ASPJ Africa & Francophonie - 4th Quarter 2009
Stabilization, Peacebuilding, and Sustainability in the Horn of Africa
Stephen F. Burgess
tabilization, peacebuilding, and and conflict on famine, destabilization, sustainability in an unstable and and conflict. It examines efforts, especially famine-prone region like the Horn in Somali pastoral areas of Kenya and of Africa are predicated on a holis- Ethiopia, to mitigate environmental Stic approach that addresses environmen- degradation and conflict as well as extre- tal degradation, conflict, and their inter- mism and terrorism. Thus, a sustainability relationship.1 They posit a set of options and stabilization assessment is used to intended to bring sustainable develop- examine environmental degradation, ment as well as security from conflict and conflict, and their interrelationship and struggles over scarce resources. This what can be done to overcome degrada- approach is especially salient in the Horn tion and conflict. of Africa because the region combines high levels of environmental stress (mani- fested in periodic famine and struggles The Horn of Africa Region over diminishing arable farm and grazing The “core” of the Horn of Africa refers lands) and conflict (interstate wars, civil to the area adjacent to where the “Horn” wars, and communal clashes).2 The juts into the Arabian Sea and Indian region is also one in which environmental Ocean and includes Ethiopia, Somalia, disasters (especially famine) and conflicts Eritrea, and Djibouti. The core features a have been interrelated. cultural clash between “lowland” Islamic This article addresses the problems of pastoralists from Somali, Oromo, and peacebuilding, sustainability, and stabili- other ethnic groups and “upland” Ortho- zation in the Horn of Africa and the inter- dox Christian farmers from Amharic and relationship of environmental degrada- Tigrayan ethnic groups. The struggle tion, instability, and conflict. It assesses between uplanders and lowlanders has the extent to which degradation causes been going on for several hundred years instability and focuses on the spiraling and has centered on control over land effect of natural disaster, degradation, and wealth.3
Dr. Stephen F. Burgess is associate professor of international security at the Air War College and associate director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His areas of expertise include African regional and cultural studies, peace and stability operations, and South Asian security issues; he has conducted field research and published numerous journal articles and book chapters on these subjects. His books are South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction; The UN under Boutros-Boutros Ghali; and Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe.
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Figure 1. Political map of Horn of Africa region. (Borders of the disputed regions of Dar- fur, the Ogaden, Somaliland, and Puntland indicated here are approximate and are included for orientation purposes only. Some overlap exists between the claims of Somaliland and Puntland along their shared border. The inclusion of such labeling does not represent or imply recog- nition by the author or by any agency or department of the US government.)
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The larger Horn refers to countries of the population of the region and who live that have close relations with or are on semiarid land with a lack of water.4 rivals of the core states, especially Sudan All of the states mentioned came and Kenya, and to a lesser extent together to create the Intergovernmen- Uganda. Sudan is especially important tal Authority on Drought and Develop- because of its rivalry for the past century ment (IGADD) in the mid-1980s to deal and a half with Ethiopia. Sudan features with famines, which were afflicting the a core group of Arab-speaking Muslim region.5 In the mid-1990s, the IGADD farmers from the banks of the Nile and became the Intergovernmental Autho- surrounding areas who have managed rity on Development (IGAD) and to control (often with force) vast out- became a peacemaking body, playing a lying sections of the country composed role in the end of conflicts in southern mostly of nomadic pastoralists and some Sudan and Somalia and authorizing the farmers. The struggle between Sudan development of an early warning system to prevent or stop environmental degra- and Ethiopia began with the Mahdi in 6 the late nineteenth century and resu- dation and conflict. med in the 1950s with the independence The Horn is greatly influenced by of Sudan. Ethiopia tended to back Egypt, which has had long, close rela- southern Sudanese rebels who were tions with the region. Egypt’s primary fighting against Sudanese government concern has been guaranteeing the attempts to “Arabize” and “Islamize” free flow of the Nile for national survi- val and ensuring navigation through them. Sudan tended to back Eritrean the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Saudi separatists who were fighting for indepen- Arabia has influence over Sudan and dence and against Ethiopian annexation. Somalia and has exported its version of Kenya fits into the Horn because of its “Wahhabist” Islam to the Horn. Yemen relations with Somalia, Ethiopia, and is just across the strategic strait (the Sudan. Kenya was a British settler colony Bab el-Mandeb) from the Horn and from which the British projected power takes an interest in its affairs. Yemen during the colonial era and attempted to has also been a crossing point for al- control pastoralist areas in the north of Qaeda from the Arabian Peninsula to the country (including Somali pastora- the Horn. lists). Kenya has been a peacemaker in Islamic extremism exists in the Horn the region, especially in Somalia and of Africa and has flowed down from the Sudan. Uganda fits into the Horn because Arabian Peninsula. Osama bin Laden of its relations with Sudan and Kenya and was welcomed to Sudan in the early its pastoralist population (in the northeast) 1990s by Islamist leader Husain al-Turabi who move across borders. In addition, and built al-Qaeda there. In 1996 the the Blue Nile and White Nile both flow Sudanese regime asked bin Laden to through the region. leave. In 1993 Islamic extremists arose The Horn of Africa features pastora- in Somalia in opposition to US, UN, and lists, drylands, and semiarid topography Western intervention. Today extremism (80 percent of the more than five mil- persists among some members of the lion square kilometers). Sixty-two per- Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and foreign cent of land in the Horn of Africa is Islamic fighters have been fighting the occupied by pastoralists, who are 12 percent Ethiopians. However, it is uncertain if
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al-Qaeda has made serious inroads into pastoralism). Before the European colo- Somalia. In Kenya and Tanzania, the nial powers arrived, there were only two discontent of coastal Muslims who have significant states extant—Amharic- been neglected by regimes dominated Shoan Ethiopia and Mahdist Sudan.14 by non-Muslims from the interior led Boundaries drawn and colonies created some to join al-Qaeda and participate in in the late nineteenth century have the 1998 embassy bombings and the remained sources of contention. The colonial legacy is one in which relatively 2002 attacks on an Israeli hotel and air- liner in Mombasa.7 At issue is the degree strong states (e.g., Ethiopia, Sudan, and of al-Qaeda presence today, especially in British settler Kenya) were surrounded Somalia and coastal Kenya and Tanza- by nonstate groupings (mainly pastora- nia. In previously religion-tolerant lists). Indirect colonial rule in Uganda Ethiopia, reports have asserted that both and Sudan meant little integration of Islamic extremism (especially Wahha- ethnic groups, especially pastoralists. The division of Somalis into five colonial ter- bism) and Orthodox Christian funda- mentalism are growing.8 ritories helped to accentuate clan fissures.15 In the Horn of Africa, pastoralists resisted state intervention and controls Stabilization Challenges and State such as boundaries, fencing, and pest Failure in the Horn of Africa eradication programs and did not need states as much as farmers did.16 In gene- State failure in the Horn of Africa has ral, there was little environmental provided considerable material for control or agricultural extension and 9 research and literature. Somalia is the livestock control in the region. Thus, 10 most obvious case. State disintegration there was little positive institutional in Uganda under Idi Amin in the 1970s interaction between pastoralists and sta- and Milton Obote in the early 1980s is tes. Therefore, the tasks of post-inde- 11 also well known. In Sudan, the central pendence state building and regional government has tried to “conquer, Ara- integration were difficult in the vast bize, and Islamize” the South for most of lowland expanses of the Horn.17 half a century, as well as ethnically cleanse In the 1950s and 1960s, Ethiopia Darfur and subdue other outlying annexed Eritrea—which led to war—and regions, instead of seeking to build came into rivalry with newly independent legitimacy—this has constituted state Sudan and Somalia, which set the stage failure in those regions.12 Less obvious for a range of destabilization activities. cases of “partial failure” include Ethio- Ethiopia supported rebels in the southern pia in the Somali Ogaden, Kenya in the Sudan, while Sudan supported the Eri- Somali Northeast, and Uganda in the trean liberation movements. Somalia laid Acholi North (facing the Lord’s Resis- claim to the Ogaden in Ethiopia, which tance Army).13 led to an invasion and war in 1977–78. At the macro level, the Horn of Africa Somalia’s defeat and subsequent Ethio- is a difficult region in which to build and pian subversion contributed to state sustain states. There are widely differing decline, failure, and collapse. These riva- topographies (mountains, savanna, and lries paved the way for state failure, espe- desert) and modes of production (com- cially for Somalia and Sudan, regime mercial and smallholder agriculture and change in Ethiopia, and the indepen-
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Figure 2. Topographical map of Horn of Africa region
dence of Eritrea. After Eritrea became shriveled in Somalia and Sudan in the independent in 1993, it quickly came 1960s and 1980s, leading to state failure. into conflict with its erstwhile ally, the In Kenya under Pres. Daniel Arap Moi Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Demo- (1978–2002), patronage networks shrunk cratic Front (EPRDF) regime in Ethiopia. and ethnic conflict over land intensified, At the intermediate level, all states in bringing warnings of possible state failure.18 the region have suffered problems with In the 1960s Ugandan president Milton institutional viability and state weakness. Obote shut out the predominant Buganda Patronage networks developed and then kingdom from patronage networks and
