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2

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

An eye for an eye only leads to more blindness. —Margaret Atwood

he attacks of September 11, 2001, were the most ghastly acts of transnational terrorism in history. Yet, as is true for other terrorists’ strikes throughout the Tages, understanding the atrocities of September 11 requires knowledge of the social, economic, political, and religious conditions from which terrorism arises. As in earlier eras, advances in communication, transportation, and weaponry are exploited by today’s terrorists. Contemporary terrorists have a vast and terrifying array of choices, but they also face a new enemy: the forces of globalization. Our world has become more unified, and evidence of interconnections are every- where. Commerce and technology have brought the people of our planet together in ways previously unimaginable. The Internet has penetrated into remote corners of the planet, and new discoveries in digital and optical technologies are likely to drive human beings even closer together. McDonald’s sells hamburgers in Beijing, and American music and videos can be heard and seen in remote corners of the world. Free-trade agree- ments make national borders more porous; someday, they may make them obsolete. Falling stock markets in Tokyo devastate investors in Chicago. The International Monetary Fund intervenes in the economies of many underdeveloped countries because of global interdependence and the push for prosperity. International peace and stability are invaluable in this new world order. Problems and their solutions are no longer isolated geographically. Terrorism is at odds with civilization’s march toward globalization. Terrorists often focus on separatism and pitting one religious, ethnic, or social group against another. Terrorism generally is not about coming together as a unified whole; it is about break- ing apart into smaller, antagonistic units. Some terrorists would like to impose their religion or political ideology on the whole world, but their tactics are brute force, not the international collaboration that is the hallmark of globalization. Barber (1992) captures this phenomenon when he notes that the “planet is falling precipitantly apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same moment” (p. 53). He labels this division as “Jihad” versus “McWorld.” Jihad, which means “struggle” in Arabic, can be applied to either the internal struggle against evil or the external struggle against the perceived enemies of Islam. It is the latter meaning that has been invoked

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by many contemporary terrorists, who are on a collision course with the forces of globalization. The effects of globalization were quickly evident after the September 11, 2001, assaults on the United States. The day after the attacks, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), founded in 1949 and comprising 19 member states, invoked, for the first time, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which declares that an armed attack on one member was an attack against all of them. Other nations around the world joined in condemning the terrorists and demonstrating solidarity with the United States. Many Muslim leaders in Africa and Asia expressed sympathy with the United States, noting that the Koran and Islamic teachings prohibit the slaughter of innocents. The international display of unity in the immediate aftermath of the attacks does not diminish the reality that, in many spots around the globe, the United States and Western nations are despised. Anti-American sentiment is particularly virulent in portions of southwestern Asia and northern Africa, an area known as the Middle East, although the sentiment exists elsewhere. Poverty, authoritarian governments, and U.S. intervention in the area have provided fertile ground for the growth of religious extremists and denunciations of the United States as the “Great Satan.”

TERRORISM AROUND THE WORLD

Although the outcome of the clash between “Jihad” and “McWorld” is unknown, it is clear that terrorism continues to exist in virtually every region of the globe. No one knows the true number of foreign terrorist groups. The United States Department of State (2000) identified 42 foreign terrorist groups. A list for the Terrorism Research Center (2000), compiled by the Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School, named 85 foreign ter- rorist groups. Precise counts are difficult, in part, because terrorist organizations are dynamic; change is therefore endemic to the phenomenon. Some terrorist organizations splinter into subgroups, and others disband and reassemble with new names. Being labeled as a terrorist organization carries political repercussions. Every 2 years, the U.S. secretary of state publishes a list of active foreign terrorist groups. These are divided into two categories—Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), which are terrorist organizations that meet the criteria of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and Other Terrorist Groups (OTGs), which do not meet the criteria of the Act. In the secretary of state’s 2001 report (U.S. Department of State, 2002), released in April 2002, 33 groups were designated as FTOs and another 28 were identified as OTGs. The report, which is reproduced in Appendix B of this volume, notes the specific terrorist activities attributed to each group. The legal and fiscal consequences of being designated an FTO are severe. It is a crime to donate money or otherwise assist an FTO, even if the funds are to be used for charitable purposes. Medicine and religious materials are excluded from the ban. Some FTOs have used charitable donations to provide sorely needed basic social services, such as hospitals and schools. Nevertheless, U.S. citizens are prohibited from con- tributing to these organizations on the premise that charitable donations make it easier for the groups to recruit supporters. In addition, members of FTOs are denied visas and barred from the United States. Financial institutions are required to block any funds intended for FTOs. The identification of an FTO is inherently political. By definition, FTOs threaten the security of U.S. citizens or endanger the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States. A few highlights of FTOs from the U.S. secretary of state’s list follow. Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:58 PM Page 47

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1. Europe • The Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) group, founded in 1959, aims to create an independent state in northern Spain comprising the seven Basque provinces. • Issued during the Easter Rising of 1916, the Proclamation of the Republic, which declared Ireland independent from England, is considered to be the founding document of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The Easter Rising was crushed and its leaders were executed, but the struggle for independence continued. Today, the IRA is the terrorist wing of Sinn Fein, the Northern Ireland political organization trying to unite Ireland and expel British forces. In 1999, for the first time, the IRA was identified as an OTG, not an FTO, because of its willingness to enforce a cease-fire and participate in the peace process in Northern Ireland. • Established in 1974, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) wants to create an indepen- dent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. Its leader, Chairman Abdullah Ocalan, was captured and sentenced to death in 1999. 2. South America • The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), established in 1964, is believed to be responsible for atrocities claiming untold numbers of innocent victims. • Begun in 1965 by Jesuit priests influenced by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, the National Liberation Army (ELN) engages in widespread kidnapping for ransom and wages an insurgent war against the Colombian government. • Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), founded in 1983, is most famous for its 1996 assault on the Japanese ambassador’s residence in Lima, where 72 hostages were held for more than 4 months. No new terrorist activities have been attrib- uted to MRTA since Peruvian armed forces rescued all but one of the hostages and killed most of the group’s leaders. • Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), founded in the late 1960s and based on a communist ideology, is believed responsible for roughly 30,000 deaths. Leaders of the group were the focus of massive counterterrorism operations by the Peruvian government. 3. Asia • Aum Shinrikyo (Aum), founded in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, is a Japanese doomsday cult responsible for releasing sarin nerve gas on several Tokyo subway trains in 1995, killing 12 and injuring thousands. • During its heyday in the 1970s, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), which is devoted to overthrowing the Japanese monarchy and fostering world revolution, conducted terrorist attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod Airport in Israel and the hijacking of two Japanese airlines. Fusako Shigenobu, one of the founders and leaders, had been on the run for 30 years when she was captured in Japan in 2000. • Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), founded in 1976, engages in assassinations and bombings to promote its goal of creating an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka. LTTE is known outside Sri Lanka for the suicide bomb attack that killed India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. 4. Middle East and Africa • For the first time, the 1999 report added al-Qaeda, meaning the “Base,” the organization led by Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden, to the list of FTOs. • Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) split from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1974 and launched an international campaign of terrorism, carrying out attacks in 20 countries against the United States, Britain, Israel, and various Arab countries. Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:58 PM Page 48

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• Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) was formed in 1987 with the goal of establishing an Islamic state and expelling Israelis. Located primarily in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, Hamas has gained widespread support from Arabs throughout the region. • Hizbollah (Party of God; also called Islamic Jihad) seeks to create an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon. It is believed responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, as well as for the kidnapping of Western hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s.

STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

A traditional view of terrorism is that it pits an individual or an organization against a sovereign state. Another type of terrorism, however, presents perhaps an even greater threat: the secret use of terrorism by a sovereign state. State-sponsored terrorism is as old as the history of military conflict. States may opt to use terrorism instead of conventional armies for many reasons. Modern warfare is extraordinarily expensive and is likely to provoke counterattack. States can sponsor terrorism covertly, allowing the state to deny its role as an aggressor and avoid retalia- tion. The relationship between the patron state and the terrorist organization can be mutually beneficial: Terrorists obtain the sponsorship necessary to maintain and expand their struggle, and the state obtains a potent weapon against its enemies. State-sponsored terrorism takes many forms. At one extreme, a government can establish its own brutal death squads, whose sole purpose is to advance the interest of the state. At the other extreme, a state can simply provide a safe haven for terrorists, allowing them to operate without restrictions. Some states that sponsor terrorism take a middle path by assisting terrorists financially and refusing to extradite them to face criminal charges in another state. Government funds can be channeled to terrorists directly or indirectly through social, cultural, or charitable associations, many of which “serve as front organizations for groups that engage in terrorism” (Paz, 2000, p. 4). The U.S. secretary of state is authorized to identify state sponsors of terrorism. The primary threat to the United States and its allies is reported to come from South Asia and the Middle East. Seven states were designated as state sponsors of terrorism in 2000: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan. Economic and political sanctions accompany the designation. The sanctions are intended to force state spon- sors of terrorism to “renounce the use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, and bring terrorists to justice for past crimes” (United States Department of State, 2000, p. 1). The seven state sponsors of terrorism are believed to have engaged in a variety of activities. For example, Iran supports numerous terrorist groups in its effort to under- mine the process of procuring peace in the Middle East between the Palestinians and Israel. Iraq provides bases and support for Palestinians and Iranian terrorists. Syria pro- vides a safe haven and funds for several terrorist training camps. Libya has refused to pay compensation for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, although in 1999 it finally surrendered for trial the two Libyans accused of the bombing. North Korea harbors hijackers of a Japanese airliner in the 1970s. Cuba har- bors U.S. fugitives from justice. Sudan serves as a meeting place and training hub for several terrorist groups. The sanctions experienced by a country as a result of the U.S. designation of state sponsor of terrorism are significant, and they have contributed to famine, economic stagnation, and other deprivations for the citizens of some sanctioned states. The concept of a list of state sponsors of terrorism breaths life into the hackneyed expression that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” The countries Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:58 PM Page 49

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on the U.S. list no doubt have their own list of terrorist states, and the United States is likely at the top of many of them. For example, Chileans would be justified in considering the U.S. intervention in their country in the 1970s as terrorism. According to documents declassified in 2000 and released by the National Security Archives, the United States tried to overthrow the government of Chile and its democratically elected Marxist president, Dr. Salvador Allende, in the early 1970s (National Security Archive, 2000). President Richard M. Nixon ordered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to mount a covert terrorist operation to keep Allende from taking office. When that failed, the CIA tried to undermine Allende’s rule. It eventually succeeded when the Chilean military seized power under General Augusto Pinochet, who ruled until 1990. Pinochet’s death squads murdered more than 3,000 people, and government forces jailed and tortured thousands more. The definition of terrorism thus depends on the experience of the definer.

RELIGIOUS FANATICISM: AN OLD TREND AND A NEW THREAT

“Holy Terror” was practiced in earlier centuries by groups such as the Jewish Zealots, the Assassins, and the Thugs, and contemporary observers are particularly concerned about the growth of religious fanaticism. According to Laqueur (1999), the new terrorism is different from the old,

aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population. In its most extreme form, this new terrorism intends to liquidate all of what it deems to be “satanic forces,” which may include the majority of a country or of mankind, as a precondition for the growth of another, better, and in any case different breed of human. In its maddest, most extreme form it may aim at the destruction of all life on earth, as the ultimate punishment for mankind’s crimes. (p. 81)

Half of the organizations designated by the U.S. secretary of state in 2001 as FTOs are in the Middle East and Africa. Some of these groups are dedicated to replacing secular society with strict Islamic law and rejecting all Western influences. Of parti- cular concern is the spread of Islamist terrorist activity to Eastern Europe and central and southern Asia. Terrorism in Kosovo, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Indonesia, and the Philippines has been associated with radical interpretations of Islam that elevate terrorism to a religious duty (Paz, 2000). Many Americans and Europeans equate Islam with terrorism, but this is incorrect and unfortunate. Most Muslims, even most fundamentalists, are not terrorists. Instead, they have overwhelmingly been the victims of violent conflicts. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims were killed in the war between Iran and Iraq, and the civil wars in Afghanistan and Algeria led to similarly horrific numbers of casualties. Noncombatant Muslims have suffered untold losses in the war between Chechnya and Russia, in the turmoil in Indonesia, and throughout much of Africa and the Middle East. Terrorism has destroyed the lives of many Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the world.

A FEW FAMOUS TERRORISTS

The above discussion focused on terrorist groups and their sponsors. The discussion now shifts to the terrorists themselves. Hundreds of thousands of human beings have Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 50

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A billboard in Cuba pays tribute to the revolutionary leader Che Guevara. Copyright © 2002 by Tim Page/CORBIS. Reprinted with permission.

filled this role, but a few names stand out in history. The following discussion highlights the careers of three of them: Che Guevara, Carlos the Jackal, and Osama bin Laden.

Che Guevara Che Guevara is a pop-political legend whose romantic photograph, taken in 1960 at a funeral for dead seamen in Cuba, today adorns murals and posters, Internet Web sites, and CD covers all over the world. Although he died in 1967, Guevara remains a potent symbol for the disaffected everywhere. His image represents freedom and is the epit- ome of youthful rebellion against authority. A Marxist revolutionary, a philosopher, a poet, and a warrior, Guevara is remembered not as a terrorist but for his deep convic- tions, for living his dream and dying for his ideals. Philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre called Guevara “the most complete human being of our age” (Che Guevara Information Archive, 2001). Guevara influenced the structure of violent revolution throughout Latin America. Revolution, he maintained, should begin in the countryside, and indiscriminate urban terrorism should serve as a supplementary form of revolt (Laqueur, 1977, p. 180). He authored three books—Guerrilla Warfare (1961), Man and Socialism in Cuba (1967), and Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War (1968)—read by left-wing radicals around the world. Ernesto “Che” Guevara was born in 1928 into a middle-class family in Rosario, Argentina. He earned a medical degree from the University of Buenos Aires in 1953, but his interests turned from medicine to helping the poor and challenging authority through revolution. He participated in riots against the Argentine dictator Juan Perón. He worked in a leper colony and joined the pro-Communist regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in Guatemala. When Arbenz was overthrown in 1954, Guevara fled to Mexico, where he met Fidel Castro and other Cuban rebels (White, 1998, p. 56). He later fought Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 51

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in Castro’s guerrilla war against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Bautista, becoming a chief strategist and respected guerrilla fighter. When Castro assumed power, Guevara served as president of the national bank and later as minister of industry, traveled widely to communist countries, and even addressed the United Nations on behalf of Cuba. Guevara wanted to export the Cuban experience to other countries. Convinced that peasant-based revolution was the only remedy for Latin America’s poverty and social inequities, Guevara, who may have fallen out of favor with Castro, left Cuba and became a revolutionary leader in Bolivia. He believed that acts of terrorism would create an environment of fear ripe for revolution. According to Vetter and Perlstein (1991), Guevara “resorted to terrorizing Bolivian village leaders and elders in a delib- erate program of mutilation and assassination when he found himself unable to influ- ence the peasants to support his revolution” (p. 45). Guevara was captured and executed by the Bolivian army in 1967. Today, the circumstances of his activities in Bolivia and his capture, killing, and burial are still the subject of intense public interest around the world, and some have suggested that the U.S. CIA was involved in his death. (For more on Guevara, see, for example, Anderson, 1998; Camejo, 1972; Castaneda, 1997; Harris, 1970; and Hodges, 1977.)

