International Journal of Strategic Communication

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Techniques of Strategic Political Communication: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Persuasive Devices

Moeen Koa

To cite this article: Moeen Koa (2018) Techniques of Strategic Political Communication: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Persuasive Devices, International Journal of Strategic Communication, 12:5, 571-598, DOI: 10.1080/1553118X.2018.1467914 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1553118X.2018.1467914

Published online: 14 May 2018.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=hstc20 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 2018, VOL. 12, NO. 5, 571–598 https://doi.org/10.1080/1553118X.2018.1467914

Techniques of Strategic Political Communication: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Persuasive Devices Moeen Koa Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, Reading, UK

ABSTRACT This research analyzes the entire range of Arabic language communiqués issued by the Muslim Brotherhood from July 2013–July 2017 in order to show how political Islamist movements utilize persuasive techniques to advance their strategic communication campaigns and achieve their poli- tical goals. Using agenda-setting as a theoretical framework and the seven devices developed by the Institute for Analysis (IPA) in the late 1930s as a deductive tool, this article demonstrates that the Brotherhood’s communication strategy strongly aligned with the seven devices developed by the IPA: more than one technique was identified in 97% of the move- ment’s communiqués analyzed. These findings indicate that persuasive techniques are being used by the Brotherhood as strategic communication devices to serve the goals of 1) discrediting the current military regime; 2) winning the hearts and minds of Egyptians; and, 3) establishing themselves as a legitimate political actor. This case study advances second-level agenda setting theory by suggesting that the IPA’s persuasive techniques reveal the specific mechanisms through which the Brotherhood seek to achieve their communication goals. By raising awareness of these techniques as a critical means of setting the Brotherhood’s agenda, this article also seeks to empower domestic and regional audiences consuming these messages.

Introduction The Muslim Brotherhood, arguably the largest and the most influential Islamist movement in the world (Matusitz, 2014; p. 181; Teitelbaum, 2011; p. 213), was established in 1928 by an Egyptian schoolteacher, Hassan Banna. Since its establishment, the Brotherhood has been embroiled in a struggle with successive Egyptian regimes and faced many coercive campaigns that have fluctuated in ferocity (Ranko, 2015; Wickham, 2015). However, the recent Arab uprisings gave them hope. Although the Brotherhood did not lead the that toppled Hosni Mubarak on 11th February 2011 the group was best placed to capitalize on the political transition in Egypt, going on to win subsequent elections. On 24th June 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi became Egypt’s first freely elected civilian president. Yet, on 3rd July 2013, after simply one year in power, he was forcibly removed by the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) led by erstwhile Defense Minister Abdel Fatah Sisi. Despite the Brotherhood’s dramatic removal from the helm of the Egyptian state, the group remains one of the key actors in the political landscape of the Middle East. Understanding the evolution and communication practices of the Brotherhood has therefore been a primary concern of Western policy- makers. In 2015, Former British Prime Minster David Cameron informed parliament that “as the Muslim Brotherhood continues to evolve, so must our understanding of it” (Cameron, 2015).

CONTACT Moeen Koa [email protected] Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, Reading RG6 6AH, UK. Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/hstc. © 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 572 M. KOA

However, research on how the Brotherhood communicate their political agenda is still scarce, despite an ever-increasing body of scholarship that seeks to unpack the group’s evolution and politics (Al-Anani, 2016; Ranko, 2015; Reda, 2014; Wickham, 2015; Wilmot, 2015). These studies conclude that the Brotherhood has evolved to incorporate democratic ideals as part of their rhetoric and , but they fail to show how these issues are framed to the public. Thus, this case study makes three main contributions to scholarly knowledge about the political communication of the Muslim Brotherhood. Firstly, it demonstrates that agenda-setting theory can advance our under- standing of Islamist movements’ strategic political communication, by revealing how their messaging tells us what to think about and how to think about it. Secondly, it expands the scope of second-level agenda setting theory by considering the persuasive techniques traditionally associated with propa- ganda, as central mechanisms of strategically positioning salient issues, i.e., examining “how” issues are framed and communicated. This approach builds upon recent scholarship that consider propa- ganda to be merely a sophisticated form of strategic communication (Farwell, 2014; Maréchal, 2017; Wilbur, 2017) rather than an exceptional or insidious form of messaging. Finally, offering a more practical contribution, this article helps policymakers better understand the strategic goals and values of the Brotherhood and identify the sophisticated persuasive devices the movement uses to the political agenda. In doing so, it also serves to potentially help audiences become sharper and more informed political consumers (Spiller & Bergner, 2011).

Literature review Agenda setting theory The agenda setting theory of McCombs and Shaw (1972) explains how the media influence . The theory confirms the idea of Lippmann that media forms “pictures in our heads” regarding the world around us (Lippmann, 1922, p. 28). The theory interrogates what issues the media highlights, as well as how issues and political actors are reported (Weaver, McCombs, & Shaw, 2004, p. 275). In other words, the first level of the theory describes the salience of matters transferred to public opinion, whilst the second-level progresses a step further, exploring the features associated with a specific issue or an object and how these issues are framed to the public. Second-level agenda setting can be considered equivalent to framing (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017,p. 624) as both are concerned with how objects are depicted in the media and focus on the most prominent aspects of the objects of interest. In addition, both are concerned with ways of thinking and with the details of the pictures in audiences’ heads (Weaver, 2016, p. 25). However, some scholar argue that there is a difference between framing and the second-level agenda setting in that framing studies focus principally on how the media report and present various subjects, whereas the latter is more concerned with the relationship between media and audience’s ways of thinking (Weaver, 2016, p. 26). In a further refinement of the theory, scholars have also developed a concept of agenda-building which resembles a second branch of agenda setting research that focuses on the source of the media agenda; identifying who has an influence on the media agenda (Wanta & Alkazemi, 2017,p.14). Traditionally, studies of agenda setting focused on political campaigns and network news pro- gramming (Funkhouser, 1973; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). However scholars are increasingly paying attention to the implications of new technologies for agenda setting theory arguing for a “change from what issues the media tell people to think about to what issues people tell the media they want to think about” (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001, p. 375). Capitalizing on this democratization of these communication structures and social media, the Brotherhood in Egypt has long been able to challenge state media with its own distinct narratives and set the agenda for its domestic, regional and international audiences (Ranko, 2015; Richter, 2011b). Agenda setting theory has generally analyzed despite the fact that up to 80% of news content is generated from news releases and communiqués (Sweetser & Brown, 2008, p. 360). Noting a lack of studies that apply agenda setting theory to the study of Islamist movements, this article INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 573 argues that analyzing the Brotherhood’s communiqués reveal how their communication “not only tell us what to think about, but also how to think about it, and, consequently what to think” (McCombs & Shaw, 1993, p. 65). In other words, what does the Brotherhood seek to communicate and how does it do so? Accordingly, agenda setting theory offers a useful framework through which to analyze the political communication of the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, this study expands the scope of second-level agenda setting theory by considering persuasive techniques as mechanisms of strategi- cally positioning the salient issues identified in level-one. Studies focused on the second-level of agenda setting have explored various means by which the salience of objects’ attributes are trans- ferred including substantive attributes such as characters of candidates and affective attributes, such as the tones media use when they describe candidates (Baumann, Zheng, & McCombs, 2018, p. 3). Building on calls to better understand the mechanisms through which agendas are set (Chen & Eraslan, 2017; Moy, Tewksbury, & Rinke, 2016; Rashi & McCombs, 2015), this article makes the case that the IPA’s persuasive techniques offer a revealing and underexplored tool through which we can understand the substantive and the affective attributes associated with salient issues communicated by the Muslim Brotherhood in the public realm.

Strategic communication and Islamist movements Strategic communication is “the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill its mission” (Hallahan, Holtzhausen, Van Ruler, Verčič, & Sriramesh, 2007, p. 3). Strategic commu- nication is also defined as “the practice of deliberate and purposive communication that a commu- nication agent enacts in the public sphere on behalf of a communicative entity to reach set goals” (Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2013; p. 74; 2015; p. 5). Based upon that, the practice of strategic commu- nication across disciplines share the following features as: deliberate and intentional; directed to achieve (a) particular goal(s); comprises one or more communicator(s) acting on behalf of a communicative entity; and communicates in the public sphere (Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2013, p. 74). It is by now that Islamist groups pay great attention to communication. Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem said that the camera is “an essential element in all resistance operations” (Matar, Alshaer, & Khatib, 2014, p. 53). Osama bin Laden went so far as to claim that, “it is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles” (Holbrook, 2011, p. 280). Donald Rumsfeld cited al Qaeda’s leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, making a similar claim for the importance of communication: “More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of Muslims.” Rumsfeld aptly observed that Islamist movements established “media relations committees [that] meet and talk about strategy, not with bullets but with words. . . They plan and design their headline-grabbing attacks using every means of communication” (Alexander & Kraft, 2007, p. 546). Despite the importance of this central element of Islamist movements, scholarship on strategic communication is an emerging field, thus far focusing primarily on extremist radical groups such as ISIS (Farwell, 2014; Ingram, 2016; Mahood & Rane, 2017; Thompson, 2017; Wilbur, 2017). Literature on the Brotherhood’s communication since 2013 is more limited, with a principal focus thus far on the official English language website ikhwanweb.com (Bardhan, 2014; Eissa, 2014; Mohamed & Mohamed, 2016). These argue that the Brotherhood’s rhetoric on the website aimed to change Western communities’ views of Islamists as radical, undemocratic and inflexible. The website was also used as a “communicative medium to demonstrate to the West the Egyptian Brotherhood’s need to be valued and respected regardless of ideological differences, understood rather than essentialized, stereotyped, and prejudged, and supported as a pragmatic, political entity within Egypt” (Bardhan, 2014, p. 235). However, these studies fail to address precisely how these goals are being sought and achieved. 574 M. KOA

