Aircraft Lease Securitizations April 13, 2020
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Asset Securitization
L-Sec Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks Asset Securitization Comptroller’s Handbook November 1997 L Liquidity and Funds Management Asset Securitization Table of Contents Introduction 1 Background 1 Definition 2 A Brief History 2 Market Evolution 3 Benefits of Securitization 4 Securitization Process 6 Basic Structures of Asset-Backed Securities 6 Parties to the Transaction 7 Structuring the Transaction 12 Segregating the Assets 13 Creating Securitization Vehicles 15 Providing Credit Enhancement 19 Issuing Interests in the Asset Pool 23 The Mechanics of Cash Flow 25 Cash Flow Allocations 25 Risk Management 30 Impact of Securitization on Bank Issuers 30 Process Management 30 Risks and Controls 33 Reputation Risk 34 Strategic Risk 35 Credit Risk 37 Transaction Risk 43 Liquidity Risk 47 Compliance Risk 49 Other Issues 49 Risk-Based Capital 56 Comptroller’s Handbook i Asset Securitization Examination Objectives 61 Examination Procedures 62 Overview 62 Management Oversight 64 Risk Management 68 Management Information Systems 71 Accounting and Risk-Based Capital 73 Functions 77 Originations 77 Servicing 80 Other Roles 83 Overall Conclusions 86 References 89 ii Asset Securitization Introduction Background Asset securitization is helping to shape the future of traditional commercial banking. By using the securities markets to fund portions of the loan portfolio, banks can allocate capital more efficiently, access diverse and cost- effective funding sources, and better manage business risks. But securitization markets offer challenges as well as opportunity. Indeed, the successes of nonbank securitizers are forcing banks to adopt some of their practices. Competition from commercial paper underwriters and captive finance companies has taken a toll on banks’ market share and profitability in the prime credit and consumer loan businesses. -
Understanding Securitization
Understanding Securitization It is important to have a general familiarity with mortgage securitization in order to understand the foreclosure process. Securitization involves a series of conveyances of the note evidencing the residential loan and assignment of the mortgage or trust deed securing it. Therefore, chain of title and beneficial interest issues frequently turn on the securitization trajectories. Securitization is the process pooling loans into “mortgage‐ backed securities” or “MBS” for sale to investors. MBS is an investment instrument backed by an undivided interest in a pool of mortgages or trust deeds. Income from the underlying mortgages is used to pay interest and principal on the securities. Figure A below is a simplified schematic depicting the general securitization process and some of the parties involved. The process begins with Originators, which are the lenders (such as banks or finance companies) that initially make the loans to homeowners. Sponsor/Sellers (or “sponsors”) purchase these loans from one or more Originators to form the pool of assets to be securitized. (Most large financial institutions are both Originators and Sponsor/Sellers.) A Depositor creates a Securitization Trust, a special‐purpose entity, for the securitized transaction. The depositor acquires the pooled assets from the Sponsor/Seller and in turn deposits them into the Securitization Trust. An Issuer acquires the Securitization Trust and issues certificates to eventually be sold to investors. However, the Issuer does not directly offer the certificates for sale to the investors. Instead, the Issuer conveys the certificate to the Depositor in exchange for the pooled assets. An Underwriter, usually an investment bank, purchases all of the certificates from the Depositor with the responsibility of offering to them for sale to the ultimate investors. -
UNITED STATES SECURITIES and EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 10-K ☒ ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020 OR ☐ TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the transition period from to Commission File No. 0-14719 SKYWEST, INC. Incorporated under the Laws of Utah 87-0292166 (IRS Employer ID No.) 444 South River Road St. George, Utah 84790 (435) 634-3000 Securities Registered Pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act: Title of Each Class Trading Symbol(s) Name of Each Exchange on which Registered Common Stock, No Par Value SKYW The Nasdaq Global Select Market Securities Registered Pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Act: None Indicate by check mark if the registrant is a well-known seasoned issuer, as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act. Yes No Indicate by check mark if the registrant is not required to file reports pursuant to Section 13 or Section 15(d) of the Act. Yes No Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days. Yes No Indicate by check mark whether the registrant has submitted electronically every Interactive Data File required to be submitted pursuant to Rule 405 of Regulation S-T (§ 232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to submit such files). -
Securitization & Hedge Funds