Carlos the Jackal Che Guevara is remembered as a romantic figure, but Carlos the Jackal’s legend is shrouded in mystery (Follain, 2000). Frequently blamed for crimes he did not commit, including the killing of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, Carlos collaborated with terrorists in Japan, Germany, Spain, and Italy. He was particularly well known for his activities on behalf of Arab terrorists seeking to drive Israel out of Palestine. He lived freely under the protection of Communist-bloc countries (Laqueur, 1999, p. 164) and is believed to have worked for Libya’s Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, and Cuba’s Fidel Castro. When finally arrested in Sudan in 1994, Carlos the Jackal was 44 years old and until shortly before that time had been living in Syria with his wife, Magdalena Kopp, a former member of the German Baader- Meinhoff terrorist group. Separating the myth from the reality of Carlos is not easy, in part because he spread false stories about himself, used multiple disguises, and changed his name and passport frequently. He was dubbed “the Jackal” after the sinister assassin in a Frederick Forsyth novel. A wanted poster showing his wide, unemotional face in dark glasses became a symbol for left-leaning terrorist movements around the globe. A Venezuelan whose real name is Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, Carlos was born in 1949 and named by his Marxist father after Russian leader Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov, or Lenin, as he was better known. His brothers were named Lenin and Vladimir. As a youth, Carlos joined the Venezuelan Communist Youth in their violent demonstrations against the ruling government. Later, he attended Moscow’s Lumumba University, a training center for future leaders of the Soviet Union’s expansion into underdeveloped coun- tries. There he met Palestinian students and came to admire the teachings of George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). After the PFLP hijacked several airlines, Carlos left Russia for the Middle East and began his terrorist career in earnest (Bellamy, 2000). Carlos’s most notorious terrorist act was the kidnapping of 11 oil ministers at an OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) meeting in Vienna in December 1975. Three people died in the takeover, and Carlos and his fellow terrorists, along with several hostages, were flown to Algeria and released, reportedly with a big payoff from an undisclosed Arab state. Carlos was also a suspect in several Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 52

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bombings and grenade attacks, and he publicly admitted to a 1973 assassination attempt on British millionaire Edward Sieff, a Jewish businessman and owner of the Marks and Spencer stores in London. He was convicted in absentia in France in 1992 and was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1975 murder of two French intelligence agents who wanted to question him about attacks on Israeli El Al planes at Orly Airport in Paris. In the shootout with the police, Carlos also killed a fellow terrorist and PFLP member whom he suspected of being an informer. Carlos seemed to drop out of sight during the late 1980s, and reports circulated of his death, although other reports had him living in Mexico, Colombia, and Syria. The collapse of the Soviet Union may have left him with few sponsors, and he was eventu- ally betrayed by the Sudanese police. After being arrested and flown to France, he was convicted in 1997 and sentenced to life imprisonment. At his trial, Carlos said he was a “professional revolutionary.” After hearing the guilty verdict against him, he raised his fist and shouted “viva la revolución.” In prison, Carlos went on a hunger strike to protest being held in solitary confinement but ended it at the request of his father. Several excellent biographies of this “superterrorist” have been written (see, for example, Dobson, 1977; Follain, 2000; Smith, 1977; and Yallop, 1993).

Osama bin Laden Osama bin Laden is the best-known contemporary terrorist. Born in Saudi Arabia around 1957 to a father of Yemeni origin and a Syrian mother, bin Laden grew up fabulously wealthy. His father, Mohammed bin Laden, had many wives and more than 50 children. Having been favored with royal patronage and awarded the contract to rebuild, among other things, the mosques in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, Mohammed bin Laden became a billionaire. At Abdul Aziz University in Jedda, Saudi Arabia, the young Osama was introduced to the wider world of Islamic politics. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a turning point for him. He began to use his wealth and organizational skills to help train thousands of young Arabs and Muslims to fight in the Afghan resistance, which was supported by the United States. After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia and founded an organization to assist veterans of the Afghan war. In 1990, when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, the United States was allowed to station its troops in Saudi Arabia. This outraged bin Laden, who saw it as a sacrilege that nonbelievers should occupy the birthplace of Islam. When bin Laden turned against the Saudi government, it expelled him from the country. He moved to the Sudan, where he continued training recruits in terrorist tactics. Bin Laden subsequently returned to Afghanistan, where he was given sanctuary under the protection of the Taliban, the fundamentalist Islamic movement that came to power in 1996. The Taliban arose out of the chaos produced at the end of the Cold War. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, the United States also left, leaving Afghanistan devastated. Into this vacuum marched the Taliban (Rashid, 2001). Bin Laden, with the help of the Taliban, jeopardized the stability of south and central Asia and Africa by training radical Arabs and Muslims in the tools of terrorism. Students from all over the region have studied in Afghanistan, and thousands are deter- mined to carry out Taliban-style Islamic revolutions in their homelands. Bin Laden is a hero to radical Muslim youth throughout the Middle East and Africa (Bodansky, 1999), and his organization oversees a loosely tied network of local cells that operate independently of each another. Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 53

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A glimpse into bin Laden’s mind was provided by a 1998 interview with an ABC news correspondent.

It is hard for one to understand if the person does not understand Islam. . . . Allah is the one who cre- ated us and blessed us with this religion, and orders us to carry out the holy struggle “jihad” to raise the word of Allah above the words of the unbeliev- ers....It does not worry us what the Americans think. What worries us is pleasing Allah. The Americans impose themselves on everyone who believes in his religion and his rights. They accuse our children in Palestine of being terrorists. Those children that have no weapons and have not even reached maturity. At the same time they defend a country with its airplanes and tanks, and the state of the Jews, that has a policy to destroy the future of these children....Each action will solicit a similar reaction. We must use such punishment to keep your evil away from Muslims, Muslim chil- dren and women. American history does not dis- tinguish between civilians and military, and not even women and children. They are the ones who Osama bin Laden, the Saudi Arabian leader of used the bombs against Nagasaki. Can these bombs Al-Qaeda, as shown on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist poster. distinguish between infants and military? America does not have a religion that will prevent it from Photo provided courtesy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. destroying all people. (as quoted in Miller, 1998)

In addition to the attacks on September 11, 2001, bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization has been held responsible for the bombings at the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. servicemen; the nearly simultaneous blasts on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania, which left more than 300 people dead; and the 1993 truck bomb attack on the World Trade Center in New York. Bin Laden is also suspected of being involved in the bombing of the destroyer USS Cole, which was attacked as it refueled in the Yemen port of Aden on October 12, 2000. The attack killed 17 Navy sailors and wounded dozens more. A motorized skiff, carry- ing explosives and two suicide bombers, tore a ragged hole in the Cole, which is the length of a football field and equipped with long-range cruise missiles. In 2001, a Federal District Court in Manhattan began hearing testimony in the case of the Kenya Embassy bombing. A top deputy to bin Laden, Jama Ahmed Al-Fadl, was caught stealing money from al-Qaeda. Fearing retaliation from bin Laden, he became an informer for the United States and entered the witness protection program. Al-Fadl testified against the four defendants at the embassy bombing trial and provided details of bin Laden’s terrorist organization. He described a thoroughly modern organization that used international companies and social relief agencies as fronts; communicated by fax, coded letters, and satellite phones; and trained recruits in the use of sophisti- cated weapons. Al-Fadl testified that the American embassies were chosen for terrorist attacks because bin Laden was angry about U.S. intervention in the civil war in Somalia. Regardless of the truthfulness of the informer’s claim, the embassy bombings did not Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 54

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go unpunished. Shortly after the bombings, the United States launched cruise missile attacks on what was believed to be bin Laden’s camp in Afghanistan. Again, attack and counterattack are the familiar pattern. (For more on bin Laden, see Bodansky, 1999; Engelberg, 2001; Huband, 1999; and Reeve, 1999.) The lives of Che Guevara, Carlos the Jackal, and Osama bin Laden illustrate some of the variations in the lives of famous terrorists. The following discussion is more lim- ited still, focusing on only one terrorist event, but it is one that had worldwide implica- tions: the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.

PAN AM FLIGHT 103

On December 21, 1988, liquid fire and twisted metal fell from the skies over the tiny village of Lockerbie, Scotland, after the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103. All 259 pas- sengers and crew were killed, including 189 Americans, along with 11 people on the ground. The explosion of Pan Am Flight 103, en route from London to New York, exemplified the political nature of international terrorism (see, for example, Emerson & Duffy, 1990; U.S. Congress, 1991; and Wallace, 2001). In 1991, two Libyan intelligence agents were charged with the bombing, and the government of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi was widely believed to have been involved. When al-Qaddafi refused to surrender the suspects for trial, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Libya in 1992. The UN resolution banned all air- line flights to and from Libya, prohibited sales of weapons and aircraft to Libya, forced drastic reductions in oil sales, and limited Libyan diplomatic presence in foreign capi- tals. The economic and political sanctions were designed to pressure al-Qaddafi to turn over the two suspects. In 1999, 11 years after the downing of Flight 103, he complied, and the suspects were handed over to a special Scottish court in the Netherlands. The United Nations suspended the sanctions against Libya, but the United States did not. On January 31, 2001, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi was found guilty of arranging for the bomb, hidden in a Toshiba radio-cassette player inside a brown Samsonite suitcase, to be loaded onto the flight. No witnesses saw the suitcase placed on board the plane, but the Lockerbie prosecutors were able to link al-Megrahi to the bomb-making materials. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and must serve a minimum of 20 years before parole eligibility. His codefendant, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, the station manager for Libyan airlines in Malta, was acquitted because the court found no convincing evidence that he knowingly helped put the suitcase in the international baggage system. He returned to a hero’s welcome in Libya. In an internationally broadcasted ceremony, Colonel al-Qaddafi rallied against the guilty verdict and objected to the way the entire case had been handled, with particularly vitriolic comments reserved for the United States. Libya was then considered by the West to be one of the most vigorous state spon- sors of international terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s. Colonel al-Qaddafi, who came to power in a coup d’état in 1969, wanted “to spearhead an Arab-Islamic revolu- tion in which he saw himself not only as the chief ideologist (by virtue of his little ‘Green Book’) but also as chief strategist” (Laqueur, 1999, p. 168). Thousands of for- eign terrorists were trained in Libya, including Carlos the Jackal, who was believed to be on al-Qaddafi’s payroll. Attack and counterattack were building blocks of the Pan Am terrorist attack. The Libyan government was believed by the United States to have arranged terrorist attacks in airports in Vienna and Rome, as well as the 1986 bombing of the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin, in which two American servicemen were killed. In retaliation, the Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 55

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United States launched an air strike, dubbed El Dorado Canyon, against the Libyan capital, Tripoli. Among the casualties was the daughter of Colonel al-Qaddafi. President George H. W. Bush responded to the Lockerbie verdict by vowing to con- tinue the U.S. sanctions and calling for the Libyan government to pay compensation to the families of the victims. At the welcome home ceremony for the Libyan acquitted of the bombing, al-Qaddafi likewise demanded compensation. He wanted the United States to pay for the bombings on Tripoli. The events surrounding the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 illustrate how one terrorist event had repercussions around the globe. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States were consistent with this pattern of transnational terrorism with world- wide ramifications.

HIGHLIGHTS OF REPRINTED ARTICLES

The two readings that follow were selected to illustrate two aspects of international terrorism not discussed above. The first discusses the interconnections between terror- ism and narcotics trafficking and other crimes. The second focuses on the religious and political motivations underlying the September 11 attacks.

Chris Dishman. (2001). “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24(3), 43-58.

Chris Dishman analyzes the popular image of terrorists and members of organized crime groups, especially drug traffickers, working closely together. Filling their coffers with proceeds from lucrative narcotics and smuggling operations enables terrorists not only to enhance their conventional arsenals but also to purchase expensive ingredients needed to manufacture sophisticated and destructive weapons. Strong evidence, how- ever, suggests that terrorists and criminals are unlikely to forge lasting bonds. In this article, Dishman argues that the different goals of the two groups make long- term cooperation unlikely. Terrorists, by definition, engage in violence to promote political or religious aims. Terrorists’ public pronouncements are full of political rhetoric, and they see themselves as serving noble causes. Terrorists’ targets are often symbolic and chosen to attract the widest possible attention. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO), on the other hand, aim to make as much money as possible, and their use of violence generally is limited to people or institutions that threaten their profit-making operations. TCOs are much less likely than terrorists to want public notice, and they are unlikely to purposely seek massive casu- alties from their attacks. Dishman uses examples from all over the globe to show the limits of collaboration between terrorists and criminals.

Michael Scott Doran. (2002). “Somebody Else’s Civil War.” Foreign Affairs, 81(3), 22-42.

Michael Scott Doran provides a glimpse into the religious motivations of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda followers. According to Doran, bin Laden had “no intention of defeating America. War with the United States was not a goal in and of itself but rather an instrument designed to help his brand of extremist Islam survive and flourish among the believers. Americans, in short, have been drawn into somebody else’s civil war” (p. 23). Bin Laden’s primary target was the umma, or universal Islamic community, Doran argues. He expected the United States “to use its military might like a cartoon character Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 56

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trying to kill a fly with a shotgun” (p. 23). The savagery of the American reaction would outrage Muslims everywhere, and they would rise up against those governments allied with the West. The revolution within the Muslim world was to center in the Arab lands, especially in Saudi Arabia. Doran notes that, aside from insisting on the implementation of the shari’a, the strict Islamic law, Arab and Muslim extremists have offered little assistance to the poor people in their countries. Doran concludes that the United States should help Arab and Muslim nations to realize that their own interests and those of the United States coin- cide “so that demagogues like bin Laden cannot aspire to speak in the name of the entire umma” (2002, p. 41).

EXPLORING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM FURTHER

• Many FTOs and OTGs have their own Internet sites, although they are unlikely to iden- tify themselves as terrorists. The Web site of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (www.eelam.com) declares that the “Tamil people of the island of Ceylon (now called Sri Lanka) constitute a distinct nation. They form a social entity, with their own history, traditions, culture, language and traditional homeland. The Tamil people call their nation Tamil Eelam.” • A Web site about Hamas (www.palestine-info.com/hamas) includes a “Glory Record” of Palestinian militants who were “martyred” in attacks on Israelis. • Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, has been a key participant in the peace process, yet it remains committed to a united Ireland free from British rule. Its Web site is www.//sinnfein.ie • A variety of bibliographies on international terrorism are available online. The Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, California, has one divided by subject and region at web.nps.navy.mil/~library/terrorism.htm

VIDEO NOTES

Background about international terrorism is explained often in documentaries about the Central Intelligence Agency. One noted exploration of the U.S. role in the “blowback” of transnational terrorism is titled C.I.A.: America’s Secret Warriors (Discovery Channel, 1997, 2 vols., 50 min. each).