Works such as Ranko (2015), Reda (2014), Wickham (2015), and Wilmot (2015) contribute to our understanding of the Brotherhood’s ideological evolution through rhetoric using a wider range of sources. They argue that the Brotherhood’s communication suggests an ideology that has become more politically pragmatic. The rhetoric of the Brotherhood shows that they have not only accepted democracy, pluralism, and human rights, but also adopted them as part of their agenda. There nonetheless remains a pressing need to understand the various elements of the Brotherhood’s strategic political communication through analyzing its Arabic statements. In so doing, this study provides valuable insights into the organization’s priorities and self-identity, the impressions it seeks to project to its domestic and regional audience and the tools it uses to communicate its political goals. This case study thus contributes to broader academic efforts to understand how Islamist political movements communicate strategically (Farwell, 2014; Richter, 2011a; Vergani & Bliuc, 2015). Farwell argues that ISIS’s communication strategy aims to persuade all Muslims that fighting to restore a caliphate is a religious duty. Therefore, the group’s narrative portrays ISIS as an agent of change, the true apostle of a sovereign faith, a champion of its own perverse notions of social justice, and a collection of avengers bent on settling accounts for the perceived sufferings of others (Farwell, 2014, pp. 49–50). Richter (2011a) examines the Brotherhood’s communication strategy during the Mubarak pre- sidency, suggesting that the Brotherhood sought to portray the group as a reliable and credible political actor. Using quantitative content analysis, Vergani and Bliuc (2015) state that the Brotherhood has been strategically utilizing emotions as a significant mobilizing dynamic, bolstering claims by other scholars that elites are more likely to use arguments evoking fear, anxiety and anger (Jerit, 2004). However, a significant gap in the literature exists as to how the goals of the strategy are being advanced and the techniques through which emotions are embodied in Islamist narratives. Analyzing this issue through existing literature on persuasive techniques can shed critical light on the mechanics of the Brotherhood’s strategic communication. Building on these works, this study thus asks:

RQ1: What have been the salient issues of the Brotherhood’s communication since 2013?

RQ2: What are the overarching objectives of the communication strategy of the Brotherhood since their removal from the helm of power?

RQ3: How does the Brotherhood seek to influence and advance these goals?

Persuasive communication techniques Persuasive communication is any message that intends to shape, reinforce, or change the responses of audience (Stiff & Mongeau, 2003, p. 10). Purposive communication activities to influence established goals is thus an essential part of any strategic communication campaign (Werder, 2015,p.81).Toachievegoals and to gain the widest possible appeal, politicians usevariouspersuasivetechniquestobemorestrategicin their communication and approaches (Negrine, 2008, p. 195). Hence, to reach their ends, especially in competitive situations, political communication benefits from other disciplines such as , adver- tisement and through professionals and media consultants (McNair, 2012, pp. 5–7). Analyzing such techniques will help identify how the Brotherhood intends to shape the perceptions of their audience. Although this study does not presume to determine the success of these attempts, it does seek to raise the awareness of audiences to identify and evaluate the persuasive methods that political actors like the Brotherhood use to influence them. Scholars suggest that once the audience is aware of the persuasive techniques, the effects of those techniques diminish, and it becomes the audience’s decision to accept the message or reject it (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014,p.167). INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 575

In order to further advance the second-level of agenda setting theory, this study adopts the taxonomy of (persuasive techniques) created in 1937 by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) as a tool to analyze how the Brotherhood communicate. This plethora of techniques consists of seven main devices; “name calling,”“,”“transfer,”“testi- monial,”“,”“card stacking,” and “bandwagon.” The IPA’s goal was to provide the public with the skills required to distinguish potentially misleading messages by identifying specific techniques prevalent in propaganda messaging in response to alarm raised “about the public’s seeming vulnerability to extremist propagandists” (Sproule, 2001, p. 168). Today, similar fears have been articulated by academics (Badawy & Ferrara, 2017; Houck, Repke, & Conway, 2017), governments, and media outlets as modern tools like social media are being exploited to promote reactionary politics and religious (CNN, 2017). Indeed scholars have found that religious themes are particularly susceptible to the IPA’s seven devices (Allen, 2002, p. 41). Allen utilized this plethora of techniques to show how religious rhetoric is an integral component of crisis speeches and how Bush attempted to unite and rally Americans through an increased use of religious rhetoric after the attacks of 9/11. This taxonomy of techniques also was employed as framework by Conway, Elizabeth Grabe, and Grieves (2007) to compare Father Charles Coughlin, who was a notorious radio commentator in the late 1930s and Bill O’Reilly, a former contemporary presenter of the “O’Reilly Factor” on the Fox News Channel. They consider the toolkit, a “systematic and dispassionate approach” through which to focus on “rhetorical strategy and presentation of people and ideas” (Conway et al., 2007, p. 198). Building on such work, this study rejuvenates the use of propaganda devices as persuasive techniques to explain how the Brotherhood advances their agenda. More broadly, it suggests that this taxonomy of persuasive techniques can be used to explain how a group or politician commu- nicate and the mechanisms by which agendas are set. Therefore, the following null and alternative hypotheses are offered:

H0: There is no significant difference between observed and expected frequencies of each technique in the analyzed communiqués.

H1: There is a significant difference between observed and expected frequencies of each technique in the analyzed communiqués.

These techniques are explained next.

Name calling In “name calling,” a communicator intentionally attaches an emotional-laden idea or symbol to a target (Shabo, 2008). This technique has been used extensively by the American President Donald Trump to discredit his political rivals. For example, he referred to Hilary Clinton as the Devil and “crooked Hillary.” He also labelled U.S. Senator Ted Cruz, his former primary opponent, “lying Ted” and called Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida “little Marco” and Jeb Bush “low- Jeb.” (Dunbar, 2016).

Glittering generality Although “name calling” attempts to make people form a judgment and renounce the credentials of an opponent, “glittering generality” urges publics to accept and approve political authority without investigating the evidence. It appeals to the popular emotions of brotherhood, generosity and love by using “virtue words” such as “constitution-definer,”“loyalty,”“,”“security,”“change,” “choice,”“the right to,”“glory,”“justice,”“freedom,”“truth,” and “honor” (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004; Sproule, 2001). In today’s political fray, “glittering generality” is common. The United States and its allies used the term “war on terror” to rally support for its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many glittering generalities were used to justify the war on Iraq, such as “regime change,”“Saddam is bad,”“bring 576 M. KOA freedom to Iraqis,”“make the world safer,”“self-defense,” and “combat terrorism” (Ryan & Switzer, 2009, p. 50). More recently, Trump’s campaign , “Make America Great Again,” is an illuminating example of this technique (Dunbar, 2016).

Transfer “ Transfer” involves carrying the prestige, respect, authority and sanction of something that is already respected to make something else revered and accepted. This technique can also work in reverse whereby something that is disrespected can make an associated object rejected (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014;Sproule, 2001). In this study, I distinguish between “positive transfer” and “negative transfer.” According to Sproule (2001), such techniques are typical when the communicator tries to establish identification between a political project and the audience’s respect of national or religious symbolism. The “transfer” technique is popular in contemporary political posturing. For example, the U.S. Republicans usually represent Jeffersonian ideals in political debates as positive transfer (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004, p. 165). In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush was portrayed as “a leader whom the nation could follow,” providing implicit backing for the administration’s rejoinder to the attacks (Ryan & Switzer, 2009,p.54). Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s “friend-enemy distinction” it serves to legitimize the actions politicians take and can buttress their authority at critical times (Schmitt, 1996).

Card stacking (selective omission) “Card stacking” effectively involves telling half-truths. The phrase was first coined with regards to gambling, in which card players attempt to stack the deck in their favor (Tidwell, 1958). It is the selection and use of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distractions, logical or illogical statements to give the best or the worst possible case for an idea, program, person, or product. This selective presentation or framing of issues seeks to win the target audience’s support for the politicians themselves, their organization or ideas, beliefs, and groups (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014; Sproule, 2001). It involves presenting out of context or providing obscure significant facts (Shabo, 2008).

