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FM 3-100/MCWP 3-3.7.1 Nuclear weapons cause casualties through blast, heat, posture. If the enemy uses NBC weapons, an and radiation effects. They restrict terrain by effective NBC defense program gives our forces an blowing down trees and buildings, starting fires, or advantage in operational tempo. This advantage cratering. They may cause radiological causes the enemy to cease NBC warfare or continue contamination over a large area. Biological and the conflict on unfavorable terms. chemical weapons cause serious injury or death At the tactical level of war NBC defense enables the through toxic properties. They may contaminate force to survive, fight, and win under NBC terrain and equipment. Effectiveness is degraded conditions. Commanders reduce the likelihood of when troops don cumbersome protective clothing and NBC attack through avoidance measures. They equipment when operating in a toxic environment. disperse their forces and ensure operations and NBC defense is a balance of three principles— communications security; harden positions to reduce avoidance, protection, and decontamination-- the impact of an NBC attack; detect and mark defend against the effects of nuclear, biological, or contamination; and control the spread of chemical weapons. contamination. When units cannot avoid contamination or are in danger of an enemy NBC THEATER STRATEGIC, attack, they implement NBC protective measures. Protective measures for biological and chemical OPERATIONAL, AND hazards, including protective mask and clothing, TACTICAL LEVELS OF WAR At theater strategic and operational level NBC defense combines US nuclear and conventional precision-strike capability to provide our deterrent 4-0 FM 3-100/MCWP 3-3.7.1 normally degrade force effectiveness and erode Based on the unit situation (static position or moving combat power. To restore combat power cross-country) and the chances of encountering commanders decontaminate as early as possible. contamination, assessments are made as to the impact Immediate decon supports individual survival. of contamination. Degradation of unit effectiveness Operational decon allows temporary reduction of for various friendly courses of action is determined, protective posture. Thorough decon allows the unit and critical tasks are identified (for example, use of to significantly reduce protective posture. Thorough alarms, contamination marking, reporting, recon). decon can be used as a part of unit reconstitution to Protective equipment needs are also determined based reduce contamination hazards to negligible levels. on risk assessment. Determinations are made as to what equipment and AVOIDANCE supplies are needed; when resupply is needed; and where supplies are packed (for example, rucksack Avoiding NBC attacks and hazards is the key to NBC close for emergency use or in a resupply bundle). defense. If forces avoid detection, they are less likely to be targeted for attack. Therefore they will not need to apply protection and decon. Although Passive Avoidance Measures avoidance will not always be possible, all forces seek Passive avoidance measures are those that a unit takes ways to reduce the chances of being contaminated. regardless of the status of NBC warfare. Good Avoiding contamination involves bypassing military tactics dictate many practices that will reduce contaminated areas as well as avoiding detection by the impact of enemy NBC or conventional attacks. the enemy. The use of PSYOP can assist in Good training, improved positions, and dispersed avoidance of NBC attacks by targeting enemy forces are particularly effective in reducing the decision-makers and public opinion with the objective chances of an NBC attack and reducing casualties if of preventing NBC attacks. FMs 3-3 and 3-3-1 an attack does occur. provides detailed guidance on conducting contamination avoidance procedures. Training NBC contamination avoidance is absolutely critical, Confusion, stress, and ever-present battlefield danger especially for light forces. To answer NBC defense place a heavy burden on soldiers’ endurance, questions, leaders conduct risk assessments to courage, and will to win. Unit commanders improve determine what protective measures will be directed. readiness and combat performance by providing See FM 3-4 for detailed information on conducting soldiers with realistic integrated training. They risk assessments. ensure that soldiers know how to protect themselves During risk assessment, consult area studies and the from NBC hazards. most recent intelligence summaries to determine enemy NBC capabilities. Assessments provide Camouflage and estimates and reports of any previous use, Enemy Concealment NBC doctrine(if any), where agents would likely be Friendly units use measures to counter sophisticated