From Strangers to Partners: Canadian-Korean Relations (1888 – 1978)
by
Jiwon Tina Park
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of History University of Toronto
© Copyright by Jiwon Tina Park 2018
From Strangers to Partners: Canadian-Korean Relations (1888 – 1978)
Jiwon Tina Park
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of History University of Toronto
2018 Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the transformation of Canadian-Korean relations between the
1880s and the 1970s. Drawing on archival materials from both Ottawa and Seoul, the study approaches the bilateral relationship primarily through the lens of Canadian attitudes, priorities and policies. Canadian missionaries, who first travelled to Korea in 1888, established the earliest bridges between the two countries. Canada’s official engagement with Korea began with its participation on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (1947-48), followed closely by the
Korean War (1950-53), which elevated South Korea’s geostrategic importance for Ottawa. Over the course of the Cold War, these humanitarian concerns soon blossomed into significant commercial and political interests, a change aided by South Korea’s remarkable economic growth under President Park Chung Hee’s leadership. By the 1970s, Canada and South Korea saw each other as significant partners and allies, marked by a rapid expansion in trade and immigration.
Shifting alliances and geopolitical interests of the Cold War had important consequences for bringing the two nations together, as South Korea searched for new partners to counterbalance American dominance and expand into new markets. From Seoul’s perspective,
Canada, in addition to growing commercial interests, was an important ally for its diplomatic
ii competition against North Korea. The case of the CANDU nuclear reactor sales to Korea at the height of the détente era clearly demonstrate the shifting dynamics in Canadian-Korean relations.
Ultimately, this study concludes that comprehensive study of the evolution of Canadian-Korean relations enriches our understanding of Canadian history, Canadian-Asian relations, and international history.
iii
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my Ph.D. supervisor, Prof. Robert Bothwell, who inspired my love for Canadian history and guided my academic journey since my first year at Trinity College. I would have never made it this far without Prof. Bothwell’s support. I am also very grateful to Prof. Margaret MacMillan and Prof. Andre Schmid, two historians I admire greatly, for their timely advice, patience and guidance on my committee. It has been a truly exhilarating experience to learn from them.
At the University of Toronto, I am grateful to my wonderful mentors and teachers for their support over the years, especially Dr. David Naylor, Chancellor Bill Graham, Prof. Don Rickerd, Prof. John English, Prof. John Kirton, Prof. Denis Smyth, Prof. Arne Kislenko, Dr. David Wilson, Dr. Robert Fraser, Dr. Mel Cappe, Prof. Lisa Mar, Prof. Peter Loewen, Prof. Ron Pruessen and Prof. Louis Pauly.
I owe special thanks to my family physician, Dr. Sue Harrison, for her loving care as I struggled with various health-related crises over the course of my studies. I am also grateful to Dr. Michael Fehlings at the Toronto Western Hospital for the exceptionally successful spinal surgery, which has given me a new life. I wish to thank my wonderful physiotherapists, Jennifer Howey and Kathy Yardley, who kept me going in the roughest days of back pain. I am grateful to Father Mark Andrews for his prayers.
I am deeply indebted to friends and colleagues who read and commented on various parts of my drafts: Dr. John M. Dirks, Dr. Adam Chapnick, Catherine Tsalikis, Jennifer L. Bonder & Julia Armstrong all deserve my heartfelt gratitude. I am also so grateful to Sowon Kim, Hana Kim and Anthony Burton for their research assistance. Dr. Jonathan Scotland deserves special thanks for reading and commenting on my drafts multiple times and cheering me on whenever I felt like giving up. All errors remain my own.
I benefitted tremendously from conversations with the Korean War veterans, politicians and diplomats and academics who shared their first-hand experiences with me. In particular, I am grateful to Sen. Yonah Martin, Bob & Young-Hae Lee, Amb. Len Edwards, Colonel Jang-Min Choi, Captain Jamie Cotter, Amb. Derek Burney, Amb. Yim Sung-Joon, Amb. Eric Walsh, Prof. Tae-Gyun Park and Prof. Dong-Hwi Lee.
The absolute highlight of my last decade at the U of T was the privilege of meeting, teaching and interacting with hundreds of brilliant students. I wish to thank them for their curiosity, energy and love, especially my colleagues at the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.
As always, I am grateful to my friends for lifting my spirits in moments of self-doubt and confusion that often follows a doctoral project. I owe special thanks to Dr. Sherif Kinawy, Dania Ciampini, Dr. Brian O’Sullivan, Robert Baines, Min Kim, Colum Grove-White, Victor MacDiarmid, David & Donne Hilton, Dr. Mark Smith, Benoit Hardy-Chartrand, Eddie Kang, Karim Kanji, Olivier Sorin and Tim O’Leary.
I am deeply grateful to the Hon. Carolyn Bennett, the Hon. Jean Charest, V. Adm Ron Lloyd and the Hon. Hugh D. Segal for all their support and encouragement throughout this long marathon.
My heartfelt thanks to my mom, without whose courage and conviction, I may never have stepped foot in Canada, and my younger sister, Sohyun, who always reminded me to never take myself too seriously.
Above all, I am grateful for God’s grace in more ways than I can count.
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Dedicated to PROFESSOR ROBERT BOTHWELL
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Table of Contents
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iv
List of Tables vii
List of Figures viii
Notes on Romanization ix
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 First impressions: Canadian Missionaries in Korea 27
Chapter 2 Division of the Korean Peninsula & Canada’s Official Engagements 73
Chapter 3 “Milk for Korea” & Humanitarian Engagements After the Korean War 111
Chapter 4 Shifting Paradigms of the Cold War Alliance 143
Chapter 5 The Take-Off Phase: Economics Over Politics 185
Chapter 6 CANDU: The Game Changer 211
Conclusion 244
Notes on Archival Sources 325
References 329
vi
List of Tables
Table 1: Canada-ROK Bilateral Trade (1969-80) ------188
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List of Figures
Figure 1 Map of Seoul drawn by James S. Gale (1901) ------48
Figure 2 Dictionaries & Books Translated by James S. Gale ------50
Figure 3 Image of the Severance Union Medical College (1956) ------55
Figure 4 Severance Union Medical College’s first graduating class (1908) ------57
Figure 5 Korean Pagoda at Victoria University ------58
Figure 6 Images of crowd outside of city hall on March 1, 1919 ------62
Figure 7 Yŏ Unhyŏng and the crowd on Aug 16, 1945 ------76
Figure 8 The UNTCOK Headquarters in Seoul (1948) ------88
Figure 9 Canadian Soldiers in the Korean War ------104
Figure 10 Prime Minister St. Laurent in his visit to Korea (1954) ------116
Figure 11 Lotta Hitschmanova in Korea, 1954 ------130
Figure 12 Korean Orphans & UN Soldiers ------133
Figure 13 Syngman Rhee’s letter to Dr. Schofield ------138
Figure 14 President Park Chung-Hee’s Letter to Dr. Schofield ------147
Figure 15 Amb. H. O. Moran presenting his credentials to President Park ------176 Chung Hee
Figure 16 Canada-Korea Trade Relations: Value of Total Exports to ------206 Canada & Imports from Canada (1969-88)
Figure 17 Annual Growth Rate of the ROK Exports to Canada (1969-88) ------206
Figure 18 Annual Growth Rate of Canadian Exports to the ROK (1969-88) ------207
viii
Notes on Romanization
▪ In romanizing Korean, I have used the McCune-Reischauer system, and have generally followed the stylistic guidelines set forth by the Library of Congress.
▪ In romanizing the names of Koreans in the McCune-Reischauer system, I have generally followed the Korean convention of placing the family name first, except for well-known names like Syngman Rhee. For the sake of consistency, I have omitted a hyphen that is sometimes used between the two personal names in Korean, unless the hyphen was intentionally used by the author or the person in question.
▪ For the names of historical or political figures and well-known geographical districts, I have tried to follow the most widely used romanization (ie Seoul or Park Chung Hee).
▪ For works written in Korean, I have followed the McCune-Reischauer system for the author’s name and the title, with English translations in square brackets for the titles. In cases where the Korean author’s name has not been consistently romanized in previous publications, I have adopted the McCune-Reischauer system.
▪ For works written by Korean authors in English, the author’s name appears as it was originally published (according to the author’s preference), even if it does not conform exactly to the McCune-Reischauer system.
▪ While every effort has been made to be consistent, historical Canadian archival documents did not always follow correct spellings of Korean names or romanization. In such cases, original spellings as found in archival documents were used in the footnotes and references, for easier identification in the archival databases.
ix 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines the transformation of Canadian-Korean relations from 1888 to 1978 by focusing on the evolution of Canadian perceptions, engagements and policies towards Korea. This bilateral relationship, which began with a handful of missionaries in 1888, slowly evolved from informal personal contacts to official state-level engagements, as seen with Canada’s involvement with the UN Temporary Commission on Korea to supervise elections (1947-48) and Canada’s participation during the Korean War (1950-53). Over the course of merely two decades, South Korea moved from an aid recipient to an important trading partner for Canada, with interests peaking with the CANDU nuclear reactor sales in the 1970s. This study argues that while religious, intellectual, cultural, military and humanitarian engagements set the tone for a highly positive bilateral relationship, it was ultimately South Korea’s economic growth and geostrategic realities of the Cold War that fundamentally altered the nature and importance of the bilateral relationship.
This study marks one of the first attempts to analyze the evolution of Canadian-Korean relations in a comprehensive manner, drawing upon archival sources from both Canada and South Korea, as well as interviews, historical newspapers and statistical data. In the post-Korean War phase, the discussion is mostly limited to Canada’s dealings with South Korea, since Canada did not recognize North Korea until 2000 and only interacted with Seoul since 1947. Nevertheless, the North Korean dimension is still featured as part of this dissertation whenever relevant.
The arrival of James S. Gale on the shores of Busan, Korea in December 1888 marked the first-ever contact between Canadians and Koreans. Upon arrival in Korea, the missionaries encountered strange smells, foods, and traditions, but Gale’s first impressions, as he wrote in 1898, were still remarkably positive: “…Yet I do not think Korea objectionable. To me, it is the most attractive country in the world. The climate is good; the people, a dignified, trustworthy, kind-hearted race; their language and ancient customs most interesting. Natural beauty
2 abounds…”1 Like Gale, many other young missionaries from Ontario and the Maritime provinces soon joined the mission in Korea. From Gale’s arrival until the end of the Second World War, Canadian missionaries served as the principal channel of cultural encounters between the two nations and engaged in activities far beyond the realm of evangelization, such as translating books, building schools and hospitals, and assisting with Korea’s independence movements.2
Canada’s early missionary engagements from the late 19th century to the mid-20th century established an important foundation for the future of Canadian-Korean relations. Canadian missionaries, doctors and teachers all operated at the intersection of imperialism and nationalism at the turn of the century, when Koreans struggled for independence under Japanese imperialism. Koreans turned to Western missionaries as a counterbalancing force against Japan, with some missionaries like Frank W. Schofield acting as important facilitators of Korea’s independence movement. The missionary encounter, which was multinational in nature because of collaborations between the American, the British and the Canadian missionaries, nevertheless had important consequences for subsequent Canadian attitudes and policy regarding Korea. For instance, Canadian soldiers who served in the Korean War were very much aware of the works of Canadian missionaries and many of them actively supported missionary activities during their service on the battlefields. Ottawa’s civil servants in the late 1960s also argued that Canada’s geostrategic interests in Korea had foundations in the earlier missionary encounters. In shaping mutual perceptions and understandings between two very distant countries, the early missionary encounter played a key role in the history of Canadian-Korean relations.
Yet, until the end of the Second World War, Canada’s official understanding of Korea remained distant and shallow, and Canada had no “Korea policy” to speak of. To be sure, the cultural and intellectual engagement of the missionary phase established a solid foundation, but did not immediately translate into government-level interests and engagements between Ottawa
1 James S. Gale, Korean Sketches, (New York: F. H. Revell, 1898), 136. 2 The Canadian missionaries, along with other Western missionaries, were forced to leave Korea under the Japanese colonial rule during the interwar years, but many stayed in China and Japan and returned to Korea in 1946. See Jung Gun Kim, “To God’s Country: Canadian Missionaries in Korea and the Beginnings of Korean Migration to Canada,” Ph.D. Dissertation, (Toronto: OISE, 1982), introduction.
3 and Seoul. From the Korean perspective, there were more pressing concerns about the division of the Korean peninsula, balancing its relationship with the United States and Japan, and subsequently the Korean War and its aftermath, so Canada never appeared as a country of high priority until the 1970s. Canada’s first official engagement on the Korean peninsula was marked by its participation on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea in 1947, but the experience was one of frustration with American dominance and the lack of UNTCOK’s jurisdiction in North Korea. A few years later when the Korean War broke out, Brooke Claxton, Canadian Minister of Defence, remarked before dispatching Canadian troops that “… Korea was an obscure place on the Western side of the Pacific, a place of indeterminate status, best known perhaps because the people were known to wear strange hats.”3 Claxton’s comment is significant because it underlines the fact that Korea was seen as a battleground of the Cold War, rather than a country of significance for its own right. Canada responded swiftly to the call for action and joined the UN Forces to fight in the Korean War, with some 27,000 Canadian troops in total, making it the third-largest contingent after the United States and the United Kingdom. Canada’s participation in the Korean War must be seen in the context of its commitment to the United Nations and the United States. The Canadian approach to the Korean War has been previously categorized as one of “diplomacy of constraint” by historian Denis Stairs4, but there is no doubt that the experience of the Korean War elevated Korea’s strategic importance for Canadian policymakers.