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removed the Kabaka as head of state, which took northern and southwestern Somali led to Idi Amin’s 1971 military coup and areas and Ethiopia took the western Oga- state disintegration.19 den region.24 The Italians did little to build At the micro level, all states in the colonial administration and infrastructure region have suffered from shocks of from 1900 to 1941, while the British put various sorts—including famine, econo- little into the north (Somaliland) from mic downturns, and revolution—which 1900 to 1961 and the south that it gover- contributed to state failure. The Ethio- ned from 1941 to 1961. pian famines of 1973 and 1984–85 contri- From independence in 1961 until buted to regime changes (the overthrow 1969, small elites struggled to create a of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and successful Somali state but were unable Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991). In the to control contention and political late 1970s, the revolutionary Dergue chaos. They established patronage regime instituted land reform and attemp- networks that drowned in a sea of cor- ted to radically reorganize farming, which ruption. They promised the recovery of disrupted traditional agricultural systems Somali lands in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Dji- and productive capacity.20 The disruption bouti but were unable to bring about the and famine gave impetus to the Eritrean irredentist promise of a larger Somalia. People’s Liberation Front and the The military coup of 1969 and the Siad Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, which Barre dictatorship were reactions to the came to power six years later. The Somalia weakness and corruption of the new Somali famine of 1991–92 was partly the result of state and the civilian elites’ inability to state failure and conflict. The rise of clan bring promises to fruition. The Barre warlords, who used food to empower them- regime made a concerted effort to selves, made the reconstitution of the Soma- strengthen and extend the state’s reach lian state all but impossible.21 (e.g., they attempted to transform pastora- lists into fishers) and build the Somali Stabilization Challenges in Somalia nation. The adoption of “scientific socia- lism” helped to bring Soviet assistance, The case of state failure and collapse in including large amounts of military aid. In Somalia (1990 to the present) is the 1977 and 1978 Somalia used that military most pronounced of any in Africa and aid to invade Ethiopia and take the Ogaden. the world and has been examined tho- Defeat in 1978 dealt a blow to the Barre roughly by a number of scholars.22 At regime from which it never recovered. the macro or structural level, the princi- At the intermediate level of institutional pal problems have been pastoralist clans viability and state weakness, dictator Siad who have long contended for resources, Barre established patron-client relations the colonial misdivision of Somalis, and in the 1970s (with the help of Soviet aid) the resulting irredentism. Pre-colonial with the various clans. However, after the Somalia was characterized by pastoralist defeat in 1978, the switch from Soviet to clans who contended over water holes, American patrons, and economic down- grazing lands, and livestock and who rai- turn in the 1980s, the regime narrowed ded sedentary agriculturalists—poor the range of clan clients until only Barre’s social capital for the building of nation-sta- sub-clan of the Darod clan was benefi- tes.23 In the scramble for Africa, Italy took ting.25 In April 1978 the Somali Salvation southeastern Somali areas, while Britain and Democratic Front launched guerrilla
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operations in southern Somalia with the United States and the UN Operation Ethiopian support. In 1981, the Somali in Somalia (UNOSOM II) tried to gain National Movement launched a campaign agreement on rebuilding the state. The in the north that would lead to the nomi- special representative of the UN secre- nal independence of Somaliland in tary-general and chief of mission, ADM 1991. Repression by the regime’s secu- Jonathan Howe, and his advisors were rity system did not prove effective and determined to take a “bottom up” approach actually backfired, increasing violent to reconstituting the Somalian state. In opposition. Siad Barre refused to nego- March 1993, they negotiated an agree- tiate with the opposition and reacted ment with a range of local leaders to build by narrowing his power base to three local governments, then provincial sub-clans of the Darod clan.26 governments, and then the central state. At the micro level, the United States However, Howe and his colleagues suddenly withdrew aid to the Barre attempted to circumvent the powerful regime in 1988 as the Cold War was warlords after already agreeing in princi- coming to an end. The evaporation of ple to a “top down” power-sharing arran- resources crippled the state and ena- gement among them. The warlords bled the rebels’ advance, which led to rejected the bottom-up approach and regime failure in the course of 1990 and mounted an insurgency that eventually collapse in January 1991. Siad Barre drove the United States and the United continued to refuse to negotiate, even Nations out of Somalia.28 as opposing rebel groups closed in on After US and UN withdrawal, the war- the capital, Mogadishu. lords continued fighting each other in After the collapse, the inability of and around Mogadishu for more than a opposition movements and clans to decade. In contrast, peace prevailed in reach agreement led to the failure of Somaliland (in the north of Somalia), the Somalian state and the rise of the which declared independence in May warlords.27 The failed state and clan war- 1991 and held democratic elections in fare in Somalia immediately had ramifi- 2003. However, Somaliland has failed to cations for environmental sustainability win recognition as a sovereign state. In and the welfare of Somalis. The great 1998, Puntland (in the northeast of Somalia famine of 1991–93 was a direct Somalia) declared autonomy from result of state collapse and the conduct Mogadishu under Pres. Abdullahi Yusuf of the warlords. Warlords seized food Ahmed and has remained relatively from Somali farmers and relief agen- peaceful (though there have been clashes cies and used the proceeds to buy wea- with Somaliland forces over the contes- pons, provide patronage, and grow in ted Sool region). In 2004, Yusuf was elec- strength. With no state, fights over gra- ted by his peers as president of the Tran- zing lands and water holes went unre- sitional Federal Government (TFG) for solved. As clan warfare intensified, there all of Somalia. Elections were held in was no state to step in to resolve dispu- Puntland in January 2005, and Mohamed tes. The interconnectedness of state Muse Hersi was voted president. failure, warfare, and environmental After 1993, peacemaking in Somalia degradation and famine became clear. fell to the IGAD under Kenyan and Dji- Efforts were mounted to reconstitute boutian leadership. In 2004 the TFG and the Somalian state, but all failed. In 1993, Somali Transitional Federal Parliament
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(TFP) were formed and elected President the prospect of Ethiopia holding Moga- Yusuf. Each of Somalia’s four major clans dishu for the TFG and even more so was allocated 61 seats in the parliament, about the Ethiopian army being replaced while an alliance of minority clans recei- by AU peacekeepers or a new Somalian ved 31 seats. The TFP and TFG agreed on army.29 Lt Col Scott Rutherford, US a charter for the reconstitution and gover- defense attaché to Kenya, observed that ning of the Somali state. A split occurred the longer Ethiopia meddles in Somali between President Yusuf’s group (based affairs, the longer it will take the TFG to in the Darod clan) and a Mogadishu- become independent.30 based faction (mainly the Hawiye clan). At the beginning of 2006, the split ended, Stabilization Challenges in Sudan and the TFG moved to Baidoa, Somalia. In early 2006, the Islamic Courts Union Sudan is a state that has failed though it arose as an armed group and by June has never collapsed. Since indepen- defeated the warlords in and around dence in 1956, the government in Khar- Mogadishu. By September the ICU toum has been unable to achieve legiti- controlled much of Somalia outside macy in vast outlying areas of Africa’s Somaliland and Puntland as well as Bai- largest country. Instead, the regime has doa, where the Ethiopian army protected mostly engaged in repression, which has the TFG. In December 2006, the Ethio- devastated the South and other areas. pians launched a counteroffensive and The civil war in the South, 1955–72 and drove the ICU out of Mogadishu and 1983–2005, has contributed to massive other major centers. In February Uganda dislocation of farmers and pastoralists sent 400 troops as an advance contingent and to famines that have killed hun- of 1,600 peacekeepers to Mogadishu as dreds of thousands of people (as well as part of the African Union Mission to livestock). Planted landmines have inhi- Somalia (AMISOM); Nigeria, Ghana, and bited agricultural and pastoral activities Malawi failed to send peacekeepers in many parts of the South. Genocide in because of continuing violence. In March Darfur has brought even greater dislocation the TFG moved to Mogadishu, which was and death in a shorter period of time.31 rocked by violence that drove tens of At the macro level, the slave trade thousands out of the city. Eritrea, in its (especially in the nineteenth century) by feud with Ethiopia, has armed and trai- the Arab North in the African South ned the ICU as part of a coalition dedica- (and other regions) created hegemonic ted to driving the Ethiopian army and the relations that have endured until today.32 TFG out of Somalia. At issue is whether or In the 1880s and 1890s, the Mahdist state not the TFG can survive and the Ethio- fought against nonbelievers in outlying pian army can be replaced by African regions that it claimed. The British inhe- Union (AU) peacekeepers. rited the tensions and minimally mana- Francois Grignon, Africa director of ged Sudan as a “condominium” of Egypt, the International Crisis Group (ICG), with the goal of protecting the Nile and finds that the conflict in Somalia is a the Suez Canal. For much of the period, greater challenge than the conflict in the North and the South were separate the African Great Lakes region (inclu- entities. However, as independence ding the Democratic Republic of the approached in the early 1950s, they were Congo). He has been pessimistic about thrown together by the British. In the
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early 1950s, the northerners’ old hege- pastoralist militias who were already monic tendencies reemerged as they struggling with Darfur farmers over attempted to spread Islam as the religion diminishing land37—to ethnically cleanse and Arabic as the language of instruction Darfur so that various rebel movements in the South.33 would lose their base of support. Also, In the two North-South civil wars, the the janjaweed militias have many merce- rebels were supported at various times naries.38 The result has been a genocide by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and other in which hundreds of thousands have states.34 At the institutional level, the been killed or raped and millions displa- Sudanese government excluded the ced since 2003–04 and in which widespread South and other regions from patro- atrocities have continued ever since. As in nage networks that were established the case of the South, the intervention of under successive dictators and during international peacemakers has been brief electoral democratic interludes in required to put an end to Khartoum’s the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. From abusive behavior.39 1972 to 1983, peace prevailed—the only Francois Grignon finds that the CPA period in which Sudan emerged from between North and South Sudan is in state failure. In the late 1970s and early danger. Darfur is a dramatic humanita- 1980s, growing indebtedness led to state rian catastrophe, but it is really a smokes- decline.35 During the 1980s, a series of creen for the real power struggle economic shocks and the resumption of between North and South. However, if the North-South civil war in 1983 led Khartoum loses Darfur, it stands a good Sudan to sink back into state failure. In chance of losing the South.40 Solomon 1989, Gen Omar al-Bashir staged a mili- Gomes of the AU Peace and Security tary coup, which deepened state failure. Commission finds that the Northern The Islamist military regime intensified Sudanese are “playing for time” and its war against the South, with help from that the AU and international community growing oil revenues in the late 1990s, must be wary of Khartoum-sponsored but was unable to defeat the Sudanese militia groups in southern Sudan and People’s Liberation Movement and must be prepared for the secession of army. The impasse and intervention by the South followed by a resumption of international peacemakers in the early hostilities by Khartoum. If the South 2000s led to the negotiation of the Com- secedes, Darfur will seek the same prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), route.41 Gomes notes that Khartoum which went into effect in July 2005 and accepted aspects of the Darfur Peace which promises a referendum for the Agreement and now the hybrid UN/AU South in July 2011 to decide whether to force. However, the problem now is per- become independent or remain part of suading the government and the fractious Sudan. The future of North-South rela- Darfur rebel movements to meet and dis- tions remains uncertain.36 cuss. In the meantime, the violence and The same symptoms of state failure humanitarian catastrophe continue. that the Khartoum regime had exhibited In regard to stabilizing Somalia and towards the South could be observed in Sudan, Gomes observes that the Peace its relations with Darfur and other out- and Security Commission (as the “loco- lying regions. In 2003 and 2004, the motive” for action) has the responsibility government dispatched the janjaweed— to inform the Peace and Security Council