used (for example, ambush sites, airfields, troop enemy intelligence equipment used for infrared concentrations), and the types of NBC weapons scanning, TV viewing, night vision, radio enemy forces could use. How environment (for interception, and direction-finding. Good OPSEC, example, desert, cold weather) impacts units and communications security, and electronic security NBC weapons is also reviewed. See FMs 3-6 and protect the unit. Friendly forces use all forms of 3-9 for detailed information on the characteristics and natural concealment as well as camouflage and field behavior of NBC agents in different smoke. Avoiding detection becomes a state of mind. environments. Friendly forces actively practice camouflage, noise, Decision points are identified for implementation of light, litter, and communications discipline to avoid the NBC defense plan. Decision points can include detection and targeting. elements relating to when and where to don MOPP, MOPP level, when and where automatic masking Hardened Positions applies, or who does NBC recon of key templated Units continually harden and improve fighting areas. Decision points can be tied to events such as positions to increase cover and protection. Recon named areas of interest (NAI), timelines, or key events. locates ready-made, hardened shelters, culverts, 4-1 FM 3-100/MCWP 3-3.7.1 tunnels, overpasses, caves, or built-up areas. Active Avoidance Measures Obscurants screen the hardening of shelters and Active avoidance measures are those taken engineer preparation of battle positions. When using specifically to avoid, control, or mitigate NBC obscurants to screen preparation of battle positions hazards. ensure that you do not actually tip off the enemy about your defense. Use a deception plan with multiple obscured areas to help conceal the friendly Contamination effort. Detection Commanders need information about contamination Dispersion hazards and locations of clean areas. They gain this Friendly forces frequently require considerable space information through the NBC warning and reporting for dispersing and maneuvering. Dispersion protects system and their own NBC recon effort. As they the force and makes its intentions unclear to the collect data, they foward it to higher headquarters to enemy. Friendly forces continually analyze the help form the overall NBC picture. If higher effects of enemy nuclear and chemical weapons. headquarters requires additional information, they They attempt to avoid positions that can be isolated direct detailed surveys. by the obstacles created by these weapons. There is range of detecting and identifying devices FM 101-31-2 contains guidance to determine how and kits to assist the commander in detecting and much a unit should disperse to limit the impact of a identifying chemical hazards on the battlefield. The nuclear attack. Dispersion decreases the probability range of devices and kits begins at the individual of a single nuclear or chemical attack destroying the soldier with detector paper and runs through corps entire force. Dispersion is also a countermeasure to and division with the M93 NBCRS (Fox). A typical enemy obscurants. However, dispersion may company-sized organization is equipped with the increase the risk that the force may be defeated by automatic chemical alarms, chemical agent monitors, conventional weapon systems and maneuver forces. chemical agent detector kits, and detector paper. Many combat service support units, especially in the Table 3-1 provides an overview of the capabilities of communications zone (COMMZ), do not have the each device or kit. NBC recon units are equipped capability to disperse. Activities such as combat with sophisticated detection and identification equipment centers (CECs), Army depots, and area equipment. support groups (ASGs) prepare for fixed site NBC defense (see FM 3-4-1). Table 3-1. Chemical detection and identification equipment I I 4-2 FM 3-100/MCWP 3-3.7.1 Reconnaissance. NBC recon is a multi-echelon hazards across a wide area, a unit may direct a zone process that begins at the national level and ranges recon. This action can provide information down to alert watchfulness of each soldier. concerning routes, obstacles (including chemical or Tactically, NBC recon is conducted as a routine part radiological contamination), terrain, and enemy of conventional combat operations. Recon elements forces within a zone prescribed by a boundary. check for contamination in addition to looking for Commanders assign this mission when the enemy enemy activity. Units check relatively small areas situation is in doubt or when they need information and routes of immediate interest to unit commanders. concerning cross-country trafficability. When commanders need additional information
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