ASPJ Africa & Francophonie - 4th Quarter 2009 Stabilization, Peacebuilding, and Sustainability in the Horn of Africa STEPHEN F. BURGESS tabilization, peacebuilding, and and conflict on famine, destabilization, sustainability in an unstable and and conflict. It examines efforts, especially famine-prone region like the Horn in Somali pastoral areas of Kenya and of Africa are predicated on a holis- Ethiopia, to mitigate environmental Stic approach that addresses environmen- degradation and conflict as well as extre- tal degradation, conflict, and their inter- mism and terrorism. Thus, a sustainability relationship.1 They posit a set of options and stabilization assessment is used to intended to bring sustainable develop- examine environmental degradation, ment as well as security from conflict and conflict, and their interrelationship and struggles over scarce resources. This what can be done to overcome degrada- approach is especially salient in the Horn tion and conflict. of Africa because the region combines high levels of environmental stress (mani- fested in periodic famine and struggles The Horn of Africa Region over diminishing arable farm and grazing The “core” of the Horn of Africa refers lands) and conflict (interstate wars, civil to the area adjacent to where the “Horn” wars, and communal clashes).2 The juts into the Arabian Sea and Indian region is also one in which environmental Ocean and includes Ethiopia, Somalia, disasters (especially famine) and conflicts Eritrea, and Djibouti. The core features a have been interrelated. cultural clash between “lowland” Islamic This article addresses the problems of pastoralists from Somali, Oromo, and peacebuilding, sustainability, and stabili- other ethnic groups and “upland” Ortho- zation in the Horn of Africa and the inter- dox Christian farmers from Amharic and relationship of environmental degrada- Tigrayan ethnic groups. The struggle tion, instability, and conflict. It assesses between uplanders and lowlanders has the extent to which degradation causes been going on for several hundred years instability and focuses on the spiraling and has centered on control over land effect of natural disaster, degradation, and wealth.3 Dr. Stephen F. Burgess is associate professor of international security at the Air War College and associate director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His areas of expertise include African regional and cultural studies, peace and stability operations, and South Asian security issues; he has conducted field research and published numerous journal articles and book chapters on these subjects. His books are South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction; The UN under Boutros-Boutros Ghali; and Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe. 45 Burgess.indd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igure 1. Political map of Horn of Africa region. (Borders of the disputed regions of Dar- fur, the Ogaden, Somaliland, and Puntland indicated here are approximate and are included for orientation purposes only. Some overlap exists between the claims of Somaliland and Puntland along their shared border. The inclusion of such labeling does not represent or imply recog- nition by the author or by any agency or department of the US government.) Burgess.indd 46 1/12/10 12:03:25 PM STABILIZATION, PEACEBUILDING, SUSTAINABILTY 47 The larger Horn refers to countries of the population of the region and who live that have close relations with or are on semiarid land with a lack of water.4 rivals of the core states, especially Sudan All of the states mentioned came and Kenya, and to a lesser extent together to create the Intergovernmen- Uganda. Sudan is especially important tal Authority on Drought and Develop- because of its rivalry for the past century ment (IGADD) in the mid-1980s to deal and a half with Ethiopia. Sudan features with famines, which were afflicting the a core group of Arab-speaking Muslim region.5 In the mid-1990s, the IGADD farmers from the banks of the Nile and became the Intergovernmental Autho- surrounding areas who have managed rity on Development (IGAD) and to control (often with force) vast out- became a peacemaking body, playing a lying sections of the country composed role in the end of conflicts in southern mostly of nomadic pastoralists and some Sudan and Somalia and authorizing the farmers. The struggle between Sudan development of an early warning system to prevent or stop environmental degra- and Ethiopia began with the Mahdi in 6 the late nineteenth century and resu- dation and conflict. med in the 1950s with the independence The Horn is greatly influenced by of Sudan. Ethiopia tended to back Egypt, which has had long, close rela- southern Sudanese rebels who were tions with the region. Egypt’s primary fighting against Sudanese government concern has been