THE AMERICAN NEOCONSERVATIVE DEFENSE PLATFORM
ROBERT W. LOTHMAN
Intern
July 11, 2011
INTRODUCTION
This report is a summary of the defense platform which current neoconservative American political leaders and organizations have espoused. The contents of this report include an examination of the views of a mix of prominent neoconservative politicians, journalists, lobbyists, and ideologues with regard to such issues as the national security of the United States of America, international security, missile defense, the U.S. defense budget, nonproliferation, and U.S.-Russia relations. Additionally, this report summarizes the policy positions of several influential neoconservative think tanks and political organizations, which exert a substantial influence on the base of neoconservative political supporters, as well as on mainstream conservative politicians.
The term “neoconservative,” as it is employed in this report, refers to an ideological branch of the Republican Party in the United States, which favors, among other things, the strengthening of U.S. military force as a means of protecting democracy throughout the world (and especially in America). Though neoconservatives hold particular views on a plethora of issues, both domestic and international, this report shall focus primarily upon neoconservative views with regard to national defense, international affairs, and military action. The militaristic views of neoconservatives are often thought to be their primary distinguishing feature, and the official definition of a neoconservative in the Merriam-Webster dictionary reads: “a conservative who advocates the assertive promotion of democracy and United States national interest in international affairs including through military means.”1
Insofar as this report discusses international relations, it will focus exclusively on the neoconservative stance regarding U.S.-Russia relations. Specific topics of U.S.-Russia relations that this report will address include neoconservative opinions on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), U.S. missile defenses, nonproliferation in general, Russia’s position in the world arena, and Russia’s potential to threaten the United States, U.S. allies, and U.S. interests throughout the world.
1 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Merriam-Webster. Web.
1 This report will analyze not only the policy stances of each leader, but also his current level of influence with fellow neoconservatives.
In terms of format, this report will delve into the views held by each included neoconservative leader, think tank, or political organization in order, before summarizing the aggregate views of the neoconservative bloc and, finally, comparing these views to those held by the Obama administration.
ROBERT KAGAN
Robert Kagan is a neoconservative journalist and ideologue who fills roles as a columnist for The Washington Post, a senior fellow at Brookings Institute, and a cofounder and director of the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI—a neoconservative think tank). Kagan formerly occupied a position as a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and he was active in other neoconservative organizations, such as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), of which he was a cofounder.
With regard to U.S.-Russia relations, Kagan takes a very cautious approach. Kagan is a critic of the Obama administration’s “reset” policy, though he does believe that the policy has led to notable advances in U.S.-Russia relations—namely an increase in dialogue between Washington and Moscow, as well as the strengthening of President Dmitry Medvedev’s position in the Kremlin. However, Kagan believes that U.S.- Russia relations are primed to go sour within the next few years, as contentious issues, such as missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, and the Russian occupation of Georgia, rise to the forefront of relations between the two nations. Kagan is extremely wary of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and he is critical of any policy which would build up Putin’s power. While Kagan views Medvedev with a degree of suspicion as well, he believes strongly that Medvedev is preferable to Putin, as far as the United States is concerned, because he is more amenable to negotiation. Kagan is a general critic of Obama, yet he wishes for Obama to be viewed, in the international arena, as a powerful, capable, and respectable individual, who will uphold American ideals and advocate for the interests of the United States throughout the world.
In contrast to many neoconservative leaders, Kagan actively supported the ratification of the New START treaty. Kagan believes that the treaty poses no threat to deterrence, due to its call for very modest reductions in arms. Furthermore, Kagan believes the administration’s claims (supported by various experts in the field) that the treaty will not limit U.S. missile defenses. Kagan believes that “there is little doubt that its negotiations improved the mood of relations between Moscow and Washington,” and that “successful cooperation with Russia on one front has allowed it to press Russia harder on others”2 (such as human rights). Finally, Kagan supports the treaty, because he believes that it will lend power to Medvedev, and he views any step toward keeping Putin out of the presidency as progress. Kagan even argues against Republicans seeking to kill the treaty by claiming that failure to ratify the treaty “will strengthen
2 Kagan, Robert. "New START: Too Modest to Merit Partisan Bickering." Editorial. The Washington Post [Washington, D.C.] 30 July 2010, World sec. The Washington Post: National, World & D.C. Area News and Headlines - The Washington Post. Web.
2 Vladimir Putin.”3 Despite Kagan’s support for the treaty, he also discusses its weaknesses: “the treaty has its problems—in verification, where the Russians seem never to be entirely trustworthy, as well as in counting mechanisms.”4 Additionally, Kagan is skeptical of the amount of credit given to Obama for putting together this treaty, because of the treaty’s modest goals. However, the shortcomings of the treaty were not enough, in Kagan’s mind, to deter him from supporting its ratification— “New START, whatever its flaws, is not a threat to U.S. security.”5
Aside from supporting the New START treaty, Kagan seldom distances himself from the primary views of mainstream neo-conservatism. Kagan is a staunch supporter of missile defense and the expansion of U.S. defense spending in general, and he places a great deal of emphasis upon the United States’ ability to improve its national security and its influence throughout the world.
