A Psychohistorical Study of Leopold III and Belgian Neutrality Author(S): Rudolph Binion Source: History and Theory, Vol
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Wesleyan University Repeat Performance: A Psychohistorical Study of Leopold III and Belgian Neutrality Author(s): Rudolph Binion Source: History and Theory, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1969), pp. 213-259 Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2504324 Accessed: 06-04-2016 01:31 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Wesleyan University, Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History and Theory This content downloaded from 147.9.69.210 on Wed, 06 Apr 2016 01:31:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms REPEAT PERFORMANCE: A PSYCHOHISTORICAL STUDY OF LEOPOLD III AND BELGIAN NEUTRALITY RUDOLPH BINION The neutrality proclaimed by Belgium in 1936 and guaranteed by Belgium's big neighbors in 1937 was a precondition for Nazi Germany's bloodless, then bloody, victories of 1938-1940. For neutral Belgium shielded Germany against a prospective French invasion, in that the French high command regarded the Rhineland bordering Belgium as vulnerable, but was pessimistic about assaulting Germany's fortified French frontier. The upshot was that Hitler conquered Czechoslovakia without a battle and that the German armies subjugated Poland, then Denmark and Norway, while fighting only a "phony war" in their rear. Meanwhile the French, having undertaken to defend Bel- gium, could not very well entrench themselves Maginot-style along their Belgian frontier. But neither could the French and British meet a German offensive through Belgium to good advantage if called in only after it was already underway; they failed catastrophically in May 1940. In short, Bel- gium's neutrality of 1936-1940 played entirely and perhaps decisively into Hitler's hands. The moving spirit behind Belgium's neutrality of 1936-1940 was King Leo- pold III. Born on November 3, 1901, Leopold was the first child of Prince Albert of Belgium, who ascended the throne in 1909 as Albert I. Albert was a dedicated monarch who, as commander in chief of Belgium's armed forces during World War I, came to symbolize his people's valiant resistance to the German invader. Prince Leopold was schooled first by a private preceptor, then at Eton from 1915 until the last months of World War I. These he spent as a foot soldier in the front lines - the youngest volunteer in the Belgian army. During the postwar years he received some special university instruc- tion, then attended the colee Militaire. He also traveled far and wide, partic- ularly in the Belgian Congo. He cultivated an interest in colonial problems, to which he addressed himself in a progressive spirit. But he was most at his ease golfing or, like his father, mountain climbing. In 1926 he courted and This content downloaded from 147.9.69.210 on Wed, 06 Apr 2016 01:31:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 214 RUDOLPH BINION married Princess Astrid of Sweden, who bore him three children over the next eight years. Leopold was recalled to Brussels with Astrid from a Swiss mountain resort early on February 18, 1934, to succeed his father, whose mutilated body had just been found, in Alpinist's apparel, beneath a chalk crag at Marche-les- Dames outside Namur. Some eighteen months later - on the morning of August 29, 1935 - an open roadster driven by Leopold, in Alpinist's apparel, with Astrid beside him and his chauffeur in the rumble seat, accidentally veered off the road just outside the Swiss village of Kiissnacht near Lucerne and coasted uncontrollably down the bank of the lake. Leopold and the chauffeur escaped serious injury, but Astrid, projected head-on against a tree part way down, succumbed a few minutes later in Leopold's arms. Leopold's shock at Albert's ghastly death was as nothing compared with his shock at Astrid's. And Astrid's affected the whole Belgian nation as grievously as did Albert's, for Flemings and Walloons alike idolized the gracious and beautiful queen. Beyond his regular duties, Albert's successor at first occupied himself with the Congo only. But in the latter 1930's he took extraordinary initiatives along three lines. First: on October 14, 1936, he induced a responsive Council of Ministers to adopt a policy of armed neutrality for Belgium in the face of the growing German menace' - a policy applied thereafter under his strict personal surveillance. Next: beginning in 1937 he pushed for a voluntary inter- national redistribution of raw materials so as to remove - in his words - "the basic cause of war."2 Finally: early in 1939, after a series of domestic cabinet crises, he thrice called upon Belgian political leaders to mend their ways so as to restore governmental authority. These endeavors concerning raw ma- terials and cabinet crises proceeded from the same concern as the policy of armed neutrality: the concern lest Belgium succumb to a new European war. And only on behalf of the neutrality policy did Leopold clearly exceed the prerogatives of a constitutional monarch such as Albert had been.3 A conflict of authority between the crown and the government, latent 1. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers (for the years 1936-1940 [Washington, 1953-1959]): this reference: 1936 I, 367, passage beginning: "The King's procedure was very unusual." This source will hereafter be referred to as FRUS. 2. Quoted by P-mile Cammaerts, The Keystone of Europe. History of the Belgian Dynasty 1830-1939 (London, 1939), 354. 3. In fact, apart from his "personal role" in the neutrality policy and (beginning on 4 September 1939) as commander in chief, Leopold would never "closely follow the principal affairs of state, receive the ministers, inquire, admonish, rectify," as a consti- tutional monarch should: Hubert Pierlot, twelve articles in Le Soir (a Brussels daily), 5-19 July 1947, reprinted in Rapport de la Commission d'information institute par S. M. le Roi Leopold III le 14 juillet 1946 et note complehmentaire, to which my page references pertain (Luxembourg, 1947), 52, 53. These sources hereafter referred to, respectively, as Pierlot and as Rapport or Rapport, note comple'mentaire. This content downloaded from 147.9.69.210 on Wed, 06 Apr 2016 01:31:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms LEOPOLD III AND BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 215 throughout the prewar period and imminent in the first months of World War II, came to a head in the eighteen days of 1940, May 10-28, during which the German armies overran Belgium. The decisive day was May 25. Early that morning a deputation of the unanimous Council of Ministers including the Catholic Hubert Pierlot, wartime Prime Minister, and the Socialist Paul Henri Spaak, perennial Foreign Minister, sought out Leopold at Wynendael castle near Bruges and urged him to continue the war from abroad with his govern- ment rather than allow himself to be taken prisoner. Leopold refused; as com- mander in chief he meant to share the fate of his army, he explained, and as King he meant to share the fate of his people. The ministers left without him for Paris, where their colleagues were waiting. The following evening Leopold had a request telephoned to Paris for some - any - minister to sign blank decrees authorizing him to dismiss the incumbent government and appoint a new one should Hitler's armistice terms permit.4 No minister would oblige him. Besides, Hitler would concede no terms: he exacted an unconditional surrender. The government thereupon unanimously declared that the King, being "under the power of the invader," was, by the terms of the Belgian con- stitution, "incapable of reigning,"5 and at Limoges three days later a rump Belgian parliament specified that his incapacity to reign was both "legal and moral." Leopold, confined to his castle at Laeken outside Brussels, declared to the same effect: "So long as I am a prisoner I shall abstain from all po- litical activity."7 He maintained this position against his ministers themselves when, beginning on June 18, they sought to renew contact with him so that Belgium might conclude an armistice along with France.8 They also moved to negotiate an armistice without him,9 but the enemy would not recognize "the former Pierlot government" beyond forbidding its members to return to Belgium.'0 Once they almost left for England, and once they actually left for Algeria only to turn back the same day." However, the Colonial Minister, with full power over the Congo,'2 did reach London alone. He was followed 4. Contribution ca 1'etude de la question royale. tve'nements-docurments. Ed. Groupe- ment National Belge in collaboration with the Centrale Belge de Documentation. 2 vols.; paginated consecutively (Brussels, [1948]), 156 (Spaak at Limoges-also available in Rapport, Annexe 34), 170 (de Man memoir 1945); Henri de Man, Cavalier seul. 45 annees de socialisme europeen (Geneva, 1948), 233, 236-237. 5. Contribution, 149 ("dans l'impossibilite de regner"). 6. Ibid., 166. 7. Rapport, Annexe 53 (29 May 1940); see further Contribution, 191-192 (1, 4, 5, 6 June 1940). Three jurists consulted by him concurred: "A prisoner of war, the King is temporarily incapable of reigning" Contribution, 168 (30 May 1940). 8. To this end they were prepared to resign: Contribution, 203; Rapport, Annexes 85-88, 92.