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and the entire AU membership regarding especially since the 1998–2000 war with the “pulse” in conflict zones. However, Eritrea. The lack of autonomy helps to the commission is understaffed and limi- explain the revived insurgencies of the ted in taking action. It provides reports, Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) for example, from Sudan and Chad but and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). cannot take action. Another problem is a Basic government distrust of Oromos and lack of authority; for example, the AU Ogaden Somali pastoralists continues in has called on all rebel movements to spite of ongoing projects for the lowlands leave Chadian territory but has been and pastoralists by government and inter- unable to enforce its request. Gomes national development agencies and non- believes that the AU should leverage sup- governmental organizations (NGO). port for Chad’s interests from France Meanwhile, the number of people and and the European Union (EU). The livestock continues to grow, as do sustaina- diplomatic track on the Chad-Sudan bility and stabilization challenges.45 conflict has been slow to materialize and The ONLF and OLF continue to ope- has only come to fruition lately through rate against the government and its for- French leadership.42 ces. The killing of nine Chinese oil wor- kers and 65 Ethiopians by the ONLF Stabilization Challenges in Ethiopia’s showed a level of sophistication that Ogaden Region points to Eritrean involvement.46 The Since annexing the Ogaden in the late escalation of hostilities in the Ogaden 1800s, the Ethiopian state has traditionally has created a humanitarian crisis in failed to reach out to pastoralists in the which pastoralists are finding it increasin- 47 Somali Ogaden region and to other pas- gly difficult to survive. The massacre of toralists, including Oromo and Borana oil workers has led Ethiopia to increase herders.43 The problem of weakness and its military operations, made aid pro- failure has been based upon the bias of grams difficult to sustain, and caused the Ethiopian state in favor of highland problems for government officials and Ethiopian Orthodox farmers versus international aid agencies. The Interna- lowland Islamic pastoralists. Also, Ethio- tional Committee of the Red Cross has pian suspicions about the loyalties of Oga- been experiencing trouble, and the United den Somalis rose in the 1960s, reached a Nations Development Program (UNDP) crescendo during the 1977–78 Ogaden has been considering pulling out of the war, and have persisted ever since. Ogaden, even though the humanitarian 48 In 1991, the Tigrayan-dominated Ethio- situation has deteriorated rapidly. pian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front regime took power and instituted a Stabilization Challenges in Pastoral Areas of Kenya and Uganda system of ethnic federalism that promised autonomy and self-rule to the Ogaden Kenya has had particular problems rela- Somalis, Oromos, and others.44 If properly ting to Somali pastoralists in eastern instituted, ethnic federalism would have Kenya. In the 1960s, Somalis fought enabled the various ethnic pastoralist against incorporation into Kenya and groups to look after their own develop- were regarded as either nationalist seces- ment needs. However, the EPRDF regime sionist guerrillas (by Somalis) or merely has kept a tight rein on the federal regions, bandits (by the government). In the
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colonial era, the British did not incorpo- global war on terrorism (GWOT) has rate Somalis living in Kenya into the pre- further marginalized them.52 vailing order. At independence, the Bri- tish reversed previous colonial policy Stabilization Challenge: The Ethiopia-Eritrea and decided to force unity among dispa- Confrontation rate ethnic groups (including Somalis) A fundamental problem for the EPRDF in Kenya. In 1961 the establishment of regime is the fact that it is based on the the Republic of Somalia inspired Somali Tigrayan ethnic group, which is less than political leaders in Kenya to rally for 10 percent of the population.53 In the secession from Kenya and incorporation May 2005 elections, the regime was sur- into Somalia. Subsequently, the Soma- prised by the strength of the opposition lian government supported the Shifta and, according to EU observers, rigged (“the lawless”). Eventually, the Shifta the results.54 The confrontation with Eri- depended too much on Somalia and lost trea is another problem for the EPRDF its internal drive for self-determination.49 regime, and thousands of Ethiopian The Shifta war has colored Kenya’s rela- troops remain in the vicinity of the fron- tionship with pastoralists from the 1960s tier. The war ended in 2000, and the onwards and helps to explain (along Boundary Commission’s decision was with a number of other factors) state rendered in 2002. However, Ethiopia has failure to deal with growing populations refused to accept the awarding of the vil- and development problems that have lage of Badme and contested territory to threatened the way of life and ecosystems Eritrea, which threatens a resumption of in much of the north of the country.50 hostilities if resolution is not achieved.55 The same hostility applies in Uganda’s Eritrea is playing a destabilizing role in National Resistance Movement regime’s the Horn of Africa, supporting the Isla- relations with the Acholi and pastoralists mic Courts Union and other movements in the north of the country, due partly to that oppose the Transitional Federal the two-decade-long struggle with the Government and the Ethiopian presence. Lord’s Resistance Army.51 Ethiopia has thousands of troops tied A fundamental problem for both down in Somalia trying to protect the Kenya and Uganda is that the regimes TFG. Eritrea has moved thousands of are based around ethnic groups engaged militias and troops into the demilitarized in farming in the south of their respec- zone bordering Ethiopia, thereby tive countries that have trouble relating increasing the chances of an incident with other groups, especially pastoralists. escalating into another all-out war. In Lt Col Scott Rutherford, US defense regard to Sudan, Ethiopia has become attaché to Kenya, notes that the Muslim very dependent on Sudanese oil and will population there has been marginalized be cautious in relations with Khartoum.56 by the government. For example, the The conflict between Ethiopia and Swahili population along the coast has a Eritrea remains the major stumbling special passport, which is a mark of block in the stabilization of the Horn of government distrust. The vast majority Africa according to Grignon of the ICG.57 of Muslims are not extremists but have Solomon Gomes of the AU Peace and felt oppressed by the Kenyan govern- Security Commission asserts that the AU ment. US-Kenyan cooperation in the views Ethiopia-Eritrea as the most serious
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crisis that it currently faces.58 The animo- dents are not responding. The local sity between the Eritrean president and population is not turning extremists over the Ethiopian prime minister is a major to Kenyan government authorities or to obstacle to peace and impacts the whole US personnel. Islamists are thriving on region. The Eritrean president is isolated, the protection of the local population. which renders peacemaking difficult. They are securing funds and can travel Gomes observes that in attempting to freely between Kenya, Somalia, Yemen, stabilize the Ethiopia-Eritrea standoff, and the Gulf states (e.g., Oman). The the commission and the AU Peace and security situation in Kenya is no better Security Council have not done enough. than at the time of the 1998 embassy The AU heads of state have tried quiet bombings, in spite of the East Africa diplomacy, without success. The Alge- Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI). rians mediated from 1998 to 2000 but The Pakistani population in Nairobi is cannot be called on again. Libya’s beha- also a source of concern. In the ranks of vior has been erratic in attempting to the irredentist Somali movements (e.g., mediate. South African president Thabo the ICU and the ONLF) are radical Isla- Mbeki and Ghanaian president and cur- mists trying to defeat Ethiopia and esta- rent AU chairman, John Kuofour, have blish an Islamist state. Eritrea is backing tried to mediate without success. At the the Islamists against Ethiopia. However, moment, the IGAD is an organization in Eritrea would not try to stage an Islamist name only due to politics, and Eritrea’s attack on the CJTF-HOA in Djibouti like withdrawal from the body has undermined the attack on Chinese and Ethiopian oil its credibility. Pres. in the Horn of Africa workers in the Ogaden.60 Mwai Kibaki of Kenya is not well enough The situation in Nairobi and Mombasa to mediate. Tanzania and the United is better than in 2006, when there was a States should both do more. The United stream of reported threats. Nine years States signed the Algiers Agreement in since the embassy bombings, the region 2000 as a guarantor and is obliged to do is as volatile as ever. Zanzibar remains a more. At the moment, the United States problem. Kenya has not made much is too focused on Somalia and the war headway—the border is porous, and nor- on terrorism. The United Nations Mis- thern and coastal Kenya are largely igno- sion in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) red by the central government. The bor- forces have been reduced, while Ethio- der is closed in the northeast; it is difficult pia and Eritrea have lots of forces near to handle Somali refugees, and there is the temporary zone and Eritrea has sent little international pressure on Kenya to militias into the zone.59 do something about them. There are no terrorism laws on the books in Kenya yet Radical Islamist Stabilization Challenges because of the December 2007 elections.61 Radical Islamists are said to be hiding and operating on the Kenyan coast and in Peacebuilding-Sustainability- Somalia. Combined Joint Task Force Stabilization Challenges Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) civil affairs personnel are conducting projects on Taken together, peacebuilding, sustai- the Kenyan coast to try to win hearts and nability, and stabilization manifested in minds and assuage fears, but Islamic resi- the interrelationship between war and