In the immediate post-Korean War period, strategic assumptions of the Cold War, coupled with humanitarian concerns, guided Canada’s approach to the Korean peninsula. Having fought so hard for South Korea during the Korean War, Canadians also shared American assumptions about the importance of preserving the South Korean state. Through the Colombo Plan, the UN Korean Relief Agency, and efforts undertaken by the Unitarian Service Committee, Canada maintained its engagement with Korea through various aid programmes over the course of the 1950s. As the Canadian government sought to limit its aid to under-developed countries,
3 Library and Archives Canada, Brooke Claxton Fonds – Unpublished Memoirs, (MG 32, B5, Vol 97, R3306-0-1-E), MIKAN 104788, 1120. 4 See Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974.
4 non-governmental organizations such as the Unitarian Service Committee assumed a leading role in mobilizing Canadian families to donate for aid operations in Korea.
South Korea’s rapid industrialization under President Park Chung Hee came as a surprise for Canadian policymakers, as South Korea transformed itself from an aid recipient to a promising trading partner. There were thorny issues, as the Yushin regime under Park showed backward movement on South Korea’s constitution, and the Park regime was not entirely in agreement with Canada’s recognition of China or the Canadian Wheat Board’s grain sales to North Korea. Political differences aside, economic interests took priority between Canada and South Korea over the 1970s. For South Korea, Canada was a new market and an important political ally in its competition against North Korea, and Canada also saw significant strategic and commercial interests with South Korea’s industrialization. This period also saw the introduction of the new points system by the Pierre E. Trudeau government, which opened the doors for newcomers based on skills and experiences.5 Immigration was both a function of Korea’s social and economic development and of Canadian political and economic change. The changes in Canada’s immigration policies over the course of the 1960s to the 1970s, such as the Immigration Act of 1976, had little to do with Korea specifically, but they had a major impact on the ability of Koreans to come to Canada after 1968. Moreover, the negotiations and ultimate sale of CANDU nuclear reactors to Korea sparked Canada’s interest on the Korean market in the 1970s, and demonstrated the interconnected nature of Canada’s nuclear policy, strategic calculations of the Cold War, and economic self-interest.
Canada’s engagement with Korea came much later than its relationship with other Pacific countries, though it conformed to the general pattern of Eurocentrism in Canadian foreign policy. Europe, rather than Asia, formed Ottawa’s preoccupation in the early to mid-20th century and scholarly accounts about Canada’s external relations have also tended to reflect “a certain
5 Instead of race or nationality, the new points system introduced in 1967 evaluated prospective immigrants based on work skills, education levels, language ability (in speaking French or English), and family connections became the main considerations in deciding who could immigrate. See Gerald E. Dirks, “Immigration Policy in Canada,” Canadian Encyclopedia, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/immigration-policy/
5
Eurocentrism” as historian John D. Meehan once remarked.6 The lack of attention on Korea can also be seen as a reflection of a broader trend in Canadian-Asian history. Aside from a few diplomatic engagements, railway workers from China, and the internment of Japanese-Canadians during the Second World War, Canada’s engagement with the Pacific countries in the first half of the 20th century tended to be very limited and ad-hoc in its approach.7 Ottawa had established a legation in Japan in 1929 and opened an embassy in Nationalist China in 1943, but it waited until 1963 to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea. 8 It then took another decade for the Canadian embassy to open in Seoul in 1973, which only materialized because of South Korean insistence. Compared to other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, it can be concluded that Canada’s relationship with Korea blossomed relatively later, a phenomenon which is also found in the scholarship.
On Canada’s engagement with Korea, much of the existing scholarship focuses on missionary work, the Korean War and diaspora studies. The lack of a comprehensive account on Canadian-Korean bilateral relations therefore follows the general trend in the history of Canadian-Asian relations, which tends to be sporadic and heavily narrative, despite the country’s obvious importance in Canadian external relations. A similar trend is also found in the Korean scholarship, where preoccupation about the United States has led to a complete gap in the study of Canadian-Korean relations. Beyond formal treaties and diplomatic visits, any substantial discussions on South Korean policy with regards to Canada only emerged after the 1970s. Such absence of attention and interest in Canada is a very curious phenomenon, especially in light of the foundations built through missionary activities and diplomatic and military engagements from the late 1940s onwards. This study aims to fill this missing gap, to better understand how two seemingly distant countries became partners and allies, while juggling their own domestic priorities and responding to changing international circumstances.
6 IBID. 7 IBID. 8 John D. Meehan, Chasing the Dragon in Shanghai: Canada's Early Relations with China, 1858-1952, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 4.
6
On the whole, the transformation of Canadian-Korean relations in the 20th century is an overwhelmingly positive story, one that evolved slowly but without any major negative incident from the perspective of race and multiculturalism in Canada. For instance, the experiences of the Chinese Head Tax or the internment of Japanese-Canadians, which are often recalled as examples of a darker period in early Asian-Canadian history, are not found in the experiences of Koreans in Canada. Part of the explanation lies with the fact that formal engagements between Ottawa and Seoul came relatively late; the official contact between Canada and Korea was made in 1947 through the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, and Canada only recognized the South Korean government in 1949. After Canada’s participation in the Korean War, a formal diplomatic relationship was established in 1963, and Korean immigration to Canada only began in the late 1960s under the points system. Moreover, Koreans who migrated to Canada tended to be highly-educated, skilled workers who passed the yardstick of the points system, and hence occupied a different niche in the Canadian economy. Domestically, Koreans arrived in Canada when there were discussions about multiculturalism and a greater tolerance and openness towards “the other”. As a result, while individual experiences may vary, there is no explicit “racist” encounter to be found in the overall history of Canadian-Korean relations.
Another important component in explaining the nature of Canadian-Korean relations lies with their common outlook on international relations and shared economic interests, especially over the course of the Cold War. Both countries were firm supporters of Western ideals and believed in the need to fight communism to preserve democracy and freedom. Canada’s participation in the Korean War cemented a certain degree of solidarity between Seoul and Ottawa. In their foreign policy orientations, Canada and South Korea also shared an important common denominator as two countries whose existence, security and prosperity were inevitably linked to the United States. Such dependence on, or proximity to, the United States led to a long tradition in both Canada and South Korea to prioritize their respective bilateral relationships with the United States over all others. Accordingly, historians in both countries were always interested in the evolution of Canadian-American relations or Korean-American relations. Given that Canada shares an immediate border with the United States and conducts more than 75 per cent of its export trade with the United States each year, Canadian-American relations have always assumed the highest priority for the direction and substance of Canadian foreign policy. Geostrategic realities also dictated Canada’s approach towards the Pacific. When Canada turned
7 to Asia in the early 20th century, the focus was primarily on Japan and China, two countries that held a greater importance for Canada’s Pacific engagements. For obvious security and strategic reasons, South Korean attention has always focused on the ROK-US alliance when they were not preoccupied by North Korea or disputes and disagreements with their immediate neighbours, including Japan and China. Hence, there remained a certain invisible triangular relationship between Canada, the United States and the Republic of Korea, guided by security and commercial interests. Yet, ironically, disagreement with the United States, under the façade of a strong alliance and partnership, was precisely what brought Canada and South Korea closer together in the 1970s.
This study draws upon historical documents from various archives in Canada and South Korea (online and offline), such as: the Library and Archives Canada; the Diplomatic Archives at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea; the Korean History Database; the Presidential Archives of the Republic of Korea; the National Archives of Korea; various missionary records and publications found in the United Church of Canada Archives and Thomas Fisher Rare Books Library; the University of Toronto archives; the Foreign Relations of the United States online archive; the historical debates of the Hansard records of Canada; the Cabinet Conclusions9; the Multicultural History Society of Ontario archives; archives of the Globe; and, the NAVER digital news library. It also draws upon oral interviews with Korean War veterans, former diplomats and Korean immigrants to Canada. Canadian archival sources from the Department of External Affairs only features an in-depth analysis of the Korean situation and Canadian-Korean relations as of the mid-1960s, while the South Korean archival sources feature analysis on Canada as of the mid-1970s. Much of the earlier discussion, therefore, focuses more heavily on the Canadian sources, but Korean sources were used whenever possible and relevant to give more agency to the Korean side of the story.
Some scholars like John Price and Greg Donaghy have lamented that a general lack of attention to Canada’s engagement with the Pacific reflects a long-standing “Euro-centric” approach in Canadian foreign policy. While they are right to point out the Euro-centric bias in
9 The Cabinet Conclusions (1944-1976) in Canada contains 105 items on Korea, most heavily concentrated on the Korean War.
8
Canadian external relations, their works on Korea only provide a limited assessment of Canada’s engagement with Korea. Price’s Orienting Canada: Race, Empire and the Transpacific (2011), which focuses on the politics of race with regards to Asia, does not provide a comprehensive treatment on Korea (it focuses mostly on the war crimes committed by Canadian soldiers during the Korean War) and Donaghy’s article on Korea only covers 1947-1972 period, essentially leading up to the establishment of Canadian embassy in Seoul. 10 There is a complete void in the scholarship of Canadian history in terms of the evolution of Canadian-Korean relations, and South Korean historians have also overlooked Canada, due to their preoccupations about the United States. To date, accounts related to Canadian-Korean history have tended to focus narrowly, and rather sporadically, on three main topics: the missionaries, the Korean War and immigration history, which merits analysis to better contextualize this study.
a) Missionaries
As John K. Fairbank, a leading scholar of Western relations with East Asia, once argued, “Mission history is a great and under-used research laboratory for the comparative observation of cultural stimulus and response in both directions.”11 Fairbank’s observation remains true for Canadian missionary engagements with Korea, not because there is a shortage of materials written by the missionaries or biographical accounts about missionaries, but rather because of a lack of serious scholarly engagement examining their long-term effect.12 The existing literature on missionaries can be divided into three broad categories. The first group includes journals, church records, news reports and letters written by the missionaries themselves, many of whom were extremely prolific writers. The second group includes scholarly accounts on the history of Christianity in Korea and the operational dimension of missions, mostly written by Korean scholars. The third group features autobiographies and biographies of notable missionaries, most
10 See John Price, Orienting Canada: Race, Empire and the Transpacific (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011); Greg Donaghy, “In the Cold War's Shadow: Canada and South Korea, 1947–1972.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 21, no. 1 (2015). 11 John K. Fairbank, “Assignment for the Seventies,” The American Historical Review 74, no. 3 (February 1969). 12 One of the few Canadian-Korean scholars who has done in-depth study on this subject is Young Sik Yoo, who has published multiple volumes on the early Canadian missionaries and most notably James S. Gale. See Yoo’s Earlier Canadian Missionaries in Korea: A Study in History 1888-1895, (Toronto: The Society for Korean and Related Studies, 1987).
9 of which are written by contemporary theologians and scholars with a specific personal interest in the given missionary. Each of these three categories of the broader mission history in Korea presents unique strengths and limitations as historical sources, which merits further discussion. There is also a significant gap in the interwar period (1920s-30s) because of the Japanese persecution of missionaries, who subsequently moved to parts of Japan and China (or back to Canada or England) and only returned to Korea in the late 1940s. 13
The early North American missionaries who served in Far East missions tended to be well-educated and were proactive in sharing their experiences with the audience at home. Their accounts are deeply personal and provide vivid portraits of life in Korea.14 These missionaries were also very active in recording and sharing their lives and experiences in Korea. Some Canadian missionaries like James S. Gale became active translators of literary works and reports on the political situation in Korea at the time.15
13 The missing gap in Canadian-Asian relations in the interwar years has been noted by scholars like John D. Meehan, who has noted that “[t]hough the 1930s marked the highpoint of Canada’s business, missionary and diplomatic involvement in East Asia, the decade has been overlooked as a formative period of its relations with the region. Early studies of those ties are too close to the events they describe, with the more recent work heavily focused on trade and politics with little historical context.” (Meehan, op.cit, 3). 14 James S. Gale, Korea in Transition, New York: Young People’s Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, 1909; Presbyterian Church in Canada, Korea: The Land of Chosen, Toronto: Presbyterian Publications, 1912; Elizabeth A. McCully and E. J.O Fraser, Our Share in Korea, Toronto: Woman’s Missionary Society, 1931; Florence J. Murray, Return to Korea, Belleville, ON: Essence, 1999; Ruth Taylor, In Korea Now, Toronto: United Church of Canada Board of Overseas Mission – Woman’s Missionary Society, 1953; James Dale Van Bushkirk, Korea: Land of the Dawn, New York City: Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada, 1931; A.E. Armstrong, Korea the Wonderland of Christianity: Where there has been a convert for every hour since missionary work began, Toronto: Presbyterian Church in Canada, 1918; Lillias H. Underwood, Fifteen Years among the Top- Knots, or Life in Korea, New York City: Young People’s Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, 1908; W. Arthur Noble, Ehwa: A Tale of Korea, New York: Young People’s Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, 1906; Rev. A. Falconer and Rev. P. M. Morrison, Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada: New Hebrides, Trinidad and Korea, Halifax: Presbyterian Church in Canada, 1899; & Jessie M. Johnston, Broadcasts: From the Women’s Missionary Society of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, Toronto: Publication Office of the Women’s Missionary Society, 1925. 15James S. Gale [Translated by Kim In-su], Cheimsŭ S. Keil Moksaŭi sŏn'gyo p'yŏnji [Rev. James S. Gale's missionary letters], Seoul: K'umnan ch'ulp'ansa, 2009; James S. Gale [Translated by Kwŏn Hyŏ- gil], Han'guk ŭi Mat'eo Rich'i Cheimsŭ keil [James S. Gale, the Matteo Ricci of Korea], Seoul: Han'guk Kodŭng Sinhak Yŏn'guwŏn, 2012; Oliver Avison, a medical missionary in Korea, regularly wrote for Taehan Kidokkyo Sŏhoe through the Federal Council of Protestant Evangelical Missions in Korea, published as “The Korea mission field,” Seoul: The Christian Literature Society of Korea. Two Canadian missionaries, Oliver Avison and R. A. Hardie, co-authored regular reports from January 6th to Sept 28th 1932 in Kidok sinbo [Christian Newspaper], published by Chosŏn Yesugyo Sŏhoe (Kyŏngsŏng).