DAN SENOR
Dan Senor is an investment banker with Rosemont Capital and a cofounder and director of the Foreign Policy Initiative. Previously, Senor served as the chief spokesperson for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq.
Senor’s expertise lies primarily in the realm of Middle Eastern studies. He writes frequently on topics concerning Iraq, Iran, and Israel and their relations with other countries in the region, the United States, and the rest of the world. Rarely does Senor write on aspects of U.S.-Russia relations, and rarely does he address U.S. defense concerns as they relate to any region outside of the Middle East. It is safe to say that Senor would favor any action by the United States or Russia which would help to limit the ability of Iran to develop its nuclear systems, but his lack of written materials dealing with Russia eliminate the ability to speculate further on his views regarding the region.
PAUL WOLFOWITZ
Paul Wolfowitz is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (a conservative think tank), as well as the chairman of the State Department International Security Advisory Board. Wolfowitz formerly served as the president of the World Bank, in the Defense Department, and in the State Department (in a variety of positions, including as an ambassador).
Wolfowitz’s areas of expertise include economic development, finance, Iraq, Africa, and U.S. foreign policy. When he served in the Defense Department under President George H.W. Bush, Wolfowitz backed plans formulated by then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to hasten the demise of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, though these plans were rejected by Bush himself. In 1992, Wolfowitz authored a policy proposal that called for the expansion of U.S. military and diplomatic power
3 Kagan, Robert. "Why Senate Republicans Should Pass the New START Treaty." Editorial. The Washington Post [Washington, D.C.] 12 Nov. 2010, World sec. The Washington Post: National, World & D.C. Area News and Headlines - The Washington Post. Web.
3 throughout the world as a means of supporting U.S. interests abroad. This report called for the preemptive use of military force to protect particular interests, including Persian Gulf oil, nonproliferation, and anti-terrorism efforts.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Wolfowitz has been quiet on issues of U.S.-Russia relations. It may be possible to infer that his views maintain the neoconservative line, because of his record of supporting a neoconservative stance on foreign policy issues, but no definitive characterization of his current views on Russia can be formulated.
RICHARD CHENEY
Richard “Dick” Cheney was formerly a Republican congressman, the chief of staff for President Gerald Ford, the secretary of defense for President George H.W. Bush, vice- president to President George W. Bush, president and chief executive officer of Halliburton, Inc. (a large defense contractor), and a cofounder of Project for the New American Century.
During his time in the administration of President George H.W. Bush, Cheney promoted policies intended to hasten the demise of the Soviet Union, though these policies were rejected by President Bush. Since the collapse of the USSR, Cheney has taken a more muted stance with regard to Russia. During Cheney’s time as vice- president, he expressed concern over Russia’s energy dominance in Europe— specifically its control over the supplies of oil and gas to Western Europe. Cheney is known to have advocated the development of a competing pipeline to Western Europe from more Western-friendly sources of energy in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Furthermore, Cheney was very outspoken about the Russian invasion and occupation of Georgia in 2008, and his office released this statement in response: “Russian aggression must not go unanswered, and [its] continuation would have serious consequences for its relations with the United States, as well as the broader international community.”6 In a later speech, Cheney reaffirmed his position by referring to Russia’s action as “an illegitimate, unilateral attempt to change [Georgia]’s borders by force that has been universally condemned by the free world.”7 Though there is little solid support for this claim, many sources believe that Cheney advocated for military action against Russia as a result of the invasion.
In recent years, since the end of the Bush administration, Cheney has remained quiet on U.S.-Russia relations, though, presumably, his views have not changed. It is safe to speculate that Cheney continues to view Russia, and especially Putin, warily, as a potential competitor to the United States, but it is impossible to know the details of his current views, because he has stayed out of the media since he left office.
Cheney’s views on missile defense are much easier to uncover than his views on Russia, as missile defense has maintained a consistent presence at the top of his agenda
6 Spetalnick, Matt. "Cheney: Russian Aggression Must Not Go Unanswered | Reuters." Reuters.com. 10 Aug. 2008. Web.
4 since the late 1980s. While serving as secretary of defense to the first President Bush, Cheney quickly espoused plans to develop a comprehensive missile defense system for the United States (an idea first proposed during the Reagan administration). Cheney’s advocacy for such a system continued into his time in the administration of the second President Bush, and he continues to support missile defense today, after he has left the administration. It is almost certain that Cheney’s early and prolonged calls for missile defense have been important in the development of the neoconservative bent toward the development of missile defense systems.
Despite his long and influential career in politics, Cheney’s run as an active member of the U.S. government is likely over, as his age and a number of health conditions have limited his activities. Though Cheney was an influential member of the neoconservative community for several decades, and though he may continue to possess a degree of influence within neoconservative circles, it is safe to speculate that his influence is waning. A poor public image, aided by Cheney’s role in pushing for the Iraq War and his advocacy of the use of torture to glean information from captive terrorists, has ensured that Cheney will never again be the face of a political movement, and neoconservatives will not advertise Cheney as one of them, despite any personal esteem they may hold for him. Any influence that Cheney will wield in the future is likely to be exercised behind the scenes, and it will certainly not compare to the influence he exerted in the past.
