, spillway and allied facilities are completed and resettlement work is in progress. Likewise 99.7 percent work on Satpara and 72.1 percent on Gomal Zam dam have been completed. 7100 MW-Bunji, 4320 MW-Dasu, 80 MW Kurram Tungi Dam, 740-MW Munda Dam and 4500 MW- Diamer Bhasha Dam are in the pipeline. Pakistan is one of the beneficiaries of Tetra-partner power import project under the head of Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) electricity trade. In addition, a number of thermal projects are under implementation including 747 Guddu refurbishment. Pakistan has huge coal reserves estimated at over 185 billion tones. Thus the long term trend shows that there was an increase of production of coal; an average 7.7 percent change occurred during the last ten years. Federal as well as Sindh Governments are actively pursuing to provide necessary infrastructure at Thar for exploiting these coal reserves for power generation. Two blocs have been leased out on pilot basis. Efforts are underway to provide the missing transmission link between Matiari and Thar. The Government is also working on different gas pipelines as well as import of LNG and LPG to address the gas shortages. In this regard, Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Policy 2011 has been notified which encourages private parties to develop LNG projects and sets them free to participate in any segment

296 Pakistan Perspectives of the LNG value chain. The gas sector supply increased by 4.9 percent in July- March 2011-12 as compared with the corresponding period of last year. The average production of natural gas during July-March 2011-12 was 4236.1 million cubic feet per day (mmcfd) as against 4050.6 (mmcfd) during the corresponding period of last year showing an increase of 4.6 percent.

Social Safety Nets: The government is committed to a sustained poverty reduction strategy and to allocate a minimum of 4.5 percent of GDP to social and poverty related expenditures. The government prioritized 17 pro-poor sectors through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) which provides a link between the policy priorities and the budget realties. Expenditure on pro-poor sectors in 2007-08 stood at 5.6 percent of GDP, 7.5 percent in 2008-09, 7.6 percent in 2009-10. Total expenditures in 2010-11 were 6.9 percent of GDP. This was first year of the 7th National Finance Commission Award when 70 percent of the divisible pool was transferred to the provinces as well as transition was taking place as a result of 18th amendment. The floods of 2010 and heavy rains of 2011 significantly hurt the efforts to improve standard of living of the people. The floods and rains affected approximately 20 million people directly and a much larger proportion indirectly; the loss to infrastructure and livelihood sources further impacted the people of these areas. The Benazir Income Support Programme, a flagship program of the Government, has made a remarkable progress by providing much needed relief to over 4 million recipients all over Pakistan. Over the last 4 years, BISP was provided over Rs. 178 billion out which Rs. 153 billion were contributed from domestic resources. A total amount of Rs. 122 billion has been disbursed to its recipients up to March 2012. The number of recipients is expected to be increased to 7 million once the on-going processing of data collected during the “nation-wide poverty scorecard targeting survey” is completed. BISP has launched a number of programmes including (i) Payment to Recipients, (ii) Graduation Initiatives, (iii) Waseela-e-Haq, (iv) Waseela-e-Rozgar, (v) Waseela-e-Sehat and (vi) Waseela-e-Taleem to mitigate the impact of stabilization program as well as inflation. The Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) is yet another element of the country‟s poverty reduction strategy. The PPAF is dedicated for micro credit, enterprise development, community based infrastructure and energy projects, livelihood enhancement and protection, social mobilization, and capacity building. The overall disbursements for core operations during the period of July-December 2012 were Rs. 8.5 billion. Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal is making a significant contribution towards poverty reduction through its various services by providing assistance to

Documents 297 destitute, widows, orphans, invalid, infirm and other needy persons irrespective of their gender, caste, creed and religion through its ongoing core projects/schemes. A total of Rs. 1.8 billion has been utilised upto February 2012 on schemes such as individual Financial Assistance, child support program, vocational schools, sweet homes etc. After devolution of the subject of Zakat, the Provinces/Federal Areas are directly managing the distribution of Zakat to the beneficiaries. Zakat funds have been utilized for assistance to the needy, indigent, poor, orphans, widows, handicapped and disabled for their subsistence and rehabilitation. Up to March 2012, a total amount of Rs. 7.8 billion was distributed amongst the provinces and other administrative areas. Peoples Works Programme (PWP) I & II are welfare programmes comprising small development schemes providing village electrification, gas, farm to market roads, education, health and other services to create jobs at the local level. PWP-I & II have been provided over Rs. 38 billion during 2011-12. Employees Old Age Benefits Institution provides monetary benefits to the old age workers through various programmes such as the Old Age Pension, Invalidity Pension, Survivors Pension and Old Age Grants. During the period of July-March 2012, Rs. 8 billion has been disbursed to 350,485 beneficiaries. Workers Welfare Fund is also facilitating the poor labourers in industrial sector by providing funds for housing facilities and marriage grant, death grant and scholarships etc. During (July-March) 2011-12, Rs. 2.5 billion has been incurred for these schemes. Government has also taken various micro- finance initiatives in collaboration with all stakeholders to generate employment opportunities and to eliminate poverty. The Government has provided huge subsidies during the last four years to the vulnerable and poor to mitigate the impact of stabilization, floods and international prices. These include: Rs. 1122 billion for the power sector, Rs. 104 billion for the petroleum sector in addition to foregone income of Rs. 136 billion from Petroleum Levy by adjusting it downward to keep the petroleum prices lower than the international market, Rs. 110 billion on fertilizer and Rs. 137 billion for food items such as sugar, wheat and subsidized items through Utilities Stores. In addition, Federal Government provided Rs. 42 billion to the flood affectees through Watan Card as well as Citizens Compensation Damages Program.

Environment: Pakistan continued to face challenges to achieve environmentally sound development. This has become increasingly difficult to achieve in the backdrop of back to back flooding and rains across the country as well as other exogenous and endogenous factors. The quality of the natural environment is not only an extremely important issue from the point of view of individual survival but it will also emerge as one of the principal human security issues in Pakistan. The environmental challenges include climate change

298 Pakistan Perspectives impacts, loss of biological diversity, deforestation and degradation of Air and Water quality. A number of projects have been funded by the government to improve the capacity of relevant institutions to deal with increasing environmental degradation. In addition, there are a number of projects funded by the donors in which the government is a partner. These are being currently implemented to improve overall environment of the country. Government efforts alone, because of the limited resources at its disposal, are not enough and demand a much larger participation and support from other stakeholders including industry, civil society, and the public at large as well as the donors. National Climate Change Policy 2011 provides a framework for addressing the issues that Pakistan faces or will face in future due to the changing climate. The level of access to drinking water is quite impressive in Pakistan. According to Pakistan Bureau of Statistics report (PBS) Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 2010-11, access to drinking water to urban and rural population of Pakistan is 94 and 84 percent, with an average of 87 percent in 2011. Sanitation facilities are also improving. According to a report released by the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program (JMP) 2012, 92 percent people had access to drinking water by 2010 in Pakistan while this ratio was 85 percent and 89 percent in 1990 and 2000 respectively. The MDG target is to achieve the ratio of 93 percent by 2015. Going forward, the government will continue to pursue policy of macroeconomic stability, growth and creating jobs, mobilizing domestic resources, incentivizing the private sector, and strengthening the social safety nets.

Source: http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_12/ExecutiveSummary.pdf