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KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

A DISSERTATION

SUB MITTED TO TH E FACULTY O F THE GRADUATE SCHO O L O F ARTS AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY F O R TH E DEGREE O F DO CTO R O F PHILO SO PHY

DEPARTMENT O F GRE E K

B Y ELIZA GREGORY WILKINS

Pr va E r u i te dition, Dist ib ted By THE UNIVERSITY O F CHICAGO LIBRARIES LL N CHICAGO , I I OIS 191 7 GEO RG E BANTA PUBLISHING CO MPANY CHAPTE R I PAGE INTR O DUCTI O N — Th e r a t l r um r a u r a . insc iptions De phi thei n be , tho ship , d te , etc Dis

‘ 1 i m éi fit a a vr' bv a a vr év n a u . r a a a v cussion s of 7 1 5604, ntiq ity I po t nce tt ched to v by 1 the Ancients . CHAPTE R II

‘ I NQGI EATT O N AS KN O W Y O UR MEA SURE

’ i s A lu Ea rl a a r r r ma xi m Hera cle t u . iest pp ent efe ence to the , in eschy s ‘

m r r a P a r P a 34 . n ew o a vr c w use a . of the pophtheg Inte p et tion of ind , ythi n II , ‘ ’ l H r al a ra a s ur M a ur in Pla a n d Ar . Know yo e s e , to istot e isto ic ch c — l l r Th e a v te rs who did not know themselves A cibi a des a n d A exa nde . bo e f i l fi a l a r me a ning o r the ma xim n Cice ro a n d Juvena . Signi c nce of tit e of ch pte s ’ 2 1 a n d 2 2 of St ob a eus Florilegiu m

CHAPT E R III

‘ I NQe I EAT T O N As KNO W WHAT Y O U CAN AND CANN O T D o

’ AS n u - l As a n u a inj nction n o t to o ve r estima te one s a bi ity . inj nction not ’ ’ - u r ma l As n u al . to nde esti te one s a bi ity . a inj nction to know one s speci bent As a n inj unction to know wha t one ca n do in the rea lm of 23

CHAPTE R IV

‘ I NQGI E TTO N AS W Y P I TS R L I O T o ZQTPO ETNH A KN O O UR LACE . E AT N

’ r uaot a a w év a r l rr a w w pp a ent y a cu ent definition of wpom n . Connection of ’ i Ar l i n m u se m a x n . the two istot e s Ethics . Co mon of the im this sense Con ’ n ect ion ) between c a m el a n d the etymologica l me a ning of a cb gapom. in Pla to s

' ‘ — Tima eu s . T h e phra se 1 6 d yvo ei v éa vr éu u sed of menta l dera ngement a s well

’ a s w a u 11 630; a a vr ou Th e l m a of by y of s ggestion of 7 . b ending of the two e nings ’ ’ 7 6 d voei v éa vr év r l Th e la r ma y in Xenophon s Memo a bi i a . te tendency to ke

' y vcbet a a vr bu include other vi rtues a s well a s o w gopoa bvn 33

CHAPTE R V

‘ I NQGI EATTO N As KNO W THE LI MI TS O F Y O UR WI SD O M

’ ra l - l a r r l - l Th e al l Soc tes ife ong se ch a fte se f know edge . f se conceit of know u l a v r a l . h i a u T e use ool. a a vr bv n a v edge ni e s f t of w the bo e sense by Xenophon, Ar a a n d ra La r u ma x . . m a istoph nes , Isoc tes te ses of the i with this connot tion 4 1

CHAPTER VI

‘ I NQO I EAT TO N AS KNO W Y O UR O W N FAULT S

T use ma x m a s a l v ual rr v r his of the i pp ied to the indi id , i especti e of othe s . ’ ’ M a r r ul r r l n s p oneness to see othe s fa ts a the tha n his o w n . Th e fa b e of the two sa cks b rought into connection with a a w év 4 6 CHAPTE R VII

‘ I NQO I EAT TO N As KN O W Y O U ARE HUMAN AND M O RTAL PAGE

Th e inj unction to think mort a l thoughts a common- pla ce of Greek litera

’ ur a u se vcw t a a w bv in t e . Inst nces of the of q this sense 5 2

CHAPTE R VIII

‘ I NQGI EATT O N As KNO W Y O UR O W N SO UL

T l r l l s h e h e u a a u Al a . T a so the e se f , disc ssed in cibi des I ntithesis between ul a n d le d a n m a u l a a ra l a n d so body to e ph sis pon the know edg e of e ch sep te y , l u a r la m . S ul ma n pon know edge of the e tion between the ince the so is the ,

’ " vcw t a a vr dv m a n a n d a l r l ma . R u a y e ns to know , hence to be phi osophe es t nt

r ll r l r u l tendency of the Stoics to cent e a thei phi osophy a o nd w oo a a vr é v. Th e ’ Neo - Pla toni sts a pplica tion of the ma xim to a knowledg e of the psychologic a l

l l - v u . a u di isions of the so Its connection with the ide of se f conscio sness . Its ’ rela tion to certa in of the soul s a ctivities 6 0

CH APTE R IX

‘ I I FF C L H w A ? I NQO EAT TO N s D I I U T . o TTAI NED

‘ ’ ” l l i ffi ul l I vcw t a a w bv is difficu t a n o d sa y ng . Di c ty of knowing se f versu s

- l l r P r r l l mi . know ing othe s . Se f know edge i ted to the phi osophe s e fect self

l l M a l - l u va r r know edge una tta ina b e . e ns to se f know edge s ggested by io us w iter s — r u al r u a r r u a r a l r rma r u th o gh di ectic , th o g h f iend , th o gh the t ic pe fo nces , th o gh l l v r r u a l ra ur r u a U G o d . ite t e , th o gh know edge of the ni e se , th o gh know edge of

CHAPT E R X

‘ I NQO I EAT T O N IN EARLY ECC LE SI A STIC AL LI TERATURE Th e ma xim a sse rted to h a ve been borrowed by the G reeks from Heb rew

E l l l - l r r li write rs . cc esia stica di scu ssions of se f know edge eflect va iou s Stoic a pp

1 ; l - l a 1 630 a a vf bv a n d u P a a n d Neo Pla . c tions of 7 , the infl ence of to the tonists Se f

l l - l r A l T r . S a a l know edge of the nge s , the inity , etc e f know edge necess y he p

r l r r l a a vr b v r towa d a know edge of G o d . D oct ines e a ted to by the Chu ch — F a thers distinctively self - knowledg e a s a rea liz a tion th a t Go d cre a ted ma n — ’ in Hi s o w n ima ge ; self knowledge a s a recognition of ma n s sinfulness a n d need ’ of repenta nce ; self - knowledg e a s inclu ding a belief in m a n s immort a lity 89

L S F - IOO I T O PAS SAGE S IN WH ICH T H E MAX I M I S EX PRE S S ED O R . P REFACE The Delphic maxim has occurred so frequently in the literature of every age from the fifth century B . C . down to our ow n day that it ma v seem at first thought too well- worn a theme B m . ut for fresh discussion odern use of it , whether in the title of a book or a play, or in the incidental pointing of a moral in some literary work , takes little account , as a rule , of its ancient con notation ; and no systematic attempt has been made hitherto to discover its meanings for the Greeks themselves . It has been the aim of this study to determine the sense in which the Ancients in t er ret ed m p the maxi , by collecting the instances of its actual or implied presence in the extant writings of the Greeks and Romans down to about 5 00 A . D . It is possible that in covering so exten sive a field some more or less important passages ma y have been over l ff . looked , but they wou d probably not a ect the categories indicated

. It is with sincere gratitude that I here acknowledge my indebted ness to Professor Paul Shorey of the University of Chicago for the m l subject of this investigation , and for any an il uminating sug gestion during the progress of the work . E Z O N LI A GREG RY WILKI S .

CHAPTER I INTRO DUCTI O N

’ 1 When in s P rolagora s is discussing certain verses — of Simonides which refer to an apophthegm of Pittacus X a kew év 33v t er/ a t un , he explains that this is one of the numerous examples of the

- m L a v o i a Old ti e , an instance of aconian Bp x x y , and he turns “ by way of illustration to the inscriptions at . Thales the ” “ M Mit len ia n ilesian , he says , and Pittacus the y , and Bias the Prien ia n L M s on , and our , and the indian , and y — h en ia n L the C , and the seventh acedaemonian Chilon met together and dedicated the first - fruits of wisdom to Apollo at the D ’ temple at elphi , writing these sayings which are on everybody s

‘ ’ ”

1 c a a vTOv M aév a a u. tongue , and n w While this passage raises ’ ‘ t a a vr cw no questions regarding the interpretation of v , it may serve as a fitting introduction to a consideration of the Delphic n — m i inscriptio s in general their nu ber , the r authorship , and their exact location on the temple . B esides the two given above we know — ’ E / in a 6 a positively of three others the va ) , d m, mentioned by 2 3 Ch a rmides D n La ert ius 6 6 3 a Plato in the , by ioge es and others ; 4 hp , 4 “ ” V se ui cited by arro , and perhaps reflected in the q deum of Cic ’ De Fi n ibus :22 E ero s III ; and a large , known to us chiefly through ’ s treatise entitled De E apud Delph os . The scholiasts on 5 6 L Dio ucian and on Chrysostom give seven inscriptions , attributi ng m 7 one to each of the Seven Sages , and there is a anuscript in the

L L - aurentian ibrary at Florence containing ninety two sayings , which bears the title Ma xi ms of th e S even S ages Wh i ch Were Foun d 8 r d o e P l r L n Ca ve n th i la a t Delph i . The late scholiasts on ucian a d 9 Dio a n d Chrysostom , however , are hardly to be relied upon , the

1 - 34 3 A B . 2 1 6 5 A . 3 1 1 3 6 8: 1 8 . , , IX , , 4 S a t . Men i . 1 6 . Ed . R . 1 30 p XXIX , eise p . 5 7 O n P h ala r . . I , z P l 20 2 u S ul l u 3 . 6 Q oted by ch t in hi o og s XXIV, p , n . 7 l P l u . 2 15 . hi o og s XXIV , p ' ‘ 3 ' 1 ‘ 7 c é7r1 d 0 0 40 631 w a p a y véh p a r a EI r w a efipéflna a v xexok a uuéva é7rl 7 0 8 év Aeh cpoi s Klovos .

See P i l l M a 19 a n . 2 15 E. ulla . . P il. a c l u d . V . 3 r h Gr e Vo . h o og s XXI , p pp ch F g I ,

. 1 r r m a r r p 2 2 fi . b ings togethe the a pophtheg s which ncient w ite rs a tt ibuted to v Me r ll ll l the Se en Wise n seve a y a n d co ective y . P h ilolo us 203 g XXIV, p . . “ ” 2 KN O W THYSELE IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE compiler of the II a p a ‘y'yéAua ‘r a of the Wise Men was undoubtedly confused1 0 in assigning to Delphi so many sayings which are no

m . So where else entioned as belonging there , too , according to — ‘ Suida s m r r v Photius and , so e people classed another proverb the y

‘ ‘ a — u Ka r a a vr cw a a Hvfl ccw dw é fle a . as a p yu , and With like error Modern discussion of the inscriptions at Delphi is concerned chiefly with the meaning of the E and with the arrangement of the fiv e sayings , certain scholars holding conservatively to the known surely to have been there , and others seeking to find trace of enough m ore to make possible an arrangement in hexameters . The meaning

E men of the letter was evidently not clear to the of later antiquity , ’ m as Plutarch s treatise Shows . He gives in the ain five possible E E explanations , two based on the supposition that the is a real , the fifth letter of the alphabet , and three on the supposition that

EI . E m E it represents the diphthong If the is a si ple , he suggests that there were originally five Sages instead of seven and that this 1 1 fifth letter registered a protest against the claims of the other two ; or E ma m l again , that the y have the ystica meanings connected m 1 2 five . with the nu ber If the letter represents the diphthong , he 13 fancies that it ma y be the conjunction ei used in asking questions — i i of the God f one should marry , f one Should go on a voyage , 14 m i fav and the like ; or the argu entative f, honored by a God who ma ored logic ; or , further , that it y be the second person singular l" “ ” — ’ of the verb dul and mean Thou art the worshipper s recognition of the fact that God alone possesses true B eing . This treatise of ’ Plutarch s is the only ancient discussion of the E in our extant 16 m t h e it literature , and al ost only allusion to , bu t the letter occurs di m 1 7 m on the recently scovered o phalo s , and also on so e coins of the 1 8 time of Hadrian which represent the temple front .

1 ° I bi d 2 1 . . p . 7 n c . 3 . 1 2 7 81 8 A 4 5 D i r a a a éékr a 9 60 i} a 5 2 . . a u 3 c Cf then e s Bj , w nn , . y p ,

T a

1 3 5 . c . 1 ‘ 6 . c . 1 5 1 7. c . ‘6 Pl i D rs o . 1 75 u . e de or 3 1 L x See B u a n Ge . ac . a n d a ra . a t f , f g of e icon ( g I , , 5 r r E note ) efe to the . 1 7 ’ See Yea r - 73 74 . s Work i n la ss i ca l S tudi es for 1 91 5 . C , pp “3 ra z r o n P u a l e es . l 34 0 . H rm VI a a 1 o . A 9 4 V . F e s ni s X, , , V , p so XXX , p “ KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 3

Among the first O f modern scholars to concern himself with the i ’ inscriptions was Goet t l n g . He accepts Plutarch s last suggestion

E m 65 w a s that the represents the verb for , but he thinks it addressed “ b u t : D u not to the God to the worshipper , and renders it hast

f v ern ii n ft i es als ges cha fenes , g Wesen ein Selbst bewusstsein , bist ” 1 9 l l R o ch er . s Mensch Schultz interprets it Simi ar y , but , in an

1900 d f . article published in , suggests a i ferent explanation He thinks " E ei m m that the is the diphthong , but he regards it as an i perative for , D like the other elphic inscriptions , and belonging rather to the verb — 2 0 el a m m V oc m for found in co pounds , and , according to his iew , 2 1 “ ” curring as a simple verb in . This he translates not go “ b ut d come , and says that it is a wor of welcome and assurance

r to the trembling worshipper . S till another view has been p o mul

La ercra n t z E a n i gated by g , who thinks that the represents j and “ ”

. O f S ru ch e means He said He thus regards it not as one the p , m but as the verb which introduces the , with Apollo understood as subject . Go et tlin g and Ros ch er have both been interested in arranging m ffi these inscriptions in verse for , and they have had no di culty in making an hexameter of

‘ ’ I Véiflt a a vr dv M OéV li / a v a a , n q , u p 5 ’ 22 by treating the v and a in E77{} a as a case of synezesis Then 23 Goet tlin S r ch e a t g , on the supposition that there were seven p u , tempted to fill out the first line by using the word «(Surfs and a phrase

‘ ’ ’ which Suida s and the Pa ro emiogra ph connect with I vcbflc o a vr cw ‘ 24 Ha a ' ’ élx a ‘ra IIvflucot as p y y p , and he produced the following

6 3. 3 i 6 K6 a é é a . 9 4 jpa . < m§e > u p a l To V uw ua x p So v

‘ “ ” The kont ge Goet t lin g renders sei hilfreich and thinks w e would 25 naturally consider our relation to men after honoring God . The “ u a p a l f a Véuw ua xépa v he takes with the 9 6 43 iip a to mean der

1 9 b a n dl A h un eu . 2 3 6 . g I , p 2 ° ‘' P l l u LI - e ' 25 2 6 a l 7r 60 el. i X . ds . 6 33 E e E c ou ct t . n h i r . 3 2 hi o og s , pp f (C ) p ( p , 21 ’ ’ ra s i 6 d e l u r cl 6 e e. In the ph se y , which he wo d w ite , y 22 Abh a n dl 2 2 un en . 8 . g I , p 23 ’ ’ Go et tlin g thinks Pla to s a n d Pa usa nia s sta tement th a t the Seven Wise Men met a t Delphi a n d inscribed the sa yings indica tes tha t the sa yings were

v in n um r a n d a r a u m r a a r ra se en be , th t pe h ps the n be of s yings st ted the t dition S even of the Wise Men . 24 Abh a n dl 24 8 un en . g I , p . 25 I bid . 244 . “ 4 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

” du m 26 Gottheit sollst dienen , nicht enschlichen Satzungen . This — To ve o r a a d a ov w a s D n m p x p i , however , not a elphic inscription, as Suida s a Dio says , but it apparently origin ted in a statement of na m h im genes the Cynic in the es , a lost play attributed to in ancient 2 7 ’ s m efl ect 1: 5t a v ti es , to the that God had bidden him 7 o r év and ’ ” D La ert i s u a p a xczp a éov To Voit w ua . iogenes u says that according ’ to a certain story this command was an answer to the Cynic s ques 30 h ow tion as to he could win distinction among men , and Julian likewise treats u a p a xdp a éov 7 6 Voma p a not as a maxim but as an 31 oracle given to Diogenes specifica lly . Ro sch er in his turn , acting on the supposition that there were seven Sp rii ch e because of the prevalence of that number in connec l 32 tion with the Apollo cu t , filled out the first line with two other

' m sayings taken from the Ha p a yy ékua m II vO ucd . He akes the verse

i’3 rea d z

06 a . Ve u w elder) . oeléev r e 6 vow . el. 43 fip n s g xp He selects the minu s 7rei00 v on account of a passage in Marcus Anto

’ a — - ‘ — v éxei v év o w 31 1 mi xer a va o ri ninus do Ovflna o 06 633. os p m m and ’ 35 emorabilia another in Xenophon s M , where Apollo when asked ‘ ’ h o w vb : w okew s . any one could please the Gods , replies uq The ’ god dev xpévow he thinks is reflected in the statement in Cicero s De

3° P . 239.

3‘ 7 La ert ius 2 1 ul a n a a ma r u Diog enes VI , , J i s ys it is tte of disp te

l i - l o r h i Ph il u . r 2 10 D . r r a s i sc s O . C whethe Diogenes w ote these p ys d scip e VII , 2 3 We a re n o t l di l a e u vr ou w a s Hboa kos b ut to d stinct y th t in the , it r seems the na t ural w a y to a ccount fo r its us e in this conn ection la te . 2 9 L r . 1 Fo r a m u u m a ra Dio . a the big o s e ning of this ph se see g e t VI , II ,

He ll us in efl ect a o ut o n e m a a r a r a r te s th t of the e ning sto y ose ch ging Diogenes , m a r al w a s s o n a a r a ul ra a . who the of b nke , with d te ting the coin ge Its et pho ic

m a i a u m o r v u r m r r u l v r . e ning of d sd ining c sto con ention occ s o e f eq ent y , howe e

t k ‘ m v é a iy r‘ o y r w ve t a a w a a a ar‘ r w u der . 71 : 7 0 14 1 81 1 1 B e é er o Ka i. u fb e O . o Cf sec y g ; n u p x p , un

“ 1 1 B - : l l r . 2 C r Ka r r K w o . O ot s a. mi o d9s 1 0 29 a r a ra (Sui bs See a u a n d so J i n VII ,

’ r t 6é ei rr O 06 6 Za v O 7 1 o>0 w3 v 66 7 érrér a eu firre o av xa l ey 3 , ap p e ; n 3: 7r 5 13 , E p p

‘ ’ ’ r a a a r‘ ‘ w ‘rr h vfl v A T v a Suid a s r r a lm é r e of) d a a (T MI o é w . p x p w y , p u ende ing is ost 2 7. al w m rz reich is ch e en ker vol . . 1 . See G o e G identic ith this p , D , II , p 3 ° ' ’ i v v T l z a a éVOO é r a r o s éa r a r o iir w Aa ei v 1 . Ka w uvfl a é evo u o s VI , II , p fi E , fi r ev a v xprj uO r ofir ov. 31 1 88 A . VI , 32 P l l L X . 9 1 u n 1 7. hi o og s , p , . 33 P l l L u X . 9 hi o og s , p 0 . 34 3 1 VI , . 35 3 1 Ro h r r ra n » oé r o r ew r éo v in 6 . sc e h n r a IV , , t i ks fu the th t the ph se ? mp ’ Pla A ol 1 9 h A a s r r . to s p . efe ence to this sa ying “ ” KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERA TURE 5

36 “ — ua e ue ra ece ta sa ien t ium iub en Fi ui bus Q q sunt vetera p p p , qui t ” e et se ui m et n oscere et m temp ri parere , q deu , se nihil ni is , 3 7 r though he needs to emend parere to pa cere to make good his point . In their insistence upon the verse form of the inscriptions Goet tlin g

Rosch er D and are influenced , of course , by the fact that the elphic oracles were given in hexameters , and by the presence of such dedica m m tions elsewhere . There was an epigra on the Apollo te ple at ’ ” Eudemi a n Eth i cs E Delos , according to Aristotle s ; and at phesus , apparently on the old temple of Artemis , were six words , known as

’ E éa t a d a m ma go vp py , which y be arranged in a perfect hexameter 39 Ro sch er r le verse . The seven sayings at Delphi thinks played a O M D :4 0 similar to that of the osaic ecalogue , and he renders them

Komm und folge dem Gott und Gesetz und nutze die Zeit wohl ! li Prufe l efa h r ch e B ur s ch aft . dich selbst , Ha t Mass , und meide g g

’ Rosch er s work is certainly ingenious , whether we are disposed to m fi accept it , or to give our i agination less rein and af rm with S chultz and La gercra n t z that we have sure evidence for five inscriptions only .

The original authorship of the sayings is an open question n ow as of old , for we cannot be sure whether they first appeared on the temple or whether they were put there after they had become familiar

in . w e current thought Plato , as have seen , attributes them to the e Sev n Wise Men , but he can hardly have been serious in doing so ,

P r ta or judging from the general tone of that section of the o g a s . Plato is the first to tell this story of the meeting of the Seven Sages

D w a s at elphi , and it has been suggested that he responsible for the 4 1 s establishment of the canon . B ut the canon w a never firmly 42 43 fixed . Pausanias and Demetrius Ph alereus follow Plato in their l ists , except for the substitution of of Corinth for the M son m less known y , but entions several

3° 2 2 . III , 37 . S a E . 94 28 . Ro sch er a a a rcere le ib us ma Cf enec , p , thinks , too , th t p g y

v all u t r ha e f en o t between empari a n d pa ere . 33 El B udem. 1 1 . k. , 3 9 l 4 e l P l l C . Al x . trom. 5 . S e a u LX . 8 S V 9 . e V , III , so hi o og s , p 4 ° P l LIX hi . , 38 .

See . 3 . 23 . p , n ‘2 24 X , , 1 . ‘3 m r r . Flor 79 . w a s t u fi r h Stob . III ; It De e i s who st dist ib uted the a p op t h e ms a m Sa v rall a r r De S e tem S a i euti b us g ong the ges se e y , cco ding to Boh en, p p , p . 5 . “ 6 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

44 - t w o substitutions for Periander , and no less than twenty names 45 are accounted among the Seven b y different authors . Diogenes ‘ 46 4 7 La ert ius 1 e cra m-( w M oév a a y attributes to Thales , n w to Solon ,

’ E~ ' ’ 4 8 i i l f b a 1rt1 a 6 a . D odorus S cu us O and yy , p m to Chilon speaks 4 9 m Chilon as having written all three . Plutarch says the A phictyons 5 0 m m . m w wrote the on the te ple So e ancient riters held the theory , too , that they were not the words of the Sages , but the utterance 5 1 — of the priestess the view advocated by Ros ch er . The un cer tainty attached to their authorship is well expressed by Porphyry ,

m : Ph emo n oe who su s up the situation with the words Whether , through whom the Pythian God is said to have first distributed

men r/{bet e a vr ov Ph a n o t h ea favors to , uttered this (y ) or , the D B priestess of elphi , or whether it was a dedication of ias or Thales i i m . or Ch lon , started by so e d vine inspiration or whether it was i before Ch lon as Aristotle says in his work on Philosophy , who ”5 2 soever it was let the question of its origin lie in dispute . We are not only in doubt concerni ng the original authorship of

D . the sayings , but we do not know how early they appeared at elphi m m 6 t h They ust have been on the te ple built toward the end of the , 5 or early in the th , century to replace the old stone structure de

54 8 B . stroyed by fire in and it is possible , if not probable , that 4 they were on the earlier temple of s t o n e fi Plutarch speaks of the “ “ x O ld E E e istence in his day of an wooden , the bronze of the ” ” 55 E E L . Athenians , and the golden of the mpress ivia If the bronze E was dedicated by the Atheni ans to adorn the n ew temple which the Alcma eon ida e made splendi d with its front of Parian 56 m ma E arble , it y be that the wooden was rescued from the fire

4 l n i of 5 8 B . C . This new temple built by the A cma eo da e was de

‘4 t S rom. 14 5 l 9 . See a B . L r P o . a . r em I , , so iog e t IX ‘5 ’ H z P a a n i a s v l us o . . 2 . 74 9 it ig s , III , pt , p .

9 35 . I , , ‘7 2 1 6 . . 1 1 4 . I , , Cf I , , 4 9 3 6 . I , , ‘9 1 0 . IX , 5 ° De a G rrul . 1 7.

l . Al C x . t S rom. 4 i 1 1 3 1 6 0 D o . La r . e I , , g e t I , , 5 2 S l . or . 26 . tob F XXI , 53 H r u 1 0 8 P u . 1 3 a 5 . e odot s II , s X , , 5“ ' Schultz thinks from the sta tement by Porphyry tha t 7 11 650; a a vr cw a t l a w a s o n m l e st the stone te p e . 55 De E a ud el h os 3 . p D p , c . 5 ° H er . 2 6 . P . r P h a t . V , Cf ind , y VII . “ ” KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERA TURE 7

4 t h 4 t h m stroyed and rebuilt in the century , and the century te ple

f B . C . seems to have su fered partial destruction in , and again ’ 5 7 m in Nero s time . Presu ably the sayings were inscribed anew with

u Goet tlin Ro sch er each reb ilding , or if they were on tablets , as g and 5 8 ma m o think , the old ones y have been rescued on so e of these cca

in seril sions . Pliny tells us that the sayings were ed in letters of 5 9 — n l R m gold a addition be onging to the o an P eriod , doubtless , as

Plutarch says of the golden E . The exact position of the inscriptions on the temple is variously ’ 6 0 given . The scholiast on Plato s says they were on the 6 1 m Propylaea . Macrobius in one passage places them on the te ple 6 2 - front , and in another on the door post . Pausanias , however , 6 3 Diodorus says they were on the pronaos , and in speaking of the 64 three best known to us says they were on a certain column . The m coin referred to above represents the te ple as hexastyle , with the

ma E in the central Space , which may or y not be indicative of its

h r position . Ro sc e thinks it may have been suspended between the 6 5 t w o m colu ns of the pronaos , While the other inscriptions were written three each on t w o tablets in boustrophedon fashion and a t t a ch ed to either column . He also conceives the idea of the sayings being written on six tablets attached to the six columns of the temple

E 11 630; u r ou front , with the on the left central and 7 e v on the right central column ; but the theory that they were on one or both of the m m pillars of the pronaos see s to us ore plausible , especially in view of its support by the earlier of the ancient authorities . m As regards the original eaning of these sayings , we have spoken of ’ Ro sch er s s u ggestion that they ma y have corresponded in a sense to 6 D u 6 the Mosaic ecalog e . In a later article he developes the idea that , D m . originating at elphi , they all had to do with the te ple service The E would be the welcome and assurance of the God to the w o r

O ct a shipper , and the ? hp would enjoin upon him to give the G od

5 7

r z r o P a us . 1 9 4 . v l a n o . . 328 II . F e X , , V , p 5 3 Ab a n dl n . 2 2 h u en 5 . g , p 5 ° N . H . 2 3 . VII , 5 ° 2 29 E .

5 ‘ m c S o u . S i . 2 9 . p I , , 5 2 t . S a 6 6 . I , , 6 3 2 4 1 . X , , “4 1 0 . r 1 . r t Men i . . 6 9 R a S a . . IX , Cf V o, p p , ed eise . “5 P il LX h . 96 , . 5 ° P - il. L h X , 98 1 00 . “ ” 8 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERA TURE

P O O L a oy . V c ur sacrifice and honor , he says , was an exhortation to the worshipper to be clear about himself and what he wanted ; the M1768): ( h o w an exhortation to limit the excessive number of requests

' ’ m E i a 7rd a 6 a with which any seekers assailed the God ; and qm , p m, whi ch taken independently later came to mean “ Give a pledge

(whether of bonds or in betrothal) without great caution , and trouble ”6 7 “ m l B dem n el b de awaits you , eant origina ly ringe nur Gott dei G ii

du erfiillen m du dar , aber bedenke dabei auch , dass es usst , wenn ” eb R nicht der Gottli en Strafe O der ache verfallen willst . This ’ theory of Ro sch er s that the sayings originated at Delphi and had at first only a local application implies that the attributing of them to the Wise Men was a later tradition arising through their Similarity in form to the general “ Wisdom Literature ” or Proverbs of the B ut D Greeks . the ancient theory that they appeared at elphi only after they had become current proverbs is at least equally plausible . We have observed that Plato is the first to refer them 6 8 m to the Seven Sages , but in his ti e likewise do we find first mention of their presence on the Delphic temple . Yet they were current ’ ‘9 M oév év a v Th eo n is long before Plato , for n y is quoted by g and Pin 6 8 ‘ ’ 70 I vcw t a a v-rou dar , and by the tragic poet Ion , and (with a dif 71 72 feren t form of the verb) by Hera cleit us and .

“7 ‘ 2 1 1 4 B Ka i 7 0 81 0 5 1 1 6 w okkous See Pl r S a . on vi vi a m . 6 u a S e t . t ch , p p C c ( ) )

‘ ’ ’ ' v t a r . é x o v Ka dw r w o xb 35 0. u d a 6 r y éy d y p o vs , w okl o trs 6 (i rrla r s , évlovs Oé i dgo o s e n s 7 7 0 p )

“3 r r A fra gment of Pinda r (2 16 ed . Ch ist) ea ds

! Bl Ka i r e, “wi th Error a lma a u i rep w a éis .

l ur a in x Eo oo i. r rr Sa b ut It is possib e , of co se , th t its conte t g efe ed to the ges , th e a bsence of a n y qualifying word in the fra gment a n d the fa ct th a t Pinda r some times used Eo cpo t of poets lea ves the ma tter in doubt . “9 335 6 5 7.

7° ra . 5 . a n . F g 5 ed . N ek 7‘ r 1 1 a . l . F g 6 . Die s 72 P l H m r a n allu ool a a vr év in ro 309 . T o a m. w scho i sts on o e see sion to w M a a I li in o rf . l a vol . D d 8: ad :5 3 . o III (B a meri I li a s S ch i . III ed V ed ss)

’ “ ' yvolns x o io v cpon os Execs fla kepfiv r a p dxo ur w .

a o n e m fa r a s sa : O 0K d a Xikw vos tb s in ro c a iuer a t In f ct , of the goes so to y p , p ,

‘ - ‘ ’ l a a a 66 ; 7 6 o a vrc w w e O o v. An u r r a 7 m , myp y s ch inte p et tion of the I i d p ss ge ,

v r T h e oi h a s ra r ma use L mb a xw howe e , is wide of the ma rk . w ns the the idio tic of 7 7 u P R 36 2A 4 6 6 C n o t r r n d l r . la e . fo nd inf equently in Home a e sewhe e (cf to p , , S 9 ‘ ’ ’ O A in x r r or r a T u fin d out . Th e ) e p essing a so t of challenge th e t , hen yo d

l a mi a n d r a H m r a n a h n ot m urr scho i st sses this , e ds into o e ide w ich did beco e c ent u l a la r r la r r r r l nti te da y . Thi s tendency o n the p a t of te w ite s to efe the De phic ’ - m x m B . a H v vi m . 2 1 1 64 C m r r i r t . a . Con i u i s to o e a ppea s al so n Plu ta ch s S ep S p , c ( ) “ ” KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 9

m i Whatever their origin , these two sayings ca e to have an m “ B h mense importance in Greek thought . ehold ow many questions

‘ ' ’ these inscriptions I vcbdt e uvr ou and Mnoév é wa v have set afoot amongst m the philosophers , says Plutarch , and what a ultitude of discussions ” 73 has sprung from each of them as from a seed . And in another m 74 p assage he compares them to strea s confined in a narrow channel . ” “ One cannot see through their meaning , he adds , but if you consider what has been written or said about them by those w h o m wish to understand what each eans , not easily will you find longer ” m l it in discussions than these . Of such long and u t ud ous fl iscus

few set ii ' sions comparatively have been left to us , although un ya v

' 1 a v7 cw and particularly 7 1 6391. a are scattered all through our extant

m m m refl ec literature , and their ention is often acco panied by so e tions upon their meaning . The longest surviving work which bears

ool a a v7 6v directly upon the w is the Alcibiades I , ascribed to Plato , m 75 though conceded by any scholars to be of doubtful authenticity .

The Neo - Platonist commentators upon the dialogue have much to say about the maxim itself , and there are discussions of shorter

e Dio length to be found elsewh re in Plato , in Xenophon , Chrysostom, E pictetus , Cicero , Plutarch , Julian , and a great many other writers . B ut Aristotle ’ s fullest treatment of the apophthegm was apparently

’ " ' " w 6 7 ! ‘ 6 l 17 a 1! mu . 6 A w rro s 11 1 Yé rra lgy 1rp $ éué X ep a a s, 6 7 6 , 1ro v6 6 §w u 66 7 0 197 00 O unp o v " ‘ ixvva t rea l a n. 7 6 V v Em a x w éa v7 6 v 2 r v é b e ee . 6 eitp e7 ) drrori e (m u op a. w ym (S p )

’ ’ ! ' v v 7 61 6 0 6 va o éa 7 0 8 p n6é érra w ér n . 73 2 E a pud Delph os c . .

‘ ’ 7‘ ‘ P a l 9 7 6 1 t a a v7 6 v Ka i 7 6 M Bév ci a v d u oéé a fl De yth i e O ra cu i s 2 . n y xe e

' m a 7 a a l 7 6. 7 t 7 év 1r Ka 0 a 0 a u 6. p0é7 p 7 6 W o u 7 oi s eis a 7 ev6 v a vuflh t fiefa t u érrovfle 9 “ E r . 4 r ei a m . a Mo 2 P a e r r i i r . 8 : t e ea a ua a ec un t u er s n Cf Senec p , ips q e p p , p mul um h a b ea n t o n deri s u u a ut a rmi in t ext a u a ut r a o ra se t p , tiq e si c ni s nt p os r l l tione in sententi a coa ta t a . Qua ia s unt il a a u t reddita o ra culo a ut Simi i h l a : Tem ori a r T e e . T e A r a l a m r p p ce , nos e ncients g e t y d i ed the conciseness of — — ’ x r La r v o f x ee Pl P ta r e p ession the conic b e ity these ma ims . S a to s ro go a s

' 34 33 a n d Plu a r De Ga rrulita te 1 7 fla v d ow a t 66 1 ml 7 63V i a t ch y g o Bp xl éy o z ,

’ ' xa l 7 3 ie i 7 0 8 II vfllo v of) T V IN ct Ba Ka i 7 1, O OOa a t a v 0 6 7 0 H i t/6 6 ) 4 pq fi 6 e , 66 65 pm ‘ r a low a s érré a I/ a v o i aklxd. 7 6 1 t a a v7 6 v Ka i 7 6 M 6év li / a v Ka t 7 6 , y p I , n q ,

’ l r 1rdp a 5 am . Th e Rhetorica write s used them a s a n illustra tion of a

' ’ xé a . See m r u P O n S t le 9 : 6 i ov7 a t 6 (56 6 Mi a £0 7 2. 7 6 c lxov p y De et i s ( ) y p g , nn

' Zk a 7 7 ov o Iov “ v t v7 K 1 1 r t 7 6 y cbfl a ea 6 v a i 7 6 £170 8 0643 7 6 7 561 0 0 40 631 . Also A istides Ar

' ’ ’ o Rh etori c 4 l i rf lx v D n do : Ké a 6 0 7 3. c o v é o K A 83 o . . 76 3 . £ s a d f II , p , ed uu u p

év 7 t0é ey ov tb s 7 6 vé flt a a v7 6v Ka i l er p y , v , ant 75 See H l - t - P s eudo la on i ca . 6 1 72 . eide , p pp ‘ ” 10 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

76 ’ ‘ ’ in his lost work on Philosophy ; of Porphyry s book entitled I vcbet ’ 77 Ea vr cw we have only extracts ; and w e likewise have extracts only ’ 78 fromVarro s satire under the same title . The Stoics wrote many

m m su m treatises upon this apophtheg , in which they ade it the and 79 O f h ilO SO h substance p p y , but none of these are extant , and the only complete ancient work which bears the title IIEPI TO T I‘NQO I ’ EATTO N directly is St ob a eus collection of statements from various 80 writers upon the subject . But while most of the longer discussions of a a v7 6v have

m S h ow m m been lost , enough re ains to how us thoroughly the axi permeated ancient literature and thought . Plato said it was on everybody ’ s tongue 8 1 and writers of almost every class use it in one 82 connection or another . Men failed to heed it in practice , but they mm looked upon it as a divine co and and held it in due reverence . Dio Chrysostom calls the sayings at Delphi almost more divine ” 83 than the oracles delivered by the inspired priestess ; and Cicero

2 says that so great is the force of 7 1 6391. a a vr bv that it is attributed 84 “ not to some ma n but to the Delphic god . The E ca elo descendit ” 85 W O O L a ea v7 6v of Juvenal may be regarded as a succinct expression of ancient feeling regarding the maxim . m n An expression which see ed sent of Heave , through whosever m i lips it first ca e , and wh ch was so frequently upon the tongue and R m m m pen of the Greeks and their o an ad irers , ust have been fraught

7 ’ ’ ° lor 2 1 2 l A S . . 6 . P r )\ 7 0 7 II a Tw uuc Ad . l t 0 7 0 7 é év oi u a 2 . s ; s tob F ; ; cf t ch Co o . p n l m r Al x . a d . S m . 14 n 6 0 . C e of e t o I , , 77 l - 2 . or 8 . Stob F . 7 3 - S at . M en i . . 1 44 1 4 7 R p pp , ed . eise . 7° ul a O r . 1 SSD J i n VI , . 9° 1 r 2 . Flo . 9‘ u ra . 1 . . Hi a rch us 2 28E r a a H a r u u S p p cf pp , whe e it is s id th t ipp ch s set p Herms in every deme bea rin g epigra ms of his o w n composing tha t the people mi m a rv l a t r ght not e the wise insc iptions a t Delphi . 82 See E 1 1 r ' 6 1 t a a v7 6v 6 eu6 s u . 8 . 6 d 6 6 m o é a rw a t 7 pictet s III , o y y p 4 p n ’ a im) voo iiw os Pla u u P s e l - udo us , t s , 972 3 “ Pa u ci ist uc fa ciun t homines qu od t u p ra edi ca s ; ri Na m in foro vi x decumus quisque est qui ipsus sese n ove t .