10
The first category of existing accounts on missionaries consists of records written by the missionaries themselves, some of which were published later by church boards (such as the United Church Archives and the Anglican Church of Canada archives), and others which have been preserved in the University of Toronto Archives and the Fisher Rare Books Library at the University of Toronto. Amongst Canadian missionaries, James S. Gale stands out for having the most comprehensive and exhaustive records. The finding aid for the James S. Gale Papers (1888-1937) at the Fisher Rare Books Library, for instance, contains 24 boxes of materials, including drafts about Korea and translations of Korean texts, commonplace books, diaries, correspondence, family papers, photographs, and his collected manuscripts, photographs, and printed appearances.16 Gale is certainly only one of many who recorded and shared his experience in Korea, and there are extensive reports written by later missionaries mostly through the United Church of Canada.17 To date, Gale remains a unique figure because of his complete mastery of the Korean language and his extensive involvement in translations and publications. While the missionaries were not free of their own biases and assumptions about the East, their records nevertheless serve as valuable resources in understanding the first impressions of Korea and experiences on the ground. Today, Korean scholars in the fields of linguistic studies and cultural anthropology are increasingly turning to Gale’s historical records.
The second category of literature consists of studies on the growth of Christianity in Korea and the role of Western missionaries.18 The history of Protestantism in Korea remains a
16 See the Manuscript Finding Aid
11 highly relevant topic in light of the size and influence of Christianity in Korea: roughly 31.6 per cent of the total population of South Korea today (48.9 million) are Christians.19 Considering that Korea remained a Hermit Kingdom for much of its existence and that the arrival of missionaries -- and Christianity -- is a relatively recent phenomenon, the success and growth of Protestant missions in Korea is all the more remarkable. Churches are quite literally in every corner in urban and rural parts of South Korea, and its capital Seoul has been called a “city of crosses” because of the way that the church crosses on the rooftops of churches light up the streets at night. Today, South Korea boasts the largest Protestant church in the world: for instance, the Yoido Full Gospel Church, with a membership of more than 800,000 people. In addition, various mega-churches and their affiliated institutions, such as newspapers, schools, broadcasting stations, and the YMCA/YWCA, exert significant influences on South Korea’s social fabric.20
Accordingly, much scholarly attention has been paid on how this “Western” religion has been so successful in the Korean society and what role it has played in Korean history at large.21 Although some have argued that Protestant Christianity in Korea was a product of Western expansion into Asia and that missionary encounters should be seen as an instrument of Western imperialism, political circumstances in Korea led Koreans to perceive Japan as the “imperialist enemy,” rather than Western missionaries. Moreover, to a large degree, the impending Japanese threat encouraged Korean nationalists to join the religious community to obtain modern education, freedom of expression and political solidarity.22 Hence, the missionary phase in the late 19th to the early 20th century demonstrates how the Korean struggle against one imperial force (Japan) motivated the native population to seek help from other foreign influences (Western missionaries). A distinct feature about this period is that the Western missionaries were
in Busan, Seoul: Korean Presbyterian Church Press, 2007; T. Stanley Soltau, Korea: The Hermit Nation and Its Response to Christianity, New York: World Dominion Press, 1932; Jan A. B. Jongeneel, Christian Mission and Education in Modern China, Japan and Korea: Historical Studies, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009. 19 CIA World Factbook, “Country Profile: Republic of Korea,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world-factbook/geos/ks.html
12 seen as an overwhelmingly positive force by the Korean general public, and some have even argued that missionaries played an important role in “modernizing” Korean society, which is absolutely true in the realms of education and medicine in particular.23 While the notion of “modernity” in the national discourse is a contentious subject, especially for countries like Korea with thousands of years of history, there is no doubt that Canadian missionaries made important contributions towards intellectual, cultural, social and political change in Korea.
Given the importance of the missionary phase in Korean history, Korean scholars, especially from the field of theology, have closely examined the growth of Christianity in modern Korea.24 Under the broader category of “church history,” denominational history focuses on various issues such as the growth of Protestantism, theological orientation, and the Korean Protestant Church as a social institution.25 Canadian missionaries are regularly featured in these accounts because the scope of mission work often extended to social engagement in the form of medical work26. Canadian missionaries like Malcolm Fenwick27 also became pioneers in teaching Koreans to bring Christianity to their fellow Koreans. Fenwick, who was involved with some 18,000 newly converted Koreans (from lower- to middle-income classes) by the time he died in 1936, was extremely critical of many other foreign missions and churches in Korea as
23 For a detailed analysis on this subject, see Jimyoung Kim, "The Role of Christianity in the Economic Modernization of South Korea," Ph.D. Dissertation, Florida: Florida State University, 1984. 24 Chung-Shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), introduction, passim. 25 See especially Tae-yŏng Yu, Han'guk kŭnhyŏndaesa wa Kidokkyo [Christianity and modern Korean history], Seoul: P'urŭn Yŏksa, 2009; Hanʼguk Kidokkyo Changnohoe, Hansomang an-esŏ: Hanʼguk, Kʻanada kyohoe sŏnʼgyo hyŏmnyŏk 100-chunyŏn kinyŏm munjip [In One Hope: Commemorating 100th anniversary of Canada-Korea Church Mission Cooperation], Seoul: Hanʼguk Kidokkyo Changnohoe Chʻulpʻansa, 1998; Su-il Chʻoe, Kanchʻurin Kidokkyo sŏnʼgyo yŏksa: chʻodae kyohoe ro putʻŏ Hanʼguk sŏnʼgyo yŏksa kkaji, [A Concise History of Christianity mission: From Early Churches to Korean Foreign Missions], Seoul: Yeyŏng Kʻŏmyunikʻeisyŏn, 2003.
26 See Yŏnse Taehakkyo Ŭihaksa Yŏn'guso, Tong Asia yŏksa sok ŭi sŏn'gyo pyŏngwŏn [Mission Hospitals in the History of East Asia], (Seoul:Yŏksa Konggan, 2015), 59 & 75; Man-yŏl Yi, Hanʼguk Kidokkyo ŭiryosa [History of Christian medical work in Korea], (Seoul: Akʻanet, 2003), 130; See as well Hyŏng-u Pak and Chun-hyŏng Pak, Han'guk ŭihak kwa kodŭng kyoyuk ŭi kaech'ŏkcha Ollibŏ Al Ebisŭn [Oliver R. Avison, the Pioneer of Korean Medical Education and Higher Education], Seoul: Yŏnse Taehakkyo Ŭiryowŏn, 2010; Chae-ŭi Sin, Kim Kwŏn-jŏng, Cho I-je chŏ, Hanʼguk Kidokkyo wa chʻogi ŭiryo sŏnʼgyo [Korean Christianity and Early Medical Missions], Seoul: Hanʼguk Kidokkyo Yŏksa Munhwa Yŏnʼguso, 2007. 27 Malcolm Fenwick, The Church of Christ in Corea: A Pioneer Missionary's Own Story, (New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1911), 5.
13 being “over-organized.” His belief in Christianity was one of a personal spiritual communion as opposed to institutionalized worship; he wrote that “God was not in the Presbyteries, Assemblies or missionary conferences but in the midst of the little flock, and especially with those who sit alone in quiet communion with the spirit.”28 Because of their willingness to work with different denominations, coupled with their linguistic skills and active involvement in non-theological works like medical and literary translations, Canadian missionaries had more access to non-elite Koreans than other Western missionaries did. Many of them settled in what is currently North Korea, and later church boards such as the United Church of Canada missions only turned to stations in South Korea in the post-Korean War era because they were unable to access North Korea.
While these denominational histories are useful for understanding the broader context of the growth of Christianity in Korea, they tend to focus more heavily on celebrating ecumenical history and often treat Western missionaries in a generalized fashion. As a result, these studies generally lack critical analysis on the work of missionaries or the complexities of their interaction with the local population. Furthermore, these texts often focus on specific events and incidents, such as the Independence Club Movement, the March First Movement, or the controversy over the Shinto-Shrine worship. This approach was intentionally undertaken in order to emphasize the church’s positive role in the development of modern Korea. Nevertheless, because of this heavy emphasis on examining the positive growth of protestant churches in Korea, complexities surrounding imperialism, nationalism and the views of missionaries are generally overlooked.29
The third category consists of autobiographies and biographies of the Canadian missionaries in Korea in the early 20th century.30 The biographies are concentrated on a few
28 William Scott, Canadians in Korea: Brief Historical Sketch of Canadian Mission Work in Korea, (Toronto: Ecumenical Forum of Canada, 1977), 20. 29 IBID.
30 Young Sik Yoo, The Good Pastor: In Celebration of Dr. James S. Gale, First Canadian Missionary to Korea 1888-2008, Mississauga: Society for Korean and Related Studies, 2008; Francoise Fauconnet- Buzelin, Mourir pour la Corée: Jacques Chastan, Missionnaire apostolique du diocese de Digne, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996; Lillias H. Underwood, Underwood of Korea: Being an Intimate Record of the Life and Works of the Rev. H.G. Underwood for thirty-one years as a missionary of the Presbyterian Board in Korea, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1983; George E. Ogle, Liberty to the Captives: the Struggle
14 select well-known missionaries.31 The most comprehensive work on Gale has been done by Dr. Young Sik Yoo. His latest two volumes of Ch'akhan mokcha: Keil ŭi sam kwa sŏn'gyo [A Good Pastor: Gale’s Life and Mission], published in 2013, are the most comprehensive to date, with nearly 2,000 pages of analysis, photos, letters and excerpts of Gale’s writings.32 Yoo’s latest volumes reflect two decades of research on Gale, with full access to Gale’s family records. However, Yoo’s work on Gale is heavily narrative and focuses entirely on Gale, to the point of appearing hagiographical, perhaps reflecting the author’s own fascination with Gale. Lives of other missionaries, such as Dr. Oliver Avison and his work with Severance Hospital, have also been examined, mostly by a handful Korean scholars. Likewise, a few former politicians and former students of Schofield, along with the Schofield Memorial Foundation based in Toronto, have published accounts of the lives and works of the missionaries.33 These accounts exemplify the strengths and weaknesses commonly found in biographies in general. They are useful for understanding the motives, challenges and complexities that individual missionaries faced over the course of their time in Korea, but many of them tend to be extremely narrative, at times hagiographic, and do not usually engage in assessing the broader domestic, regional and international circumstances.
against Oppression in South Korea, Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1977; Helen Fraser MacRae, A Tiger on Dragon Mountain: The Life of Rev. Duncan M. MacRae, Ma Moksa, “Duncan Korea”, Charlottetown, P.E.I.: A. J. Haslam, 1993; Dong-Jin Kim; Daniel M. Davies, The Life and Thought of Henry G. Appenzeller (1858-1902), Missionary to Korea, Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 1988 ; Elizabeth McCully, Kʻeipʻŭ Pŭretʻŭn eso Sorae kkaji : Williŏm Chon Mekʻenji Sŏnʼgyosa ŭi saengae wa Hwanghae-do sŏnʼgyogi, [From Cape Breton to Sorai, Life of Rev. W.J. McKenzie of Korea], Seoul: Taehan Kidokkyo Sŏhoe, 2002; Son-Su Choi, Purŭshim Pada Ttangkkŭtkkaji: Naehan K'aenada Sŏn'gyosadŭrŭi Samkwa Shinang, Hŏnshinŭi Palchach'wi, [To the End of the Earth Through Calling: The Lives and Faiths of Resident Canadian Missionaries in Korea], Seoul: Hongsŏngsa, 2011; Janette E. Mcintosh, “Double Witness: Mission as Evangelism and Justice – Contributions of John H. McIntosh to the Mission of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and the Korean Christian Church in Japan 1987-1994”, Vancouver: Vancouver School of Theology, 2010. 31 See Geoffrey Johnston and A. Hamish Ion, Canadian Missionaries and Korea: Two Case Studies in Public Opinion, Toronto: University of Toronto – York University, Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1988; Jin Woo Lee, The Presbyterian Church in Canada’s Mission Work for Koreans in Japan 1927-1934: The Beginnings of Partnership Mission, Toronto: Toronto School of Theology, 2012. 32 Young Sik Yoo, Ch'akhan mokcha: Keil ŭi sam kwa sŏn'gyo, [A Good Pastor: Gale’s Life and Mission], Seoul: Chinhŭng, 2013, V1 & V2. 33 Sŭng-t'ae Kim & Yu Chin, Yi Hang eds, Kanghan cha enŭn horangi ch'ŏrŏm yakhan cha enŭn pidulgi ch'ŏrŏm: Sŭk'op'ildŭ Paksa charyojip, [A Tiger for the Powerful and a Dove for the Weak, A Collection of Resources on Dr. Schofield], Seoul: Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'an Munhwawŏn, 2012; Yi Chang-nak, Minjok taepʻyo 34-in Sŏk Ho-pʻil, [The 34th Representative of National Liberation Movement, Dr. Schofield], Kyŏnggi Sŏngnam: Param Chʻulpʻansa, 2007.
