Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit
Adam B. Ashcraft Financial Intermediation Federal Reserve Bank of New York New York, NY 10045 [email protected]
Til Schuermann Financial Intermediation Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Wharton Financial Institutions Center New York, NY 10045 [email protected]
Boston – Delft Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
Foundations and Trends R in Finance
Published, sold and distributed by: now Publishers Inc. PO Box 1024 Hanover, MA 02339 USA Tel. +1-781-985-4510 www.nowpublishers.com [email protected]
Outside North America: now Publishers Inc. PO Box 179 2600 AD Delft The Netherlands Tel. +31-6-51115274
The preferred citation for this publication is A. B. Ashcraft and T. Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit, Foundations and Trends R in Finance, vol 2, no 3, pp 191–309, 2006
ISBN: 978-1-60198-140-0 c 2008 A. B. Ashcraft and T. Schuermann
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers. Photocopying. In the USA: This journal is registered at the Copyright Clearance Cen- ter, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by now Publishers Inc for users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC). The ‘services’ for users can be found on the internet at: www.copyright.com For those organizations that have been granted a photocopy license, a separate system of payment has been arranged. Authorization does not extend to other kinds of copy- ing, such as that for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale. In the rest of the world: Permission to pho- tocopy must be obtained from the copyright owner. Please apply to now Publishers Inc., PO Box 1024, Hanover, MA 02339, USA; Tel. +1-781-871-0245; www.nowpublishers.com; [email protected] now Publishers Inc. has an exclusive license to publish this material worldwide. Permission to use this content must be obtained from the copyright license holder. Please apply to now Publishers, PO Box 179, 2600 AD Delft, The Netherlands, www.nowpublishers.com; e-mail: [email protected] Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
Foundations and Trends R in Finance Volume 2 Issue 3, 2006 Editorial Board
Editor-in-Chief: George M. Constantinides Leo Melamed Professor of Finance The University of Chicago Graduate School of Business 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue Chicago IL 60637 USA [email protected]
Editors Franklin Allen Nippon Life Professor of Finance and Economics, The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania
Andrew W. Lo Harris & Harris Group Professor, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ren´eM. Stulz Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
Editorial Scope
Foundations and Trends R in Finance will publish survey and tuto- rial articles in the following topics:
• Corporate Governance • Asset-Pricing Models • Corporate Financing • Tax Effects • Dividend Policy and Capital • Liquidity Structure • Equity Risk Premium • Corporate Control • Pricing Models and Volatility • Investment Policy • Fixed Income Securities • Agency Theory and Information • Computational Finance • Market Microstructure • Futures Markets and Hedging • Portfolio Theory • Financial Engineering • Financial Intermediation • Interest Rate Derivatives • Investment Banking • Credit Derivatives • Market Efficiency • Financial Econometrics • Security Issuance • Estimating Volatilities and • Anomalies and Behavioral Finance Correlations • Asset-Pricing Theory
Information for Librarians Foundations and Trends R in Finance, 2006, Volume 2, 4 issues. ISSN paper version 1567-2395. ISSN online version 1567-2409. Also available as a com- bined paper and online subscription. Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
Foundations and Trends R in Finance Vol. 2, No. 3 (2006) 191–309 c 2008 A. B. Ashcraft and T. Schuermann DOI: 10.1561/0500000024
Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit
Adam B. Ashcraft1 and Til Schuermann2
1 Research Officer, Financial Intermediation, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045, [email protected] 2 Vice-President, Financial Intermediation, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Wharton Financial Institutions Center, 33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045, [email protected]
Abstract In this survey we provide an overview of the subprime mortgage secu- ritization process and the seven key informational frictions which arise. We discuss how market participants work to minimize these frictions and speculate on how this process broke down. We continue with a complete picture of the subprime borrower and the subprime loan, dis- cussing both predatory borrowing and predatory lending. We present the key structural features of a typical subprime securitization, docu- ment how the rating agencies assign credit ratings to mortgage-backed securities, and outline how the agencies monitor the performance of mortgage pools over time. Throughout the survey, we draw upon the example of a mortgage pool securitized by New Century during 2006. Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
Keywords: Subprime mortgage credit; securitization; rating agencies; principal agent; moral hazard.