DONALD RUMSFELD
Donald Rumsfeld is a former U.S. secretary of defense (twice over—under Presidents Ford and Bush), a former U.S. congressman, a former fellow at the Hoover Institution, and a cofounder of the Project for the New American Century.
Rumsfeld takes a more favorable view of Russia than do many prominent neoconservative leaders. According to Rumsfeld, “neither the United States and its allies nor Russia view our strategic relationship as adversarial.”8 Furthermore, Rumsfeld claimed that he “would be perfectly comfortable” allowing the Russians to “have a good many more [tactical nuclear weapons] than we have.”9 Though Rumsfeld was almost certainly wary of Russia as a potential competitor to the United States, his official policy stances never adopted open hostility toward Russia, but rather were fringed with respect and a desire to cooperate. However, Rumsfeld’s apparently cooperative stance on Russia did not prevent him from opposing the New START treaty. When a bipartisan group of former U.S. Secretaries of Defense joined together to author a position paper advocating for the ratification of the New START treaty, Rumsfeld declined to throw in his lot. Despite his opposition to the treaty, Rumsfeld seems, by all accounts, to be open to working with Russia on many issues.
Rumsfeld’s stance on missile defense, however, is unambiguous—he is, and always has been, a major proponent of a U.S. missile defense system. In 1975, Rumsfeld
8 Isaacs, John. "Rebuttals to Additional Arguments Against “New START”." Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. 6 May 2009. Web.
5 initiated the first attempt by the United States to create something to the effect of a missile defense system. Though the system failed, Rumsfeld maintained his support for the concept of missile defense. When Rumsfeld returned to the administration as secretary of defense under the second President Bush in 2000, he continued to push for more developments in U.S. missile defense. Though the extent of Rumsfeld’s lobbying with President Bush cannot be known, it is reasonable to speculate that his influence on the president was vital in forming the president’s elaborate missile defense plan, unveiled shortly after he entered office.
Though Rumsfeld was a major player in neoconservative politics for several decades, it is reasonable to conclude that his influence is severely reduced from what it once was. Rumsfeld left his post as secretary of defense in shame in 2006, resigning in the midst of an ailing war effort in Iraq and a number of prisoner abuse scandals. Much of the blame for the United States’ inadequate preparations for the Iraq War fell upon Rumsfeld, and that blame lingers into the present day. However, Rumsfeld has made a mild resurgence into the public sphere in the wake of the release of his book in 2011. The book, in which Rumsfeld discusses his various roles in the U.S. government, was a bestseller, and Rumsfeld began to appear on news programs with some regularity. This resurgence will likely be short-lived, however, as Rumsfeld is 78 years old, retired from the political sphere, and retains a certain stigma in the eyes of the American public. For these same reasons, it is safe to assume that Rumsfeld will not take up a position as an influential leader among American neoconservatives.
WILLIAM KRISTOL
William “Bill” Kristol is the founder and editor of The Weekly Standard, a neoconservative publication, a cofounder of the Foreign Policy Initiative, and a cofounder of the Project for the New American Century. Kristol often appears on television news programs, especially on Fox News, and his ideas are frequently published in a variety of American news publications.
Most of Kristol’s writing focuses on domestic politics in the United States. Though Kristol writes not infrequently about foreign policy issues, as well, he spends most of his time commenting upon U.S. actions in the Middle East and issues relating to Israel, for whom Kristol is a major advocate. Kristol rarely writes about or comments on U.S.-Russia relations. With regard to New START, Kristol claimed to be “mildly against the treaty,”10 citing worries about the link between offensive and defensive weapons established in the treaty’s preamble. Kristol worries that the United States will not be able to build up a strong missile defense system if the treaty’s language concedes that such a system would affect deterrence between the United States and Russia. However, Kristol did not take a strong stance on the issue, and the character of his broader views on Russia cannot be inferred from his comments on the treaty.
Though Kristol’s support of a U.S. missile defense system is clear from his commentary on the New START treaty, he writes very little on the subject. There is no reason to believe that Kristol departs from the standard neoconservative line that
10 "FPI Director William Kristol Discusses New START on Special Report W/Bret Baier." Foreign Policy Initiative. 22 Dec. 2010. Web.
6 missile defense is integral to America’s safety in the future, but the level of weight Kristol places on such a system cannot be determined from anything he has said or written on the subject.
Kristol is certainly a very prominent leader among modern neoconservatives, and he might even be said to be the voice of that particular ideology, as he edits its most prominent publication. Kristol, it seems, has no desire to engage in politics firsthand, but he wields a great deal of influence by appearing frequently on national media outlets to speak in support of the neoconservative position on many policies. Furthermore, Kristol is one of four directors of the Foreign Policy Initiative, so his opinion carries weight with the politicians who turn to the FPI to supply them with information.
CHRISTIAN WHITON
Christian Whiton is a principal at D.C. International Advisory, as well as a former employee of the U.S. State Department (from 2003-2009). Whiton makes frequent appearances as an analyst on Fox News programs.