Au soni us De H eredi olo 1 9- 20 “ Qua mqua m di fli cile est se n o s cere ; w eer o ea vr ov u a m r le i mus t a m n ecle imus . q p ope g , cito g 33 ’ O r . L 3S6 R tb s 7 3 6 7 0 2 Ka i a e66v T L 7 631! a é w 0a 67 e a XXII , 4 ) 6 0. x xpn p p ,

6 r II i 0 3 ) vG a. Exp a . 84 De Le i b 2 us 2 . See g I , p . 6 9 . 85 2 7. XI ,

CHAPTER II

‘ I NQO I EATTO N As KN O W Y O UR MEASURE

The earliest apparent reference to w ear a a v7 6 V is found in a l fragment attributed to Hera cleit us :

' ' n r t i dvdpd ow 7 6 0 ué7 6 0 7 t y w coa xew éw vr obs Ka i a w gopovei v. m B ut this is only a frag ent , and without the context the meaning which the words are int ended to convey cannot be determined direct l m y . The frag ent of Ion , to which we have also alluded , tells us i l m O O L e uvr ou d fli cu t . erely that W is Aeschylus , however , who is ’ m the only other author to use the phrase directly before Plato s ti e , brings it into his , where its meaning is unmistakable . — — The self- will of Prometheus his defiant pride has brought h im to his doom and nailed him to a beetling crag on the desolate edge

. hi s o w n of the world Justified in eyes for his service to man , he can see in Zeus ’ treatment of him only ingratitude for his help in gaining the throne and an arbitrary use of power , and his Titan i i B m hear t knows no fl n ch n g . ut Oceanus at length co es to beseech 2 : him to conciliate Zeus , and says in the course of his pleadings

y i‘v a xe a a v7 6v Ka i p eflé puoa a t 7 p6 170 vs

‘ veobs v66s y ap Ka i 7 6p a w 0 s év 0eai s .

’ Obviously Oceanus plea is that Prometheus may humble his pride ” and adopt manners becoming a subject god . To know himself n ew i m is to know his place as subject of the k ng , to recognize his li i 4 ta tion s in his inability to defy Zeus save to his own hurt . And

i ool o a vr év w i these mean ngs of w , together th the more general idea

l 1 19 r l ti h esii Reli uia e u . Herac ei E S or . . a o tob F V , Byw te ( p q , CVI ,) q esti ns l s i a u i b u l r 1 1 6 r a a s u . sub t t a . the thent city of this , Die s (f g ) t e ts it gen ine Die s

ut es o vefv fo r M r di a w o vefv u v n o r a fo r . t SS. a qpp the e ng ¢p , tho gh he gi es e son doing so

m - 1 P ro . 309 3 0 .

3 H a rr P rometh eus 1 r r v r l a r l c n y ( p . 84 ) ende s the e b e n to know thyse f ( ” “ dea vo r) a s distinguished from the a orist come to a knowledge of thy l ru a n d u r a s im . n o t a s a se f sa ys tha t the p res . p is b pt gent m m r a r . Thi ma ru b ut v r l l r u r the o ist s y be t e , e y ike y the eq i e ents of the ete ul m r r wo d o e na tu ally a ccount for the shi ft in ten se .

’ Simila r to this in spirit a re the words of O dysseus in E uripides Hec ub a ’ vv 2 26 - 22 ( . 8) when he a nnounces Polyxena s doom :

’ um 6 1s xev é n t kk a v é£éw ns éuo l

’ ‘ yiv a xe 6 Ka i r a po vo la v xa x43u

' 7 43V 0 43V a , o

’ of knowing the measure of one s capacity , were undoubtedly the

m m w e m usual connotations of the axi , as shall see fro our further study . m ma If these were the early forces of the apophtheg , we y venture to construe the fragment of Hera cleit us quoted above somewhat 5 “ in this w ay : It is the part of all men to know their limitations and ’ Hera cleit us m be sober . Another of frag ents has been thought — to be connected with the well- known saying the phrase 66 1070 6 a fi ’ ép ew vr ov Plutarch in his refutation of Colot es attack upon Soc ’ 7 : rates , says with regard to Socrates seeking to know what man is

’ ‘ ’ H x ei m 03 6 0 TL Ka i 6 1 11 La rrerr a ' 611 0 ( a t 6 6 pa h s, s 11 7 0 11 1 6 6 p yu s m ,

' ' ‘ é v7 1 1ca 7 431 611 Aek i a o ww v 06 16 017 0 11 666K6 1 7 6 I Vibdc 0 a v7 011 . uew 61 , i 1 goo s y p nu 7 8 ' And Julian connects the t w o in like manner : 0 13x0 61 6 My (611 ) Aelwpols

' ‘ ’ ' 7 11 4301 0 0 11 611 n oa O e a H a x ei r o 66 661 0 6 1 1 11 6 1 6 w v7 611 . 06 6g 6 7 7 p y p IJ , p k s 0 1 1 7 1 9 “ ‘ B urnet says in his Greek P h ilos oph y : The Delphic precept Know ’ Thyself was a household word in those days and Herakleit us says ‘ ’ ‘

. 1 I sought myself He also said (fr . 7 ) You cannot find out the ”0 : boundaries of soul so deep a measure hath it . Whether Her

' a cleit us really used the word aignp a t with the idea of soul- searching attributed to him by men of a later day , we cannot tell surely from

w e such a mere fragment , though know that he was a great thinker “ along ethical lin es as well as along the lines of natural philosophy “ a thinker of that class to whom nothing thoughtful can be strange .

B ut however much of self - examination the words 6610 70 640 7711 611 6 4 1117 611 Hera cleit us may imply , there is no indication that in using them him

11 4301 0 611 R w e self had 7 0 117 in mind . ather would like to b elieve m d that he used the maxi as we have indicated above , and expresse — the idea of a deeper inner knowledge of self in other ways with words like 619711 0 1 .

5 It is possible tha t 0 w ¢po z1 6 211 ma y be synonymou s here with 7 111 430 x6 w ‘ ’ éw vr obs m a l 3 ff. ur . 3 in its e ning of Know yo p a ce . See pp

l r 0 1 a . 1 . Die s , . f g 7 l t Ad . o o . . 20 C c .

O r . I8SA VI , .

P . 5 t . 9 . I , p 1 ° 82 See p . .

1 1 ‘ L r I ‘ ou 6 O a v éo to 6K 1ra 16w 11 7 rea l 11 11 a . 1 4 é e 6 s 6 6 60 5 63 See Diogenes e t IX , . . y u , ’ cw xe 1 7 6611 6 16611 0 1: 6 1 1 1 1 M 7 6 6 10 9 1 61 7 0 1. 6 1 6 1 6 1 0 vw xéva t xova é 7 0 66 6 1 6 d q 1 1 1 7 1 s, év . fi 6 3 , ' a 137 611 6 6 t 70 0 0 0a u lor m § 1 Cf . Stob . F . 1 2 Gr eek P ilos o h h ers . 1 9 . Benn, p , p “ ” 14 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

’ If 1 711 4301 0 0 0 7 611 ordinarily suggested knowing one s measure or ma limits , we y agree with the scholiast in seeing an indirect allusion ’ ’

P th i a n 34 . to it in Pindar s y II , He is speaking of Ixion s falling Sin m into presumptuous in atte pting to pollute the couch of Hera , and he adds

’ 1 1 1 xpfi66 Ka 7 0 137 61 1ra vr6s 6pa1 ué7 p0 1 .

Jebb says : this passage has been taken to imply the Pythagorean ” 13 1 4 doctrine of a relative ethical mean ; Taylor in his A n ci en t I dea ls “ 1 1 6611 renders it , Take measure of Thyself and connects it with 1 1 15 m m while Gildersleeve calls it , only another for of the ho ely — advice of Pittacus to one about to wed above his rank 7 6 11 xa r d 0 0 117 6 11 ”

6M . 0 Gildersleeve translates it , however , T measure everything ’ ’ m ” i . e . ow n by one s self , , to take one s easure in every plan of life ; and this meaning “ to take one ’ s measure ” the scholiast of old recog n iz d m D 11 6301 0 0 0 11 e as the co mon interpretation of the elphic 7 7 6 . “ ” i 1 6 It is fitting , says the schol ast on the passage , to consider the ’ measure of things according to one s power and to desire these , and not strive for those beyond our power . This is like the inscription ” 1 by Chilon at Delphi . The word u67 p0 1 may suggest the doctrine of the Mean , it is true , and the context of the passage happens to m fit well with the Pittacus saying ; but if , as see s probable , the idea of taking one ’ s own measure was to the Greek an instant reminder of 1 7 1 1 1 4391 0 0 0 7 61 m . 7 , it see s natural to so construe it here

By way of evidence that 7 11 6301 0 0 0 7 611 in its ordinary acceptance ‘ ’ m w e meant know your own easure , have an interesting passage ’ 1 8 in Hellen ica h ra s b ulus m Xenophon s , where T y akes it the text of his address to the City party after the victory of the patriots

1 3 Essa s a n d ddre s 5 A sse . 5 . y , p , ft note . ‘4 l V o . a 202 I , p ge note . ‘5 l m i a a 2 0 H e m a r P a r O n nd P t i a n d . h O es 6 . y p y , p co p es with this ind ’ ’ ' — a s a A lu F ro 2 di s 7 6 x 6 ei30 a t xa fi éa v7 611 6 t 0 7 6116 1 a x 3 W p s ge eschy s m. 89 : n p p p4 hich , a s m ur S elect O des o P a 14 r m us S l a o n A lu i n d r . 5 Sey o ( f , p ) e inds , the cho i st eschy s “ a v l s ys is a de e opment of the sa ying of Pitta cus . 1 5 ’ ' 1 1 i3 6011 0 1 1 11 7 6 é7 0 11 0 K0 176 i 11 4 1 x 7 a. 1 6a v7 0 ol . 2 r 7 43 a 7 1 V . D a h m II , p . ed . c a n . 3 1 p p

’ rea l 7 0 137 0111 érrtdv ei v Ka 1 1 1 ' 10 11 66 7 0 67 0 7 3 i17 6 X lkw vo i. 7 431 1 0 u. 1 p , m) brrép 60 04 1 1 1 6p é ye0 9 61 0 4 s

' 611 Aeh c oi s 11 4301 0 a v7 11 p [7 6 ] . ‘7 ’ — 1 1 Th e ra in a m 72 61 0 1 o Ios 60 0 1. 1 0 9031 a a a r r m ph se this s e ode v . 7 1 t ken p t f o

x mi 1 11 l r 2 4 m r r 1 650 1 0 a v7 6 al b ut a s G l v . 6 its conte t , ght see to efe to 7 so , i de s ee e (p ) “ 1 0 941 11 n o t a a r mma a n d m a S shows , the 1 is p t of the co nd , the sentence e ns how l f ” u a rt or a v a u . thyse f who tho , I h e t ght it thee 1 " 4 0- 4 1 II , IV, . “ ” KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 15

over the Thirty at Eleusis . Upon the conclusion of the terms ’ m of peace and the disbanding of Pausanias ar y , the patriots had marched up to the Acropolis and offered sacrifice to Athena ; and m E m . when they ca e down , the generals called a eeting of the cclesia Thrasybulus then made an address beginning with the words

' 1 13 1 1 43 6K 7 0 6 6 11 6 6 s 0 v 0 l ei1w 6 41 11 431 011 01137 0 139 . 11 1 , p , u6 7 7 “ ” And you might know yourselves best , he goes on to say , if you would take account of the qualities upon which you ought to pride m yourselves in attempting to rule over us . Are you ore just? The

o pe ple , though poorer than you , have never wronged you for the sake

w h o of money , while you , are richer than all , have done many dis graceful deeds for the sake of gain . Consider whether it is for your courage forsooth that you ought to feel pride . What fairer test of this than the way in which we have carried on the w a r against each other? Could you claim to be superior in intelligence m Pelo en you who with a fortification , and ar s , and money , and p n esia n e w h o h a d allies have be n worsted by men . none of these ? ” fi things This quotation is suf cient , perhaps , to Show the sense m m in which Thrasybulus used the axi , and it is significant not only because the apophthegm formed the basis of a speech before the m Assembly on so mo entous an occasion , but also because it dem o n st ra t es the interpretation put upon 7 11 4301 0 0 v7 611 by ordinary men i m of a fl a rs . Thrasybulus would have the City party easure them

in selves carefully comparison with the patriots , and recognize the limits of their own moral qualities and power to achieve . 1 9 Xenophon discusses our apophthegm in his Cyropa edi a in the story of a conversation between Croesus and Cyrus after the capture “ m ” . e of Sardis Tell , Croesus , said Cyrus , how have your responses from Delphi turned out? For it is said that Apollo has received m i ”20 much service fro you and you do everything in obedience to h m . Croesus gave a brief account of his relations with the Oracle and told of h ow after one of his sons was born dumb and t h e other w a s 21 a fllict ion killed , he sent in his to ask the God in what way he could

1 9 - 2 - 1 H r u 8 9 . Th e m l r 20 25 . . a ma VII , II , Cf e odot s I , si i ity between ny ’ a ur hi r a nd a u in H r u r fe t es of t s sto y of Xenophon s the cco nt e odot s is st iking , ’ b ut 11 4301 a a v7 611 a the connection with 7 is Xenophon s ddition .

2 ° H r - r . 5 1 ll us r e . 4 6 5 1 . a u r Cf I , , esp , whe e he te s th t C oes s sent ich gifts l to De phi .

2 1 H r e . 34 ff Cf . I , . “ ” 16 KN O W TH YSELE IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

22 m 1 1 . Ea vr ov 1 41 1 Spend the rest of his life ost happily 7 7 1 0 10 0 6 1360 111 0 11 , K '‘ l o 1 0 6 7 6 0 0 6 1 s . p , p , the god rep ied Croesus thought that the easiest thing in the world , he said , for while in the case of other people it m t is possible to know so e and others not , he hought every one knew m B t with regard to hi self both who and what he is . u after several

fl a t t erers years of peace , spoiled by his wealth and by , and by those h im m mm who begged to beco e their leader , he accepted the co and ” m w a s m of the ar y , supposing he capable of beco ing very great “ ”

m . not knowing hi self , forsooth For he thought he was able to

ma n m carry on war against Cyrus , a descended fro the gods , of m 24 kingly race , and practised in courage fro a child while the first B n m . ut ow of his own ancestors to be king was a freed an surely , ” “ 1 11 1110 10 0 1 611 1 0 0 7 611 O Cyrus , he says , 7 7 1 , 4 , and do you think that Apollo spoke the truth in saying that in knowing myself I Shall be ? ” 25 m h im happy Cyrus pro ised to restore to his wife and family , bid i h m m . ding refrain fro wars thereafter , and Croesus was content In this story , which we have necessarily condensed , we see again the ‘ ’ 26 11 4301 0 0 v7 611 m 7 interpreted as know your own easure , for Croesus admits that he thought himself more capable than he was until experience in matching himself against Cyrus brough t h im to a

- better self realization . ’ 2 7 In Plato s P h ilebus we arrive at this meaning of 7 11 4301 0 0 v7 611 through a characterization of the ma n who does not know himself . — Socrates and P ro t a rch us are discussing mixed pleasures pleasures — mixed with pain when both are mental and Socrates says that w e experience these mixed feelings when viewing Comedy . The real

m m — s ecifica ll nature of the co ic is at botto a kind of evil , he says p y that evil which is experiencing the opposite of what is said in the “ 1 1 Pr r h inscription at Delphi . D o you mean 7 1 6201 o t a c us “ : l asks , and Socrates replies I do , and clea y the opposite of that

er es would be not to know oneself at all . g a t then goes on to define ignorance of self as an over - estimate of one of three things

22 H r d u r r ma S l sa w a s 30 . ll u e o ot s (I , fl ) te s how C oes s t ied to ke o on y he the ha ppiest of men .

23 2 ma w a r o n P er 4 . Th r ul Sec . e O a cle told C roesus tha t if he sho d ke the

a ul r a mi m r b ut a m r r v o w n . si ns he wo d dest oy ghty e pi e , th t e pi e p o ed to be his H r 5 3 a n 8 e . d 6 . I , 2‘ l 2 - . A c. I 1 1 D IZZA Cf , . 25 Sec . 2 5 . 2° L . m 395 . S Eth i k der alten Gri ech en . See ch idt , II , p ’ 7 4 8 C 13 . “ ” KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 1 7

2 8 o r o ur . our wealth , our personal appearance , character The ma n

' w h o does not know himse l will fancy that he is richer than his actual m l m a ount of property warrants , or he wil think hi self taller and bet m ter looking than he is , or will think hi self better than he is in point

. m m of virtue And of virtues in general , wisdom is the one that ost en

m n h have a false conceit about . The a w o thus has an exalted O pinion im of h self , if he be powerful and able to avenge any ridicule , will m m be an object of fear ; but if he is weak and har less , he beco es an

O . bject of laughter and despite ) We find pleasure in our laughter , yet in our feeling of despite there is a certain pain . The question as to whether Plato is fair2 9 to Comedy here in taking as an instance m but one type of co ic character need not concern us , for we are interested only in the interpretation of 7 11 4301 0 0 117 611 B y showing l what the opposite wou d be , the passage defines it for us indirectly , ’ for if the man w h o does not know h ms elf has a false conceit of his m possessions , his outward personality , his character and his wisdo , it follows that he w h o does know himself does not over - estimate his wealth , his appearance , his virtue , or his knowledge . In other

o w n m in words , he knows his easure both in external goods and in ternal qualities, The above passage from the P h ilebus is only one of many in which

0 11 0 6 211 60 v7 611 m m the phrase 7 is suggestive of the axi , for it is the usual w a y of expressing a failure to meet the behest . And it is through this negative form that w e are reminded indirectly of 7 11 4301 ’ 1 - 0 0 117 6 1 in Aristotle s description of the High minded ma n . This

High - minded ma n (0 6 7 0 A6pvxos) he regards as a mean between the

Little - minded ma n (ut xpéifivxos) on the one hand and the Conceited

a fivo L - m ma n man (x s) on the other , and he describes the ittle inded as 3° 60 110 511 K0 1< 611 6 6 1 11 7 1 6K 7 0 1 1 0 10 011 60 v7 611 7 4311 0 0 04311 Ka i 0 11 0 6 111 6 0 7 11 x 6 1 ) 5 7 7 6 6 v 6 ,

2 3 ra r r r a r in n ti i 24 0 P r r Isoc tes efe s to this t ip tite di vision his A dos s . o phy y l i . o a r a r v r n (Stob Fl r . spe ks of the t ip tite di ision of igno a nce of se f the

1 1 1 Ph il eb us a n d o n sa : i 0 13 6 7 6 01 1 7 61 01 7 1 s . , g oes to y f 7 1 v

tbs 6 7 6 7 1 : 111 6111 0 00 11 170 7; d7 x1

’ 6 0 7 6176 1 0 611 170 1 1 0 0013 1 0 7 0 1 1 171 6 0 0 1 3 1) p1 1 1 71 ,

0 601 0 v11 v 17 0 111 11 0 1 6 0 111 00 13 - s 6 6 6 0 I t. 36 2 36 4 x x p w ( XV , )

’ 170 : 0 1311 0 7 11 0 10 60 117 0 6 7 61 K0 0 0 137 611 6170 111 01 11 06 10 x6 7 0 1 13176p 7 6s 61711 10 vp 7 770 00 11s 0 137 6 11

' ’ < 110 6 w s 1r)\6 ?ov i 6K6 111 1 6 0 016 7 0 1 7 0 0 117 41 0 6 1 11 0 00 v 0 w 11 170 1 11 1 0 7 6 p f ) 6 6 7 , fis 8 1 p § 7

' ’ 11 4301 0 611 0 0 v7 6 11 6 1 1 1c6 1 6 1 617671 1 1 11 7 s 1 7 0 0 0 11 0 6 v11 0 1 6 w 0 1 0 6t 7 1 5 110 6 p ns 1 s , 17 1 7 7

1 7 1 1 7 61 1. 6 p 0 6171 1701 7 0 11 . 2 9 a h i s r u th e Ph ileb u s 54 5 ma a Jowett in footnote to Int od ction to , p . , int ins a th t he is n o t . 3 ° N16 Eth i c 1 1 2 2 1 s . 9 . 5 a . . IV , . “ ” 18 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

' 1 1 1 1 While he characterizes the x0 61 0 as 1311 1010 1 Ka i 60 v7 o13s 07 1 0 0 131 7 6 9 .

- m ma n ma n The High inded , he tells us , is a worthy of great things , 32 w h o with a true estimate of himself lays claim to greatness . The

L - m ma n ittle inded has great qualities likewise , but he does not think

he has , and in that he does not appreciate his own worth and act

m . upon it , he knows not hi self in that sense On the other hand , the man who lays claim to honors which belong to greatness without possessing the requisite qualities is a fool and likewise lacking in

- - m ma n m self knowledge . The High inded , then , in that he is a ean between the ma n who under - estimates and the ma n who over - esti m m ’ mm m ates hi self , both of whom fail to fulfill the God s co and , ust m m m m m be the very e bodi ent of the axi , since he has a perfect esti ate

of his own high worth . The two historical characters most conspicuous in ancient litera ture for their failure to know themselves were Alcibiades and Alex l i . A c bi a des I ander In the , which is , as we have indicated , a veri ‘ I 11 4301 2 0 117 611 table treatise upon , Alcibiades is represented as a young 33 ma n m , not yet twenty years old , about to co e forward in public if h im l e , and Socrates , whose alleged purpose is to bring to a know

of m m h im m ledge hi self , re inds of his great a bitions and his lack of i p reparation to carry them out . He Shows h m that he really knows

\ nothing about politics , for he does not know the nature of justice m l and injustice , either fro investigating them himse f or from any teacher ; and if he thinks he is n o w orse than other Athenian states m m men , Socrates suggests that he easure hi self with the Spartan

and Persian kings , whose superiority in point of descent , early educa

W . tion , and ealth , he sets forth at length Then he appeals to Alci 34 b ia des : 41 1 0 x0 1 6 176 106 16 11 0 6 1 0 1 11 0 1 7 3 1 with the words 1 p , 1 ; 1 7 6 4 61

' ’ Aelu o i s d 1 a 7 1 11 4301 0 0 117 611 6 7 1 0 137 0 1 1 1711 6 10 1 11 011 0 11 0 1 0AA p 7p 1 p , 7 , 31 7 117 , 0 0x obs 0 13 To the further discussion of the maxim in this Dialogue

we shall return later , but it is interesting to observe that in this —‘ ’ first occurrence it has its ordinary force know your ow n limits ‘ m ’ know your easure .

3 ‘ 1 2 1 5 . 2 a 8 .

32 1 1 2 1 - 0 1 v o 3 . I h i 1 6 M b 2 . n s Rh etori c Aristotle u ses 1 7 1/ x s in a somewha t

a rr r H e 7 6 6 10 611 0 67 6 11 n owe sense . a pplies it to the young a n d defines it a s 5 6 ’ rr v m H e al a l “ 7 d i especti e of the j ustice of the cla i . so spe ks of the O d a s

1 x 61 v o1 a u a v u m l 7 6 7 0 7 6 1 76 0 00 1 l 13 n p p x bec se they h e been h b ed ( ) by ife . (II , , 33 1 2 3 D . 34 1 - 24 A B .

“ ” 20 K NO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

“ m . o w n m D ight be You are your worst ene y , iogenes 4 2 “ ma n o u answered , and this is the of whom y are ignorant as of none other . For no uncontrolled and wicked ma n understands m l hi self , else Apol o would not have enjoined this first of all as the

1 1 4311 0 1 60 117 611 . hardest thing for each of us , 7 Or do you not consider ’ 43 0 0 0 0 1111 m 1, p n the greatest and ost deadly of all diseases “ ” m me D You will have the truth fro alone , iogenes says a little “

m . farther on , and fro no one else could you learn it Alexan er was evidently making the mistake of estimating himself by his p osr tion and military achievements rather than by his real qualities of h im m character , and the Cynic would have know the easure of his

self . r real ’ Diogenes gives the maxim much the same force in Dio Ch ry sost om s 44 S hort dialogue on Reputation . The question is raised as to h o w m f m e m the philosopher see s to di fer fro the r st of ankind , and the gist of Diogenes ’ argument is that the philosopher brings every men thing to the test of truth , while others are guided by what say “

m . ma n D of the Would a be of any account , iogenes asks , if he measures himself by this rule and standard ? and his interlocutor replies that he certainly would not . Then the dialogue continues — ’ Afilxov 7 0p 6 7 1 0 1366170 7 6 7 11 0 117 60 v7 611 0 137 01 0 1c0 174311 O a1 7 0p 6111 7 11 0 117

" ' Q0 7 6 0 13K 011 67 1 176 100 1 7 0 7 43 17p0 0 p7111 0 7 1 “ 11 6 130 0 11 7 1 1ra 11 7 6s 11 010 1 0 11 “ 1 1 1 ff m m n 7 17 1 410 10 1 1 0 137 6 1 . The e ect of flattery in aking a a think more highly of himself than he ought to think ” is a common theme in an cient literature and is associated wi th 7 11 4101 0 0 117 611 on more sides m D than one . It was i plied in the words of iogenes to Alexander to

efl ect A m h im the that lexander would learn the truth fro alone , and we remember that Croesus frankly admitted that he grew to over 4 5 estimate his powers partly because he w a s Spoiled by fl a t t erers . So

men w h o Seneca , in speaking of the subject , says that in position listen to flattery do not know their own strength , but while they m believe that they are as great as they hear the selves called , they 46 s w in draw on unnecessary and hazardous wars . Plato a in this

42 1 6 0 R .

‘3 ’ Fo r o0 117 m r n fi a r 0 11 r a a . a the sig i c nce of the wo d ¢p 7 he e , co p e Ch p IV, p ge

8 1 3 . v 0 10 10 0 1 1 i r l It is e idently the opposite of 0 7 6 7 n its gene a sense . “ O r . L 3 1 6 R . XVII ,

‘5 " ’ Z h 0 0 117 11 60 7 1 6 1 1 0 11 bino v . E e 6 6 1 1r 6 1 S . l 9 s or . 14 4 Cf eno ( tob F , ) 7 x , 1 3 p x p , ' 0 < 0 1 0 6 66 Koh tucw v 1 p p 170 pp170 10 1 .

4‘ " De B e e ii 2 n c 4 n . 8 . s . 30 5 See . fi VI , . p , ‘ ” KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 2 1 sidious evil a chief reason why his dream of an ideal king must m ever fall short of fulfill ent , and its prevalence is undoubtedly re

1 1 1 sponsible in part for the fact that 7 1 430 0 0 117 61 is hard .

When w e come to Latin authors we meet an apparent allusion “ ’ ” ’ to the maxim in this sense of knowing one s mea sure in P lautus

ti ch us S , where in answer to the question “ Quae tibi mulier videtur multo sapientissima? one of the characters replies “ m m uo m secun da e o t erit n oscere Quae ta e , q res sunt , se p g , ”4 7 Et illa quae aequo animo p a t iet ur Sibi esse peius quam fuit . The maxim occurs again with this force in one of Cicero ’ s Phil 4 8 lipics . He is inveighing against the audacity of Antony in occupy ’ “ m : An ing Po pey s house , and he says tu , illa in vestibulo rostra

cum a ds exis t i do mu m u m in t roire ? (spolia) p , t a te putas Fieri

m is m m Sis t t m en . ua v u a non potest Q eni sine ente sine sensu , es , i “ et te e t tua e t t uo s n o s t . In saying you know yourself and your ” o u m m property and y r household , Cicero i plies that Antony ust m ’ realize that he is not Po pey s equal , and to that extent , of course , he knows or measures himself aright .

B u t the best instance in Latin literature of the use of 7 11 4301 0 0 117 611 4 9 with its original force occurs in the satire of Juvenal to which w e m have already alluded . The satire contains an invitation to a si ple

E w h o dinner , and it begins with a picture of an picure lives beyond

m n R ili m ext ra va his means . In a a like u t us a su ptuous table is an V gance , though in the case of entidius it is praiseworthy because of his wealth ; and the Poet continues :

Illum eg o i ure

D es i cia m ui ua s ub limior A la p , q scit q nto t s O m u in L a mo n t ib us t a men m nib s iby sit , hic ide I n oret ua u m rra a dis t et a b a rea g , q nt fe t

l clo i 11 4301 0 6 0 v7 611 Sa u u . E ca cc s descend t 7 , i en du m et m m r t ra ct a n dum r v F g e o i pecto e , si e Conj ugium q ua era s vel s a cri in pa rte sena tu s E sse velis ; Seu t u ma gno discrimine ca usa m P re fe s co n s ule ui ro t eg e a d ct a , te , dic tibi q sis ,

O ra r veh emen s a n ur u et Ma u a . to , C ti s tho b cc e “ ” 22 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

N o s cen da est mensura s ui sp ect a n da q ue reb u s w I n s umrms m mm u e m et ur q , m , Ne mullu m cu i a s u m a u m p , q e sit tibi gobio t nt i ” I n lo cul s .

This extract from Juvenal illustrates so clearly the use of 7 11 4301 0 0 v7 611 which w e have been trying to emphasize that further comment 5 1 upon the passage is s up erfl uo us . ’ St ob a eus compilation of statements from various authors on

11 4301 0 0 117 11 m l the subject of 7 6 contains uch valuable materia in itself , but the very position of the chapter in his Florilegi u m is also Sign i

fica n t . The book consists of quotations touching various virtues m and vices , each chapter on so e virtue being followed by one on its corresponding vice . It is accordingly noteworthy that the chapter on the vice corresponding to IIEPI TO T FNQO I EA’I‘TO N5 2 is entitled IIEPI Thus did the earlier and really dominant A m m . D m force of the axi persist until the sixth century . a id all the added conceptions which the growth of the centuries brought . ‘ ’ Side by Side w ith this general meaning of knowing one s measure m ’ m ‘ or li its , there went the ore specific ideas of knowing what one

i ’ ‘ ’ ’ b can and cannot do , and knowing one s placez They elong very e w e closely to the general thought , how ver , and distinguish them only according to the apparent emphasis in given instances and as a matter of convenience for our study .

5 ° H ra . i . E 7 98 : Met ri ue m ue s uo m ul a c veru Cf o ce , p I , , se q q od o pede ns. ’ “ . Al Luca n s P ha rsali a 5 2 7: Met iri s ua r a decet vires ue est so VIII , egn q

fa t eri .

5 ‘ H r Pa r r i l x en y ks W ight sa ys n his edi tion of J uvenal p . 1 38 ; Juvena e tends

11 4301 0 a o7 6 11 n i m m t m s Nas ce a n a uu r T sc. Di . 5 2 a 7 u . n d it ( ) beyo d the of Cice o , I ’ ” ma lu m a ur a li n r r v kes it inc de the e s e of one s bi ties a d esou ces . It is e ident a r a r Gr u a h a s hi th t the o din y eek s ge esca ped m . “2 S . lor 1 2 . tob F . ‘3 . 22 . r 4 c E xt a ct n o . of this cha pter is ta ken from Philemon a n d re a ds

’ 7 6 7 11 4301 0 0 v7 611 ob 11 07 1711 6 6 70 0 67 1

' 7 0 1 1 lx 6 6611 7 0 137 0 6020 1 61 Ae gooi s 6xet . CHAPTER III

‘ I NQO I EATTO N As KNO W WHAT Y O U CA N AND CANNO T D o

There is a rather long discussi on of 7 11 4301 0 0 117 611 in the fourth ’ l Memora bili a book of Xenophon s , and while the passage contains , m m m more than one idea connected with the axi , the do inant force

o o there given it is a knowledge of what one can and cannot d . S cra tes E ut h dem us is talking with y , a representative of the class of people who think they have acquired the best education and pride them 2 Eu t h demus selves o n their wisdom . y admits that he is aspiring 3 m m a to beco e a states an , s did the young Alcibiades under somewhat 4 h im similar circumstances , and Socrates brings by a series of ques

n m tions to the poi t where he is dis ayed at his inability to answer . 5 “ : E u t h demus Then Socrates asks him Tell me , y , have you ever ” “ Di D ? . d been to elphi Yes , twice , said he you notice , then , — ” “ ” m m 1 1 1 ? an inscription so ewhere on the te ple the 7 1 430 0 0 v7 61 Yes . “ Did you pay no attention to the inscription , or did you heed it and ” “ ” “ ? No or try to consider what you were indeed , said he , f I n n surely thought I knew that at least} I would scarcely know a ythi g ” 6 “ D m n m m . a at all , if I actually did not know yself oes a see to m ? ” you to know hi self who knows his name only asks Socrates , and he goes o n to bring out the thought that just as in buying a

men e t h horse se k to , so we should

‘ 1 6 1 l6b7 e 60 v7 0 11 7 0 7 6 6171 7 1 66 1 0 know our own abili 1 1 7 0p e s 3 , he says , 7

’ “ 7 0 i 7 1 1 1 60 v s 0 0 0 1 «0 1 0 1c0 v0 1 1 7 6 6131 0 1 7 0 1 m l 6. And in doing “ what they understand , he continues , they procure what they need m and are successful , while by refraining fro what they do not under B . ut stand , they are without fault and avoid faring ill those m who do not know the selves , and are deceived about their own m ability , are in like case with regard to other men and other hu an affairs ; they do not know what they need nor what they are doing m nor what they are using , but , istaken in all these things , they miss

1 c . II . 2 1 Sec . .

3 Sec . 1 1 .

’ Socra tes method of proceedure in dea ling with the you th is quite Simila r l a so . 5 A Sec . 24 .

See . p . 78 . “ ” 24 KNO W THYSELF I N GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

" the good and fall upon evil You see this , too , in the case of — states that those which go to war with a stronger power , ignorant ” o w n 8 of their inability , are laid waste or lose their freedom . Eut h ydemus at length admits that knowing oneself should be made

m m h ow a atter of great i portance , and asks one ought to begin the

- m . self exa ination Socrates does not reply directly , but by a series E m of further questions about Good and vil and about De ocracy , he leads Eu t h ydemus to recognize still more his o w n ignorance and

i - sends h m away crest fallen . This idea of knowing the extent of one ’ s ability seems to be the ’ leading thought in Aristotle s treatment of 7 11 4301 0 0 v7 611 in his Rh et 9 ori c in the course of his discussion of the use of maxims in Oratory .

m difli cul t ies The passage has presented so e in translation , to judge E “ from the obscurity of most nglish renderings , but the general “ meaning becomes clear if we interpret knowing oneself correctly . “ ” M con t ra dict ib n axims may be cited too , Aristotle says , in of sayings that have become public property , (by public property I

11 4301 0 0 v 11 1 1 6611 0 0 11 mean , for instance , the 7 7 6 and the 1 7 7 ) whenever

they are uttered under stress of emotion . It would be a case

‘ n 6 77 1 6 1 6 1 6 110 s 0 0 11 1 6 860 5 6 111 0 1 035 66 1 of the emotio al use , for example , s p7 § 7 4 7 1

'’ “ ’ 0 137 611 0 67 0 11 1 1 1 7 11 0 0 7 6 0 7 0 7 1 6 1 11 s 7 0 6 6 67 17 1 0 10 1 0 1 60 v 6 , 111c 17 p 77

1 0 0 77511 110 6 1 . Cope is probably right in understanding the 67 s to be “ some imaginary person , and in taking the words of the sentence

7 ’ 2 - 2 7 - Sec . 6 . . Pl Cf a to s Ch a r mides 1 64 A C . 8 O bserve in this connection the us e of the Greek word 7 7 0 10 10 0 31 6 27 fo r ’ know ing the we a kness of one s fighting powe r in compa rison with tha t of the

my Her 1 1 11 1 11 0 w 6 11 0 10 1 1 0 6 6 « 0 1 61 177 6 . 1 Ka f s . 25 : 6 61 111 1 0 041 7 0 137 6 ene III , 1 1 ufi n 7 1 x , 77

'

61710 0 1 7 6 11 0 7 0 7 6 11 6171 7 0 1 06 11 6 11 0 11 11 6 1 0 0 7 06 1 r 6 11 711 0 o b s . p , 73 p x 7 7 76 17 1 7 , fi 77 ¢

Eur K ra l 7 - 7 ipides e e . 06 0 7:

' xpfiv 7 110 10 1 11 0 x6 i x1 0 1711 fikmia v

’ ’ 1 7 6. 6 dp fixa v 601 .

