Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts : the Mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen Diasporas

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Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts : the Mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen Diasporas Original citation: Koinova, Maria. (2011) Diasporas and secessionist conflicts : the mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen diasporas. Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.34 (No.2). pp. 333-356. ISSN 0141-9870 Permanent WRAP url: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/51494/ Copyright and reuse: The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes the work of researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made available. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for- profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. Publisher’s statement: This article is available by a License to Publish, based upon the Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) license. Under this license others may download your works and share them with others as long as they credit you, but they can’t change them in any way or use them commercially. The License to Publish also allows for text- and data-mining of your works. A note on versions: The version presented in WRAP is the published version or, version of record, and may be cited as it appears here. For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: [email protected] http://go.warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications This article was downloaded by: [137.205.202.162] On: 15 April 2013, At: 04:24 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Ethnic and Racial Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rers20 Diasporas and secessionist conflicts: the mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen diasporas Maria Koinova Version of record first published: 06 Jul 2010. To cite this article: Maria Koinova (2011): Diasporas and secessionist conflicts: the mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen diasporas, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34:2, 333-356 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2010.489646 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE For full terms and conditions of use, see: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/ terms-and-conditions esp. Part II. Intellectual property and access and license types, § 11. (c) Open Access Content The use of Taylor & Francis Open articles and Taylor & Francis Open Select articles for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 34 No. 2 February 2011 pp. 333Á356 Diasporas and secessionist conflicts: the mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen diasporas Maria Koinova (First submission February 2008; First published July 2010) Abstract This article examines the impact of diasporas on secessionist conflicts, focusing on the Albanian, Armenian and Chechen diasporas and the conflicts in Kosovo, Karabakh and Chechnya during the 1990s. How do diasporas radicalize these conflicts? I argue that despite differences in diaspora communal characteristics and the types of the secessionist conflicts, a common pattern of mobilization develops. Large-scale diasporic support for secessionism emerges only after independence is proclaimed by the local elites. From that point onwards diasporas become engaged in a conflict spiral, and transnational coalitions are formed between local secessionist and diaspora groups. Depending on the organizational strength of the local strategic centre and the diasporic institutions, these coalitions endure or dissipate. Diasporas exert radica- lization influences on the conflict spiral on two specific junctures Á when grave violations of human rights occur in the homeland and when local moderate elites start losing credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal. Downloaded by [137.205.202.162] at 04:24 15 April 2013 Keywords: Diaspora; secessionism; mobilization; radicalization; Balkans; Caucasus. Introduction Scholars on civil wars and secessionism are increasingly interested in the relationship between diaspora mobilization and secessionist conflicts. Domestic level explanations do not sufficiently explain the onset, duration and termination of civil wars. Starting in the 1990s # 2011 Taylor & Francis ISSN 0141-9870 print/1466-4356 online DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2010.489646 334 Maria Koinova studies asserted that international actors Á such as kin-states, refugees, distant and regional powers, and international organizations Á influence the course and outcomes of secessionism. Mounting empirical evidence demonstrated that conflict-generated diasporas Á such as the Albanian, Armenian, Irish, Tamil and Palestinian Á helped to perpetuate conflicts. The growing pace of globalization created more opportunities for diasporas to establish viable linkages to their homelands via the Internet, global media and inexpensive transporta- tion. Understanding diaspora mobilization with regard to secessionist conflicts became a theoretical necessity. This article assesses the impact of conflict-generated diasporas on secessionist conflicts by offering theoretical innovation in three ways. First, while a number of studies analysed either diaspora politics or secessionism, this study combines both and focuses on diaspora mobilization vis-a`-vis local elites. Second, case studies on diasporas and secessionist conflicts exist but lack systematic comparison. This article derives common patterns for diaspora mobilization by compar- ing three different cases of conflict-generated diasporas Á the Albanian, Armenian and Chechen Á and their linkages to secessionist conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Finally, this study is the first to explore the timing and sequencing of transformative events during diaspora mobilization. The overarching question addressed is: how do diasporas exert a radicalizing impact on the secessionist conflicts of their homelands? The study also examines whether diasporas start secessionist conflicts and whether diasporas become radicalized themselves. I review the emerging literature on diasporas and conflicts and established accounts on external actors and internal conflicts. Then I explain the value of the transnational social movements literature for the study of diaspora mobilization, lay out the research design and introduce the cases. I argue that despite differences in diaspora Downloaded by [137.205.202.162] at 04:24 15 April 2013 communal characteristics and the secessionist conflict types, a common pattern of mobilization develops. Large-scale diasporic support for secessionism emerges only after independence is pro- claimed by local elites. From that point onwards diasporas become engaged in a conflict spiral, and transnational coalitions are formed between local secessionist and diaspora groups. Depending on the organizational strength of the local strategic centre and the diasporic institutions, these coalitions endure or dissipate. Diasporas exert radicalizing influences on homeland politics at two junctures Á when grave violations of human rights occur in the homeland and when local moderate elites start losing credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal. The mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen diasporas 335 Major theoretical accounts The emerging scholarship on diasporas and conflicts goes back to Collier and Hoeffler’s (2000) influential statistical study demonstrating that civil wars resist resolution if they are linked to large diasporas. Stateless diasporas are more likely to remain involved with homeland politics as long as the nationalist struggle continues (Sheffer 2003). Diasporas generated by conflicts rather than by voluntary migration are especially likely to maintain a trauma of displacement and a myth of return that durably link them to a homeland territory (Scheffer 2003; Lyons 2006). Diasporas Á such as the Jewish and Armenian Á may develop interests differing from those of the local elites in order to preserve their own diasporic identity (Shain 2002). Some authors of particular case studies (Albanian, Croatian, Ethiopian, Irish, Tamil) captured practices of diaspora engagement with internal conflicts. Diasporas send labour remittances and humanitarian aid, recruit fighters, lobby homeland governments and international organizations, disseminate propaganda, stage demon- strations, and tap into resources of criminal networks (Byman et al. 2001; Hockenos 2003). The deficiencies of this literature, focused specifically on case studies, lead us to draw theoretical insights from more established accounts on external actors and internal conflicts. External actors intervene due to instrumentalist motives that include
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