SECURITIZATION & HEDGE FUNDS: COLLATERALIZED FUND OBLIGATIONS SECURITIZATION & HEDGE FUNDS: CREATING A MORE EFFICIENT MARKET BY CLARK CHENG, CFA Intangis Funds AUGUST 6, 2002 INTANGIS PAGE 1 SECURITIZATION & HEDGE FUNDS: COLLATERALIZED FUND OBLIGATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................ 3 PROBLEM.................................................................................................................................................... 4 SOLUTION................................................................................................................................................... 5 SECURITIZATION..................................................................................................................................... 5 CASH-FLOW TRANSACTIONS............................................................................................................... 6 MARKET VALUE TRANSACTIONS.......................................................................................................8 ARBITRAGE................................................................................................................................................ 8 FINANCIAL ENGINEERING.................................................................................................................... 8 TRANSPARENCY...................................................................................................................................... -
Private Mortgage Securitization and Loan Origination Quality - New Evidence from Loan Losses
Private Mortgage Securitization and Loan Origination Quality - New Evidence from Loan Losses Abdullah Yavas Robert E. Wangard Chair School of Business University of Wisconsin - Madison Madison, WI 53706 [email protected] and Shuang Zhu Associate Professor Department of Finance Kansas State University Manhattan, KS 66506 [email protected] December 11, 2018 1 Private Mortgage Securitization and Loan Origination Quality - New Evidence from Loan Losses Abstract Due to data constraints, earlier studies of the impact of securitization on loan quality have used default probability as a proxy for loan quality. In this paper, we utilize a unique data set that allows us to use loan losses, which incorporate both probability of default and loss given default, to proxy for mortgage quality. Our analysis of prime loans shows that higher expected loan losses are associated with higher probability of securitization. Lenders sell prime loans with lower observable quality and keep higher observable quality loans on their books. For subprime loans, we observe opposite results that lenders sell better quality loans and keep lower quality loans on their book. We then use the cutoff FICO score of 620 to infer the lender’s screening effort with respect to unobservable loan quality. We find that securitized prime loans exhibit no significant difference in default losses for 620- versus 620+ loans. However, securitized subprime loans with a 620- score incur significantly lower loan losses than securitized subprime loans with a 620+ score. By using loan losses as the proxy of loan quality, separating the analysis into prime and subprime samples, and distinguishing between observable and unobservable risk characteristics, this study sheds additional light on the potential channels that the securitization affects loan quality. -
Aircraft Leasing in the Context of Covid-19 – Practical Considerations on Compromise, Relationships and Mitigation
GLOBAL: COVID-19 : AIRCRAFT LEASING IN THE CONTEXT OF COVID-19 – PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON COMPROMISE, RELATIONSHIPS AND MITIGATION April 2020 www.bclplaw.com Dear Aircraft Lessor Re: COVID 19: Aircraft Lease Agreements relating to Relevant Aircraft I am writing to inform you that our business has been materially and adversely affected by the COVID 19 pandemic. My CFO has informed me that in a few months, we anticipate difficulties meeting our rental payment obligations under aircraft lease agreements entered into with your company. We are hoping that we can arrange a time to speak via video conference to consider and discuss steps that we may take and agree to mitigate these circumstances. Our respective companies have a long history of working together, but if there is a time that we need your co-operation, support and assistance, it would be now. I look forward to hearing from you to confirm a time to discuss. Yours sincerely Airline CEO INTRODUCTION The above paints the scene of a typical request which most (if not all) international aircraft lessors are currently facing (and a similar scenario could also apply to financial institutions who have lent money to airlines). If you were the relationship manager of the subject aircraft leasing company, what would you do? This paper is intended to provide some practical suggestions and considerations that commercial parties could consider when preparing for those “hard conversations” and is intended to encourage aircraft lessors, financial institutions and airlines to be innovative, creative and practical whilst balancing and prudently managing associated risks during the COVID 19 crisis. -
Fly Leasing Q4 2019 Earnings Press Release