° 4 l . . Her . 1 I l P . I a P . D a n s . 30 29 Isoc . ad . hi 83 See so VII ; V II , ; X , VII , Cf

Se e a De B ene cii s 30 5 : I n ora vere v r s ua et dum t am ma n c , fi VI , , g i e s s se gnos

ua m a udiun t credun t xere erva cua et in discrimen r rum m um q , adt ra sup e o ni “ erven t ll I Hi cum et ua O ura a . Th e Au r ad Herren ium 9 p be cto V , se s s pes et a m ar n orun t t um v r l m u r r ro in ui ta t em et copi necess io , e o nihi o in s p opte p p q m um r rum so ie r u ulu R ma u r o ni e c t a t em quid omn ibus eb s pop s o n s posset , sci e ” “ et existim - - L ma r : His an iae a re o r 190 191 . t e l 1 4 . an t . ru 7 3 p F o s , II , , , pp ed e i e p n u mqua m a nimu s fuit a dv ersu s nos un iversa e co n surg ere Sed a nte a Romanis o b s essa est q ua m se ipsa cogn oscere t ; et 5 0 10 omni um p rovin cia ru m ” v r s ua o s t ua m v e a in ellexit i e s s , p q i t est , t . 9 2 1 . 1 3 II , . “ ” KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 25 with which it begins as Aristotle ’ s own rather than as a quotation 1 0 m . from so e orator And Cope is right , too , in suggesting that ’ “

n . the maxim means knowing one s o w incapacity . The ima

” gin a ry orator in a burst of indignation against some incompetent “ ’ general thus says in effect : It s all a lie that one must know h im ! a u h o w self At v rate . if that fellow had known incapable he was , he would never have claimed the office of General”’ 1 1 While we have no instance of a 7 11 4301 0 0 117 611 in the extant spoken orations of the

Ten Orators , this passage , like the address of Thrasybulus in Xeno ’ Hellen i ca phon s , indicates the sense in which it was naturally used in public speeches , and its evident meaning for the audience . This meaning for the maxim is further illustrated in Epictetus ’ 1 2 - Discourse to a Would b e Cynic . B eing a Cynic involves not merely r ff 1 3 wea ing a cloak and going about begging with sta and wallet , 1 4 ff . D he says It involves the rising superior to esire , indi erence D 1 5 1 6 to eath , and the consciousness of having been sent from Zeus to proclaim to people fearlessly that they are seeking for happiness in possessions and in power rather than in indifference to these

m n things . A a who is going to be a Cynic must look himself over to see if he is equal to the exactions of the Cynic life , just as a con testant at the Olympic Games takes notice of his shoulders and 1 7 . obh ev0 0 1 6171 1 6 h é0 7 6 0 11 11 4301 a u7 611 011 01< 11 0 11 7 thighs B 7 p , he adds , 7 0 , p1 6 ' 1 8 6 1 1 1 6 0 1 1 1 0 1 61 0 06 0 17 1 1 6171 6 1 7 0 . 1 , x 7 7 x p 7 779 For the Cynic must be in truth m m superior to others if he would teach . He ust be as a queen a ong

1 ° ’ m ta r o 2 1 7 . l t r c t 0 . a Aris tot e s Rh e o i Wi h Co men b M . e 13 . S ndys , y y C p , p n Vict o riu s r r r a r a I h icra t es l l r thinks the wo ds efe to ce t in p of ow y o igin, who h m i v r l d a n . u l in a a 1 7 a a . 3 co e to ch e e disti ction B ck ey note to his t ns tion , p , “ ” ’ l a : Th e r r l m r I h i r a so s ys wo ds p ob a b y of so e p a negy ist of p c a t es . Cope s r u a m ll- r u al u in o w n r r ra r v r ef t tion see s we g o nded , tho gh his ende ing he the o e ’ emph a siz es the ma n s s u ccess . 1 1 It ma y ha ve been in some s uch spirit of cha llenge th a t Menande r ma de on e of his ch a ra cters sa y

’ ’ «0 7 61 170 M\ 61p 60 7 111 0 13 K0 7\43$ 6 10 1771 611 0 11

1 1 1 7 11 0 11 7 6 7 1 4301 0 0 v7 6 1 . xp170 711<11 épo 7 p 5

1 430 ls h v l o . 7 6 7 1 1 7 0 139 a o s . (Stob . F r “ 26 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

m 1 9 m . the bees , not a drone clai ing superiority over the And so th e ma n who is thinking of becoming a Cynic needs to first consider 2 0 his preparation , as Hector knew his own preparation for war , ’ An dro ma ch e s while , aware of weakness , he bade her go into the 21 house and weave . The general tone of this discourse , and the last E part in particular , indicate that pictetus does not think the youth ’ rO le in question capable of filling the Cynic s , and his use of the maxim is evidently a warning to h im to take account of his limited 22 ’ capacity . The allusion to Hector s consciousness of his strength ’ remi nds us of the passage in Plutarch s B a n quet of th e S even Wise 23 Men in which Hector is said to know the limits of his ability “ 7 1 1 E 1 11 10 5 0 1 0 0 7 6 11 0 0 0h h 1 6171 7 6 06 1 6 11 «a t 11 170 1 7 61 71 61 x7 op 0 7 7 410 6 , 7 15 7 p o s 7 “ " A1 0 11 7 0 s dh é éw é 11 070 711 Plutarch again uses the apophthegm with this force of knowing the limits of one ’ s ability in an ironi cal passage near the beginning of his 25 Life of Demosth en es . He says that in writing the Parallel Lives of Demosthenes and Cicero he is going to compare them from the stand

oi i m point their deeds and pol tical measures , and not atte pt to Show from their Speeches which was the pleasanter or more clever orator . And then he gives a thrust at Ca ecilius : For in that case I would have ‘ ” h e sa s as much strength as a dolphin on dry land , y , a saying of ’ Ion s which that marvellous Ca ecilius did not know when like a h ot - headed youth he attempted to bring out a comparison of Cicero

‘ ’

D m . 70 0 1s 6 1 rra 11 7 6 711 7 6 I vc301 0 a u7 6z1 6 6 1 11 and e osthenes , s 7 x

17 6 6 1 0 11 0 1311 6 11 666116 1 17 06 0 7 0 1 0 0610 11 C ecilius w e p x p , 7 71 a , as know ,

‘ 9 - 95 9 . Sec . 9

2 ° - 6 3 11 a 11 1 7 0 0 0 x 11 11 0 1 1 109 . . 1 m 07 . . 66 7 6 6 16 6 0 1 7 1 0 13 0 6 17 . 6 Sec Cf II , 7 p 7 6611 0 111 11

2 1 4 92 . r m I I. F o VI , ” Tha t 7 11430 1 0 0 117 6 11 w a s sometimes o n the lips of the Cynics themselves m rr r r L r a a m a ra m M a r Dio . a . y be infe ed , pe h ps , f o f g ent of en nde ( g e t VII ,

3 2 I n r n a r fo r m h a s m all , , desc ibi g w etched cynic who he conte pt he c s h im a di r a r n d ty begg , a sa ys of h im

' 0h k Il/O 1 éKé S 6 711 6. 7 1

' 6< 06 0 7 0 1 1 p 7 £ 13661 611 p< 6 p 6s 11 6. 7 6 1 A10

7 3 11 4301 0 0 117 6 11 0 1 4 7 , 1366 7 0 2; 6 0 0 111 61 0 1 5

3’ 2 1 c . . 24 l m I . r 54 2 . F o . XI

25 c. 3 .

“ ” 28 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

m me more than the present po p that surrounds , praising , of course , the leisure of the time I spent there and finding fault with my present B ut life on account of its multitudinous duties . you ought to judge about me better , not with a view to my industry or the lack of it ,

‘ ' but rather lookin g to the I vc601 0 0 v7 611 and the

“ ’ ‘' ’ Ep6o 1 6 6 Ka 0 7 0 5 ijvn v 6 i66 1n

n me m Bei g a king appears to so ething beyond human powers , and

m ’ n i . a k ng see s to eed a more divine character , as Plato used to say “ And in his concluding paragraph he says : Since I a m conscious of — no good in me save this only that I do not even think I have the greatest abili ties when I have none— with reason do I cry out and m m me bear witness that you ust not de and great things of , but entrust everything to God . This letter breathes throughout the spirit of a ma n who feels himself in a position for which his natural li abi ties and tastes have not fitted him , and that he cannot fill it

1 as ma . n 116301 0 0 0 7 61 he ought , try as he y The connotatio of 7 is

. Em clear His success as peror is not a question of his industry , he maintains , but should rather be judged on the basis of what he l h i real y has it within s capacity to do . “ i Necesse a est ima re Wh le , as Seneca says , est se ipsum , quia fere ”33 videmur m m plus nobis posse qua possu us , it is likewise true that some people thin k too meanly of themselves and so fall short of ’ 34 - i Ma n their possible attainment . Aristotle s Little m nded was ’ Ch a rmides such a person , and prior to Aristotle , the of Xenophon s 35 l h i r r Memor o bi i a . C a rm des i m e e , wh le a ere youth in Plato , is p — sented by Xenophon as a mature ma n a ma n of abili ty and influence

32 “ Ar a c i s 1 8 : m ee 4 r T s . . S s . 1 Ve 3 1 . n istoph nes , p Cf . Cice o , D p I , Bene eni ill o Gra ecorum proverbio p ra ecipit ur ‘ ’

ua m u u v a r m h a c exercea t . Q q isq e no it te , in se

r E . 1 4 Al Ho . 44 : so p I , , “

ua m ut er ue lib en s cen s eb o exercea t a r m . Q scit q , , , te 33 N all T a l va . r n . A n . 6 3 Th e r a r r De g . enti e ch pte is e e nt ote especi y al r 4 : i i ua a d redi mur et v r sec . A n d a so the wo ds in ast man da sunt de e ips , q e g , i es ” m r See al a n ost ra e cu u ua t em t a t uri s umus co n a ra n da e . eb s , q s p , p so cit tion

0 . 4 1 o n . 3 . p , n “ Aristotle sa ys th a t Little - mi ndedness is a more frequent a n d a worse d a l - i i 1 1 M r Th e Eth i cs o Aristotle N c . E 25 a efect th n se f conceit ( th cs , oo e , f ,

- - r m r a . 2 34 5 sa m n r p p , ys this is beca use the Va in glorious a does not sh ink f o g e t “ ” t a u - m a rr hi m r u sks which his nbounded self co n fiden ce ma y someti es c y th o gh ,

- r w h ile the Little minded ma n is content with lo w a ims a n d a spi a tions . Cf .

G ra Th e Eth i cs o Ari t tle l s o vo 78 . nt , f , . II , p . , n “5 III , 7, 9. “ ” KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 29

m in private life , but averse to co ing before the people in public . h im Socrates rebukes for avoiding his duty as a citizen , and meets m his natural shrinking fro the public gaze , and the possible ridicule m of the Asse bly , by pointing out the folly of his fearing to face the masses when he copes so readily in conversation with the more “

m . intelligent and fore ost citizens My good fellow, he says , “ 1 11 mm f m mj 617 1 0 6 ? 0 6 c w7 6 , and do not co it the ault which ost people

off f commit . For they hasten to investigate the a fairs of others , and do not turn to examine themselves . Now do not you be faint hearted in this , but rather stretch every nerve to give heed to your self . And do not neglect the interests of the city , if it is in any ” w a y possible for it to become better through you . As we have

m 11 6391 0 a v7 611 already pointed out , there is an i plication of 7 in

11 0 6 ? 0 0 0 7 11 m m m 617 6 , usually , and the axi thus has its essage for the 36 - self depreciating ma n . Evidently Cicero ’ s brother Quintus also was a man who shrank

m O n S ta n di n from putting hi self forward , and in his letter to him g

or th e Con sulsh i m h im 11 11301 0 0 v7 6 11 . f p, Cicero re inds of 7 He bids 37 him think what the S tate is , what he seeks , and what he is , and he m develops each of these points in turn . Then after e phasizing ’ the need of the greatest tact and wisdom on Quintus part , he urges R him strongly to make the most of his oratorical gifts , since ome is “ : ub n ia m much influenced by oratory , and he adds Q in hoc vel

vit iosa la r itio n e in t er o sit a maxime est civitas , quod g p virtutis ac di n it a t is ob livis ci u t ut in t elle a s g solet , in hoc fac te bene noris , id est g eum esse te qui iudicii ac p ericuli metum maximum comp et it orib us ’ i ”3 8 ah ere p o ss s . In this instance Cicero is trying to impress his brother with a realization of his powers as an orator . In another letter he tries to rouse him to an appreciation of his literary talent . “ He says near the close of the letter : Qua t t uor t ra go edia s sedecim dieb us scrib a s uic ua m mut ua ris ? absolvisse cum , tu q q ab alio et

776160 s ua eris Elect ra m et Aero a m s cri seris ? Cessa t or q , cum p p esse

3° m a r r P oli ti ca l Th ou h t o Pla to a n d Ari stotle . 88 a r l B ke , g f , p , kes too gene a “ a sta tement when he sa ys There w a s something of a tendency to pose in every ‘ ’ Gr a h a d r u old m T l eek , tendency which been eb ked in the otto Know hyse f . ’ “ So N l hi 06 a r : Lectures on Pla to s Re ublic . 1 ett es p p , p , spe ks of the inhe ent t en ‘ ’ ma Gr l mi a v men al a a deney of ny eek peop es to be i t ti e , w ys posing inste d of being m l ” the se ves .

37 De P etiti on e 2 . I ,

. 5 Sec 5 . “ 30 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE noli et illud 7 11 12101 0 6 01117 611 noli p ut a re ad a droga n t ia m min uen da m i ” 3 9 m m m m ut n or mu s . solu esse dictu , veru etia bona nostra A specific phase of ‘knowing what one can do ’ is ‘knowing ’ ’ one s special bent . The importance of this knowledge is a leading l 4 0 4 1 P atonic idea and it is emphasized by Cicero and Seneca , but it 4 2 1 1 is Plutarch who connects it directly with 7 1 5101 0 010 7 61 . He says that some people think the Stoics jesting when they claim that the m l Wise Man ust be not on y prudent and just and courageous , but

ma n an orator , a poet , a general , a rich , and addressed as king ; yet B they claim all these things for themselves . u t it is not so among the Gods , for one is the God of War , and another the God of the

. : Oracle , and another the God of Gain And then he goes on to say “ m All prerogatives do not belong to all , but one ust in obedience

’ ‘ 1 1 m 0 137 61 xa 7 a a 06 1 1 . to the Pythian inscription , p Then he ust direct 43 efiort s fit t ed his toward the one pursuit for which he is naturally , and not drag himself toward the imitation of some other type of m life and do violence to nature . Ovid likewise refers to the axim with a slightly extended use of this idea in a characteristic passage

h o w of his A rs Ama tori a . He has been telling of Venus brings 44 m m m : har ony and joy in her ating of various ani als , and he says m While I was singing of this , Apollo appeared of a sudden , and oved ‘ with his thumb the strings of hi s golden lyre . Preceptor ’ ‘ l of wanton love , he said , come , lead to my shrine thy discip es ,

Est ub i di versu m fa ma celeb ra t a p er o rb em

L ra co o ci ua ue m ue i ub e t . itte , gn s q e sibi q q

ui u cr lu sa ien t er a ma b it Q sibi not s it , so s p

Atque opu s a d vi res exig et omne sua s . C ui fa ciem Na ura s ect et ur a b lla t dedit , p i ;

C ui l r u m r sa e e a u co o est , e o p p tente c bet ; ui rm la a ur a silen t ia vit et Q se one p cet , t cit n i r i u a m a r a a ui a b b a t . Q c it te c n t , q bibit te ,

3 ° t 4 7 010 11 0 0 01 Letters to ui n 7 ti n en ti a 2 . us 6 . P r r De A bs Q III , , . Cf o phy y , I , 5

1 ‘ 6 1 6. 7 0 67 0 61 17 61 1 7 0. 66 6 7 a 1 1 vcb xo v0 a 7 6a v7 1 600 5 . ) x , 7 y 0 6 fis 1 67

4 ° “ De O icii s 3 1 1 14 Suu m ui u ur n o s ca t n u m . fi I , ( ) q sq e igit inge i

‘1 ra i u fe t . De T . A n n . 6 2 . Et eo in clin a n du m uo v s ne g , , q te ingen

‘2 - De Tra n . A n . . 1 2 q c 13 .

‘3 6 17 0. 0 0 0011 17 6 a v m u a m 70 0 p s 6 17610 0 11 6 . Menander ma y h e ch the s e: thou ght in the v er ses :

7 6 11 11301 0 a v7 611 60 7 1 7 7 1 1 7 6. 1711 617 11 01 0.

1 16 ; 7 6. 0 01117 0 8 11 61 7 1 l 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 or . 0 170 7 7 60 1 . . 3 7 (Stob F , 4 93 fi II , . “ ” KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 3 1

Inasmuch as the Stoics made 7 11 6301 0 01117 611 the very foundation

O f e E th ir philosophy and ethics , pictetus very naturally uses it in ‘ ’ one instance to mean know What you can do in the realm of Will . m m l The ost i portant thing for each of us , he says , is to have our wi l 45 - such as it ought to b e . If w e are angry because of What evil doers m deprive us of , we should learn not to put so uch value upon Things .

ma n w h o We should not be angry with the steals our clothes , for 46 w e would not lose them if w e had not had them . The ma y

o ff bind our leg , or cut our neck , but he cannot bind or take away 4 7 A 11 1301 0 11 117 11 our will . For this reason the ncients passed on the 7 6 ff We ought , then , he goes on to explain , to practice indi erence to m m loss and pain in s all things , and pass on fro little things to greater until w e become invincible like the athlete W h o after a series of minor victories Wins at Olympia . Nothing in the way of enticement or money or weather or mood can keep him from going on to con “8 K ’ quer . nowing the power of one s will , then , and the importance

D m . of developing it , is conceived to be enjoined by the elphic axim So Augustine teaches that the ma n w h o fails in a given situation

- m because he over esti ates his strength of will , fails through ignorance ’ “ of himself . He says of Peter s Denial : Quantum sibi a s su mp s era t

Petrus intuendo quid vellet , ignorando quid And in another passage he says in explaining that we often do not know “ h ow far our will can avail : Nempe b ea t iSSImus a p os t olus Petrus pro Domino animam ponere plane voleb a t sed quantas vires i ” 5 0 P r n e l . n es cieb a t . o haberet , voluntas ipsa d vir tantus se a t eb a t ‘ ' ’ I 11 12101 0 0 v7 611 in the sense of knowing one s ability is thus seen to have been used by ancient writers as an injunction not to over

m - w e m esti ate or under estimate what can do , to deter ine our natural bent , and to be cognizant of the possible achievements of our Will . w e d These shades of meaning , however , are , as have sai , merely

‘5 1 8 8 . I , , “ ’ 1 1 - 1 8 1 Sec . 6 . . 20 7 i 6. 0. 0 60 7 1 1 K . s 6s 0 13 6 16c 6 9 60 7 1 7 1 6 Cf III , 7 m 7 ; 3

0 16 611 7 11 07 0 . 7 11 11 6 1 d up n i 7 61 7 6 611 6 11 .

‘7 ’ ' 1 6 a 11 11 0 1 11 1 1 . 7. 76 0 67 6 7 1 7 6 0 9 0 h h h $ 3 d du e el . 7 1 7 6 1 T d h o v Sec p 3 , ; , p ; p xn .

’ ' ' 7 1 0 1311 0 13 6 7 0 1 h 11 1 1 1 1 h 1 < > 3 6 0 66 dgo e el ; 7 6 7rpo a 1p 60 1 . 6 81 7 0 37 0 1701p 77 7 6 h 0 1 0 1 n a h a w i 7 6

1 1 7 1 6301 0 11 117 61 . ‘3 1 8 - 2 Sec . 3 .

4 9 “ I n J oh n L 1 . . . 5 Na m i n firmit a t em ua m P ru , XVI Cf XXXII , s et s ” n escieb a t ua a m u t er n e a t uru s a udie , q ndo Do ino q od esset g b a t . 5 ° De A n i ma et Ei us O ri i n e 1 1 . H e al a r u a a re ra g IV , so g es th t we igno nt

ur lv a s u x m - o ur m r . e 9 10 . of o se es to ching the e tent of e o y S c . “ ” 32 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

‘ ’ specific connotations of the general idea of knowing one s meas ’ ure ; and thi s is true also of th e use of the maxim in its fu r ther m ‘ ’ “1 eaning of knowin g one s place .

B1 ’ A pa rt of Au soniu s little poem on Ch ilon is somewha t pertin ent in connection with the theme of the present chapter “ mm ru m 11 6301 0 6 010 7 6 11 Co endo nost 7 , nosee te , i l i el hi Q uod n co umn a a m tenetur D p ca . L a r moles t us fruc i O t imi bo iste , t est p ,

u rr o ssis uidve n o n di n oscere Q id fe e p , q , ; No ct u di u ue ua ra u a es eris q , q e ge s , q e g s ,

r re Ad usque p un ct i tenuis insta r q ua e e . O fficia cun ct a u r r a a , p do , hono , const nti ” l r l r In hoc et u la sp eta nobis g o i a .

L d u S e tem a ien tum 1 38 - 14 5 ( u s p S p , ) CHAPTER IV

‘ T I NQGI EATTO N As KN O W Y O UR PLACE . I s RELATI O N T o C E EQ PPO TNH.

When in Aeschylus ’ play Oceanus advised Prometheus to know 1 himself , he was , as we have said , warning him to know his place as ‘ ’ ’ a subject of the n ew king of the Gods . NO W knowing one s place

’ 2 m 0 01 1 0 0 1311 1 w a s one of the eanings of that complex Greek virtue pp 7, and because of this phase of similarity it is probable that 7 11 0101 0 010 7 611 w a s often given as a definition of the virtue in the ethical discussions

’ ’ - in l of Fifth century Athens . Hence it is that P ato s Ch a r mides f — 0 10 0 0 611 m 7 6 7 01 when another current definition of

i i 1 1 n Cr t a s 1 11301 0 010 7 1 . his ow business , seized upon 7 6 To be sure , Socrates had virtually put the words into his mouth by using the

’ phrases 0 13 7 17 11 610 116 1 éc1u7 611 tb s 67 p a £6 11 and 6 601117 611 in his pre m Critia s ceding refutation , but it is also probably safe to assu e that m ’ w a s repeating so ething which he had heard before . Socrates interlocutors usually voiced opinions rife in popular thought and 4 m Ch ar mides discussion , and besides the state ent in the that the 5 7 01 0167 0 0 7 017 7 6 1 11 w a s w e definition p borrowed , have as evidence for 6 the general currency of the two definitions a passage in the Ti ma eus :

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 13 11 011 1761)\ a 1 A67 6 7 a 1 7 6 77p617 7 6 1 «0 1 7 1 631 11 1 7 61 7 6 01137 0 8 11 0 1. 60 117 61 0 61

1 1 M ri i 1 1 77 0 1 1 6 1 1 . t a s 116 9 70 0 5 oreover , the fanciful way in which C goes on in an attempt to Show the identity of 7 11 6301 0 0 v7 611 and 0 w gop0 0 131117 indicates that he had not given the matter any real thought himself .

D 11 1301 0 01117 611 The God at elphi , he says , uses this 7 as a form of address

’ ff m a t e to his worshippers , which di ers fro the usual x p because the

2 1 . See p .

2 ’ 14 25 81 16 6 4 Pla Re D - - A . . 389 E La w A . Al See esch g ; to s p ; 81 s 6 96 D E . so ’ ’ “ h ore s r v o et t s Tra la A . . P . l r S w . . 36 1 : m y e iew of J ns tion, J XIII p It is on y f o ’ ‘ this ide a of knowing one s pla ce tha t it (a w pc poa bvn) gets the connota tion of self l ’ know edge .

3 1 D - I 64 6SA. ’ 1 S r Un it o P la to s Th ou h t . 5 . See ho ey , y f g , p

5 1 O IR- C .

’ 72A . See St allb a u m s : al r u a Ch rmides . 1 1 1 . note so his Int od ction to , p “ ” 34 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

7 God speaks not as ma n speaks but with a nobler salutation . And

1 he says always to every one who enters nothing other than Ew

F 1 1 B ut men mis 7 6 0 0 01 0 0 0 7 61 7 6 Ew 61 6 1 m . For and ¢p are the sa e ,

u m taking this sal tation for an ad onition , added the later sayings

’ M 660 0 0 11 E 60 7 0 0 0 7 and 77 , p Plutarch evidently has this 8 “ mi E a t Del h i : passage in nd when he says in his p The god , as it w h o w were in greeting , addresses each one of us comes there ith the ‘ ’ — ‘ ” 1 1 m I 1 1601 0 0 0 7 61 a salutation in no way inferior to xa i pe. So e scholars have used these passages in trying to determine the position D 9 l of the inscriptions at elphi , but it is better , doubt ess , to regard ’ Crit ia s words not as in any sense historical , but as a piece of pretty fancy introduced for literary purposes . As the dialogue proceeds Plato treats the subject on the basis of the psychological principle 1 0 - m m t h e - of self knowledge , a treat ent which for ed starting point of many later disquisitions upon the theme . The connection between

0 w 0 0 611 11 1301 0 0 0 7 611

- ma n . We recall that he difiered from the Little minded man and m the conceited man , who knew not the selves , in that he had a true 1 1 B t - m . u and high sense of his own worth to be high inded , his worth must be really high , for the man of little worth who deems 1 2 m 1 1 0 cb w 1 1 6 0 )\6 1 0 o . hi self so is

7 Fo r the cu stom of pla cing inscriptions a t the entra nce of Greek dwelling io u D . La r . l v 5 0 ul a O r . 200 B . . a S al e ho ses see g e t VI , II , J i n VI , Cf so the o n r l P m l 2 232 . 24 0 E n . a a u . r Cal us the th esho d of o pei n ho se Bekke , , (p g r T a ns ) . 3 1 7 c . . 9 ’ La er ra n H r 4 1 Pl ra c tz m . 3 a fi . a g ( e es XXXVI , p ) thinks th t to s ph se the ” la ter sa yings indi ca tes tha t 7 11 12301 0 0 0 7 011 w a s the first in orde r of all the in scrip ’ a v E a n d u a s a n a r u m a a Go et tlin s a n d Ro tions s e the , he ses this g ent g inst g ’ s ch er s V iew tha t the E w a s o n e of the Sp rii ch e a n d tha t 7 11 6501 0 0 0 7 6 11 bega n a xa m r l R r l . o s ch er in r l H rm 4 85 a u a P a he ete ine ep y ( e es XXXVI , ) g es th t to ‘ ’ ’ m a a I 11 1601 0 0 0 7 011 w a s fir m r l i n r la M1 6611 0 0 11 a n d E 6 0 e ns th t st e e y e tion to 7 7 7 7 , ’ 6 0 7 1 a n d in r la ll r - La ercra n t z al 7 not e tion to a the insc iptions . g thinks so

a 11 12101 0 0 0 7 611 w a s r O f G o d r r E th t if the 7 the g eeting the to the wo shippe , the a r c nnot be so const ued (p . 1 ° ’ See S r t U n i o P la . 1 7. Th ou t 1 5 n . a n to s h . 81 ho ey , y f g , p , d p 1 1 See . 1 pp 7 f . 1 2 i 1 1 1 1 1 N c. Eth i cs 7 1 1 23 6 6 111 1 6 m 11 0 1 7 0 137 10 1 0 1631 60 0 7 61 0 01 w 1 . b 5 . 1 163 g 1 IV, , 7 p 1 1 2 2 pp , ’ M M “ 6 0 6 .

“ ” 36 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE his orations besides bringing it into his letters ; and it is interesting to observe that while in his orations he gives it the ph iIO SO ph ic m h e meanings which it had co e to acquire , both in the letter to T 1 7 mist ius and in this one to Ia mb lich us he uses it with its ordinary force . In the passage in the Timaeus to which we referred above1 8 Plato so plays upon the word 0 111

' 11 611 01 7 p0 0 17116 1 11 mean that to know oneself is possible only for a person m in full possession of his faculties . That Plato is giving this eaning to 7 11 0111 0 1 60 0 7 611 in a spirit of mere word- play becomes the more apparent when we realize that this is almost the only instance in 20 ancient literature in which the maxim ma y be so construed . The

7 6 0 110 6 711 60 0 7 6 11 m negative phrase 7 , however , was used so ewhat ’ — frequently to convey the idea of n o t being in one s senses a use 21 m l u ore or less co loquial , apparently , and q ite apart from its other

‘7 27f. See pp . 1 3 P 33 . .

‘9 ’ Fo r 0 w o 0 0111 l Pl P rot 2 B 0 m al a . 3 3 81 333 C . g p 7 in its ety o ogic sense , see to s 2 ° Pla to begins the proemi um to his La ws of Inherita nce (La w s 923A) with

r : 51 0 1 0 1 0 0 x0 2 0 7 6 0 63 6 1 0 7\6 17611 13 1 1 11 60 7 1 11 1 11 61 0 11 6 1 0 7 the wo ds 40 , M 0 0 , x :

’ ' b fi 0 117 6311 ‘i a r‘ a x0 1 17 6 0 01 -o 0 77 x0 2 7 6 7 II vBla 6 1 1 d 1 6 b 6 0. fl ép xp m p $ 7 s , 6.3 p 6s s 7 p 4 1 (pp i 6

1 1 7 0 1 01 . T o p ress the mea ning of mental a berra tion into his allusion to the ma xim

r v r ul m t a n r l l a a . he e , howe e , wo d be to is ke e ti e y the high y poetic tone of the p ss ge 21 Th e o n e insta nce of the strictly colloquial use of 7 11 6301 0 0 0 7 611 in somewh a t th i s sense occurs in a fra gment of Epicte tu s (Fo r a discu ssion of the fra g men t ’ l 1 1 1 h k 7 1 1 1 a s a . 68 6 o evT 7 s 7 0 6 6 6 1 631 0 1 60 0 7 61 who e see p , n . x p fi p 77 7 7 ,

1 0 61: 61 r 1r 0 7 6. 77 0 0 7 3 11 fi p0 £6 1 p 6 1x6 4 61r10 7 p 0

m l a 11 12101 0 0 117 611 e m llo u al r r v r hi se f with 7 s e s too co q i , conside ing the e e ence in

ma x m w a s l a n d a re r a l a in a um a w a s which the i he d , we p ob b y s fe ss ing th t it

a t all ral a l u Fo r 0 16 0 a r x v u col not gene to pp y it in s ch wa ys . with efle i e sed lo ui all Lib a ni us 32 r in a u a r a Eut ro ius la r q y see IV , , whe e cc sing ce t in p of s nde ing ’ h im a a l ma sa a la u h i s ul 6 6 6 111 0 67 0 s 7 0 07 , he s ys th t peop e y y in pp se of ins ts 7 , ,

’ ’ 1 1 1 0 w 1 7 0 67 6. 1 1 7 0 87 6 16111 0 67 61 . Li n ius l x r a p x , jp , : b a a so e p esses the ide of not know in g oneself in the sense of mental un fit n ess with the verb 0 16 0 ra ther tha n 7 1 7 11 010 110 1 in a m ra i H e r m a u ll old this s e o t on (sec . is efuting a sta te ent bo t the fo y of ’ a e a n d a : 1 0 13 w y/0 6 1 6 111 6 711 (1 6X 6 1 1 611 HA0 7 0 111 0 0 6 1 6 Ia ox d‘r g , he s ys 3 h 7 9 , 3 fip 1 , 10 p ns,

‘ ’ 6M 6 1 6 6 2 0 00 116 5 0 0 x 60 w 1 6 11 6 1 66 I o 10 13K 6 6 1 6 60 0 7 611 6 Tva veb pp 1 6 , p p p7 s, 0 5 s “ Th e La tin ph ra se si me novi w a s a colloquial expression a pp a rently some

a a ll 7 6 0 11 0 211 60 0 7 611 r 2 2 6 H a a t . 9 Gr . S wh t ied to the 7 of the eeks See o ce , I , , fl “ KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 37 connotation as the opposite of that which the Delphic inscription ” w h o urges . Thucydides says of those survived the Plague that as soon as they got up forgetfulness of all things seized them and 137 11 6710 0 11 7 6 0 137 0 135 7 0 135 Aristotle in discussing m voluntary and involuntary cri e , enumerates the points about m m which a man ight be ignorant in com itting an involuntary act , 23 61 1 611 0 1311 7 0 137 0 0 1366 1 6111 0 11 0 1 0 6 1 6 11 1 1 0 1 11 6 6 11 0 and says : 170 1 7 0 11 5 7 3 1 ) 11 0 5 ,

' ’ ' 666 0 11 6 1215 0 1366 7 611 77pc1 7 7 0 11 7 0 77635 7 0p 60 0 7 6 11 The author of the

E in o mis p , erroneously ascribed to Plato , when contending that men need not fear the jealousy of the Gods in concerning themselves m D with divine atters , says that the eity knows that He teaches us m i n o these things , for He would be the ost stupid of all if He were g 25 of : 7 6 31 6 6 1 6 11 0 11 61 6111 611 7 10 5 0 137 6 0 137 6 61 11 0 6 2 rant this , and he adds 7 1 7 p , 7 ,

' ' 1 1 1 1 1 0 61 1 0 1 0011 6 1 1 61303 0 11 0 0 0 1 ov 6111 6 0 061 0 0 6 1 6. xa h erra i vov 60 1 11 9 11 , 7 x p 10 "3 1 1 1 ? 0 3 6 1 0 61 1. 06 61 7 0 06 7 0 0 So , too, Basil writes to one of his friends

1 1 1 0 0 67 6 67700 0 6 6 00 6 7 0 1 11 0 1 60 0 7 0 135 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 1 . 6 7 7 11 , 7 6 0 The two meanings of ’ 27 7 6 07 11 0 6 211 60 0 7 611 are brought together in Xenophon s Memora bili a

1 0 11 10 1 0 11 10 where the phrase is used as a definition for 1 , but 1 in the extended sense of not knowing what one thinks he knows . Socrates ,

Si me v n o n u m luri s a micum bene no i , Visc p , Non Va riu m fa cies ;

Al r I n Verrem 6 8 : Tur cum a c ua m v a m n o sses i n so Cice o II , III , n, te t it ,

r i An d Pro S ex . Sicilia m tecu m g ra n dem p a et ext a t u m fil u m duceb a s . “ 14 2 i i u m l e i u cum Ch r so on us Rasc. : uo ds u u et et a a a d Q q is est , q se c s p tet , y g H r vit u eret ur a u a m i n ora t um r v . o . E . p , is c s g , se ips p obe no it ; Cf p

- 5 8 . 84 0 84 35 6 P r u Cen a Tri m. 18 1 O v . Met . I , , ; id XIII , ; XIV , ; et oni s , N ur r ll u al use —co n os cit r il A en eid 903 ii ote f the the co oq i of se g in Vi g , XII , “ u curren t e m n ec co n o scit eun t em neq e se g , T ollen t emve manu s a xumve imma ne mo ven t em : “ P r u ie m r I n . s 3 30 : A m ui ul a c b at u a . A a Cf b ose , CXVIII , , d , q se occ t e p , q i se non a gn os ceb a t . 22 I 4 L r l m r 9 8 . u u v h a d a a I , , c eti s e ident y this p ss ge in ind in his desc iption

Pla u a t A 1 2 13 - 14 of the g e thens (VI , ) “ Atque eti a m quosda m cep ere O b livia rerum

Cun ct a rum u o ssen t r ut , neq e se p cognosce e ipsi 23 Et i 2 1 1 1 1 c. I Ni h cs a 6 . II , , , ‘ 2 I n discussing the sa me subject Clement of Alexa ndria sa ys tha t a ma n who commits a n involunta ry crime 15 7 0p 0 67 611 7 1 5 117 11 6170 6 11 1215 KAeoy évns 11 0 1

1 06 1 0 0 1 1 0 11 611 7 . r m 5 6 5 . 4 1 (St o II , 25 9SSE . 2° E L I 4 p . V , 7 . 2 7 - 7 9 . 6 . III , 1 1 38 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

00 6 1 0 6 1 0 m 1 7 0 7 0 0 7 6 61 0 6 11 60 0 7 60 . he says , did not consider 00 7 adness , but 7 0

11 0 10 60 61 1 0 0 16 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 166 6 0 7 6 11 1 0 0 1 1110 116 0 6 . 1 ) 2 ? 7 7 , 7 7 0 7 07 10 11 0 0 10 5 6h o7 1§6 7 0 6 10 0 1 While most people call a ma n ma d who fancies that he is so tall m that he ust stoop in going through the city gates , or that he is strong enough to lift houses , they do not call the conceit of knowledge m m . o cra adness , for they do not recognize it as an abnor ality To S tes , however , thinking one knows what he does not is not only a species of madness but an error which 7 11 6301 0 0 0 7 60 w a s designed to 2 8 . l m m correct Hence the passage is clear y suggestive of the axi , 2 9 t 1 1 and the w o ideas adhering to 7 6 6 7 1 0 6 70 6010 7 61 are blended .