JEL codes: G24, G28 Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Overview of Subprime Mortgage Credit Securitization 3 2.1 The Seven Key Frictions 5 2.2 Five Frictions that Caused the Subprime Crisis 21
3 An Overview of Subprime Mortgage Credit 25 3.1 Who is the Subprime Mortgagor? 27 3.2 What is a Subprime Loan? 30 3.3 How have Subprime Loans Performed? 40 3.4 How are Subprime Loans Valued? 42
4 Overview of Subprime MBS 47 4.1 Subordination 47 4.2 Excess Spread 50 4.3 Shifting Interest 50 4.4 Performance Triggers 51 4.5 Interest Rate Swap 53 4.6 Remittance Reports 53
ix Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
5 An Overview of Subprime MBS Ratings 59 5.1 What is a Credit Rating? 59 5.2 How does One Become a Rating Agency? 62 5.3 When is a Credit Rating Wrong? How Could We Tell? 63 5.4 The Subprime Credit Rating Process 64 5.5 Conceptual Differences Between Corporate and ABS Credit Ratings 69 5.6 How Through-the-Cycle Rating Could Amplify the Housing Cycle 71 5.7 Cash Flow Analytics for Excess Spread 74 5.8 Performance Monitoring 84 5.9 Home Equity ABS Rating Performance 87
6 The Reliance of Investors on Credit Ratings: A Case Study 93 6.1 Overview of the Fund 94 6.2 Fixed-Income Asset Management 97
7 Concluding Remarks 99
References 117 Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
1
Introduction
As of this writing the total write-downs by financial institutions over the course of 2007–2008 has been $290 billion,1 much — if not most — directly or indirectly related to subprime mortgages. This already exceeds the total cost of the S&L crisis of about $250 billion (in 2008 dollars) (GAO, 1996). How does one securitize a pool of mortgages, especially subprime mortgages? What is the process from origination of the loan or mortgage to the selling of debt instruments backed by a pool of those mortgages? What problems creep up in this process, and what are the mechanisms in place to mitigate those problems? This survey seeks to answer all of these questions. Along the way we provide an overview of the market and some of the key players, and provide an extensive discussion of the important role played by the credit rating agencies. In Section 2, we provide a broad description of the securitization process and pay special attention to seven key frictions that need to be resolved. Several of these frictions involve moral hazard, adverse selection, and principal-agent problems. We show how each of these
1 Abigail Moses, ‘Credit Suisse Leads Increase in Bank Risk on Loss, Writedowns’. Bloomberg News, April 24, 2008.
1 Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
2 Introduction frictions is worked out, though as evidenced by the recent problems in the subprime mortgage market, some of those solutions are imperfect. In Section 3, we provide an overview of subprime mortgage credit; our focus here is on the subprime borrower and the subprime loan. We offer, as an example a pool of subprime mortgages New Century securitized in June 2006. We discuss how predatory lending and predatory borrowing (i.e., mortgage fraud) fit into the picture. Moreover, we examine sub- prime loan performance within this pool and the industry, speculate on the impact of payment reset, and explore the ABX and the role it plays. In Section 4, we examine subprime mortgage-backed securi- ties, discuss the key structural features of a typical securitization, and, once again illustrate how this works with reference to the New Century securitization. We finish with an examination of the credit rating and rating monitoring process in Section 5. Along the way we reflect on dif- ferences between corporate and structured credit ratings, the potential for pro-cyclical credit enhancement to amplify the housing cycle, and document the performance of subprime ratings. Finally, in Section 6, we review the extent to which investors rely upon on credit rating agen- cies views, and take as a typical example of an investor: the Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund. We reiterate that the views presented here are our own and not those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. And, while the survey focuses on subprime mortgage credit, note that there is little qualitative difference between the securitization and ratings process for Alt-A and home equity loans. Clearly, recent problems in mortgage markets are not confined to the subprime sector. Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
References
Adelson and Jacob (2008), ‘The subprime problem: Causes and lessons’. Unpublished Mimeo. Amato, J. D. and E. M. Remolona (2005), ‘The Pricing of Unexpected Credit Losses’. BIS Working Paper No. 190. Bangia, A., F. X. Diebold, A. Kronimus, C. Schagen, and T. Schuer- mann (2002), ‘Ratings migration and the business cycle, with appli- cations to credit portfolio stress testing’. Journal of Banking and Finance 26(2/3), 445–474. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996), ‘Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks’. Basel Committee Publi- cation No. 24, available: www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000), ‘Credit ratings and complementary sources of credit quality information’. BCBS Working Paper No. 3, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ bcbs wp3.htm, August. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), ‘International con- vergence of capital measurement and capital standards: A revised framework’. Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.htm, November.