REFERENCES

Anderson, Jon Lee. (1998). Che Guevara: A revolutionary life. New York: Grove Press. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (2001). Barber, Benjamin R. (1992). Jihad vs. McWorld. Atlantic Monthly, 269(3), 53-65. Bellamy, Patrick. (2000). Carlos the Jackal: Trail of terror. Retrieved June 4, 2002, from www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists/carlos/text.htm Bodansky, Yossef. (1999). Bin Laden: The man who declared war on America. Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing. Camejo, P. (1972). Guevara’s guerilla strategy. New York: Pathfinder Press. Castaneda, Jorge G. (1997). Companero: The life and death of Che Guevara. New York: Knopf. Che Guevara Information Archive. (2001). Retrieved June 4, 2002, from www.geocities.com/ Hollywood/8702/che.html. Dishman, Chris. (2001). Terrorism, crime, and transformation. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24(3), 43-58. Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 57

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Dobson, Christopher. (1977). The Carlos complex: A study in terror. New York: Putnam. Doran, Michael. (2002). Somebody else’s civil war. Foreign Affairs, 81(3), 22-42. Emerson, Steven A., & Del Sesto, Cristina. (1991). Terrorists: The inside story of the highest ranking Iraqi terrorist ever to defect to the West. New York: Villard. Emerson, Steven, & Duffy, Brian. (1990). The fall of Pan Am 103: Inside the Lockerbie investi- gation. New York: Putnam. Engelberg, Stephen. (2001, January 14). One man and a global web of violence [Electronic ver- sion]. Retrieved June 4, 2002, from The New York Times on the Web, www.library. cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/jihdbnl.htm Follain, John. (2000). Jackal: The complete story of the legendary terrorist, Carlos the Jackal. New York: Arcade Publishing. Guevara, Che. (1961). Guerrilla warfare. New York: Monthly Review Press. Guevara, Che. (1967). Man and socialism in Cuba. Havana: Book Institute. Guevara, Che. (1968). Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War. New York: Monthly Review Press. Harris, R. (1970). Death of a revolutionary: Che Guevara’s Last Mission. New York: Norton. Hodges, Donald C. (Ed.). (1977). The legacy of Che Guevara: A documentary study. London: Thames and Hudson. Huband, Mark. (1999). Warriors of the prophet: The struggle for Islam. Boulder, CO: Westview. Laqueur, Walter. (1977). Terrorism. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. Laqueur, Walter. (1999). The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction. New York: Oxford University Press. Miller, John. (1998, May 28). An exclusive interview with Osama bin Laden: Talking with ter- ror’s banker. Retrieved January 5, 2001, from www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/ dailynews/terror_980609.html National Security Archive. (2000). Chile: 16,000 U.S. secret documents declassified [Press release]. Washington, DC: National Security Archive. Paz, Reuven. (2000, September). Targeting terrorist financing in the Middle East. Paper pre- sented at the International Conference on Countering Terrorism through Enhanced International Cooperation, Mont Blanc, Italy. Retrieved June 4, 2002, from www.ict. org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=137 Rashid, Ahmed. (2001). Taliban: Militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Reeve, Simon. (1999). The new Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the future of ter- rorism. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Smith, Colin. (1977). Carlos: Portrait of a terrorist. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Terrorism Research Center. (2000). Terrorist group profiles. Retrieved June 4, 2002, from www.terrorism.com/terrorism/Groups2.shtml U.S. Congress. (1991, December 18). Drug Enforcement Administration’s alleged connection to the Pan Am Flight 103 disaster. Hearing before the Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of State. (2000). Patterns of global terrorism: 1999. Washington, DC: Department of State. U.S. Department of State. (2002). Patterns of global terrorism: 2001. Washington, DC: Department of State. Vetter, Harold J., & Perlstein, Gary R. (1991). Perspectives on terrorism. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Wallace, Rodney. (2001). Lockerbie: The story and the lessons. Westport, CT: Praeger. White, Jonathan R. (1998). Terrorism: An introduction. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Yallop, David A. (1993). Tracking the Jackal: The search for Carlos, the world’s most wanted man. New York: Random House. Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 58 Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 59

TERRORISM, CRIME, AND TRANSFORMATION

CHRIS DISHMAN

This article argues that some of today’s terrorist groups have transformed into transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) who are more interested in profits than politics. This dynamic has important implications for policymakers as some traditional, politically motivated terrorist groups further profit-minded agencies under a political banner. The author argues that there are different degrees of transformation; some terrorists commit criminal acts to support political operations, while others view profit-driven criminal acts as their end game. The article further argues that unlike some observers suggest, TCOs and terrorist groups will not cooperate with each other to advance aims and interests, instead utilizing their “in-house” capabilities to undertake criminal or political acts.

he relative decline of state supported country’s largest guerrilla group, draws much of terrorism in this decade has led many its revenue from involvement in the narcotics Tscholars to believe that terrorist groups trade. Some evidence indicates that guerrilla will increasingly engage in drug trafficking groups in Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and and other illicit activities to acquire money Lebanon also engage in drug trafficking and and material. Some suggest that criminality has other crimes to raise funds for their violent overtaken certain politically motivated guerrilla activities. groups, making negotiation near to impossible. These headlines have prompted many schol- Others point to the lurid possibilities of a terror- ars to suggest that terrorists and transnational ist cooperating with a transnational criminal criminal organizations are creating strategic organization (TCO)1 to acquire ingredients for a partnerships to boost profits or enhance military chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear capabilities. This theme paints an ominous (CBRN) weapon that could potentially be used picture of a future where TCOs and terrorists against U.S. citizens. work hand in hand to destabilize society and Examples of guerrilla groups committing further criminal ends. nonviolent criminal activities dot the headlines In fact, little evidence suggests that Mafia of world papers. During the Kosovo conflict, groups and terrorists are interested in pursuing reports surfaced that the Kosovo Liberation collaborative arrangements with each other to Army (KLA) trafficked heroin in order to raise traffic contraband or commit other violent acts. money for its operations. The Revolutionary The differing aims and motivations of a profit- Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the minded Mafia group, and a revolutionary-driven

The author would like to thank Alison Kiernan, Kelly Lieberman, and Ken Myers for their valuable insight into this project. Address correspondence to Chris Dishman, 1230 N. Scott Street, Apt. 202, Arlington, VA 22209, USA.

From “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation,” Dishman, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24, 43-58. Copyright © 2001. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis, Inc., http://www.routledge-ny.com

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terrorist group, hobble any attempts at revolutionary aims where financial well being collaboration. Witness the activities of the co-exists or overrides traditional political Russian Mafia or Mexico’s Zapatista National motivations. Liberation Army (EZLN)—both notable exam- ples of a political and criminal group unwilling to engage in any activity that crosses their AIMS AND MOTIVATIONS OF ideological fence, be it profit or politics. The POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL GROUPS Russian Mafia and the EZLN have shied away from potentially vibrant collaborative relation- The aims and motivations of TCOs and terror- ships with political or criminal entities (respec- ists are what set revolutionaries and Mafiosos tively) in large part because their aims and apart and make collaboration between the motivations differ with that of their potential two entities difficult. A useful starting point for collaborators, both choosing instead to remain understanding these different motives lies with on an authentic political or criminal course. an examination of the definition of terrorism Some terrorist and guerrilla groups, however, itself—which scholars and policymakers have have strayed from their political agenda and long debated.3 engaged in organized crime as a means to Defining acts as terrorism attempts to set generate revenue for their war effort. In some them apart from other horrid criminal acts. In instances, criminal activity has become much his latest book, noted terrorist expert Bruce more than a means to purchase “one more gun,” Hoffman illuminates what he considers the arguably emerging as the overriding motivation most widely accepted components of terrorism: of the group. By most accounts, guerrilla groups it is ineluctably political in aims and motives; it in Colombia and Burma2—among others— is violent or at least threatens violence; it is appear disinterested in giving up their illicit designed to have far-reaching psychological activities in favor of a position at the bargaining repercussions beyond the immediate victim or table. Driven by a mix of profit and politics, target; and it is conducted by an organization or these groups often maintain a public veneer that conspiratorial cell structure and perpetrated by a can be quite different from their underlying subnational group or non-state entity.4 In this motivations. These “transformed” guerrilla respect, violent actions committed by TCOs are groups have not sought partnerships with not defined as terrorism, primarily because they national or global Mafia syndicates, even lack the traditional political component. As though their profit-driven goals would suggest Hoffman states, “the terrorist is fundamentally otherwise. an altruist: he believes he is serving a ‘good’ The disinterest of TCOs and guerrillas to cause designed to achieve a greater good for a forge lasting alliances is a pattern supported by wider constituency . . . the criminal, by compar- the limited number of examples where coopera- ison, serves no cause at all, just his own per- tion between the two groups has actually sonal aggrandizement and material satiation.”5 occurred. It is important to highlight these This definitional analysis highlights the cases, however, because they shed light on why fundamental difference between a TCO and a cooperation between terrorists and TCOs is terrorist-guerrilla group: TCOs aim, by and usually episodic and impermanent, and they large, to preserve a status quo beneficial to their support the conclusion that cooperation between illegal, profit-making activities, while terrorists the two will not be forthcoming. Two contem- and guerrillas aim to overthrow the government porary examples of collaboration in Chechnya or, at the least, gain an independent territory or and Kosovo, however, do partially challenge seat at the political table. This historical distinc- this conclusion, but while insightful, these cases tion between the two is still evident today; TCOs will likely prove to be the exception rather than generally do not seek to overthrow or dent the the rule. The pattern of concern for the future state in an attempt to gain political attention.6 then, will not be cooperation among TCOs and There are no calls for a separate homeland, a terrorists, but rather, the transformation of different form of government, or a fast track Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 61

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into the political system from TCO leaders. STAYING TRUE TO THE TCO leaders do not support radical political POLITICAL OR CRIMINAL COURSE change through violence, nor do they use their strong financial foundations to mount political campaigns. The ways that TCOs and terrorists use vio- The motivations of a terrorist or criminal lence is a symptom of an important underlying syndicate shape the way each uses violence. phenomenon—political and criminal groups TCOs usually attack only those who seek either maintain different ends and means. This factor directly or indirectly to disrupt or illuminate has inhibited cooperation in the past and will their profit-making operations. They use selec- likely poison efforts at long-term collaboration tive and calibrated violence to destroy com- in the future. Simply put, drug barons and revo- petitors or threaten counternarcotic authorities. lutionary leaders do not walk on the same path As such, a violent attack directed by a TCO to success. Terrorists may commit kidnappings is intended for a specific “anti-constituency” or extort local businesses, but their fundamental rather than a national or international audience, goal remains to shape or alter the political land- and it is not laced with political rhetoric. Their scape in some manner. TCOs may also employ targets usually include journalists, judges, terrorism as a tactical weapon, but their end politicians, revolutionary groups, and of course, game is to avoid prosecution and make money. competing criminal organizations. Medellin’s In short, the collision between political and attacks in the late 1980s and early 1990s were financial aims of TCOs and terrorist organiza- illustrative of this selective violence: over 500 tions erects significant barriers to collaboration. policemen and 40 judges were killed by TCOs and terrorists, more often than not, narcotics-related violence.7 Terrorists, in con- view each other with suspicion. TCO kingpins trast, target symbolic structures like companies, are hesitant to collaborate with a terrorist group train stations, airports, planes, apartment build- because they believe that the relationship will ings, and other government and commercial bring unwanted pressure from a government landmarks, seeking to attract national and inter- more interested in political subversion than ille- national attention to an enduring cause through gal crimes. More generally, TCOs are unwilling indiscriminate8 violence. Even terrorists whose to engage in any criminal or collaborative activ- aims are not traditionally political, such as reli- ity that would bring predictably suffocating gious fundamentalists, still seek to alter society pressure from the government. By the same in some radical way. The result is that terrorists, token, terrorist groups are reluctant to cooperate more often than not, aim to kill significant with narcotics syndicates, cognizant that any numbers of people and do not refine and limit involvement in drug trafficking—and especially their attacks to the same degree as TCOs. The enduring cooperation with a narcotics syndi- increasing lethality of terrorism in the 1990s also cate—would fuel state campaigns aiming to highlights that terrorists and TCOs use violence poison the terrorists’ image by portraying them differently, as TCO leaders have shown little as drug traffickers and thieves. They also under- interest in fomenting mass-casualty attacks. stand that state authorities will paint insurgents The different ways that TCOs and terrorists as drug traffickers to appeal to the large anti- use violence to achieve their ends is a key drug resource pool in the United States.9 indicator as to why the two entities have not Organizations that are cognizant of these con- cooperated in the past. A TCO kingpin is not siderations are usually ones that have stayed on interested in blowing up a city block, much like a straight and visible criminal or political course, a terrorist bent on maximizing national and unwilling to blend their activities by getting international publicity is unlikely to kidnap and involved in political matters, or vice versa, using murder inconspicuously. But isn’t it possible organized crime to generate revenue. These rigid that TCO leaders and terrorists could set aside political and criminal forces highlight the funda- these operational differences to collaborate in mental barriers to cooperation that are evident ways that are beneficial to both groups? with all TCOs and terrorists—even those who do Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 62