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famine have been devastating in the Horn is plenty of conflict over land and resour- of Africa. Already noted was the close rela- ces and strong and continuing ethnic tionship between famine, conflict, and tensions. In the area where Somalis and the undermining of regime legitimacy in Oromos border each other, there is lots Ethiopia in 1973–74 and 1984–85 as well of conflict and fighting.66 as in Somalia in 1991–93. Drought and Some disaffected Somali pastoralists dependence on foreign aid, along with in Ethiopia have supported continued corruption, undermine sustainability and destabilization of the Ogaden by the legitimacy. Global warming is affecting ONLF against Ethiopian security forces. the region, but direct evidence of war- The sustainability and stabilization crises ming causing conflict is difficult to in the Ogaden could open the door to confirm. For example, a study of the Tur- safe havens for Islamic extremists and kana in northern Kenya did not find a could conceivably generate recruits. The direct link.62 same could be said of some Oromo pas- Among pastoralists, sources of conflict toralists and support for the OLF. include scarce resources such as water Conflict appears to be decreasing in holes and grazing lands, particularly northeastern Kenya, but structural during times of extreme hardship.63 problems remain. With good rains, Desertification (caused in part by climate there is less conflict over natural change) has contributed to conflict resources. There have been drought and among pastoralists. There is conflict famine over the past two years.67 Drought between neighboring ethnic groups in has caused a recent spike in pastoralist pastoral areas that often crosses borders, unrest. Pastoralists have restocked their mainly because of cattle raiding.64 Pre- livestock after drought by raiding other vious analysis has discussed the under- livestock from farming areas to the south. lying reasons for conflict, including a Somali pastoralists in Kenya identify lack of infrastructure to support pastoral more with Somalia than with their livelihood.65 In addition, promoting country of residence.68 Historical neglect sedentary agriculture can cause alienation at the pastoral level compounded by lack among pastoralists who are being forced of understanding by elites leads to conflict. to give up a generations-old lifestyle. Land titling is unpopular with pastoralists In regard to pastoralists and sustainabi- and has led to a groundswell of political lity and stability, their level of support for dissent. In the meantime, irrevocable Islamic extremism/terrorism is open to damage has already been done.69 question. In Somalia (and to a lesser In Moyale, on the Kenya-Ethiopia bor- extent Sudan), it could be said that sustai- der, local politicians are being divisive and nability and stabilization challenges have have helped to create new political divi- created dissatisfaction among Muslim sions among pastoralists along ethnic lines. populations and have opened the door Previously, several generations had lived to at least tolerating Islamic extremism/ peacefully together and intermarried.70 terrorism even if not supporting it. Coastal populations have been discri- In Ethiopia, desertification and decli- minated against by the central govern- ning grazing lands have led to impoveris- ment. The problem goes well beyond hment of Somali and Oromo pastoralists, environmental sustainability. Political disaffection, and declining legitimacy of factors alienate the population. This is a the state. In areas with large clans, there region with a rapidly growing popula-
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tion maintaining the same practices. In stabilizing the Horn of Africa at the Therefore, the people will become macro or structural level, the Horn is the increasingly alienated, and it is uncer- only region in Africa where the structural tain what will they do. As for al-Qaeda, it solution of secession (i.e., Eritrea, is a mystery not well understood, espe- southern Sudan, Darfur, and Somali- cially in East Africa.71 land) seems to be a realistic option that In Sudan, population displacement, could make matters more peaceful rather lack of governance, conflict-related than increasing bloodshed (e.g., Nige- resource exploitation, and underinvest- ria). The question is: Should secession ment in sustainable development, all be allowed to run its natural course? Or, produce sustainability and stabilization should the international community challenges. There are five million inter- encourage compromise solutions (e.g., nally displaced persons (IDP) and inter- federalism or confederation)? Thus far, national refugees (Sudan has the largest secession has only been allowed in the population of IDPs).72 Competition over case of Eritrea, where the Eritrean Peo- oil and gas reserves, the Nile River waters, ple’s Liberation Front won military vic- and timber, as well as land use issues rela- tory and where a friendly (at that time) ted to agricultural lands, are factors in Ethiopian government agreed. the instigation and perpetuation of At the intermediate level, building state conflict in Sudan. Confrontations over capacity and institutional viability remains range lands and rain-fed agricultural an ongoing process in Ethiopia, Kenya, lands in the drier parts of the country and Uganda, involving international aid demonstrate the connection between agencies and NGOs. The three states have natural resource scarcity and conflict. In a long way to go before they can provide northern Darfur, high population services to all of their people. In Somalia growth, environmental stress, land degra- and Sudan, the issue is one of reconsti- dation, and desertification have created tuting the state through either peace- the conditions for conflicts, which have building or neotrusteeship. Thus far it been sustained by political, tribal, or eth- seems that neotrusteeship is too costly for nic differences. This is an example of the the international community and will be social breakdown that can result from perceived as neocolonial in Africa. Thus, ecological collapse.73 a gamble will be made on lower-cost pea- cekeeping and peacebuilding. In regard to managing micro-level chal- Stabilizing and Peacebuilding lenges (short-term shocks), the IGAD in the Horn of Africa (Intergovernmental Authority on Develo- pment) has developed policies for sustai- In overcoming state failure and stabili- nability, food security, conflict resolution zing the Horn of Africa, the approach mechanisms, and an early warning system must be sophisticated—managing macro, that is intended to ameliorate the impact intermediate, and micro levels and for- of state weakness and failure and environ- ging a range of partnerships from the mental disaster.74 However, the IGAD United Nations to African regional orga- early warning and prevention capabilities nizations and from states in the region to are only in their initial stages. Problems NGOs and to the United States and the with the IGAD early warning system European Union. include the fact that three key countries
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(Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia) are not the European Union. A Marshall Plan for involved and the system remains focused Africa is needed to overcome this deplo- on low-level pastoral conflicts in northern rable situation.78 Uganda and northern Kenya. Further- According to Marcel LeRoy of the EU, more, measures for resolving conflicts the EU provided €243 million in support to over resources in Uganda and Kenya have the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) not been implemented.75 in Darfur from 2004 to 2007. The AU The Golden Spear Disaster Manage- deployed AMIS with hope and heart, not ment Center provides early warning to 11 with plan. The EU cannot withdraw sup- African states. Regional organizations port, which would lead to the collapse of and governments need to have the politi- AMIS and massive looting. The switch to a cal will to act and fund early warning and hybrid AU/UN Darfur mission may help, prevention.76 but there will still be problems. The EU is more reluctant to fund AMISOM in Soma- Standby Capability lia and the AU Peace and Security Commis- 79 Member states of the IGAD and the East sion because of the AMIS experience. African Community (EAC) are building Stabilizing Somalia and Peacebuilding the East African Brigade of the African Standby Force (ASF) to intervene to stop Top-down and bottom-up approaches to state failure and its consequences. overcoming state failure have been However, the “Eastbrig” has fallen behind implemented in Somalia. Since 1993, its western and southern counterparts one bottom-up approach has NGOs wor- because Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda king with Somali groups and civil society.80 have been slow to cooperate and imple- A second bottom-up approach was under- ment prior agreements. In fact, the taken by the “Islamic Courts.” Islamism Southern African Development Commu- arose in the 1990s and was manifested in nity (SADC) brigade of the ASF, led by the Islamic courts that were founded to South Africa, has already deployed to administer sharia law and justice in an Darfur ahead of the Eastbrig. In any event, anarchic environment. They formed the the UN will play the lead role in Southern Islamic Courts Union, defeated the war- Sudan and appears to be assuming lea- lords in May 2006, and established control dership in Darfur.77 of Mogadishu and large swaths of southern The ASF’s biggest problems are logis- Somalia until being defeated by Ethiopian tics and sustainability within the AU fra- forces backing the Transitional Federal mework. Within the African Union, there Government in December 2006.81 is little vision regarding where the ASF is Another approach has been multila- headed. For example, the military plan- teral and top down, with the IGAD, led ning cell has drafted terms of reference by Kenya, bringing various Somali elites for its missions, but AU administrators do together to establish the TFG and then not seem to know that the planning cell sending them back to Somalia to assume exists. Thus, a sustainable ASF remains a control with Ethiopian assistance.82 It is dream. African states contribute less than uncertain whether this approach will suc- one percent of their defense budgets to ceed or if bottom-up approaches will pay fund the ASF and support staff. Most sup- dividends. It is also uncertain whether port comes from the United States and Somaliland will ever become part of
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Somalia again or if it will become inde- and clinics are the answer to the cross- pendent, as appears to be the prevailing border dilemma. Somalis and other pas- sentiment. Reconciliation talks between toralists live for movement. Therefore, the TFG and the Islamic Courts were held regional integration is very important. twice in 2007, but no progress was made. An IGAD framework has been set up to The problem of Ethiopian troops as a enable the informal sector to benefit “lightning rod” in Somalia remains. from regional integration, especially pas- According to Solomon Gomes of the toralists, and to make a contribution to AU Peace and Security Commission, environmental sustainability. Somalia is high on the AU list of coun- The TFG is not the permanent solu- tries to stabilize. The AU did not want to tion for Somalia. The reconstruction of go into Somalia until the UN Security Somalia is an ongoing process in line Council guaranteed logistics. However, with the tasks given by the 2004 charter. Uganda jumped into Somalia, while Reconciliation talks between the TFG Ghana, Nigeria, and Malawi did not. If and the ICU must be used as a spring- four countries had sent four battalions, it board to the next stage. The internatio- would have sent a visible message, but nal community must push for a settle- the situation on the ground makes it dif- ment in Somalia and needs to bring ficult for the Ugandans to sustain peace- other countries and organizations into keeping operations. In the peace process, the process.85 a “carrot and stick” approach is needed, Interpeace is continuing to conduct and the ICU must be made stakeholders.83 extensive public consultations, workshops, Peacebuilding in Puntland, Somaliland, forums, and stakeholder dialogue on and Somalia requires a longtime horizon. issues essential to peace-building and state Shifting political, military, and social dyna- reconstruction. As there was no central mics demands up-to-date knowledge and government, it adopted a regional understanding of the situation on the approach—setting up projects in Punt- ground to facilitate peacekeeping. Institu- land (Garowe), Somaliland (Hargeysa), tions that the NGO Interpeace helped and south-central Somalia (Mogadishu). build in Puntland and Somaliland have In Somalia, the Center for Research and helped keep peacebuilding going. Ingre- Dialogue, with the help of the traditional dients for success include bringing stake- elders, has sucessfully facilitated a number holders together, creating institutional of reconcilitation processes among major dynamics, and providing technical assis- clans in the region. Work is being carried tance and support. Pastoralists must be out on the ground by three nonpartisan made part of the stakeholder process. partner organizations that promote peace For example, nomads were consulted and reconciliation in Somalia. After before the date was set for the recent months of reconciliation and power sha- Somaliland elections.84 ring among clans, people of the Bakool An early warning system has been esta- region went to the polls to vote for local blished all over Somalia consisting of and regional authorities, including the partnerships with organizations that have governor, district commissioners, and contacts and offices throughout the regional and district councilors. The country. Since Somali nomads are found region became the second area in Somalia all over Somalia and in parts of Ethiopia to elect its officials through a community- and Kenya, mobile education systems based, participatory process.