117 Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
118 References
Ben-David, I. (2008), ‘Manipulation of collateral values by borrow- ers and intermediaries’. Unpublished Working Paper; available at http://home.uchicago.edu/∼ibendavi/manipulation.pdf. Benner, B. and A. Lachinsky (2007), ‘Subprime contagion’. Fortune Magazine. 5 July 2007. Cagan, C. (2007), ‘Mortgage payment reset’. Unpublished Mimeo, May; available at http://www.facorelogic.com/landingpages/ caganform.jsp?id=8037. Christie (2007), ‘Putting the card before the house’. 25 June 2007, CNNMoney.com. Dollar, R. (2006), ‘seven indicated in Oklahoma cash back at closing scheme’. www.mortgagefraudblog.com, 15 November 2006. Duffie, D. (2007), ‘Innovations in credit risk transfer: Implications for financial stability’. Stanford University GSB Working Paper, avail- able at http://www.stanford.edu/∼duffie/BIS.pdf. Economist, T. (2007a), Measuring the Measurers. May 31. Economist, T. (2007b), Securitisation: When it goes wrong... Septem- ber 20. Ernst, K., D. Bocian, and W. Li (2008), ‘Steered wrong: Bro- kers, borrowers, and subprime loans’. Available at http://www. responsiblelending.org/research/steered-wrong-brokers-borrowers- and-subprime-l-oans.html. Federal Reserve Board (2003), ‘Supervisory guidance on inter- nal ratings-based systems for corporate credit’. Attachment 2 in http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/meetings/2003/20030711/ attachment.pdf. Fitch (2007), ‘The impact of poor underwriting practices and fraud in subprime RMBS performance’. 28 November 2007. Fitch Ratings (2007), ‘U.S. Subprime RMBS/HEL Upgrade/ Down- grade Criteria’. Residential Mortgage Criteria Report, 12 July 2007. Flannery and Samolynk (2005), ‘Payday lending: Do costs justify the price?’. FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2005/09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=771624. GAO (1996), ‘Financial audit: Resolution trust corporation’s 1995 and 1994 financial statements’. July, GAO/AIMD-96-123. Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
References 119
Gourse, A. (2007), ‘The subprime bait and switch’. In These Times. July 16. Hagerty, J. and Hudson (2006), ‘Town’s residents say they were targets of big mortgage fraud’. Wall Street Journal. September 27. Hanson, S. G. and T. Schuermann (2006), ‘Confidence intervals for probabilities of default’. Journal of Banking and Finance 30(8), 2281–2301. Inside Mortgage Finance (2007), ‘The 2007 mortgage market statistical annual’. Keys, B. J., T. K. Mukherjee, A. Seru, and V. Vig (2008), ‘Did securiti- zation lead to lax screening? Evidence from subprime loans?’. Avail- able at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093137. King, U., L. Parrish, and O. Tanik (2006), ‘Financial quicksand: Pay- day lending sinks borrowers in debt’. Available at http://www. responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr012-Financial Quicksand-1106.pdf. Kliger, D. and O. Sarig (2000), ‘The information value of bond ratings’. Journal of Finance 55(6), 2879–2902. Lando, D. and T. Skødeberg (2002), ‘Analyzing ratings transitions and rating drift with continuous observations’. Journal of Banking and Finance 26(2/3), 423–444. Levich, R. M., G. Majnoni, and C. M. Reinhart (2002), ‘Introduc- tion: Ratings, ratings agencies and the global financial system: Summary and policy implications’. In: R. M. Levich, C. Reinhart, and G. Majnoni (eds.): Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System. Amsterdam, NL: Kluwer, pp. 1–15. Lopez, J. A. and M. Saidenberg (2000), ‘Evaluating credit risk models’. Journal of Banking and Finance 24, 151–165. Mason, J. R. and J. Rosner (2007), ‘Where did the risk go? How misap- plied bond ratings cause mortgage backed securities and collateral- ized debt obligation market disruptions’. Hudson Institute Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475. Mayer, C. J., T. Piskorski, and A. Tchistyi (2007), ‘The ineffi- ciency of refinancing: Why prepayment penalties are good for risky borrowers’. Unpublished Working Paper, available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1108528. Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