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not avoid criminal or political activities. Two hand, involvement in acquiring, smuggling, and noteworthy examples—the Russian Mafia and selling CBRN materials would likely bring a the EZLN in Mexico—are model illustrations of powerful response from Russian authorities, a criminal or political group that has little desire and as such, most Mafia groups are reluctant to to cooperate with any political (in the case of the become involved. Moreover, nuclear traffick- Russian Mafia) or profit-minded (as in the case ing is a capricious, high-risk endeavor, and the of the EZLN) entities. They provide a useful supply-side nature of the market makes finding a example of subversive groups who intentionally buyer a risky and difficult proposition.12 As one avoid risky partnerships that could potentially observer questioned, “Why drag across multiple jeopardize their ultimate aims. frontiers kilograms of uranium that require years of reworking and enrichment and then spend Russia months looking for a potential buyer? Why not just ship non-ferrous metals out of the country or The apprehensiveness of transnational crimi- make millions from banking manipulations and nal leaders to cooperate with terrorists or [sic] is ruble-dollar exchange transactions?”13 evident in the former Soviet Union, where national security experts and analysts have Mexico kept a close eye on Russian organized criminal groups. Observers are fearful that the Russian The same phenomenon is evidenced to a Mafia will use its entrenched networks to move lesser extent in Mexico, where the EZLN has CBRN material out of Russia and into the hands not approached Mexican cartels in pursuit of of terrorists or hostile states. Thus far, however, collaborative arrangements.14 Like the Russian little evidence suggests that the Russian Mafia Mafia in the CBRN market, the EZLN is well is willing to smuggle CBRN materials. Russian positioned to transport or cultivate drugs. The organized criminals are well placed to transport remote and rugged territory in the Mexican state nuclear ingredients: they have made substantial of Chiapas would provide a prime location to inroads into the Russian military; they have cor- conceal the cultivation or transportation of rupted a number of high level Russian officials; narcotics, and one could envision arrangements and they maintain smuggling networks that being worked out with the Tijuana and Juarez would be well suited for obtaining, transporting, cartels to transit drugs. They have chosen not and selling CBRN materials. Nevertheless, as to do so, however, primarily for the reason a recent report noted, there have only been a mentioned earlier; simply put, the EZLN’s handful of nuclear material smuggling incidents predominant goal is not to make money, but to in the former Soviet Union and none of these gain legitimacy as a relevant political force in have involved organized crime.10 Most of these Mexico. The Tijuana and Juarez cartels are also cases involved local Russian gangs rather than reluctant to establish alliances with the EZLN or organized criminal groups. any political revolutionaries, fearful of the Russia’s criminal syndicates are unwilling to government’s reprisal toward a drug cartel get involved in the CBRN market because they wedded to a revolutionary group. are satisfied with the money raised by their role The EZLN has shied away from drug traf- in “krysha” arrangements, where Russian com- ficking at least in part so they will not fuel the panies pay a percentage of their profits to the Mexican government’s campaign to receive Mafia to protect their businesses. This low-risk, more counternarcotics funding from the United profit-making activity infuses a stable and regu- States, which the government would in turn uti- lar amount of money into Mafia accounts with lize to clamp down on the EZLN. Also, involve- little risk of government interference. Russian ment in the narcotics trade would likely erode criminal kingpins provide a wide range of the EZLN’s foreign support, which provides services including debt collection, co-opting law crucial licit financial and political capital. enforcement, physical security, banking privi- EZLN solicits most of its donations from foreign leges, assistance with customs clearances, and sympathizers through its web site, music con- protection from other racketeers.11 On the other certs, and other means.15 Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 63

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The unwillingness of the EZLN to exploit a traditional sources of funding have evaporated, potentially lucrative relationship with Mexican or a criminal group employing terrorism—in its drug cartels is a useful example in understand- tactical sense—to force government leniency ing the barriers inhibiting cooperation among and negotiation. TCOs and terrorists (or in this case guerrillas). There are different degrees of transforma- The Russian Mafia is also an insightful example tion. If one considers a linear spectrum, at the that illuminates TCO motivations for not coop- left end sit groups like the EZLN and Russian erating with politically motivated subversive Mafia who have not transformed any of their groups. Unlike these examples, however, both organization and remain politically or crimi- of which have refrained from engaging in any nally “authentic.” These groups might at times overtly political (Russian Mafia) or organized involve themselves in a nontraditional activity, criminal (EZLN) behavior—some political rad- such as the Russian Mafia funding a political icals have in fact turned to organized crime as campaign, but these activities are sparse and a means to raise monies for their operations. only serve to further their “end game.” At the These groups do not share the same concerns of other extreme (the right end), transformation the EZLN or Russian Mafia, who were fearful has occurred to such a degree that the ultimate that involvement in an activity outside their aims and motivations of the organization have normal realm of operations—stealing and trans- actually changed. In these cases, the groups no porting CBRN ingredients, or growing or refin- longer retain the defining points that had hith- ing marijuana, cocaine, or heroin—would stoke erto made them a political or criminal group. It a strong response from federal authorities. This is possible they still may maintain a public in turn raises the question: Have these “cross- façade, supported by rhetoric and statements, over” groups looked for potential collaborators but underneath, they have transformed into a to participate in their new, nontraditional crimi- different type of group with a different end nal endeavors? game. The best example of this phenomenon exists in Burma, where many traditional insur- gent groups have given up all prospects of a TRANSFORMING political solution and focused solely on generat- ORGANIZATIONS (A SPECTRUM) ing revenue by cultivating and processing drugs. One would suspect that organizations sitting Political radicals that turn to organized crime to on the middle-right end on the transformation generate revenue ostensibly retain paramount spectrum (who participate to a significant political objectives, and as such, ill-gotten degree in criminality or politics) would seek monies serve only as a means to effectively collaborative arrangements to flatten the steep reach their political ends. They claim to still learning curve when undertaking nontraditional hang their political banner high, even though operations. The reality, however, is that the much of their organization is transformed to learning curve is in fact not that steep; both undertake profit-minded activities. This trans- TCOs and terrorists already maintain organi- formation—or mutation—changes the way that zations that are capable, to some extent, of guerrillas and terrorists operate, as significant engaging in terrorism and organized criminal amounts of the group’s energies and resources activities. Most TCOs already possess extensive are directed at committing profit-driven crimi- arsenals and bomb-making capabilities, while nal acts. Though less notably, this mutation can most guerrilla groups maintain active contacts also occur within a criminal group that decides in the criminal underworld. These contacts are to depart from its traditional use of selective often involved in a range of criminal activity violence to employ mass, indiscriminate vio- and can facilitate a smooth transition to orga- lence—more like a terrorist group than a TCO. nized crime for a guerrilla group. This “in- These transformations are usually sparked by house” capability obviates the need for terrorists changing circumstances, which in the minds to appeal to criminal organizations to foster of terrorist and TCO leaders, necessitate an profit-minded business relationships. In essence, operational transition: a political group whose a political or criminal organization would rather Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 64

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mutate their own structure and organization to group’s leaders are, at the very least, up for take on a nontraditional, financial, or political debate. In many of these cases, the transforma- role, rather than cooperate with groups who are tion of the group’s operations has occurred to already effective in those activities. A number such a degree that the underlying aims and moti- of examples support this observation, and it is vations of the group’s leaders may have also important to examine them in turn. changed—even though their rhetoric continues to espouse their traditional political goals. The Irish Republican Army Following a crackdown on the IRA’s NARCO-GUERRILLAS fundraising efforts in the United States in the early 1970s, the IRA was forced to find new Many insurgents view narcotics as a fertile and sources of revenue. Rather than seek collabora- risk-free source of revenue. Often dubbed tive partnerships with Irish criminals and gangs, “narco-guerrillas,” these groups participate to the IRA used its own members to commit crimes differing degrees in the drug industry; some tax normally associated with ethnic mobs. These drug producers and provide safe havens for included smuggling livestock and cars, running cultivators, while others prefer a more “hands protection and extortion rackets, managing on” approach, using their own manpower to underground brothels, and engaging in contrac- refine and smuggle narcotics. Typically, guerril- tor fraud. The IRA even entered the transporta- las are involved in what one author coined the tion market by purchasing a number of cabs and “upstream” phase of drug trafficking, which buses. Much like an organized criminal group, refers to the initial cultivation stage of drug they threatened the competition until there was production—the least profitable leg of the indus- none and subsequently monopolized the market. try.18 The historic record for guerrilla involve- Citybus, Belfast’s bus service, was gradually ment in the narcotics trade is extensive. forced to retire more than 300 buses, costing the In the early 1980s, many insurgents partici- city $15 million.16 The cab companies claimed to pated in the lucrative drug market emerging in have over $1.5 million in assets.17 Western Europe. During this time, guerrilla The IRA’s transition to organized crime in involvement in narcotics trafficking peaked, and Ireland was the group’s next logical step follow- many groups reportedly harnessed ill-gotten ing the evaporation of crucial North American funds from the drug trade.19 In the late 1990s financial support. While they had been involved this involvement began to diminish consider- in microcriminal activity before, never had the ably. Sendero Luminoso, one of the most active group invested so much of its resources in com- drug-ensconced guerrilla groups, has largely mitting Mafia-like criminal acts. But their con- been stamped out by the Peruvian government, tacts (and manpower) inside and outside Ireland and many of the aforementioned Colombian paved the way for the group to become success- groups (except of course FARC) have either fully involved in organized crime and as such, been incorporated into the political system or they did not seek alliances or relationships with have chosen other illegal routes to make money. TCOs at home or abroad—content to keep all Some evidence indicates that the Basque operations “in-house.” Homeland and Freedom movement (ETA) con- The IRA is a prime example of a mutated tinues to smuggle drugs, but not on a scale close terrorist group who invested significant energies to its 1980s involvement. The Liberation Tigers into committing profit-driven criminal acts. To of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has also been accused most observers the IRA’s political objectives of smuggling narcotics, although the evidence were still paramount, and the group could be for this allegation is sparse, and the movement dealt with accordingly. (As such, the IRA would appears to have largely distanced itself from the best be placed in the middle of the transforma- narcotics activities of the 1980s.20 tion spectrum.) Many insurgent groups, how- While many of today’s insurgent groups ever, have stepped so deeply into organized avoid involvement in drug trafficking, others crime that the aims and motivation of the do not. Burmese insurgents—most notably the Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 65

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United Wa State Army—continue to actively IRA, and other insurgent groups are steeped in cultivate, refine, and traffic opium and heroin criminality, by and large, most of them are still out of the Golden Triangle (the border between unwilling to work with organized, ethnic Mafias Burma, Thailand, Laos), and some have even to lower risk and maximize profit. moved into the methamphetamine market.21 The FARC is still profiting from Colombia’s lucra- tive drug market, and the Turkish government TCOS WILL ALSO claims that the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) TRANSFORM, BUT NOT COOPERATE is heavily involved in drug trafficking, although Western analysts have difficulty pinpointing The examples of the IRA, and other narcotics- specific evidence.22 Israeli and U.S. sources involved guerrilla and terrorist groups, highlight indicate that the Hizbullah receives money for that politically motivated entities are unlikely to protecting laboratories involved in the manu- cooperate with TCOs when engaging in a non- facture of heroin and cocaine.23 It is alleged traditional, profit-driven criminal activity. In that the Taliban receives money derived from the same vein, with a few exceptions, criminal Afghanistan’s position as supplier of two-thirds syndicates have not tapped the resources of of the world’s opium. guerrilla or terrorist groups when committing This list of “narco-guerrilla” examples high- mass casualty violent acts. TCOs have at times lights that guerrillas and terrorist leaders are embarked on terrorist-like campaigns of vio- unwilling to cooperate with TCO kingpins lence, departing from their traditional use of because they do not want to be associated with select violence aimed towards their “anti- people they consider to be greedy, profit- constituency.” TCOs have employed terrorism seeking entrepreneurs. Politically motivated sub- (in a loose sense) when they felt the survival of versive groups believe that their cause is noble their organizations was threatened, and they and just, and that they are pursuing an altruistic used it as a last resort to force the government drive for the betterment of society. Revolu- to negotiate terms beneficial to criminal leaders. tionaries frown upon suggestions that they are Like revolutionary groups, TCO leaders have just “common criminals.” not felt compelled to cooperate with terrorist This attitude is evident in Colombia, where groups to gain bomb-making expertise and guerrillas have historically maintained antago- material, intelligence, or tactics—instead they nistic relations with Colombian drug barons. have chosen to mutate their own organizations FARC leaders are unwilling to cooperate with to adapt to changing realities. While examples Colombian drug cartels fearful of being branded of criminal groups adapting terrorist-like strate- common criminals and further clouding the gies of violence are sparse, there are a few purpose and clarity of their revolution. Addition- notable illustrations that again highlight that ally, one of the foremost aims of the FARC— criminal syndicates—much like the aforemen- the demand for pervasive land reform in tioned guerrilla and terrorist groups—are Colombia—collided with the interests of unlikely to build strategic relationships with any Medellin and Cali leaders, who, during the politically driven movement. 1980s and 1990s, purchased over one-twelfth of Colombia’s land.24 The FARC and other The Medellin Cartel revolutionary groups raid the ranches and kidnap family members of Colombia’s richest A good illustration of a TCO that for a period traffickers. This conflict of interest has pre- of time could have been mistaken for a terrorist vented any meaningful collaboration between group is the Medellin cartel in the early 1980s. the FARC and Colombian narcotics syndicates. During this time, Medellin leaders launched a This pattern of non-cooperation (and indeed brutal and indiscriminate campaign of violence animosity) between the FARC and Colombian on Colombian leaders and citizens. A group drug cartels highlights the underlying reasons called the “Extraditables”—a collection of drug why other criminal and political groups are not traffickers opposed to a sweeping crackdown by likely to collaborate. Even though the FARC, the Colombian government—declared total war Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 66

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on Colombia and its citizens.25 A communiqué Italian Red Brigades). Rather than create an issued by the Extraditables illustrated their alliance with these groups, however, the desire to attack a wide range of targets: Medellin cartel and the Sicilian Cosa Nostra employed their campaigns of mass violence We declare total and absolute war on the govern- without the help of the FARC or the Red ment, the industrial and political oligarchy, the Brigades. (As we will see later, the Naples journalists who have attacked and outraged us, the Camorra, another Italian mafia group, did seek judges who have sold themselves to the govern- a short-term alliance with the Red Brigades, ment, high court extraditing judges and presiden- but it was not to tap its expertise or create a tial and sectorial (social, business and labor) pan-criminal/political organization.) associations, and all who have persecuted and Since the evidence indicates that TCOs, ter- attacked us.26 rorists, and guerrillas are more likely to trans- form their own organizations rather than This campaign of violence was far more cooperate with each other, what are the prob- formidable than attacks unleashed by the FARC lems associated with transformation? and the National Liberation Army (ELN) around the same period. Targets ranged from shopping malls, theaters, airports, newspapers, DON’T JUDGE A GUERILLA BY ITS COVER banks, and liquor stores—turning Medellin and Bogota into virtual battlegrounds. In one inci- This extensive list of examples supports the dent, a bomb blew up a commercial airliner, conclusion that both terrorists (IRA) and guer- killing 119 people, while in another, a gunman rillas (FARC) who participate in illicit activities opened fire in an international airport. Both of outside their traditional political or criminal these attacks mimicked the operations of a ter- spectrums, choose to transform their own orga- rorist group (like the Japanese Red Army, who nizations to perform these operations rather than also sprayed bullets in an airport) more than any cooperate with local or international Mafias. drug cartel. Medellin also utilized a traditional These groups, which are positioned on the terrorist weapon, exploding over 400 bombs middle-right end of the transformation spectrum from August 1989 to July 1990 and killing (due to their heavy involvement in organized 1,000 Colombians.27 crime), have not sought criminal-political The terrorist-like violence conducted by alliances because they continue to remain dis- the Medellin cartel was not without precedent. trustful of each other—unwilling and unlikely The Sicilian Cosa Nostra, one of three notable to tap each other’s expertise. The in-house Italian criminal groups, assassinated a number adaptation by these groups of each other’s “core of Italian officials following a crackdown on competencies” (for example, a TCO’s experi- its operations from 1979 to 1983. This ensuing ence in smuggling drugs or a guerrilla group’s period of violence resulted in the deaths of a ability to commit terrorism) should remain a number of top Italian political and judicial rep- pattern for coming years. resentatives including the Christian Democratic Nevertheless, this pattern of non-cooperation Party secretary, the chief examining magistrate is likely to be accompanied by a more concern- of Palermo, the President of the Sicilian region, ing development. Groups that have undergone a and many others. One author noted that these virtual “sea change” in their operations (sitting attacks were considerably more violent than at the far right end of the spectrum) pose a num- those of the Italian Red Brigades during the ber of significant problems for policymakers. same period.28 Most notably, the extensive participation of In both of these cases, the Medellin cartel subversive political movements in the narcotics between 1989 and 1993 and the Sicilian Mafia trade clouds a clear view of the underlying aims between 1979 and 1983, a criminal organization and motivations of many of today’s guerrilla launched a brutal campaign of violence against groups. In some cases, it is arguable that finan- Colombian and Italian societies—much like cial gain has become the overriding motivation, their terrorist counterparts (the FARC and the rather than simply a means to support a political Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 67