15
b) The Korean War
Another key theme in the existing Canadian-Korean historiography concerns the Canadian participation in the Korean War. There are three key sub-fields to consider for the purpose of this dissertation: the general Western scholarship on the Korean War, the South Korean scholarship, and the Canadian scholarship. On the whole, the scholarship on the Korean War is vast in size, both in English and in Korean, and has expanded considerably in the last two decades with the release of new archival documents. Various terms have been used to describe the Korean War – the “forgotten war,”34 the “limited war,”35 the “war before Vietnam,”36 and even the “wrong war.”37
Initially, the prevailing view in the West was that Stalin was the “mastermind” behind the Korean War and Kim Il Sung was merely a “puppet”38; it essentially concluded that North
Korea’s act of aggression was plotted by Moscow.39 David Rees’ Korea: The Limited War (1964), for example, was the standard account of the Korean War until the 1970s when archival
34 When the Korean War came to an end, it did not arouse any euphoria among the public, as they calculated the costs of the war with unsatisfactory and inconclusive outcome. “There were no victory celebrations, no cheering crowds in Times Square, no sense of triumph … only relief that a sour little war was finally over” (Ambrose, 106). Unable to celebrate the victory, the Korean War quickly became a “forgotten war” in the conscience of the decision makers and the public (Callum, 262-63). 35 David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964. Rees argues that given the “expansionist aims of the international Communist movement, the Korean War was a limited war, “fought for specific political objectives which … tends to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to affect the opponent’s will, not to crush it…” (Rees, introduction); Martin Lichterman in 1960 claimed that “the Korean War has been the only experience Americans have had with limited war in the nuclear age” See Martin Lichterman, “Korea: Problems in Limited War,” in Gordon B. Turner and Richard D Challener, ed. National Security in the Nuclear Age, (New York: Praeger, 1960), 31. 36 Callum A. MacDonald suggests that “[a]t the height of the cold war, Western statesmen assumed that their own security interests were synonymous with international order.… In retrospect, the Korean conflict seems less an exercise in collective security than an example of intervention against a Third World revolution which threatened to disturb the status quo” (Callum, 264). 37 Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-53 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). Foot argues that even though the Korean War remained limited in military terms, it led to unnecessary destruction and casualties (37) and “brought out a wave of anti- Communist hysteria in the United States and added impetus to McCarthyism, with equally devastating consequences for Koreans, Chinese and Russians alike.” (Foot, conclusion). 38 Lowe, 156. 39 In between were revisionists like Cumings who lay the blame principally on the US and Syngman Rhee, even suggesting the latter may have started the war with the border clashes, and that the DPRK invasion was a reaction. The opening of the Soviet/East bloc archives confirm a version of the traditional view, that Kim was the instigator but waited until Stalin gave the green light in the spring of 1950.
16 materials became declassified. Rees argued that the Korean War was an example par excellence of the containment policy at work. Most scholars in the 60s and 70s rarely paid any attention to the internal issues in Korea, such as the rising tensions between two Korean states or various guerrilla outbreaks in the South. Then, Bruce Cumings broke a new revisionist interpretation with his book, The Origins of the Korean War, arguing that internal factors were responsible for the outbreak of war in Korea. Cumings inspired many scholars to take a new approach towards understanding the conflict throughout the 80s.40 Subsequently, a post-revisionist interpretation emerged with scholars such as Erik Van Ree claiming that that the Soviet Union and China played much more important roles than what Cumings had suggested.
With the opening of Soviet archival documents, it became clear that Kim Il Sung conceived the Korean War with the intention of re-uniting the North and the South through military means, and sought permission and the necessary equipment from the Soviet Union, as well as approval from China.41 While Stalin and Mao supported the war, Stalin remained extremely cautious throughout and made every effort to conceal his involvement in the Korean War. Immediately following the Northern attack, Stalin maintained a façade of reluctance, and even showed a willingness to withdraw his support for Kim Il Sung amid the crisis in the fall of 1950. In light of the abundance of Soviet military weapons in Korea, which was plain to any observer, the credibility of Stalin’s efforts to deny his involvement was short-lived, although the theme did survive for many years in the works of deluded Western scholars.42 By the time William Stueck wrote his book, Rethinking the Korean War (2002), it was clear that both the internal and external factors had to be considered to understand the origins of the Korean War. A common problem found in these works is that the authors did not have full access to the Korean
40 Some of the well-known accounts include Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War and Korea, 1945-50, Kent, Ohio: Kent University Press, 1981; Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command, New York: Knopf, 1986; Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-53, New York: Times Books, 1987; Max Hastings, The Korean War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987; Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War New York: Times Books, 1982.
41 Myŏngnim Pak, Hanʼguk chŏnjaeng ŭi palbal kwa kiwŏn, [The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins], (Seoul: Nanam Chʻulpʻan, 1996), 866. 42 The Cold War International History Project by the Woodrow Wilson Centre provides a rich account of primary documents on this issue: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/theme/cold-war-history.
17 archival materials, partly due to language barriers and partly due to the reticence of the Korean government.
If Western scholarship on the Korean War suffered from lack of access to Korean materials, there were other problems with the Korean-language accounts. South Korean scholarship on the Korean War has shown a strong nationalistic undertone as an overarching theme. For instance, the South Korean government began publishing its “official” account of the Korean War in 1967. The nine volumes of The Official History of the Korean War were written with exclusive access to the resources available at the Ministry of National Defence, as well as a wide array of interviews with politicians, war veterans and many others.43 These volumes unquestionably placed the blame on the North and set the trend for the approach taken by almost all South Korean historians. The eleven volumes of the History of the Korean War, which appeared in the late 1970s and were edited by the War History Compilation Committee of the Ministry of National Defence, followed the framework of the Official History.44 Since then, many Korean historians have produced works in a similar vein, mostly focusing on the domestic issues pertaining to the Korean War. While the two “official” series of productions are hailed as the authoritative accounts within South Korea, they have a number of limitations. Even though it is believed that most of the key information on the War remained with the Koreans and these series benefitted greatly from first-hand interviews, much of the strategic, political, and diplomatic documents stayed with the Americans. It is also significant that the Official History does not indicate its sources, rendering it difficult to separate facts from interpretation. As a result, many scholars outside of Korea have long considered them unreliable and of only limited scholarly value.45
The Canadian scholarship on the Korean War does not conform to the trends found in Western scholarship or Korean scholarship. In Canadian history, three main streams of accounts
43 Byung-Joon Chung, Han'guk chŏnjaeng: 38 Sŏn Ch'ungdolgwa Chŏnjaengŭi Hyŏngsŏng [The Korean War: The Conflict at the 38th Parallel and the Formation of the War], (Seoul: Dolbegae, 2006), 30- 33. 44 Kim Chull Baum and James I. Matray eds., op cit., 9. 45 Bruce Cumings called it a “fabrication” (See Cumings, 571).
18 are found with regards to the Korean War: military, personal, and academic. In 1956, the Historical Section of the Army published a brief account, composed of articles written by the 25th Brigade’s Historical Officer named Frank McGuire.46 It was followed by the official record written by Lt.-Col. Herbert Fairlie Wood, a Korean War veteran.47 In addition to being heavy on technical details of the battlefields, Wood’s account has been criticized for its patronizing tone and factual errors. In a similar vein, first-hand accounts from the veterans are highly narrative, as well as descriptive and narrow in their contents and approaches.48 Some political accounts, such as Lester B. Pearson’s Memoirs or Brooke Claxton’s unpublished memoirs at the Library and Archives Canada, provide some useful glimpses into the Canadian attitude towards the Korean War. Contrary to Wood’s Official History, these personal accounts overwhelmingly testify that Canada’s Special Force volunteers were generally unfit, unprepared and faced numerous tactical problems on the field.49 In terms of scholarly treatment of Canadian foreign policy regarding the
Korean War, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States50 by Denis Stairs remains as the standard work. Stairs argued that Canada’s foreign policy towards the Korean War was guided by an attempt to “constrain” the Americans from getting too involved in conflicts in Asia during the Cold War. However, Robert Prince challenged this interpretation, arguing that there were severe limits to how much Canada could influence the decisions made in the United States, given the nature of the relationship.51 Stairs is correct to point out the difference between the Canadian approach and the American approach – the only
46 Historical Section, General Staff, Army Headquarters, Canada’s Army in Korea: The United Nations Operations, 1950-53, and Their Aftermath (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1956). 47 Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Operations In Korea and Their Effects On The Defence Policy of Canada (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1966). 48 See Les Peate, The War That Wasn’t: Canadians in Korea (Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 2005); Robert Hepenstall, Find The Dragon: The Canadian Army in Korea 1950-1953 (Alberta: Four Winds Publishing Company, 1995); Brent Byron Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea 1950-53 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); and William Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003). 49 Johnston, op. cit, Introduction.
50 See Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).
51 Robert Prince, “The Limits of Constraint: Canadian-American Relations and the Korean War, 1950-51,” Journal of Canadian Studies 27, no. 4 (1992-93).
19 critical issue with his work is that he approaches the Korean War primarily through the lens of Canadian-American relations, and did not consult any Korean-language sources due to language barriers. As a whole, Canadian scholarship on the Korean War is very limited and approaches Korea as a battleground in the broader Cold War context.
c) Diaspora studies on the Korean-Canadian community
Scholarship on contemporary Korean-Canadian diaspora and the history of the Korean diaspora in Canada is a relatively new field of study with encouraging signs of growth, mainly from the discipline of sociology and community-based anthologies. A notable scholarly work on this subject is the Korean Immigrants in Canada: Perspectives on Migration, Integration, and the Family52 which examined issues such as migration factors, demographic profiles, ethnic identities, health-related concerns for the elderly, and kirogi families.53 The primary focus is on ethno-cultural analysis and psychology, and very little reference is made to the historical background and evolution of the community itself. In an effort to fill this gap, the Korean Canadian Cultural Association in Toronto recently published a major volume on the History of Korean-Canadians (2013) to commemorate the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Canada and South Korea.54 Chronicling the history of the Korean-Canadian diaspora through oral interviews and submissions by key members of the community, this latest volume makes an important contribution to the scholarship. However, the quality of research and analysis varies a great deal depending on the author. Moreover, there is no coherent theme through this massive volume, and this anthology is more valuable as a record for the community rather than as a serious scholarly work.
Overall, it is evident that various efforts to chronicle different aspects of Korean- Canadian history, such as missionary encounters, the Korean War and the Korean-Canadian
52 Samuel Noh, Ann H. Kim, and Marianne S. Noh eds, Korean Immigrants in Canada: Perspectives on Migration, Integration, and the Family, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012. 53 A kirogi family is a kind of a family arrangement where the father usually stays in Korea to earn income and support the offspring as an international student abroad, usually accompanied by the mother. 54 Korean Canadian Cultural Association, K'aenada Haninsa [History of Koreans in Canada], Toronto: Korean Canadian Cultural Association, 2013.
20 diaspora, reveal a significant gap in terms of analyzing the evolution of the bilateral history with a long-term perspective. This study intends to build upon the existing secondary literature whenever possible and relevant, and furthermore fill the gap with previously unexamined archival materials to present a more comprehensive and analytical assessment of the evolution of Canadian-Korean relations.
Chapter Overviews
Chapter One (1888-1945) examines the motivations, the nature and the impact of Canadian early missionaries in Korea during a period when the “Hermit Kingdom,” as Korea was known then, began to open its door to foreign missionaries. Canada’s early presence on the Korean peninsula took shape in the form of missionaries, with many young men and women engaged in activities far beyond the realm of theology and evangelizing. Canadian missionaries often worked in collaboration with the British and American missionaries, and it is difficult to impose a strict sense of what it means to be “Canadian” in the early phases of this history, since many of the missionaries were of British heritage and paid through American boards. Very little distinction was made by Koreans in terms of “blue-eyed” Westerners. The first chapter therefore adopts a broad definition of a “Canadian” as a liberal categorization for those who came from Canada and who were born in Canada. The early missionary phase is important, not only because it fundamentally shaped Korean perception of Canada and Canadians, but also because it influenced Canadian attitudes, perceptions and ideas about Korea, however imperfect and subjective that may have been. Although fewer in number compared to American missionaries, Canadian missionaries stood out for their ability to assimilate, and they gained the respect of Koreans for their courage to speak up against Japanese imperialism. Their active reports and public condemnations about Japanese atrocities during the colonial era, when political considerations prompted the silence of the Americans and British, were significant. Koreans never forgot about the heroic role played by Canadian missionaries in their struggle against Japanese imperialism.