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According to Francois Grignon of the Ghana decided that the situation was too ICG, reconciliation negotiations must volatile and is not sending a force. The open the door to legitimate claims by clan Burundians are sending more than 1,000 representatives. A third-party facilitator is troops, but they need to be trained and needed to negotiate between the TFG and equipped. In regard to building the capa- the ICU. Trade control is a factor in the city of the AU Peace and Security Commis- negotiations. A disarmament process has sion to do military planning, there are to be included in negotiations. Since fear 1,000 positions, only 500 personnel, and is entrenched in Mogadishu, confidence- 350 quality people. With AMIS and AMI- building measures need to be agreed 86 SOM plus operations planned for the upon and implemented. Comoros, Chad, and the Central African In Somalia, Islamic activists have taken Republic, the AU has its hands full. The advantage of the absence of a central AU has no expertise in large-scale peace- government and ascendancy of the ICU. support operations. The EU wants to have For now, a possible Islamist onslaught has a voice but is not giving sufficient funds. been pushed into the background. A num- 88 ber of things are needed to prevent people The AU has a lack of fiscal capacity. from joining Islamist movements. There In Somali areas, the various streams of should be no guarantee that the lifestyles Islam and Islamist movements are affec- of protagonists will be maintained if and ting the entire Horn. What happens in when peace comes. The Islamists will be Somalia provides opportunities for Isla- victims of peace and will continue to act as mism to emerge in different forms and spoilers. At the moment, Djibouti is playing spread. In Somalia, the sources of Isla- the mediator role. It is difficult to see if mism include Wahhabi extremism due to Somalia’s problems can be overcome. Saudi funding. Wahhabists have been There is a need for the international com- taking students to Saudi Arabia and Yemen munity to strike a fair balance to help stabi- in the last 15 years. In dealing with Isla- lize Somalia. Reconstitution of the state is mism, there must be a recognition that crucial, as is political will. Then the United Islamism is not going to stop. Thus, a States and others can come into support, long-term approach must be taken. The playing a facilitative role.87 moderate voice within Islam must be It appears that the US Department of enhanced, for example, with investment State is providing support for the TFG in moderate madrassas.89 government because US policy makers do not want to be involved in Somalia again. Stabilizing Sudan With no presidential directive, there has been no US action. Western partners are The future of Sudan remains just as uncer- waiting for the United States to act. Somali tain as that of Somalia. Whereas it seems reaction to Ethiopian intervention has difficult if not impossible to reconstitute been strong and negative. Intervention in the Somali state, the problem with Sudan Somalia is costing Ethiopia politically and is the concentration of power in Khartoum. economically. Ugandans want their peace- As the oil boom continues, Khartoum will keeping force to be Africanized and brought continue to reap the lion’s share of the under the UN umbrella so that resources benefits, will grow in power, and will can start to flow their way. Nigeria failed to become increasingly capable of preventing send a force because of internal problems. the South and Darfur from seceding.
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Popular opinion in the South and nal security architecture would help in Darfur indicate that the optimal approach Sudan and Somalia. The IGAD supported would be to allow the South to secede in negotiations in Sudan and Somalia, but it 2011 and provide the same option for needs to be strengthened to promote dia- Darfur. The two regions have been bruta- logue in the region. There is no good lized by Khartoum, and it is hard to visua- alternative to a regional peace process lize their remaining part of even a confe- because of the connectivity of conflicts.94 deration. The problem is that Khartoum will not allow secession without a strug- Stabilizing Ethiopia vs. Eritrea gle. As for the rest of Sudan, federal Resolving the Ethiopia-Eritrea confronta- arrangements would be most suitable, tion is a daunting task, especially now that but it is difficult to see how Khartoum the two countries are fighting in Soma- could be persuaded to accept constitu- 95 tional changes.90 lia. Even if the border issue is settled, According to Gomes, peacebuilding the confrontation will not end because efforts are ongoing in southern Sudan. the pride of national leaders and their First, there is a need to disarm all militia survival is the main issue, not borders. groups in the South. Second, the interna- Pres. Issaias Afwerki had exaggerated tional community must take seriously the expectations that Eritrea would be the possibility of the South seceding.91 Singapore or Malaysia of the Horn of International actors need to think Africa and would become a dominant ahead to the 2011 Sudan referendum and political, economic, and technological the possibility of southern Sudanese inde- center. He assumed that the Eritrean pendence. The Saudi government is wor- Defense Force was invincible. As a result king to influence actors in the region to of dashed expectations, Eritrea has not 96 help to stabilize Sudan. In Sudan, the been flexible. ruling Congress Party and the associated The US role has been and will continue National Islamic Front are making conces- to be crucial in Eritrea-Ethiopia talks. sions for peace, but it is uncertain if they Unfortunately, the US preoccupation with will follow through. The Bashir regime its alliance against terrorism has relegated has sidelined the Wahhabi faction that the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation to the used to dominate the government but is background. The Boundary Commission also reluctant to yield to international decided to “virtually” demarcate the boun- pressure.92 dary, as neither side would allow access for If Khartoum gets the lion’s share of physical demarcation. This decision led resources, it may be prepared to let Eritrea to demand the withdrawal of southern Sudan become independent. UNMEE peacekeepers from its territory, The Sudanese “Arab” mind-set has been which began in March 2008.97 to make peace when it suits them; otherwise, According to Grignon, the internatio- they wage war.93 nal community should not attempt to Grignon, of the ICG, says there is a reengage via Libyans and other actors that great need to stabilize Somalia and Sudan have been associated with Eritrea in nego- and to create a level where differences tiating an end to the confrontation. Ins- can be regulated. Peacemakers must find tead, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia centers of gravity and create equilibrium should be called upon to put pressure on in the region. A new (or revitalized) regio- the two parties. Peacemakers have to take
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into account Ethiopia’s internal dynamics accept change in Darfur, Kenya remains and constraints on the regime.98 Prime engaged.101 Minister Meles Zenawi cannot make major Peace in Somalia is the main focus of concessions because of pressures from Kenyan military engagement. Some parts Ethiopian nationalists. Gomes believes of Somalia have been stabilized. The role that peacemakers should be using back of the Kenyan military is to participate in channels. Uncontested areas along the line with AU rules of engagement to border should be demarcated, with dispu- advise, train, coordinate, and liaison. ted areas left until later.99 Kenya is working with Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti to limit collateral damage in Kenya as an “Anchor State” in the Mogadishu as well as to control the influx Horn of Africa of terrorist groups and with the United States on Somalia, antipiracy operations, Kenya is an industrializing state and is and sea lanes regulation. Kenya is willing relatively stable and democratic. Accor- to train Burundian peacekeepers for ser- ding to noted scholar and development vice in Somalia. However, Kenya cannot expert Michael Chege, the democratic send its own peacekeepers because it bor- Kibaki regime has made great strides; for ders on Somalia and because peace has example, helping to reduce poverty by 10 not been secured. Djibouti is trying to percent between 2003 and 2007. He belie- defuse the Somali conflict as well as the ves that Kenya is becoming an economic Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation.102 dynamo as well as a center of peace and In regard to the Eastbrig of the ASF, stability. There are concerns about the Kenya is hosting the planning elements possibility of Sudan and Somalia dissol- and the independent mechanism for ving into even greater chaos. However, coordinating security and socioeconomic Kenya will probably follow the reactive development. The headquarters of East- stance that it assumed in the past, even if brig is in Ethiopia, and, according to Bri- its interests in southern Sudan are har- gadier Walugu, Kenya enjoys good par- med. Finally, Islamic extremists on the tnership with Ethiopia. Kenya is ready to Kenyan coast remain a cause for respond to contingencies thanks to US 100 concern. and EU training and support. Kenya has Kenya remains engaged in the diplo- peacekeepers in UNMEE, alongside Jor- matic process, including Darfur negotia- danian forces, the only forces remaining tions, recognizing that the region is very between Ethiopia and Eritrea.103 Kenya unstable. According to Brigadier Maurice does not want to be in Somalia because Walugu of the Kenyan Ministry of Defense, “frontline states” are not supposed to ope- there are two levels on which Kenya deals rate there. As for the Ugandan peacekee- with Sudan—the political level of negotia- pers, Walugu believes they were not ting with the Sudanese government and deployed too early in Somalia; just too few the practical military level—as the peace troops and not enough support. The pro- process (e.g., the Comprehensive Peace blem is deploying into Somalia. It takes a Agreement between North and South) lot of time and considerable risk.104 does not guarantee results in reducing As for dealing with Kenyan pastoralists conflict or the number of internally dis- and communal conflict, Walugu likened placed people. Although the Sudanese the Kenyan army to the 7th Cavalry in the government does not seem willing to western United States. It takes time to
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educate and change the culture of people nalists want universal recognition of (i.e., pastoralists). The drilling of boreho- Somaliland as an independent state (with les and the development of water resour- the ulterior motive of further dividing ces and pastures can help to contain the Somalis). They want a united democratic conflict.105 federal Sudan and believe that secession In the operations against the Islamic of the South is destabilizing. They demand Courts Union, the Kenyan military joined that the United States induce Egypt to with the Ethiopians on occasion, which negotiate with Ethiopia over sharing Blue caused tensions. The Ethiopians were not Nile water.110 easy to deal with and blamed the Kenyans Ethiopian moderates note that, following when something went wrong. The plan- 11 September 2001, the Horn of Africa ning cell is on Kenyan real estate.106 attracted more attention as a region percei- ved to be a base for radical Islamists and Ethiopia as an “Anchor State” terrorists. Ethiopia was thought to be a tar- in the Horn of Africa get, and Somalia and Sudan were suspected Besides intervening with troops in Soma- of sponsoring terrorists. One of the pro- lia, Ethiopia has sent peacekeepers to blems has been governance failure in most three different peacekeeping operations of the countries in the region. For example, and is prepared to send more. At the Ethiopia cannot build national consensus. Sudan has improved since the CPA in 2005, moment, cordial relations exist between 111 Ethiopia and Sudan, partly because Ethio- but Darfur remains a disaster. pia is importing oil from Sudan.107 EU and US policy towards the EPRDF Regional Organizations as Partners regime is necessarily “nuanced.”108 After Stabilization and peacebuilding in the the rigging of elections and shooting of Horn of Africa have involved considerable students in May 2005 and the trial of efforts at peacemaking by IGAD states, opposition leaders in November 2005, the the AU, the UN, and the United States. EU and the United States downgraded The UN has mounted peace and stability some ties. With the 2006 intervention in operations between Ethiopia and Eritrea Somalia, full relations have been restored. and in Somalia (which failed in 1993–94) However, Congress recently sanctioned a and southern Sudan, and the African number of regime leaders for the 2005 Union has done so in Darfur and Somalia. events. Ethiopia is disappointed at not In the Horn of Africa, the IGAD must be being compensated by the United States rejuvenated as a forum in which disparate for its intervention and peacekeeping role member states air their differences (aiding in Somalia in 2007.109 In fact, Ethiopians stabilization efforts) and work to prevent cannot leave Somalia without a guarantee humanitarian disasters by addressing sus- of security, so the costs continue to tain-ability challenges. The East African mount. Community has demonstrated even grea- Ethiopian nationalists believe that the ter potential to build cooperation for sus- best approach to stabilizing the Horn of tainability and stabilization. The Common Africa is to bring Eritrea under control— Market of East and Southern Africa through regime change if necessary. They (COMESA) has been working on econo- want the United States to support the TFG mic and sustainability challenges and is in Somalia with billions of dollars. Natio- moving to work on issues of stabilization.