Whiton takes an extreme position on U.S.-Russia relations. In contrast to neoconservative leaders like Kagan and Rumsfeld, who view Russia with wariness, but also seem willing to cooperate, Whiton fosters little trust for Russia, which is evident in references he makes to “Moscow’s rich tradition of cheating on treaties,”11 and to “our authoritarian adversaries”12 in Moscow. Whiton vehemently opposed the New START treaty, claiming that the treaty “will dramatically weaken [U.S.] defenses against nuclear assault.”13 The foremost among Whiton’s contentions was the claim that the treaty’s ratification would cripple the U.S. missile defense system and leave the country open to attack from adversarial nations (particularly Iran and North Korea) and terrorist organizations. Rather than limiting nuclear weapons, Whiton believes that the United States should improve its nuclear arsenal, and that such actions would be a better means of deterrence. In addition to opposing New START, Whiton habitually offers up criticism of the Obama administration, as he believes Obama’s “reset” policy with Russia has been a failure.
Whiton appears to be more of a talking head than an actual political force. While he does receive substantial airtime from Fox News, he gets little attention from other news sources, even those that embrace a notably neoconservative viewpoint. Perhaps Whiton’s views receive attention from the neoconservative public, but there is no evidence that he carries much weight with established neoconservative leaders, such as Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan, with whom his opinions are occasionally at odds.
JOHN MCCAIN
11 Whiton, Christian. "Why Obama and Kim Jong Il Love START." FoxNews.com. 22 Nov. 2010. Web.
7 John McCain is a Republican senator from Arizona, chair of the International Republican Institute, and a former presidential candidate (twice over). McCain is also a veteran, having served for over 20 years in the U.S. Navy.
Senator McCain professes to be an expert on U.S. military strategy, citing his experience in the armed forces. He frequently spoke of his experience in military matters during his failed 2008 presidential campaign against Barack Obama. McCain supported the Iraq War and the War on Terror, and he is very pro-Israel.
With regard to Russia, McCain is worried about Russia’s willingness to engage with the United States, especially concerning human rights issues. McCain sees Russia’s scarred human rights record unfavorably, and he wants the United States to put pressure on Russia to improve that record. McCain is fairly critical of U.S.-Russia relations under President Obama. Furthermore, McCain’s stance on the New START treaty was somewhat ambiguous—at first, he opposed the treaty, but he came to support it in early November, 2010, before once again expressing concerns about the treaty in December, 2010 (though these concerns were milder the second time around). McCain echoed concerns voiced by Senator Jon Kyl, who used Republican opposition to the treaty as a bargaining chip to procure a promise from the Obama administration to invest in the modernization of the United States’ current nuclear arsenal. Late in the ratification process, McCain attempted to introduce an amendment to the treaty, which would have removed from the treaty’s preamble language linking offensive and defensive weapons, but this attempt failed. McCain based his attempt to revise the treaty on “concerns about how the Russian Federation could use this Treaty as a de facto veto against U.S. missile defense systems.”14 In November, McCain is on the record saying, “I believe that we could move forward with the START treaty and satisfy Sen. Kyl's concerns and mine about missile defense and others,”15 before he began calling for changes in the treaty’s wording.
McCain’s stance on missile defense is much less ambiguous than is his stance on the New START treaty—he is a staunch supporter of missile defense. In an address McCain made on the Senate floor during the ratification process for the New START treaty, McCain claims that “the Russians have always understood that U.S. missile defenses would be superior to any defensive system the Russian Federation, and the Soviet Union before it, could ever deploy.”16 McCain’s pride in the U.S. missile defense system comes from his belief that such a system will be an integral component of the U.S. defense system, which will ultimately save the lives of American citizens by preventing missile attacks from hostile countries and terrorist organizations. U.S. national security has always been one of the pillars of McCain’s political platform, so he naturally places a great deal of emphasis upon any defense system that offers great potential for the maintenance of U.S. national security.
14U.S. Senate. Senator John McCain. Floor Statement by Senator John McCain on Missile Defense and the New START Treaty. Senate.gov, 17 Dec. 2010. Web.
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Though McCain still maintains a great deal of seniority and influence within the Senate (he is the ranking Republican member of the Senate Armed Services Committee), his influence has waned in recent years, as a result of his failed presidential campaign in 2008 and his increasing age (McCain is 74 years old). In addition, McCain has never really been considered a neoconservative, aside from his advocacy of hawkish military policies. Undoubtedly, McCain’s opinions carry some weight with the like-minded neoconservative elite, but he is not a typical neoconservative leader, and he is unlikely to espouse neoconservative positions on issues beyond security and the military. Furthermore, McCain’s political power is likely to continue to decrease in the coming years as he grows older.
ELLIOTT ABRAMS
Eliott Abrams is a senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, a cofounder of PNAC, and a former member of the National Security Council (2001-2009).
Abrams’ expertise lies, almost exclusively, in the area of Middle East studies. As a member of the National Security Council tasked with advising President George W. Bush on foreign policy and matters of U.S. national security, Abrams continually pushed for U.S. intervention in the Middle East as a part of the War on Terror. Furthermore, Abrams has constantly voiced his support for any action that hints at introducing democracy into the Middle East, though he is not known to support peaceful negotiations aimed at this goal. Israel and Iran both come up frequently in Abrams’ writing, as he is a strong supporter of Israel and a fierce opponent of Iran, which he views as the antithesis to democratic development in the region. Abrams is very critical of the foreign policy espoused by the Obama administration with regard to the Middle East, which he believes is too easy on Iran, too unfavorable to Israel, and too light on intervention.