Fly Leasing Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2019 Financial Results Dublin, Ireland, February 27, 2020 – Fly Leasing Limited (NYSE: FLY) (“FLY”), a global leader in aircraft leasing, today announced its financial results for the fourth quarter and full year of 2019. Fourth Quarter 2019 Highlights Net income of $75.2 million, $2.43 per share Adjusted Net Income of $77.0 million, $2.49 per share Return on equity of 35.9%, Adjusted return on equity of 36.7% Sold ten aircraft for an economic gain of $62.7 million, a 31% premium to book value Purchased seven aircraft for $217.0 million 2019 Full Year Highlights Net income of $225.9 million, $7.12 per share Adjusted Net Income of $245.9 million, $7.75 per share Return on equity of 29.2%, Adjusted return on equity of 31.8% Sold 35 aircraft for an economic gain of $149.1 million, an 18% premium to book value $28.42 book value per share at year end, a 32% increase since December 31, 2018 Net debt to equity ratio of 2.3x "FLY is reporting record financial outcomes for the fourth quarter and full year 2019 along with adjusted returns on equity of more than 30% in both the quarter and full year," said Colm Barrington, FLY's Chief Executive Officer. "At year end, our book value per share was $28.42, which was a 32% increase in the year. Our leverage was reduced to 2.3x at year end, down from 4.0x at the beginning of the year.” “Our aircraft sales in 2019 demonstrated the value in our balance sheet, reduced lessee concentration, generated cash and reduced our leverage,” added Barrington. -
The Role of the Secondary Market in Mortgage Financing | 2 Limiting the Secondary Market Would Share of Mortgages on Balance Sheets at 30 Percent
Economic Policy Program Housing Commission The Role of the Secondary Market in Mortgage FinancingTotal Mortgages Outstanding (total $13.1 trillion) Home ($9.8 trillion) 75% Multifamily Residential ($0.9 trillion) 7% Commercial, e.g. offices, retail, factories ($2.2 trillion) 17% Farm ($0.2 trillion) 1% The secondary market for mortgages Mortgages: A $13.1 Trillion Market Notes: plays a critical role in sustainingThese lines The taken current verbatim size of the from mortgage one-‐line market is totals of L.217 $13.1 trillion, the a healthy housing market. Few largest share of which (75 percent) funds home mortgages. As displayed in Chart 1, another 7 percent of the mortgage homebuyers have sufficient savings market fundsTotal mortgagesMortgages Oonu tapartmentstanding (t obuildingstal $13.1 and other to purchase a home outright, and multifamily properties. trillion) many need to borrow money to buy their first home or to move to another Chart 1: Total Mortgages Outstanding ($13.1 trillion) 1% one. Without the ability to borrow against the value of the home they are 17% purchasing, many prospective buyers 7% would be shut out of the market. The secondary market allows participants 75% in our mortgage system to access capital from investors in the United States and around the world. Any decline in the size of the secondary market would reduce the amount of Home ($9.8 trillion) Multifamily Residential ($0.9 trillion) capital available for mortgage lending Commercial, e.g. offices, retail, factories ($2.2 trillion) and, in turn, borrowers’ options for Farm ($0.2 trillion) financing the purchase of a home. -
On the Securitization of Student Loans and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009
On the Securitization of Student Loans and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 by Maxime Roy Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Tepper School of Business Carnegie Mellon University May 16, 2017 Committee: Burton Hollifield (chair), Adam Ashcraft, Laurence Ales and Brent Glover External Reader: Pierre Liang À Françoise et Yvette, mes deux anges gardiens. abstract This dissertation contains three chapters, and each examines the securitization of student loans. The first two chapters focus on the underpricing of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) collateralized by government guaranteed student loans during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The findings add to the literature that documents persistent arbitrages during the crisis and doing so in the ABS market is a novelty. The last chapter focuses on the securitization of private student loans, which do not benefit from government guarantees. This chapter concentrates on whether the disclosure to investors is sufficient to prevent the selection of underperforming pools of loans. My findings have normative implications for topics ranging from the regulation of securitization to central banks’ exceptional provision of liquidity during crises. Specifically, in the first chapter, “Near-Arbitrage among Securities Backed by Government Guaranteed Student Loans,” I document the presence of near-arbitrage opportunities in the student loan ABS (SLABS) market during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. I construct near-arbitrage lower bounds on the price of SLABS collateralized by government guaranteed loans. When the price of a SLABS is below its near-arbitrage lower bound, an arbitrageur that buys the SLABS, holds it to maturity and finances the purchase by frictionlessly shorting short-term Treasuries is nearly certain to make a profit. -