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agenda. A profit-minded group will not wish to towards committing profit-driven criminal acts, seek a negotiated settlement, determined to transforming into a criminal enterprise with a prolong the very war that affords it a profit. The political façade. This mutative process is the Shan United Army in Burma is a good illustra- key pattern that should be on the radar screen tion of a group with once legitimate political for future analysts and policymakers. Never- goals that has transformed into a de facto drug theless, this article would be remiss not to enterprise. Its organized participation in the acknowledge and examine the cases where ter- heroin and methamphetamine trade goes well rorist and TCO groups have in fact cooperated. beyond merely supporting the political banner Criminal groups have at times sought material for the movement.29 The FARC has also become and expertise from terrorists, while terrorists so reliant on an influx of drug money30 that it is have in rare circumstances sought partnerships arguable whether any political solution would with Mafias. These few examples, however, fur- compel its leader, Manuel Marulanda, and a ther support the conclusion that political and majority of its members to use the ballot box criminal groups will not cooperate with each instead of armed attacks. This poses tough ques- other: in each instance the relationships proved tions for the Colombian government: What if short-term and unsustainable. Marulanda and the FARC have become more Two especially noteworthy examples in interested in money than politics, and are Chechnya and Kosovo, however, do partially committed to continuing the FARC’s lucrative challenge this idea that criminals and political involvement in the drug trade regardless of gov- radicals will not develop alliances; in these ernment concessions? Does Marulanda still aim cases, cooperation between a Mafia and a guer- to reform Colombia’s political process and its rilla group occurred to an unprecedented degree. social programs, or is he more concerned about Nevertheless, for reasons that will be noted prolonging the civil war that has afforded his later, it is likely that these examples will prove group so much profit? unique and will serve as the exception rather Perhaps more importantly, guerrilla groups than the rule. like the FARC who are steeped in criminality are able to significantly sharpen the military edge of their organizations. The battlefield suc- TRIAL EFFORTS AT TCO AND TERRORIST cesses of the FARC stem from its sizable war COLLABORATION: A HISTORY OF FAILURE chest, which grows annually anywhere from $100 to 500 million.31 This money is harnessed Organized crime expert Phil Williams accu- from the FARC’s participation in drug traffick- rately details two cooperative modalities ing; FARC soldiers collect “war taxes” from between profit-minded groups. These catego- coca cultivators, refiners, and traffickers. In rizations provide a useful construct for examin- turn, FARC provides a virtual shield from anti- ing collaborative possibilities between terrorists drug authorities in the Caqueta and Putumayo and TCOs. provinces in southern Colombia. The money grossed from these activities funds the purchase Strategic alliances have several qualities that set of sophisticated weapons and high-tech commu- them apart from other linkages (among TCOs). nications equipment including encryption and They are long-term, involve operational linkages, voice scrambling technology.32 Perhaps most are based on some kind of formal or tacit agree- importantly, illicit funds are channeled to FARC ment, and are underpinned by mutual expectations soldiers who are paid reportedly twice as much of continued cooperation. At the other end of the as Colombian army conscripts.33 spectrum are one-off arrangements or spot deals The transformation of the FARC is a pattern in which criminal organizations come together for likely to be followed in the future by political a specific transaction without any notion that the radicals; ones who lack key financial support relationship will become more enduring.34 begin to believe that they cannot win their war, or simply lose interest in their traditional goals. These constructs define two types of linkages They will perhaps turn their formidable assets between organized criminal groups—strategic Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 68

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and tactical (one-spot). Strategic alliances the Camorra to extort small business owners between TCOs are created for a number of and championed its traditional aims: reasons including: the desire of a TCO to enter a new market, the need for a specialized service, The indications of this new type of fight come or more generally, as a means to reduce the also from Secondigliano and Sant Antonio risk of a TCO’s illegal operations.35 Conversely, D’Abate (communities near Naples), where the a tactical relationship involves the same types proletariat is putting restrictions on tradesmen, of exchanges, but for a shorter timeframe and who for a long time have been trying to extermi- without complementary long-term goals. Often nate the extra-legal worker.39 enough, the aims and motivations of competing criminal enterprises are not complementary, and as such, alliances between TCOs remain short- The Red Brigades claimed credit in the term linkages. slaying of a Naples police chief who had In much the same way, terrorist groups and arrested the close friends and relatives of a TCOs rarely cooperate on a long-term basis, due jailed Camorra godfather. Several months later to their greatly differing views on what consti- the Red Brigades failed in an attempt to stage a tutes success. Most of the evidence of TCO/ massive escape from a Naples prison that terrorist cooperation has consisted of what housed many Camorra members.40 In another Dr. Williams called “one-spot” linkages, and did example of this alliance, a senior politician from not evolve into longer-term alliances. In these the Christian Democratic party was kidnapped instances, a terrorist or TCO was using another in 1981 by the Italian Red Brigades, and a for a one-time service or function. Colombian Camorra godfather acted as an intermediary police reports indicated, for example, that Pablo during negotiations between the authorities and Escobar hired ELN guerrillas to plant car bombs the terrorist group. In the end, the Camorra in 1993 because of Medellin’s limited ability to pocketed a sizable $1 million commission, and commit terrorist acts.36 Medellin’s war against allegedly as part of the deal, the Camorra agreed Colombia also led to the explosion of 1,100 to assassinate a number of people designated by pounds of dynamite in front of the Department the Red Brigades.41 of Administrative Security building in Bogota, The Red Brigades sought this alliance and some reports indicate that this bomb was because the organization had been seriously planted on behalf of the cartel by a Spanish crippled by Italian authorities in the early 1980s. terrorist with ties to the Basque Fatherland and In the end, the fate of the alliance was accu- Liberty group.37 More recently, Colombian rately forecasted by an antiterrorism police police report that an alliance has developed official at the time: “We don’t think any such between Carlos Castano, the leader of Colombia’s alliance will work because, while they have a largest paramilitary group, and La Terraza, an common enemy in the police and the establish- urban-based organized criminal group, formed ment, their aims and ideological beliefs are so from the remnants of the Medellin cartel and vastly different...the Camorra and the Red some of Escobar’s former rivals. La Terraza Brigades possibly can cooperate on practical allegedly kills human rights activists at the matters, like plotting to get rid of a judge, but behest of Castano, since his organization lacks their alliance at best would be superficial and the intelligence necessary to plan and execute short-lived because neither of them would want high profile, urban kidnappings and murders.38 to compromise the group’s secrets.”42 In another illustration of short-term TCO/ This official accurately portrays the obstacles terrorist cooperation in the early 1980s, the of long-term cooperation between a criminal Italian Red Brigades attempted to establish an and political subversive group. The barriers to alliance with the Naples Camorra, Italy’s most cooperation between the Camorra and Red organized mainland criminal group. In a five- Brigades—namely their different views of what page statement issued in 1982, the Red Brigades constitutes success—are also evident with offered to help the Camorra spread organized TCOs and guerrillas in other countries including crime. The statement applauded the efforts of Mexico, Russia, and Colombia. In Italy, the Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 69

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Camorra and Red Brigades were able to to Chechen rebels. Even more alarming, exchange services for a brief period of time in although it is hard to determine the extent of the contractual or one-spot arrangements, but this Mafia’s participation, Russian authorities allege relationship did not evolve into a longer-term that Chechen rebels were responsible for the alliance. In sum, cooperation between the spate of apartment bombings in Moscow and Mafia and terrorist groups—as evidenced by two other cities that killed 300 people last these examples—was episodic and imperma- September. If Chechen guerrillas were in fact nent, illuminating a pattern of non-cooperation responsible, one could speculate that the Mafia between TCOs and terrorists that should con- would have been well suited to provide safe tinue well into the future. Unlike the EZLN and havens, intelligence, and supplies for the terror- Russian Mafia mentioned earlier, these groups ists. It is also a possibility—although no evidence actually sought cooperative relationships that supports this—that the Mafia could have com- eventually degenerated and proved that sustain- mitted the attacks themselves at the behest of ing cooperation between a criminal and political guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev.44 group is a difficult route to take. It is important to note that the aims of these two groups did not initially overlap. Basayev’s determination to ignite a larger Islamic uprising DOES THE FUTURE in Dagestan was clearly not on the minds of POINT TO DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES? Chechen gangsters grossing large profits in Moscow. The views of the Chechen Mafia There are contemporary examples, however, changed, however, as Russia began an extensive that at first glance challenge the aforementioned crackdown on Chechen criminal activities. conclusions. In both Chechnya and Kosovo, criminal and political groups created vibrant Kosovo partnerships that outlasted many of the previ- ous collaborative attempts. In both cases, the Enduring cooperation between two separate Kosovo Liberation Army and Chechen guerril- groups—one criminal and the other political— las accumulated significant amounts of money has also occurred in Kosovo, where the KLA and material from collaborative relationships maintained a strategic alliance with Albanian with the Albanian and Chechen Mafias, respec- criminal syndicates before and during the tively. It is important to examine these exam- Kosovo crisis. After the demise of the Berisha ples, and understand what factors were in place government in Albania in 1997, the ensuing that allowed these relationships to flourish. disorder allowed Albanian organized criminal groups to secure their hold on heroin trafficking through the Balkan route—a well traveled Chechnya smuggler’s corridor that transports an estimated Perhaps the most notable example of a strate- $400 billion worth of narcotics per year.45 At gic linkage that developed between a political roughly the same time, the KLA emerged as an and criminal subversive group is that of the organized guerrilla force seeking an indepen- Moscow-based Chechen Mafia and Grozny- dent state from Serbia. Members of the KLA’s based Chechen guerrillas. The Russian incursion political wing, the Kosovo National Front into Chechnya to root out Chechen rebels (KNF), manned a drug cartel centered in was complemented by a total crackdown on Pristina that collaborated with the Albanian Moscow-based Chechen criminal groups. The Mafia to smuggle heroin. The close ties between Kremlin, fearful of the Chechen rebels’ threat of the three groups—the KNF, the KLA, and the terrorism and the possibility of a “fifth column,” Albanian Mafia—provided a well-oiled arrange- ordered Russia’s anti-crime police to crackdown ment; the profits from the Pristina cartel, esti- on the Chechens’ criminal operations within mated to be in the “high tens of millions,”46 Russia and arrest the syndicates’ kingpins.43 were funneled to the KLA, where they were According to the Russian Interior Ministry, used primarily to buy weapons, often in “drugs the Chechen Mafia sent large amounts of money for arms” arrangements. Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 70

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CONCLUSION The reality of this threat, however, is much less sensational and grandiose. A diagnosis based on the historical record suggests that At first glance, the pattern of cooperation future cooperation between TCOs and terrorists modeled by Chechen and Kosovar guerillas is unlikely. As this article has shown, the differ- points to some alarming possibilities for the ing aims and motivations of the two make it future. A political group—empowered by a crimi- unlikely that political and criminal groups will nal alliance—could gain weapons, money, intel- cooperate with each other in long-term, strategic ligence, explosives, and other wartime goods and alliances. If cooperation does occur, it will most services. A pan-criminal-political alliance would likely be short-term linkages of convenience, be a force multiplier for radicals, sharpening their and even these will be limited and spotty. military edge and making it difficult for legiti- Instead, analysts should be cognizant of a mate governments to combat them. transformation of political motivations and Fears that these types of arrangements will ends. Criminal motives, spread deep and wide flourish, however, will likely prove unfounded. throughout a terrorist group, will transform the The Chechen guerrillas were fortunate—in their aims and motivations of its leaders. Terrorists eyes—to have a sympathetic, ethnically similar and guerrilla groups who view their cause as Mafia group who was willing to donate funds to futile, might turn their formidable assets support Basayev’s cause. Since the Chechen towards crime—all the while under a bogus Mafia is based largely in Moscow, they—unlike political banner. Other groups might turn to most criminal groups—were not worried about organized crime if their raison d’être evaporates the instability hundreds of miles to their South, in the face of negotiation or peace. which would not affect their Moscow opera- This transformation is more likely to occur tions. They also most likely realized that a than any strategic partnerships between TCOs Chechen state under Russian control would and terrorists. The evaporation of Soviet and not be as lax regarding border control, since the other state sources of funding are unlikely to Mafia often used Chechnya as a route for smug- spur insurgents to become involved in narcotics gling goods out of Russia. This set of circum- since many continue to distance themselves stances is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, from drug trafficking, even though their coffers and perhaps more importantly, the relationship have not been filled by Soviet funds for years. was not quite the “force multiplier” that one And perhaps more telling, the guerrilla/drug might suspect. Chechen guerrillas were not as nexus was strongest in the early 1980s, a time well armed as other guerrillas bands (like the when state sponsorship for terrorism reached Shining Path and FARC) who committed epidemic heights. criminal acts using their own manpower and Clearly there are dangerous potentialities without the help of any local or international when guerrillas generate money through drug Mafia groups. trafficking—as evidenced with the FARC—and Nevertheless, such headlines prompt some this issue should be addressed accordingly. But observers to contend that the patterns of criminal- alarming prognostications about a “grand shift” political collaboration are already in force today, where terrorists and criminals operate hand in and that the global development of these linkages hand will likely prove unfounded. has already reached epidemic proportions. In the words of one expert, “a grand shift is occurring that few people have noticed . . . international NOTES drug traffickers and international terrorists are in a hedonistic marriage of design . . . these groups 1. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) are now linked at the hip, and they are extremely are best defined as “contemporary organizations wealthy.”47 This observer further stated that in (which) are adaptable, sophisticated, extremely opportunistic, and immersed in a full range of illegal the absence of Soviet funding, terrorist organiza- and legal activities . . . they have expanded their tions are more often turning to drug trafficking to activities to a quasi-corporate level where they are make money. active in large scale insurance fraud, the depletion of Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 71