Plain folks Politicians attempt to convince target audiences through language or actions that convey that their ideas are good because they are “of the people,” giving themselves a common touch with their targets. They try to appear as if they are from humble origins and carry the peoples’ interests at heart and therefore, should be trusted (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004; Severin & Tankard, 2013). Islamist groups have deployed similar strategies. The Hezbollah’s veteran leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was particularly successful in presenting himself as a “plain folk.” This was an image that provided him with huge popularity to the extent he was “described as a man of the street and a brother among equals” (Matar, 2014, p. 165). The people pronounced Nasrallah as “one of us;” an image that was bolstered by his austere and simple , which reinforced his image as an organic leader with concrete links to the people (Matar, 2014, p. 166). In a more recent vein, Vergani and Bliuc (2015) argue that ISIS has been increasingly utilizing internet jargon (net-speak) to adapt to connect with young people. This can also be considered a form of “plain folks” as ISIS seek to deploy the most commonly used discourse by the social media users who are their primary constituency.

Testimonial “” consists of having some respected or admired person endorse a given idea, program, project, product or person, hoping that the targeted audiences will follow their example. Donald Trump used many prolific businessmen to endorse his campaign such as Colony Capital CEO Tom Barrack, who delivered a testimonial for Trump at the party in July 2016 (Horsley, 2016). This technique can also work in reverse by using a hated, unqualified, or disrespected person to present or endorse an idea or project, which can yield a negative outcome (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004). An example of “negative testimonial” might be; “I’m Bill Clinton, and I believe in chastity and self-denial” (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004,p.166). INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 577

Bandwagon () The metaphorical label of the “bandwagon device” goesbacktothelate19thcenturyin American politics and “alludes to the wagon in a parade that carries the band and attracts a large crowd of followers marching behind it to enjoy the music” (Schmitt-Beck, 2016,p.57).The goal of this technique is to make people follow the crowd and accept the politician’sagenda.The “bandwagon” device relied on the idea that “everybody is doing it!” Therefore, you should be doing it too (IPA, 1939,p.97).The“” is also referred to as “contagion effect” (Schmitt-Beck, 2016, p. 57). The communicator here appeals to the desire to persuade people that their peers are accepting the program or the idea and they should join in rather than be left out (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014;Sproule,2001). According to Sproule (2001), the communicator usually appeals to ties of nationality, , race,vocation,region,sex,oroccupationtodo this. This technique exploits what is called “the herding instinct”, whereby people prefer to belong to the majority and hate being left out. Hence, (Shabo, 2008,p.18).Forexamplescholars have found that when voters learn that a party is gaining in the polls, other voters will be more likely to vote for it (Dahlgaard, Hansen, Hansen, & Larsen, 2016).

Method and scope Data set This study deployed computer-assisted content analysis using MAXQDA 12 Analytics Pro software to enable the organizational aspects of structuring the research data. MAXQDA is a professional software for qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods data analysis. MAXQDA Analytics Pro is the most advanced version of MAXQDA as it integrates a module for statistical analysis of qualitative data. The content analysis was combined with discourse analysis to discuss the cultural and historical significance of specific terms used. For this study, I analyzed the entire range (a census) of Arabic language communiqués issued by the Brotherhood from 3rd July 2013 to 9th July 2017: a total of 201 communiqués. The period chosen consists of a critical stage of the Brotherhood’s history. It is the period that followed the Mohammed Morsi removal from power on 3rd July 2013, by erstwhile Defence Minister Abdul Fattah Sisi (elected in May 2014 as the sixth president of Egypt) until 9th July 2017. The communiqués were chosen because they are official letters to the public on different occasions (For an example of these occasions, refer to Appendix A: titles of the first 10 Brotherhood’s statements analyzed in this study as an example.) Communiqués formalize the actual political agenda of the Brotherhood. They are political messages in which the Brotherhood presents their thoughts and issue positions (Zahid, 2010, p. 123). These communiqués all begin with the label “Official Statement” followed by a subject specific title, suggesting that these are deliberately constructed, and official political messages designed for public consumption. The average communiqué consists of around 1300 words. As all the communiqués were in Arabic, the coders were fluent Arabic speakers and all translations used in this study were crosschecked by an independent researcher who is a professional bilingual. All the communiqués were first published on the Brotherhood’s Arabic official website www.ikhwanonline.com and then posted by the Brotherhood’s Media Center via their social media pages and other affiliated websites. Most of these communiqués were also shared by sympathizers, members and followers on social media. A range of visual images were also used to support the analysis, not least because scholars have found that “the idea of visual framing continues to be underexplored”(Cacciatore, Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2016, p. 19). In particular, caricatures were extracted from the Brotherhood’s websites to show how non-textual images were used to bolster the Brotherhood’s communication strategy. Visual communication is particularly important in supporting strategies as images exhibit superior recall and recognition of political information than textual communication (Geise, 2017, p. 26) and also attract audience’s attention more effectively. For example, a study by Adobe (2013) found that 578 M. KOA posts on social media that contain images produce an engagement rate that is 600% higher than text- based posts. However, the main difference between textual and visual strategic communication is that textual communication is usually based on argumentation and reasoning, while visual images follow the logic of association, connecting different meanings that would not necessarily make sense if written down or communicated orally (Knieper & Saleh, 2017).

Coding In this research, two approaches of content analysis were used to create categories: inductive and deductive categorizing (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; p. 108; Langmann & Pick, 2018; p. 105; Martin & Hanington, 2012; p. 40; Roller & Lavrakas, 2015; p. 234). I used the inductive approach when there was not enough former knowledge about the category, thus creating my own categories (Croucher & Cronn-Mills, 2015, p. 210). This approach was deployed to investigate the key goals of the Brotherhood’s political communication strategy. This process included three phases: open coding, creating categories, and finally, abstraction (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 109). For the open coding phase, I benefited from the feature called “Creative Coding” available in MAXQDA 12 to support building categories from open coding. This feature offered a plain map where I visually arranged and re-arrange codes,addednewcodes,builthierarchiesandinte- grated the structure I built as my code system. After reading each communiqué several times, line-by-line to understand fully what was said, recurrent manifest and latent concepts were coded. I then created the various categories according to which the data could be classified on the bases of similarities and dissimilarities to reduce the number of categories (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 111). The last step was abstraction, which involved a general description of the under- lying data “themes” that generated the entire discussion around the salient issues of the Brotherhood’s communication since 2013 and overarching objectives of their 2013 – 2017 communication strategy. For example, the following is a paragraph from the Brotherhood’s communique issued on 23rd January 2016, entitled “No Compromise, No Reconciliation with Murderous Coup Regime.”

With every new revolutionary wave, false rumours are spread alleging the start of negotiations, understandings or agreements. Each time, the Muslim Brotherhood reaffirms and reiterates that: We will not negotiate with the murderers and criminals. We will not compromise on the rights of martyrs, prisoners, the wounded and all those tragically impacted by the junta and its coup. We will not compromise on the legitimacy of our elected President Mohamed Morsi. We will not compromise on the full rights of all the Egyptian people. During the open coding process, the preceding paragraph was coded initially under the code “delegitimizing the government,” but during the abstraction process was moved to the more comprehensive theme, “delegitimizing and incriminating the incumbent regime.” To find out what persuasive techniques the Brotherhood deployed to delegitimize the regime in the above paragraph, the deductive approach was used. Deductive content analysis is usually employed when the codebook is structured on the basis of previous knowledge (Kyngas & Elo, 2008;p.109;Roller& Lavrakas, 2015; p. 234). According to Elo and Kyngäs (2008), if a deductive approach is selected, the next step is to construct a categorization matrix and to code the data according to the categories. In the current study the IPA taxonomy of persuasive techniques was used to develop the code system (codebook) in the MAXQDA software. Then, all the communiqués were reviewed for content and coded for correspon- dence with the categories (Elo et al., 2014; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). For example, to code for persuasive techniques in the example above, I examined the availability of each technique one by one. For example, I found several “name callings” such as “murderers, criminals, and junta.” The Brotherhood also deployed numerous “assertions”; “We will not negotiate with the murderers and criminals. We will not compromise on the rights of martyrs, prisoners. . ..” Moreover, the Brotherhood utilized the “glittering generality” technique referring to “rights of martyrs,”“legitimacy,” and “the full rights of all the Egyptian people.” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 579

For the purpose of this study, content analysis was used in combination with discourse analysis. Discourse analysis provided a deeper and more holistic examination of the historical and cultural context of the techniques used in the communiqués to set the agenda.

Reliability To check the reliability of my findings, an intercoder was employed. There is little consensus on the amount of data that should be coded by the intercoder. Some recommend a sub-sample “between 10% and 25%” of the data (Wimmer & Dominick, 2013, p. 172). Others suggest 10% of the total sample (Lombard, Snyder- Duch, & Bracken, 2010). Kaid and Wadsworth (1989)believethat5–7% could be sufficient. In this study, 15% of the data was recoded by the intercoder. Thus, a total of 30 communiqués from the 201 already analyzed were randomly selcted and analayzed by the intercoder. The average of the Inter-Coder Coefficient Kappa (ĸ) achieved was .828 which is considered a perfect agreement (Burla et al., 2008, p. 114). Coefficient Kappa is Cohen’s kappa coefficient к,which“relates the number of concordant ratings to the number of discordant ratings while taking into account the agreement of ratings that could be expected by chance” (Burla et al., 2008, p. 114). It is the most frequently used in similar studies (Von Eye & Mun, 2014,p.1).1

Findings The results of the data collection provide important insights into the Brotherhood’s political goals and how they attempt to advance this agenda. Below are the salient issues and goals of the Brotherhood’s communication. This is followed by the persuasive techniques that the Brotherhood utilized to achieve these goals and create salience for the audience.