Abrams says little about Russia, and he is only concerned with Russia’s ability to affect proceedings in the Middle East. Abrams offered no opinions on the New START treaty, though he did critique the Russian government for selling missiles to the Syrian government, which eventually sold them to Hamas. Presumably, Abrams would dislike any action by the Russian government which would lead to favorable results for Iran (and, specifically, its nuclear developments), as he is vehemently opposed to the Iranian nuclear project, but this claim is only speculation. On the direct relationship between Russian and the United States, Abrams remains mute.
Missile defense is an issue dear to Abrams, as well. According to Abrams, “missile defense is a very important thing for [the United States],”17 because the United States encounters real missile threats from hostile nations and organizations. Of more importance to Abrams than long-range missile defense systems are short-range systems designed to defend U.S. interests abroad—especially U.S. military bases in foreign countries. Most of Abrams’ statements in support of U.S. missile defense systems refer to plans to develop short-range missile defense systems in the Middle
17 Keinon, Herb. "Abrams on Obama: He Sees Israel as a Problem to Solve." The Jerusalem Post. 1 July 2011. Web.
9 East, in order to neutralize missile threats against U.S. interests and allies in the region. Abrams believes that the United States is “very good with long-range missile defense systems developed in the days of the USSR,”18 so he concerns himself with the development of short-range systems instead.
Abrams appears to continue to wield a significant amount of influence within neoconservative circles today, as does his wife, Rachel Abrams, who is a like-minded, pro-Israel, neoconservative ideologue. Abrams continues to write frequently on U.S. foreign policy as it relates to the Middle East, but he says little about other aspects of U.S. foreign policy. It is unclear what sort of position Abrams takes on Russia, but it is clear that there are louder neoconservative voices who do take an interest in the region.
CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
Charles Krauthammer is a columnist for The Washington Post, as well as a frequent contributor to news programs on Fox News. The journalist also had a hand in the creation of the PNAC. Krauthammer is widely respected among conservatives and neoconservatives alike, and his voice often sets the tone of neoconservative policy.
Over the past several decades, Krauthammer has been a consistent advocate for interventionist military action as a primary component of U.S. foreign policy. In an article that he wrote for Foreign Affairs magazine in 1990 entitled “The Unipolar Moment,” Krauthammer outlined his vision for U.S. foreign policy in the time following the fall of the Soviet Union from its status as a superpower. Krauthammer proclaimed proudly that the new “center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States,” which is “the one first-rate power” with “no prospect in the immediate future of any power to rival it.”19 Appealing to the United States’ status as the foremost world power, Krauthammer then claimed that “if America wants stability, it will have to create it,” and he called for American intervention to meet “the need to establish some new regime to police [weapons of mass destruction] and those who brandish them.”20 In short, Krauthammer stated his belief that the United States must “unashamedly [lay] down the rules of world order and [be] prepared to enforce them.”21 Krauthammer’s doctrine of the use of economic, diplomatic, political, and military force on the part of the United States to enforce stability is widely regarded as the initial ideological blueprint for many of the foreign policy stances adopted by the United States government throughout the past two decades.
The most crucial element of the post-Cold War era, according to Krauthammer, is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Krauthammer claims that the development of weapons of mass destruction on the international level has led to the creation of “Weapon States,”22 or economically and politically weak states that possess the ability to influence international security and the policies of more powerful states through the threat of attack with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
18 Ibid. 19 Krauthammer, Charles. “The Unipolar Moment.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 70, No. 1, America and the World 1990/91 (1990/1991), pp. 23-33. Published by: Council on Foreign Relations.
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Despite his early recognition of this threat, Krauthammer is critical of disarmament treaties, because he believes that they have no effect upon proliferation in Weapon States. For this reason, Krauthammer vehemently opposed the ratification of the New START treaty, because he perceived no threat from the Russian nuclear stockpile. According to Krauthammer, the Russians “are no longer an existential threat,” and “a nuclear exchange between Washington and Moscow is inconceivable.”23 Nor did Krauthammer see in the treaty any benefit to international security from disarmament. Krauthammer believes that the United States’ nuclear stockpile is its only real means of deterring attack from its enemies, and he does not want the United States to take any actions toward limiting that stockpile.
With regard to U.S.-Russia relations, Krauthammer takes a very hard line against Russia. The journalist desires the expulsion of Russia from the G8, as well as U.S. threats to bar Russia from the World Trade Organization (WTO), if Russia does not comply with U.S. demands. Krauthammer has no patience for Russian action against Georgia, and he supports actions that would pressure the Russian government into withdrawing from the region—thus, withdrawing a claim for dominance in Central Asia, as well. Krauthammer harbors no warm feelings for Putin, especially, and he is likely to support any policy that will lead to a weakening of Putin’s position. Moreover, Krauthammer believes that Russia, under Putin, “has gone from partner to adversary.”24 It seems that Krauthammer’s primary concern, regarding Russia, is its increasing relevance in world affairs in recent years.