0 6301 0 0 0 7 60 0 10 0 10 0 60 1 w a s w e The earlier relation of 7 and 1 1 7 , as have B m m . u t m shown , a co paratively si ple one as ti e went on , the ’ Ch a rmides connection of the two in Plato s , and the Platonic doc trine of the Unity of the Virtues gave rise to a tendency among admirers of Plato to make 7 11 6301 0 0 0 7 611 include not only 0 w 10 p0 0 ' 13017 ” in the large but other virtues as well . This tendency is seen in the

E r a sta e spurious Platonic dialogue known as the , where the author brings forward the maxim as a definition of 0 ' w 1pp0 0 ‘1307) and makes it in 1 f clude 6 1 11 0 10 0 61 17 also . Socrates is discussing with t w o young 31 me n the question of philosophy , what it is and what its province .

The youths reason that the philosopher should be a well- informed ma n af m , able to converse intelligently with physicians and cr ts en though his knowledge would be less expert than theirs ; and in order to show that the philosopher should have not a second - rate but a

firs t - class knowledge of the political art , Socrates is made to resort to an argument which seems rather clumsy . The ma n Wh o knows h ow h o w to punish dogs and horses aright , he argues , knows also to make them as good as p os sib lei hence the art which knows h ow to n m pu ish knows the good fro the bad . If a person has this knowledge m in the case of the any , he should have it in the case of the one N the self . o w horses or dogs in failing to know good from bad

m ma n horses or dogs , fail to know the selves ; and so a who fails to

2 8 See c . V .

2 9 E l 67 1 66 1 6 0 0 0 1 17 151 11 7 o Eth . 1 24 : 0 S St ob a eus c . 6 5 a S ( II , , ) s ys of the toics 7

' ’ 1 0 13h 0 0 in ra 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 6 0 90 1 11 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 137 0 0 11 0 1 7 13 0 11 0 9 0 137 6 11 p ( cont st with 10 ) 1 , 7 x

61 7 60 7 1 1 0 0 10 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 66 0 1 0 1 0 0 10 0 60 0 7 10 11 11 0 0 7 0 1 0 . 0 1 . 3 7 6 1 0 1 fi p1 p0 17 3 ° Ale I 1 3 7 6 1 11 1 0 0 7 60 16 X0 0 8 1 6 0 0 10 0 0 130 1 0 6 10 0 1 . 3 C : 6 6 0 1110 6 13 0 1 See See , 7 7 0 7 1 p p 7 ; ’ “ a l Wila mo w it z A ollo r rr 4 1 : E v r m l s a . Mu a a so p , t ns by y, p ge e ything i p ied in tha t speci ally Greek w a y of thinking which is summed up by the untra nsla ta ble

r 0 10 l 1 1 wo d 0 p be ong s to the 7 1 6301 0 0 0 7 61 of the Go d . 31 13 A S fl . “ ” KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 39

know good men from bad men would not know whether he himself

1 1 1 1 1 1 were good or bad . This 0 137 61 617 1 0 6 11 is 11 17 0 01 100 0 1 6 1 and conversely “ ” 1 1 1 1 1 m 1 7 6 1 1 1 111 0 11 6 11 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 3 . 7 6 0 0 7 7 is 1 7 This , it see s , forsooth , Socrates “ D mm — says , is what the inscription at elphi co ands to practice 0 01 0 110 0 611 17 and for the virtue by which we know h ow to punish aright is 6 111 0 10 0 01117 and that by which we know ourselves is a w o b gopo vn, and if to know how to punish involves a knowledge of ” “ 1 6 1 11 0 10 0 61 1 0 w < 0 0 1311 1 m . oneself , 7 and pp 7 are the sa e Cities are well ” - governed when the wrong doers give justice, he goes on to say , and

’ 0 w o 0 0 11 11 6 111 0 10 0 1311 1 so connects g p n and ) with the political art , of which 32 the true philosopher must have superior knowledge . The essential connection between justice and w a s expressed by Plato 33 La w s V w a s in the , and the unity of the irtues in general a favorite

w e Platonic thought , but in none of the genuine dialogues do find their unity proved by recourse to the kind of reasoning employed

t en en c t O ' rel t e 11 5391 1 here . The d y a the four cardinal virtues to 7 0 0 117 6 1

m m Neo - beca e distinctly arked in the Platonists , however , and the Era sta e ma y be regarded as in a sense a connecting link between

them and the Cka rmides .

‘ ’ Porphyry says in his work on I 11 1601 2 0 v7 611 that w e never hear

0 w 611 6 1 0 61 7 1 11 0 611 1 0 1 11 0 10 0 0 0 1311 1 ¢p used in the sense of e 7 1 p 7 , although 1 p 7 is w e a certain if we did so regard it , however , would discuss

' ' 7 6 ( ovei v 7 6 c o vei v 11 0 83 pp and the cause of pp , Which is , and it is therefore ’ 34 1 necessary to know one s essence . Porphyry thus connects 0 0 51 170 1 ;

' 1 1 1 With 0 10 1pp0 0 111 17 and both with 7 1 113191 0 a v7 é1 . So Gregory Thau ma t urgus connects the three somewhat similarly in his I 11 O rigen em ’ ’ 35 “ Gratz a P a n egyrz ca when he says of Origen : He taught us to b e wise and to be with self , and to wish and try to know our

. l of selves This indeed is the nob est function philosophy , which is

m - w ascribed to the ost oracular of the gods , since it is an all ise — ‘ ‘ mm I 1 A co and the v6191 0 0 117 61 . This is well said by the ncients

1 1 1 to be the divine gop61 170 1 3 . He taught us also 0 w

011 6 1 e0 90 1 0 0 1 0 11 6 111 m év m p § , and by

32 1 3 A 8 .

33 6 96 C .

3‘ S lor . tob . F

35 C . XI . “ ” 40 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATUR E

36 0 0 1 1 10 0 611 1 is a part of every virtue , and he explains how it is a part of 0 1 ; 37 1 1 1 1 6 1 and 1pp6 1 170 1 s and 0 1 611 10 and 6 111 0 10 0 131 1) in turn . That 7 1 11391 0 0 v7 1 ’ gave courage is the purport of Ph ilos t ra t us account of a conversation between Apollonius of Tyana and Demetrius regarding the danger that Apolloniu s was in at the hands of Domitian . Apollonius anticipated that Demetrius would advise h im to go into hiding where 38 “ : W ma n he was not known , and he said I think that the ise should do n oth i ng privately . And whether the Pythian inscription

m m m ma n m is the com and of Apollo hi self , or of so e who knew hi self m m m me soundly and therefore made it a axi for all , it see s to that the wise man in knowing himself and keeping his intelligence at hand should not cower before any of the things whi ch most people fear. 39 - If self knowledge is a part of every virtue , then conversely a lack

- of virtue implies a lack of self knowledge , and this is expressed by Apuleius when in reviewing Plato ’ s types of character corresponding 4 0 — to the degenerate forms of states , he says of the worst the tyrant type Hun c talem nunquam in a gen dis rebus exp edire se posse n on solum propter in scien t ia m sed quod ipse etiam sib imet sit ig n o 4 1 ” i i i n n i tus et quod perfecta mal tia s ed t o em me t b us pariat .

“ l 4 r r 6X0) 6 7 6 1 11 160 11 111 0 117 11 la . I o . 2 1 . euz e . 1 1 6 I n A V . C : , II , p ed 7 p 7

' 1 0p e7 is £0 7 1 . 3 7 Hi ero cles ommen ta r on th e Golden Vers es o th e P th a rea n s o . in his C y f y g , pp

- d r l m 1 12101 0 0 117 11 i u v r u a n a . 64 6 5 , also d sc sses the i t es e tes the to 7 6 ‘3 ’ ' 1 4 111 1 0 9 1 0 1 7 6 11 0 0 6 11 6 11 1 75 1 17 . 1 1 T . 37. 1 161 6 1 7 A oll . o é 0 v 0 f1 p f y VII , , 7 37 1 p 1 1 0 1 1

' 1 7 w 11 0 17 0 137 0 8 7 6 11 0 00 ? é 1 1 a 1 1 1 1rp 0. 7 e 1 £ 6 7 p t 1 6 7 6 6. 1 6p6 s 137 1 139 10 11 7 61

’ 7 1 7 11 180 110 111 11 0 1 170 p 0 0 7 07 n11 w v 7 6 11 1 0 v7 0 6 11 0 611 11 157 7r7 fi£0 1 7 1 6111 3 ° Virtue is sa id to know itself (Cicero De Ami ci ti a XXVI) a n d Wisdom

t - A ca d . ua e . 8 a l a ra l . s n d l c nnot be igno nt of itse f (Cic Q II , ) se f know edge is the I n t l a r r ru Gr r N a a n . a n t H m l . on y s fe c ite ion of t th ( ego y of yss , C C , o i y III p 1 v l S 0 B o .

1 . De o ma ta P la t . 6 D g II , ’ a m u v r in S a Th estes 4 1 - 4 03 Cf . the f o s e ses enec s y ( 0 ) “ Illi mors gra vis in cub a t Qui notu s nimi s omnibu s ” m r u r Ignotu s o it sibi . CHAPTER V

‘ I NQGI EATTO N As KNO W THE LIMITS O F Y O UR WISD O M We have said that Alcibiades and Alexander are the stock exam ples of men who preeminently did not know themselves . Plato would have us believe that the one great character who above all m others did know himself w a s Socrates . The i portance which Socrates attached to the maxim is brought out in a passage in Plato ’ s

Ph a edrus to which we shall frequently have occasion to refer . As Socrates and Phaedrus in their walk along the banks of the Ilissus draw near to the spot where B oreas was said to have carried o ff 1 reith uia O , Phaedrus reminds Socrates of the story and asks him if he believes it . Socrates replies with the rationalistic interpretation

s of the myth which the wi e skeptics of the day put forth , but declares that of such rationalizing there I S no end . He has no time for such things , however , and he gives the reason why I am not able yet , “ D m . he says , to know yself , according to the elphic inscription Indeed it appears ridiculous to me to reflect upon alien matters while I am still ignorant of this»And so bidding Good bye to these i s m n o questions and believing wha t thought about the , as I just w — said , I consider not these matters but myself whether I happen to m be some beast ore intricate and full of passion than Typho , or a simpler and more gentle creature , sharing in some divine and less ” 2 - - monstrous destiny . If in his life long search after self knowledge di d m 3 Socrates co e to know himself better than most men , Plato maintains that it w a s because he did not think he knew What he

A olo did not a lHe says in the p gy that if Apollo is right in declaring ma n him to be the wisest , it is because he knows that he has no wis 4 dom . Wisdom is the virtue that most people have a false conceit ff P h il about , he says in e ect in the course of that passage in the e

2 29 B fi . 2 ' P h a edr 2 - 1 0 7 0 7 6 A6 111611 11 1 1 0 11 1611 0 1 0 1 us 2 9E Z3O A . 0 11 6111 0 11 0 1 7710 11 Np 7p 4 1 7 6 0 117 6 1 .

1 1 1 0 1 0 11 1 1 61KX6 7 1 0 0 11 0 7 6 11 . 606 1 6 7 0 1 6 1 11 600 1 10 1 67 0 1. 7 0 87 0 67 1 0 7 1 0 0 131 7 0 7 6. p ) x p 0 :

7 0 87 0 176 106 1 611 0 3 66 1re 1 0 137 6311 6 11 v11 6 1 0 11 0 77111 0 11 7 0 87 0 (SAN 6 0 v7 611 , 1 p , ) 0 ,

6 17 6 7 1 01 0 11 1 1 1 kkov 6171 7 60 v 1 1 611 0 11 1 7p 1 6 1 7 117 x0 10 0 T v

’ 1 1 1117 6 61 7 6 11 0 1 6117Mi10 7 6 0 11 30 11 06 10 7 1 11 6 3 11 0 1 617 13< 0 v 1 0 1 0 s 0 110 6 1. 6 7 6 0 1 . p p (4 , 5 p 1 p 1 0 x 3 ' N H l u A 1 : w c w s 6 s 7 6 11 17191 0 0 v7 611 1r 0 dv. er 8 H . ote ippo yt s , I , p n 7 p

‘ 2 - - ls . 1 22 1 3A B . See Z ll r ocra ti c S ch oo 23 En e e , S ocra tes a n d th e S , pp , g . Tra ns . “ ” 4 2 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

5 b us in which he declares that ignorance of self is the opposite of D m what the elphic inscription bids , and discusses the for s which

ma . m such ignorance y take And this false conceit of wisdo , often

0 1 0 010 . designated by 1 , is a conception that runs all through Plato

m m m m m o We eet it so eti es in definition , so eti es in discussi n , and again we see it exemplified in the very men whom Socrates is trying 6 o /1 5 1 7 6 111 to refute . It is defined in the S p 1 as 6 11 1) 11 0 7 6 1667 0 7 1 60 11 7 6 16611 0 1 S m osi u m 7 6 1 7 611 7 0 11 0 0 0611 1 1 66 0 611 1 10 11 , and in the y p as 1 ) 7 1 7 10 1 8 1 1 1 11 1 1 i t 60 116 21 0 137 1 3 13 1 0 1 10 1 61 . S o h s 3 It is discussed in the p , and at greater 9 h Th ea etetus . Eut h ro length in the The bigoted yp , the rhapsodist

Euth demus Ion , Hippias the Wise , the two sophists in the y , and other ff h 1 0 1 0 9 0 . characters in greater or less degree , are all a licted with t is 1

It is truly a universal fault , characteristic not only of the youthful 1 0 1 1 - skeptics , of the philosopher politicians , and of the men who spend 12 l 1 3 m . their ti e in debate , but of the ordinary artisan as we l This t o 14 universal fault Plato shows be a serious one , endangering the 15 16 m . m state , threatening religion , and leading to cri e Socrates ade 1 7 m men - it the ission of his life to help rid of it , for cross examination m 1 8 and refutation , he clai ed , purify the soul of its conceit , and those 1 9 who would submit thereto made wonderful progress . Men knew m that if they talked with Socrates , Plato tells us , they ust give an 2 0 account of their lives , and in his presence even Alcibiades became 21 m m . hu ble If then this false conceit of wisdo , of which Socrates men by his presence and conversation so persistently convicted , m D m is , as he aintained , a failure to heed the elphic axim , Socrates

5 4 9A .

2 29C .

7 204 A . 3 2 29 ff.

9 1 50 C ff .

1 ° La w s S8 B 6 .

1 1 E uth d m s 30 y e u 5 C . 1 2 P do 0 - h a e 9 B C .

13 A olo 2 2 - D p gy C . 1 4 Ti m . 86 B .

1 5 La w s 886 B - E .

1 5 L a w s 86 3 —D C . 1 7 l A o . 23 B p . 1 3 - S o h . 2 30 B p D . 1 9 T t h a ee . 1 50 D .

2 ° La ch es IS7E—1 88A .

2 1 1 - S m. 2 6 A y C .

“ ” 4 4 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

m 2 7 covered the noblest of pursuits and had taught the to others . Isocrates in turn proceeds to confute this idea by objecting to the en ds of Spartan education and her attitude toward her neighbors ; and at length his critic , who has dared to interpose but once , goes

ma n O f O away a wiser with the sails his pinion furled , having ex ” “ D perienced Isocrates says , that which is written at elphi , and knowing himself and the character of the Lacedaemonians better ” 28 m n ffl than before . It is evident that the a had been a icted with m that conceit of wisdo which the Platonic Socrates so deplores , and “knowing himself ” means that he had come to see the worthlessness of his opinions . The Socratic theme of man ’ s proneness to think he knows what m m m 2 9 he does not beca e so ething of a tag a ong later writers , though 30 it is not O ften again associated so closely with the maxim .

O f m There is at least a hint this conceit of wisdo , however , in the story told of Hipparchus in the spurious Platonic dialogue which

m Dio bears his na e , and it is essentially the purport of a passage in ‘ I t o Hi a rch s m . v630 o a vr v u Chrysosto is introduced in the pp , as in ’ P rota or a s m m Plato s g , not so uch for the sake of its own eaning as by way of humorous illustration in connection with another a p oph t h egm . Socrates and his interlocutor are discussing the love of m Gain , and Socrates is accused of deceiving his co panion by turning 31 - things topsy turvy in his arguments . He replies that in that case m he would not be heeding Hipparchus , who set up Her s in every

m m ow n m de e , bearing epigra s of his co posing , that the people might — ‘ not marvel at the wise inscriptions at Delphi the 1 t o a vr év and — th e Mnoév liq/ a v and the rest but think the sayings of Hipparchus wiser 32 O f Hi a r and flock to him to learn more . One of these pp ” n ma y éEa r d‘r a n chus contai ed the injunction w) , which is the poi t

2 7 202 S ec . .

2 8 2 Ka i a w ea r a k év v 6? Sec . 30 6 d dw a o m r e o . M v p fl g po mb p s y n w

' " ‘ r u Bt éw o mv Ka i r v A i a br ou 7 é xcbs Ka i 7 11 fi a mped) : 7 6 y ey p a p p évov é eNpo s, v 6

Aa xeoa o vlw v < 10 ' u1 8k 1 1r ' z1 m pf 11 3 p61 epo . 2 9 ’ - 3 L n i See fo r P a n t 8 1 De Ebrz el . 1 6 2 . a ct a t us a il uda e us De Pl . , inst nce , h o J , ; , De De I f a l . , I 3 ° H r mu r i o n e l L 1 2 ie ony s b ings the two togethe r n of his epist es ( VII , ) “ ‘ ’ Atque u tinam So cra t i cu m illud h a b eremus Scio quod n esci o et alte ri u s ien is T ei .s a t su m in t elli e p p g . 3 1 2 28A .

32 228 13 . 3 3 2 29A . “ KN O W THYSELF I N GREEK AND LATINLITERATURE 4 5 of Socrates long digression about him and his service to Athenian

- m u . w e e u cult re As hav said , the passage is half hu oro s and we are tempted to imagine a touch of irony in Hipparchus so esti mati n g his O w n wisdom as to count his inscriptions superior to the

’ ev vcbfit a o ur ou w e m r ered y , although ust not go beyond the text in pressin g the inference . ’ Dio m The passage , or rather story , in Chrysostom illustrates an s 34 presumption in trying to know other men and God before knowing

m . hi self , and this is a phase of the false conceit of wisdom As D m iogenes was going along the road fro Corinth to Athens one day , . he fell in with a ma n w h o had started out to consult the oracle at

D w a s elphi , but as his slave had run away he going back to Corinth ”5 i n i to try to find h m . After talking with the man about the u w s dom of trying to recapture a bad slave , the question of the value 3 s O of consulting the oracle came up . Diogenes said he did not bject ’ m w a s to the man s aking use of the oracle if he able to do so , but it is hard to make use of either God or ma n if one does not know h o w ; and then he proceeded to ask questions in true Socratic fashion

m m - with illustrations fro ani als , cithara playing , and the like , until he brought the ma n to admit that he w h o is ignorant of ma n is m incapable of using man , and accordingly he who is ignorant of hi self “ i : would not be able to use himself . Then D ogenes asks Have you — ‘ ’ ’ ” D I vcbfit o a vr c w? already heard , then , of the inscription at elphi the “ 37 nl ma n an d : No w Certai y , the replies ; the conversation proceeds is it not evident that the God gives this command to all on the ground ” “ ” “ that they do not know themselves ? Probably . And you for ” ” v sooth would be one O i the all? Yes . Then not e en you ” “ “ know yourself at all? It seems so to me . And in that you

ma n are ignorant of yourself you are ignorant of , and not knowing ma n you are u nable to make use of man ; but While you are incapable ” m ma n m ! of aking use of , you try to ake use of God

3‘ ee . S pp 94 f .

35 r 2 9 . 5 K O . X , 35 3GI R . ‘7 303R . CHAPTER VI

‘ I NQGI EATTO N As KN O W Y O UR O WN FAULTS In the Phaedrus passage to which we have referred1 Socrates said that he considered himself to see whether he happened to be some beast more intricate and full of passion than Typho , or whether m i he was a gentler and more si ple creature , sharing in some div ne

i 11 6301 o r o1 and less monstrous destiny . This is giv ng to 7 a u 1 the sense ’ ’ of knowing one s soul , and includes a knowledge of one s disposi ’ - tion o i one s temper and spirit . From this conception it is not a far cry to the thought that a man should know his own faults ; and m fl O f in ti e , through the in uence the S toics probably , this force came m to be defini tely attached to the apophthegm . Someti es w e find m O it so used where the individual alone is concerned , but ore ften the emphasis is upon knowing our own faults rather than those 2 L . of other people . As an instance of the former Schmidt cites the 3 ’ ’ questions of the Pythagoreans : 7rfi u a péfin ; Ti 6 épega ; Ti 11 0 1 Oéov 0 13K ér ekéo fin; but While we have abundant evidence that 7 11 6301 o a vr év 4 was one of the watchwords of the school , and know that the dis 6 ci les p were supposed to pass in retrospect their daily conduct , we do not happen to find the maxim applied in this connection in the little Pythagorean literature extant . There is a possible suggestion of it in a pertinent passage in Seneca , however , and Galen and Plu ta rch introduce it definitely with this connotation .

Seneca in one of his Epi stles quotes with approval a statement — “ ” — of Epicurus I ni t iu m est salut is notitia peccati and says 6 “ Na m n escit . himself qui peccare se , corrigi non vult Ideo

1 4 1 . See p .

2 ' Etl ulz der a lten Gr iec e v l l a a ma n a h n o . . 395 : , II , p Vie f ch d chte d bei n ur a n di e a u der m l r U r den M l r der t h a Beob cht ng eigene Feh e . nte itg iede n p y

o reis ch en S ul al a ls r r a t a lich ra v rz ul g ch e g t es Vo sch ift sich t g g die F ge o egen , welche in dem g em erw ii h n t en Verse ihren Ausdru ck gefunden ha tte

’ ” Worin h a b ich gefehl t? Wa s get h a n ? Welche Pfl ich t en vera b sa umt ? 3 B L r . 1 a . 1 De Curi os itale . . 9 Plu . iog e t VIII , I , t c ‘ G l r - 1 08 8 1 I a m l r . . P . r 14 1 5 . S o den Ve ses of the ytha go ea ns tob F o , b lich us Li e o P th a oras : 3 , f f y g XVIII 8 .

5 — ' See r De S en ect t 3 De Vi ro B ou o II vBa o t m u A , e 38 . u u Cice o , soni s VII , y p )

V 1 4 4 . V . 1 5 esp .

6 1 M E . or . 7 1 0 . 1 III , , “ ” KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 4 7

7 m co a r ue : a ccusa t oris quantu potes , te ipse ( ) g , inquire in te primum ” d in de i i i r i e ud c s de eca t or s . partibus fungere , , novissime p Galen says in his chapter entitled De P ropri orum A n imi oui usque Afiectuum ’ 8 Dign ott on e et Cura tton e : We see all men fancying that they are free m few from error altogether , or that they make erely a slight mistakes in judgment , and this is especially true of those whom others think h err the most . Those w o allow others to reveal their opinion about what sort of people they are , I have seen make the fewest mistakes , but those who take it for granted that they are good , w i . thout leaving it to others to judge , stumble most seriously and most frequently . So while as a lad I thought that the Pythian com

n w a s n ma d to know oneself eedlessly praised , and that it was not such ’ ”

w a s . a great saying , I later found that men s praise of it just Galen — hints here at What he says explicitly farther on that the w ay to know one ’ s faults is to allow an impartial critic to tell us the truth

m - - about the . B ut our self love stands in the way , and self love is 9 “ ” 1 0 “ fl a t t er . fl a t t erer fed by y The , Plutarch says , is likely to be an enemy to the Gods and especially to the Pythian ; for he always

11 6301 a a vr év w acts counter to the 7 , deceiving each of us ith reference

n - m n hi . a to mself , and causi g self ignorance He makes a ignorant of both his good and bad qualities to the extent of degradi ng his good points into failures and imperfections , and his bad ones into ” n somethi g irremediable . Farther on in thi s same essay Plutarch

- exhorts the reader to do away with his self love and conceit , for these “ ” w e O serve to make him an easier prey to flattery . If bey the God , “ 1 6301 a a vr v - he goes on to say , and learn that the 7 é is all important O f w e for each us , and if at the same time see that there are countless failures to attain the Good in our nature and rearing and education , while much that is reckless and bad is mi xed in with our actions and w e ll l words and experiences , sha not so easi y place ourselves in the ’ ” 11 Flatterer s path .

“ 7 l t L r 19 a : I u r Summ r S e ec ette s o S en eca . 7 e s , f , notes , p s ys nq i e in te ,

m ima re a va r a for 11 6301 0 11 117 11 osce l Tra . u a est 6 N ike ( nq se ips , i nt 7 (te 4 9 ,

8 l - 4 V . c . I . 3 u . Vo . I , p , K hn ” Th e effect of fla ttery in blinding men to their fa ults is distinguish a ble r m f ma m m lv m r r ul a a re f o its e fect in king the think the se es o e powe f th n they .

H c a ur oy r ff r r m II ence its connection with he e di e s f o tha t indica ted in c . . 1 ° D i c e do Ad la t r 1 e s ern n u o e et Ami co . . D , c n 2 c . 5 . “ ” 4 8 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

Our proneness to see others ’ faults rather than our own is indicated 12 “ by the author of the M a gn a Mor ali a . He says : Since then it m is very hard , as so e of the Wise have declared , to know oneself we are unable to contemplate ourselves from within ourselves ;

u and beca se we are unable to know ourselves , we evidently do ” 13 unwittingly the very things for which we find fault with others . We next meet this idea in connection with the maxim ’ in a humorous ’ bit of word - play in Horace s Satire on our Intolerant Judgment of Others

0 C ’ Ma emu s a m No vru m cu m ca r ere t H u t u bsente p , e s , ‘ u a m a it ra a n u t u m a r Q id , igno s te , ignot d e nobis ’ ‘ ’ r a u a ? E o met mi i n o s co Ma u Ve b p t s g g , eni s

h mm i i n or a s i n otum W ile all co entators recogn ze the play on g , g and i n os co m g , and the general sense of the passage , no one see s to have “ ” called attention to the fact that ignoras te is the O pposite O f

1 De Vita 7 1 52101 o a vr ov. Seneca puts the thought vigorously in his 15 “ ’ ” B ea ta : m Have you ti e to seek out another s faults , he asks , and ’ to disclose your O pini on of any one? D o you O bserve another s pimples when you are covered with numerous sores? This is as if some one should ridicule the moles or warts on some very beautiful m m f e . person , while he is being consumed by the cruel ange hi s l i m W ll you not rather look at your own faults? . Are hu an conditions

statu m vestrum aru m n osti s fi such that even if p , you have suf cient ” time to wield your tongu e to the reproach O f your betters? The “ ” phrase S tatum vestrum n os tis is certainly a reminder of 7 11 6301 a a vf ov s , but again it is Plutarch who use the exact words of the maxim til ta t with this application . He tells us in h is De I n imicorum U l e of m how when Plato was in co pany w ith men of disorderly character ,

’ ' ‘ he was wont to ask himself M17 1rov ap é'yo) r orofir os ; If he who l h ” ca ls into reproach the life of anot er , Plutarch goes on to say ,

1 2 See ur T w a s r a l r a s a rl a s 3rd ur . . his p ob b y w itten e y the cent y B C B net , t i c ri t tl r E h s o A s o e . . . f , Int o p XI 13 1 2 1 3 1 4 . 1 5 . a II , , fl 1 ‘ - H o r . a t 2 2 2 S . 3 3 . I , , 15 2 7 4 - 6 r 5 0 - 0 T ea ut . T1111 . 3 5 5 . . H VII , , Cf e ence “ It a co mp a ra t a m esse h o min u m na tura m omnium Aliena u t melius videa n t et diiudicen t ” Q ua m sua l

Al W 2 2 - 2 3 : so . 9 “ N fl a i t i ums t aliis l u m a r onne id g , te consi i d e , ” r a r n on a uxilia rier? Fo is s pe e , tibi posse te “ ” KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 4 9 shall straightway consider his ow n and correct it he will derive

m m n h some advantage fro the reb uke . A a w o is going to censure

- another ought not to be clever , and loud voiced , and hasty , but he should be above reproach and without O ffence ; for upon no one is the God so likely to have enjoined the 7 11 5191 a o ur ou as upon h im who is ” 15 going to find fault with another . While the Ancients had many ways of expressing the thought 1 7 New m m t h e m contained in our Testa ent figure of the bea and ote , probably the oldest and most common was Aesop ’ s fable of the two

u it er t w o : sacks . J pp placed upon us sacks , the fable reads “ ’ h e t one laden with others faults he hung before our heart ; the other ,

fi o w n . lled with our , he placed behind our back And so it is that w e ow n m cannot see our evil deeds , but conde n others when they fail ” 1 8 This fable is referred to with particular frequency among the Latin poets . Horace alludes to it in his Satire on the Stoic paradox that all save the Wise Man are ma d :

Dixerit in sa n u m ui me m u diet a u q , totide a , tq e ” 1 i r 9 Resp ce e ignoto di s cet p en den tia tergo .

1 “ c t 1 11 1 a o iir w Zo me 5 . Th e l l u r a : 0 66 3 De I n i mi oru m Utili a te c . a st c a se e ds y p s

o r dr' r’ w 6 9fo ei1 7 0 3 uéh kou t é‘ ew Er ov TO 11 636 1 a a vr u D A udi en do u o e s s n e é . . e p , 3 j l y p , 7 Cf ’ 4 0 D - E r u a m u r Pla a n d a a l VI , , whe e he q otes the s e q e y of to s , s ys th t whi e it a la m o ur r u l a n d l un l o n e rr a n d ua r is e sy to b e neighbo , it is se ess id e ess co ects g ds

‘ l l D i a 1 4 E D ri o l u in m l . d a a e Coh b en I r . 6 6 3 e u a ga inst ike fa ts hi se f Cf . so c ( ) C

l l 7 3 11 7 a EO t x n oi z1 e lva t a h n drr a r ov 2 . . a a H ex . 6 : 1. e e e Sila te C . 6 Cf so B si IX , 4 y p x

' ’ ' éa vr' oy ém ' vcbva t cbv 6 11 0 9s O éw s 7 6 dlxkér w v d d r‘ a Ka r a kén w v a dtts y - fiu E p p p np fi Bp

’ 11 ix l v i a 1 1. 7rp6 s 7 63 o e w ék a r r w uocr w v éw ivvw a w . 1 7 d R m x r r For Gr a n a m S a a v . eek o n e p essions , see the two f o enec cited bo e

t 3 73 - 74 Al H ra S a . so o ce , I , , Qui n e t ub erib us p rO p r ns o fl en da t a mi cum

P ula i n o s ce verru i illi s ost t , g t c s u . “ An d P r u S a t ri con 5 7: I n al educlum v in ricin um n on v et oni s y , io p ides , te ides 1 8 ’ r l P a ru 9 B rius v r n o 6 6 r a a b . A t ans a tion of h ed s IV . e sion ( ) e ds

9 6 58111 H o deb 7 11 7 1 dkkd 7 6311 1r drr 11 p un s 1 s, p w .

- - 7 0 81 0 11 n kda a a fl a i goa a' t Bea n 67 1111 {4140 11

' dvdpcon' ou éK ‘yfis ' éx Oé 1 0 6 66a) 1r77p a s

r ' ' 1 1 ' e p éw a t wépovr é. (p a o L 7 611 751 dvdpdm ow

’ xa mb v o bo' a 1r 6 0rw 1 611 6911 6 i y eu s, p 1

‘ 1 idiom (Sé 61r1 0 96 11 f n 7 1 el w v. , i s 7 u i

5 16 Ooxo fia t a vy goop ds 11 2511 dkkfikw v

1 kéu ew t c (1 1 0 61311 Oé T ri s O ZKO L. B d B , 7

3 2 . See al S n a De I ra 2 8 8 Plu . Cra ss . so e ec II , , t 1 9 r - l illen er er r r r Ho a t 3 298 99 . n d D b a S . a . II , , Kiess ing g see he e efe ence

2 n relli - M n R l v a l r x la a ca u da m t ra h a t v . 5 a d O a d a v to , , ewes o fe gi e te n ti e e p n l ll a l r l r b u t ur a u a a . tions , s e y the sion to the f b e is pe fect y pp ent “ ” 50 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

Sufien us And Catullus uses it in writing of the poet , who was never m “ so happy and proud of hi self as when he was writing verses . Of m m ” “ course we all ake the sa e mistake , Catullus reflects , and there ” n m is o one who you cannot see a Suffen us in something .

“ Suu s cuiq ue a t t rib ut us est e rror ” 2 ° ed n o n videmu m n i e i r S s a t ca quod n te go est . — Persius bri n gs the fable into his fourth Satire a poem of which “ Gildersleeve says : The theme of the satire is contained in the ” 21 l n i 1 1 ol i 1 1. closing verses . It is the Ap c 7 1 6 0 6 6111 1 61 The first part m of the poe is very obviously based upon the Alcibiades I , and the m thought of the axim continues as the ideas grow more general .

“ Ut m t em t a t descen dere m ne o in sese p , ne o , ” 22 Sed p ra eceden t i sp ect a t ur ma ntica te rgo !

f : Y o u the poet exclaims , and then he goes on to say in e fect ask about a certain rich man ’ s property and you hear him criticised e for his miserliness , but your own luxury and bad habits are riti

cised . also We slay others , and in turn expose our limbs to the

: . arrows . This is the rule of life this is its lesson We try to conceal our defects , and give credence when men speak well of us , but their if ” praise amounts to little we are guilty of avarice and wrong . And in conclusion he says

“ ” Tecum ha bit a : noris qua m sit tibi curta supelle x .

11 0101 6 61111 611 While 7 is not expressed here in so many words , the poem as a whole , and the verses we have quoted in particular , seem based upon it , and it is probably not too much to say that the fable of the m m m two sacks and the axi eet in the above couplet . Connington “ renders the verses freely : None of us knows himself Every o ne ” 24 thi nks only of his neighbor ; and Gildersleeve says : The tho ugh t ” 25 is simply n o scere se ipsum .

The maxim and the fable meet again in Galen also . He say s l “ he is going to te l how one can learn of his faults , encouraging him who is famili ar with thi s inscription an d is feeling it incu mbent

1 ° 2 2 - 2 a ullu 1 5 1 . C t s ,

Th e atires o P ersi . 14 1 S f us p .

- W . 23 24 .

“3 r a M a v T um a a ut r Ce t in SS . h e ec h bit no is 2“ P ersi us it t a n d c t . r w h r n s . a om. b Con n i n on N l . 3 , y g , ed by ett eship ( d ed . r vise 79 e d) p . . 25 P a ge 14 7.

CHAPTE R VII

‘ I NQGI ZATTO N As KN O W Y O U ARE HUMAN AND MO RTAL In Pindar ’ s Third Pythian Ode we find expressed one of the commonplaces of Greek thought in the verses :1

‘ ’ 'l 60 1 11 7 11 7r 1 6110 111 r evé ev i o a iv xp ) 7 131 6 c1p 5 0111 ua a u , Ova r a s g p a ,

'' ’' 1 1 61 i 7 1a 1 . 7 0. i v 7 1 7 6 w p 0 56s , o s e ué a 0 a s “ The scholiast upon the passage says : This is similar to the 7 11 0101 0 0111 7 611 l m m ” 2 of Chi on , eaning that we are by nature ortal . But it is not at m all likely that Pindar had the apophtheg in mind here , for it is not until the days of Menander that the two are definitely brought m together . The injunction to think ortal thoughts , however , to recognize our human limitations and know that we must die

: is as old as Archilochus , who says

’ ' f’ 7 17 11 1110 116 6 0 10 9 [3110 116 s 6111 0pcbfl ovs éxa m — And the tragic and co ic poets yes , and the prose writers too m m m reiterate the t he e . Someti es they e phasize the thought that m we are only human beings , subject to hu an vicissitudes , and so must not think too highly of our human powers ; sometimes they dwell upon the thought that death awaits us ; and again , as in the

m . above passage fro Pindar , the two ideas are both expressed They m are but two shades of the sa e conception , really , and they are never far apart . Sophocles has the first s hade O f meaning chiefly in ff mind when he says that Ajax brought his su erings upon himself ,

’ 4 1 7 1 0 ov /631 1 . Ka 6. pw 1r (ppm 1

1 - 5 9 60 . III , 2 h : 11 zxw 7 7 3 P11 30 . Vol . . 76 . D ra c ma n n 6 10 10 7 1 3 x vo s 6 0 0é a 7 1 II , p ed 1 5 ¢ 7u 4

11 7 6 66 6ko x1 67 0 1 m 0 11 117 6 . 7 u , 1 1 17 0 1 i recpf a ue . 3 A th olo i a L ica ra 2 v r - r n r 6 . 7 . B e H ll . . k g y f g , , ed g i e

A a x 777. r r E u . . 6 3 j . Cf . F a g 9 ed . Na uok

’ ’ ‘ d GOT a. 1 1 6 611 516 E0 7 10 é a né bxnu 1 7 y y ,

’ ' 6 0 éEei ra p e? 11 1 2;0 11 if xpecbv cppovei v

’ ° 11 6 711 7 0 v ii d)\ 111 1 7 5 1 q fiéw xep és , Oo ko 1r

' ' d a 117 6 s a lei 11 111 11 15 7 7111 a a w ofi

1 1 0 4152 111 36 6 11 101: 1110 7 5 xp va és £1 1rvpl.