Salient issues and overarching objectives of the Muslim brotherhood’s communication The focus of the Brotherhood communiqués has been two-fold: first, delegitimizing and incriminat- ing the incumbent regime and, second, legitimizing and branding the Brothers. These themes were the focus of 98% of the communiqués analyzed during the period studied to achieve three strategic objectives in the political realm.

(1) The first sought to discredit the regime that ousted President Morsi. Therefore, the Brotherhood conducted a to incriminate the regime and damage its image, credibility, and reputation. Several strategies were used to undermine the post- 2013 order; exposing the regime’s malpractices and weaknesses, linking the state with Israel and Zionism, and highlighting the institutional corruption rife within government. (2) In so doing, the Brotherhood simultaneously endeavored to win the hearts and minds of the public and construct itself as a legitimate representative of the Egyptian people and the Islamic faith. To achieve this second goal, they launched a branding campaign to burnish the movement’simage. Many strategies were deployed to this effect: appearing to speak on behalf of the people; placing the people’s interests ahead of their own; promoting equality between men and women; appearing as a divine movement, and, indeed, victims and martyrs of the regime’spersecution. (3) These two parallel strategic goals were sought simultaneously with the movement’s third strategic goal: to be a central and legitimate political actor in the Middle East’s political fray by presenting itself as a moderate, nonviolent movement that upholds and adheres to democracy and a civil state.

To advance these goals and set the agenda, the Brotherhood deployed many persuasive techniques as the following section illustrates.

1Please refer to Appendix B: Intercoder coefficient Kappa Calculations. 580 M. KOA

Persuasive techniques used to influence and advance these goals The results of this analysis show that the Brotherhood’s communication strategy aligns strongly with the seven persuasive techniques identified by the IPA in the late 1930s. These devices feature in most of the statements issued by the Brotherhood during the period of study. More than one technique can be identified in 97% of the public statements analyzed and overall the IPA’s techniques feature 1295 times in different parts of the 201 analyzed statements. Significantly, “name calling” is the most dominant device: identified 525 times in 87% of the statements, followed by “glittering generality,” which featured 258 times in 60.2% of the statements. Table 1 summarizes the techniques and their frequency. This extensive and intensive deployment of persuasive techniques by the Brotherhood along the whole period of analysis, suggests that the group have been using such techniques as strategic communication devices to advance their argument, influence the public and set the agenda. A brief summary of each technique and how it is used to set the agenda follows, with a fuller analysis as to the historical and cultural significance of these tools in framing salient issues explored in the Discussion. “Name calling” is the overriding technique that the Brotherhood use to discredit their rivals. It is mainly used to advance the goal of undermining President Sisi and his regime. This technique serves to sway people to form a judgment, to reject and condemn the incumbent regime without discussing evidence for the judgment by labelling them with a bad idea or a negative symbol. “Name calling” is used by the Brotherhood to frame targeted objects in order to set their agenda of discrediting the Egyptian regime. “Glittering generalities” are used in order to frame their struggle with Egyptian regime since 2013 as one of good against evil. The second most commonly used technique by the Muslim Brotherhood, it appears 258 times in 60.2% of the analyzed statements. They use this technique to try to win over people to their agenda of legitimizing their authority through associating their projects, ideas and programs with virtue. In so doing, they seek authorization and without substantive examination of the data. Among many is the primary revolutionary slogan of “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, and Human Dignity” in an attempt to co-opt the discourse of the January 2011 revolution. Comparable to Barack Obama’s trademark campaign slogan; “change we can believe in” or Trump’s “Make America Great Again” the words sound promising and advantageous but say nothing definite. The Brotherhood seeks here to arouse the Egyptian public with vivid, emotionally suggestive phrases associated with the hope and exhilaration of Mubarak’s overthrow. The movement use the “transfer” technique 239 times in 44.8% of the analyzed statements; “negative transfer” 134 times and ‘positive transfer’ 105 times. “Negative transfer” is used to set Brotherhood’s agenda to discredit the regime, while “positive transfer” serves to present the move- ment as humble, sanctioned, accepted, revered and respected. In “negative transfer,” the Brotherhood uses negative qualities of ideas, situations, and characters transferred to the target they intend to condemn. In “positive transfer,” the Brotherhood attempts to project the positive qualities of good behavior, drawing on the Mohammed ’s righteous conduct and Qur’anic verses to appear accepted and respected and set their agenda to appear as a legitimate and moderate political entity.

Table 1. Persuasive techniques and number of times they appeared. Number of times each Number of statements in which Frequencies of each technique # Persuasive Techniques technique appeared each technique appeared in the statements 11. Name Calling 525 175 87% 12. Glittering Generality 258 121 60.2% 13. Transfer 239 90 44.8% 14. Card stacking 118 74 36.9% 15. Plain Folks 92 69 34.3% 16. Testimonial 38 30 14.9% 17. Bandwagon 25 24 11.95% Total 1295 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 581

The Brotherhood uses “card stacking” as a technique to set the agenda 118 times in 36.9% of the documents analyzed. In a selective presentation of facts and figures they use this technique fairly extensively to arouse anger and hatred and rally their audience against the regime. Deploying this tool to depict the Egyptian regime as incompetent or brutal, this also serves to win over the hearts and minds of their audience and encourage them to accept the group as a legitimate representative of the people. The “plain folks” technique is deployed 92 times during the period under examination. It features in about 34% of the total analyzed statements as a central technique through which the Brotherhood set their agenda of appearing as legitimate and reliable by framing themselves as representing the people and having the peoples’ interests at heart. Frequently this technique appears in the movement’s communication when demanding . “Plain folks” is parti- cularly employed in support of its strategic communication branding campaign and also serves to discredit the regime as removed from the experience of ordinary Egyptians. Through this technique, the Brotherhood present their ideas, projects and revolution as “of the people” and thus, seek to set the agenda by arguing that Egyptians should accept these ideas and projects because they are for their benefit. The “testimonial” technique features in 14.9% of the total analyzed statements; “positive testimo- nial” appears 33 times, while “negative testimonial” appears 5 times. Through deploying “negative testimonial,” the movement seeks to discredit the regime, while through using “positive testimonial,” the movement attempts to reinforce the idea that they are a democratic movement and, therefore, set their agenda to appear as moderate. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the “bandwagon” technique is the least used tool by the Brotherhood. Identified only 25 times, this technique is generally used to mobilize wavering audiences and potentially to recruit new supporters. Its low use suggests that the group does not seek often seek to persuade their audience to join them because “everybody is doing it!” but instead, the group focus’s its attention on maintaining their current base of support.

Results of chi-squared test The statistical significance of the Brotherhood’s strategy was assessed using chi-squared test with a significance level of P < 0.05. The test was conducted to evaluate objectively the differences between the observed and expected frequencies of each persuasive technique through simple probability in the analysed 201 communiqués. The following Table 2 shows the results of chi-squared test. According to the above results of chi-squared, the null hypothesis (H0) was rejected for name calling, glittering generality, card stacking, plain folks, testimonial, and bandwagon. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (H1) was accepted for the same techniques. The statistical significance here implies that the differences are not due to chance, which means that the use of such techniques could be planned. In the meantime, the null hypothesis was accepted only for “transfer” as the deviation was small enough that chance might account for it.