The threat of nuclear attack against the United States from hostile nations, such as Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as from hostile militant organizations, such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, has led Krauthammer to adopt a very favorable stance regarding missile defense, which he believes to be the best means of eliminating this threat. Krauthammer supports the expansion of the U.S. missile defense system into Eastern Europe, because he believes that its placement in such a location will provide a missile shield for the United States against attacks launched from the Middle East. Any legislation or treaty that possesses any ability to limit the development of a U.S. missile defense system is likely to find an opponent in Krauthammer.
Krauthammer continues to maintain a large influence in many conservative circles, including that of the neoconservatives. The journalist has authored many neoconservative doctrines during his time as an ideologue, and his opinions are widely disseminated through mainstream media sources. It is likely that Krauthammer will continue to maintain his considerable amount of influence in the years to come, and his writing will likely continue to give voice to neoconservative sentiments.
THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH
23 Krauthammer, Charles. "The Irrelevance of START." The Washington Post. 26 Nov. 2010. Web.
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The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEIPPR, or AEI) is an influential think tank and research center located in the United States. Founded in 1943, AEI boasts a long history, and its research often finds its way into the hands of influential politicians. Though AEI has no official mandate from either major American political party, its research has often been colored by conservative, and even neoconservative, sentiments. However, AEI does house experts from different backgrounds, and not all of its research is written by conservative-minded researchers. Nevertheless, the resources produced by AEI often support neoconservative standpoints, and the public perception of the organization paints it largely as a strictly neoconservative organization, especially on military issues.
AEI’s squad of experts on Russia boasts a litany of neoconservative thinkers: Leon Aron, Frederick Kagan (brother of Robert), Richard Perle, and Gary Schmitt. These writers express generally similar views on both modern U.S.-Russia relations and missile defense, and Perle serves as their primary voice on military matters. Perle & Co. are critical of the New START treaty, because they feel that its shortcomings on a number of issues—verification, the building of political leverage, and the establishment of a U.S. missile defense system—pose a threat to U.S. interests that supersedes the potential gains from the treaty. According to Perle, in an opinion piece he wrote for the AEIPPR, the New START treaty “falls short of those negotiated by President Reagan,” because “it’s verification regime is inadequate,” “it gives the Kremlin an unwarranted influence over the structure of our nuclear deterrent,” and “it will almost certainly limit our freedom to deploy vital defenses against ballistic missiles.”25 Not only does Perle view the New START treaty as inadequate and potentially harmful, but he is also skeptical of nonproliferation, and the goal of “global zero,” in general. Claiming that the goal of a world without nuclear weapons is a manifestation of a naïve and unrealistic quest for utopia, Perle writes that “asserting that the world should forsake nuclear weapons sounds—and is—a lot like declaring that war should be illegal.”26 Perle even believes that the pursuit of this utopian goal “could help bring about the very evils [it] is trying to eliminate.”27 Following the typical neoconservative line, Perle, along with his cohort of AEI brethren, supports the development of a complex U.S. missile defense system, which he views as the best means by which to deter nuclear conflict.
The AEI, though not as outwardly conservative as other notable think tanks that perform a similar function, promotes a firmly neoconservative point of view in its military research. Despite this bent in many of AEI’s publications, the institute does not conceive of itself as a neoconservative organization, and its research, though often colored in neoconservative red, does not aspire to further an exclusively neoconservative platform, though it often ends up doing so. Certainly, the AEI is an influential organization that often aims to influence policymakers to adopt neoconservative viewpoints on military matters, but its commitment to maintaining
25 Perle, Richard, and Ed Meese. "New Start: What Would Reagan Do?" AEI.org. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2 Dec. 2010. Web.
12 itself as an officially nonpartisan entity will keep it from ever becoming an official flag bearer for neoconservative policy.
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
The Heritage Foundation is an openly conservative American think tank that publishes research and lobbies for the adoption of conservative policies in all realms of government. Heritage was founded in 1973, and it has since grown to become the largest conservative think tank in America.
The fleet of Heritage specialists who focus on Russia and Eastern Europe universally adopts a neoconservative military mindset in their research.
The writers at the Heritage Foundation are, first and foremost, extremely suspicious of Russia—especially Putin—and critical of U.S.-Russia relations as they currently stand. Ariel Cohen, Heritage’s leading authority on Russia, referred to President Medvedev as “Prime Minister Putin’s appointed protégé with no political base of his own,” and he asserts that “Putin remains Russia’s ‘national leader’ and the real power behind— and on—the throne.”28 Cohen is extremely wary of Putin, and he believes that the Obama administration made a costly mistake in showing vehement support for Medvedev, which could cost them if (“when,” according to Cohen) Putin returns to power. The United States, Cohen believes, has already made too many concessions to Russia, and Putin’s inevitable return to power will lead to even more demands. Cohen characterizes the entire “reset” policy with Russia designed by the Obama administration as the process of “chasing a mirage,” and he claims that the policy is “in dire need of a reassessment.”29
Furthermore, Heritage opposed the New START treaty, which, according to Cohen, conceded too much to Russia with regard to missile defense, verification, and compliance. Heritage takes the stance that no potential cuts in missile defense are permissible, for any reason, and especially not for a treaty like New START, which they perceive to be inherently flawed. Additionally, Heritage favors U.S. military superiority, so any drawbacks, even in nuclear weapons, are impermissible, as they would decrease the aggregate power wielded by the U.S. armed forces. Heritage supports the idea that military force should be used to build political influence, and it favors a return to a foreign policy ideology similar to Teddy Roosevelt’s famous “Big Stick Diplomacy.”