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natural resources, environmental crime, migrant 12. Lee (op. cit.), pp. 140-141. smuggling, and bank fraud . . . they are not afraid to 13. Ibid, p. 63. work globally in any country where legal and bureau- 14. Despite allegations by the Mexican govern- cratic loopholes allow them to take advantage of the ment that the EZLN is involved in drug trafficking, system.” See Canadian Security Intelligence Service, most experts agree that they are not. See The San “Transnational Criminal Activity” November 1998. Diego Union-Tribune, “Mexico’s Drug-War Effort 2. Officially known as the Union of Myanmar, Gets Poor Grade,” 24 May 1996. but referred to here as Burma. 15. The Scotsman, “Rebel Yell: The Zapatista 3. For the purposes of this article, guerrillas National Liberation Army Has Garnered World and terrorists will be used interchangeably (as politi- Support Via the Web for its Fight Against the cally motivated groups). This does not mean that Mexican Government,” 6 July 1999. there are not important differences, however. In par- 16. The IRA’s “black cabs” (since they were ticular, terrorists are unwilling or unable to occupy painted black) were favored by locals due to their rea- large chunks of land. As a result, guerrillas are more sonable rates. See James Adams, The Financing of likely than terrorists to exercise direct control over a Terrorism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), population. Finally, terrorists avoid direct confronta- p. 173. tion with military forces, while guerrillas usually 17. Ibid. focus attacks on military and police outposts or con- 18. See Clawson and Lee (op. cit.). voys as evidenced in Colombia, Sri Lanka, and other 19. Some of these include the April 19th locales. Movement (Colombia), FARC (Colombia), Popular 4. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia Liberation Army (Colombia), Sendero Luminoso University Press, 1998), p. 43. (Peru), Burmese Communist Party (Burma), Kachin 5. Ibid, p. 43. Independence Organization (Burma), mujahedin 6. Nowhere is this more evident than in guerrillas (Afghanistan), Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka), Colombia, where recent evidence indicates that new Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia criminal syndicates appear to have learned from the (Armenia), Kurdish separatists (Turkey), and the mistakes of Cali and Medellin leaders before them. A Basque Fatherland and Freedom Group (Spain). For recent sting uncovered a technologically sophisti- a more extensive discussion on guerrillas and drug cated and active drug network that purposely avoids trafficking in the 1980s, see Mark Steinitz, “Insurgents, the political limelight, does not commit large-scale Terrorists, and the Drug Trade,” The Washington acts of violence, and utilizes sophisticated communi- Quarterly, 1985. cations technology. See The Washington Post, 20. In 1996, a European Commission envoy to “Colombian Drug Cartels Exploit Tech Advantage,” South Asia claimed that “there is some indication of 15 November 1999. the Mafia backing the LTTE.” The envoy has reason 7. Patrick Clawson and Rensselaer Lee, The to be suspicious. The vibrant LTTE networks, which Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin’s smuggle arms from Cambodia to Thailand, would be Press, 1996), p. 51. well suited for trafficking drugs as well. The official 8. It is important to note that the word “indis- provided little evidence, however, and if the LTTE criminately” is used loosely here. Politically moti- was involved in drug trafficking, it is hard to con- vated terrorists have traditionally tried to confine ceive how none of its members have been arrested in their attacks to certain groups, fearful of alienating recent years on narcotics-related charges. Moreover, their supporters and sparking a strong government the LTTE still continues to receive sizable sums from response. On the other hand, religious and apocalyp- its widespread diaspora, which by some estimations tic terrorists are more likely to commit mass, indis- reaches $2-3 million each month. Estimations of criminate attacks aiming to kill a large number of diaspora contributions does [sic] vary. See Jane’s people since they are not trying to garner national or Intelligence Review, “Cash for Carnage: Funding the international support. Modern Terrorist,” 1 May 1998. Another source 9. It is important to note that there are two reports that 60 percent of a total $2 million a month sides to this coin. Some guerrillas clearly do not care revenue comes from abroad. See Asiaweek, “How a about their international image or what measures the Secret Global Network Keeps Sri Lanka’s Tamil state authorities may take to crack down on them. Organization Up and Killing,” 26 July 1996. 10. This is not to say that there are not networks 21. AgenceFrance Presse, “Burmese Drug that will procure and smuggle materials out of Russia, Production on Rise Despite Accords with Rebels,” 24 but as Rensselaer Lee notes in a recent book, these November 1996. Also see Jane’s Intelligence Review, groups do not maintain the characteristics of an orga- “Burma, the Country that Won’t Kick the Habit,” nized criminal group. See Rensselaer Lee, Smuggling 1 March 1998. Armageddon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 22. See San Diego Union-Tribune, 6 July 1996. pp. 140-141. In one state-wide operation, authorities arrested 551 11. Global Organized Crime Project, Russian members of the PKK on drug charges. See Ankara Organized Crime, Project by Center for Strategic and Anatolia, “Security Directorate on ‘Terrorist’ Ties to International Studies, 1997, p. 29. Drug Deals,” 20 May 1998. Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 72

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23. The Jerusalem Post, “US May Hit Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy Hizbullah Drug Trade,” 17 June 1997. Also see Before the House Committee on Government International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Reform, Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human U.S. Department of State, 1996. Resources Subcommittee. Subject, “The Evolving 24. Rachel Ehrenfeld, NarcoTerrorism (New Drug Threat in Colombia and Other South American York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 91. Source Zone Nations.” 25. The group vowed to set off 5.5 tons of dyna- 34. Prepared testimony of Dr. Phil Williams mite in residential areas of the capital for every drug before the House International Relations Committee, trafficker extradited to the United States. 31 January 1996. 26. “Drug Lords Vow War on Colombia,” Los 35. Phil Williams, Washington Quarterly, Angeles Times, 25 August 1989. “Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic 27. “The Drug War: Who Won?” Orange Alliances,” Winter 1995. County Register, 21 July 1991. 36. Clawson and Lee (op. cit.), p. 53. 28. Alison Jamieson, “Terrorism and Drug 37. Ibid. Trafficking in the 1990s,” 23 March 1995, p. 47. 38. The recent kidnapping of a Colombian sena- 29. Other groups known to be involved include tor provided the first concrete evidence of this alliance. the Kokang, Shan, and remnants of Khun Sa’s Mong See Los Angeles Times, “A Chilling Crime Network Tai Army—the leader of which turned himself into Rears its Head in Colombia,” 16 March 2000. [sic] the government. 39. United Press International, “Red Brigades 30. Some estimates indicate 50 percent of their Praises Camorra,” 19 July 1982. money comes from drugs. 40. Associated Press, 5 October 1982. 31. Federal News Service, 6 August 1999. 41. Adams (op. cit.), pp. 187-188. A parliamen- Prepared testimony of General Barry R. McCaffrey, tary report confirmed that the Red Brigades and the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy Camorra had agreed to cooperate in the killing of a Before the House Committee on Government number of police magistrates and police officials. Reform, Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human 42. Associated Press, “Police Say Red Brigades Resources Subcommittee. Subject, “The Evolving Alliance with Organized Crime Won’t Work,” 20 Drug Threat in Colombia and Other South American July 1982. Source Zone Nations.” 43. Moscow News, “Pre-Election War in the 32. Interestingly, FARC’s most popular weapon Caucasus,” 18 August 1999. is the gas tank mortar, first designed and used by the 44. Insight on the News, “Russia Hammers IRA. This weapon, made from common gas tanks, Chechnya,” 29 November 1999. can shoot roughly 2000 meters and is powerful 45. Interpol statistic cited in The San Francisco enough to destroy bunkers. They have also purchased Chronicle, “KLA Linked to the Enormous Heroin AK-47 assault rifles, Dragunov sniper rifles, explo- Trade,” 5 May 1999. sives, hand grenades, ammunition, and rocket- 46. As one would expect, estimates vary. See propelled grenades. See Jane’s Intelligence Review, The Washington Times, “KLA Buys Arms with Illicit “FARC’s innovative artillery,” 1 December 1999. Funds,” 4 June 1999. 33. Federal News Service, August 6, 1999. 47. See Armed Forces Journal, “The Enemy Prepared testimony of General Barry R. McCaffrey, Next Door,” March 2000. Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 73

SOMEBODY ELSE’S CIVIL WAR

MICHAEL SCOTT DORAN

Call it a city on four legs heading for murder....New York is a woman holding, accord- ing to history, a rag called liberty with one hand and strangling the earth with the other. —Adonis [Ali Ahmed Said], “The Funeral of New York,” 1971

n the weeks after the attacks of September 11, around the world, and the umma would find it Americans repeatedly asked, “Why do shocking how Americans nonchalantly caused Ithey hate us?” To understand what happened, Muslims to suffer and die. The ensuing outrage however, another question may be even more would open a chasm between state and society pertinent: “Why do they want to provoke us?” in the Middle East, and the governments allied David Fromkin suggested the answer in with the West—many of which are repressive, Foreign Affairs back in 1975. “Terrorism,” he corrupt, and illegitimate—would find them- noted, “is violence used in order to create fear; selves adrift. It was to provoke such an outcome but it is aimed at creating fear in order that the that bin Laden broadcast his statement follow- fear, in turn, will lead somebody else—not the ing the start of the military campaign on terrorist—to embark on some quite different October 7, in which he said, among other things, program of action that will accomplish what- that the Americans and the British “have ever it is that the terrorist really desires.” When divided the entire world into two regions—one a terrorist kills, the goal is not murder itself but of faith, where there is no hypocrisy, and something else—for example, a police crack- another of infidelity, from which we hope God down that will create a rift between government will protect us.” and society that the terrorist can then exploit for Polarizing the Islamic world between the revolutionary purposes. Osama bin Laden umma and the regimes allied with the United sought—and has received—an international States would help achieve bin Laden’s primary military crackdown, one he wants to exploit for goal: furthering the cause of Islamic revolution his particular brand of revolution. within the Muslim world itself, in the Arab lands Bin Laden produced a piece of high political especially and in Saudi Arabia above all. He had theater he hoped would reach the audience that no intention of defeating America. War with the concerned him the most: the umma, or universal United States was not a goal in and of itself but Islamic community. The script was obvious: rather an instrument designed to help his brand America, cast as the villain, was supposed to use of extremist Islam survive and flourish among its military might like a cartoon character trying the believers. Americans, in short, have been to kill a fly with a shotgun. The media would drawn into somebody else’s civil war. see to it that any use of force against the civilian Washington had no choice but to take up the population of Afghanistan was broadcast gauntlet, but it is not altogether clear that

From “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” Doran, Foreign Affairs, 81(3), 22-42. Copyright © 2002 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Reprinted by permission.

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Americans understand fully this war’s true threatened to undermine the special position dimensions. The response to bin Laden cannot that Mecca enjoyed in Arabia as a pagan shrine be left to soldiers and police alone. He has city. With much of their livelihood at stake, the embroiled the United States in an intra-Muslim oligarchs punished Muhammad’s followers and ideological battle, a struggle for hearts and conspired to kill him. The Muslims therefore minds in which al Qaeda had already scored a fled from Mecca to Medina, where they estab- number of victories—as the reluctance of lished the umma as a political and religious America’s Middle Eastern allies to offer public community. They went on to fight and win a support for the campaign against it demon- war against Mecca that ended with the destruc- strated. The first step toward weakening the tion of Hubal and the spread of true Islam hold of bin Laden’s ideology, therefore, must be around the world. to comprehend the symbolic universe into Before the Prophet could achieve this suc- which he has dragged us. cess, however, he encountered the Munafiqun, the Hypocrites of Medina. Muhammad’s accep- tance of leadership over the Medinese reduced AMERICA, THE HUBAL OF THE AGE the power of a number of local tribal leaders. These men outwardly accepted Islam in order to Bin Laden’s October 7 statement offers a crucial protect their worldly status, but in their hearts window onto his conceptual world and repays they bore malice toward both the Prophet and careful attention. In it he states, “Hypocrisy stood his message. Among other misdeeds, the treach- behind the leader of global idolatry, behind the erous Munafiqun abandoned Muhammad on Hubal of the age—namely, America and its sup- the battlefield at a moment when he was already porters.” Because the symbolism is obscure to woefully outnumbered. The Hypocrites were most Americans, this sentence was widely mis- apostates who accepted true belief but then translated in the press, but bin Laden’s Muslim rejected it, and as such they were regarded as audience understood it immediately. worse than the infidels who had never embraced In the early seventh century, when the Islam to begin with. Islam can understand just Prophet Muhammad began to preach Islam to how difficult it is for a pagan to leave behind all the pagan Arab tribes in Mecca, Hubal was a the beliefs and personal connections that he or stone idol that stood in the Kaaba—a structure she once held dear; it is less forgiving of those that Abraham, according to Islamic tradition, who accept the truth and then subvert it. originally built on orders from God as a sanctu- In bin Laden’s imagery, the leaders of the ary of Islam. In the years between Abraham and Arab and Islamic worlds today are Hypocrites, Muhammad, the tradition runs, the Arabs fell idol worshippers cowering behind America, the away from true belief and began to worship Hubal of the age. His sword jabs simultaneously idols, with Hubal the most powerful of many. at the United States and the governments allied When bin Laden calls America “the Hubal of with it. His attack was designed to force those the age,” he suggests that it is the primary focus governments to choose: You are either with the of idol worship and that it is polluting the idol-worshiping enemies of God or you are with Kaaba, a symbol of Islamic purity. His imagery the true believers. has a double resonance: it portrays American The al Qaeda organization grew out of an culture as a font of idolatry while rejecting the Islamic religious movement called the American military presence on the Arabian Salafiyya—a name derived from al-Salaf al- peninsula (which is, by his definition, the holy Salih, “the venerable forefathers,” which refers land of Islam, a place barred to infidels). to the generation of the Prophet Muhammad and Muhammad’s prophecy called the Arabs of his companions. Salafis regard the Islam that Mecca back to their monotheistic birthright. The most Muslims practice today as polluted by return to true belief, however, was not an easy idolatry; they seek to reform the religion by one, because the reigning Meccan oligarchy emulating the first generation of Muslims, persecuted the early Muslims. By calling for the whose pristine society they consider to have destruction of Hubal, the Prophet’s message best reflected God’s wishes for humans. The Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 75