Discussion The Brotherhood strategic communication objectives and tactics These findings illuminate how the Brotherhood communicate their political agenda in an attempt to attract and mobilize domestic and regional audiences to their cause. Developing second-level of agenda setting theory by offering a systematic tool through which to analyze how they communicate their agenda, it becomes clear that the Brotherhood’s political communication very much align with the seven persuasive devices developed by the IPA. With a focus on the cultural and historical resonance the Brotherhood’s rhetoric, the discussion below illustrates how these tools are intended to create salience for the audience. 582 M. KOA

Table 2. Results of chi-squared test to evaluate the differences in persuasive techniques. Variable Persuasive Techniques Observed N Expected N Chi-Squared DF Sig. Name Calling Yes 175 100.5 110.45 1 0.000* No 26 100.5 Glittering Generality Yes 121 100.5 8.36 1 0.004* No 80 100.5 Transfer Yes 90 100.5 1.19 1 0.139 No 111 100.5 Card stacking Yes 73 100.5 15.05 1 0.000* No 128 100.5 Plain Folks Yes 69 100.5 19.74 1 0.000* No 132 100.5 Testimonial Yes 30 100.5 98.91 1 0.000* No 171 100.5 Bandwagon Yes 24 100.5 116.46 1 0.000* No 177 100.5 N = (201) * is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Name calling The central figure of the Brotherhood’s “name calling” is Abdul Fattah Sisi, who was the former head of the Egyptian armed forces. Sisi came to prominence in the public realm as head of Military Intelligence and was thus a member of SCAF, which governed after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak. He removed the previous Islamist president, Morsi, who had made him Defence Minister and in August 2013 oversaw the massacre of hundreds of Brotherhood protestors in Rabaa square in what Amnesty described as “the bloodiest incident in Egypt’s recent history” (Haddad, 2015). On 26th March 2014, Sisi resigned from the military to run for the presidency. A central figure in the army-backed post-Morsi interim government, Sisi became the object of almost cultlike popular devotion, while showing adeptness as a political tactician (AFP, 2013). He ran for election under the slogan “Long Live Egypt” and promoted his campaign on the premise that his victory would mean the Brotherhood’s time would be “finished” and that the discourse of Islamists had to be “rectified.” In Western press, he was blamed for the deaths of hundreds of people killed in the authorities’ crackdown on Islamists since the ousting of Morsi in July 2013 (BBC, 2014b). To denigrate President Sisi and set their agenda to present him as a villain, the movement portray him as “the mass-murderer,”“butcher” (safah and mujrim), the “putschists’ leader” (qayid alainqilabiiyn), and “traitor” (khayin). Unsurprisingly, considering the dramatic and public massacre of August 2013, the terms “mass-murder” and “butcher” are found in almost all statements in which Sisi was mentioned. Through this technique, the movement seeks to associate the regime with blood and death, alluding to the brutal crackdown that followed Morsi’s ousting. They are the same labels that were assigned by Americans to Saddam Hussein in 2003 to justify its invasion of Iraq. Indeed similar stereotypes were ascribed to Milosevic during the war in Kosovo in 1990 by the European press to direct the audience’s attention to the emotive dimension of the conflict (Savarese, 2005, p. 212). Likewise, it seems that the Brotherhood, by using such labels in their discourse, seek to draw the international community’s attention to the emotive dimension of the conflict, leading to condemnation and possibly even invoke their intervention. Such “name calling” was also visible through caricatures. For example, on 12th February 2014 they published a caricature, Figure 1, depicting Sisi in military apparel as “mass-murder” holding a chainsaw dripping blood. It refers to the 1974 brutal, merciless American horror film, Texas Chainsaw Massacre. Sisi is also frequently labelled as a “traitor.” This serves to denounce his removal of Morsi as Egypt’s only legitimately elected president and also advances the Brotherhood’s secondary agenda of linking the subsequent Egyptian regime with Zionism in order to undermine the government. The association with Zionism was found in 22.9% of the communiqués issued. The Brotherhood also affirm this through their visual communication. For example, in October 2014, Egyptian military operations in Sinai to establish a buffer zone led to the displacement of some residents of the area, an act the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 583

Figure 1. A Caricature depicting Sisi as “mass murder” (FJP, 2014).

Brotherhood describe as evidence that the regime are a tool at the hands of Americans and Zionists, hoping to delegitimize the regime. Simultaneously, the group describe Morsi as the hero who stood against the fulfilment of the Zionists’ scheme in Sinai in attempt to positively the Brothers.

What the Putschists are doing in Sinai is merely to implement the American-Zionist project of handing over Sinai to the brutal Zionist enemy. The legitimate president of the country, Dr. Mohamed Morsi was aware of this beforehand and thus enthusiastically began reconstructing Sinai to abort this heinous scheme and enacted a national plan to protect this land (Brotherhood, 2014c).

The Sinai territory was lost to Israel in the 1967 war and only regained after the 1973 surprise attack on Israel and subsequent negotiations that led to the Camp David Accords. This contested space thus has important symbolic significance in the memory of Egyptian people. The Brotherhood frequently attempt to framing Sisi as a traitor using caricature. For example, on 19th October 2014, the Brothers’ political wing, Freedom and Justice, published a caricature on their website portraying Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minster, as a puppeteer manipulating Sisi, who is exposed as a puppet in army apparel (see Figure 2). In the caricature, Netanyahu is much larger than Sisi, who is depicted as clumsy and idiotic, thereby both literally and symbolically belittling the Egyptian President. The Muslim Brotherhood seek to convey a message that Sisi is a perfidious, if insignificant, Zionist stooge. Sisi is also called “the commander of Putschists” in an attempt to reinforce the idea that Morsi’s removal was a coup, rather than a revolution, in order to shape how their audience view the events of July 2013. This second-level agenda setting taps into one of the most contested discursive narratives of the events of July 2013, which much Western press and commentary labelled as a “coup” in contrast to within Egypt (King, 2015; NPR, 2016). Of course, Putschists is a German word mostly linked to the event that led Hitler from a Munich beer-hall in late 1923 to overthrow the government. However, the so-called “Beer Hall Putsch” failed ignominiously and Hitler was arrested and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment (Doerr, 1998, p. 74). It seems that the message of the movement, by using this label, is to reinforce their idea that “the coup will inevitably fail” and thereby framing the regime as ultimately doomed. Sisi is commonly presented as a “dictator” who is unfit to rule and demonstrates a “contempt for democracy” (Brotherhood, 2013d). By deploying these terms, the Brotherhood consolidate their agenda through pre-existing discourses expressed by international about the events of July 2013 as a coup. They also seek to appeal to human rights organizations such as Amnesty and 584 M. KOA

Figure 2. A caricature portraying Benjamin Netanyahu as a puppeteer and Sisi as a puppet.

Human Rights Watch who have condemned the Egyptian regime (HRW, 2014). Moreover, they use much the same language with which enemies of the West, such as Saddam Hussein, were described in the past. This idea is reinforced by other familiar frames. The regime is called “dictatorial” (23.40%) and “fascist” (15.15%) to further discredit the regime and present the government as untrustworthy. The term “gang” also appears in 11.5% of the statements. The Brotherhood thereby aims to frame the regime as an organized group of criminals sharing a common identity as mere thugs who engage in illegal and violent behavior. This serves to demonstrate the Brotherhood’s discursive agenda that the regime cannot be regarded as a real government and cannot be trusted with the people’s lives and the country’s resources. The use of this technique can be understood as part of the Brotherhood’s overarching strategy to focus public opinion on the regime’s failures. Beyond the figure of Sisi himself, the Egyptian army and security forces are the central focus of their name-calling campaign. This sector is portrayed primarily as a group of corrupt murderers, a “name calling” that is also reinforced through caricature. For example, on 1st January 2016, the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party (FJP) website, published a caricature, Figure 3, credited to the Brazilian political cartoonist Carlos Latuff, depicting the army (SCAF) as pursuing the revolutionists who participated in the 25th January 2011 revolution against the disposed Mubarak, while calling them “thugs” whose hands are stained with blood. Linking the army and the police to brutality also allows the Brotherhood to connect their experience of persecution since July 2013 to popular anger against police violence that prompted the 25 January protests in commemoration of Khaled Said (Preston, 2011) and clashes with SCAF in October 2011 at the Maspero state television building (Ahram, 2012). Revealingly, the preceding analysis shows that the Brotherhood has moved away from religious “name callings” to demonize the regime. In the past, Islamist opponents of the Egyptian regime relied principally upon religious “name callings.” For example, to delegitimize the authorities during President Nasser’s regime, the Brotherhood denounced them as infidels (Kufar)oras ignorant (juhal). They also pronounced Egypt as the land of unbelief (dar-al-kufr) because of the failure to implement Islamic law in life and governance (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996, p. 12). However, it is notable that such religious “name calling” is conspicuously absent in the period under examination. Instead, civic themes, such as contravening the law, are a more common INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 585

Figure 3. A caricature depicting SCAF as corrupt (Latuff, 2016).

“name calling” technique to undermine the regime. The movement portray the state as “criminal” in 31.2% and “illegal” in 14% of the analyzed communiqués, suggesting that the Brotherhood are moving towards more secular frames of reference through which to set their agenda.

Glittering generality The movement seems to use the “glittering generality” technique primarily to pacify potential supporters and to make the outright persecution they have faced since 2013 more palatable. In the quest to set the agenda that they are the legitimate representatives of the Egyptian people, they deploy “glittering generalities” that are euphemistic and evocative, describing the struggle with regime as “the path of free people” or “the battle for freedom.” They also impart respect and dignity on the participants in the struggle against the regime to encourage others to join and link their movement to appeals for “freedom” and “dignity” that were prevalent in the 25 January revolution (Nour & Nawara, 2011). In such a context, they use vague but emotive phrases, describing their supporters as “the free comrades,”“the believers of justice, freedom and human dignity,” and “the loyal to the country.” Thereby, they attribute legitimacy to their struggle with the regime using terms such as “the popular will,”“the rights of the martyrs,” and stress their “commitment to democratic legitimacy” to evoke virtue. Their call to continue the struggle in the face of persecution relies on highly emotive language, such as “the call of the right,” emphasizing “the great sacrifices” they have suffered and “lofty” or “noble” goals. By assigning such words of virtue to the cause and endeavors they are trying to achieve, they seek to consolidate the determination and persistence of their members to continue their struggle against an oppressive regime and thereby bolster their legitimacy. “Glittering Generalities” are not simply used by the Brotherhood to assign their ideas, projects, and movement with virtues to acquire legitimacy and prestige, but also encourage their audience to condemn the government. To this end, they describe “the regime’s horrific crimes,”“barbaric violence,” and “brutal torture.”