120 References
Moody’s Investors Services (1996), ‘Avoiding the ‘F’ word: The risk of fraud in securitized transaction’. Moody’s Special Report, New York, June. Moody’s Investors Services (1999), ‘Rating methodology: The evolving meanings of moody’s bond ratings’. Moody’s Global Credit Research, New York, August. Moody’s Investors Services (2003), ‘Impact of predatory lending an RMBS securitizations’. Moody’s Special Report, New York, May. Moody’s Investors Services (2004), ‘Introduction to Moody’s struc- tured finance analysis and modelling’. Presentation given by Frederic Drevon, May 13. Moody’s Investors Services (2005a), ‘The importance of representations and warranties in RMBS transactions’. Moody’s Special Report, New York, January. Moody’s Investors Services (2005b), ‘Spotlight on new century financial corporation’. Moody’s Special Report, New York, July. Moody’s Investors Services (2007a), ‘Corporate default and recov- ery rates: 1920–2006’. Special Comment, Moody’s Global Credit Research, New York, February. Moody’s Investors Services (2007b), ‘Early defaults rise in mortgage securitization’. Moody’s Special Report, New York, January. Moody’s Investors Services (2007c), ‘Structured finance rating tran- sitions: 1983–2006’. Special Comment, Moody’s Global Credit Research, New York, January. Morgan, D. (2007), ‘Defining and detecting predatory lending’. Staff Report #273, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Morgan, D., B. Iverson, and M. Botsch (2008), ‘Subprime foreclosures and bankruptcy reform’. Unpublished FRBNY Working Paper, avail- able from the authors upon request. Morse, A. (2007), ‘Payday lenders: Heroes or villains?’. Unpub- lished Working Paper, available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/ research/conferences/2007/october2/morse payday061125.pdf. New York Times (2007), ‘Pensions and the mortgage mess’. Editorial, 7 August. Nickell, P., W. Perraudin, and S. Varotto (2000), ‘Stability of rating transitions’. Journal of Banking and Finance 24, 203–227. Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000024
References 121
Sichelman, L. (2007), ‘Tighter Underwriting Stymies Refinancing of Subprime Loans’. Mortgage Servicing News. May 1. Standard and Poor’s (2001), ‘Rating methodology: Evaluating the issuer’. Standard and Poor’s Credit Ratings, New York, September. Standard and Poor’s (2007), ‘Principles-based rating methodology for global structured finance securities’. Standard and Poor’s Ratings Direct Research, New York, May. Sylla, R. (2002), ‘An historical primer on the business of credit rating’. In: R. M. Levich, C. Reinhart, and G. Majnoni (eds.): Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System. Amsterdam, NL: Kluwer, pp. 19–40. The Mortgage Asset Research Institute (2007), ‘MARI’s ninth case report to the MBA’. May 2007. Thompson, C. (2007), ‘Dirty deeds’. East Bay Express. July 23. Tomlinson, R. and D. Evans (2007), ‘CDO boom masks subprime losses, Abetted by S&P, Moody’s, Fitch’. Bloomberg News, May 31. Treacy, W. F. and M. Carey (2000), ‘Credit risk rating systems at large U.S. banks’. Journal of Banking and Finance 24, 167–201. UBS Investment Research (2007a), ‘Mortgage strategist’. June 26. UBS Investment Research (2007b), ‘Mortgage strategist’. 23 October. Wei, L. (2007), ‘Subprime lenders may face funding crisis’. Wall Street Journal. 10 January. White, L. (2002), ‘The credit rating industry: An industrial organiza- tion analysis’. In: R. M. Levich, C. Reinhart, and G. Majnoni (eds.): Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System. Amster- dam, NL: Kluwer, pp. 41–64.