'

. l Her I 20 7 P r a I 1 . a 1 59 . a r t 6 em. 1 5 A . a uck s h . N N . Cf so , ; ind , V , , XI , ; esch f g ,

Eur - - B acch a e 199 395 6 1 00 2 1004 1 a t A li s 3 1 ra . 79 a u k 1 11 . u N c . ipides , , ; 1 ; f g , I 2 1 soc . A a n L r De m . t 1 0 I 6 . vol . i s t e i n es 1 6 1 Di h ilus a . I , ; g p . p f g , ed Koch I , 4 . 5 7 . r 2 a a . 2 6 . H . . a n t h al : p C to , f g II , p ed . “ An ca elum ue re un t n e ua r do ceri di sint q g , q e e ; ” C u m o rt alia ua r i r m mo t al a u a . sis q e sint , c “ KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERA TURE 5 3

And with similar feeling the Romans sought to remind the victorious m m general at his triu ph that he was only hu an , for the slave w h o stood behind h im on the triumphal car holding a golden crown over “ ” : R : m m 5 his head kept saying espice post te ho ine te memento . — — The other meaning the idea that death is before us is clearly ’ ’ 6 expressed by Heracles words in Euripides Alces ti s :

’ ' 7 61 011 177 61 1rp 617p a r 0 20 00 5 1711 6x6 1 go11 o t z1 ;

' Bpor oi s 6177010 1 K a 7 0a z1 6 i 11

110 616 60 7 1 011 777 6311 60 7 13 656 7 10 7 0 7 a 1 7 7 r)11 a iipi ov p éh h ova a v 6 1 61 0 6 7 0 15

A good instance of the juxtaposition of the t w o ideas occurs in a

‘ 8 fragment of D en lo crit us : xpéw v 61110p<117riz11711 6 10 7 711 dgoa vpfiv 7 6

1 1 1 1 60 60 011 11 0 1 6A17 oxp61 10 1 . And when the word 01 77 6 is used it always m gives the added suggestion of death , even if the e phasis of the sentence as a whole is upon our humanity rather than upon our 9 m h i s : mortality . For exa ple , Sophocles says in one of fragments

’ ’ 7701s 667 67 1117 6111 0z1 i77 6s 511 011n7 ij s 7 6 gobs

' A16 s 7 6 11 0 1a 6 0 gop0 11 6 811 a ogocbr 6 pos ; 1 0 and in another :

'‘ ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 11 0001 1 g0 p0 1 6 1 1 7 61 01 77 61 611 0po171 0 1s 10 0 .

So Pliny implies the one shade of mean ing while expressing the “ : —dum in firmi sumus— other when he says tunc deos , tunc hominem ” 1 1 l esse se memin it . We natura ly look for this commonplace not nl m h r o y in the literature , but a ong the sepulc al inscriptions , and i we find it frequently n both the Greek and the Latin collections . 12 - b The passer y is repeatedly enjoined to know the end of life , or to

5 l 33 . T r ull a A . e t i n, po 0 vv . 78 ff.

7 l r . 10 7 . 1 P m a 5 2 . Cf . hi e on f g , Koch II , p

9 285 Diels .

9 4 8 1 u k . , Na c

l ’ ° r r E i h rm in r 3 2 1 . l a c a us u a l F a g . Bent ey sc ibes to p the q ot tion A istot e s

1 1 1 1 R ic 2 1 6 : 7 6 11 011 0 7 6 11 0 611 60 611 11 7 0 . 7 61 01 0 7 61 h etor . . II , , xp fi , Cf Soph

'‘ r 53 1 : 011 a 7 d o11 6 1 11 r f a g . gop xp )

' ' 1 r 11 7 a 66 0 7 7 0 11 011 7 7 0. Ka z1 i x1 w Eu . Alces ti s 799 : 6 s 1 1 s 1 i

‘1 E . 26 . p VII , ‘2 E i ra ma ta a eca ex L a i i o l t K i l 44 c b e 303 3 5 33 . m Gr d bus C n e a . a 81 p g p ed II , ;IV , “ ” 54 KNO W THYSELF I N GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

m 1 3 remember that he is ortal , and a certain Greek says of himself ’ 14 7 6611 0 11 11111 0111 7 31 66 7ra 110 6 6w 11 11 1 1 110 6 , 7 p

m Sa rda n a ulus The inscription on the to b of p , according to Athenaeus , 15 was in part as follows :

6 11 6 160 3 67 1 0i1177 bs 6p m 0 611 0u11 b 11 616 56

' 1 1 1 7 6 p7r611 6 vos 0a kin0 1 0011 61 7 1 0 0 1 0 67 1s 61 170 1s .

’ 111 7ro6é ivov 6 d1 a a 1k6 f10 a 11 0 1 7 81p 67 0 s N 1.1 7 a fi s

To multiply instances further were tedious , but it is interesting

1 1 to see that. 7 1 12101 0 0 v7 61 at length took on these t w o additional and interrelated meani ngs of knowing that w e are human and knowing m that we must die . That it should do so see s natural , for the idea that we are all subject to human limitations calls for only a slight extension of the idea of knowi ng our own limits in ability and achieve

B t 1 ment as compared with other men . u the connection with 7 1 6101 0 0 v7 611 was probably due rather to the influence of the Stoics in m m their claim that the axi was the foundation of philosophy , and to their insistence to an unprecedented degree upon our cultivating a n m attitude of i passivity toward misfortune and sorrow and death , by reminding ourselves that these things are an inevitable part of 16 the human lot . That this connotation was general and not merely literary is suggested by the mosaic floor of a small tomb found west R m 1 7 of the Appian Way at o e , bearing the figure of a skeleton with ‘

I NQ I EA O N . the words O TT written in large , bold letters underneath In studying the specific passages in the literature in which the ap oph t h e m i ma g was given th s force , we y pass by several extracts given by 1 8 St ob a eus P1 0 01 E a v7 611 m in his chapter on , inas uch as , like the

s . pas ages cited above , they do not contain the words of the maxim

11 1 h lo dn i a k 4 35 790 1 323 1 324 . Ant o r a 1 1 1 L at n a . o h Ca mi n 5 1 1 111 11 i ed C , , , ,

2 r e i i r ula rl u in r lo i a La ti n a 14 92 Th e m m n . g II , , . wo d is eg y sed these insc iptions “ i m m e H r o . 1 1 h olo n k r a : a t f v n 3 9 . C d a owe e , ed , e ds Cogit to te ho in(e ) esse sci o ’ morien du (m) s t .

a i 6 1 K b el 5 . V , 15 1 4 A a u . then e s VIII , t 1 5 1 a t Pra . . E u 8 a Nat . u es . pictet s I , ; Senec , Q III , e ‘7 l i ’ l 2 e He b s uide Vo . T i m a in T rma M u u m . Se G h s os ic is the he e se g , no .

l 1 8 6 . 1 64 . F r l ll l . . 6 o 1044 . 2 22 ee a u . En . S , p ( g so B de Inst , p the use l r m men ra r uma l P r u of ske etons to e ind of the t nsito iness of h n ife see et oni s , ’ ’ l r al u M a T m. a a u en ri 35 a n d L . N C , owe s note (p ote so the Bosco e e C ps ( s

m ei i 1 - r l ull a n d P o . 38 2 En . a . a n d m a a r p p , g t ns ) the os ic t b e top with sk othe m l u i sy bo s fo nd a t Pompei (Ma u p . 1 9 l r 2 1 F o . ; “ KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 5 5

m The words are contained , however , in a pertinent frag ent of Men ’ 1 9 “ — ” : ander s When thou dost wish to know thyself what thou art , “ m he says , look at the to bs as thou dost pass along the street . In —O f them lie the bones and the light dust of men kings , and , men men and wise , and greatly exalted by reason of their birth , m m . or fa e , or personal beauty And then the ti e for enjoying these mm m . m proved all too short A co on grave claimed the all , ortals L — that they were . ooking to these things , know thyself what thou art . 2 0 Seneca in his Con s ola ti on to Ma rci a for the death of her son dwells upon the frail and mortal nature of ma n in an eloquent pas

in : W sage . He says part Mortal you ere born , and you have given ” — birth to mortals . Your son has died that is , he has come down to that end toward which all whom you think happier than ” your O ffspring are hastenin g . Hither comes with uneven step all m ' that throng which contends in the foru , takes seat in the theatre , and prays in the temples ; and those whom you cherish and those whom you despise are made equal in one common dust . In view

O f l w a s Nos ce Te this , manifest y , that ascribed to the Pythian oracle . ?” What is man A kind of fragile vessel , broken at the slightest

. ma n ? toss What is A weak and delicate frame , unprotected , m defenseless in hi self , in need of help from without , subject to all l the buffets O f fortune . And so he goes on . P utarch writes

1 ' 9 r 5 38 1 a . 6 1 F g , Koch III , p .

6 7 0 11 1 11 0 0 6 u7 11 6 0 7 1 1 6 66 1 6 m 0 ea 6 s 6 ,

’ Z k v i 11 0 0 16 660 1 7ro 6 fs ufl a fio 6 s 7 6. 11 1771 s p ,

’ ’ 1 1 11 1 1 61 7 0 80 61 6 0 7 6 0 7 01 7 6 11 0 1. 11 0 1310 77 61 :

11 6 6111 a m h v 7 v 6111 11 w z1 11 0 2 0 0 6311 6. p B éw 11 0 2 p 0 1

11 0 1 11 67 0 ¢p ovo f111 7 w 11 67ri 7 611 6 1 11 0 2 700 77711 0 0 111

1 11 0 137 011 7 6 66577 11 617 2 d kd 0 0 171 617 111 .

’ '‘ ’ ' 1 1 1 1 0 6661 0 11 7 0 1 s 7 631 6 67717p 11 60 6 1 xp 61 o s .

1 1 1 1 1 1 11 0 1 1 6 1 7 6 1 66771 Za xov 0 1 7761 1 7 6 6 110 7 0 .

’ 1 1 1 7rp6 s 7 0 130 670 1711 7 11 0 10 11 6 0 0 v7 6 1 6 0 7 1 s 6 i .

m r o min m e v H ex. h r h u t u . A 8 5 1 R in se ulc a ex Cf b ose VI , , . espice p ide q id te

’ et a rema n eb un t ex r r t uo nisi cinis oss , hoc est , co po e 2 ° VI x 1 1 , , 3 .

2 ‘ - a r O f a Cf . the oft qu oted rema rk of Ana xa gora s upon he ing the de th of his

' : 6 6 1 11 011 7 6 11 V ' 1 6 4 74 D 1 6 V7 0 Q . A n . C . . P De Tra n . son 77 7 7 7 S lut . q ( )

. Eur 4 1 ra . 8 Na uck Cf ipides , f g

’ ' 1 1 11 6 11 7re 1 67 111 7 17 1 01 0 11 6 7 611 0p 1117r6 1 0. 7 77 p1 p s

1 xa KoTs 7 0p 0 6 0 1) 7rp6 0 1< 6 1 0 0 1 116 1 17. “ ” 5 6 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

2 3 in somewhat similar strain in his C on s ola ti on to Apollon i n s that he who resents his ow n death or the death of his children has evidently

ma n m forgotten that is ortal , and that his children are likewise i “ m h m m . : ortal , lent for a ti e And he continues It is not possible for any one in his senses to be ignorant of the fact that ma n is a mortal creature and that he is born to die . These two of the — ‘ ’ Delphic inscriptions are exceedingly necessary for life the I vcI101

1 1 1 0 0 117 61 and the M 7661 for on these all else depends . And they m are in accord and har ony with each other , and through the one the force of the other seems to be revealed . For in knowing oneself

‘ M1 6e11 0 0 11 M1 6611 0 0 11 1 11 61 0 11 6 1 11 there is included the 7 7 , and in the 7 7 the 7

17 1 m 60 1 61 . He who has these in ind as precepts of the Pythian oracle will be able to harmonize the experiences of life readily and

l o w n to bear them successfu ly , while he looks to his nature , and i s neither exalted with undue arrogance in prosperity , nor dejected and given to wailing and lament through weakness of soul and the fea r of death implanted in us .

24 Aelia n tells the story of how after Philip had conquered the

t n mm i h im A he ians at Chaeronea , he co anded a slave to rem nd early m m in the orning that he was hu an , and he would not leave the house nor let any one in to see him until the slave had shouted this

m . m m to him three ti es Alexander , oreover , despite his assu ed m divinity , is said to have re arked upon regaining his strength after a long illness that he was none the worse for it ; for 677611 11 170 6 '‘ 2s 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 711 6 5 71 60 0 s 11 ) 11 67 0

: m him with the words This ti e , Alexander , you cannot deny that you are my son ; for you would not have died if you had been Am

- 2 1 . c . 8 1 6 B 29 . Th e r r i r , c G eek ea ds n pa t

' 11 1 1 1 1 11 7 6 11 0 66 6 7 1 0 6 6. 60 7 1 6 a E ow a 1 1 o v 1 21 6 ci 1 0 o 60 7 1 01 < s s 6. 0 1 11r 0 0 6 67 1 s 7 p op x p 7 , p 7 ,

, ' 11 1 7 1 11 1 0 w 11 7 0 1 0X10 7 0 1 0 7 67 0 61 6 1: 6 0 170 0 0 1 6 2 . A6 60 7 1 7 631 7 p 0 11 11 7 7. 7

‘ ' 11 0 1 67 0 7 0 77 0 7 6 11 6 10 11 7 6 I vc50 1 0 0 v7 11 11 6 611 7 0 67 10 11 0 1 0 7 1 7 0 1 11 0 1 7 6 : 7 , 6 0 2 7 6 M17 6» 7 p 77 7

' r akk a 7 0 67 0 0XMM1 0 v11 1 6 11 0 0 0 1 w 11 0 11 0 2 00 7 6 o v 60 111 6 67 Mi3 7 $ 9 6, 2. 1 ¢ , p 7 ” 0 7 11 1 11 1 1 1 1 M1 6611 0 0 11 11 0 2 611 00 1. 11 0 6. 6 19 0 1 E1 7 6 6. 7 3 11 1 1 v7 1 1 6 6 7 0 1 7 6 1 . 7 p 6 7 61 0 11 6 60 6 1rep x 7 7 ,

1 1 1 1 7 6 7 11 610 11 6 1 60 117 6 1 . 24 1 l r 2 1 1 5 . u in a r St o b a eu s o n P1 5 91 2 0 v7 61 o . VIII , Q oted p t by (F , 5 lor Stob . F . 2° Di alog ues of th e Dea d X I V Lu ci a n spea ks of how prone men are to forget

a a re m r al in h a ron 8 81 1 7 Men i us 1 2 a n d l r b ut u th t they o t C , ; pp , e sewhe e , he ses

116101 0 0 v7 611 in h l r 7 t is connection on y he e . “ ” KNow THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATUR E 5 7

’ ” 2 7 “ . Now o u mon s that you have died , he says farther , do you not suppose that there are many w h o will mock at your pretended divinity , when they see the corpse of the God lying before them? m Moreover , everything you did see s to fall short of being ” “

. me the work of a God Men do not think that about , Alex “ d m me D ander replie , but they ake out a rival of Heracles and ionysus . ’ 2 8 m Ao n o s And what s ore I alone seized that , which neither of them ” D succeeded in taking . And then Philip concludes the ialogue :

Do mm you see that you say that as if you really were the son of A on , comparing yourself with Heracles and Dionysus ? Are you not m asha ed of yourself , Alexander , and will you not learn to drop that 2 9 bombast and 7 1 1110 77 0 6 0 v7 6 11 11 0 1 0 1111 170 77 15617 11 6 11 p6s It is obvious ‘ that Lucian is using the phrase 7 11 1210 77 0 6 0 11 7 611 here to mean Know that you could not perform the feats of a God since you are a mere ’

. m mortal , as the fact of your dying shows This satire re inds us somewhat of the inscription that the Athenians placed on the inside of the Gate which Pompey w a s to pass through as he left their city after a short visit on his way to the East . His sacrificing to their Gods and his address to the people had evidently made a favorable m impression upon the , and they wrote

’ ’ ' E 1 16 67 1 7 0 0 0 67 0 11 6 1 go 60 0 1 61v0pw 7ros 0 0 9,

2 7 Sec . 5 .

2 9 A l r i n ofty ock n I di a . 2 9 ’ ’ St o b a eus u a r m a : 7 6 66 11 136 1 0 0 117 6 11 1 0 1 1 0 11 6 19 1 0 0 96 0 1 11 Cf . q ot tion f o Bi s 7 xp 7 7 0

' 1 A 1 1 1 6 1 1 1 1 11 7 631 0 0 61 01 1 61 67ré 7 1 1 60 v7 1 6 11 0 1 1 1 1 )\v0 0 80 l r . § , p 7 1 1 7 p p (F o ‘ 3 ° There is a sugg estion of the ma xim in this sense of know th a t y o u a re ’ l r m n e a rr m r a in a a P l . S o o n a . m 2 1 3 v r o t f g of hi e on ( , Koch) o e is c ying con e a a r a l a a r l ma x u fo r la s tion with ce t in K eon , who is pp ent y king e c ses his ck of

fio r a r ' r a h a s r r ma e t u a a . u a l to cq i e t de If the yo th s ys he p ope ty , this y f i .

a a h i s r n ll a u a r u fo r h im a r h i If he s ys th t f ie ds wi t ke p cont ib tion , the spe ke bids m

’ efixov Aa fl el v n efp a v xw 11

1 1 11 )\1 11 0 11 0 11 6 1 66 7 1 650 6 1 0 6 0 v7 61 0X)\0 71 1766 7r ) 1 .

’ ' Koch removes a ce rta in h a rshness of expression by rea ding 0 65611 611 7 axx fi ’ instea d of Q M 71 176611 b ut H eimso et h s cha nge of 7 1 111 0 6 1 0 6 0 0 7 6 11 to 7 11 0 117:

0 117 0 65 See H erw er t t ca 14 8 m a den ollec a n ea Cri i . ul ( C p ) isses , point which wo d

l u T a r ll n o t l l a Gr a u . not be ost pon eek dience h t his f iends wi he p K eon is , of

ur ma m l a b ut ff r a lur ll ma h im co se , the in i p ic tion, the e ect of thei f i e wi ke not

l m l z a a a ll a a m r a b ut r a . on y to beco e e e sh dow to e i e th t th t is th t he is Cf .

A - S . a x 1 25 6 oph j .

’ 6 cb 0 1 0 9 0 66611 6 11 7 0 ; 0 h ko 7r)\1 11 p , 7 p 511 )

’ 1 110 0 1 11 0 11 1 011 . 6 1610 N , 6 0 0 1 7rep 7 11 1 7

3‘ Plu r i a la a P o1n . t . 2 7 n u v V . r t ch , p c . O the o tside of the g te they p ced the e se

1 0 11 11 160 1 6 11 1r 0 7r6 1 7ro 1 61 . 7rp0 6 11 v 0 8/1 6 , 6 1 , p 1 1 “ ” 5 8 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

The maxim with this force seems to be implied in a couplet of 32 Th e Golden S a yi n gs of th e Pyth a gorea n s :

' 1 1 10 0 11 e1 1 1 6 11 1 ' 11 7 6 X0 7 0 7 s 0 117 6 6x x 176 0. 11 7 6 60 j 6

1 1 11 6 1 1 6300 1 7 1 0101 11 61 (ES 00 6 1 1ré7rpw 7 0 1 6 170 0 1 . That this was one of the teachings of the sect is made evident by a ’ m Tr a n uilit fragment fro the Pythagorean Hipparchus treatise on q y ,

' whi ch reads in part : 7 0 11 7 0 11 66 650 11 7 1 11 0k1 0 7 0 77011 7 0 111 6111p17016s 67 1 0 7 011 6 11 0 1 33 1 1 11 1 167 6 v 67 6 601 0 7 0 63 0 7 1 61 7 1 01 0 7 0 1 11 0 1 0 0 11 1 11 0 1 . . 0 7 , p Jewish and Christian writers also made much of the thought that ma n is human

i m uda eus in his lim tations , as certain passages fro Philo J and Cle 34 1 21 1 ment of Alexandria attest . Clement says that 7 1 6 01 0 0 v7 61 shows

m 11 0 1 67 1 0111 7 6 6 1 many things , and he puts first in his enu eration 7 ;

’ ’ 11 0 1 6 7 1 111110pw 1ros 67 6110 0 Philo concludes a discussion of the reasons for the rite of Circumcision by saying that it is a symbol 7 0 13 7 11 12111 0 1

11 0 60 117 6 11 di l 0 11 0 1 11 7 1 , and of discar ng that terrible disease of the sou , 7 , for some men boast that they are able to produce the fairest being — — of all Creatio n ma n concealing the fact that God is in truth 35 the Creator . And again in connection with the passage in Exodus

18 11 e h im m Ph ilo in t er re s 33 ; , wh re Moses asks God to show Hi self , p t ’ “ : N God s answer to Moses as follows either the nature of man , nor even the entire Heavens and the Universe can adeq uately appre

me . F1 6 01 61 0 0 117 6 11 hend 7 , and be not carried away with impulses and desires beyond thy power of realization , nor let the desire for ” 36 the unattainable seize thee and carry thee aloft . Such are the ’ —a B nli words of Philo s God eing who , u ke the more intimate Gods

- O ff of Greece , sits in wondrous majesty in a far world beyond all the conception and reach of men .

r Th e A r r llu ra a Fo r al a . u Ad He en n i n m 5 2 the gene ide cf cto IV , In i st ting ” sermo ci n a t io u r a n in hi a r m m l a r u he pict es incident w ch fte so e i it y s ccess , l a few men b rea k into a certa in house a n d demand the ma ster of the househo d . r His w ife throws herself a t the feet O f the lea der a n d begs h im to ha ve me cy . ‘ ’ ‘ Pa r in uit et er ua dulcis sima u in v a m r r r . N l ce , q , p q e tibi s nt it , ise e e nost i o i exsti n g uere e xst in ct o s ; fer ma nsu ete fo rt un a m ; n o s quoqu e fuimus bea ti : n o s ce ’ te es se hominem . 32 Mulla . Hiero cles Th e G l Sa P a r a . 1 . , o den yings of the yth go e ns , p , ed ch

- 14 1 5 . W . 33 l 10 1 S . or . 8 8 . tob F , 3‘ m. 23 S tro . V , IV , 35 1 L De i De S . e . C rc mci u s . 1 1 g I ( ) 0 . 3° L . D De S . e e Mon arc i a 4 4 p g I ( h ) .

CHAPTER VIII

‘ I NQGI EATTO N As KN O W Y O UR S O UL

It is to Plato that we owe the first application of 7 11 6301 0 0 117 611 ’ in the sense of knowing one s own soul , for it is the purport of the words of Socrates to Phaedrus when he explains that he has no time for speculative theology , inasmuch as he has not yet succeeded in m l knowing hi se f , whether he is a beast more passionate and intricate 1 m . m than Typho , or a si pler and gentler creature This eaning was ta ken up by the author of the Alci bi a des I and forms the central 2 theme of the Dialogue . We recall that in the early part of the discussion Socrates seeks to bring Alcibiades to a recognition of m how far his attain ents fall short of his ambition , and that he uses the Delphic maxim in emphasizing the need of his taking his ow n measure . Alcibiades then asks how he ma y secure this requisite m l knowledge of hi se f , and the conversation continues until he is brought to a contradiction and humbly admits his ignorance . Soc hi m h im rates tells that there is hope for since he is young , and bid s if him go on answering questions he wishes to improve , which lead s

di n m a n d to a stinctio between i proving , or caring for , our belongings m improving ourselves . To improve ourselves we ust know ou r

a n d : 176 7 6 o11 0 611 61 6 610 11 7 v 0 11 6 1 7 6 selves , Socrates goes on to ask p ) 7 0 7 x

'’ 1 17111 0 1 1 1 i s 1 1 1 7 11 11 II 0 1 Petiw 7 1 60 117 6 1 , 11 0 1 7 1 ; 131 (p a i l os 6 7 0 137 0 6 1 0 06 s 6 5 6 6 v0 , fi 3 x0 )\6 77611 7 1 11 0 1 obxi 170 11 7 6 s ; Alcibiades replies that it often seems to ’ 4 “ him to be in every one s power and again it seems very hard . Easy “ m ” or not , says Socrates , we ust have it , and he proceeds to dis t in ui sh u g between the so l an d the body , as he has before distinguished b etween the person and h i s possessions . The soul is shown to be the r ffi m : 1 11 1 11 6 0 1 1 6 1o a 1 6 6171 7 617 7 01 11 eal self , and he a r s 0 x 7 p 71 5 7 v Then follows a little further consideration of the fi— t v met P h ilebn s ripartite di ision , which we in the the self , and the t l 7— hings of the se f , and the things of the things of the self leading

1 e 4 S e p . 1 .

2 ee 1 S p . 8 .

3 IZ9A.

4 See p . 78 .

5 ISO R.

e 1 f Se pp . 6 .

7 P ra 1 33D - E h sing in . “ ” KNO W TH YSELE IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 6 1

m 8 again to the placing of the e phasis upon the real self , or the soul . “ How then can w e know it (the art of caring for the soul) most ” “ m ? . w e clearly asks For if we know this , it see s shall . Socrates m f u . O w e also know o rselves And in the na e the Gods , if are right m D in what we say , do we not get the eaning of the elphic inscription ” n ow m ? of which we were just re inded Alcibiades is puzzled , but Socrates tells h im what he surmises the inscription ‘ to mean— that l as the eye can see itse f by looking into another eye , so the soul m l to know itself ust ook at soul , and especially at the part of it m m ” 9 in which the virtue of soul exists , na ely wisdo This part of the soul is like to God , and any one looking to this and know

h 1 6 11 1 0 1 s ing all t at is divine , God and pp 7 , would in this way especially k w e Him know himself . Loo ing to God would use as the fairest mirror , and looking also into the virtue of the human soul ” 1 0 in this way would we see and know ourselves best . This gives D enough of the ialogue for our purposes , perhaps , but the argument

nl ma n is carried further to show that o y as a knows his real self , will he know aright the things of the self , and the things of the things

l . m of the se f And if he does not know all this regarding hi self , he c it annot know for others or be a competent leader of men . m m It is the soul , or the real self , then , which the axi here bids us know . The antithesis between soul and body thus set up resulted in a tendency to use 7 11 11301 0 0 v7 611 in emphasizing a knowledge O f the m m soul irrespective of the body , though we so eti es find it applied to a

t w o few knowledge of the relation between the , and in a instances it is treated as a very definite injunction to know one ’ s physical nature and its powers as an important preliminary to the fullest

- self knowledge . This last is especially true of the use of the a p oph h m ma n m t eg by Philo Juda eus . He would have reme ber the insigni 11 fica n t m elements of which he is ade , but he would also have him

i fr e know his ph ys cal . a m and sensibilities before going on to the more important knowledge of the mind and soul and the apprehension of

3 1 32 C . 9 133B .

' ’ ’ 1 0 ' 1331 C : 6 1s 7 611 066 11 fiké’fl O I/T GS éKGlJ/ Q) 611 6 177 pcg q 1i1 e0 0 11 11 0 1 7 12111

' 1 1 1 6. 1 0 10 17111 10 11 6 1s 7 1 1 t v s 0 1 6 7 1 11 11 0 1 0 67 0 1 1 60 00 7 0 6 31 6 11 11 0 1 1 1 1210 110 1 6 1 0 6 7 p 7 p xfi 1 7 , 3 7 pq 1 7 7 1 0 113 . 1 1 - — S . Le r ull a De A n i ma . T 26 3 4 D 2 2 . e S omn . 1 1 . p g I , ; I , Cf e t i n , XVII

i sius ro viden t ia m ui cu n ct is O erib us ui in t elle en dis in colen i p dei p q p s s g , d s , dis en sa n di s fruen dis ue falla ces et m a m ra efecerit n u p , q end ces do inos p se s s

m Pla n e u m um sen sib us ro t erea et in Ph a e Sed eni to , q od testi oni signet , p p dro ex So cra t is r pe sona n eg a t se cognoscere posse semet ip su m . “ ” 6 2 KN O W TH YSELR IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

1 1 1 true Being . He introduces 7 1 1201 0 0 v7 61 with this purport in h is m sy bolic interpretation of Charran and the life of Jacob in particular . — m 1 2 Charran the land into which Terah ca e when he left Chaldea , l L and into which Jacob went to ive with his Uncle aban , is the “ ” 13 . m land of the external senses The word eans holes , he says , and he bids the ma n who would examine himself go into the holes e and caverns of the body , and investigate his ey s , ears , nostrils , and other organs of sense 14 “ He who is still active in mortal life has ” 15 ” R b 11 6391 0 0 11 7 6 11 need of these organs , and so ebekkah says to Jaco 7

7 0 0 0 v7 0 8 11 6m) 7 1 7 6 611 0 0 7 0 11 11 0 1 7rp6 9 7 1 7 67 0 11 6 11 0 1 7701s éVé p‘YGTV 776gov11 6

’ 11 0 1 7 1; 6 7 0 00 11711 0 7 0 11 1 11 171 11 11 0 1 11 6 vp0 0 7ra 0 7 1611 06p 0 7 0 s 00 70 07 0 3 6 17 6 6 611 0 0 1

" 1 1 1 11o 1 1 7 10 1 . R 6s 6 7 6 7 1711 0 v11 7r6. B ut ebekkah would not have Jacob stay long in the country of the external senses . He was not to remain there “ ” all f his li e but certain days , while a long lifetime is stored up for 1 7 m h im in the city of the Mind . The com and to Abraham likewise m was to depart fro his country and his kindred , the outward senses , which means to be alienated from them in one ’ s thought— to treat 1 8 m m . H6 11 the as subjects , to learn to rule and not be ruled by the 7 0

7 6 11 0 1011 0 111 0 10 116 0 6 0 1176 11 0 67 0 61 11 7 6 67 0 11 0 116 1 11 7 , Philo says , m 7 p

11 0 1 of; 6171 7 0 7 7 6 1 11 7 700 0 6116 11 This control of the outward senses is followed by the mind ’ s beginning to know itself2 0 and associating with the reflections of the intellect , and when the mind m w has co e to understand itself accurately , it will probably someho 21 know God .

12 Mi xed in with this e xposition of the mea ning of self - k n owledge a re exh o r t a t io n s a a u al a n d l v to b ndon the st dy of the physic sciences to know onese f , e en a s T era h in g oing from Chal de a a b a ndoned the investig a tion of the uni ve rse fo r l rr T h e which the Cha lde a ns were fa mo u s to st udy himse f a t Cha a n . dis H r calle zl T ra a u r m m position which the eb ews e h , he s ys , fo nd conc ete e bodi ent

r r 11 171 91 0 0 117 11 De S a r old i n m a r ul a 6 . in oc tes , who g ew the ost c ef conside tion of 7

o n 5 8 . . . A br a a 1 5 S m . i M h m 8 . I , cf g ‘3 De a e 11 11 4 F ug t [ 11 6 11 0 71 6 5 . 1 ‘ D 5 . e S omn . 5 I , ‘5 D F I 4 e . 5 . ug et n . 1 5 Se . 4 c 6 . 1 7 D 4 e S omn . 6 . I , 1 8 T r ll a D i Pla n e u m n u m sen sib us . u e A n ma : Cf e t i n , XVII to , q od testi o i n ro t erea et in Ph a edro ex o cra t is r a m a n r e sig et , p p S pe son eg t se cog osce e poss s emet i su m p . 1 9 De - M . ig Abra h a m 7 8 . 2 ° I i b d . 1 3 .

2 1 1 I bi d 0 0 1 11 1 1 11 0 1 06 6 1 . . 195 . 11 011 0 71 1 6 0 3 60 1 7 6 1 6 10 6 7 0 1 7 dxc 1rov “ ” KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 6 3

‘ ’ ’ Porphyry in an extract from his work on I vcbfit a cw refers to ’ Ph ileb us m Plato s and says , a ong other things , that to know oneself altogether probably includes finds m i 7 0 fiuéTGp a Ka i 7 0 7 6 W fiue7 épw v. “ ” “ w a s m Plato , he says , zealous to know hi self in every way , that the immortal man within might be known and the outer portrait might f m not be unknown , and that the dif erence between them ight be

voO distinguishable . For the perfect s of which each of us is a likeness distinguishes the inner self , where the real man dwells , and the ’ outer image is distinguishable b v the things of the body and one s

e possessions . The powers of these also w ought to know and con Em sider how far they extend . The peror Julian likewise 23 ’ “ s vcbfic 0 0 v7 v ays that y 0 means a knowledge of the body , for Socrates

” “ ’ 7 0 éa v7 ov vcbva i and many others , he says , thought y to be this ”

7 0 0 96 21) 0K L c33 7 i év 0770 50 7 éov 1 1 1 ae o d a n . 0 p B s u 1 003, m and earlier in 24 “ the same chapter he says : He who knows himself will know about l the soul and he wi l know about the body also . And coming back to the first beginning of the body , he will consider whether it i s simple or composite ; and then as he goes forward he will reflect m ff about its har ony , and how it is a ected , and about its powers and , ”

or . in a word , about everything which it needs f its continuance The above passages from Porphyry and Julian are patently ’ nl 7 0 éa v7 0 i} m mere e argements of the the e of Plato s tripartite division , and Philo very likely had it in mind also . There is a further instance ’ of self - knowledge as applied to the body in Nemesius work on Th e N a ture of M where he says that the Tree of Knowledge in the E ’ m Garden of den gave a knowledge of one s nature , and akes it clear that the self- knowledge which it gave was a consciousness of ’ 26 m one s bodily needs . He refers to the Hebrews the state ent that man in the beginning w a s neither mortal nor immortal ; for if he had been mortal , God would not have pronounced death as the pen l alty of his disobedience , while if he had been immorta , he would not have needed food ; and he gives as his own view that man in that w a s m state equipped as a mortal , but was able to attain i mortality

22 S lor tob . F . 23 19GB . VI , 2“ l 8 - 3B C .

25 1 6 . I , 2° ma u Ex os iti on o t e d x a t 1 1 7 0 év . a i h O rth o o h . Cf John of D sc s , p f F II , p

BMu 7 s vcbo ew s 0 1ré1ret 0v 7 0 1 0 x0 2 ooxt v Ka u / 0 0 4,0 11 7 7 0 0 v6 dn rov a x i E fi v , p , uh , i y m fis 8 p in r o is

‘ ’ Ka i w a a xo . Abb Ka i fikov 7 0 6 Lt O Ké LV Ka MV Ka i clv Kéxlx fl i 6 (Sin/ a a l p fis E Y r omp n u , } 7 1. n

' £65 0 vw o x v 7 7 a h a 0 1/ v0 60 v n fi oi s ue u6 o t 7 ifs o ixeia s gobo ew s . “ ” 6 4 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

through progress . At length , after explaining that plants in those days before they had been touched had a very strong power , and that ’ there was a fruit which gave knowledge of one s own nature , he goes on to say : God did not want ma n to know his ow n nature before m he attained perfection , that he ight not know that he was in want m m of any things , and co e to care for his bodily needs , abandoning all forethought for the soul . For this reason God sought to prevent B ut his taking of the Fruit of Knowledge . giving no heed and

l éa v7 6 v ma n m m w al s fell away fro perfection , and beca e the prey of his physical need ; at any rate he straightway sought a covering , ” for Moses says he knew that he w a s naked .

‘ ’ I vcbet a o ur ou m m m was so eti es used , oreover , as an injunction t o O f know the relation between body and soul , and this use we have a ’ e Colotes E very good instance in Plutarch s r futation of , an picurean who had published a book entitled “ According to the Opinions of ” 2 7

i . the Oth er Ph losophers it is not Possible even to Live . He had

ff e ma n evidently sco ed at Socrates for s eking to know what is , and Plutarch says that Socrates was not a fool for searching into him self , but those who undertake to investigate other knowledge first are foolish , since the knowle dge of self is so necessary and so hard to 2 8 Colo t es fin d . B ut let us ask , he says , how it is that a man cannot continue living when he happens to reason with himself in this “ : m ? m way Co e , what is this that I happen to be Am I ade up of m x soul and body i ed , or does the soul use the body as a horseman i m n ? uses a horse , without the two being a m xture of horse and a Or are we each most auth oritative in that part of the soul with hi hi k w ch we t n and reason and act , and are all the other parts of the soul and body instruments of this power? Or is there no essence of the soul at all , but is the body itself a mixture , with the power of knowing and living? These are those dreadful and perplexing questions in th e Phaedrus where Socrates thinks he ought to consider m whether he is a onster more intricate and passionate than Typho , ” 2 9 or whether he shares in a certain divine and less monstrous destiny . Cicero echoes the main point of the Alcibiades I in his Ta sca lo n

3 0 “ ” ‘ Di s putati on s in saying that Nosce te means Nosce a n imum

2 7 Ad l V z a é v 5 0 7 0 0 3 . Co otem c . 1 . 1 repi 7 0 8 5 7 1. 7 0 7 63 6. k go ko w 6711 65

v 1 ffi $0 7 0 . 2 8 20 1 1 1 8F c . , . 2 9 2 c . 1 .