Hyundai Auto Lease Securitization Trust 2020-B
Presale: Hyundai Auto Lease Securitization Trust 2020-B September 15, 2020 PRIMARY CREDIT ANALYST Preliminary Ratings Ethan Choi New York Preliminary amount Legal final (1) 212-438-1043 Class(i) Preliminary rating Type Interest rate(ii) (mil. $) maturity ethan.choi A-1 A-1+ (sf) Senior Fixed 142.00 Oct. 15, 2021 @spglobal.com A-2 AAA (sf) Senior Fixed 380.00 Jan. 17, 2023 SECONDARY CONTACT A-3 AAA (sf) Senior Fixed 380.00 Sept. 15, 2023 Sanjay Narine, CFA Toronto A-4 AAA (sf) Senior Fixed 74.39 June 17, 2024 + 1 (416) 507 2548 B AA+ (sf) Subordinate Fixed 52.94 Oct. 15, 2024 sanjay.narine @spglobal.com Note: This presale report is based on information as of Sept. 15, 2020. The ratings shown are preliminary. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings. Accordingly, the preliminary ratings should not be construed as evidence of final ratings. This report does not constitute a recommendation to buy, hold, or sell securities. (i)All or a portion of one or more classes of notes may be initially retained by the sponsor Hyundai Capital America Inc. or its affiliate. (ii)The actual coupons of these tranches will be determined on the pricing date. Profile Expected closing date Sept. 23, 2020. Collateral Prime auto lease receivables. Origination trust Hyundai Lease Titling Trust. Issuer Hyundai Auto Lease Securitization Trust 2020-B. Sponsor, servicer, and administrator Hyundai Capital America Inc. (BBB+/Negative/A-2). Depositor Hyundai HK Lease LLC. Indenture trustee U.S. Bank N.A. -
Aviation Industry Leaders Report 2021: Route to Recovery
The Aviation Industry Leaders Report 2021: Route to Recovery www.aviationnews-online.com www.kpmg.ie/aviation KPMG REPORT COVERS 2021.indd 1 20/01/2021 14:19 For what’s next in Aviation. Navigating Change. Together. Your Partner For What’s Next KPMG6840_Aviation_Industry_Leaders_Report REPORT COVERS 2021.indd 2021 2 Ads x 4_Jan_2021.indd 4 19/01/202120/01/2021 15:37:29 14:19 CONTENTS 2 List of 10 Regional Review 24 Airline Survivorship 36 Return of the MAX 54 Chapter Four: The Contributors and Post-Covid World Acknowledgements Chapter One Assessing which Boeing’s 737 MAX incorporates a regional airlines will survive the aircraft was cleared for The recovery from 4 Foreword from Joe review of the aviation immediate health crisis return to service after the devastation the O’Mara, Head of market. and the subsequent the US Federal Aviation coronavirus pandemic Aviation, KPMG recovery period has Administration officially has wrought on the 18 Government rescinded the grounding world is expected to be Ireland become an essential Lifelines skill for lessors, lenders order. Industry experts slow but how will the 6 Chapter One: and suppliers. discuss the prospects new world environment This section takes a for the aircraft type and impact demand for air Surviving the Crisis deep dive into the levels 28 Chapter Two: Fleet how it will be financed. travel. This chapter also of government support considers the impact This chapter considers Focus for the aviation industry 44 Chapter Three: The of climate change the macroeconomic and around the world and Airlines are likely to Credit Challenge concerns on the aviation geopolitical shock of the considers its impact emerge from the crisis coronavirus pandemic industry. -
Securitization of Catastrophe Mortality Risks
Securitization of Catastrophe Mortality Risks Yijia Lin Samuel H. Cox Youngstown State University Georgia State University Phone: (330) 629-6895 Phone: (404) 651-4854 [email protected] [email protected] SECURITIZATION OF CATASTROPHE MORTALITY RISKS ABSTRACT. Securitization with payments linked to explicit mortality events provides a new investment opportunity to investors and financial institutions. Moreover, mortality- linked securities provide an alternative risk management tool for insurers. As a step toward understanding these securities, we develop an asset pricing model for mortality-based secu- rities in an incomplete market framework with jump processes. Our model nicely explains opposite market outcomes of two existing pure mortality securities. 1. INTRODUCTION Securities with mortality risk as a component have been around a long time. These securities arise as securitization of portfolios of life insurance or annuity policies. The risks underlying a life insurance or annuity portfolio include interest rate risk, policyholder lapse risk, as well as mortality or longevity risk. In these transactions, the positive future net cash flow from the policies is dedicated to pay the bondholders. Therefore, they are similar to asset securitization. Cummins (2004) surveys recent life insurance securitization transactions, including these asset- type securities. However, securitization of pure mortality or longevity risk is a recent and potentially important innovation in financial markets. Pure mortality or longevity securitization is more like property- linked catastrophe bonds than the common asset-type life insurance securitizations. This is be- cause, like that of a property-linked catastrophe bond based on earthquake or hurricane losses, the payment of a mortality security is only subject to a well-defined risk.