The lives and works of three Canadian missionaries are examined in Chapter One to highlight the variety of the work and impact they had in setting the foundations of Canadian- Korean relations. These three missionaries were chosen because of the impact they had in Korea, and also how they are remembered by Koreans today. James S. Gale, the first Canadian
21 missionary to step foot in Korea, quickly mastered the Korean language and became a prolific writer and translator. Missionaries like Gale took a microscopic approach to the “Oriental mind” as Gale once called it, writing and sharing about customs, traditions, and values that ordinary Canadians never knew about. Another Canadian missionary, Dr. Oliver R. Avison, was a founding father of the Severance Hospital in Seoul and a royal physician to King Kojong, and played a key role in establishing medical education curriculum in Korea. The most famous of all Canadian missionaries was Dr. Frank W. Schofield, who became an instrumental force in Korea’s fight against Japanese imperialism. Dr. Schofield helped to arrange meetings of Korean nationalists for the March 1st Independence movement, took photographs of Japanese atrocities, and actively shared information on the crimes committed by Japanese authorities with the outside world. Dr. Schofield is remembered by Koreans as a heroic figure in South Korean history and remains the only foreigner buried in the national cemetery. Long before diplomats and businessmen arrived in Korea, these missionaries served as a source of information and agents of change, and they had a profound impact in terms of shaping public perception – both for the Canadians at home and Koreans whom they interacted with. By examining the lives of three exemplary Canadian missionaries, this chapter argues that the missionary encounter set a highly positive foundation for the future bilateral relationship between Canada and Korea.
Chapter Two (1945-1953) focuses on Canadian engagement with Korea, most notably through the UNTCOK (UN Temporary Commission on Korea) in 1947-48 and the Korean War (1950-53). This chapter argues that Canada’s official political and military engagements during this period actually reflected a relative distance between Ottawa and Seoul, as Korea was mainly perceived as a distant battleground of the Cold War. This period marked a transition from unofficial contacts by missionaries to Canada’s official engagements in Korea through the United Nations. In the aftermath of the Japanese defeat in the Second World War, Koreans initially rejoiced at the news of liberation and regained freedom. The end of the Second World War and the emergence of a new world order, manifested in institutions like the United Nations, appeared to signal a new era in Asia as well. However, the rise of political factions and the arbitrary division of two Koreas at the 38th parallel, jointly decided by the Soviet Union and the United States, guaranteed no political stability on the Korean peninsula. As the Soviet Union and the United States each backed different political leadership in the North and the South, the UN Temporary Commission (UNTCOK) was tasked with supervising a fair election. Canada was a
22 member of the UNTCOK and had a representative named Dr. George Paterson, who tried his best against American pressures. Ultimately, the efforts of the UNTCOK were largely unsuccessful: its jurisdiction was limited to the South and the North Korean political leadership was unwilling to cooperate. The Americans, alarmed by the “loss of China,” (the unexpected victory of the Chinese Communist Party over the American-backed Nationalist in 1949) became determined to not repeat the same mistake in Korea. In an effort to save South Korea from falling to communism, the American government committed to providing millions of dollars in foreign aid and backed Syngman Rhee, the first president of the Republic of Korea. Canadian missionaries who had left Korea in 1942 because of the military situation returned in 1947 to a divided country. Most of the Canadian missionaries resumed their work again in South Korea from the late 1940s.
The ultimate outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was both a result of domestic political rivalries and competing interests of the superpowers at the height of the Cold War. The Korean peninsula became a bloody battlefield and the United Nations intervened immediately, calling it a case of communist aggression and a threat to international security. From the South Korean perspective, Canada’s participation in the Korean War cemented the foundations for the dynamic political and economic relationship between the two countries.55 Nearly 27,000 volunteers made up the Canadian infantry group dispatched to Korea, accompanied by 60 Canadian Nursing Sisters. Over the course of the war, the Royal Canadian Navy patrolled Korean waters and transported soldiers and supplies to the battlefield from the west coast of the United States. The 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry played a critical role in stopping an enemy breakthrough at the Battle of Gapyeong in 1951.
Canadian engagement in the Korean War, motivated by a desire to support its American ally and uphold the legitimacy of the UN and its values, marked an important turning point in terms of Korea’s strategic importance to policymakers in Ottawa. Canadians did not share American guilt over the loss of China, but believed strongly in the need to preserve Western
55 For a detailed overview of the transformation of Canadian-Korean defence relations, see Jiwon Tina Park, “Friends, Allies and Partners: The Past, Present and Future of Canada-Korea Defence Relations (1950-2015),” in Kang Choi, James Manicom and Simon Palamar eds., Mutual Security in the Asia- Pacific: Roles for Australia, Canada and South Korea, Waterloo: Centre for International Governance and Innovation, 2015.
23 ideals. By the end of the Korean War, the Canadian Air Force had carried more than 13,000 passengers and 3,000,000 kg of freight. The contributions of the Royal Canadian Navy --with nine destroyers and more than 3,000 officers --were also notable, especially in light of Canada’s total military capacity at the time.56 In total, 516 Canadian soldiers sacrificed their lives on duty and 378 of them were buried in the UN cemetery in Busan.57 The experience of Korean War veterans, coupled with the voices of Canadian missionaries, meant that Korea was no longer a place that could be casually abandoned. South Koreans, for their part, also never forgot about the Canadians who came to support them, referring the relationship as “the friendship formed on battlefield.” Hence, this turbulent period in Korean history, and Canada’s participation through the UNTCOK and the Korean War, actually changed mutual perceptions about the importance of the bilateral relationship.
Chapter Three (1953-1963) focuses on Canada’s humanitarian engagement with South Korea and argues that non-governmental organizations such as the Unitarian Service Committee (USC) served as a substitute for Ottawa’s official interest and aid. As historian Hector Mackenzie aptly put it, this was the period of “Canada’s nationalist internationalism.”58 But the most significant effort for humanitarian aid came from individuals like Lotta Hitchmanova and the Unitarian Service Committee, rather than from the Canadian government. As a member of the Commonwealth, Canada was a founding member of the Colombo Plan which was designed to provide bilateral aid to developing countries, but its official commitment to the Colombo Plan was limited. The missionary interest saw a revival in the post-Korean War phase, as was seen with the work of the Board of World Mission and through the Joint Work Committee with the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea. From the Post-Korean War period, most of the Canadian missionaries in South Korea came from the United Church of Canada (UCC). The missionary connection was re-vitalized during this period, through scholarships and financial
56 Veteran Affairs Canada, “The Korean War,” http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/korean-war
24 commitments to hospitals like Severance Hospital and Wonju Hospital, and key universities such as Ewha Woman’s University, Yonsei University and Hankuk Seminary. This chapter examines how aid programmes in the Cold War period often had mixed motives, and Korea, on the recipient’s end, generally welcomed the work of the USC in its desperate efforts to feed war orphans and recover from the damages of the conflict.
Chapter Four (1963-1972) analyzes South Korea’s rapid transformation from an aid recipient to a viable trading partner for Canada. South Korea’s economic growth was a function of both domestic policies and changing regional circumstances, namely the Vietnam War and rapprochement with Japan. Over the course of the 1960s, the South Korean economy grew at an exponential rate, through an export-led industrialization strategy carefully choreographed by President Park’s technocrats. Park was inspired by the German and Japanese models of development, and the technocrats admired Rostow’s “take-off” theory and believed that with careful planning and discipline, anything was possible. During this period, South Korea also tried to reduce its dependence on the United States and diversify its trade relationship. Canada and South Korea formally established a diplomatic relationship in 1963, but the relationship was not politically or economically substantial. The Vietnam War had a tremendous effect on South Korea’s economic and political situation, because Korea began to shift away from its reliance on the United States and began to look at Canada as a viable new market for its goods.
Chapter Five (1973-1978) assesses the notion of a “Pacific Turn” in Canada under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and argues that South Korea’s economic growth elevated its importance in the minds of Canadian policymakers. It demonstrates how commercial prospects and geopolitical interests shaped Canadian attitude and policies towards Korea. Growing diplomatic competition between North and South Korea during the Cold War and the establishment of the Canadian embassy in Seoul had huge symbolic significance for the South Korean government. After Canada and South Korea forged diplomatic relations in 1973, both trade and immigration expanded significantly. Park had adopted the Yushin system in South Korea to further oppress political opposition and expand his own power, but Canada largely overlooked Park’s human rights records. Canada also irritated South Korea by selling wheat to North Korea, while South Korea had grave concerns about Canada’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China. Ultimately, economic interests trumped political differences. Over the course of the 1970s,
25
Canadian exports to South Korea increased by 250 per cent and South Korean exports to Canada increased by 750 per cent.
Drawing from the expansion of the trade relationship between Canada and South Korea in the 1970s, Chapter Six focuses specifically on the Canadian export of CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) to Korea, designed by the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Using CANDU exports as a case study, this chapter examines the complex interplay of nuclear, political, economic and strategic issues that defined and shaped Canadian-Korean relations in the 1970s. This deal, valued at $576.5 million, single-handedly changed the commercial importance of South Korea for Canada. In their search for a greater autonomy from the United States, Ottawa and Seoul found a mutually attractive opportunity in CANDU reactors, which offered excellent commercial value for Canadians and energy potential (and perhaps more) for Koreans. In pursuing the CANDU deal with Canada, South Korea intentionally distanced itself from the U.S. and sought to develop a meaningful bilateral partnership with Canada. Despite public concerns and intense political debates about nuclear non-proliferation and scandals involving the use of an agent, the CANDU deal was ultimately signed and marked the single biggest commercial transaction between the two countries.
Despite its significant commercial value, the actual deal-making was a highly contentious process because of fears about nuclear proliferation in the 1970s, and vocal oppositions from the public and policymakers alike about doing business with the Park regime. Moreover, Seoul used this deal to pressure Ottawa against doing business with North Korea. CANDU also required a “leap of faith” from the Canadian government to trust the Park regime’s true intent for importing nuclear technology, for even the Americans worried that the South Koreans were interested in developing their own nuclear weapons. In the backdrop of détente, Canada's CANDU exports to Korea again proved that it was economic interests that served as the main driver of policies in Canadian-Korean relations, rather than ideological or political values. Officials in Ottawa willingly downplayed President Park's domestic human rights record, actively supported South Korea's position at the UN, and resisted North Korea's plea for a closer relationship, all in fear of jeopardizing the CANDU deal with Seoul. From the South Korean perspective, the CANDU deal served as a gateway towards greater energy independence from the United States, further industrialization, and the potential enhancement of nuclear technology as a defence mechanism against North Korea. Ultimately, this study concludes that economic
26 interests and geopolitical interests during the Cold War brought Canada and Korea closer together as serious partners and allies.
27
CHAPTER 1 FIRST IMPRESSIONS: CANADIAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA
“Three hundred years ago, the Japanese discovered the Korean artisan. Deep in the granite hills of Korea, many precious minerals have been found, while the close ally of the Government, the Oriental Development Company, has increasingly found the value of Korea’s paddy fields. The treasures of Korean graves and temples have been discovered and removed, but one thing as yet the Japanese have not discovered. Their genius has failed to penetrate the Korean himself. His thoughts are still a secret; he still rules in the council of his mind, and controls the gateway of his soul…The Japanese failure in Korea has been largely due to a failure to discover and win the heart of the Korean.”
– Dr. William Schofield, The Japan Advertiser (1919) 59
***
When a young man named James S. Gale from the University of Toronto stepped foot on the shores of Busan, Korea in 1888, his voyage marked the first-ever contact between Canada and Korea. While fewer in number than the Americans sent from church boards in a more organized fashion, the Canadian missionaries (about 200 people in total)60 individually played a significant role in setting the foundations for a bilateral relationship between Canada and South Korea. This chapter adopts a broad definition of “Canadian” to include those who were born in Canada and those who came from Canada. Many Canadian missionaries had British heritage and often felt at home in both Canada and in England. It is also important to recognize from the onset that many of these early missionary enterprises were multi-national in nature; there was close cooperation between the Americans, the British, and the Canadian missionaries and very little distinction was
59 Frank Schofield, “The Discovery of the Korean Mind,” The Japan Advertiser, (Aug 2, 1919).
60 In comparison, the number of American foreign missionaries increased from 934 in 1890 to 5000 at the end of the century, and to 12,000 by the end of the 1920s. See Dae Young Ryu, “Understanding Early American Missionaries in Korea (1884-1910): Capitalist Middle Class Values and the Weber Thesis,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 113, January-March 2001.
28 made from the Korean perspective. 61 Considering that the missionary phase covered the first six decades of Canadian-Korean relations, and given the large volume of literature on missionaries, this chapter does not intend to provide an exhaustive summary. Instead, this chapter focuses on three key Canadian missionaries -- James S. Gale, Oliver R. Avison and Frank W. Schofield -- as case studies to argue that the missionary encounter had a lasting impact on Canadian perceptions of Korea and set a positive foundation for future bilateral relations.
Until the Canadian participation on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea in 1947, missionaries served as the only channel of interaction between the two countries. At a time when hardly any information existed in Canada about Korea and vice versa, early missionaries assumed the role of human bridges, generating knowledge and shaping perceptions and attitudes. From translating the Bible and major Korean and Western literature,62 to building schools and hospitals,63 and to mobilizing Korea’s independence movement against Japan, early Canadian missionaries left a mark on Korean society well beyond the realm of spreading Christianity. Moreover, through their writings, reports and translations, these early missionaries not only sought to evangelize Koreans, but they also set the tone for a positive bilateral relationship between Seoul and Ottawa for decades to come.