3 0 5 2 . I , “ ” KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 6 5

m tuu , but he indicates the relation of the soul to the body when “ h e adds : Na m corpus quidem quasi vas est aut a liquo d animi ” t receptaculum . Porphyry in his Let er to Marcella expresses this 31 “ same conception under a different figure . The divine cries aloud m ” ‘ in the pure region of thy ind , he writes , unless thou dost keep thy body joined to thee only as the outer membrane is joined to the m child in the wo b , and as the sheath is joined to the sprouting grain , ’ r thou wilt not know thyself . No does any one know himself who ” ff does not so think . So in an extract on the di erent classes of

- virtues , Porphyry says that the very foundation and under pinning ,

Kéfla a t as it were , of p s is for the soul to know itself existent in another 32 substance and bound together with a different essence .

One of the ways by which S ocrates in the Alci bi a des I led up t o

’ ‘ ’ the thought that y vcw i o a v7 6v means Know your soul w a s by — ' ’ w showing first that man and the soul are one 1) llf vxr) éo r w é wbpw r os and this w a s probably the starting - point of the idea that 71 c o a v7 bv means to know man . So the title which came to be attached to

' 4 : AMi t do Mei w v i He l Avfi dn rov bo ew the dialogue read B ns j , i p p s f and Plutarch says regarding Socrates ’ attempt to know what man is“ that 17c 0 0 v7 0v gave to Socrates the beginning of his perplexity and investigation , according to Aristotle , and that if man is that E which is made up of both soul and body , as the picureans clai m , he who seeks the nature of soul seeks the nature of man . The next step in the process of extending w ool o a vr bv along this line is shown clearly in a statement of Porphyry ’ s to the effect that some people assert that the inscription urges us to know man , and since 36 m man is a small universe , the com and means nothing other than to

' ' 31 ' L t l 7. n 7 0 G a a 0 7 d o c o vv fl o fia t vh 0 et da 7 0 E é oz e ter to M a rce la , 3 2 : 6 I } m i5 w np j

' ’ ' x o v évo c 7 v « 7 (rin h a a wovn 7 7 u Ka h d v ob vcbo a ea v7 1 V obbe 0 vowop u s 0 xbp t o 0 3. 65 g B n j jun , y n 7 7 p

' a 6, t b n s in ) 0 57 0: 60 5031 1. 2v éa w b v. 32 lo 74 . . r 88 . ee a S . S tob F I , p ge 33 130 0 .

34 l r z r I vo . . 3 . eu e . Pr lu I n Ale. C oc s , II , p ed

35 ‘ vafl c o a w u 6 6 7 «a w r t o a Ka i 1 7 1 0 6 0 3 Ad . Colotem 20 : 7 0 v b ) t cp d e 0 1r pl s { 7 5 9

' 0 r v év v tb A LO ' T T IVI év 7 0 13 Hka r w vucoi el x el 0 7 0 E 0 < ofv px j éw e , s p O é ) ? s s pn e 7 p ff p p , obs 0 w 60 w a 7 o l 7 0 Lo i36 6 x0 2 t v 0 v0 w 1rb s é0' 7 w 0 1 7 631} b v s t ba w £ b , fi xfis, p , { 7 g xfi p ,

' 0 v0 v or 7 i pdn ro { 177 6

u mirum n o s cere mu um Q id , nd Si o ssun t m u u et mu u in i sis p ho ines , q ib s est nd s p , E xemplu mq ue dei quisqu e est in ima gine p a rva ? “ ” 6 6 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

3 7 m Alci bi a des I be a philosopher . Proclus says in his Co mentary on

i v 0L0 0 K0 M0 1 0 07 17 7 oliv 30 7 0 ) m i goLXoo ocpi a s 0px 7 Ka i 7 ji s IIX07 w os 0 3 , )

' ’ ea vn bv and he says further that Ia mb lich us gave the Alci bi a des I the first place in the ten dialogues in which he thought the 3 9 O f entire philosophy of Plato was contained . This extension

’ vcbdt 0 0 v7 6v d Neo - b c y , so explicitly state by the Platonists , goes a k m to the Stoics , who ade it not only the beginning of philosophy , ’ th e sum but to use Julian s phrase , very and substance thereof ’ ' 4 0 1 t eo 7 0 I mbdt 0 0 117 01 Kegoét Xa Lo v 7 106 V7 0 c go h o0 0 goi0 s . To Stoic and and N

- t h Platonist alike the end of self knowledge , like e end of philosophy 4 1 was happiness , though that happiness was attained in somewhat di fferent ways by the two schools . It is in the writings of Cicero that we find the fullest expression of the tendency of the Stoics to centre all their philosophy around

11 690» 0 a u7 y m 7 b , though it is ade evident here and there among other 42 h il s ra t us n s h l . P o t ow writers , for i stance , tell the story of Apo lonius of Tyana went to visit some India n Sages who told him to ask them whatever he wi shed since they knew all things . Accordingly Apol loni us m n t asked the if they k ew themselves , thinking hat like

u s n l Iarch us the Greeks , they wo ld con ider k owing onese f hard ; but , “ h i s their leader contrary to exp ectation, said, We know all

‘ £7 0 07 7r cb7 ovs éa vr obs vcb o xo ev. a things , 7 p yw u For no one of us p ”43 pr o a ch es this philosophy without first knowing himself Apol lo n ius agreed with this reasoning , because he had been convinced m of its truth in his own case also , and he asked the further what

7 3 lor Stob . F .

3 3 l r uz er Vo . . 5 C e . I , p 3 ”P 1 1 . .

4 ° 0 7 1SSD . . VI ,

‘1 ’ l 7 i 1 . or . 00 0 170 007 T 7r 0 7 10 3 1 0 éa v7 0v w a a x h m i Stob F 5 ) js p s 0 7 1. p e ez ew s e s

7 0 0 : 7 ) v 6 2 fis d s ebb a mo ia s dF O T é iVGT a L. “ ll A o . T . 1 8 . p y III ,

‘3 Ap ropos of this idea a la te epig ra m in the Pa la tine Antholog y is of inte rest 34 9 (XI , )

' ei7r0 7 66 61} 0 0 p er‘ p ei s 10 30 0 0 0 x0 2 1reip a 7 a 7 0 ins

£ 0M 7 ‘ a l ( ‘ u 5 7 7s y ns pépw u 0N yo .

2 0 0 7011 0 v ‘ v p £0jun0 o r pb r epo Ka i 7 10 3301. 0 ca v7 0v

’ Kai 7 07 0 0 : - 1 p t9m$ et s 7 0 20 1 dr a p e0 071 .

’ ' cl 0 0M'yov 7n 7>x0v 7 0 8 0 0 x0 7 0 p t90 6 i s

1763: vruv 7 03V 040 37 w 7 0 jué7 p 0 ;

“ ” 6 8 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

i en m n os met ipsos nosse non possumus . Iubet igitur nos i i Pythius Apollo n o scere n os met ipsos . Cogn t o autem haec est una

ut vim a ni mi ue n orimus s e ua mur ue r nostri , corporis q q q ea n vitam ” 5 2 iis rfr m quae rebus p e ua t ur . He says also in the sa e work that w ithout a knowledge of natural philosophy no one can see the force “ t em ori of those old precepts of the Wise Men , which bid us p parere ” 53 et s e ui m t Ta sca lo Di s q deu e se n os cere et nihil nimis . In his n 54 pa loti on s he repeats again the idea that the philosopher is con 55 w N : t ra ct a n ti cerned ith investigating ature , and says Haec

h ta r c 1 - 1 B o i i ci a z a E i h i us o P ro o i us . 5 6 s s on . C o r us G a de . Cf of , p p f p pp , ’ ’ H e tells the stor y of Apollo s reply to C roesu s question a s to how he could p a ss ' l a l a n d a : 6 1 7 0 111 0 11 0 1 011 11 0 0: 00 0 7 011 6 000 1 0 0 11 K0 7 0 A7rb)\ h is ife h ppi y , then dds 1 7 1 ,

M I1 O 1 o11 1 11 x 1 7 60 0 7 11 7 1 0 11 0 9 17 0 1 0 7 6 w 11 000 10 11 0 0 ; j/figo , 7 cb0 6 06 1 9 0 , 0 60s p £6 6 p7 , 6 0 6 0

1 7 0v0 e lv0 11 7 11 1 ) x p a 6 s 7 0 1ra p0 . 5 3 7 3 . III , 5 ‘ 70 . V , 5 5 Am r ex 3 : N u a e n a ura es t ia ru m dica mus . b e H . t s t Cf b ose VI , II , nc g , , h o mimis en er io Au i m ia mdudu m ali uo s in s usurra re g a t n e m . d o eni q dicentes ‘ Qu a m di u a liena di s cimus et nost ra n escimus ? Qua mdi u de reliquis a n ima n t ib us doce mur s cien t ia m et n o s met i so s ra mu ? Illud dica t u m r , p igno s q od ihi p osit , ’ u me i m ri Sed r s erva n dus u m Scri t ura con nde p sa n ove m . o do est q e p t exuit mul u a n o n umu len ius r r u ua m um ; si q i poss s p nos cognosce e , nisi p i s q e sit o ni ” r i na t u a a n ma n t ium cog n o verimus . ’ t O n e u r m n v r lor . . G a r E a S . of pictet s f g e s , howe e , ( tob F ed isfo d)

r m z z l i I n a a r ra di p esents so ething O f a p u e n this connection . pp ent cont ction O f u ual S m a u n m r a O f a l O f U v r the s toic e ph sis po the i po t nce know edge the ni e se , r a a n a r in ula v r l m a n d a n ot he p otests g i st bso ption these spec ti e p ob e s , sks if it is enough to lea rn the essence of g ood a n d evil a n d the me a sure of the desires a n d a v r d r n l a v us An d a : 7 1 0 011 a n a d et . e sions , so fo th , the things bo e go he sks

' 11 0 1 7 0 611 Aekgooi s w a p 07 7 ekp a w a pékxov é0 7 l 7 0 7 11 0301 0 0 0 7 011 7 2; 0011 0 0 3

' 0 07 0 0 0 1 1 60 0 7 011 0 16 0 11 611 7 7r 0 7 0 6 1 1r 0 6 E 6 7 1 ; xop ew fi 7 1 s 7 7 1 031 0 1. 0 fi po £ p0 X 3

67 10 7 a o vcu . Th e ra m a t hi in r a MSS . b ut in r p g fi f g ent ends t s point ce t in , othe s the idea tha t a xop ew fis mu st work in h a rmony with the rest of the chorus is ll u l m a z W re fo owed p a n d the thoug ht tha t ma n is a soci a being is e ph si ed . he upon the qu estion is ra ised a s to whether o n e ought not to know wha t Na tu re a n d v r is how she mana g es the Uni e se . Th e contra di ctions involved in thi s fra gment a s it sta nds a re n o t e a sily x l a l r a l v r a la n ot E u e p ic b e . It is p ob b e , howe e , th t the st sentence is by pictet s , b ut ra r r r r m en m on e the c ept into ce ta in of the MSS . f o the p of so e who took x l m T r e ception to his denouncement of the stu dy of physica pheno ena . he ein l a di m a h a d r ur ies fii cul t y fo r us a s well . It a y be th t if we the enti e disco se

a a n x ra ul fin d r a E u u r m m inste d of e t ct , we sho d eithe th t pictet s is q oting f o so e r S o r a i m l n o t mu r a a dissente to toic tenets , th t he h se f is so ch p otesting g inst all l al il a s l S ra O ld u know edge of physic ph osophy insisting , ike oc tes of , pon the ‘ a ra m u va lu f i P0 6 01 0 0 v7 11 r O v u l m a G v p o nt e O eth cal studies . 6 he e b io s y e ns i e “ KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 6 9 animo et n oct es et dies cogitanti exis tit illa a deo Delphis pra ecep t a co n it io u t m a n osca t co n iun ct a m ue cum g , ipsa se ens g q divina mente ili ” sen t ia t in sa tia b co m lea t ur . B ut se , e quo gaudio p it is in his De Legibus that Cicero gives his fullest exposition of Stoic tenets , “ 1 1 1 P in their relation to 7 1 630 0 0 0 7 61 . For hilosophy alone teaches “ us , he says , not only other things , but also that which is most — difficult a t n os met ips os n osceremus and so great is the force and thought of this precept that it is attributed not to some ma n h m l but to the Delphic God . For he w o knows hi se f will perceive

m O f first of all that he possesses so ething divine , and he will think h im m a his spirit within as so ething consecrated like sacred image , and he will always do and think somethi ng worthy O f so great a gift from the gods . And when he has perceived himself and tested m u hi self fully , he will know with what natural eq ipment he came into i m O l fe , and what eans he has for btaining and acquiring Philosophy , inasmuch as he will conceive first of the knowledge of all things shadowed as it were in his mind and soul ; and with this made clear , he will see that under the leadership O f Philosophy he will be a good man , and for that very reason , happy . And when he has observed the sky , and the earth , and the seas , and the nature of all d things , and whence these were generate , whither they return , m when and in what way they eet their end , what in them is mortal and perishable , what divine and eternal ; and when he shall see m m hi self regulating and al ost ruling them , and shall comprehend that he is not surrounded by the walls of some one place , but shall recognize himself as a citizen of the whole universe as if it were one — city in this splendid conception of things and in this grasp of a N mm h ow ! knowledge of ature , ye I ortal Gods , he will know himself h ow In view of the precept which the Pythian gave , he will condemn , h ow he will despise , how he will count as naught those things which are commonly called most important ! And all these (interests of philosophy) he will intrench by a hedge as it were , through his

O f f method discussion , his ability to judge of true and alse , and a

a ur l ur r a n d a v r l a &c a n d x ttention to yo se f , yo desi es e sions , inc in tions , , its e ten ‘ ’ lu ur la in r l a mm sion to inc de Know yo p ce society is inte esting , if on y co ent m by so e unknown critic . Va riou s emenda tions ha ve been suggested fo r the text O f the la st sentence ll a v . e a v a r a v fo r of the bo e W h e fo owed G isfo d , who keeps to the MSS . s e the

a 7 0 7710 7 a v0 1 w a i v ch nge of 6 p ¢fi to 7 G: éw r p go j a t . “ ” 70 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATUR E certain skill in knowing what follows each thing and what is opposite to each . And when he perceives that he has been born for civil society , he will not only think that he ought to use that careful rea

m difiuse m soning for hi self , but also that he ought to ore widely the power of speech by which he rules peoples , establishes , chastises the wicked , gives recognition to the Good , praises illustrious men , gives forth precepts O f safety and praise suited for the persuading O f his

l - ll m fe low citizens , exhorts to glory , reca s fro disgrace , consoles the fl l O f af icted , and records the deeds and counse s the brave and wise ,

m m m . along with the igno iny of the wicked , in eternal onu ents These m are the powers , any and great as they are , which those who wish to know themselves see to be in man ; and the parent and nurse ” 56 of these is Philosophy .

h o w m 11 656 1 0 0 0 7 611 We have seen , then , fro the idea that 7 bids mm m th e us know our soul , the co and ca e to be applied not only to relation of the soul to the body in the case of the individual , but to ui the knowledge of man in general and the purs t of philosophy ,

- including the main tenets of the Stoics . The Neo Platonists con ’ s t ru ed the God s command to mean a knowledge of the psychological l analysis of the sou into its various faculties and functions , while they brought its phraseology into connection with the idea of self ’ consciousness , and applied it to certain of the soul s activities . Plotinus says in his first chapter on the Difi culti es a b out th e S oul that in investigatin g these difficulties we would obey the command of 5 7 the God which bids us know ourselves ; a n d again in speaking of the One or the Good and of how it transcends all predications of know 5 8 : 6176 1 11 0 1 7 0 11 0301 0 0 11 6 e7 a 1 7 o 0 1 00 ledge , he says 7 0 7 0 ls 7 b7 o1 s 01 0 7 7703 :

60 0 7 0311 6 0 11 6 0 0 0 1 01 0 10 1 6 211 60 0 7 0 0 : Ka i 0 06 111 00 0 11 0 1 770 1 0 011 7 07 x 0 1 5 11 , 6

’ 170 11 7 0 1 0 1 11 i 0 00 11 1 0 0 6 0 00 07 1 0 6 0 006 x0 7 0 7 1 0 07 0 1. i , 0 x Porphyry says in his work on 1 71301 2 0 0 7 6 11 that knowing oneself is likely to have reference to the n ecessity of knowing the soul and the And w hen

5 ° De L ib us - 2 l e Ed re li s . 5 8 6 . O u g I , . 5 7 E 1 1 n . 1 : 176 100 6 00 06 0D Ka i 7 3 7 0 0 060 0 170 0 11 6 0 6 00 0 7 1 0 07 0 0s 1 1 010 11 6 1 1 IV , III , 0 4 0 0 7 w a a xekevo évc 1 76 1 7 0 07 0 0 7 11 7 1 11 1 l i L p u p 0 0 656 0 0 1 70 10 011 61 0 1 . I a mb ich us sa ys n h i s etter

S a r o n al « 1 1 1 010 0 x 1 11 7 0 0 M 0 0 . r 8 1 0 1 7 1 0 v 1 1 6 1 1 1 61 7 1 1 S lo . 6 to op te Di ectic ( tob F , 0 1 1 1 71 7 0 7

’ 1r 0s 7 0 0X0 17 0 1 0 7 0 0 0 7703 6 11 0 07 11 06 7 11 60 v7 0 0 11 030 1 11 7 0 13 M 0 0 11 0 9 r p 0 71 7 0 0 0 7 7 , fi

7 0311 010 v 7 11 776 1 11 0 7 7 0 0 7 0 0 11 7 11 0 11 11 7 7 11 0 0 6 0 75 6 0 0 7 0 17 00 0 0 2 7 1 0 10 1 0 17 , ci1s

1 1 0 7 v 6 ? 11 0 2. 7 0 61 IIvdo? 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 00 10 00 0 ch 77 0 7 11 1 0 0 7 0 1 1 , 0 0 6 » s 0 013 17 0 . 5 8 E n . 4 I E 1 . 1 0 C n . 81 VI , VIII , ( V , III , 5 ° lor . St O b . See . 76 F p . “ ” KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITER ATURE 71

Julian says in speaking of the apophthegm that he who knows h im. l w i se f ll know about his soul , and he will know about his body , “ — he adds : And this alone is not enough to understand that

n ma is soul using a body , but he will go on to the essence O f the ” 6 0 soul itself , and then he will trace out its faculties This psycho logical analysis O f the soul found its beginning and inspiration in

A M eta Plato , and was carried on in greater detail by ristotle in his 6 1 si cs De A n i ma n ew m r u ph y and , but it received a i petus th o gh the

f m eo - work O Plotinus and thereby beca e the very basis of N Plato nism .

62 Plotinus regarded the soul as a mean between the world O f sense 6 3 Na il and the higher intelligence , s, and in the particular chapter in which he discusses self - knowledge he speaks of the soul as contain ing broadly the faculty of sense perception , the faculty by which m m m judg ents are for ed in relation to sense i pressions , designated as dianoetic , and pure reason or intelligence , which he calls the 6 4 ail Nofi . v s in the soul , because of its likeness to the higher s The

- faculty of sense perception aside , Plotinus attributes self knowledge

Nail ca to these faculties of the soul proper and to the s , though he n — ceives O f an ultimate Reality beyond the Nafis the Good or the — One of which neither self - knowledge nor a nything else can be 65 - predicated . The self knowledge of the dianoetic part of the soul — consists in knowing that it is dianoetic that it receives the know ledge oi external things and judges with the standards in itself ’ fro m Na il d Na il which it has s, knowing that it is secon after s and an 6 6 i - m Na il n . i age of s, with all things written itself The self knowledge of the vails in the soul and of the Higher Na ils is an intellectual self — knowledge the self - consciousness of the individual and O f the

6 ° l e l 2 reuz er . 1 83 . . P r u I n Al . I vo . . 78 C VI . B Cf oc s , , I , p

5 1 29 ff . 9 4 32 a . III , ,

5 2 E 3 ul 1 84 A : 7 0 7 6 0 6 6 1 0 01 0 7 s 611 0 00 1 5 1 1 111 n . a . V , III , . Cf J i n VI , 7 0 0 7 71

'’ 6 6 10 s 0 6 0 10a s 7 0 7 66 11 777 0 01 0 7 17s 6 11 177 0 6 1 00 0s p a lp a s 7rp0s 7 0 07 0 3 610 17 7 0 70 6 7 0 20 7 0 0 (1230 11

’ 1 1 1 1 1 611 K0 6 6 11 1 7 11 7 3 770 1 7 1 06 06 0 11 0 7 0 11 . 1 0 177 1 . 6 11 0 1 7 01 0 60 0 0 7 0 , 0

“3 E n . . V , III 6 4 2 E 17 . . V , III ,

“5 l 0 006 11 01 0 1 77 0 0 10 11 7 4 1 e E n . 6 : 3 E n . . Se a VI , VII , so VI IX , 7 0 7 0 7

“ 1 1 1 0 11 0 6 0 7 0 111 0 11 0 11 0 0311 60 7 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 7 1 . 77 1 0 60 3 K0 1 770 0 1 0 770 6 0 3 7 1 7 00 K0 1 1 0 7 6 ; [7] 6 0 0 0 0 7 3 , 7 ,

I I (I A I Q A 11 0 1 11 0 1 0 60 06 1 0 6 7 0 1 1 11 0 11 60 0 7 0 11 0 0 0 7 0 1< 1 7 3 7 , 7 01 p 0 7s

4 . En . V , III , “ ” 72 KNO W THYSELF I N GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

— 6 7 General Mind the turning O f the mind in upon itself until thinker 6 8 a n d thought are one .

For the history of the connection of this idea O f self- consciou sness ’ with the maxim we n eed to go back to Plato s Ch a rmides . When C rit ia s had given out 7 11 6216 1 0 0 0 7 611 as a defin ition of 0 0 10 00 0 01117 and had made a fanciful attempt to show the connection between the 6 9 t w o m - m , Socrates took up the the e of self knowledge not fro a m m personal but fro an episte ological point of V iew . He argued

f m O that the knowledge of sel ust be unlike other sciences , for its bject

i . is within itself , wh le the object of any other science is without

Critia s replied that self - knowledge difiers from other sciences in that it includes a knowledge O f itself and other knowledge as well ;

n and this , Socrates adds , would involve a k owledge of the absence 70 B u t of knowledge also . this science which is not a science of any one subject , but a science of itself and of other sciences and the

n m abse ce of sciences , is shown not to exist in the real of sense , or of wish , or desire , and so forth , and Socrates says that they have m 71 n eed of so e great man to determine whether it exists at all . m Granted that it does exist , the argu ent runs , he who has it will 72 know himself ; but the argument closes without proving the exis c tence or practi al advantage of such a science . This puzzle as to whether if a thing knows itself it does not m combine in itself the inco patible qualities of subject and object ,

hi P ar of knower and known , of t nker and thought , is raised in the

' Th e close connection between 67 10 7 0 60 6 1 11 a n d 7 11 136 1 0 0 0 7 611 a ppe a rs in ma ny

For Pr l 1 0 011 60 0 7 011 0 7 0 as sa . a u I n Ale I 2 77 Creuz er : 01 6 1 p ges inst nce , oc s . , p . , 7 7 0 31 ’ 111 010 11 6 1 11 0 A)\x1 1 001 0 07 0 11 0 11 1 11 0 11 0 1 1 1 1 7 6 7s 0 6 0 6 0 7 0 170 0 30t 7 0 7 0 13 M7 ovs , 1 0 0 7 0 07 0 7 1 0

1 i 0 0 7 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 7 0 7 1. e 6 0 67710 7 1. 1 050 1 1 1 0 0 0 , 0 s 0 610 6 16 0 1 7 171 60 0 7 0 0 61 60 7 6 1 0 1 11 0 1 7 771 60 0 7 0 0 7 7 7 1 110 w

1 1 1 111 7 77 0 7 0 1 0 10 7 01 11 0 1 0 11 0 0 7 0 6 1 0 6 1. 7 11 61 7 6 0 1. 0 5 7 07 0s 0 7 00770 s Tfis 60 10 7 pa

7 ” 0 7 1 11 r 00 10 19 1 11 r z r 0 10 . l 10 eu e : 6 1 s 5 6 0 l . C i le I vo . O m o dorus I n A . M 1 7 fi 0 y p , II , p

1 1 6 1. 0 7 0 07 1 0 6 1 7 0 0 1 0111 0 1 60 0 7 011 01 0 0 0 1 011 1 1 7 7710 7 6 6 1 11 7r 0s 60 0 7 0 1 3 1 1 01 7 0 0 0 7 1 6 6 , 0 0 06 0 0 6 0 0 p 7

1 60 0 7 0 0s . Pr lu 1 11 0 10 7 111011 7r 0 60 0 7 0 0 x0 61 I n st . 0 0 7 0 0 s Th eal . L : 0 01 7 0 6 0 oc s , XXXIII 7 , p

A 1 1 770 60 10 7 6 0 7 0 100 60 7 1 11 . 1 0 7 0 60 1 0 7 6 6 1 11 6310 110 1 m 0 07 1. 7 00 7 3 61 6 0 7 6 10 0 p0s 60 0 01 , 7

' Mv 611 0 1 1 0 1 60 0 7 0 0 60 7 1. 7 0 1 1 11 1 d L : 030 0 «0 1 7 0 1 0 10 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 . An , fi 7 0 7 , 7 0 C XXXVI 0 x 7

1 0 11 010 11 1. 60 0 7 1 11 1 1 1 1 0 7 1 6 7 0 1 . 7 0 7 6 7 , 770 1 06 7 0 60 0 7 0 7 1 1 030 11 0 1 1rp0s 60 0 7 0 0 60 0 6 0 “9 “ Whi a r T - u v . h e Neo P la ton i st 4 : Th e h i m s . 5 Cf tt ke , , p ghest ode of s bjecti e l x m l u fi u a a r l ife , ne t to the co p ete ni ca tion in whi ch even tho ght dis ppe s , is inte ” l ual l — l ect se f know edge . Here the knower is identical with the known . “9 D - - 1 64 1 6 5 B . See 33 pp . 34 . 7° 1 6 6 E .

71 IO 9A.

72 1 6 9E . “ ” KNow THYSELF I N GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 73 men ides in connection with the suggestion that the Ideas may be 73 ’ m l De thoughts , and it is discussed ore at ength in Aristotle s w e m a n When co e to Plotinus , we find insistence upon

11 0 0 w 11 0 1 7 61 the identity of 3 ith 7 in his chapter on Gn osti c Hyposta s es . “ “ Does the he asks , behold one part of itself with another ” ? 110 0 u part and he proceeds to argue that this division of 3 is abs rd , by raising questions as to h ow and by whom the division is to be made ; then he continues : 6 67 0 77103 60 0 7 011 7 11 100 6 7 0 1 0 06 10 0 1011 611 7 10

1 1 7 0 06 10 6 011 0 0 0 1 11 11 6 1 06 10 00 0 0 61 10 7 0330 3 60 0 7 01 11 0 7 0. 0 ; 7 0 7 6 7 10 0 10 00 0 0 61 19 7 0

1 6 111 6 011 6 11 0 0 60 0 7 011 0 07 0 1 06 0 1 0 0 6 11 0 11 6163 68 0 0 06 10 0 011 7 0 11 0 1 0 6 1 630 7 6 0 0 ; 77 3 0 0 , 0 , 7

’ 0 0 776111 7 0 0 006 00 0 11 7 11 100 6 7 0 1 6010 7 611 17 7 0 0 0 0170 6 1 170 0 0 07 0 0 11 0 6

7 011 7 6 00 0 1 1167 0 611 0 7 60 6 10 11 0 07 011 0 7 , 77 If the perceiver pos sesses the things perceived , he goes on to say , he does not see them m through dividing hi self , but he has beheld and possessed them

m 66 ? 7 1 11 96 10 60 11 prior to the division of hi self ; and if this be the case , 7 0

1 6 611 0 7 1 06 10 1 7 1 11 0 6 7 011 11 0 011 7 0 07 011 6 611 0 1 7 1 11 0 1 7 1 611 7 0 07 01 1 0 0 7 0, 0 7 0

1 1 1 6 0 1 1 6 0 07 0 1 1 0 03 11 0 6 7 0 1 0 177 01 11 0 7 0 1 . Farther on he argues that 1 170 1 3

110 1 7 011 m 11 0 1 7 611 11 1 0 1 611 6 6 60 and 7 are the sa e , since 7 , like 6 7 3 , is an 0 7 , — 11 0 0 11 61 0 1 7 6 11 0 1 7 11 . and so all will be one 3 , 7 3 and 7 6 This oneness of

110 11 0 1 7 11 11 1 0 1 l 03 with 7 6 , and of both with 6 7 3 , is reiterated e sewhere 76 t Neo - in Plotinus and in o her Platonist writings , particularly in ’ 1 57 T l 77 Proclus [ 11 3 0 1 110 h eo ogi a . In this sense of the identity of

110 0 thinker with thought , or knower with known , the 3 in the soul may be said to know itself and self - knowledge becomes synonymous

- B with self consciousness . It represents with Plotinus , as rett “ Hi stor o P s ch olo d has said in his y f y gy , an interme iary stage between consciousness of objects and the final unity which has no distinction ” 78 l “ . m of subject and object Or as P otinus hi self puts it , the self- knowledge of the 11 0 03 of the soul consists in knowing itself n o

73 1 2 3 C .

4 ’ 7 Fo r Aristotle s discu ssion of the p roblem see a rticle by Shorey o n the De 1 4 P . . 5 ff . An i ma A . . in J XXII , pp 75 5 E11 . . V , III , 7° 1 6 6776 16 11 0 11 011 7 11 611 11 1 7 11 7 0 0 110 0 011 . En E n 0 07 10 0 0 6 . See . 3 0 III , IX , 0 7 7 7 , VI ,

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 VII 4 6 6 06 7 0 07 011 1 0 03 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 1 7 61 770 11 7 1 61 6 11 6 11 6 11 0 0 1 0 1 1 6 ? 0 07 0. 61 0 07 0 23 . , 1 , 7 , 7 , 7 7 7 0 77 - ll 11 7 0 1 7 0 77 0 0 07 0 0 N . 770 3 CLXVII CLXIX . ote esp the fo owing : 0

111 100 1110 11 11 100 6 7 0 1 11 0 6 60 0 7 011 6 6 0 011 7 1 60 7 1 11 0 0 11 0 1 7 0 611 011 0 60 0 7 011 11 0 6 7 011 7 7 , 3 3 7 3 , 6 3

11 0 1 7 011 0 606 11 1 7 03 1011 0 60 7 1 11 0 07 0 3 L a n d 6 6 0 60 0 7 011 11 0 6 7 0 07 0 7 , 0 7 , (C XVII) ; 7 0

11 0 0 11 0 6 11 1 7 11 1 1 1 11 1 7 0 11 0 1 1 7 3 0 0 . 11 0 6 1 6 0 3 7 1 07 0 6 7 1 1 0 7 1 L P r lu I 11 Ti m. 5 7 7 0 0 0 7 0 (C XIX) . Cf . oc s

- A B , 73 P 1 2 . 3 . “ ” 74 KNow THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

ma n m ff longer as , but as having beco e altogether di erent in hastening

d n to unite itself with the higher alone , and rawi g on the better part of the soul , which alone is able to be winged toward intelligence , that it ma y deposit there in the better part of the soul what it has ” 79 l - . N0 0 seen The perfect se f consciousness of the Higher 3 , that m is , of the General Mind of which the individual ind is but a part , n aturally follows , and of this too Plotinus uses phraseology sug ges tive of the maxim when he speaks of it as 6 11 0 03 6 7 6A6 1os A I 1 1 8 0 1 1 0 1 11 . 11 0 1 170 3 , 0 7 7 10 0 110 770 10 7 10 3 6 0 0 7 01

Neo - mm Alci bi a des I The Platonist Co entators on the , Proclus

O l m iodorus 11 17101 0 0 0 7 611 and y p , brought 7 into relation with the activities by which the soul abstracts itself from the realm of sense , and gives itself to pure speculative thought and contemplation “ 1 activi ties designated as 11 0 00 0 7 1 1101 and 06 10 0 177 11100 respectively . 82 “ : With regard to the Cathartic activity , Proclus asks From what point should we properly begin the purification and perfection of ourselves other than with the command which the God at Delphi gave us ? For as an inscription presents itself to those Who are E about to en ter the precinct at leusis , forbidding the uninitiated to

u 11 11301 0 0 7 11 m D go within , so s rely the 7 0 6 on the te ple front at elphi showed , I fancy , the way of approach to the divine , and the most l m t o effectual road to purification . It says virtua ly in plain ter s m those who can understand , that he who knows hi self beginning 83 at the hearth is able to be united with God , the revealer and guide of universal truth and of the purified life . The actual way in which 7 11 1336 1 0 0 0 7 611 aids in purification is indi cated by Porphyry when he says that the very foundation of 11 000 0 0 1 3 is 7 0 7 11 1011 0 1 60 0 7 011 111 0 x1711 6 11 7 0 611 000 0 7 0 610 7 10 170 0771 0 7 1 11 0 6 67 6 0 0 0 0 610 Knowing oneself

06 10 0177 0 1633 is the phrase the Neo - Platonists used to characterize

79 E 4 11 . . V , III , 3 ° E 11 . 8 . V , III , 81 l 4 —5 r z r l r u 11 630 1 0 0 0 7 6 11 r la V o . . C eu e . T a II , pp , hey so b o ght 7 into e tion

1 l m io do rus ll u s a al a ul a a s 170 0 1 7 1 11 61 . O with the ethic f c ty , design ted y p te s th t m l 170 707 1 11 6 3 D a ma s ciu s s a id th a t Socra tes wa nted Alcibia des to know hi se f , rea soning from the definition of m a n in the dia log ue a s a 111 0 x1711 0 0 7 0 10” “ ” 11 6 1 6111 11 7 1 3 0 121 1 0 7 1 Alc I 1 0 Th l al ul al r a . e x0 70 7 2 7 ( 3 A) . po itic so one , he e soned ,

0 0 11 1 11 6 1 7 0 1 7 1 0 10 1 0 7 1 06 0 1 6 11 0 60 7 6 7 00 10 0 10 07 6 770 7 600 3 070 3 0 11 0 6 67 100 71 60 3 0 7 0 x0 7 0 7 7 3 1 1 7 , 3 0 0 ,

7 0 0 66 170 1 1 0 0 1 7 0 03 m u m s vol 4 reuz er See 9 . . C . 3 ( II , p , note of 82 l . 5 . V o . I , p 33 ’ El u . 71 0 170 6 63 0 0 60 7 01 3 w a s a phra se u sed in a solemn initi a tion a t e sis 34 S . lor . See 6 5 tob F p .

“ ” 76 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

The extent to which the higher part of the soul can exercise its theoretic activity in yielding itself up to the contemplation of N0 03 and God will d etermine the extent to which we ma y become like m that which we conte plate . and the greater our likeness to the

N0 03 hi ma Higher w ch knows itself perfectly , the more perfectly y 90 we know ourselves in the psychic sense . For there is truth in the 91 “ words of Crit ia s in the Ch a r mides : If any one possesses that l science of knowledge which knows itse f , such a man would be like what he possesses , just as he who possesses swiftness is swift , and he

W h o possesses beauty is beautiful , and he who possesses knowledge ” “ ” 07 0 11 00 131 11 1710 1 11 0107 1 11 0101 knows ; and , he adds defiantly , 7 7 7 31 3 “ ’ 1 1 7 1 0 1 1 0 0 1110 1 1rov 0 07 03 00 0 7 011 7 07 6 00 7 0 1 . 3 x77, 7 7 I don t dispute ” “ that , said Socrates , that when any one possesses that which ”

l b e . knows itse f , will know himself indeed The contemplation of pure knowledge which inherently knows itself until the soul becomes l Neo - m ike it is , according to the Platonist Com entators , the thought

Alci bi ad es I of the passage in the , in which Socrates says that if m the soul is going to know itself , it ust look at the region where

the virtue of soul , resides , and further that he who looks to — — th i s and knows all that is divine God and 100011 170 1 3 Would most 92 l i - of a ll know himself . O y mp odorus renders this in the Neo Pla 93 t on ist 110 0 m terms , 3 and God , and it is this which Porphyry eans “ When he says of 7 11 17101 0 0 117 011 : 7 0 11 011 0 011 7 1 7 11 100 116 1 11 00 v7 011 0 11 0 100 0 0111

1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 011 11 0 011 011 7 0 07 1 1 1 031 00 1116 1 0x6 017 7 0 7 7 1 0 0 11 6 1 7 171 7/vx 7 7 , 0 71 1 i m Accord ng to Porphyry , too , the attain ent of true happiness is furthered by the application of the maxim in this psychic — sense b y the contemplation of the Good and the knowledge of true B eing . To follow the abstract use of the phrase for self- knowledge through all the literature of the Neo- Platonists would carry us too far afield

9° l a l N0 03 l i u E 11 . r a u . P 8 a Cf ot n s V , III , , whe e he s ys th t the so is b e to see , — hi r ma r l l r u a s r a n ma r u w ch p i i y knows itse f , th o gh being , it we e , i g e th o gh being ma de lik e to it more a ccura tely a s fa r a s a p a rt of the soul ca n come into likeness with No fis . 91 1 6 9E .