The junta-appointed regime’s Interior Ministry and media machine continue to lay charges and throw allegations about bombing incidents and assassinations, mostly against the Muslim Brotherhood, merely to justify their own coup regime’s horrific crimes, barbaric violence and brutal torture, and to distract the Egyptian people from the severe crises they suffer daily due to the illegitimate putschists regime’s colossal failures on all fronts (Brotherhood, 2016). 586 M. KOA

Thus, the Brotherhood use “glittering generality” in an attempt to set their agenda and win over the people to their cause in the struggle against the incumbent regime through associating themselves, their movement, “revolution” and “revolutionaries” with virtuous characteristics and goals and assigning the state negative generalities to discredit them. Accordingly, this technique contributes to advancing two strategic communication campaigns; the smearing of the regime as “bad” and branding themselves as “good.”

Transfer Negative transfer. The Brotherhood repeatedly seek to associate the regime with the disrespected to make the latter despised and unaccepted. For example, the movement links the Syrian regime’s atrocities in their civil war against the Syrian people with the Egyptian repression of demonstrations.

At the time we [Egyptians] are trying to heal our wounds and wipe away our grief over the martyrs and the wounded in the massacres committed by the military Putschists in Egypt, in which, thousands were martyred, and an even greater number were wounded, the Syrian criminal regime has shocked us today with another massacre against the defenseless Syrian people using internationally banned toxic gases. More than one thousand three hundred were martyred, many of whom were innocent children, women and elderly (Brotherhood, 2013e). In this quote, the Brotherhood uses “negative transfer” in a twofold manner; firstly, by linking the Egyptian regime and their actions with the hated Syrian regime, thereby appealing to negative emotions associated with Bashar Asad’s actions to serve their agenda of discrediting the govern- ment. Secondly, the group transfers the emotions associated with the Syrian massacres that were condemned by international entities and human rights organizations to the Egyptian event, in the hope of persuading their audience that, accordingly, the Egyptian government should also be denounced. The Brotherhood use a variety of colorful metaphors to set their agenda of delegitimizing the government. For example, they associate the regime with “poisonous weeds” that prevent plants from growing and blossoming, implying therefore, that the populace must get rid of them to allow the country to develop, grow, flourish and prosper. The “transfer” here seeks to depict and frame the regime as harmful to health of the county.

The collapse of the of the bloody military bloody coup is approaching, and the people will pluck it out from its roots like farmers weed out poisonous plants from their fields to allow others plants to grow up, prosper and blossom by the permission of God (Brotherhood, 2013g). The statement is targeted at the Dakahlia Governorate, in which most residents live in rural areas. Applying this analogy within a communiqué targeting a rural governorate is likely intentional, calling on a familiar grass roots base amongst the peasantry and rural people. The group also deploys powerful and emotive historical analogies in order to frame their enemy as threatening. They associate the regime with tyrants such as Hulagu Khan, who sieged Baghdad in 1258 and demolished the greatest center of Islamic power. Khan was responsible for the death of more than 100,000 people and destroying grand constructions that had been the work of generations, burning palaces, mosques, libraries, and hospitals to the ground (Banks, 2012, p. 2331).

There is no doubt that history will remember the leaders of the bloody coup; the killers of their Egyptians brothers alongside Hulagu, Nero and Hitler (Brotherhood, 2013a). Nero was a Roman Emperor from 54AD to 68AD, who followed Roman paganism and was known for his daily crimes and brutality, including the killing of his own wife (Morgan, 2003). However, the most common historical analogy deployed by the Brotherhood in their statements is one that will be familiar to all Egyptians: portraying Sisi as Pharaoh, i.e., an arrogant tyrant who refused to submit to the will of Allah. This discursive frame appears in more than 6.5% of the analyzed INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 587 statements. According to the Qur’an, the Pharaoh divided his people into factions, oppressed them, and slaughtered their sons, as the Qur’anic verse (28:4) adduced. In appealing to these familiar and powerful historical figures, the Brotherhood can frame the “Putschists” as following in footsteps of the oppressive Pharaoh (Brotherhood, 2013e). The Brotherhood thereby presents the regime as faithless and brutal and consequently a force that must be denounced and abolished. This association between the Pharaoh and Sisi is repeated numerously, both discursively and through images, as for example in Figure 4. Other images rely on more modern imagery to shame and discredit the President. Some of the Brotherhood’s websites go so far as to present Sisi as an evil pimp. The cartoon below, Figure 5,was as part of an ﺹﺮﻌﻟﺍﺍﻮﺒﺨﺘﻧﺍ ”originally credited to Ammar Abu Bakr and was entitled “Vote for the Pimp anti-Sisi campaign launched in April 2014 under the Hashtag “Vote for The Pimp” begun on Twitter in Egypt and tweeted hundreds of thousands of times. The pimp was a phrase coined during the British colonial of Egypt, and is associated with the management of prostitutes (BBC, 2014a). According to Al-Jazeera (2014), this term is “extremely offensive in Egyptian , but its use also mockingly references the North American meaning: showy, impressive, the boss of a gang.” The term is deployed to put down Sisi’s supporters, implying that his devotees are prostitutes and thereby setting the agenda that the regime is illegitimate.

Positive transfer. The Brotherhood generally use “positive transfer” to associate themselves with the prestige, respect, and authority of the Qur’an. This religiously orientated transfer features in 15.15% of the analyzed statements. It serves to make the group revered and accepted in the hope of achieving their agenda to win over the hearts and minds of people. It is also used to encourage their members to remain united and to be patient in the face of persecution. In the following quote, for example, the movement transfers the character of true, dignified believers to Brotherhood members.

Figure 4. Negative Transfer: A cartoon associating Sisi with Pharaoh (klmty, 2014). 588 M. KOA

Figure 5. Carton, entitled; “Vote for the Pimp”, by Ammar Abu Bakr (Ikhwanonline, 2014).

But you, O members of the Muslim Brotherhood, we remind you of Allah’s words: (Brotherhood, 2013g).

So do not become weak (against your enemy), nor be sad, and you will be superior (in victory) if you are indeed (true) believers. Qur’anic Verse (3:139). The dignity and the sacrifices of several famous role models of Islamic history are evoked. In 11th September 2013, targeting Egyptian women, the movement attempted to associate the women participating in the struggle against the regime with Sumaya bint Khabbat Om Ammar, who, along with her husband, Yasser, and her son, Ammar, were some of the first individuals to embrace Islam. They were terrorized, tortured and tormented by Qurashis and Abu Jahal promptly upon discovering the family’s new beliefs. Her husband was killed in front of her and her son was tortured while she was watching him until, finally, Abu Jahal killed her (Ghadanfar, 2001, pp. 178–181). This period is revered in Islamic history as a time of uncertainty and violence for Muslims from which they learnt many hard and important lessons in patience and self-sacrifice. Thus, my analysis finds that “transfer,” in its both types; negative and positive is employed by the Brotherhood to support its political communication strategy and reinforce the key messages they intend to convey. The Brotherhood has shown the adaptability of their images and analogies by using both established (religious and pharaonic) and more modern (gang and pimp) discourses as mechan- isms by which they can set their agenda of smearing the state and demonstrating their legitimacy. Card stacking The Brotherhood used “card stacking” as a technique to set the agenda 118 times in 36.9% of the documents analyzed, with the goal of arousing anger and hatred and rallying their audience against the regime. For example, on 6th October 2015, the Brotherhood condemned Sisi’s call on Arab countries to expand the peace process with Israel to include more Arab countries. The group “stacked cards” to frame Sisi as a traitor who attempts to annihilate the nation.

What the traitor Sisi and the leaders of the military are doing now is purely a crime to obliterate the nation (Ummah). Perhaps Sisi’s call for the expansion of the Camp David agreement between Egypt and the Zionist entity to encompass wider Arab participation, his position regarding the siege of Gaza, his flooding the borders with Gaza with seawater, the displacement of the residents of Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid, his silence about what is happening in Jerusalem, his support of the Russian occupation of Syria, as well as his support for the tyrant Bashar al-Assad provide proofs beyond doubt of his treason (Brotherhood, 2015b). INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 589

In the preceding quote, the Brotherhood attempts to manipulate audience’s perception of President Sisi by highlighting and grouping all the evidence that supports their traitor narrative at the expense of an alternative, more balanced account of the President’s foreign policy. The Brotherhood also uses “card stacking” to assign the regime with responsibility for all the country’s failures. In line with this strategy, in 2014 the movement used different uncorrelated numbers to manipulate the audience’s perception of Egypt’s international ranking.