Heritage is very supportive of U.S. plans to develop an extensive missile defense system, and it has produced its own plan for a comprehensive, multilayered system, which would employ sea, ground, and space components in a shield-like defensive missile system. Advocating for such a missile defense system is one of Heritage’s top priorities with regard to U.S. defense policy.
The Heritage Foundation wields a massive amount of influence in the conservative sphere, and its neoconservative military policies are likely to influence many
28 Cohen, Ariel. "Reset Regret: US Should Rethink Relations with Russia." Heritage.org. The Heritage Foundation, 15 June 2011. Web.
13 Republican congressmen and various other government officials, as well as a large base of their political support, which are sympathetic to such views. Heritage is the standard-bearer of American neoconservative military policy, and its views on foreign policy-related issues are usually representative of the neoconservative standpoint on the whole.
THE FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE
The Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) is a newly created (as of 2009) think tank located in Washington D.C. Though FPI claims to promote a non-partisan outlook, and though it is not officially affiliated with a particular political party or ideological strain, its research tends to reflect the neoconservative viewpoint held by its creators—Dan Senor, Robert Kagan, William Kristol, and Eric Edelman (a like-minded neoconservative ideologue).
FPI’s researchers are highly critical of current U.S.-Russia relations, as well as of the Russian government itself. Robert Kagan, in an FPI report published in The Washington Post, refers to the Russian government as a “corrupt, authoritarian mafia state, led by a president-for-life who crushes all dissent.”30 This perception of Russia as an enemy of democracy pervades FPI’s research. This statement further illustrates the attitude of the FPI toward Putin, whom FPI views as the unchallenged and unchecked possessor of control over the entire Russian government. Furthermore, much of FPI’s research indicates disdain for the foreign policy of the Obama administration with regard to Russia. FPI Executive Director Jamie Fly chastised Obama’s goals, claiming that “the ‘reset’ is based on fundamentally unsound judgments about the type of regime that inhabits the Kremlin.”31 Kagan criticized the Obama administration’s unwillingness to focus “much on Russia’s increasingly authoritarian domestic policies,” and Fly referred to the New START treaty as “meaningless.” Clearly, FPI espouses the same critical perspective on Russia that its neoconservative founders support.
However, FPI’s negative outlook on U.S.-Russia relations did not lead the think tank to oppose the New START treaty. Rather, the research institution embraced Kagan’s views on the treaty, which called for its ratification and denied the validity of Republican concerns about the negative effects the treaty would have on missile defense and U.S.-Russia relations. Though FPI cannot claim full support for the treaty, which it viewed only as a small measure of progress, its backing of the treaty separated it from a number of other similar neoconservative think tanks, suggesting that it is more heavily influenced by the particular views of its leaders than by the tide of popular neoconservative thought.
The support for the treaty came only as a result of the belief that the treaty would have no negative effects on the development of a missile defense system, which FPI, like
30 Kagan, Robert. "Loosening Putin's Grip." The Washington Post. 18 June 2011. Web.
14 other neoconservative institutions, supports wholeheartedly. Fly, in particular, expressed strong concerns about Obama’s plans with regard to missile defense, writing that “fears were heightened when the president's first budget slashed missile defense by $1.4 billion and were amplified when, in September 2009, the president announced his intention to abandon President Bush's plan for missile defense sites in Central Europe to confront the threat posed by Iran's emerging long-range missile capability.”32 These concerns, voiced by FPI’s head official, reveal the emphasis which the organization puts on missile defense as a matter of the utmost importance to U.S. national security.
Though it is relatively new on the scene, FPI has evolved quickly to become a standard bearer for neoconservative foreign policy. The collaboration of four champions of modern neoconservatism has gained credibility in neoconservative circles, because of the influence wielded by its well-known founders. It is hard to tell to what degree FPI develops its own unique policy platform, but the consistent alignment of its views with those of its founders, even where they differ from other well-known neoconservative leaders, suggests that it nearly always adopts the views of its founders. Moreover, the officially non-partisan stance of the organization, as well as its neutral name, suggest that FPI is an attempt by neoconservatives to sell their viewpoints to the American public through a new medium, which is, at first glance, unrecognizable as an organization tinged with a neoconservative bent. Despite its youth, FPI has quickly ascended the hierarchy of non-governmental political organizations, and it is safe to assume that it will occupy a position of influence, at least within the neoconservative sphere, for the foreseeable future. The degree to which FPI will manifest its influence outside of the traditionally neoconservative realm remains uncertain.
CONCLUSIONS
This report has, thus far, outlined the viewpoints of a number of influential neoconservative leaders and organizations with regard to U.S. national security, international security, nonproliferation, missile defense, and U.S.-Russia relations. The task that remains is to determine, as much as possible, the stances of the neoconservative community as a whole, as opposed to those held by individual factions within neoconservatism. Thus, this report will conclude with an attempt to summarize the views of the neoconservative community in the aggregate, though such an endeavor is sure to entail certain limitations, and it will never account, with perfect accuracy, for the views held by its individual members. However, this report takes into account the viewpoints of a range of influential individuals and organizations within the neoconservative community, who represent many of the significant factions present within the community as a whole. The conclusions drawn by this report, imperfect as they are, are informed by multiple perspectives, which add to the report’s credibility.