92 - 5 C reuz er : 1 00 1 0 00 7 1 1 133B e r l . 8 C . Se P lu I n lc I vo . A . oc s , I , p , 1 7 7 0 7

11 030 1 3 00 0 7 1011 7 5 3 7 6 7 0311 0 110 11 11 10 0 7 7 7 0 0 10 6 170 00 1 3 10 3 010 1 0 11 0 00 3 7 7 6 , 7 0 6 03 11 0 1 73 6 03 2 0 7 ( 0 , 7

1 1 0171 7 1 1 06 10 7 0 0 11 011 1 0 11 7 0 1 1 1 00 117 171 11 1 10 0 6 10 3 . 7 0 007 6 01 0. 07 73 7 11 6 7 0 1 11 00 173 7 73 7 93 l 7 r a a V o . . 8 re C uz er Pl u E 11 . V II , p , . Cf . otin s , , III , , whe e he s ys th t ur ll r v Go d p e inte ect pe cei es . 9‘ l 2 1 2 . or . 8 . ee S . 70 . Stob F , p “ KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 77

i n the realm of metaphysics for the p urposes of this study . Yet that it had primarily a connection with the 7 11 17101 0 0 0 7 61 of the D el

h ic m m p te ple is ade evident by the passages which we have cited , 95 and by some others as well . The connection is not always as near and definite as in the instances before us , but it is perhaps not too much to assume that whenever a Greek scholar after Plato wrestled m with the proble s of the psychic life , he felt more or less vaguely ’ with Plotinus that he w a s obeying the God s command .

95 Fo r a D a ma s cius D ubita tion es et S oluti o n es 96 . 1 5 6 . inst nce , , F , , V , p , ed

' R uelle : 77t 0 0 7 1) “y dp 0 170 7 0 8 7 11 10 0 7 0 8 137 11 1130 1 3 11 011 0 011 7 0 07 0 0 7 pi7 v7 7 1 3 60 1 11 6 11 6 111 0 1

1 1 1 1 1 n H r T r 11 0 7 01 00 é0 x0 7 171 7 0 7 1 7 1 630 11 0 1 60 v7 0 11 0 0 7 0 7 1 11301 0 0 0 7 01 . A d e mes is

1 1 1 1 m e is t us P oema n dres 2 2 : 11 0 6 13213 6 11 110 3 0 ea u7 01 11 0 2 7 01 770 7 é 0 7 01 é7 6 0 1 . g , XIII , 0 7 p fiu p CHAPTER IX

‘ H N ? I NQGI EATTO N I s DIFFICULT . ow ATTAI ED

We recall that at one stage in the discussion in the Alcibi a des I

Socrates asks Alcibiades whether 7 0 7 11 11311 0 1 51 0 117 6 11 happens to be easy and to have been inscribed on the temple by some ordinary

m f l e man , or so ething di ficu t and not within the power of everyon

: E d 1 611 if) 2 11111 0 7 6 770 00 011 1 1 011 770 11 7 0 and Alcibiades replies n 1 , 0 3 , 3 1 3 elz1 a 1 170 00 011 1 00 Eu t h demus , 3 The youthful y in Xeno ’ phon s Memora bili a apparently had no thought of its being anything h im but easy , for when Socrates asked if he paid any attention to the

D m : M inscription when he saw it at elphi , he answered pro ptly 0

’ ‘ Al 0 0 007 0 11 0 0 01) 170 11 0 7 0 87 6 7 6 133111711 6 l0611 0 1 0 xoh fi

011 000 1 0 SO m Croesus , we reme ber , sa id that when Apollo told him that if he knew himself he would be 3 a . happy , he thought that the e siest thing in the world And Galen even says of himself that when he was a lad he thought people praised mm m the Pythian co and to know oneself over uch , for it did not 4 seem to h im a great injunction . It is evident that to unthinking

L 11 11301 0 0 117 611 m youth and the ydian Croesus the words 7 ight , for l ‘ ’5 iterary purposes at least , mean merely know who you are , but greater maturity of thought and experience brought men to a

1 1 0 7 11 s better realization of their profundi ty . That 7 1 630 0 11 6 w a ffi di cult , however , was a new idea to the individual only as it became

o n his w through experience or reflection , for it was an old saying , l 6 7 attributed , like the maxim itself , to Tha es , or Chilon , or the Wise

1 IZ9A . See . 60 . p 2 I 4 2 . . 23 IV , I , See p .

3 - X e . r 2 2 1 ee 15 1 n C . S 6 . y VII , , . pp .

V ol . 4 . . u . See . 4 7. V , p K hn p

5 ’ O bserve th a t Socra tes a sks E ut h y de mus if a ma n seems to know himself hi s m 6 6 ll r a l M a r u S a t . who knows n e on y (sec . c obi s ( I , , ) te s the sto y of how V et t ius Pra et ext a t us w a s a sked by on e of a group of schola rs a ssembled ’ a t hi s house why a mong the va riou s te rms a pplied to a man s dress Pra et ext a t us l w a s u a s a r r a m Vet tius r a h i s x la a t a in on y sed p ope n e . p ef ced e p n ion by s ying p a rt cu m posti in s crip t um sit Delph ici templi et uni u s e nu mero septem

i 1 sa en t um a m a a 1 6101 0 0 0 7 011 u in me n escire a est ima n dus . p e de sit ist sententi 7 , q id sum m r ? , si no en igno o S l l . or . V o . 2 35 97 M L r 9 . . B . a tob F IV, p ; eineke ; iog e t , I , , 7 S . lor 2 1 1 3 tob F . , . “ ” KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 79

8 I li . a mb ch us Men generally The Pythagorean hearers , tells 9 1 0 : us , included it in the second class of questions in their catechism

6 77011 000 0 51 ' 1 1 1 1 7 0 0 0 7 0 7 0 a h e ifl m u 0 0 0 01 01 . 0 0100 7 0 x , x m a 7 1 7 7 7 1 131 0 0 00 7 1 1 Ho w early this became a part of the Pythagorean 0110 190 11 0 7 0 we do ’ 1 2 w e m : not know , but meet the thought in a frag ent of Ion s

’ 7 0 7 11 11301 0 0 0 7 011 7 0 07 0770 3 11 011 0 0 11 07 0

’ ‘ 1 1 1 1 00 7 0 1 0 00 0 1 Zet1 3 11 01 0 3 01700 7 0 7 0 1 06 1211 . Leopold Schmidt in his Etkik der Allen Gri ech en says this is the only

- place in Greek literature , as far as he knows , where self knowledge 1 3 is called impossible ; but it is probable , especially in view of the fi period in which Ion wrote , that he was exclaiming over the dif culty “ ” m 1 1 . 1 1391 0 0 v7 01 of the task rather than its i possibility This 7 , he “ — ” h ow ! says , is a little word , but the deed great it is Zeus only knows This sentiment that 7 11 1301 0 0 117 011 is difficult occurs frequently in m m f discussions of the axi , and the question of wherein the di ficulty lies is answerable only in terms of its application in each given 1 4 . D instance When iogenes cited it to Alexander , he meant that it was hard for men to estimate aright their ow n ability and impor tance ; but when Socrates asked Alcibiades Whether or not it seemed ’ 1 5 hard to him , he was thinking of knowing one s soul . Sometimes w e read that it is harder for us to know ourselves than to know others , and then again that knowing others is more di fficult , but the statements involve no contradiction , for it all depends m upon the eaning of the maxim in a given context . So Crassus ’ 16 ’ De O ra tore m i n Cicero s , after enu erating Antonius characteristics

9 l M a r n Mor . 1 2 1 1 4 I m li h Li P t a A . 3 o a a b c us e h ora s 83 . istot e , g II , , ; , f f y g 9 Life of P yth a gora s 83 . 1 ° Th e fir la a W a a a all a n d st c ss sked h t thing is , the second wh t it is especi y , r W a on e mu o r mu n o t the thi d h t st st do .

1 1 ' Th e x u w a s 0 000 7 0 7 0 010 11 000 0. 7 0 7 0 0 7 0 11 07 1 7 0 000 1 0 0 00 1 ne t q estion 00 , 00 70 0 . 1 2 r 5 r l l . m P u . Co . a d A ol . 28 m la r a 5 Na uck . A n s . F g , F o t p si i distich m m r m n o l u a a . 389 vo . . is to be fo nd ong the Co ic f g ents ( , Koch III , p

7 11 6301 0 0 11 1 L 1 0 7 0 7 0 01 M7 O 3 0 0001 0 07 0 .

0 00 7 0 07 11 1 700 7 7 0 0 7 10 0 110 0 3 0 0 1 0603 .

T r m l a a o n Ale. I 390 r n o r i . a s t s his is t ken f o the scho i st , (Bekke ) with wo d to a u r m r l l a rru I on ra m tho ship . It is o e ike y to be co ption of the f g ent tha n a u a r r r q ot tion f om a diffe ent a utho . 13 ’ ’ ’ m u r m c it 396 . S a G Ges ra h e m Eckerma n n II , ch idt s q ot tion f o oethe s p ’ x ll b ut a r l r m a a ni . is e ce ent , h d y p opos of Ion s e ng

1 - 2 0 . See pp . 9 1 5 - le. I IZ 0 A , 9A 1 3 E . 1 ° 33 . III , “ 80 KNO W THYSELF I N GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

as an orator , says of his own Quale sit non est meum dicere , p rop t erea quod minime sibi quisque notus est et difficillime de se

u ni it difii cult quisq e sentit , mea ng , of course , that is to form a m ’ B right esti ate of one s own powers . u t when Apollonius of Tyana tells Tigellinus that he uses his wisdom to know the Gods and under

men 7 0 0 0 00 11 011 11 1311 0 e 7 6 1 01 1 stand , 7 0 7 7 1 xa h 77111 0 0 1 6 1 0 1 7 0 0100 0 1 he probably has reference to the idea that knowing oneself is the

n beginning of philosophy . Augustine says that a ma in charge of m ma m a onastery y resolve to ad it no one who is wicked , and asks “ h o w s o he will avoid doing \ Those who are about to enter do not ” know themselves ; he says h ow much less dost thou know t h emQ For many have promised themselves to fulfill that holy life ” 1 8 ’ t hey were sent into the furnace and they cracked ; and Augustine s thought apparently is that while we may be deceived about our own strength of will , we can judge of it better than we can that of m m another . Again it is so etimes assu ed that a knowledge of self includes the ability to know others likewise ; as , for instance , when Socrates tells Eut h ydemu s that they who know themselves can the l 1 9 2 0 better judge of other peop e , and when he tells Alcibiades that only as a ma n knows himself in the three - fold way will he know others aright and be a fit leader among them . A story told by

il r Life Di o Ph o s t a t us is also in point in t his connection . In his of n y 2 1 si a s Miletus D m of he says that ionysius once ca e to Sardis , where

D t Polemon he learned from his host orion , that a cer ain , of whose eloquence he had heard fabulous tales , was to serve as advocate in

- h h i s a la w suit t e next day . In the course of conversation with ’ D c m P ole mo n s orion about the o ing event and about oratory , he suggested that Dorion tell h im in what respects P olemon and him

D : self excelled each other , but orion replied very discreetly . You will be the better judge of yourself and him . 0 0 7 00 01170 0 0 10 00 3 0 00 3

7 é11 7 ‘ U VCiJ ’ K LV 6 1 1 1 0 a v 6 Y Y O G , 07 001 7 0 1 ) ’ This story of Ph ilo s t ra t us shows not only that the knowledge of others was regarded as in a sense consequent upon the knowledge

1 " Ph ilo r u A oll T r in a A l t . s a t s . 4 4 . . 35 , p y IV , Cf VI , whe e spe king of po ’ lon ius la r ur la h a d v r v u l a : 170A111 te jo neys to p ces which he isited p e io s y , he s ys

0 010 0 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 01 1 0 0 7\ 17 0 10 7 0 13 11 0011 0 1 00 v7 011 00 110 0117 0 0 0 11 ) x 110 0 10 0 01 60 0 1 . x 6 0 7 0 7 3

a k w 7 v 1 1 1 1 1 x e é 6 0 0 07 0 17 6 37 0 0111 0 1 7 0 11 021 0 1 7 01 0 0 1001 00 117 123 011 0 10 1 . ‘3 E n a rra ti o i n P s almu m 1 1 . XCIX , 1 9 M 6 111 . X en . 26 IV , II , . 2 ° Ale. I 1 D , 33 if . 2 1 Ph ilo s t r Li th o t r a t us ves o e S h i s s 4 . a . 38 . , f p I , XXII , p , ed K yse “ ” KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 8 1

mm of self , but it hints at another idea co on in later philosophical — m literature na ely , that the knowledge of self , and so the knowledge

‘ ’

ma n m . I 11 12101 0 0 0 7 11 of , was li ited to the philosophers 6 in any sense

m l w a s was hard , but in its si p er ethical forces it not conceived as m l i being beyond the attain ent of each and a l . Taken as an n j un c ’ m tion to know one s soul , however , it beca e possible for the Wise

h im - w a s Man only , and even for perfect self knowledge unattainable , h for it is God alone w o fully knows Himself . This is expressed in

uda eus 11 11301 0 0 0 7 611 part by Philo J , when he speaks of 7 in connection

. w a s with the life of Jacob Jacob to tarry in Charran , the country 22 few w e m m of the external senses , only a days , re e ber , but a longer i n period was allotted h m i the city of the mind . He would never m 28 be really able to comprehend his soul and his ind , Philo says , yet those who practice the exercise of wisdom most perfectly proceed to leave Charran after they have learned fully the Whole field of the senses , as did Abraham , who attained to great progress in the com 24 “ prehension of complete knowledge ; for when he knew most then he especially renounced himself in order to come to an accurate m knowledge of true B eing . For he who apprehends hi self well , by clearly grasping the universal nothingness of the creature , heartily m m renounces hi self , and he who renounces hi self learns to know ” 25 Em h e 26 . on t B eing Sextus piri s , Skeptic , says in his discussion of the definition of man that man is not altogether to be comprehended , for Socrates was at a loss , although he continued in his investigation , and said that he did not know what he w a s and h o w he was related 2 7 “ D m ” “ to the universe . e ocritus , Sextus says further , in saying man is what we all know , merely begged the question ; for no one

’ Will grant that ma n can be kn own O ff- hand 7 0 0 IIt1010 3 1013 1107 1 0 7 0 11

1 1 1 B u t { 137 1711 0 7700 001711 0 1 0 07 1213 7 0 7 1 0101 0 a v7 é1 . granted that man can be known at all , he will not turn the investigation over to all men

22 e 6 2 . Se p .

23 6 . De 5 0 111 11 . 5 I ,

24 - 59 6 0 . A r r r . Sec . f ee ende ing

25 - Le . ll a 91 92 a m r I n A e r . a u a Sec . 6 0 . his g g I , he s ys the ind c nnot nde st nd ' itself a n d a sks : 0 07 0 011 0 0 7700 0 060 0 0 11 0 777 611 011 0 1 0 00 00 3 ; 0 0 7 010 7 03 0000 3 111 10 033

7 011 0 00 00 11 0 011 771133 776 0 0 7 03 7 6311 05t 100 3063 0110 10100 0 1 6 11 ; There is n o real

He m a m l a m ca n l a n o cont ra diction here . e ns si p y th t the ind know itse f d G d

b u t m r l a t a n d ca n Go d l a s l . i pe fect y best , it know on y it knows itse f

25 II 0 Ao 111 4 - p 3 7 0 03 A . 26 6 .

2 7 S x u o n u P a ru a a r e t s g oes to q ote the h ed s p ss ge he e . “ ” ‘ 8 2 KNO W THYSELF I N GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

2 8 Hier le but only to the most careful philosophers . oc s shows that this is the thought of certain of the Golden Verses of th e Pyth a 2 9 gorecms :

‘ ' Z6 ?) 1ré 7 e 1 vroh M w K6 Kaxé w Mmeca s 6 770 11 7 013 p , 5

1 1 cbw a t . ci 778 0 1 1 Beiéa s 7 123 6 0 15110 1 1. xp

' t é7rei 06 20 11 é0 7 i 0 7 0 50 w 60 0 61 0 1) 0&p0 e , Bp

‘ ' ‘ 1 1 l1< 1 11 éxa 7 a 0 33 iep ct 17p0

’’ ' 1 i ’ K 7 1 et 51 11 xekebw 631 cc 0 o T L p éTé O TL, p a 70 3

1 1 1 1 7 611 66 0 01500 6 1 . éfa xé0 a s 11 0 x 51 63 7rov , 3

30 m Hiero cles It is necessary for the release fro all evils , explains ,

c f : 7 3 that we see our own essence , and this is what is meant by q 4 ' — '' 1 fl t m o t v . e ec 5 a i 0 1 1 bw a L . b u xpc na ely , q g xfi And he further says in that while all have implanted within them the first impulse to a knowledge m of their own essence , it is i possible for every one to attain it , for all cannot be philosophers , and they alone have turned to the con 31 la i n t emp t o of the real Good .

This idea that self - knowledge was possible only for the ph iloso

re- m m pher is , of course , merely a state ent fro a different angle of

- the Stoic doctrine , logically derived from Plato , that self knowledge

- is the beginning of philosophy . That self knowledge could be but imperfectly attained even by the philosopher is expressed in the 32 ’ Hera cleit us : v r ei a T a £111 11 0 111c é eb ow 17610 0 11 é771 770 words of ¢ xfi3 p f p , p

‘ — 6 11611 6 11 0 3 66011 0 137 10 Xéy ov Exec although we assume that Hera clei

1 1 tus did not especially relate the thought to 7 1 1301 0 0 0 7 61 . The connection of the maxim with the power of abstract contemplation

B w e necessary to an apprehension of true eing or the Good , which

Alcibia des I met in the , means perforce that man can know himself m but intermittently , for only so can the soul be free fro the limitations of the flesh and in unison with the Divine which knows itself per f l “ ect N0 83 . y , call it , true Being , the Good , or God According to one and the same knowledge , God knows both Himself and all i ” D 33 th ngs , said ionysius the Areopagite . It is but the personal

2 8 R 1 a .L6 1 0 L3 W r e ding 1 ith Bekke . 2 ° W 1 - . 6 6 6 .

3 ° Pa 1 5 6 l 1 2 . M ull a . ge , ine , ed ch 31 Pa 1 ge 5 7. 32 4 ra . S l . F g , Die s 33 De v 1 1 1 9 ‘ 1 Di . N0 711 . 4 6 9C Ka 7 d i a v Ka i. a 6 7 7 1 1 630 u 6 66 3 Ka i éa vr éu xa l 1 1 VII , p } 7

’ 4 7GA 1 1 11 . : o é 0 7 7 a v7 0 £ 1. 176 0 1 600 x 1 1110 0 70 1 1 é Cf x mw s 173 7 6 0 13 afl 7 3 ,

‘ 84 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

recognize them as his o w n ; and a ma n can contemplate his friend m ’ 42 better than hi self , and he can see his friend s deeds better also .

M ma n m oreover , a good sees hi self and his actions in his friend 43 because his friend is likewise good and a friend is a second self . 44 O f Eudemi a n Eth i cs E udemus In the corresponding passage the ,

’ tells us that this full life (K0 7 évep 'yeia v) is the being alive to our

a n d perceptions and the acquisition of knowledge , to have perception

O f oneself and acquire knowledge of oneself is most to be desired .

O f m If one could isolate the knowledge self fro living , he says , it would make no difieren ce wheth er you knew yourself or another 45 instead O f yourself ; and he adds farther on : 7 0 0 011 7 0 0

‘ “ 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 1 lh ov 1 6 1 1 0 0 07 0 0 7710 3 61 1 07 11 7 0 i0 00 1 6 0 00 1 6 l1 0 1 , 0 < 01 cp 1 1 0 n 1 7 0>

' 46 1 1 1 1 0 07 01 770 13 y1 w plg6 1 1 . The author of the Magna Moralia cites the “7 “ ” “ m fin i l m f de t e . O axim y Since it is very hard he says , as so e the

11 62111 0 1 0 07 011 Wise have declared , to know oneself (7 ) we are unable

to contemplate ourselves from within ourselves . And because we

n ot O are able to know ourselves , bviously we do the very things

for which we find fault with others . Accordingly , just as when we m wish to see our face , we see it by looking into a irror , likewise

when we wish to know ourselves , we would acquire the knowledge ” by looking at our friend . For our friend , we say , is a second self . |f A O f friend , then , by virtue his similar ideals and their expression

ma in character and conduct y reveal to us our own , and this can afford us not only the happiness arising from an appreciation of our 4 8 m O f - attain ent , but the pleasurable sense having gained self know i ledge . Yet we O bserve that Aristotle is speak ng only of a friendship t e be we n those whose ideals are lofty and whose actions are noble , f and the kind of sel - knowledge which we may reach in this w a y is i a m lim ted to a realization O f our o w n worth . The author of the M a M m l th e oralia , on the other hand , akes no qua ifications as to char

‘2 i 1 I ra c . . E h 1 l r D o i b . N c . t . 9 1 6 9b 33 . . P u a . e C h IX , , . Cf t ch ‘3 ‘' 6 7 6 0 0 7 i)\ 7 11 po 3 7 p 0 03 0

’ 1 1 1 1 1 1 t . 33 . \ ee r z Ea d . E h . 0 0001 01 0 ¢ép0 1 0 7 0 7 1 1 100 11 6 11 0X) 0 1 0 1 0 0 07 0 0 . S F it sche p 4° 1 24 5 31 36 .

4 7 1 1 14 r v l h a s a 5 1 2 3 a fi . ee . 3 . S . II , , , c VI p Cice o e ident y this s ying in m in hi s D e A mi citi a 23 ru m m a micum ui in t uet ur a m ua m ind VII , Ve eni q , t q x m la r a li i e e p quo d n t uet ur sui . ‘3 Th e me a ning of Aristotle is a dmi ra bly expla ined by Stewart in his Notes

o n Et - i c. l N h . vo . . 3 85 386 . the II , p “ ” KN O W THYSELF I N GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 85

o h im d acter of the friends inv lved , and with it is rather the knowle ge of our faults than of our virtues which w e ma y derive by looking

. w e m m t at a friend Galen , re e ber , though that he had found a m way to know hi self by having a friend reveal his faults , but he m proposed to use the friend not as a reflectio n of hi self , but as a 4 9 critic . In fact , such a person could hardly be called a friend in m the Aristotelian sense , for he ust be absolutely unbiased in his i 5 0 attitude a n d not necessarily similar n character . The figure of the mirror to which the auth or O f the Magna Moralia refers goes back to the Alci bi a des and it is used occasionally in

1 1 connection with 7 1 0301 0 0 0 7 01 by later writers . Seneca says that

ut h omo i se s e n os s et mirrors were invented p , and he elaborates m ” “ m . : the the e Many results come fro their use , he says first ma n a conception of oneself , then counsel for certain ends ; if a is

- m good looking , the irror counsels that he avoid disgrace ; if ugly , it makes h im know that his physical defects ought to be counter ii balanced by moral virtues ; young , it warns him in the flower of

n his age that it is the time for lear ing , and for daring brave deeds ;

h im m n if old , it counsels to lay aside unbeco i g conduct and think somewhat of death . T O this end the nature O f things has given ” 52 l l m i odoru us an opportunity to see ourse ves . O y p s compared the 7 11 11301 0 a v7 011 on the temple of Apollo to the mirrors placed on Egyp m m tian te ples , which he says are able to do the sa e thing as the 53 . St ob a eus m O f Pythian inscription , oreover , felt the suggestion

4 9 0 - 1 5 5 . See pp . 5 ° ’ While recogniz ing one s o w n condition by seeing a nother in like sta te is ’ u di f r r m r z m l a r O f a ra r a a sa in S a u q ite fe ent f o ecogni ing si i ities ch cte , p s ge t ti s a m r in m r all Th eb id . T u u is of so e inte est this connection yde s , o t y wo nded by M la u h a d url a a a t h im in r ur a n d a s la e nipp s , h ed we pon et n , he y dying , he begged

for a M la u . a a u u M la u a n d r u h im the he d of e nipp s C p ne s fo nd e nipp s b o ght , l r r h e u l a o n h i s ul T u . T m : sti b e thing , sho de to yde s poe contin es “ Erigit ur Tydeus vult uque occurrit et a mens La et it ia ue ra u ut sin ult a n t ia vi q i q e , g dit O ra t ra h ique o cul os ses eque a g n ovit in illo ” I r is m r 7 1 - 7 4 m e a t a b sc cu . 5 5 p po gi (VIII , ) 5 1 IS3A .

5 2 Th e r t 4 . i Na t . u a es . a r : Der dea n Q I , XVII , ch pte begins with the wo ds ” t ur u h il h i u ul a ura di er De r o s o ss a n t . . I a n nc p p , q od de spec i n t Cf II , “ 36 1 : uib us d m ut a it Sext ius i ra t is rofui t a s exis e r , Q a , p d p s speculum . Pe t ur b a vi t ill os a a mu t a t io sui velut in rem ra esen t e i m a dduct n o n a n overun t . t nt , p g se 5 3 I l re z n Ale. 1 vo . . 9 C u er . . Au u S ermo L 1 3 : Co m , II , p , Cf g stine , VIII , ” m m ra fidem ua m in s ice : a m ua m e o t , p te sit t q speculum tibi Symbolu m t uu m . “ ” 86 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE the maxim so strongly in connection with the figure of the mirror

‘ ’ that in his chapter on I vc001 2 0 0 7 011 he included an extract from B ias

: 06 50 6 1 030 776 611 11 0 7 0777 : 7 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 77 0 6 1 1 which reads 0 0 00 3 p $ 3 , 7 03 11 01

K0 )\ 03 0771 x0 0 1 7 03 06 a l0 03 1 03 , xp There is , besides , a half ’ 5 5 m L P a n to i hu orous allusion to the figure in ucian s essay on m me. ” O f o The applause the spectators would know no b unds , he says , when each O f them recognizes his o w n qualities and comes to see m m himself in the pantomi e as in a irror , and what he is accustomed to experience and what he is accustomed to do . For then men cannot restrain themselves for delight , but they burst into applause i O f with one accord , as they see , each one , the l keness his own soul ,

’ 1 b m m . 07 6 1 1 s d and co e to know the selves x y p , he continues , 70

' A6 M0 11<011 610 0110 7 0 Pvc001 0 6 0 0 7 011 6K 7 3 060 3 6K6 £V 3 0 07 0 03 776 1 ' i' z1 6 7 0 0 0 p y y 1 , and they go away from the theatre cognizant O f what they ought to choose and what to avoid , instructed in what they did not know ” m n m m l before . That a a a y see hi se f reflected not only in theatrical representations but in literature is implied in one of Martial ’ s epi 56 grams :

H m m a a r a o ine p gin nost a s pit . Sed n o n vi s Ma murra t uo s r m r , , cognosce e o es i llim h i ” L a Aet a C a a c . N ec te sci re . eg s

Philo Juda eus sa w in the purification rites O f the Hebrews a 5 7 - means O f acquiring one kind O f self knowledge . He says that most people use pure water only for purposes of purification , but Moses had some O f the prepared ashes from the sacred fire put in a vessel

t h e i O f with water , and instituted sprinkl ng the candidates for puri

fica tion w a s with this mixture . And the reason for this , he says , that he Wished 7 0 03 0771 7 011 7 0 0 011 7 0 3 06 p 0 776 £0 11 1011 7 0 3 7 11 6311 0 1 77p07 6 p0 11 60 0 7 0 03 5 8 — 11 0 1 7 7711 1010 11 0 00 10 0 It is our bodily essence earth and water O f m which Moses re inds us through this rite , Philo says furth er , because h e understood that the most beneficial purification is just — 7 0 11 1011 1 11 11 6 0 201 11 0 0 1 0 ou0 0 111 this 7 0 7 1 0 60 117 0 11 0 0 5 013 0 6 0 3 a 7r 0s 510 , 7 6g0 p 0 3 5 9 “ ” 11 0 11 000 7 0 3 0 11110 1 00 m , 1 0 For in co ing to know this , Philo adds , “ a man will straightway cast aside his treacherous conceit , and

54 S O b . l r t o . 2 1 1 1 F , . 55 1 Sec . 8 . 5° 1 0 - 1 2 X , IV , . 5 7 - S ac . L S . e . 26 2 26 De ( p g I) 5 . 5 3 2 Sec . 6 3 .

5 ° . 2 Sec 64 . ‘ KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 8 7

- discard his excessive pride , and be well pleasing to God . This 6 0 m ’ same idea is expressed in other passages in Philo , and an s humble

origin is one O f his frequently recurring themes . The sprinkling

ma n - with ashes and water would bring to a truer self estimate , he

O f h im m felt , and hence was a means aiding to know hi self in the

An d o w n sense of knowing his measure . this realization of their nothingness Philo conceived as essential for those who would seek

to know the superior greatness O f God . The S toic doctrine that ma n is a part of the soul O f Nature led the S toics to emphasize a knowledge of the Universe not only as

- m something to be included in self knowledge , but as a eans to attain

ing it . This is expressed several times by Cicero and repeatedly

De Fi n i by the Church Fathers . We recall that Cicero says in his 6 1 bus that without a knowledge of natural philosophy w e cannot see

m n osce te what force certain maxi s (including ) have , and again that we must enter into the nature O f things and see deeply what it de

w e m mands , or cannot know ourselves ; and he also e phasizes this thought in the passage from the De Legi bus which w e cited l 6 2 A ' . m m O f at ength ong the Church Fathers , Cle ent Alexandria says of the maxim that “ it can be an injunction to the pursuit of knowledge , for it is not possible to know the parts without knowing the essence of the whole ; and we must concern ourselves with the origin of the world , as through a knowledge O f this it will be possible to ” 6 3 understand the nature of man An d Min ucius Felix says in his “ “ O cta vi us ? I do not den y that man ought to know himself — a n d w h and look around and see what he is , and whence , y whether m m m m m collected fro the ele ents or for ed har oniously from ato s , or m m w e rather ade , fashioned , and ani ated by God ; and cannot investigate and draw forth this knowledge without inquiring into

the Universe , since all things are so closely connected and bound together that unless you examine diligently the methods of divinity um you can not know h anity . The Stoics thus said virtually that the way to know oneself — is to know God a n idea more frequently expressed than its equally

“0 D 6 - 11 1 11 0 0 . e A b el t 6 0 0 1 0 0 7 0 0776 8 Cf 5 0 . e Ca i n i 5 5 5 6 : 11 6 11 1711 1 3 7 p 7 03 10 0 776 p1 77 0 03

0 00611 6 150 3 1 6 1 11 0 11 0 2 7 7 0 0 0 0 77 770 1 7 )\ - 1 i 1 0 77 0 . l 7 2 1 1 2 2 3 60 6 0 6 3 See a De 5 0 17 77 . [ 1 0 11 0 p p6 0 so I , ; De P osteri ta te Ca i i 1 1 n 5 . “I See - . 6 7 pp 6 8 . 6 2 See p . 69. “3 S trom. 6 0 I , . “4 1 7 Sec . . “ ” 88 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

m 65 true converse that to know God one ust know himself . For it all m - depends upon what we ean by God and Self knowledge . If man is proud and presumptuou s or if his God is a far - O ff majestic

ma n m m m l m B eing , ust easure hi se f aright before he can co prehend ’ God s greatness . B ut if ma n is seeking to realize his union with a m N R God who per eates all ature , or with a God of abstract eason , he can come into that realization O f his true self only as he apprehends m m . m God This last thought beco es war with religious feeling , ore ’ O f over , when we read Augustine s expression of it in the chapter “ his Confes s i on s entitled ~ H omo S es e Totn m N on No-vi t : Although ‘ ma n ma n O f no knoweth the things of a , save the spirit man which “36 h im m ma n is in , yet there is so ething in man which the Spirit of i L hi h m . B ut w ch is in does not know thou , ord , who hast made i m h m knowest him altogether . What I know about yself I know by thine enlightening me , and what I do not know about myself I shall not know until my darkness become as noonday in ” 6 7 Thy sight .

“5 See pp . 4 5 an d 94 .

r r 1 1 . m Co . F o I II , ‘7 7 Au u on ess i on s . g stine , C f X , V . CHAPTE R X

I‘NQGI EATTO N IN EARLY ECCLESIASTICAL LITERATURE

We have fou nd occasion n ow and the n in the pre ce ding chapters to quote from the writings O f the Fath ers of the Christian Church

O f 11 0301 0 0 11 1 in illustration of certain points touching the use 7 7 01 . m m Direct allusions to the apophtheg are not nu erous , however , in view of the large body O f literature which these m en have left

m - to us , although the the e of self knowledge found a place in their m thought in other connections , and received a treat ent at their hands somewhat similar to that accorded the maxi m In non- Christian

few writings , besides taking on a conceptions which were in a sense m peculiar to Christianity . The pro inence given the maxim or the theme seems to have varied somewhat with different authors . In studying the works of the Fathers of the first five centuries w e look largely in vain for either theme or maxim among the scanty remains 1 O f m m the literature of the Apostolic Age , and in so e of the later ore ? m O f m m s volu inous works , such as those Chrysosto and Hierony u

m 2 n d O f On the contrary , Cle ent of Alexandria of the century is one m m our ost fruitful sources for ideas connected with the axim directly , and the theme of self - knowledge is later particula rly recurrent in

m . m m 2 ud A brose Cle ent , however , while the ost valuable of the

O f 11 0301 0 0 0 7 011 century Fathers for his discussions 7 , does not stand m alone among his conte poraries in referring to the apophthegm , for it occurs in the anti - heretical polemics of Irenaeus and Hippolytus

E Min ucius of the astern church , and in the works of Felix and

Tertullian O f the Western . m m Clement not only gives interpretations of the axi , but following the tradition already established by Jewish writers , who tried to account for the best in Greek thought by saying that the Greeks had

m m 11 12101 0 0 0 7 11 borrowed fro the Hebrews , he aintains that 7 0 and

m in certain other apophtheg s really originated the Old Testament . 3 He says that one of the Greek Sages drew 6770 0 06 03 from Abraham ” 4 ’ ’ L h im E ~ 00 770 0 0 07 proceeded as the ord spake to that y y , 0 0

1 T his ma y be due somewha t to the fa ct tha t we ha ve b ut a fra ction of the l ra ur O f l s ite t e the t century e xta nt . 2 ’ I t ur in o n e O f Hiero n mo us E i tl s es v r . . 44 n . 0 3 . occ s y p , howe e See p , 3 t 5 - rom. 7 S 1 0 71 . . II , ,

n . 4 Am r D Ge . . e Ab ra h a m 5 . XII , Cf b ose II , II , “ ” 90 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

m is from the words of Solo on , saying , My son , if thou become ” 5 surety for thy friend , thou wilt give thine hand to the enemy , and more mystically the 7 11 00 1 0 0 0 7 611 is taken from the passage ”6 t . Thou hast seen thy bro her , thou hast seen thy God A little

’ farther on he adds : 0 0 ¢é0 7 6 p0 11 00 7 0 7 11 0301 0 a u7 0x1 770 p6 7y'yvc011 0 v 0 03 ’ 007 6 1 7rpo0 éx6 Clement s pupil and successor

m O f m Origen , who beca e one the ost learned and constructively m m m influential of the Fathers , ade use of the axi in his oral teaching , m d as we have learned fro the panegyric of him by his isciple , Gregory 8 m m - Thau aturgus , and he treated the the e of self knowledge with particular fulness in connection with a clause in the S on g of S on gs ” 9 If m . thou know not (thyself) , O thou fairest a ong women He 1 0 “ begins his exposition of the verse by saying : Unius Ch ilon is scilicet ex septem quos apud Gra ecos singulares fuisse in sapientia

con celeb ra t m fert ur fama , haec inter caetera irabilis esse sententia t en : cito tei su m co osce tei su m. a m quae ait S p vel gn p Quod Salomon , quem pra ecessisse omnes hos tempore et sapientia ac rerum scientia

ra efa tion e do cuimus m m mulierem in p nostra , ad ani a quasi ‘ N co n overis t emet i sa m mulieres dicit isi g p , O pulchra inter Writers after Clement and Origen gather much O f what they have 1 1 to say about self - knowledge around this text and the Take heed ” m II oa é e to thyself O f the Pentateuch . B asil wrote a ho ily on p x

2 6 0 0 7 3 O f S on o S on s . 0 , and expositions the verse in the g f g are numerous Discussions and allusions pertinent to our subject are not confined

5 1 - Pr v . 2 . o VI , 5 l in A - N T i l ee o n Tra . W his is not n the Bib e . S note ns by i son nti icene r r r Ch isti a n Lib a y . 7 m 8 28 1 2 P l uda eus De Mi . Abr a h a Ex . 9 u . . . X , ; XXXIV , ; De t IV , Cf hi o J , g “ 1 7 1 3 1 1 1 1 kk a o 01000 11 6 1 0 6 0 111 77 0 0 6 6 7701 7 0 01 0 11 31 0 7 11 010 “ 0 6 0 0 7 01 , 013 11 0 2 v 0 03 n o x 0 7 p x

0 6 0 0 7 10. 9 ee . S p 39 . 9 8 . I , 1 ° Pa t . f H r mu . t r . O I n a n . a n t . 5 6 Ex a La a C C II , . t nt in the tin t ns ie ony s l G ra ec . o . . 1 3 V 2 . XIII , p 1 1 Am r x 6 r No s ce um n o t a mma He . 39 la a b ose ( VI , , ) dec es th t te ips is co nd P a A ll b u t S l m al u M r l r in of the ythi n po o , of o o on, tho gh oses w ote ong befo e “ I P s . De r . n ut o o n o m A O m a . y ttende tibi , ho o , ttende tibi Cf CXVIII , II , “ 1 3 : No s ce um u o i l v r ua a u r te ips q od Ap ll n i Pythi o a ssignant genti es i i , q si ipse cto Al fuerit h ui us sententia e ; eum de nostro usurp a t u m a d sua t ra n sfera n t . so

l f - a M w a s l r r O Al x . on tra li a H e r m us J u n um 1 4 1 5 . Cy i e C I , e inds th t oses o de

a Gr Sa s a n d a a P a ra a n d T al a r mu th n the eek ge , s ys th t yth go s h es g the ed ch of r l r i E thei o e n gypt .