The military establishment preoccupied itself with economic activity; monopolized the nation’s land; and controlled around 40% of the country’s economy. The result is a debt of more than 1600 billion Egyptian pounds, national poverty that has exceeded 40%, the unemployment of millions, the highest number of liver disease and kidney failure sufferers in the world, 20 million people living in slums; of which four million live in cemeteries and the loss of transparency. Matters that have led to the failure of Egypt, its weaknesses and its diminished regional and international standing (Brotherhood, 2014d).

The cumulative effect of these unsubstantiated statistics allows the Brotherhood to dramatize Egypt’s economic situation to discredit the government, conveniently ignoring that the economic situation was arguably worse during the Brotherhood’s Morsi’s time in power. As the BBC reported: “Egypt’s debt ballooned, Mr. Morsi’s government continually dipped into the country’s cash reserves, which at $16bn today are less than half what they were before Mr. Morsi took office.” Government debt increased from $30bn before Mubarak was ousted to around $40bn in July 2013 with inflation increasing to between 13% and 18% and unemployment at a record 13.2 percent (Davies, 2013). On balance, the Brotherhood relies upon “card stacking” as one of its fundamental persuasive techniques through which to set their agenda of undermining the Egyptian regime. The Brotherhood depends such selective framing of relevant facts alongside other persuasive techniques such as “glittering generality” in order to persuade their audience that they are a legitimate and trustworthy political entity.

Plain folks The Brotherhood rely heavily on the notion that they are one with the people. Featuring in over a third of their communication, they use this technique to set their agenda of appearing as legitimate and reliable by framing themselves as representing the people and having the peoples’ interests at heart. Frequently this technique appears in the movement’s communication when demanding compliance and is also used to set the agenda on national occasions such as the Sinai Liberation Day on April 25 and Revolution Day on January 25. The Brotherhood frequently frame their leaders as men of the people, sharing others’ struggles and sacrificing themselves for the country’s freedom.

The group stresses that its leaders, the members of the Guidance Bureau, whom were kidnapped and hidden are the beacon of the nation’s struggle, alongside tens of thousands of young men, women and elderly who are confronting the criminals of the military coup with chests that do not fear bullets, detention or torture. We will continue to follow in their steps (Brotherhood, 2015a).

This technique is particularly used to frame moments of crises such as terror attacks on Christian churches or on Egyptian soldiers in Sinai, whereby the Brotherhood take the opportunity to depict themselves as feeling the adversity of others. For example, on 18th November 2013, when a freight train travelling from the city of Beni Suef, hit vehicles at a crossing near the village of Dahshur, the Brotherhood rushed to extend their condolences to the victims’ families. Occasions such as this serve as a chance for the group to frame the state as responsible, stating that justifications of, “human error and individual negligence,” cannot be acceptable.

The Muslim Brotherhood extends its sincere condolences to the victims’ families of the Dahshur train accident and to the Egyptian People. We also pray that the injured quickly and fully recover. We call for an urgent investigation to identify those responsible for the incident, and to hold them accountable according to the law (Brotherhood, 2013c). 590 M. KOA

Thus, the Brotherhood employ this mechanism to present themselves as an average Joe or a common movement that understands and empathizes with the people’sconcerns.Throughthis technique, the Brotherhood present their ideas, projects and revolution as “of the people” and thus, seek to set the agenda by arguing that Egyptians should accept these ideas and projects because they are for their benefit. The movement deploy this technique to convince the people that the Brothers’ views and interests reflect those of the Egyptian people and therefore they should be supported.

Testimonial The Brotherhood utilize “positive testimonial” to look humble, reliable, and worthy. This technique serves to reinforce their strategic goals of appearing as a democratic group and denying the virulent accusations of the Sisi regime that they are terrorists. For example, they quote the former U.S. President (1977–1981), Jimmy Carter, claiming: “The president Morsi was kidnapped and the leaders of the Brotherhood were arrested and detained in subhuman conditions, treated like terrorists when they are not” (Brotherhood, 2013f). On 26th December 2013, refuting their designation as a terrorist organization by the Egyptian government, the movement cite the title and ideas of an article in the British newspaper, The Telegraph: “Who was the greatest champion of democracy in 2013? Unbelievably, the Muslim Brotherhood.” In this article, Brendan O’Neill, the editor of Spiked Online and a columnist for The Australian, Reason,andThe Big Issue, provides a testimony for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Looking back over 2013, what person or organization has done the most to preserve the ideals of democracy and freedom? Who should win the prize for standing up for democratic rights in the face of autonomy-crushing ? I cannot believe I am about to say this, but I think it is the Muslim Brotherhood, or at least its supporters in Egypt. More than any other group of people on Earth, the Egyptian masses who back the Muslim Brotherhood risked life and limb in 2013 to try to preserve the idea that the people should get to choose their political leaders and should be free to express their political views and anger in public. Where we liberals in the West merely write articles about the importance of democratic rights and freedom of speech, Muslim Brotherhood fans in Egypt have fought tooth-and-catapult for those things; they’ve even died for them, in their thousands (O’Neill, 2013). Although are typically used positively, the Brotherhood is also able to skillfully use it in reverse by assigning the regime with a negative testimonial that is hated and disrespected in the Egyptian context. The Brotherhood specifically deploy this technique to reinforce the notion that the regime is a Zionist agent, thereby undermining its legitimacy. The Brotherhood link the regime with Zionism by using such a technique in sentences that could be understood as: “hey, look who is praising the regime!” For instance, on 22nd December 2013, the Brotherhood address this technique to the Egyptian Army, bringing to the soldiers’ attention that Israeli politicians are praising the Egyptian leadership. Accordingly, the regime cannot be trusted.

You may have heard the huge praise the leaders of the Zionist entity directed at the leader of the coup, considering him a national hero for Israel (Brotherhood, 2013b). Using “negative testimonial,” the Brotherhood can thereby establish that they are the true patriots, whilst the regime, who is being praised by a longstanding, historical enemy, is a traitor that is betraying the country and its people. Referring in October 2014, to Egyptian military operations in Sinai, the Brotherhood claim that,

The Putschists have done what the Zionist occupation was unable to do. The spokesperson of the Zionist army declared with all his bravado, that what the Egyptian army is doing to the Egyptian people of Sinai and Rafah is being done in full cooperation and coordination with the Zionist enemy! (Brotherhood, 2014a) In brief, “testimonial” in its both forms is used by the Brotherhood to set the agenda. In “negative testimonial,” the movement seeks primarily to discredit the regime. It serves to support their strategy of linking the regime with Zionism and presenting the Brothers as the real patriots. In “positive testimonial,” the movement seek to reinforce the salient issue that they are a democratic movement INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 591 and, therefore, set their agenda to appear as moderate. It is also used to refute attempts to link the movement to terrorism, bolstering scholarly arguments that emphasize the Brotherhood’s commit- ment to nonviolence (Ranko, 2015; Richter, 2011a; Wickham, 2015).

Bandwagon Though the least commonly used of all the persuasive techniques (featuring only 25 times), the Brotherhood also deploy this technique as a means of second-level agenda setting. The movement generally employ this technique as a mobilization tactic to urge the audience to participate effectively in the struggle with regime.

The attempt to overthrow the bloody coup, although primarily the task of the revolutionaries on the ground should also be carried out by every free noble person belonging to this country, as well as it lovers all over the world. This is through councils, revolutionary coalitions, human rights and media outlets that carry the message of the revolution to peoples around the world. And to all countries, to local and international organizations, to all courts and judicial authorities involved in prosecuting murderers and perpetrators of humanitarian crimes [. . .]. Through this, their honest work will integrate with the growing revolutionary effort (Brotherhood, 2014b). The “bandwagon” technique appears primarily as a device in order to encourage mobilization and recruitment. Perhaps recognizing that the group lost considerable popularity during Morsi’s year in power from 2012–2013 (reference), the low frequency of this technique suggests that recruitment may not be high on their list of priorities now, focusing their attention rather on maintaining and consolidating their current base of support.

Conclusion This study has sought to examine Islamist movements’ strategic political communication using a critical period of the Brotherhood’s communication to its domestic and regional audiences since its ousting from power in July 2013 as a case study to examine how the group has sought to achieve its strategic goals. It utilized the two levels of agenda setting theory as a theoretical framework. The first-level was used to identify inductively the salient issues and the goals of the Brotherhood’s communication, while the second-level of agenda setting was utilized to describe how these objec- tives were sought. The IPA’s category of persuasive techniques was applied as the basis of the content analysis index to deductively identify and analyze the Brotherhood’s employment of such techniques in order to explain and illuminate how the second-level of agenda setting is achieved by the Brotherhood. Discourse analysis was also used to deepen the discussion and understanding of the cultural and historical significance of specific terms used and how they created salience. The results show that the Brotherhood’s communication aligns with the IPA persuasive techniques to advance its political communication strategy and influence audiences. Precisely, it found that these techniques were deployed to support three campaigns that are being implemented simultaneously:

(1) A smear campaign to discredit and incriminate the regime that ousted President Morsi and damage its image, credibility, and reputation. (2) A sophisticated marketing and branding campaign to burnish the movement’s image to win the hearts and minds of the public and construct itself as a legitimate representative of the Egyptian people and the Islamic faith. (3) A public relations campaign to present itself as a central and legitimate political actor in the Middle East’s political fray by presenting itself as a moderate, non-violent movement that upholds and adheres to democracy and a civil state.