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Salafiyya is not a unified movement, and it merged with al Qaeda. In fact, investigators expresses itself in many forms, most of which believe that Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s leaders, do not approach the extremism of Osama bin Ayman al-Zawahiri and Muhammad Atef (who Laden or the Taliban. The Wahhabi ideology of was killed in the U.S. air campaign), master- the Saudi state, for example, and the religious minded the attacks of September 11. In his 1996 doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt “Declaration of War against the Americans,” and a host of voluntary religious organizations bin Laden showed that he and his Egyptian around the Islamic world are all Salafi. These associates are cut from the same cloth. Just as diverse movements share the belief that Zawahiri and Atef considered the current Muslims have deviated from God’s plan and regime of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt to be a nest that matters can be returned to their proper state of apostates, so bin Laden considered the Saudi by emulating the Prophet. monarchy (its Wahhabi doctrines notwith- Like any other major religious figure, standing) to have renounced Islam. According Muhammad left behind a legacy that his follow- to bin Laden, his king adopted “polytheism,” ers have channeled in different directions. An which bin Laden defined as the acceptance of extremist current in the Salafiyya places great “laws fabricated by men . . . permitting that emphasis on jihad, or holy war. Among other which God has forbidden.” It is the height of things, the Prophet Muhammad fought in mortal human arrogance and irreligion to “share with combat against idolatry, and some of his fol- God in His sole right of sovereignty and making lowers today choose to accord this aspect of the law.” his career primary importance. The devoted Extremist Salafis, therefore, regard modern members of al Qaeda display an unsettling will- Western civilization as a font of evil, spreading ingness to martyr themselves because they feel idolatry around the globe in the form of secular- that, like the Prophet, they are locked in a life- ism. Since the United States is the strongest or-death struggle with the forces of unbelief Western nation, the main purveyor of pop that threaten from all sides. They consider them- culture, and the power most involved in the selves an island of true believers surrounded by political and economic affairs of the Islamic a sea of iniquity and think the future of religion world, it receives particularly harsh criticism. itself, and therefore the world, depends on them Only the apostate Middle Eastern regimes and their battle against idol worship. themselves fall under harsher condemnation. In almost every Sunni Muslim country the It is worth remembering, in this regard, that Salafiyya has spawned Islamist political move- the rise of Islam represents a miraculous case of ments working to compel the state to apply the the triumph of human will. With little more than shari`a—that is, Islamic law. Extremist Salafis their beliefs to gird them, the Prophet believe that strict application of the shari`a is Muhammad and a small number of devoted fol- necessary to ensure that Muslims walk on the lowers started a movement that brought the path of the Prophet. The more extremist the most powerful empires of their day crashing to party, the more insistent and violent the demand the ground. On September 11, the attackers that the state must apply the shari`a exclusively. undoubtedly imagined themselves to be retrac- In the view of extremist Salafis, the shari`a is ing the Prophet’s steps. As they boarded the God’s thunderous commandment to Muslims, planes with the intention of destroying the and failure to adopt it constitutes idolatry. By Pentagon and the World Trade Center, they removing God from the realm of law, a domain recited battle prayers that contained the line that He has clearly claimed for Himself alone, “All of their equipment, and gates, and techno- human legislation amounts to worshiping a logy will not prevent [you from achieving your pagan deity. Thus it was on the basis of failure aim], nor harm [you] except by God’s will.” The to apply the shari`a that extremists branded hijackers’ imaginations certainly needed noth- Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat an apostate ing more than this sparse line to remind them and then killed him. His assassins came from a that, as they attacked America, they rode right group often known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad, behind Muhammad, who in his day had the remnants of which have in recent years unleashed forces that, shortly after his death, Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 76

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destroyed the Persian Empire and crippled Look! There is the master of democracy whom Byzantium—the two superpowers of the age. they have so often sanctified but who causes crim- inal, barbaric, bloody oppression that abandons the moral standards of even the most savage AMERICA, LAND OF THE CRUSADERS empires in history. In my last column I listed for readers the five million killed (may God receive When thinking about the world today and their them as martyrs) because of the crimes committed place in it, the extremist Salafis do not reflect by this American civilization that America leads. only on the story of the foundation of Islam. These five million were killed in the last few They also scour more than a millennium of decades alone. Islamic history in search of parallels to the present predicament. In his “Declaration of Similar feelings led another Al Shaab colum- War,” for instance, bin Laden states that the nist that day, Khalid al-Sharif, to describe the stationing of American forces on the soil of shock and delight that he felt while watching the the Arabian peninsula constitutes the greatest World Trade Center crumbling: aggression committed against the Muslims since the death of the Prophet in AD 632. To put this claim in perspective, it is worth Look at that! America, master of the world, is remembering that in the last 1,300 years crashing down. Look at that! The Satan who rules Muslims have suffered a number of significant the world, east and west, is burning. Look at that! defeats, including but not limited to the destruc- The sponsor of terrorism is itself seared by its fire. tion of the Abbasid caliphate by the Mongols, an episode of which bin Laden is well aware. In The fanatics of al Qaeda see the world in 1258 the ruthless Mongol leader Hulegu sacked black and white and advance a particularly Baghdad, killed the caliph, and massacred narrow view of Islam. This makes them a tiny hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, stacking minority among Muslims. But the basic cate- their skulls, as legend has it, in a pyramid out- gories of their thought flow directly from the side the city walls. Whatever one thinks about mainstream of the Salafiyya, a perspective U.S. policy toward Iraq, few in America would that has enjoyed a wide hearing over the last argue that the use of Saudi bases to enforce the 50 years. Familiarity thus ensures bin Laden’s sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime ideas a sympathetic reception in many quarters. constitutes a world-historical event on a par In Salafi writings, the United States emerges with the Mongol invasion of the Middle East. as the senior member of a “Zionist-Crusader Before September 11, one might have been alliance” dedicated to subjugating Muslims, tempted to pass off as nationalist hyperbole bin killing them, and, most important, destroying Laden’s assumption that U.S. policy represents Islam. A careful reading reveals that this the pinnacle of human evil. Now we know he is alliance represents more than just close relations deadly serious. between the United States and Israel today. The The magnitude of the attacks on New York international cooperation between Washington and Washington make it clear that al Qaeda does and Jerusalem is but one nefarious manifesta- indeed believe itself to be fighting a war to save tion of a greater evil of almost cosmic propor- the umma from Satan, represented by secular tions. Thus in his “Declaration of War” bin Western culture. Extreme though they may be, Laden lists 10 or 12 world hot spots where these views extend far beyond al Qaeda’s imme- Muslims have recently died (including Bosnia, diate followers in Afghanistan. Even a quick Chechnya, and Lebanon) and attributes all of glance at the Islamist press in Arabic demon- these deaths to a conspiracy led by the United strates that many Muslims who do not belong to States, even though Americans actually played bin Laden’s terrorist network consider the United no role in pulling the trigger. And thus, in States to be on a moral par with Genghis Khan. another document, “Jihad Against Jews and Take, for instance, Muhammad Abbas, an Crusaders,” bin Laden describes U.S. policies Egyptian Islamist who wrote the following in the toward the Middle East as “a clear declaration newspaper Al Shaab on September 21: of war on God, His messenger, and Muslims.” Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 77

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As strange as it may sound to an American extremist Salafis fall back on the writings of Ibn audience, the idea that the United States has Taymiyya for guidance. A towering figure in taken an oath of enmity toward God has deep the history of Islamic thought, he was born in roots in the Salafi tradition. It has been around Damascus in the thirteenth century, when Syria for more than 50 years and has reached a wide stood under the threat of invasion from the public through the works of, among others, Mongols. Modern radicals find him attractive Sayyid Qutb, the most important Salafi thinker because he too faced the threat of a rival civi- of the last half-century and a popular author in lization. Ibn Taymiyya the firebrand exhorted the Muslim world even today, nearly 40 years his fellow Muslims to fight the Mongol foe, after his death. A sample passage taken from his while Ibn Taymiyya the intellectual guided his writings in the early 1950s illustrates the point. community through the problems Muslims face Addressing the reasons why the Western pow- when their social order falls under the shadow ers had failed to support Muslims against their of non-Muslim power. It is only natural that bin enemies in Pakistan, Palestine, and elsewhere, Laden himself looks to such a master in order to Qutb canvassed a number of common explana- legitimate his policies. Using Ibn Taymiyya to tions such as Jewish financial influence and target America, however, marks an interesting British imperial trickery but concluded, turning point in the history of the radical Salafiyya. Bin Laden’s “Declaration of War” uses the All of these opinions overlook one vital element logic of Ibn Taymiyya to persuade others in the in the question . . . the Crusader spirit that runs in Salafiyya to abandon old tactics for new ones. the blood of all Occidentals. It is this that colors The first reference to him arises in connection all their thinking, which is responsible for their with a discussion of the “Zionist-Crusader imperialistic fear of the spirit of Islam and for alliance,” which according to bin Laden has their efforts to crush the strength of Islam. For the been jailing and killing radical preachers—men instincts and the interests of all Occidentals are such as Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, in prison bound up together in the crushing of that strength. for plotting a series of bombings in New York This is the common factor that links together com- City following the 1993 bombing of the World munist Russia and capitalist America. We do not Trade Center. Bin Laden argues that the “iniq- forget the role of international Zionism in plotting uitous Crusader movement under the leadership against Islam and in pooling the forces of the of the U.S.A.” fears these preachers because Crusader imperialists and communist materialists they will successfully rally the Islamic commu- alike. This is nothing other than a continuation of nity against the West, just as Ibn Taymiyya did the role played by the Jews since the migration of against the Mongols in his day. Having identi- the Prophet to Medina and the rise of the Islamic fied the United States as a threat to Islam equiv- state. alent to the Mongols, bin Laden then discusses what to do about it. Ibn Taymiyya provides the Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin Laden, and the entire answer: “To fight in the defense of religion and extremist Salafiyya see Western civilization, in belief is a collective duty; there is no other duty all periods and in all guises, as innately hostile to after belief than fighting the enemy who is cor- Muslims and to Islam itself. The West and Islam rupting the life and the religion.” The next most are locked in a prolonged conflict. Islam will important thing after accepting the word of God, eventually triumph, of course, but only after in other words, is fighting for it. enduring great hardship. Contemporary history, By calling on the umma to fight the defined as it is by Western domination, consti- Americans as if they were the Mongols, bin tutes the darkest era in the entire history of Islam. Laden and his Egyptian lieutenants have taken the extremist Salafiyya down a radically new path. Militants have long identified the West AMERICA AND THE MONGOL THREAT as a pernicious evil on a par with the Mongols, but they have traditionally targeted the internal When attempting to come to grips with the enemy, the Hypocrites and apostates, rather nature of the threat the modern West poses, than Hubal itself. Aware that he is shifting the Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 78

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focus considerably, bin Laden quotes Ibn titled “The Neglected Duty.” Not a political Taymiyya at length to establish the basic point manifesto like bin Laden’s tracts, it is a sus- that “people of Islam should join forces and sup- tained and learned argument that targets the port each other to get rid of the main infidel,” serious believer rather than the angry, malleable even if that means that the true believers will be crowd. Unlike bin Laden’s holy war, moreover, forced to fight alongside Muslims of dubious Islamic Jihad’s doctrine, though violent, fits piety. In the grand scheme of things, he argues, clearly in the mainstream of Salafi conscious- God often uses the base motives of impious ness, which historically has been concerned Muslims as a means of advancing the cause of much more with the state of the Muslims them- religion. In effect, bin Laden calls upon his fel- selves than with relations between Islam and the low Islamist radicals to postpone the Islamic outside world. The decision to target America, revolution, to stop fighting Hypocrites and therefore, raises the question of whether, during apostates: “An internal war is a great mistake, the 1990s, Egyptian Islamic Jihad changed its no matter what reasons there are for it,” because ideology entirely. Did its leaders decide that the discord among Muslims will only serve the foreign enemy was in fact the real enemy? Or United States and its goal of destroying Islam. was the 1993 bombing in New York tactical The shift of focus from the domestic enemy rather than strategic? to the foreign power is all the more striking The answer would seem to be the latter. Bin given the merger of al Qaeda and Egyptian Laden’s “Declaration of War” itself testifies to Islamic Jihad. The latter’s decision to kill Sadat the tactical nature of his campaign against in 1981 arose directly from the principle that the America. Unlike “The Neglected Duty,” which cause of Islam would be served by targeting lax presents a focused argument, the “Declaration Muslim leaders rather than by fighting foreign- of War” meanders from topic to topic, contra- ers, and here, too, Ibn Taymiyya provided the dicting itself along the way. On the one hand, it key doctrine. In his day Muslims often found calls for unity in the face of external aggression themselves living under Mongol rulers who had and demands an end to internecine warfare; on absorbed Islam in one form or another. Ibn the other, it calls in essence for revolution in Taymiyya argued that such rulers—who out- Saudi Arabia. By presenting a litany of claims wardly pretended to be Muslims but who secretly against the Saudi ruling family and by dis- followed non-Islamic, Mongol practices—must cussing the politics of Saudi Arabia at length be considered infidels. Moreover, he claimed, and in minute detail, bin Laden protests too by having accepted Islam but having also failed much: he reveals that he has not, in fact, set to observe key precepts of the religion, they aside the internal war among the believers. had in effect committed apostasy and thereby Moreover, he also reveals that the ideological written their own death sentences. In general, basis for that internal war has not changed. The Islam prohibits fighting fellow Muslims and members of the Saudi elite, like Sadat, have strongly restricts the right to rebel against the committed apostasy. Like the Hypocrites of ruler; Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrines, therefore, were Medina, they serve the forces of irreligion in crucial in the development of a modern Sunni order to harm the devotees of the Prophet and Islamic revolutionary theory. his message: Egyptian Islamic Jihad views leaders such as Sadat as apostates. Although they may out- You know more than anybody else about the size, wardly display signs of piety, they do not actu- intention, and the danger of the presence of the ally have Islam in their hearts, as their failure U.S. military bases in the area. The [Saudi] regime to enforce the shari‘a proves. This non-Islamic betrayed the umma and joined the infidels, assist- behavior demonstrates that such leaders actually ing them . . . against the Muslims. It is well serve the secular West, precisely as an earlier known that this is one of the ten “voiders” of generation of outwardly Muslim rulers had Islam, deeds of de-Islamization. By opening the served the Mongols, and as the Hypocrites had Arabian Peninsula to the crusaders, the regime served idolatry. Islamic Jihad explained itself disobeyed and acted against what has been back in the mid-1980s in a long, lucid statement enjoined by the messenger of God. Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 79