“ ” 92 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

and apropos of this kind of self - knowledge he introduces the ques tions What ought to be done? What avoided? Wherein do you lack? Wherein do you abound? What ought to be corrected and ? ” 14 R what cherished egarding the substance of the soul , which m fi m 15 he calls a ore dif cult proble , he says that the soul ought to

n k ow whether it is corporeal or incorporeal , whether both body 16 a n d m m m soul are si ple , or co posed of two or three or ore substances how the soul was made whether the virtue of the soul can approach and depart , or whether it is unchangeable and if once acquired does not flow back ” 1 7 The most recurrent Stoic theme ’ in this literature was that of man s knowledge of himself in relation

B x r to the Universe . asil says in his He a eme on that in this city of

ni w e the U verse was our first native country , and that there see 1 8 ma n m II ooré e 2 6 0 117 3 the origin of ; and in his Ho ily on p x 4 , that we may trace out the Creator in ourselves as in a certain small uni 1 9 “ m r en t is n verse . And A brose says : Es t p ud a g o scere se

m et uema dmodum sa ien t ib us defin it u m m ipsu , q a p est , secundu ” 20 naturam vivere . Ambrose brings out still another phase of Stoic teaching in connection with the story of Joseph ’ s being sold into Egypt . God gave through Joseph a means of consolation to ( “ h im those who are in servitude , he says . He assigned an overseer that men mi ght learn that even in the worst circumstances character

si a n i mus s e can be superior , and no condition is devoid of virtue , un in scui us n e co n osoa t v q g ; the flesh is subject to ser itude , not the 2 1 mind . The di rect influence of Plato appears in a passage in Ambrose ’ s 22 “ ” “ Heacaemeron . We are one thing , he says , ours is another , m what is around us is another . That is , we are ind and soul , ours

1 ‘ I a n t . a B n d . 5 6 r 1 25 . r ff . See Pa t . G a . C C ee XIII , 15 1 25 D . 1 ° 1 2 6 B .

’ 1 7 IZ7A : Sed et hoc a dh uc a d co g n o scen da m semet ip s a m a nima requira t v r u a n ima e r si i t s eius a ccedere potest et decede e . 1 3 Hex . 1 VI , . 1 9 7 0 11 1 (fl aw K0 7 0 0 xev s 7 611 Sec . : 6 a 7r o 0 é s 0 6 0 v7 0 6561 6 6 7 0 616 7 s y p p xy c§, 3 17 fi fi

’ '

A w ov é t v fiew kk 1 1 1 1 x6 0 1 . a d 61 0 1 1 7 1 1. 6 0 nu w f x , 6 0 v7 q3 0 10 6 1 14 p 1 y q 2 ° De E xcess n Fra tri i a t 4 s S u S r i 5 . y I , 21 De J os e h P a tri a rch a 2 0 . p I , IV , 22 l a rm 4 2 . a rra r a r P a w VI , F s y s tha t Amb rose rea d the wo ks of to with a mi ra Li ves o th e a th ers vol . . d tion ( f F , II , p “ KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 93

m m m are the e bers of the body and its sensibilities around us are oney , u A servants , and the f rnishings of the outer life . ttend to yourself , — therefore , and know yourself that is , not what sort of limbs you

h ow u h o w have nor m ch physical endurance , nor great possessions , ” h o w m m nor uch power , but the character of your soul and ind .

We feel also something of the Neo - Platonist Spirit of abstraction from the body in one of Ambrose ’ s comments relative to the familiar “ S on o S on s : e t verse in the g f g Cognosce igitur te , naturae tuae

m et exut a m et exsert a decore , exi quasi vinculis pede , nudo vestigio ; ut in t e umen t a m cor or li carnalla g non sentias , vestigium entis tuae p a a ” 23 ’ i n vincula non mplice t . And a little before he says of Paul s being caught up into the third Heaven that “ his soul had risen from m his body and while he was ade a stranger to himself , he held ” 24 within himself the ineffable words which he heard . A limited heirarchy of spirits naturally came into Christianity through the old Hebrew faith and the teachings of Philo , though it w a s limited indeed as compared with the numerous intermediaries

ma n between God and developed by the Gnostics , against whose 25 . O h o w extreme ideas Christianity inevitably protested rigen ,

23 De I a a c oi A i a 6 s n m 1 . I , IV , 2 4 1 r I ll r r e 1 . . 6 4 a : n a a ma u n o n c S c . o Cf VIII , whe e he s ys i e g o it dine g v a ma co rru t ib ile m r u a ra va t a n m a m e t t erren u m a a no it se ni ; p eni co p s gg i , h bit

i n li r r d t en a u ulum c n a t ur n a u m m . Se t t s c cito . Cog osce e te se pe se debet est et P ru et n o n v et P ru n a m co n o vi ss et n o n n e a vis s et a uc et s , se cogno it et s ; si g , g ” “ l A 10 : e r l n u r e v r m . . a I n oh n S d t m ua m e u . J t to e Cf so g XXIII , e i q e fo is este t m i ca rn em ua n . t , descende te 25 I rena eus in his a ttempt to overthrow the i n t rica te Gnostic theory of C rea

a n d a Go d a l n w a s r a r rl a o n e tion , to show th t o e the C e to of the wo d , b ses of his

r u l - l b n r a g u men ts pon the esse n tia l se f kn ow edge of e a ch of the eings co ce ned .

Th e n r l a m u Pl r m a al u r l G ostic theo y he d th a t Ach oth o tside the e o , tho gh he se f

ma P ro a t o r uff r a m n r a n a n n ra n the i ge of the p , s e ed o g othe p ssio s the p ssio of ig o ce , a n d the Demiu rg e whom she crea ted in the ima ge of the No v; (who w a s the O nl y

n a r w u ull r al z n a m a w a s Begotte of the F the ) itho t f y e i i g by wh t e ns he doing it ,

r r r n a A n n t h e Pl r m c ea ted a n o de of a eo n s w hich w a s a im ge of the eo s withi e o a .

I n r u a n r r n a u a m ur w a s a n his ef t tio of this theo y , I e e s sks if the De i ge , who ma N0 0: rm Sa v r r u A a m w a s n ra n i g e of fo ed by the io th o gh ch oth , then ig o t of r Sa m l n ra r a ra n M . v r hi se f , ig o nt of C e tion , igno t too of the othe If so , the io mu a v ma h im a n m r ma o r l v r Nofis a r w a s st h e de i pe fect i ge , e se the e y of the F the

ra m l a n d a a n a a A n a re r m L a n d igno nt of hi se f ; g i he s ys th t if the eo s f o ogos ,

L r m No fi n Nofi r B t h us P ro a t o r m u m la r og os f o s , a d s f om y (the p ) , they st be si i , l u v l r m a r a n d r a ll ll a v a on ra ike s ccessi e ig hts f o to ch , eithe wi h e the p ssi of igno nce o r A a m ll v PrO a t o r ul a a v . An d a ch oth c nnot h e it if ha e it , then the p wo d be ra H m l ! W a m r L a n n n ra n a r igno nt of i se f h t is o e , the ogos c ot be ig o t of the F the , “ 94 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

m ’ ever , akes the soul s knowledge of itself include a knowledge of — its place in the order of spirits oi whether there are spirits of the m m f sa e substance with itself , and others not the sa e but dif erent 26 m m o w n . fro it , and whether the substance of angels is the sa e as its

Self - knowledge was definitely predicated of the members of the Trin

e ity severally and collectively , particularly after the rise of N o

- Platonism . Augustine raises the question of the self knowledge 2 7 rin it - e of the T y , and self knowledge was assert d separately of the 2 8 2 9 D Father and of Christ by others writers , while ionysius the Areopagite declares that the Angels know themselves 3 0

n w a s t o o The God of the Christia s , like the God of the Jews , ’ 32 m m em h a great for an s full co prehension , but the Church Fathers p sized the thought that self - knowledge was a necessary help toward i 3 3 an apprehension of H m . Hence Athanasius interprets the verse

‘ ’ ’ I 6 1 1 1 in S on o S on s m : mbfli 0 0 v7 61 7r cb7 ov Ka i 6 6 1 031 0 1. the g f g to ean p , 0 7 “ 35 among and Gregory of Pisida says in effect that to see God a

a s ma a n o t ra m l mu n a r they int in; if he is igno nt of hi se f , he st k ow the F the to

i m x . Adv . H er 7 2 1 7 n . 81 5 know who he e ists ( II , , ,

2" a t 5 : a n i io n em i r ir li i r a n t . n . 8 u I n C C g t s u a nima eq a t si est a q u s o do . 2 7 1 1 1 2 Confessions , XIII , . .

2 “ Areo . D D o i L 4 1 . 0 N o ni . 4 70 E h i us e i . a n Dion p , VII , II , ; p p XXIV , ,

' )11 ‘ d a 9 66 ; L E 0 v7 ¢ . 1 1 . y p Cf XXVI ,

2 9 P rudentius Apoth eos is 963 - 969 : Dign usn e videtur i ” u u a c sua a r a v . Q testis sibi sit , seq e c n no it

3 ° cl r H r . De E c e . a 4 s ie ch II , III , .

See h r isti a n P la ton i t - s s . 9 10 . Big g , C , pp

32 “ See T r ull a A olo eti cum 1 7: u u u in co m reh en s ib ilis e t i n , p g De s n s est p etsi p er g ra t ia m rep ra es en t et ur ; Quod v ero immen s um est soli sibi notu m ” i t “ i Arn o b us Ado. Gen es I I u es t . 74 : u m ro m t us cu a m , , Neq e eni p p est q Dei mentem videre Homo a nima l ca ecum et ipsum se n es cien s n ullis potest “ i m r ra t io n ib us con s e u . A De ide V 1 9 23 7: Pa ulu ra u u u a d q b ose F , , s pt s sq e i tertiu m coelu m se ipsu m n es civit : Ari u s in s t erco re volut a t us De u m s civ t . ‘ ’ ‘ ’ Pa ul u Au u u Ar u di E o v . s dicit de se ipso De s scit , i s de Dio cit , g no i g stine , “ S er mo LI I 2 3 : I n m u : in eo ui u , te eni q od est , potes nosse q te fecit q od est ” qua ndo potes nosse ?

33 . 4 5 a n Cf . pp d 88 .

34 r I a t a . n n . t l ex . a n . P r l . a H 1 34 8 . a l 2 7 . a Gra a vo . F g C C t o ogi ec , , p Cf B si ,

P a t . r e 7 11 6 . G a c . vol 6 . k 6 0 15 1 0 1 0 0 Ka i s . x0 i7 o¢ ob 1 6. IX , ( XXIX p 1 5 7 1 vfi

‘ 1 60 v7 6 11 6 7 1 1 : Yé 0 vi 6 7 61 s 26 0 0 0 1 7 0 tbs ma y 6 r po gofims 7) 7 1 560 55 a o u 65 60 0 0 . 35 6 02 fi H ex .

“ ” 96 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

. e repentance These doctrines were essentially H braic , but the — relating of them to 7 11 6101 0 0 v7 611 and to self knowledge generally 4 1 m u was in the ain pec liar to the Christian Fathers , as was also the m m occasional connecting of the axi with the doctrine of immortality . That God created ma n an d created him in his o w n image is a theme

u Hexa emera l which occ rs frequently not only in the writings , but

- in other commentaries and anti heretical literature as well . Clement 4 2 “ ‘ of Alexandria says of the maxim : It means know whose image ’ ” crea t ion thou art , what is thine essence , and what thy ; and Hip 4 3 p oly t us says in his Refuta ti on of All H eresi es z 7 ov7 éo 7 t 7 0 T1 0 91 “ ‘ 0 6 0 v7 0v ém uob 7 011 770 0 0 11 10 37 0 6 6 611 . s o n oscere , y s 7 What is , asks Am 44 “ brose , except for each one to know that he is made after th e “ ” 45 m ? : Co n os ce te i age and likeness of God And elsewhere he says g , a n i ma , that thou art not of earth or clay , since God hath breathed upon thee and made thee to become a living soul .

B u t ma n while God created , unlike the rest of the Universe , in

m ma n m m his own i age , is hu an , and by reason of his hu anity , prone to sin . We are familiar with the fact that knowing that w e are human

m 11 11301 o uvr é11 ca e to be attached to 7 , but outside of Church literature it usually meant to recognize one ’ s inability to cope with the Gods m because of the li itations of the flesh , whereas in the writings of ‘ ’ the Fathers it means recognize that you are a sinner , and further ,

1 4 Th e E ur a Ph ilo demus v r ma a v ma x m in m pic e n , howe e , y h e the i ind when

‘ 1 1 1 1 7 0 1 11 410 w 0 117 011 he a sks : 1763s ydp 11 1 0 6 21 7 01 0p a p7 01 0 1 7 0 11 ) 1 6t , 7 7

1 7 >\ 11 1 11 < 1 0 xw 11 7 011 7 0 7 0 11 6 1 11 01100 0 1 11 He i Ha 0 6x 6 1 7 0 6 é (L) 0 ml 11 11 n > 6 1. 17 6 9 011 0 6 ; ( p p i i i 2 2 Teu n er . An d L b a n us u n p a o ia s 4 6 . p . ( b ) ses it the sense of knowing the ’ ra l O f ma a ur in v r vil ma T m f i ty n s n t e iew of the powe of e , when he kes i on the

' Misa nth rope s a y : dkk 6176 107) 06 8111 7 1 ; y ou 0x>xin1 xa i 7 1)11 n/wxfiv 610 101710 6

’ 1 v 16 0 « 0 7 0 7 0 0 7 0 A N u< 011 6 11 01 11 6 1 0 0 7 011 Ka i T l 7r0 7 60 7 111 dvfl w n os 7 771 éy fi 3. 7 p fl p a 6 p 7 1 p

x0 1 00 0 11 x0 1< 611 60 7 1 m etri c» Ka i (130 176 p «9117 31 ; 0 111101111 0 Xa fld w 176ppw 11 611 7 fis 7rp0s 0 110pénro vs

t kia 1 1 7 11 b s 6 6 1 6 . O r . u 7 1 1 ( XII , ‘2 t 4 23 . S rom. V , , ‘3 l 34 54 34 . Pa t . G ra ec . vo . . . X , In XVI , p ‘4 1 3 . I n P s . CXVIII , II , ‘5 20 : m ui I 1 0 . . I P . n P s . n s XVIII , X , Cf CXVIII , XIII , Bene ti et , q h m m co n o s ci t s cia mus u a m su mus a d ma m o ine se esse g ; q i ho ines , i gine l 0 Au u S er mo 8 5 . l i i . H ex . et s mil t udin em a . a sci icet Dei f cti Cf so VI , , g stine ( LII 1 7 us l fo r r a T r ur lv a re , ) bids ook t ces of the inity within o se es , since we ’ ma in G ma de od s i ge . 46 l 4 4 805 . t l P . G . vo . . t . a H m See Gr r N a I n a n n . ego y of y ss C C o i y II , , p C

11 1 7 0 0 61 0 15 1 0 11 0 6 0 11 6 11 7 630 1 7r60 0 1 in rép h o m fiv K7 f0 w 770 p 0 7 0 8 176 7ro ml< 07 0 s 7 6 120 71 0 1 . 6 1 5 7 7

6 110 1111 7 0 6 9 k 60 0, of) 0 6x fi w s . “ ” KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 97

’ m - co e to a better self knowledge by way of repentance . Augustine “ says in one of his Sermons : Thou da res t perchance to judge about the heart of another what thou dost not know : but thou knowest ” 4 7 thyself to be sinful ;and in quoting the verse in Romans All men ” 48 m : A n os ce have sinned and co e short of the glory of God , he says g i i ” 4 9 n firm t a s m . u m te , hu ana Touching the f rther point Cle ent of 5 0 Alexandria says that he w h o according to the word of repentance m knows his life to be sinful , will loose it fro the sin by which it is drawn away , and when he has loosed it , he will find it , according to

: the O bedience which lives again to faith and dies to sin . And he adds

’ ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 m 7 0 87 0 01 60 7 1 7 0 6 00 6 21 7 1 1 0 1 7 0 1 031 0 1 6 0 v7 01 . 1 0 1 x0 7 A brose , too , “ m says of the words If thou know not (thyself), thou fairest a ong “ m co n o s ca s m m m et wo en hoc est , nisi g te ortale , rationale , tua fa t ea ris in i uit a t es ut us t ificeris peccata , cito dicas q tuas j , nisi con ‘ vert a ris in uit et sum et nisi scias te , q dicas Fusca ’ i . 1 4 su m ro der t decora (Cant , ) fusca , quia peccavi nihil tibi p ” 5 1 B patrum gratia . It is doubtless passages such as these that auer has in mind when after speaking of the place of the Delphic maxim 52 in Greek philosophy he says in his Da s Ch ri stli ch e des Pla ton i s mn s : “ l B z u m h ris t en th um In we cher nahen eziehung aber diess C steht , zeigt an einfachsten und unmittelbarsten die Zusammenstellung des — delphischen Sokratischen Sprii ch e mit dem evangelischen Aufruf

1 6 7 0 110 50 1 6 7 0 11 0 6 27 6 zur 1 , jenen 1 das j a selbst nichts anderes ist als ein verst a rkt es ub erh a u t den Menschen nicht blos p , sondern in Zustande

1 1 der Sunde in das A uge fassende 7 1 6301 0 0 v7 61 . Sokratische Philosophie

Ch ris t en th um und verhalten sich dennoch , in diesen ihren Aus ga n gspun kt betrachtet z u einander w ie Selb st serken n t n iss und

- i erken n t n ss . n Sunder A recognition of our si ful nature , together with a sense of the greatness of God; naturally leads to the Christian

4 7 I . m v Am r I P s . 1 1 1 : m LV 3 . n 6 , Cf b ose CXVIII , , ho ine se esse cogno it i l i al imp a r sibi bellum a dversu m sp ri t a ia n equ t ia e in co elest ib us . Cf . so

a l E . 4 . B si , p C CIV , 4 3 23 . III , 4 9 P s . LX 14 . I n V , 5 ° t 7 m 6 2 . S ro . IV , , 5 1 14 Th e n o t m lv a r I P . n s . CXVIII , II , wicked do know the se es cco ding “ l 2 8 : Sed h un c exit um a r l Am r De E xcidi o Hi eros o . to b ose , III , XVII , s c i egi ferun t a u t ro dit o res vel ercuss o res a ren t um ui v rum a t re m n o n a n o ve , p p p , q e p g ” “ r Au u S er mo L 1 8 : Ha eret ici u n ec co n o s cun t . . nt , sese g Cf g stine , X VI , ” l n o n n o r un t . e 7 a ipsi se Se 3 so . 2 5 Pa 24 g e . “ 98 KNO W THYSELF IN G REEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

grace of humility . Chrysostom says that the more we advance in m m virtue , the ore we ake ourselves contrite , and that he who best m m 5 3 knows himself estee s hi self to be nothing . So Augustine says

m : h umilit a s ut co n o sca s Tu , ho o , cognosce quia es homo tota tua g ” 54 “ te ; and Th eo doret says : We know and measure ourselves in m m truth , for we have learned fro the beginning the hu ility of the ” 55 Apostles .

As the idea that ma n is human was extended by the ecclesiastical ‘ ’ m a re m writers to ean know that you sinful , and be hu ble , so the kindred thought of knowing that ma n is mortal came to mean ‘ ’

e m m . know that while you hav a ortal body , your soul is im ortal Irenaeus says that God ma y permit us to be mortal and die that we ma y never become puffed up as if we had life from

ma m w e ourselves , but y learn fro experience that have eternal ” “

Him . life from And was it not on this account , he asks , that God permitted our resolution into the dust of the earth—that we might be clearly instructed in every way and diligent in all things ? ” 66 for the future , ignorant neither of God nor of ourselves And “ B asil says in his Homily on IIpo0 6x6 2 6 0 117 43: Know thin e o w n m nature ; that thy body is ortal , thy soul immortal , and that thy — life is somehow two- fold thine o w n life after the flesh which swiftly ” 5 7 passeth , and the inborn life of the soul which knoweth no bounds . Eusebius would find a basis for this im mortality in the conception 5 8 ma n m m mm that is ade in the i age of the i ortal God , for he says

u that Plato and Moses agree abo t the soul , in that Moses defined the substance of the so ul as immortal when he taught that ma n w a s ’ m “ ” made after God s i age ; and Plato , he explains , as if he had ‘ Alci bi a des I : L been a disciple of Moses , says in the ooking to God m and into the virtue of the hu an soul , we would see and know

5 3 I Ma tt 4 P r vol L . 332 n . . a t . G a ec . . . XXV , VII , p 5 4 I h u mile r n t n o n u r h n 1 6 . er mo L 9 : s e a n J o . S XXV , Cf XVII , , s pe bi

l er mo 1 r a a n o s ceb a n t . A S se g so C CXC , , whe e he s ys of John the “ a : u u m ra ci a n o vit u t a d m u m l a B ptist q od bon e t , se g , pedes Do ini h i i ” ret ur .

55 7 L E . De P r v 1 XXXVI . Cf . o . V . 5° r a 2 u Ado. er 3 H . . I en e s V , 5 7 Sec . 3 .

5 9 P ra e l ma n all ex er . a n e i ca 34 r a a p g XI , whe e he s ys th t sh know the p i l r l u v r en ces a Go d a v m mm a . A u th t be ong to , by h ing beco e i o t g stine , howe e , a r ul— a a r m GOd b ut n o t s ys we do not know the o igin of the so th t i t is gift f o , of a m a ur a s Go d H m l D m t i n e 3 e A n i a e O r i . the s e n t e i se f . g IV ,

P SS S I W I P S O F T E M X I M I S M EX LI I W A AGE N H CH THE RE ENCE H A ADE P C T, HETHER

B Y EX W O S P1 0 0 1 2 0 117 6 11 O R B Y ALL SI O To L I A O LLO THE ACT RD , AN U N DE PH , P , O R THE WI S E ME N

I n Greek Auth ors

Aeschylus : Prometheus 309 (vi 'v a ne 0 0 117 011 )

5 . a u Ion : F ra g . 5 ed N ck Pla to : Ch a rmides 1 64 E Pha ed rus 2 29E

Ph ileb us 4 8 C

Prota gora s 34 3A- B La ws 923A

Alc a I Z4 A 1 29A 1 30 E 1 32D ibi des I , , ,

Era s t a e 1 38A

Hipp a rchus 2 28 E Iso cra tes : P a n a t h en a icus 230

: C ro a edia 2 20 Xenophon y p VII , , M m ra l a 2 24 e o bi i IV , ,

Ar l : R r 2 1 1 3 istot e heto ic II , ,

Ma a M ral a 15 1 2 1 3a 14 gn o i II , , ,

P l m . l r 2 : ra . 1 5 2 . . 2 4 hi e on F g ed Koch (Stob F o , )

M r : r . 24 0 24 9 307 38 a a 5 . en nde F g , , , ed Koch Demetri us O n Style 9 i r i H 1 0 D o do us S culus : . ist IX ,

I . 4 P hilo Juda eus : De ug . et n 6 M a r 4 4 S Le . a De pec . g I (De on chi )

7 if . S m . 5 De o n I , Leg a t io a d Ga i um 6 9

i ‘ iy c 0 117 11 l) . 8 w m 0 De M g . A (y e 60 ) Ch rso s t o m : 1 6 0 R 303 R L 36 1 R Dio y IV , ; X , ; XVII , E u : 1 8 1 7 1 1 8 2 2 5 3 pictet s I , , ; III , , ; III , ,

l r . r E b e kl r . d . Se n . m F a g . I . (F o Stob F o Pl r l 2 u o o t em . 0 ta ch : Ad . C c

A ll . a d . 28 Cons . po c

A ul . a b AM . . 1 2 5 De Dis . d c li e 1 7 Ga rru t a t . De , c m 3 De osthenes , c .

I n im tili e 5 U t a t . De . c P h r 9 . . 2 De y t O . c

r An . . 13 De T a nq . c l 2 1 7 E a pud De phos c . Lu cia n : O n P a ntomime 8 1

' Arist eides : Art of Rhetoric A 4 83

Pa u a n i a : ra ec 24 1 G . s s Des . X , l 4 l . G P vo . : An . r . I . V a r . u m . Afl . . et u . en De op C s Dign C c I ( , p ed

l m Al x r r m 70 - 71 4 2 3 I 3 a a : S . 1 4 6 0 1 5 V C e ent of e nd i t o I , , ; II , , ; , , ; V I , , 0 O o s p - o KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

H er . 1 8 4 H l u : Adv . 3 ippo yt s I , ; X , 6 B a . 5 O rigen : I n C nt C ant .

x u Em iri cus : II 05‘ AO ‘ mo bs A 2 6 6 Se t s p p y , i La er us : . P il t . 1 1 3 Diogenes De Vit h I , , Ph ilo st ra t us : L A ll u T a a 14 1 37 ife of po oni s of y n VII , , Pl u : E a 1 E a 4 1 otin s nne d IV , III , nne d VI , VIII ,

‘ ’ I 69 1 - P r : ra . o n v1 1 2 0 117 01 . l r 1 r S . 2 26 28 o phy y F g ( tob F o , ) r I P l u : a . n a . a . t . r 2 7 . 1 34 A a a a G a ec . vo . 8 th n si s F g C nt C nt ( , p ) 1 1 Lib a n ius : O r . XII , ul a : E l 4 1 4 20 B J i n pist e , Epistle to Th emist ius 26 0 C

O ra I8SA 81 1 88A- C tion VI ,

O ra 2 1 1 B - C tion VII , Pr l Al v l 5 r t u : a o . . . uz oc s In cibi des I I , p ed C e e r l Al xa r a : ra ulia n um VI 20 1 B Cy i of e nd i Cont J , Hi r l l r 4 l e oc es : n G Sa P a . l M a . O a 6 81 6 5 . u the o den yings of the yth go e ns , p ed ch D m s iu ’ u e sor : D u i a io es et olu i e cc 6 . R ll a a c s S s b t t n S t on s 96 V . 1 5 u F , p ed e e h o ri i z i a h i f r Pr C c us a a : E t us o u . 1 6 G . . of p p ocopi s , p ed Boiss S ob a eu l r 7 t s : . 9 F o III , ; XXI Gregory of Pisida : Hexa emeron 6 33 Pal a A l 36 6 34 9 A x IV 4 8 tine ntho ogy IX , ; IX , ; ppendi , l l a vol i orf v l D n d o . M a S a I i d 5 3 . . 81 . V a cho i sts on III , III , ed , ed ss ; ’ P a r P a 34 81 6 0 Pla P a ru 2 29E R u l 6 00A ind , ythi n II , III , ; to s h ed s ; ep b ic ; ’ r m L 386 R Lu a P ala r I 7 Dio Ch ysosto XXII ; ci n s h is , H s 8 e y chi us no . 3 Suida s 839 83 1A 81 T al C , , on h es

I n La ti n Auth ors

i I‘NQGI E T O N rr Men . Va o : Sa t . pp A T r : Fini b us 2 2 4 4 Cice o De III , ; V,

Le ib us 2 2 5 8 - 60 De g I , ( ) m 6 7 E . a d Fra t rem u u p Q int III , , 5 2 70 Tusc . . Dis I , ; V , O v : Ars Ama r a 5 00—5 02 id to i II ,

a : Con sola t ion e 2 - 5 Senec De XI ,

or. Ep . M

Pl : Na t . H . VII 32 iny ist , uv al : I 2 7 J en X , Tertulli an : Ap olegeti cum 4 8 D e Ani ma XVII Ausonius : De Herediolo 19 — Lu dus Septem Sa p Solon 1 - 3 81 Chilon H r mu : E l LV I 1 2 ie ony s pist e I , Am r : I n Ps 1 3 b ose . CXVIII , II , H xa m r VI VI 39 e e e on , , Au us : T ri n it a t e 9 1 2 g tine De X , ( ) ‘ ” 102 KNO W THYSELF IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

i i m . 9 2 M r us : m . a m n S . Sc c obi Co o n p I , ,

Sa t . 6 6 I , , S ni u : a rm a 1 6 3 5 0 ido s C in II , ; XV ,

P S S S I W I P S o r M X IM I s A T O MO A AGE N H CH THE RE ENCE THE A PPARENT , H UGH RE O R LE SS IND I RECTLY EX PRE S SED

I n Gr eek A uth ors

Hera cleit us : ra 1 16 l F g , Die s P a r : P a 34 ind ythi n II , Pla to : Ti ma eu s 72A

Ph ileb us 19C

: Hellen ica 4 0 - 4 1 Xenophon II , IV , M m ra l a 9 6 e o bi i III , VII , ; III , IX , Aristophanes : Clouds 84 2 9 1 1 2 2 2 l i E 5 a . Ar : N c . istot e thics IV , , 1 16 9 33 E n d . E 9 b . thics IV , ,

2 1 . Philemon : Fra g . 3 ed Koch 1 85 1 5 i . 81 9 Philo Juda eus : De M g Ab .

0 - Le . r um 1 2 . 26 26 5 De Spec g I (De Ci c cision) ; De Sa c . 2 1 2 S m . De o n I ,

- 1 7. Le . Alle or . 9 9 g g I ,

E u 8 10—1 3 14 1 8 - 20 pictet s II , , ; ,

l . 1 on . 2 P uta rch : Septem Sa p . C c

eh 1 1 n . . . Quo modo a d . poet . a d d c

L u a : al u a 6 ci n Di og es of the De d XIV , r P l 9 3 5 La e t i us : . . Diog enes De Vit hi I , , Ph ilo s t ra t us : L A ll u T a a 18 44 35 ife of po oni s of y n III , ; IV , ; VI , v hi I V 5 25 Li es of the Sop sts , l P u : E a 3 fl . 6 otin s nne d V , III , ; VI , IX , Pro ph y ry : Letter to Ma rcella 3 2

r i l r 88 a . n S . . F g tob F o I , Ab s t in en ti a 3 2 7 De , I a mb lich us : L P a ra 83 ife of yth go s XVIII , i r 1 1 r l . 8 8 a . n S . F g tob F o , r 22 D ul a : O . 5 J i n VII , Nemesius : Na ur Ma n 1 6 t e of I , l Pr l : . 2 77 v . . reuz r im . 85 81 o e u Alc . a ss C oc s In I p , esp pp , I ed l i L L L I n st itit uo Th eo o ca . 81 V g , esp XXXIII , C XVII , C XXX I

l i - 0 l r r 4 7 1 vo . . e z e O m od : a s i . . u oru s Al c . s m 8 81 C y p In I p , esp pp , , II , ed G l Sa P a r a 14—15 o den yings of the yth g o e ns , M ll 1 5 7 . u a . Hi ero cles : O n G l Sa P a r a . the o den yings of the yth go e ns , p ed ch t a eu s : r 1 S ob l . a r a n d 8 F o Ch pte XXI ; CVIII ,

I n La ti n A uth ors

Pla u tus : Pseu dolus 972 - 973

Sti ch us 1 24 - 1 25

r : O fficiis 3 1 1 14 Cice o De I , ( )

“ 104 KN O W THYSELF IN GREEK AN D LATIN LITERA TURE

Au u : 7 g stine Confession X , V , S l l ui 1 o i oq es II ,

i 1 0- C v . 1 2 De Dei , VIII ,

- 1 An e r . 2 2 . t O a De igine IV , Ch p

° Trini t a t e 1 2 3 - X 9 S- 14 3 6 7 1 3 De I , ; IX , , ; XIV , XV , , , , I n n 1 6 5 L 1 ° 1 Joh XXV, ; XXXII , ; XVI XC , X 14 I 1 1 Ps . L V X C C 8 In , ; , ; C ,

S rm 4 L 1 8 2 7 36 - 37 L 23 LVI 3 LVIII e o XXV , ; XVI , , , ; X VII , ; , ; , 1 3 L 9 8 1 5 ; XVIII , ; CXXXVIII , ; CCXC , ; CCXCII , BIBLIO GRAPHY

Th e P l al T u Pla a n d Ar l Ne w Y r r r : . 190 a 6 . E . B ke o itic ho ght of to istot e o k , Pl m l a u . T r D a s r u 1 837. B a u : Ch ist iche des tonis s bing en , r L 1 h e r P l . 914 T G . W . : A . Benn eek hi osophe s ondon,

Pl n Al x n r x r Th e r a a a a . O 1 886 : . C . Bigg Ch isti n to ists of e d i fo d , 1 90 h e r r a . O x r 9 . T O igins of Ch isti nity fo d , i 1 86 7 S m Sa ien t b us . A . r : F . Boh en De epte p Bonn ,

l . L 1 1 A H r P n 9 2 . S . r : G . B ett isto y of sycho ogy ondo ,

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P r u Fl . 1 h e Sa r A . a ccus O x r 89 : T 3 . J . Connington ti es of e si s fo d ,

L 1907. L v a r . W . a rra r : F . F i es of the F the s ondon , r r a r New Y r 1 896 P r : H . G . . Fishe isto y of Ch isti n Doct ine , o k , ’ r l r G vo . . L . G . ra z r : Pa u a a f 1 898 . J F e s ni s s Desc iption o eece , V ondon,

r P r u . New Y r 1 L G l r l v : Th e Sa 8 75 . B . . i de s ee e ti es of e si s o k ,

P a r Th e O l m a n a n d P a O New Y r 1 0 ind , y pi ythi n des , o k , 89

Mun H ll 1 1 - i A a l u . 81 a 85 186 3 Goet tl n : . K . W . g bh nd ngen chen e ,

r New Y r 1905 . o m erz : Gr T . T . G p eek hinke s o k ,

L 1 888 . Pla . G . Gr : ote to ondon, — l m r 1 896 . . H l : P u Pla a . a W A . eide se do tonic B ti o e , i r v l r i a e o . . L H z : Pa u sa n a e G a ec . z H . 19 10 it ig Desc iptio , III , pt II eip ig , . l Pl Tr l New Y r : Th e a u a a a . 1 892 B . Jowett Di og es of to ns ted o k , .

a r : Efia t is Del h i cis 1 1 0611 0 0 11 et 11 036 1 0 6 0 v7 011 I S . K sten De p 1 7 7 7 . n Sy mb ola e

i r ri l . 5 7 ff . L t t e a a e vo . II , p l h i H rm L er r n t z :Da s E z u . 190 1 0 . a c a . 4 1 1 g De p e es XXXVI ( ) pp H.

l . L 1 M r : T r a r uv a 880 . E . a S . B yo hi teen ti es of J en ondon, T h T m l A ll a l hi H M l : e t . ur l . . a H ll u J idd eton e p e of po o De p Jo n of e enic St dies ,

l 2 . vo . . 28 ff IX , p R l Pl L ur u a . L R L . l : o n . N 1 906 ett eship ect es the ep b ic of to ondon , . R h er : u u E z u l un H . osc d W . Die Bede t ng des De phi die fib rigen mag n um

u l LI . 1 A ca. 2 e P l u X . Np hi o og s , pp fl

N u r z ur u tu l hi a E . H rm e e Beit ge De ng des De p schen e es XXXVI , 4 70 pp . H. Weiteres uber die Bedeutung des E z u Delphi un d die iib rig en

0 1 1 P l l u LX 0 7 a. 7 p 1 1 hi o og s , pp . 8 1 H.

. E . Sa : Th e R r Ar l a mm a r E M J ndys heto ic of istot e with Co ent y by . . Cope . m 7 a r 1 8 7 . C b idg e ,

. E r l rl L m : de Al r vo . . 1 8 2 G 8 . Sch idt thik ten iechen, II Be in,

. ul z : S ru ch e der l Sa ul . P l l u V . 193 F Sch t Die p de phischen e hi o og s XXI , pp 5 . ’ P r Th e U Pl T . 19 . S . a u a 03 . ho ey nity of to s ho ght Chic go , l ’ Ph . l Ar ma . A . . vo A . 1 . 5 4 E istot e s De ni J of XXII , pp . l G . St a b a Pl i r L 1 85 8 . u m : a t on s O m a O a . ni pe ondon , H . 0 . T a l r A Y r 0 : 19 0 . al . New y o ncient Ide s o k ,

- T . Wh a r Th e : Pl . m r Neo a a 190 1 . itt ke tonists C b idge ,

E . Z ll r : P l L er r 1 2 . d G . z 89 e e Die hi osophie iechen eip ig ,

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