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According to Ambassador Wane of the Promoting Sustainability, African Union Peace and Security Com- mission, a regional approach is needed, Stabilization, and Peacebuilding given the interconnection of conflicts. Policies that could promote sustainabi- The problem is that the IGAD is dysfunc- lity, stabilization, and peacebuilding tional due to political differences.112 include the development of federalism, According to Walter Knausenberger, the improving the lives of pastoralists, and COMESA is more dynamic and promising regional early warning and intervention. than the IGAD.113 Programs include expanding and The IGAD has been playing a mixed strengthening the IGAD-CEWARN early role in stabilizing the Horn of Africa for warning and action system and programs two decades. The Intergovernmental that aim to build links between pastora- Association on Development was founded lists and governments in Addis Ababa, in the wake of the 1984–85 Ethiopian Nairobi, and Kampala, including the buil- famine, and a main priority was dealing ding of wells, schools, and clinics and the with drought and desertification that hel- provision of marketing centers for the ped to bring about famine and instability buying of herds. International aid pro- in the region. In the early 2000s, the IGAD grams are enabling the building of scho- played a role (along with Kenya and the ols and clinics and helping to extend the United States) in the resolution of the presence of states in previously ungover- North-South conflict in Sudan and in ned regions. Stakeholders include state negotiating a transitional federal govern- and nonstate actors, international govern- ment for Somalia, which moved back to mental organizations (e.g., the IGAD), the country in February 2006 and attemp- and NGOs. A participatory approach to ted to establish authority from Mogadishu project development and implementation in 2007. A conflict the IGAD does not should be promoted, and local pastoralist have the capacity to resolve is the conti- institutions such as trading associations nuing confrontation between Ethiopia and peace committees should be built. and Eritrea in the wake of the 1998–2000 Pastoral self-governance should be war, which has spilled over into Somalia strengthened.117 and has affected the entire region.114 Only Moderate forces exist among the Soma- UN peacekeepers are preventing a lis; they need to be understood, strengthe- resumption of hostilities, while Saudi Ara- ned, and supported. Somalis as a group bia and Algeria are being suggested as are not susceptible to extremist philoso- possible mediators. phy, but if forced to choose sides, they will The COMESA has helped to reduce go with the Islamists, even though Somalis tariffs among member states and boost are not strict Sunnis. The key is to provide intraregional trade, which has helped economic growth equitably and to engage Kenya and several other states prosper. with people who know the area.118 Trade in livestock and animal products The Kenyan government requires a has been demonstrated to help pastora- mind-set change in relation to Somalis lists become more prosperous in the Horn and other politically marginalized groups of Africa.115 The biggest problem conti- to move towards sustainability stabiliza- nues to be the low level of African trade. A tion. The government needs to be pro- second problem is the plethora of organi- perly engaged but thus far has taken a zations to which states belong.116 divisive approach, making issues political
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as well as resource based. Pastoralists must and boundaries do not constrain groups. be assisted in managing the excessive The task for RELPA is to make steps growth of population and animals. Ways forward. Thus far, there have been procu- must be found for herders to move to rement issues and delays. RELPA needs other pasture and water areas so that more than two years’ funding to be effec- conflict can be avoided with sedentary tive. Thus far, livelihood interventions agriculturalists. Visual tools, including have not had the impact desired, as they ones that show ethnic overlay, trade rou- have not addressed or understood under- tes, and markets, have been developed to lying conflict dynamics among pastora- assist pastoralists and enable them to deal lists. In any case, it is unlikely that the with resource and pasture access issues. RELPA approach and “alternative liveli- Access to the political process is essential hoods” programs can mitigate support for to providing pastoralists with voice and Islamic extremism and terrorism.122 participation at the national and provin- A consortium of groups has formulated cial levels. Fifty percent of the GDP in a cross-sectoral program across borders. Kenyan agriculture comes from pastoral Case studies in Ethiopia and Kenya indi- activities throughout the country; so, the cate that there is now better reporting res- marginalization of pastoralists is partly ponse regarding conflict, early warning, due to misperceptions. Marginalization is and drought (this is difficult to do in Soma- now being overcome by technology—with lia). The Integrated River Basin Manage- cell phone access (cell phone towers in ment Project works with the private sector. the rural areas), pastoralists now have There is a need for resources to provide access to market information. Alternative access to safe water. In addressing issues of access means rural banking and livestock education and health, mobile schools and sales can develop. Funds can go into other clinics have been proposed in pastoral entrepreneurial areas besides livestock. areas. The health issue is vital—a quarter Therefore, providing access to economic of the pastoralist population has acute mal- resources and development is the best nutrition compounded by a lack of stable counterterrorism initiative.119 health service and good hygiene.123 The RELPA (Regional Enhanced Live- The IGAD-CEWARN early warning lihoods in Pastoral Areas), managed by mechanism holds promise for preventing the Nairobi regional office of the US conflict among pastoralists as well as Agency for International Development famine. The IGAD-CEWARN, established (USAID), is attempting to promote sus- in 2001, has lacked strategic direction; tainability and stabilization in pastoralist however, state-of-the-art software is its areas with a number of NGO partners.120 strength. There are 52 sets of selected indi- One such partner is the NGO “Pact,” which cators of communal variance, areas repor- works with partner NGOs and the USAID ted, media reporting on conflict, and envi- for conflict mitigation and provides conflict ronmental context. Field monitors provide resolution training to deal with pastoralist weekly reports on specific incidents as they water disputes and subclan conflicts.121 happen. Information flows to the national RELPA represents sound thinking, is a level and to the IGAD-CEWARN, but lack step forward, and is intended to use a of government action is a major weakness. joint programs approach. It is regional, The well-established response mechanism integrated, and comprehensive, which is needs to be programmatically designed essential because pastoralism is regional and developed. Another problem is the
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diverse source of funds (60 percent from The macro-level or structural factors the USAID, 30 percent from the German are important in explaining sustain-ability GTZ, and only 10 percent from member and stabilization challenges. The clan- states).124 based Somali society made state building The Ugandan government has used difficult in the 1960s, made state collapse daily reports from the IGAD-CEWARN to possible, and is making state reconstitu- deal with problems of drugs, arms, and tion even more difficult in the 2000s. In human trafficking by pastoralists. The Sudan, long-standing historical and cultu- Ugandan government adopted a disarma- ral differences between Khartoum and ment strategy with NGO funding. The outlying regions led to state failure from Ugandan army was used to disarm the pas- the outset. In Ethiopia, Kenya, and toralists. Many community members died Uganda, the center of power has rested in as a result (Karamojong in the Karamoja agricultural centers, with pastoralists the region).125 The IGAD-CEWARN needs to outsiders. The intermediate or institutio- work at early warning and conflict manage- nal level also helps in explaining sustain- ment among pastoralists at a lower level. ability and stabilization challenges. Cer- Then, it can be developed to manage bigger tainly, in the case of Somalia, institutional conflicts and disasters involving states.126 mismanagement and state weakness Interpeace partners in Somalia, Punt- contributed to failure. In Sudan, discrimi- land, and Somaliland have initiated various nation against outlying regions was impor- efforts to prevent environmental devasta- tant, but the impulse to subjugate those regions was even more significant. State tion, notably uncontrolled tree cutting for weakness helps to explain why pastoralists charcoal. This began during the late 1970s in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda did not by refugee influxes from the Ogaden in receive adequate attention, but the struc- neighboring Ethiopia but was further tural divide was more important. aggravated by a lack of governance fol- 127 The Horn of Africa is one region of the lowing years of prolonged conflict. world where short-term shocks have played a significant role in creating acute Conclusion sustainability-stabilization challenges. The susceptibility of the region to drought, The Horn of Africa is one of the world’s overpopulation, and famine has brought most fragile regions; only West and Cen- several cataclysmic events that have contri- tral Africa surpass it in terms of state failu- buted to state failure. Sudden changes in res and instabilities. This article underli- conflicts, such as the rebel success in nes the importance of a regional focus on Somalia in 1990, led to state collapse. The the problem of state failure and the dan- sudden defeat of Somali forces in 1978 in ger of conflict spillover. In regard to a the Ogaden had a crushing effect on the sustainability assessment, clearly failed Siad Barre regime. states cannot deal with environmental Clearly there is a gap on the continuum degradation and disaster. Disasters (e.g., of state failure between (1) state collapse famines) and the lack of sustainability in Somalia, (2) failure by Khartoum to contribute significantly to state failure. deal with its outlying regions in a peaceful State failure means that struggle over and fair way, and (3) failure of Ethiopia resources occurs in a state of anarchy and and Uganda, and to a lesser extent Kenya, results in a downward spiral. to relate to and provide services to pasto-