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Osama bin Laden undoubtedly believes that turning the umma into the only legitimate Americans are Crusader-Zionists, that they political community, radical Salafis have pre- threaten his people even more than did the cious little to offer in response to the mundane Mongols—in short, that they are the enemies of problems that people and governments face God Himself. But he also sees them as obstacles in the modern world. Extremist Islam is pro- to his plans for his native land. The “Declaration foundly effective in mounting a protest move- of War” provides yet more testimony to the old ment: it can produce a cadre of activists whose saw that ultimately all politics is local. devotion to the cause knows no bounds, it can galvanize people to fight against oppression. But it has serious difficulties when it comes to THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM producing institutions and programs that can command the attention of diverse groups in If the attacks on the United States represented a society over the long haul. Its success relies change in radical Salafi tactics, then one must mainly on the support of true believers, but wonder what prompted bin Laden and Zawahiri they tend to fragment in disputes over doctrine, to make that change. The answer is that the leadership, and agenda. attacks were a response to the failure of extrem- The limitations of extremist Salafi political ist movements in the Muslim world in recent theory and its divisive tendencies come to light years, which have generally proved incapable clearly if one compares the goals of al Qaeda of taking power (Sudan and Afghanistan being with those of the Palestinian terrorist group the major exceptions). In the last two decades, Hamas, whose suicide bombers have also been several violent groups have challenged regimes in the headlines recently. The ideology of Hamas such as those in Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, but also evolved out of the Egyptian extremist in every case the government has managed to Salafiyya milieu, and it shares with al Qaeda a crush, co-opt, or marginalize the radicals. In the paranoid view of the world: the umma and true words of the “Declaration of War,” Islam are threatened with extinction by the spread of Western secularism, the policies of the the Zionist-Crusader alliance moves quickly to Crusading West, and oppression by the Zionists. contain and abort any “corrective movement” Both Hamas and al Qaeda believe that the appearing in Islamic countries. Different means faithful must obliterate Israel. But looking more and methods are used to achieve their target. closely at Hamas and its agenda, one can see Sometimes officials from the Ministry of the that it parts company with al Qaeda in many Interior, who are also graduates of the colleges of significant ways. This is because Hamas oper- the shari‘a, are [unleashed] to mislead and con- ates in the midst of nationalistic Palestinians, a fuse the nation and the umma . . . and to circulate majority of whom fervently desire, among other false information about the movement, wasting things, an end to the Israeli occupation and the the energy of the nation in discussing minor issues establishment of a Palestinian state in part of and ignoring the main one that is the unification of historic Palestine. people under the divine law of Allah. The nationalist outlook of Hamas’ public presents the organization with a number of Given that in Egypt, Algeria, and elsewhere thorny problems. Nationalism, according to the regimes have resorted to extreme violence to extremist Salafiyya, constitutes shirk—that is, protect themselves, it is striking that bin Laden polytheism or idolatry. If politics and religion emphasizes here not the brutality but rather the are not distinct categories, as extremist Salafis counterpropaganda designed to divide and rule. argue, then political life must be centered around Consciously or not, he has put his finger on a God and God’s law. Sovereignty belongs not to serious problem for the extremist Salafis: the the nation but to God alone, and the only legiti- limitations of their political and economic mate political community is the umma. Pride in theories. one’s ethnic group is tolerable only so long as it Apart from insisting on the implementation does not divide the community of believers, of the shari‘a, demanding social justice, and who form an indivisible unit thanks to the Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 80

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sovereignty of the shari‘a. One day, extremist Do a number of intelligent and educated Salafis believe, political boundaries will be people actually believe this? Yes, because they erased and all Muslims will live in one polity must; their self-understanding hinges on it. devoted to God’s will. At the moment, however, Since their political struggle must be for the the priority is not to erase boundaries but to greater good of the umma and of Islam as a raise up the shari‘a and abolish secular law. whole, their enemy must be much more than Nationalism is idolatry because it divides the just one part of the Jewish people with designs umma and replaces a shari‘a-centered con- on one sliver of Muslim territory. The enemy sciousness with ethnic pride. must be the embodiment of an evil that tran- If Hamas were actually to denounce secular scends time and place. Palestinian nationalists as apostates, however, it Although the sanctity of Jerusalem works in would immediately consign itself to political Hamas’ favor, in Islam Jerusalem does not irrelevance. To skirt this problem, the organiza- enjoy the status of Mecca and Medina and is tion has developed an elaborate view of Islamic only a city, not an entire country. To reconcile history that in effect elevates the Palestinian its political and religious concerns, therefore, national struggle to a position of paramount Hamas must inflate the significance of Pales- importance for the umma as a whole. This tine in Islamic history: “The present Zionist allows Hamas activists to function in the day-to- onslaught,” the covenant says, “has also been day political world as fellow travelers with the preceded by Crusading raids from the West and nationalists. Thus one of the fascinating aspects other Tatar [Mongol] raids from the East.” The of Palestinian extremist Salafiyya is a dog that references here are to Saladin, the Muslim hasn’t barked: in contrast to its sibling move- leader who defeated the Crusaders in Palestine ments in neighboring countries, Hamas has at the battle of Hattin in 1187, and to the refrained from labeling the secular leaders in the Muslim armies that defeated the Mongols at Palestinian Authority as apostates. Even at the another Palestinian site called Ayn Jalut in height of Yasir Arafat’s crackdown against 1260. On this basis Hamas argues that Palestine Hamas, the movement never openly branded has always been the bulwark against the ene- him as an idolater. mies of Islam; the umma, therefore, must rally Like al Qaeda, Hamas argues that a conspir- behind the Palestinians to destroy Israel, which acy between Zionism and the West has dedi- represents the third massive onslaught against cated itself to destroying Islam, but for obvious the true religion since the death of the Prophet. reasons it magnifies the role of Zionism in the Despite the similarities in their perspectives, alliance. The Hamas Covenant, for example, therefore, al Qaeda and Hamas have quite dif- sees Zionism as, among other things, a force ferent agendas. Al Qaeda justifies its political determining many of the greatest historical goals on the basis of the holiness of Mecca and developments of the modern period: Medina and on the claim that the presence of U.S. forces in Arabia constitutes the greatest [Zionists] were behind the French Revolution, the aggression that the Muslims have ever endured. communist revolution. . . . They were behind World Hamas sees its own struggle against Israel as the War I, when they were able to destroy the Islamic first duty of the umma. The two organizations caliphate [i.e., the Ottoman Empire]....They undoubtedly share enough in common to facili- obtained the Balfour Declaration [favoring estab- tate political cooperation on many issues, but at lishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine], [and] some point their agendas diverge radically, a formed the League of Nations, through which divergence that stems from the different priori- they could rule the world. They were behind World ties inherent in their respective Saudi and War II, through which they made huge financial Palestinian backgrounds. gains by trading in armaments, and paved the way The differences between al Qaeda and for the establishment of their state. It was they Hamas demonstrate how local conditions can who instigated the replacement of the League of mold the universal components of Salafi con- Nations with the United Nations and the Security sciousness into distinct world views. They Council. . . . There is no war going on anywhere, display the creativity of radical Islamists in without [them] having their finger in it. addressing a practical problem similar to that Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 81

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faced by communists in the early twentieth regimes (such as Mubarak’s Egypt) have cut a century: how to build a universal political deal with the extremists: in return for an end movement that can nevertheless function effec- to assassinations, the regime acquiesces in some tively at the local level. This explains why, of the demands regarding implementation of when one looks at the political map of the the shari‘a. In addition, it permits the extremist extremist Salafiyya, one finds a large number of groups to run networks of social welfare organi- organizations all of which insist that they stand zations that often deliver services more effi- for the same principles. They do, in fact, all ciently than does a state sector riddled with insist on the implementation of the shari‘a, but corruption and marred by decay. This powerful the specific social and political forces fueling cultural presence of the Salafis across the that insistence differ greatly from place to place. Islamic world means not only that their direct They all march to the beat of God’s drummer, ranks have grown but also that their symbolism but the marchers tend to wander off in different is more familiar than ever among a wider public. directions. But the attack on America also resonates The new tactic of targeting America is deeply among secular groups in many countries. designed to overcome precisely this weakness The immediate response in the secular Arab of political Islam. Bin Laden succeeded in press, for example, fell broadly into three cate- attacking Hubal, the universal enemy: he identi- gories. A minority denounced the attacks force- fied the only target that all of the Salafiyya sub- fully and unconditionally, another minority movements around the world can claim equally attributed them to the Israelis or to American as their own, thereby reflecting and reinforcing extremists like Timothy McVeigh, and a signifi- the collective belief that the umma actually is cant majority responded with a version of “Yes, the political community. He and his colleagues but”—yes, the terrorist attacks against you were adopted this strategy not from choice but from wrong, but you must understand that your own desperation, a desperation born of the fact that policies in the Middle East have for years sown in recent years the extremist Salafis had been the seeds of this kind of violence. defeated politically almost everywhere in the This rationalization amounts to a political Arab and Muslim world. The new tactic, by tap- protest against the perceived role of the United ping into the deepest emotions of the political States in the Middle East. Arab and Islamic community, smacks of brilliance, and—much commentators, and a number of prominent ana- to America’s chagrin—will undoubtedly give lysts of the Middle East in this country, point in political Islam a renewed burst of energy. particular to U.S. enforcement of the sanctions on Iraq and U.S. support for Israel in its struggle against Palestinian nationalism. Both of these EXPLAINING THE ECHO issues certainly cause outrage, and if the United States were to effect the removal of Israeli set- The decision to target the United States allows tlements from the West Bank and alleviate the al Qaeda to play the role of a radical “Salafi suffering of the Iraqi people, some of that out- International.” It resonates beyond the small rage would certainly subside. But although a community of committed extremists, however, change in those policies would dampen some of reaching not just moderate Salafis but, in addi- bin Laden’s appeal, it would not solve the prob- tion, a broad range of disaffected citizens expe- lem of the broader anger and despair that he riencing poverty, oppression, and powerlessness taps, because the sources of those feelings lie across the Muslim world. This broader reso- beyond the realm of day-to-day diplomacy. nance of what appears to us as such a wild and Indeed, secular political discourse in the hateful message is the dimension of the problem Islamic world in general and the Arab world in that Americans find most difficult to understand. particular bears a striking resemblance to the One reason for the welcoming echo is the Salafi interpretation of international affairs, extent to which Salafi political movements, especially insofar as both speak in terms of while failing to capture state power, have never- Western conspiracies. The secular press does not theless succeeded in capturing much cultural make reference to Crusaders and Mongols but ground in Muslim countries. Many authoritarian rather to a string of “broken promises” dating Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 82

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back to World War I, when the European powers States have sometimes worked to divide the divided up the Ottoman Empire to suit their own Arabs, sometimes to unify them. Mostly they interests. They planted Israel in the midst of the have pursued their own interests, as have all the Middle East, so the analysis goes, in order to other actors involved. Bin Laden is a participant drive a wedge between Arab states, and the in a profoundly serious civil war over Arab United States continues to support Israel for the and Muslim identity in the modern world. The same purpose. Bin Laden played to this senti- United States is also a participant in that war, ment in his October 7 statement when he said, because whether it realizes it or not, its policies affect the fortunes of the various belligerents. What the United States tastes today is a very small But Washington is not a primary actor, because thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of it is an outsider in cultural affairs and has only a years. Our nation has been tasting this humiliation limited ability to define for believers the role of and contempt for more than eighty years. Its sons Islam in public life. are being killed, its blood is being shed, its holy The war between extremist Salafis and the places are being attacked, and it is not being ruled broader populations around them is only the tip according to what God has decreed. of the iceberg. The fight over religion among Muslims is but one of a number of deep and For 80 years—that is, since the destruction of enduring regional struggles that originally had the Ottoman Empire—the Arabs and the nothing to do with the United States and even Muslims have been humiliated. Although they today involve it only indirectly. Nonetheless, do not share bin Laden’s millenarian agenda, U.S. policies can influence the balance of power when secular commentators point to Palestine among the protagonists in these struggles, and Iraq today they do not see just two difficult sometimes to a considerable degree. political problems; they see what they consider Until the Arab and Muslim worlds create the true intentions of the West unmasked. political orders that do not disenfranchise huge Arab commentators often explain, for segments of their own populations, the civil war instance, that Saddam Hussein and Washington will continue and will continue to touch the are actually allies. They ridicule the notion that United States. Washington can play an impor- the United States tried to depose the dictator. tant role in fostering authentic and inclusive After all, it is said, the first Bush administration polities, but ultimately Arabs and Muslims more had the forces in place to remove the Baath generally must learn to live in peace with one Party and had called on the Iraqi populace to another so as to live comfortably with outsiders. rise up against the tyrant. When the people actu- Whether they will do so is anybody’s guess. ally rose, however, the Americans watched It is a stark political fact that in the Arab and from the sidelines as the regime brutally sup- Muslim worlds today economic globalization pressed them. Clearly, therefore, what the and the international balance of power both United States really wanted was to divide and come with an American face, and neither gives rule the Arabs in order to secure easy access much reason for optimism. Osama bin Laden’s to Persian Gulf oil—a task that also involves rhetoric, dividing the world into two camps—the propping up corrupt monarchies in Kuwait and umma versus the United States and puppet Saudi Arabia. Keeping Saddam on a leash was regimes—has a deep resonance because on some the easiest way to ensure that Iran could not levels it conforms, if not to reality, then at least block the project. to its appearances. This is why, for the first time Needless to say, this world view is problem- in modern history, the extremist Salafis have atic. Since World War I, Arab societies have managed to mobilize mass popular opinion. been deeply divided among themselves along This development is troubling, but the ethnic, social, religious, and political lines. United States still has some cards to play. Its Regardless of what the dominant Arab dis- policies, for instance, on both West Bank settle- course regarding broken promises has to say, ments and Iraq, are sorely in need of review— most of these divisions were not created by the but only after bin Laden has been vanquished. West. The European powers and the United These policy changes might help, but the root Griset02.qxd 9/20/02 5:59 PM Page 83

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problem lies deeper. Once al Qaeda has been America’s loss of innocence. To foreigners, annihilated without sparking anti-American rev- this view of Americans as naive bumpkins, a olutions in the Islamic world, the United States band of Forrest Gumps who just arrived in should adopt a set of policies that ensure that town, is difficult to fathom. Whether the MTV significant numbers of Muslims—not Muslim generation knows it or not, the United States has regimes but Muslims—identify their own inter- been deeply involved in other peoples’ civil ests with those of the United States, so that dem- wars for a long time. A generation ago, for agogues like bin Laden cannot aspire to speak in example, we supposedly lost our innocence in the name of the entire umma. In 1991, millions Vietnam. Back then, Adonis, the poet laureate of Iraqis constituted just such a reservoir of of the Arab world, meditated on the ambiva- potential supporters, yet America turned its lence Arabs feel toward America. In the after- back on them. Washington had its reasons, but math of the September 11 attacks, his poem they were not the kind that can be justified in seems prophetic: terms of the American values that we trumpet to the world. Today we are paying a price for that New York, you will find in my land hypocrisy. This is not to say that we caused or . . . the stone of Mecca and the waters of the deserved the attacks of September 11 in any Tigris. way. It is to say, however, that we are to some In spite of all this, extent responsible for the fact that so few in the you pant in Palestine and Hanoi. Arab and Muslim worlds express vocal and East and west you contend with people unequivocal support for our cause, even when whose only history is fire. that cause is often their cause as well. Since the events of September 11, innumerable These tormented people knew us before we articles have appeared in the press discussing were virgins.