The current attitude of the neoconservative community, with regard to U.S.-Russia relations, can be characterized by mistrust for Russia, disdain for Russian political leaders and institutions—especially for Putin—and criticism for the Obama administration’s efforts to improve relations with Russia. Though individual
32 "Senate GOP's Progress on Missile Defense in the New START Debate Strengthened National Security, Says FPI's Jamie Fly." Foreign Policy Initiative. 3 Jan. 2011. Web.
15 neoconservative leaders express contrasting views on individual policies, such as the New START treaty, they are united in their wariness of Russia. This wariness is encouraged by lingering Cold War rhetoric and an outdated perception of Russia as an enemy of the United States. Every neoconservative leader assessed in this report advocate for caution in dealing with Russia on security issues, while the same individuals urge U.S. leaders to engage in talks regarding diplomatically-sensitive issues, such as the Russian electoral system, Russian treatment of Georgia, and other contentious issues centering around U.S. perceptions of Russian actions contrary to democracy. Furthermore, these neoconservative leaders urge the administration to adopt a security-first approach to diplomatic negotiations with Russia, such as the unfettered development of a NATO missile defense system in Eastern Europe, despite Russian concerns about U.S. actions. Largely unconcerned about easing Russian fears, these neoconservative leaders hope, rather, that the United States will seek first to maintain a position of dominance in its relationship with Russia.
Furthermore, nonproliferation occupies a low position on the neoconservative agenda. While most of these neoconservative leaders support nonproliferation in theory, they view its practice as a measure often contrary to U.S. security interests. Some of these leaders even oppose nonproliferation in theory, and they support this position by claiming that possession of the largest nuclear arsenal is the best means of ensuring deterrence. Regardless of the differences in neoconservative views on nonproliferation in theory, the neoconservative bloc usually aligns in its opposition to nonproliferation in practice, as it can potentially result in a decrease in U.S. military dominance on a global scale. Some of these leaders did break from this mold in supporting the New START treaty, but their support was, as they clearly stated, based on the belief that the cuts proposed in New START were too minor to have an effect, and that the promises of nuclear modernization that Republicans received during the ratification process outweigh any small potential for instability caused by the treaty. Regardless, the low position of nonproliferation on the agenda of the neoconservative community ensures that, for practical purposes, the community is relatively unenthusiastic about nonproliferation and the quest for global zero.
While nonproliferation occupies, perhaps, the lowest position on the list of neoconservative defense priorities, missile defense inhabits the highest. Each conservative leader and organization included in this report, without fail, pledged undying support for the development of a comprehensive missile defense system designed to shield the United States from attack by hostile nations and terrorist organizations. Much of the Republican opposition to the New START treaty was derived from the perception that the treaty would undermine the United States’ ability to further develop their missile defense system by giving the Russians a platform from which to decry missile defense as a cause of instability. This perception hit right at the heart of neoconservative defense policy, and the neoconservative proponents of the treaty had to offer extensive explanations for why the treaty did not affect missile defense, in order to speak in favor of the treaty. That Robert Kagan, one of the leading voices of neoconservatism, had little success at convincing neoconservatives that New START was a harmless treaty is a testament to the degree to which neoconservatives are protective of missile defense. The development of a comprehensive missile defense system might be said even to be foremost among neoconservative desires with regard to U.S. foreign policy as a whole, and not solely with regard to U.S. military policy. Thus, any foreign policy, which neoconservatives perceive to be in opposition to the
16 development of such a missile defense system, is likely to encounter massive opposition from the neoconservative community.
It is hard to determine the degree to which the neoconservative faction influences the policies of the larger community of American conservatives, but it is safe to conclude that neoconservative military policies are instrumental in forming the general defense platform adopted by the Republican Party. Though neoconservatives hold particular opinions on other foreign and domestic policies, their influence in these areas is less pronounced than in areas of military and defense policy, which constitutes the largest and most influential branch of neoconservative opinion. Furthermore, neoconservative influence in all of aforementioned areas—domestic, foreign, and defense policy— increases when the administration departs from conservative policies. As the Obama administration stirs the ire of the Republican Party as a whole, the anti-administration policies of the neoconservative faction gain credence with a larger cross-section of the Party. The stronger the Republican opposition to the Obama administration becomes, the more likely is the Party to distance itself from the middle and to espouse a platform more heavily influenced by its most rightwing factions. As a result, a reactionary presidential candidate with neoconservative defense views is more likely to emerge from a Republican Party that feels increasingly estranged from Obama’s foreign policy. However, the details of campaign politics, domestic policy, and individual candidate appeal are likely to confound this effect one way or another, making it nearly impossible to predict the actual nature of the platform that the Republican Party will commit to during its next bid for the presidency. All that is certain is that the neoconservative bloc will remain an active voice in the broader conservative culture in the United States, and that its research and policy suggestions will continue to influence the actions of Republican politicians in the future.
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