guaranteeing the attempts to “Arabize” and “Islamize” free flow of the Nile for national survi- val and ensuring navigation through them. Sudan tended to back Eritrean the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Saudi separatists who were fighting for indepen- Arabia has influence over Sudan and dence and against Ethiopian annexation. Somalia and has exported its version of Kenya fits into the Horn because of its “Wahhabist” Islam to the Horn. Yemen relations with Somalia, Ethiopia, and is just across the strategic strait (the Sudan. Kenya was a British settler colony Bab el-Mandeb) from the Horn and from which the British projected power takes an interest in its affairs. Yemen during the colonial era and attempted to has also been a crossing point for al- control pastoralist areas in the north of Qaeda from the Arabian Peninsula to the country (including Somali pastora- the Horn. lists). Kenya has been a peacemaker in Islamic extremism exists in the Horn the region, especially in Somalia and of Africa and has flowed down from the Sudan. Uganda fits into the Horn because Arabian Peninsula. Osama bin Laden of its relations with Sudan and Kenya and was welcomed to Sudan in the early its pastoralist population (in the northeast) 1990s by Islamist leader Husain al-Turabi who move across borders. In addition, and built al-Qaeda there. In 1996 the the Blue Nile and White Nile both flow Sudanese regime asked bin Laden to through the region. leave. In 1993 Islamic extremists arose The Horn of Africa features pastora- in Somalia in opposition to US, UN, and lists, drylands, and semiarid topography Western intervention. Today extremism (80 percent of the more than five mil- persists among some members of the lion square kilometers). Sixty-two per- Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and foreign cent of land in the Horn of Africa is Islamic fighters have been fighting the occupied by pastoralists, who are 12 percent Ethiopians. However, it is uncertain if Burgess.indd 47 1/12/10 12:03:26 PM 48 ASPJ AFRICA & FRANCOPHONIE al-Qaeda has made serious inroads into pastoralism). Before the European colo- Somalia. In Kenya and Tanzania, the nial powers arrived, there were only two discontent of coastal Muslims who have significant states extant—Amharic- been neglected by regimes dominated Shoan Ethiopia and Mahdist Sudan.14 by non-Muslims from the interior led Boundaries drawn and colonies created some to join al-Qaeda and participate in in the late nineteenth century have the 1998 embassy bombings and the remained sources of contention. The colonial legacy is one in which relatively 2002 attacks on an Israeli hotel and air- liner in Mombasa.7 At issue is the degree strong states (e.g., Ethiopia, Sudan, and of al-Qaeda presence today, especially in British settler Kenya) were surrounded Somalia and coastal Kenya and Tanza- by nonstate groupings (mainly pastora- nia. In previously religion-tolerant lists). Indirect colonial rule in Uganda Ethiopia, reports have asserted that both and Sudan meant little integration of Islamic extremism (especially Wahha- ethnic groups, especially pastoralists. The division of Somalis into five colonial ter- bism) and Orthodox Christian funda- mentalism are growing.8 ritories helped to accentuate clan fissures.15 In the Horn of Africa, pastoralists resisted state intervention and controls Stabilization Challenges and State such as boundaries, fencing, and pest Failure in the Horn of Africa eradication programs and did not need states as much as farmers did.16 In gene- State failure in the Horn of Africa has ral, there was little environmental provided considerable material for control or agricultural extension and 9 research and literature. Somalia is the livestock control in the region. Thus, 10 most obvious case. State disintegration there was little positive institutional in Uganda under Idi Amin in the 1970s interaction between pastoralists and sta- and Milton Obote in the early 1980s is tes. Therefore, the tasks of post-inde- 11 also well known. In Sudan, the central pendence state building and regional government has tried to “conquer, Ara- integration were difficult in the vast bize, and Islamize” the South for most of lowland expanses of the Horn.17 half a century, as well as ethnically cleanse In the 1950s and 1960s, Ethiopia Darfur and subdue other outlying annexed Eritrea—which led to war—and regions, instead of seeking to build came into rivalry with newly independent legitimacy—this has constituted state Sudan and Somalia, which set the stage failure in those regions.12 Less obvious for a range of destabilization activities. cases of “partial failure” include Ethio- Ethiopia supported rebels in the southern pia in the Somali Ogaden, Kenya in the Sudan, while Sudan supported the Eri- Somali Northeast, and Uganda in the trean liberation movements.