Yet, there was nothing inevitable about the success of the early missionary encounters between Korea and Canada. Given its frequent history of foreign invasions by powerful neighbours like Mongolia, China, Russia and Japan, in addition to regular internal political turmoil, Korean dynasties remained wary of foreign influences until the late 19th century. Historical circumstances in Korea at the turn of the 20th century between the geopolitics of imperialism in East Asia and the missionary encounter provided an important synergy for
61 There were five individual Canadian missionaries operating in Korea before 1898. They included James Scarth Gale (1888), Malcolm Fenwick (1889), Robert Hardie (1890), Oliver Avison (1893) and William McKenzie (1893). For more information on these individual missionaries, see Elizabeth A. McCully and E.J.O. Fraser, Our Share in Korea, (Toronto: Board of Foreign Missions, United Church of Canada, 1931), 5-9 or William Scott, Canadians in Korea: A Brief Historical Sketch of Canadian Mission Work in Korea, (Toronto: United Church of Canada, 1975), 15-34. 62 See James S. Gale, Korea in Transition, New York: Young People’s Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, 1909; & Presbyterian Church in Canada, Korea: The Land of Chosen Toronto: Presbyterian Publications, 1912. 63 See Yi Man-yŏl, Hanʼguk Kidokkyo ŭiryosa, [History of Christian Medical Work in Korea], Seoul: Akanet, 2003.
29 developing a meaningful relationship. Canada was not particularly interested in establishing a relationship with Korea, practically an unknown territory for most Canadians. Having confederated in 1867, Canada spent the next two decades sorting out its domestic affairs and its relations with Britain and the United States. In addition to Canada’s imperial connection to Great Britain, geographical proximity and commercial interests also dictated that its relationship with the United States would always be a top priority. Moreover, stresses and strains such as federal- provincial relations, resource allocation, building political institutions, and negotiating a place within the North Atlantic Triangle all accounted for Canada’s domestic and international preoccupations.64 It may come as no surprise, therefore, that there was no real impetus for a Canada-Korea bilateral relationship when Gale left for Korea. Canada’s lack of interest in Asia was not limited to the Korean peninsula -- even with other Pacific powers such as China and Japan, Canada maintained a very low volume of trade and interaction with Canada in the late 19th century.65
Canadian missionaries to Korea were uniquely equipped to serve as an agent for change and were greatly helped by the historical timing of their arrival. Within Korea, domestic pressures for new knowledge and changes in the regional order in East Asia collectively opened up a new intellectual domain for the Western missionaries in general. From the perspective of the larger evolution of Canadian-Korean relations, contributions made by the Canadian missionaries also demonstrate the power of non-state actors in advancing bilateral relations through cultural, religious, intellectual, and political engagements. The Canadian soldiers who served in the Korean War had first heard about Korea through the presentations given by the missionaries in local churches, and many missionaries chose to return to Korea to spend the rest of their lives after completing their terms. In more ways than commonly recognized, the missionaries played a
64 “The Charlottetown and Quebec Conferences of 1864,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, http://www.biographi.ca/en/theme_conferences_1864.html?p=1
30 fundamental role in shaping both Canadian and Korean attitudes, perceptions and imaginations about each other.
This chapter begins by examining the historical context and changing regional order in East Asia at the turn of the century, which helps to contextualize the Korean political situation at the turn of the century. As Korea navigated within a declining Sino-centric order to the rise of Japanese empire, there was a compelling intellectual desire for “sinhak,” or new knowledge. The changing political order and domestic developments, such as the rise of Independence Club, all contributed towards collaboration with new partners. The chapter then examines the growth of Christian missionary movements and motives for Canadian missionaries by examining the rise of student evangelical movements in Europe and North America and how these missionaries perceived Korea’s position vis-à-vis Japanese colonial authorities.66 Each of them played a key role in advancing Korean nationalist discourse and their intellectual contributions to Canadian- Korean relations. Gale’s literary translations and publications, Avison’s leadership in advancing medical education and the Severance Hospital, and Schofield’s political involvement with Korea’s struggle for independence are all remembered and celebrated to this day in South Korea.67 Many students who were educated and mentored by these missionaries would later become political leaders, doctors and public intellectuals, such as Syngman Rhee (South Korea’s first elected president), who studied abroad in the United States with Gale’s letter of recommendation, and Dr. Chung Un-Chan (later the President of the Seoul National University and the Prime Minister of South Korea from 2009 to 2010).68
66 See Sŭk'op'ildŭ Paksa Tongsang Kŏllip Wiwŏnhoe, Dr. Schofield: Han'guk ŭl saranghan K'aenadain, [Dr.Schofield: A Canadian Who Loved Koreans], Newmarket, ON: Sŭk'op'ildŭ Paksa Tongsang Kŏllip Wiwŏnhoe, 2005.
67 Myung-Han Kim, 19 seki kukŏŭi chaŭm ch'ekye: J.S. Galeŭi han yŏng cha chŏn-ŭl chungsim ŭ-lo, [The vowel system in 19th century Korean—Centering on the Hanyoung Jajeon by Gale], Ph.D. Dissertation (Incheon: Incheon University, 1985); Sang-Ran Lee, “Keilgwa han'gung munhak: choyonghan ach'imŭi nara, kŭ munhakchŏng ŭimi”, [Gale and Korean Literature: The Land of Morning Calm and Its Cultural Implications] in Collected Works on Canada, Vol 1, (1993): 127-137; Sang-Hyun Lee, “Cheimsŭ Keirŭi Han'guk'ak Yŏn'guwa Kojŏnsŏsaŭi Pŏn Station”, [James S. Gale’s Korean Studies and Translation of Classical Epics] Ph.D. Dissertation, Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University, 2009. 68 “Introduction,” Dr. Schofield Memorial Foundation http://www.drschofield.org/bbs.php?table=board_0&query=view&uid=1
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE HERMIT KINGDOM IN THE 20TH CENTURY
Unlike many countries that found their “national identity” and emerged as a nation-state in the modern era, tracing a precise date for the birth of nationhood in Korea is a challenging task. Koreans had long identified themselves with the bloodline of Tangun minjok,69 a national myth, which gave a highly homogeneous ethnic population a sense of unity about its history.70 With the exception of a tributary relationship with China, Korea pursued an isolationist policy for self- preservation until the 1880s.71 Such policy had roots in the nation’s geography: the Korean peninsula is located in the strategic centre of Northeast Asia, a region that includes China, Mongolia, Japan and Russia. As a result, Korea was frequently invaded by its neighbours, such as Japan in 1592 and the Manchu tribes of Manchuria in 1627. 72 From the earliest times, China - - with its vast land, wealth and Confucian culture -- served as the hub of the East Asian regional order, and Koreans willingly accepted China’s hegemony. Indeed, throughout much of the 19th century, Korean political leaders embraced a Sino-centric view of the world, and regarded their close ties with China with high esteem.73
The Chosŏn dynasty (also known as Yi Dynasty), founded by General Yi Sŏng-gye, was the last and longest-surviving imperial dynasty of Korea, lasting from 1392 A.D. to 1910 A.D. The Yi Dynasty had a close relationship with China, which led to a profound Chinese influence on various aspects of Korean society, ranging from a neo-Confucian philosophy to a bureaucratic
69 According to Gi-wook Shin, the main debate comes down to “whether nationhood is a product of nationalist political mobilization of uniquely modern dimensions, or conversely, whether the prior existence of ethnicity in fact explains much of modern nationality...Race, ethnicity and nation were conflated and this is reflected in the multiple uses of the term minjok, the most widely used term for 'nation,' which can also refer to 'ethnicity' or 'race'” See Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic nationalism in Korea : genealogy, politics, and legacy, (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2006), 4. 70 Andre Schmid, “Re-discovering Manchuria: Sin Ch’aeho and the Politics of Territorial History in Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies 56 (1997): 33. 71 “History of the Yi Dynasty,” The Britannica Encyclopedia, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Choson- dynasty
32 system modelled after the Chinese structure.74 However, an attempt by Chinese imperialist powers to colonize Korea in the late 19th century resulted in failure because of a mutual reluctance to abandon the practice of the tribute system.75
CHANGING EAST ASIAN ORDER
Korea was at the centre of the rapidly changing regional order in East Asia at the turn of the century. As a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, the balance of power in East Asia began to shift towards Japan. The Qing Empire in China declined and, as Japanese imperialism took hold, Korea found itself “both temporally and physically between two empires,” as Korean historian Andre Schmid aptly described.76 After years of resisting Western influence, Japan negotiated its way out of the unfair treaty system imposed on it in the 1850s and adopted a course of rapid modernization and territorial expansion. 77 In a rather peculiar way, Japan used the rhetoric of anti-colonialism to curry public favour for their influence, since many Asian countries looked up to Japan as a force of modernity and as an example for resisting Western imperialism.78 With the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in 1895, the Qing dynasty recognized the absolute sovereignty of Korea for the first time, thereby ending the centuries-long history of the tributary relationship between China and Korea. Korean intellectuals were keen for a change, which certainly had an impact on how they perceived the Western ideas brought forth by the missionaries. An editorial on the Tongnip sinmun (Independence Newspaper) noted that Koreans “…had lived in one corner of the Eastern Sea” having revered China for centuries and scorning Japan as the country of wae, and call all other countries barbarians [orangk’ae]....”79 It continued, “Now, for more than ten years, our doors have been open, and we have welcomed
74 IBID. 75 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea 1895-1910, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 3. 76 Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 3. 77 See W. G. Beasley, Introduction to Japanese Imperialism: 1894-1945, Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press, 1987. 78 Mark R. Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945,” in Peter Duus ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. VI (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 210. 79 Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 57.
33 guests coming from all places. With our ears we can hear and with our eyes we can see the customs and laws of Western countries. We can now generally judge which countries are the civilized ones and which ones are the barbarous ones.”80
At the turn of the 20th century, the dynamics of relationship in the Asia-Pacific continued to evolve, with important consequences for the Korean peninsula. A handful of imperial powers such as Russia, Germany, France, Britain, Japan and the United States gained control of much of China, Southeast Asia and the South-Western Pacific. Amongst these powers, Japan and Great Britain emerged as the most influential.81 In 1902, in recognition of Japan’s growing influence, Britain signed an Anglo-Japanese Alliance, essentially enshrining Japan’s dominance in the Far East.82 Britain’s official position certainly had implications for Canada’s views on Japan, since much of Canada’s external relations during this period was still directed by Great Britain. At a time when general Canadian and British attitudes towards Japan were favourable because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Canadian missionaries in Korea became vocal advocates and supporters of Korea’s independence movement.83
CANADIAN MISSIONARIES & JAPANESE IMPERIALISM
While many Canadian missionaries had British roots and were frequently paid through American mission boards, they did not blindly endorse Japanese colonialism as most Western missionaries did at the time.84 Japanese colonial authorities permitted the activities of Western missionaries, but the dominant culture at the time was to remain non-political; the prevailing
80 IBID. 81 Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1974), 14. 82 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World, (New York: Random House, 2003), 310-11.
83 Canadian Historian John D. Meehan, in his study of Canadian-Japanese relations, has argued that “Many Canadian missionaries, except those affected by local attitudes in China and Korea, regarded the Japanese as the British of Asia, who would civilize the continent and provide a bulwark against Russian bolshevism…” John D. Meehan, The Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929-41 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 3. 84 See K. Kale Yu, “American missionaries and the Korean Independence Movement in the Early 20th century,” International Journal of Korean Studies (Vol. XV, No. 2), 173-4.
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Western view was to see Japan as a new beacon of modernity in Asia.85 As China, Russia and Japan all looked towards Korea for influence, the United States reminded its citizens in Korea to “strictly refrain from interfering in Korea’s political affairs.” For instance, in 1897, John Still, the U.S. Minister to Korea, warned missionaries to focus on “their legitimate avocations,” in a letter sent to every American citizen in Korea and later published by the Independent on May 15th 1897. Still advised missionaries “to strictly refrain from any expression of opinion or from giving advice concerning the internal management of the country, or from intermeddling in its political questions. If [missionaries] do so, it is at their own risk and peril.”86 Hence, the political activities undertaken by Gale, Avison and Schofield carried considerable personal risks, which they willingly undertook against the common positions assumed by other Western missionaries.
JAPANESE ANNEXATION OF KOREA
In a rather peculiar way, the rise of Japanese imperialism actually helped to advance the missionary activities in Korea, because Koreans saw the Western influence as a counterbalance to Japan’s. With an overwhelming military force, the Japanese control over Korea began in November 1905, effectively turning Korean into a Japanese satellite. While the Korean monarch still held onto his throne, the authority transferred to the Resident General, Ito Hirobumi, who efficiently expanded Japanese control over all aspects of Korean society. Tensions were inflamed by the changing political landscape in Korea, with strong opposition and anti-Japanese sentiments emerging across the Korean population.87 By 1910, Korea was formally annexed into the Japanese empire, and Terauchi Masatake was installed as the Governor-General.88 The Annexation Treaty was formally made public on August 29th 1910, followed by imperial edicts
85 For more information on the Japanese colonization, see Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea 1895-1910, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 3. 86 Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, (New York City: MacMillan Co., 1922), 572. 87 King Kojong remained on the throne until 1907. See Yi Tʻae-jin, Kojong sidae ŭi chae chomyŏng [Re- examination of the King Kojong Era], Seoul: Tʻaehaksa, 2000. 88 Mark R. Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945,” in Peter Duus ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. VI, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 210.