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ralists. State failure and sustainability and Threats in the Horn of Africa from sus- stabilization challenges in the Horn have tainability and stabilization challenges are been distinctive and unusual. moderate in severity. Certainly, the threats This article has extensively examined from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border sustainability challenges, including cli- region and from Iraq and Iran are much mate change, population growth, and greater. The 1998 bombings of the US desertification, as well as water shortage, embassies in Kenya and Tanzania indicate famine, and rivers that are linked with that there are threats and that actions to conflict. It has demonstrated that there is build peace and bring greater sustainabi- a degree of interrelationship among eth- lity and stabilization to the region will nic conflict, weak states, and interstate advance wider security. Somalia and Soma- lis are the focus of efforts to prevent ungo- rivalry, as well as extremism, terrorism, verned areas and underdeveloped pastora- and sustainability challenges. It has lists from being used by extremists. The focused on a specific problem of sustain- development of a coordinated approach ability stabilization—the challenges facing among diplomats, development experts, Islamic pastoralists who may be attracted and defense personnel to bring sustainable to Islamic extremism and terrorism—as development to Somalis and to help well as solutions. reconstitute the Somalian state could bear This article has offered solutions at the fruit if sustained over the long run. macro level (e.g., the reduction of green- In this regard, this article has identified a house gases and improving education and range of intervention policies and programs employment to reduce birthrates) and at as well as tools and technologies that could the micro level (e.g., development pro- increase sustain-ability and stability and delay, jects for pastoralists, farmers, and women, defer, or prevent failure. The article also iden- tified the range of stakeholders, including as well as the development of market state and nonstate actors (intergovernmental infrastructure, local governance, and tree organizations and NGOs). The article deter- planting). Stabilization measures were mined their likely reactions to stabilization also examined, including early warning and sustainability efforts, as well as their willin- and preventive action, peacemaking, and gness to accept constructive roles in the pro- peace and stability operations, as well as cess of sustainable development or the likeli- peacebuilding, development and trade, hood that they will oppose efforts. The task of winning over partners to assist the Horn of and the role of anchor states and a range Africa in achieving sustainable development of organizations. The article confirmed and stabilization is very difficult and requires the utility of peacebuilding and stabilization an ongoing effort to change structures and and promoting sustainability together. attitudes. ❏
Notes
1. Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival: Environ- 2. See Mapping Climate Vulnerability and Poverty in mental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Inse- Africa: Where are the hot spots of climate change and curity (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996); Thomas Homer- household vulnerability? Report to the Department for Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, International Development submitted by the Interna- NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Nils Petter tional Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Nairobi, Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Cri- Kenya, in collaboration with The Energy & Resources tique of the Literature,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. Institute (TERI), New Delhi, India, and the African Cen- 3 (May 1998): 381–400. tre for Technology Studies (ACTS), Nairobi, Kenya, May
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2006, http://www.acts.or.ke/pubs/books/docs/Map- tutions, and Government (London: Pluto Press, 2001), ping_Vuln _Africa.pdf. See also Stephan Faris, “The Real 134–44. See also Paul Spencer, The Pastoral Continuum: Roots of Darfur,” Atlantic Monthly 299, no. 3 (April The Marginalization of Tradition in East Africa (Oxford, UK: 2007). Faris points to global warming and resulting Oxford University Press, 1998). desertification as major causes of the conflict between 17. Robert H. Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The janjaweed pastoralists and Darfur farmers. Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge, 3. Stephen F. Burgess, “African Security in the 21st UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 73–92. Only a few Century: The Challenges of Indigenization and Multilat- states, such as Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s, reached out to eralism,” African Studies Review 41, no. 2 (September provide services to farmers and pastoralists. 1998): 37–61. 18. Eric E. Otenyo and Philip O. Nyinguro, “Social 4. Mebrate Woldentensaie (research and training Movements and Democratic Transitions in Kenya,” officer, the Conflict and Early Warning Response Mecha- Journal of Asian and African Studies 42, no. 1 (February nism [CEWARN] of the IGAD, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), 2007): 5–24. interview by author, 31 May 2007. 19. Juma Okuku, Ethnicity, State Power and the Democ- 5. History of IGAD, http://www.igad.org/.Eritrea ratisation Process in Uganda (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic joined the IGADD in 1993 at independence and withdrew Africa Institute, 2002), 19–20. from the IGAD in 2006 for political reasons (differences 20. Jason W. Clay and Bonnie K. Holcomb, Politics and with Ethiopia over Somalia). the Ethiopian Famine, 1984–1985 (New Brunswick, NJ: 6. IGAD Strategy, October 2003, http://www.igad Transaction Publishers, 1986), 42–48. .org/about/igad_strategy.pdf. 21. Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: 7. Alexander de Waal, ed., Islamism and Its Enemies State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies of in the Horn of Africa (Bloomington, IN: University of Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Brookings Insti- Indiana Press, 2004). tution, 1995), 7–24. 8. Stephanie McCrummen, “Cherished Interweaving 22. Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse; Lyons and of Christians, Muslims Shows Signs of Fraying,” Washing- Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse; Clarke and Gosende, ton Post, 13 May 2007, A-15; and Tewolde Ezgabier “Somalia: Can a Collapsed State”; and Matt Bryden, “No (Ethiopian Environmental Protection Agency, Addis Quick Fixes: Coming to terms with terrorism, Islam and Ababa), interview by author, 29 May 2007. statelessness in Somalia,” Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 9. Jennifer Milliken, ed., State Failure, Collapse, and 2, (Fall 2003), http://www.lib .unb.ca/Texts/JCS/Fall03/ Reconstruction (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). bryden.htm. 10. Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the 23. I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland: From Threat of Terrorism, Adelphi Paper 364 (Oxford, UK: Nation to State (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004); and 18–98. Walter S. Clarke and Robert Gosende, “Somalia: Can a Collapsed State Reconstitute Itself?” in Robert I. Rotberg, 24. Ibid., 95–165. ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror 25. I. M. Lewis, “The Ogaden and the Fragility of (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation and Washing- Somali Segmentary Nationalism,” African Affairs 88, no. ton, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), 101–28. 353 (October 1989): 573–79. 11. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “State Collapse and Recon- 26. I. M. Lewis and James Mayall, “Somalia,” in James struction in Uganda,” in I. William Zartman, State Col- Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism, 1991–1994: United lapse: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 33–48. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 104–6. 12. Gerard Prunier and Rachel Gisselquist, “The 27. Ismail I. Ahmed, “The Heritage of War and State Sudan: A Successfully Failed State,” in Rotberg, ed., State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-level Effects, Failure and State Weakness, 101–28. External Interventions and Reconstruction,” Third World 13. Kevin Ward, “ ‘The Armies of the Lord’: Christian- Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1999): 113–27. In 1991, the Somali ity, Rebels, and the State in Northern Uganda, 1986– National Movement seized control of the north and estab- 1999,” Journal of Religion in Africa 31, no. 2 (May 2001): lished “Somaliland” that became an unrecognized but de 187–221. facto state. The “bottom up” approach of local organizing 14. Harold Golden Marcus, A History of Ethiopia and initiative helped in building the Somaliland state. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 63–76; 28. Stephen F. Burgess, The United Nations under and Christopher Clapham, “Ethiopia and Somalia,” in Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Conflict in Africa, Adelphi Paper 93 (London: Interna- 2002), 74–76. tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), 3–23. One 29. Francois Grignon (Africa program director, Inter- could also count Buganda and other kingdoms in what is national Crisis Group, Nairobi, Kenya), interview by author, now Uganda as significant pre-colonial states. 8 June 2007. 15. Burgess, “African Security.” 30. Lt Col Scott Rutherford (defense attaché, US 16. Mustafa Babiker, “Resource Competition and Embassy, Nairobi), interview by author, 4 June 2007. Conflict: Herder/Farmer or Pastoralism/ Agriculture?” 31. Alexander de Waal et al, War in Darfur and the in M. A. Mohamed Salih, Ton Dietz, and Abdel Ghaffar Search for Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Mohamed Ahmed, eds., African Pastoralism: Conflict, Insti- 2007); and International Crisis Group, Darfur: Revitaliz-