In fact, the extensive and intensive deployment of persuasive techniques by the Brotherhood along the whole period of analysis provides evidence that the movement, whether consciously or unconsciously, has been using these techniques as strategic communication devices to advance its argument 592 M. KOA persuasively, influence the public and attempt to shape audience perceptions. Although this study has shown a close alignment of the Brotherhood’s communication with the IPA taxonomy of persuasive techniques, it remains unclear whether the Brotherhood are consciously modelling their communication strategy on this. Investigating this question would undoubtedly require interviews with the upper echelons of the organization. This presents both practical and methodological challenges, not least in the current political climate when the group faces perhaps unprecedented persecution but such an integrated approach, if possible in the future, would greatly enhance the significance of these findings. Theoretically, this case study contributes to the second-level of agenda setting theory by suggesting that these persuasive techniques serve as an under-explored tool to illuminate the substantive and affective attributes of salient objects, thereby revealing the discursive mechanisms through which the Brotherhood frames its rhetoric. The analysis of an extensive range of the Brotherhood’s textual and visual communication using the techniques developed by the IPA’s codebook, clearly advances scholarly understanding of how underground Islamist movements seek to set the agenda in a contested public realm, and more precisely, the specific mechanisms through which they seek to achieve their goals. It also supports the findings of previous scholarship by Conway et al. (2007) who concluded that IPA’s seven devices can be utilized as a common means of measuring political messages and that this approach “provides a template for future content analysis studies, allowing for comparisons across media and programming genres” (p. 198). This systematic approach could also potentially be used to compare discursive changes in the rhetoric of the same actor over time, or between different Islamist groups in order to determine how the goals and techniques of agenda setting change amongst Islamist groups across time and space. The study shows that the IPA’s techniques, when combined with discourse analysis of both texts and images, can provide real insight into the strategic goals and values of influential Islamist movements, empowering both policy-makers and audiences. In its current form, this study makes an important contribution to a literature that seeks to understand the evolution of the Brotherhood’s ideology through studying its rhetoric. In contrast to the assertion of some scholars that argue that the central vision of the Brotherhood remains essentially unchanging in its ideological quest to establish an Islamist state (Khalil, 2006; Tadros, 2011; Tibi, 2008), their communication since 2013 suggests that they have responded to persecution by emphasizing their moderate, legitimate status as the ultimate representatives of the democratic state. Setting these findings against existing secondary sources also revealed a significant change in the communication strategy of the Brotherhood as it appears to transition from a predominantly religious to a more secular discursive landscape (Eickelman &Piscatori,1996, p. 12). This supports the conclusions of recent scholarship that highlight the Brotherhood’s increasing commitment to moderation and non-violence (Al-Anani, 2016; Ranko, 2015; Reda, 2014;Wickham,2015;Wilmot,2015). Whilst clearly deploying persuasive techniques, this study has found that the group has also been remarkably adaptiveinhowtheyframethemselvesandtheirenemies, drawing on a range of established (e.g. Sisi as Pharaoh) and novel (Sisi as Pimp) analogies as well as drawing on the emotive discourses of the January 2011 revolution to depict themselves as one with the people and a legitimate force to be reckoned with. Ultimately this study reinforces the significance of further scholarly examinations as to precisely how the Brotherhood communicate and thereby seek to persuade domestic and regional audiences in the ongoing quest to achieve their political goals.

ORCID Moeen Koa http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9424-8474

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Appendices

Appendix A. Titles of the first 10 Brotherhood’s statements analyzed in this study as an example.2

# Translated title to English Original title in Arabic Date 2nd July ﻦﻣﺅﺮﺒﺘﻠﻟﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟﺍﻥﺍﻮﺧﻹﺍﻦﻣﻥﺎﻴﺑ A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood Repudiating Bloodshed .1 2013 ﺔﻨﺘﻔﻟﺍﺮﺸﻧﻭﻡﺪﻟﺍﺔﻗﺍﺭﺇﺕﺎﻄﻄﺨﻣ Schemes and Dissemination of 16th July ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟﺍﻥﺍﻮﺧﻹﺍﻦﻣﻥﺎﻴﺑ A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: A New Massacre Committed by .2 2013 ﻦﻴﻨﺛﻹﺍﺔﻃﺮﺸﻟﺍﺎﻬﺒﻜﺗﺮﺗﺓﺪﻳﺪﺟﺓﺭﺰﺠﻣ the Police Monday 15th July 2013 15 ﻮﻴﻟﻮﻳ 2013ﻡ 18th July ﺮﺷﺎﻌﻟﺍﻯﺮﻛﺫﻲﻓﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟﺍﻥﺍﻮﺧﻹﺍﻦﻣﻥﺎﻴﺑ A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood in Commemoration of the .3 2013 ﻥﺎﻀﻣﺭﻦﻣ Tenth of Ramadan War 20th July ﺓﺭﺰﺠﻣﺹﻮﺼﺨﺑﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟﺍﻥﺍﻮﺧﻹﺍﻦﻣﻥﺎﻴﺑ A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood .4 2013 ( ﻲﻓﺀﺎﺴﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﺭﻮﺼﻨﻤﻟﺍ ( ﺭﺎﻌﻟﺍﺓﺭﺰﺠﻣ (Regarding the Massacre of Women in Mansoura (the Massacre of Shame 21st July ﺝﻭﺮﺨﻠﻟﻢﻬﺘﻳﺅﺭﻭﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟﺍﻥﺍﻮﺧﻹﺍﻦﻣﻥﺎﻴﺑ A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood .5 2013 ﻱﺮﻜﺴﻌﻟﺍﺏﻼﻘﻧﻻﺍﺔﻣﺯﺃﻦﻣ Clarifying their Vision to Escape of the Military Coup Crisis 23rd July ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟﺍﻥﺍﻮﺧﻹﺍﻦﻣﻥﺎﻴﺑ Muslim Brotherhood Statement Condemns New Dawn Massacre .6 2013 ﺮﺠﻔﻟﺍﺪﻨﻋﺓﺪﻳﺪﺟﺔﺤﺑﺬﻣ Tuesday, July 23 24th July ﺀﺎﺟﺎﻣﻰﻠﻋﺎﻘﻴﻠﻌﺗﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟﺍﻥﺍﻮﺧﻹﺍﻦﻣﻥﺎﻴﺑ A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood Commenting on the Speech of .7 2013 ﻲﺴﻴﺴﻟﺍﻖﻳﺮﻔﻟﺍﺏﺎﻄﺧﻲﻓ the Field Marshal, el- Sisi 16th ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟﺍﻥﺍﻮﺧﻻﺍﻦﻣﻥﺎﻴﺑ A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood Regarding Sabotage Plots .8 August ﺎﻫﺮﺑﺪﻳﻲﺘﻟﺍﺐﻳﺮﺨﺘﻟﺍﺕﺎﻄﻄﺨﻣﺹﻮﺼﺨﺑ Hatched by the Putschists 2013 ﻥﻮﻴﺑﻼﻘﻧﻻﺍ 16th ﺪﻘﻓﺹﻮﺼﺨﺑﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟﺍﻥﺍﻮﺧﻹﺍﻦﻣﻥﺎﻴﺑ A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood Regarding the Putschists’ Loss .9 August ﻢﻴﻘﻟﺍﻞﻛﻦﻣﻢﻫﺩﺮﺠﺗﻭﻢﻬﺑﺍﻮﺻﻡﻮﻴﻟﺍﻦﻴﻴﺑﻼﻘﻧﻹﺍ of Temper Today and their Lack of all Values, Principles and Ethics 2013 ﻕﻼﺧﻷﺍﻭﺉﺩﺎﺒﻤﻟﺍﻭ 17th ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟﺍﻥﺍﻮﺧﻹﺍﻦﻣﻥﺎﻴﺑ ’A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood Concerning the Putschists .10 August ﻦﻴﻴﺑﻼﻘﻧﻼﻟﻲﻔﺤﺼﻟﺍﺮﻤﺗﺆﻤﻟﺍﺹﻮﺼﺨﺑ Press Conference 2013 2For the full list of the titles and actual statements, please contact the author. 598 M. KOA

Appendix B. An example of the Inter-coder coefficient Kappa Calculations.3

Sample # 7, Statement: 24 July, 2013 Sample # 10, Statement: 17 August, 2013 Document 1 Document 1 1 0 1 0

1 a = 88 b = 2 90 1 a = 60 b = 0 60 Document 2 Document 2 0 c = 10 0 10 0 c = 11 0 11 98 2 100 71 0 71

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.88 P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.85

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 33 = P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 27 = 0.03 0.04 Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.88 Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.84

In case of missing values or in case of In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code: comparing one code: P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)2 = 0.03 of codes+1)2 = 0.03 Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.88 Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.84