35 and official proclamations. The Japanese emperor declared that the annexation was inevitable “in order to maintain public order and security and to advance the happiness and well-being of the people of Korea.”89 Even though the annexation marked the end of Korea's dynastic institution, the Japanese colonial government continued to allow for a symbolic role for the royal institution in order to legitimize its own imperial rule. 90 Upon annexation, the Japanese colonial government quickly introduced a new social hierarchy in Korea, with the Meiji Emperor at the centre overseeing the Korean Royal House and the elites also working for the government.91 The Annexation Treaty of August 1910 contained eight articles; among them were the Korean emperor’s cession of all rights of sovereignty, with appropriate honour and compensation to be made to the members of the imperial court and other Koreans who had given meritorious service to the government of Japan.92
KAEHWA (REFORM) & SEARCH FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND INDEPENDENCE
In tandem with the changing dynamics of power in East Asia and political turbulence brought about by the Japanese annexation, there was a strong desire for new knowledge within Korea. As part of the Chosŏn dynasty’s policy of “self-sustaining,” progressive officials called
89 C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism 1876-1910, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 215. 90 Christine Kim, “The King is Dead: The Monarchy and National Identity in Modern Korea, 1897-1919,” Ph.D. Dissertation, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2004), 112. 91 Social and cultural histories that examine aspects of the effect of political or state power on Chosôn society appear to be a growing trend among Korean scholars. See, for example, Han Yông‟u, Chôngjo ûi Hwasông haengch’a, kû 8 il [The eight days of Chôngjo‟s Hwasông progress], (Seoul: Hyohyông Ch‟ulp‟an, 1998); Hong Sunmin, Uri kunggwôl iyagi [Story of our palaces], (Seoul: Ch‟ôngnyônsa, 1999); and Han‟guk Yôksa Yôn‟guhoe, ed., Uri nûn chinan 100-nyôn tongan ôttôk’e sarassûlkka [How might we have lived in the last 100 years], (Seoul: Yôksa Pip‟yôngsa,1998).
92 Under the administrative code of the Royal House, the management of the Korean Royal family now fell on the Japanese Imperial Household Ministry. This included the management of royal finances, assets and property; health and security measures for the royal family; record keeping of the family genealogy and other official records; ceremonial duties of ancestor worship rituals and court music performances; monitoring of royal palaces and shrines in Korea, and newly built civic spaces such as museums and zoos in Seoul. Moreover, resembling their own system called the "flowery lineage" to accommodate the disenfranchised former lords, the Japanese administration created a new social class of "colonial Korean nobility" for 76 Koreans, composed of marquis, count and viscount which in turn endowed them with high rank and financial security. See Aoyagai Nanmei ed., Politics of the Government-General (Seoul: Chosen Kenkyukai, 1918), 200.
36 for a new approach, which included taking new forces like Christianity seriously.93 This approach stemmed from late 19th century efforts by Korean nationalists to revisit their country’s relationship with China in order to re-assert its national culture and sovereignty.94 It was believed that the guhak (old knowledge) of China was responsible for Korea’s military defeat to the Japanese, who had successfully mastered the sinhak (new knowledge). Such a paradigm shift away from China meant that many old customs and practices, including a natural aversion to Western religion, were open for re-consideration.95 An increasing number of elites in Chosŏn believed that Western science and technology were necessary for Korea’s Kaehwa (reform). The royal family in Korea felt compelled to adopt the Western education system, which included science and technology in the curriculum. The government gazette Hanson Sunbo attributed the perceived wealth and strength of Western nations to their modern education system, citing the writings of the medieval English thinker Roger Bacon.96 These Western-oriented domestic reforms also had their use in King Kojong’s desire to assert more autonomy in Korea’s foreign policy. As political intervention by China intensified after the internal uprising of 1882, King Kojong attempted to diversify the foreign support base for Korea’s sovereignty. 97 He distanced himself from the pro-Chinese Min lineage and established a relationship with the U.S. envoy, thereby hoping to cultivate goodwill and friendship with the U.S. to countervail the Chinese influence.98 As Andre Schmid noted, the formation of Korean identity was
…as much a part of the process of writers coming to terms with their new global position as it was one of rethinking their own nation, and nationalism was the first consciously globalizing discourse…In the fifteen years between 1895 and annexation, nationalizing and globalizing
93 Harold S. Hong, Won Yong Ji, and Chung Choon Kim eds., Korea Struggles for Christ: Memorial symposium for the eightieth anniversary of Protestantism in Korea, Seoul: Christian Literature Society of Korea, 1966. 94 Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires 1895-1919, (New York: Studies of East Asian Institute, 2002) chapter 2, passim. 95 Schmid, op.cit. 96 Jong Koe Paik, 74-75. 97 The “Imo Uprising” on July 23, 1882 was an uprising against the lack of wages by the solders, as well as an expression of general discontent against government officials. For more analysis on the Imo Uprising, see Kim Yong-gu, Imo Kullan kwa Kapsin Chŏngbyŏn: sadae chilsŏ ŭi pyŏnhyŏng kwa Hanʼguk oegyosa, Inchʻŏn Kwangyŏksi: Wŏn, 2004. 98 See also Christine Kim, "The King Is Dead: The Monarchy and National Identity in Modern Korea, 1897-1919," op.cit.
37
forces intermingled, often to the extent that it is difficult to disentangle from the other or to distinguish clearly the internal from the external. The two were neither as exclusive nor as oppositional as many pundits of globalization today assert.99
Throughout this period, Korean intellectuals became active in producing writings about Korean nationhood in popular media such as newspapers and journals, a task towards which Canadian missionaries like Gale actively contributed. There were also efforts stemming from Korean elites calling for education and enlightenment. Established in 1897 by intellectuals such as So Chae-p'il, Yun Chi-ho and Yi Sang-Jae, the Independence Club represented a civil nationalism movement with modernization, social, and political reformation as its stated goals. This new intellectual class, composed of men who had been exposed to liberal ideas from the West, formed a variety of political organizations in their struggle to secure the nation's independence and rights of the people.100 Many of the prominent leaders of the Independence Club were Christians, influenced by the Western missionaries who shared the ideal of so-called “Protestant civilization” that they believed would strengthen the nation and help gain independence from the great powers like Japan. The Independence Club, in its promotion of a spirit of national sovereignty, political liberalism, democracy and citizenship believed that the best path forward would be to reform the Great Korean Empire (Taehanjeguk) into a constitutional monarchy.101
Most of the Club's mandates were widely supported by the public, as well as the royal family and high-ranking government officials. As the Club transformed itself into a citizen’s assembly, however, it went beyond these symbolic activities and began to directly engage in social and political issues. It made proper education a top priority, and proposed means of engagement, such as a debating forum and the publication of a modern newspaper. Several hundred Club members and spectators attended the debates, held each Sunday at Independence
99 Schmid, 5. 100 Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson eds, Colonial Modernity in Korea, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 12. 101 Sae-Eun Kim, “The Debates of the Independence Club in the late 19th century: The Classical Form of the Public Sphere in Habermas sense?” Korean Journal of Journalism and Communication Studies, Special English edition, (2001): 119-135.
38
Hall. The official news organs of the Club were the Bulletin of the Independence Club of Great Choson and the bilingual newspaper, printed in both English and Korean, The Independence (Tongnip Sinmun). This latter newspaper was the first modern vernacular publication to be published in Korea, and it often espoused the Western liberal ideas championed by the new intelligentsia.102 The desire for new knowledge was strong, both at public and intellectual levels. It would have important consequences for the work of missionaries, for they would be seen as harbingers of ‘sinhak’ well beyond the realm of theology.
TURNING TO WESTERN MISSIONARIES
From the Korean perspective, accepting Western influence appeared as an attractive option to counterbalance the growing influence of Japan. There had been earlier attempts by Christian missionaries to convert Koreans, and throughout the 18th and 19th centuries Roman Catholics and Anglicans had made forays into the Hermit Kingdom, all without much success.103 These earlier missions failed mainly because of the rigidity of the rules enforced by the Chosŏn dynasty. During the first half of the 19th century, Korea had officially banned Christianity and thousands of Catholics fell victim. Chosŏn dynasty elites perceived Catholicism as a threat to maintaining the integrity of Korean society; a papal decree in 1742 declared that Christians could not participate in ancestor worship.104 Such positions were in direct conflict with the Confucian practices Koreans had adopted from China, particularly highly valued ceremonies to honour Korean ancestors. It may seem peculiar that none of Korea’s treaties with the Western powers -- the U.S., Britain, Germany, and France -- contained any clause covering either the toleration or prohibition of the propagation of Christianity.105 This absence, however, was meant to ensure that the Korean government had control over all evangelistic work by foreign missionaries.106
102 Carter Eckert, Korea Old and New, 232-233. 103 “Christianity in Korea,” The Concise Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church. http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20111026152619384
105 See Donald N. Clark, Christianity in Modern Korea, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 6-10. 106 China lifted its ban on Christianity in the Sino-French Treaty of T’ientsin, negotiated in 1858 and ratified in 1860. Japan lifted its ban on Christianity in 1873; later, the Constitution of 1889 publicly
39
Of central importance in Korea’s opening around this time was the 1882 Treaty of Amity and Trade negotiated between the United States and Korea, which included a clause for the protection for American missionaries and thus forced Korea to open up its doors and lift its missionary ban. For the first time in the late 19th century, the Western missionaries in Korea were not subjected to military oppression by the government in charge nor hostility from the local population in Korea, unlike those in many other foreign mission territories.107 Evangelizing for religious conversion was still banned under the laws of Chosŏn, so early American missionaries in the 1880s focused on medical and educational work.108 Very little distinction was made between the Western missionaries from the Korean perspective, for they were generally considered as “yangin” (foreigners) and most foreign missions tended to be concentrated in the diplomatic quarter in Seoul.
After the annexation of Korea in 1910, the Japanese colonial government could not openly oppress the Western missionaries for two reasons: many of them were citizens of Great Britain or the United States, two countries of formidable diplomatic power; and the missionaries’ stated aim of modernizing Korea aligned well with the Japanese’s own message of modernity and ‘progress.’ As a result of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Canadian missionaries also received diplomatic protection under the Japanese colonial rule, but a fair number of Canadians, such as Schofield used their British-Canadian citizenship to their advantage in supporting Korea’s independence movements. Korean resistance to foreign influence began well before Japanese colonial rule began, as was seen in the Tonghak rebellion of the late 19th century (where peasant guerilla bands led by local elites fought against foreign invaders). Yet this history of resistance
approved Christianity. Kishimoto Hideo ed., Japanese Religion in the Meiji Era (Tokyo: Ōbunsha, 1956), 194. Also see Jong Koe Paik, 73.
107 Yu Yŏng-nyŏl, Yun Chŏng-nan, 19-segi mal sŏyang sŏnʼgyosa wa Hanʼguk sahoe: The Korean repository rŭl chungsim ŭro, [Western Missionaries and the Korean Society in the late 19th century: Based on the Korean Repository], (Seoul: Kyŏngin Munhwasa, 2004), conclusion; see also Hyŏn-bŏm Cho, Chosŏn ŭi sŏnʼgyosa, sŏnʼgyosa ŭi Chosŏn, [Chosŏn’s missionaries and the missionaries’ Chosŏn], (Seoul: Hanʼguk Kyohoesa Yŏnʼguso, 2008). 108 “Christianity in Korea,” New World Encyclopedia, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Christianity_in_Korea
40 was not the sole path forward for Korea: at the same time, progressive intellectuals aspired to take ideas from the Western model of the nation-state as a basis for reform.109
THE GROWTH OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY MOVEMENTS (LATE 19TH CENTURY)
Having examined the domestic impulse for new knowledge, as well as the changing regional order in East Asia, it is useful to consider what motivated the missionaries to embark on their journey to Korea. By the time Canadian missionaries arrived in Korea in the late 19th century, the Korean peninsula was the new magnet field for many young missionaries inspired by the Student Volunteer Movement (SVM). To fully understand the Canadian missionary impulse in the 19th century, it is important to examine the general growth of missionary fervor amongst young students, which had its roots in North America. “The long-closed doors of China, Japan, and Korea are now open,” proclaimed American evangelist D. L. Moody, “and beckoning with new challenge.”110 A leading U.S. figure of late 19th century evangelicalism, Moody inspired hundreds of students in the English-speaking world. These missionary impulses, emerging in the late 19th century, reached as far as churches in England and Germany.111 Between 1890 and 1915, the total number of American missionaries abroad increased from 934 to over 9,000.112
The Student Volunteer Movement, which came into existence in 1886, was rapidly growing in its membership, challenging many young students to dedicate their lives towards a meaningful life abroad. The SVM had its origins in the college ministry of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), which began in London, England, in 1844. At the height of the Industrial Revolution, when many young people moved to cities for new jobs, the YMCA
109 Young-Woo Han, “The Establishment and Development of Nationalist History,” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 5, (December 1992), 63. 110 Lillias H. Underwood, Underwood of Korea: Being an Intimate Record of the Life and Works of the Rev. H.G. Underwood for thirty-one years as a missionary of the Presbyterian Board in Korea, (Seoul: Yonsei University Press), 1983. 111 Scott, 16; Also see Felicity Jensz, “Missionaries and Indigenous Education in the 19th-century British Empire,” History Compass 10, no.4 (2012): 306–317; Kirsten Rüther, Angelika Schaser and Jacqueline Van Gent, Gender and conversion narratives in the nineteenth century: German Mission at Home and Abroad, (VT: Ashgate, 2015). 112 Mary Taylor Huber and Nancy C. Lutkehaus, “Gendered Missions at Home and Abroad,” in May Taylor Huber and Nancy C. Lutkehaus eds., Gendered Missions: Women and Men in Missionary Discourse and Practice, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
41 became active in offering housing and other social activities to these young people.113 Concurrently, in the United States, the YMCAs at various colleges grew rapidly in number, with some 100,000 undergraduate members at 500 colleges by 1900.114 Under the leadership of the recent Cornell graduate John R. Mott, the SVM mobilized and formed chapters in college, university and seminary campuses across the United States. Between 1886 and 1920, the SVM recruited more than 8,000 American students to sign a declaration that they were “willing and desirous, God permitting, to be foreign missionaries.”115
MOTIVES FOR CANADIAN MISSIONARIES
The Korean peninsula became a hotspot for many young missionaries who were inspired by the Student Volunteer Movement. The story of early Canadian missionaries began at the University of Toronto in the 1880s. The University was a relatively young institution and much less centralized than it is today.116 Its colleges made independent efforts to reach out to the Far East. Wycliffe College and Trinity College sent a handful of young male students, among them J. Cooper Robinson, to begin Canadian-Anglican work in Japan.117 At University College, a YMCA branch was formally established in 1873, largely influenced by the new SVM movement in the United States.118 In response to prominent Canadian Methodist missionary Charles Eby’s call for a creation of a “Self-Support Band” to help with the missionary efforts, Victoria College
113 See Georgina Brewis, A Social History of Student Volunteering: Britain and beyond, 1880-1980, (New York City: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Ninan Koshy, A History of the Ecumenical Movement in Asia, (Hong Kong: World Student Christian Federation Asia-Pacific Region & Asia and Pacific Alliance of YMCAs), 2004. 114 William Scott, Canadians in Korea: Brief Historical Sketch of Canadian Mission Work in Korea (Toronto: Ecumenical Forum of Canada, 1977), 16. 115 Michael Parker, “Mobilizing a Generation for Missions,” Christianity Today, Aug 6, 2009, http://www.christianitytoday.com/history/2009/august/mobilizing-generation-for-missions.html (Accessed 18 February 2017). Also see Michael Parker, The Kingdom of Character: The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1886-1926, Lanham, Md.: American Society of Missiology: University Press of America, 1998. 116 For a good overview of the history of the University of Toronto, see Martin Friedland, The University of Toronto: A History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002. 117 Young Sik Yoo, Chak’han Mokja, 806. 118 Young Sik Yoo, "The Impact of Canadian Missionaries in Korea: A Historical Survey of Early Canadian Mission Work, 1888-1898,” Ph. D. Dissertation, (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1996), 140-145; Murray Ross, The YMCA in Canada: The Chronicle of a Century, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1951), 115.