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ing the Peace Process, Africa Report No. 125, 30 April 2007, dent NGOs such as Save the Children UK have been http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index. cfm?id=4769&l=1. working successfully in the Ogaden. 32. Francis Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities 49. Nene Mburu, Bandits on the Border, The Last Frontier in the Sudan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, in the Search for Somali Unity (Trenton, NJ, and Asmara, 1995), 33–96. Eritrea: Red Sea Press, 2005). 33. Ibid., 135–84. 50. M. M. Okello and J. W. Kiringe, “Threats to Bio- 34. Ibid., 347–84. diversity and their Implications in Protected and Adja- 35. Bodour Abu Affan, “A Missed Opportunity: cent Dispersal Areas of Kenya,” Journal of Sustainable Sudan’s Stabilization Program, 1979–1982,” in John Obert Tourism 12, no. 1 (2004): 55–115. Voll, ed., Sudan: State and Society in Crisis (Washington, 51. Ward, “‘Armies of the Lord’,” 187–221. DC: Middle East Institute, 1991), 108–22. 52. Rutherford, interview. 36. John Young, “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process 53. Lahra Smith, Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty Leading to a Flawed Peace,” Review of African Political in Ethiopia (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, August Economy 32, Issue 103 (March 2005): 99–113. 2007), 1–20. 37. Faris, “The Real Roots of Darfur.” 54. Wong, interview. The Carter Center found that 38. Marcel Leroy (political advisor to the EU special there were significant flaws but not enough to change the representative, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), interview by outcome of the elections. The EU cut direct aid to Ethiopia author, 31 May 2007. 39. de Waal, War in Darfur; and International Crisis because the elections were found to be unfree and unfair. Group, Darfur. 55. Terrence Lyons, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of 40. Grignon, interview. Africa (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 41. Solomon Gomes (AU Peace and Security Com- 2007); and Wong, interview. mission, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 31 May 2007. 56. Wong, interview. The Carter Center found that there Another problem in Darfur is that Libyan and Eritrean were significant flaws but not enough to change the out- soldiers seem to be autonomous from the AU peacekeep- come of the elections. The EU cut direct aid to Ethiopia. ing force. 57. Grignon, interview. 42. Gomes, interview. 58. Gomes, interview. 43. John Helland, “Participation and Governance in 59. Ibid. the Development of Borana: Southern Ethiopia,” in M. A. 60. Rutherford, interview. Mohamed Salih, Ton Dietz, and Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed 61. Ibid. Ahmed, eds., African Pastoralism: Conflict, Institutions, and 62. Joan Kariuki, Andrew Adwerah, and Elvin Nyukuri Government (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 56–80. (ACTS, World Agroforestry Centre [ICRAF], Nairobi), 44. Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Ethiopian Federalism: interview by author, 7 June 2007. Autonomy Versus Control in the Somali Region,” Third 63. John K. Livingstone, A Comparative Study of Pastoralist World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004): 1131–54. Parliamentary Groups: Kenya Case Study, Natural Resources 45. Ben Watkins and Michael L. Fleisher, “Tracking Institute/Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Pastoralist Migration: Lessons from the Ethiopian Somali Africa (NRI/ PENHA), Research Project on Pastoralist Par- National Regional State,” Human Organization 61, no. 4, liamentary Groups funded by the British Department for (Winter 2002): 328–38. International Development’s (DFID) Livestock Produc- 46. Eric Wong (deputy political and economic coun- tion Programme and the CAPE Unit, African Union’s selor, political affairs, US Embassy, Addis Ababa), inter- Interafrican Bureau of Animal Resources (AU-IBAR), view by author, 30 May 2007. The ONLF has not been May 2005, http://www.nri. org/projects/pastoralism/ declared a terrorist organization by the US government in kenyappgmayfinal.pdf. spite of the attack on the Chinese and Ethiopian oil workers. 64. Philip Dobie (UNDP Drylands Development 47. Kaleyesus Bekele, “Ethiopia: Humanitarian Situation Center), interview by author, 6 June 2007. According to in Ogaden Raises Concern,” Reporter (Addis Ababa), 29 Dobie, Darfur and other conflicts over pastoral land are September 2007. A recent United Nations interagency development failures, not meteorological disasters. mission to the Somali Regional State observed that humanitarian conditions within the conflict areas have Local populations have been adept at dealing with climatic deteriorated substantially over the past several months. fluctuation for hundreds of years. Government restrictions of commercial and livestock 65. Woldentensaie, interview. trade aimed at preventing contraband activity have markedly 66. Graham and Wondimkum, interview. In Somali aggravated an already fragile food security and livelihood areas with small clans, there is no conflict. However, in situation. Livestock prices have fallen by as much as one- Gambella is another area where the USAID has been third due to a drastic reduction of export trade from the assisting with conflict- mitigation work, even though envi- areas of military operations. Food reserves at the house- ronmental issues are not relevant in such a lush and hold level are nearly exhausted among the communities sparsely populated area. visited. Moreover, food aid operations in the zones affected 67. Simon Richards (Pact director for African by military operations have been seriously delayed. Region), interview by author, 5 June 2007. 48. John Graham and Yacob Wondimkum (USAID), 68. Dobie, interview. interview by author, 31 May 2007. In contrast, indepen- 69. Ibid.
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70. Walter Knausenberger (senior regional environmen- 92. Courville and Wong, interviews. tal officer, USAID, East Africa Regional Mission, Nairobi), 93. Amb. David Kikaya and Prof. Moses Onyango interview by author, 5 June 2007. (International Relations, US International University, 71. Ibid. Nairobi), interview by author, 6 June 2007. 72. UN Environment Program, Sudan: Post-Conflict 94. Grignon, interview. Environmental Assessment, June 2007. 95. Lyons, Avoiding Conflict; and Wong, interview. 73. Ibid. 96. Wong, interview. 74. Susanne Schmeidl and Cirû Mwaûra, Early Warning 97. Ibid. and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa: Protocol on the 98. Grignon, interview. See also Lyons, Avoiding Conflict. Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism 99. Gomes, interview. for IGAD Member States (Trenton, NJ, and Asmara, Eritrea: Red 100. Michael Chege, interviewed in Nairobi, June 7, Sea Press, 2001); and IGAD- CEWARN personnel, Addis 2007. Ababa, Ethiopia, interview by author, 31 May 2007. 101. Brig Maurice A. Walugu (operations director, Min- 75. IGAD-CEWARN personnel, interview. istry of Defence, Nairobi), interview by author, 4 June 2007. 76. Col Don Zimmer (director, Kenya-US Liaison 102. Ibid. Office [KUSLO], US Embassy, Nairobi), interview by 103. Ibid. author, 4 June 2007. 104. Ibid. 77. Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, Progress with the 105. Ibid. African Standby Force, ISS Paper 107, May 2005, 1–21. 106. Col Don Zimmer, interview by author, 4 June 2007. 78. Maj Gen Benon Biraaro, Ugandan Peoples 107. Wong, interview. Defence Force (director, strategic planning, African 108. Ibid. Union Peace and Security Commission, Addis Ababa, 109. Ibid. Ethiopia), interview by author, 1 June 2007. 110. Kinfe Abraham, interview by author, 31 May 79. Marcel Leroy (political advisor to the EU) 2007 80. Maruga Peter (coordinator, Peacemaking, Healing 111. Prof. Berhanu Kassahun (Department of Political and Reconciliation Programme, Nairobi Peace Initiative Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa Univer- [NPI]–Africa, Nairobi), interview by author, 8 June 2007. sity), interview by author, 1 June 2007. NPI and Interpeace officials interviewed in Nairobi, 7 June 112. Amb. Wane (African Union Peace and Security 2007, have adopted extensive bottom-up programs to end Commission, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 1 June 2007. state failure and build a new state and society. 113. Knausenberger, interview. Also, COMESA is tied 81. Cedric Barnes and Haran Hassan, “The Rise and Fall into the New Partnership for African Development, which of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts,” Journal of East African Studies is attempting to hold states accountable in areas of gover- 1, Issue 2 (July 2007): 151–60. For background, see Roland nance, accountability, and development. Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil 114. Lyons, Avoiding Conflict. War,” in de Waal, ed., Islamism and Its Enemies, 114–45. 115. Stephen Karingi (chief, Trade and International 82. Ken Menkhaus, “State Collapse in Somalia: Second Negotiations Section, UN Economic Commission for Thoughts,” Review of African Political Economy, no. 97, Africa, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 29 May 2007. (2003): 405–22 116. Joseph Atta-Mensah (director, UN Economic 83. Gomes, interview. Commission for Africa, Regional Integration Office, New 84. Abdurahim Raghe (senior program officer, Partnership for African Development Unit, Addis Ababa), Somali Program) and Johan Svensson (regional director, interview by author, 29 May 2007. East and Central Africa, Interpeace, Nairobi), interview 117. Ann Muir, Customary Pastoral Institutions Study by author, 8 June 2007. (Washington, DC: USAID, March 2007). 85. Ibid. 118. Knausenberger, interview. 86. Grignon, interview. 119. Ibid. 87. Amb. Cindy Courville (US Mission to the African 120. USAID, A Better Way of Working: Creating Synergies Union), interview by author, 31 May 2007. in the Pastoral Zones of the Greater Horn of Africa (Nairobi: 88. Col Timothy Rainey and Bob Cunningham (advisors RELPA RFA-Support Documents, November 2001). to the US Mission to the African Union), interview by author, 121. Richards, interview. 31 May 2007. 122. Ibid. In discussion is a broader regional conflict 89. Richards, interview. In discussion is a broader mitigation program. Security is needed for NGOs special- regional conflict mitigation program. Security is needed izing in conflict mitigation and work in conflict zones. for NGOs specializing in conflict mitigation and doing 123. Knausenberger, interview. work in conflict zones. 124. Woldentensaie, interview. 90. ICG, A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in 125. Ibid. Sudan, Africa Report no.130, 26 July 2007, http://www 126. Paul McDermott (office director, Regional Con- .crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4961&l=1. One flict Management and Governance Office, Regional Eco- contested area of high value (rich oil deposits) is the nomic Development Services Office, East and Southern Nuba Mountains, which lie between North and South on Africa, USAID, Nairobi), interview by author, 7 June the west bank of the White Nile. 2007. 91. Gomes, interview. 127. Raghe and Svensson, interview.
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