42 students enthusiastically pledged to support Canadian Methodist missionary staff. “Corea, last land to be opened to the gospel, calls loudly for help. Fifteen million souls await the messengers of the Lord,”119 was a plea made by Jonathan Goforth on the Knox College Monthly in May 1887.
The SVM made active efforts for recruitment at various campuses across Canada, including at the University of Toronto. In 1888, the Secretary of the SVM, Parmelee Wilder, and his associate, John Forman of Princeton University, came to Canada to recruit future missionaries. The YMCA from University College selected four men to begin the mission work in Korea: Robert Harkness, James S. Gale, Dr. Robert Hardie and Dr. Oliver R. Avison.120 Unlike the American missionary enterprise, which came after the arrival of American businessmen and was largely organized by church boards, the early Canadian missionaries were mostly student volunteers who did not formally belong to a church mission board (those who did arrived late in the Canadian mission, in the 1920s).121 Moreover, the Protestant missions were different than the Catholic missions, with educational and cultural initiatives targeted directly at natives in lower social classes.122 This was an important distinction, in tandem with the ability and willingness of Canadian missionaries to integrate into the local society and travel widely from one end of Korea to another — largely owing to the freedom they enjoyed as independent missionaries.123 The Presbyterian Church and, later, the United Church of Canada became the main funding sources and provided support for Canadian missionaries on the ground, until their formal withdrawal in the early 1940s. By the time the missionaries returned to Korea in 1946, they could not return to
119 Knox College Monthly (May 1887) as seen in Young Sik Yoo, Chak’Han Mokja, 806. 120 A. Hamish Ion. The Cross and the Rising Sun, (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1990), 31-32.
121 Sŏn-su Ch'oe ed, Purŭsim pada ttang kkŭt kkaji: Naehan K'aenada sŏn'gyosadŭl ŭi sam kwa sinang, hŏnsin ŭi paljach'wi [To the ends of the world with God’s calling: Dedication and Footsteps of Canadian missionaries in Korea], Seoul: Hongsŏngsa, 2011. 122 Young Sik Yoo, "The Impact of Canadian Missionaries in Korea: A Historical Survey of Early Canadian Mission Work, 1888-1898," Ph.D. Dissertation, (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1996), 115.
123 The most comprehensive record of archival sources on Canadian missionary activities in Korea can be found in the Helen F. Macrae Collection, A Bibliography of Korean Relations with Canadians and other Western Peoples 1898-1975, Halifax: School of Library Service, Dalhousie University, 1976.
43 their former fields in the Hamgyong provinces because of the Communist occupation in North Korea.124
JAMES SCARTH GALE [1863-1937]
Having considered the general context for both Korea’s political developments and Canadian missions in general, it is appropriate to turn to the work of individual missionaries to gain a better appreciation of the nature of work undertaken. James S. Gale arrived on the shores of Busan, Korea on December 12th, 1888. He was one of many students at the University of Toronto influenced by the Student Volunteer Movement, and was one of 110 Canadian students who enlisted to volunteer in East Asia. He had set sail from Vancouver on November 13th. From Busan, Gale took a coastal vessel to Chemulpo (presently called Incheon) in South Korea.125 While other foreign missionaries had knocked on the doors of the “Hermit Kingdom” before, Gale’s arrival marked the first personal contact between Canada and Korea. In subsequent years, many more eager missionaries joined Gale -- most notably from Ontario and the Maritime provinces -- to serve in missions in Korea.126
Gale’s background largely shaped the nature of his work in Korea. Born in 1863 in a small farm in Ontario, Gale came from a Scottish Presbyterian family.127 His great-grandfather, Henry Esson, was one of the founders of Knox College at the University of Toronto. While Gale grew up in a strong Presbyterian household, he displayed only marginal denominational commitment in Korea. During his upbringing in St. Catharines, he studied Latin, French, German and Classics
124 For detailed records on the latter missions supposed by the United Church of Canada, see United Church of Canada, Board of World Mission, Records of Associate Secretary for Korea,
126 For a good overview of early Canadian missionaries in Korea, see Young Sik Yoo, Pusan ŭi chʻŏt sŏnʼgyosadŭl [First Missionaries in Busan], (Seoul: Hanʼguk Changnogyo Chʻulpʻansa, 2007) & Young Sik Yoo, Earlier Canadian Missionaries in Korea: A Study in History, 1888-1895, Mississauga: Society for Korean and Related Studies, 1987. 127 For a good overview of Gale’s family background, see Young Sik Yoo, The Good pastor: In celebration of Dr. James S. Gale, First Canadian Missionary to Korea, 1888-2008, (Mississauga, Ont.: Society for Korean and Related Studies, 2008), 41.
44 at the University of Toronto.128 The YMCA at University College appointed Gale as its missionary representative, even though he did not receive any formal training. Gale was more interested in literature, language and culture than theology. His life-long dedication to all things Korean left an enduring legacy on Korean society.129 But perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Gale’s life in Korea was his role in shaping popular Canadian perceptions of Koreans, at a time when the flow of information was so limited and the predominant Western interest in Asia was focused on Japan rather than Korea.130
“FIRST IMPRESSIONS”
Gale, like other missionaries, brought his own biases and perspectives to his work in Korea. Upon arriving in Busan, Gale wrote to his sister Jane that the life of a missionary was a “Bohemian life.” In his Korean Sketches, he outlined his first impressions and interactions with Koreans at length:
Amongst my first impressions, I recall being quite overwhelmed by the wide pantaloons and white dress of a Korean, who came on board ship in Nagasaki harbor on my first arrival there. Why such a dress, and wherefore the topknot? Little did I dream that he valued his topknot so highly, or that in every seam of his wide pantaloons were stitched ancestral reverence, Confucian propriety, ancient traditions, and other tremendous considerations…The people of Korea claim to be a race descended from the gods, slightly admixed with Chinese; no wonder they develop at times extraordinary traits.131
128 Edward W. Poitras, “Gale, James Scarth,” in Gerald H. Anderson ed, Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions, (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 1998), 234.
129 See Young Sik Yoo, The good pastor: In celebration of Dr. James S. Gale, First Canadian Missionary to Korea, 1888-2008, Mississauga, Ont.: Society for Korean and Related Studies, 2008.
130 See In-Su Kim (trans.), Cheimsŭ S. Keil Moksa ŭi sŏn'gyo p'yŏnji, [Rev. James S. Gale's missionary letters], Seoul: K'umnan ch'ulp'ansa, 2009.
131 Gale also seemed to have an intuitive understanding of the Korean welcoming of Western Christian missionaries despite their isolationist past. As he writes on pages 12 to 13 of Korean Sketches: “They have had a horror of foreigners, yangin, or men of the sea, from time immemorial…It is ten years and more since the ‘barbarian’ entered, ten years of political chaos it has been, and yet no European or American has been injured, or threatened, or treated in any other than the kindest way…Missionary work has gone on unmolested, and there are a thousand and more Christians, having many established places for regular worship.”
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One of the culture shocks for Gale, like many other Western missionaries, was the dominance of rice and the unique odour of Korean cuisine – Gale famously swallowed pickled kimchi without chewing it in his early days, but soon became used to the unique Korean diet:
No grain in the Western world stands out pre-eminently over all others as does rice... The odor of lacquer is one of Korea’s national smells. The second smell is due to a mixture of garlic, onions, cabbage, fish and other ingredients that make up the Korean pickle so greatly enjoyed with their rice. This odor clings like that of Limburger cheese, and follows the native to church and into all the other walks of life. 132
The strange smells, sights of white dresses, and Confucian traditions were all foreign to Gale and many Western missionaries. Yet, Gale tried his best to understand Korea and Koreans with an open attitude. For Gale, and many other Canadian missionaries who followed his footsteps, Korea represented a land of opportunity to “win Asia for Christ,” especially as it struggled between empires at the turn of the 20th century. Gale believed that although Korea lacked political or military influence, “in the missionary circle she is a first-rate power.” In 1909, Gale justified his own interest in the Korea mission:
Korea…suddenly emerged from the unknown into the widely advertised of today. … Her changes that have taken place externally and internally during the last quarter of a century make one of the startling pages in history. She was nothing, and yet she set in motion the most colossal war-campaign of modern times. She was the Hermit ‘til she was hitched to the longest railway system of the world. But one idea possesses her leaders now, not one of politics, not one of war, nor one of railway extension, but one of evangelization, to win Asia for Christ, to sound the call to all these dusky multitudes, to tell them of Marconi messages from God, to say peace and good cheer to the downtrodden millions of Asia. This is a large idea for so small a people, but it is good. Shall we not be interested in it too?133
132 Gale, Korea in Transition, 8.
133 James S. Gale. Korea in Transition, (New York: Young People's Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, 1909), xiii.
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Soon after he arrived, Gale was quick to recognize that he had to learn the culture and language of the Korean people. He toured Korea nearly twelve times over the course of his first eight years. Gale’s natural curiosity and his fluency with the Korean language meant that he was willing and able to explore various parts of Korea, well beyond the usual diplomatic quarters that Western missionaries generally remained in. His denominational independence afforded him much more freedom than many other missionaries. Of all Canadian missionaries who served in Korea in the 20th century, none travelled as extensively or published as much as Gale.134
GALE & YMCA
In examining Gale’s long service in Korea, it is important to note the close-knit nature of the Western missionary community operating in Korea at the turn of the 20th century. The close community of the Western missionaries took precedence over identity with the missionaries’ respective homelands, and it is prudent to not over-emphasize a distinct “Canadian identity” in these missionaries. The Canadian missionaries under consideration, especially Gale, Avison and Schofield, had their roots in England and families in Canada, just like the rest of English- Canadian population at the time. In addition to a Scottish background that endeared him to the English missionaries, Gale often worked closely with the American missionaries. As a part of his funding conditions by the YMCA at University College (roughly CAD $500 a year), he was instructed by the committee at the YMCA to “cooperate with other evangelical denominations at work in the field” rather than establish an independent mission.135 The YMCA in Canada, which first opened with the Montreal chapter in 1851, was mandated to help people and communities grow. While it had a strong Protestant background initially, eventually it broadened its acceptance of all denominations and became active with university chapters and supporting troops serving abroad through recreation, religious, educational, and entertainment services. The YMCA’s mandate constantly evolved to support the workers of the Canadian Pacific Railway and to engage in international projects. 136 Gale’s salary paled in comparison to American
134 James S. Gale, Han'guk ŭi Mat'eo Rich'i Cheimsŭ keil, [James S. Gale, the Matteo Ricci of Korea] (Seoul: Han'guk Kodŭng Sinhak Yŏn'guwŏn, 2012). 135 Scott, 16. 136 YMCA Canada, “Our History,” http://ymca.ca/Who-We-Are/YMCA-History (Accessed March 1, 2017)
47 missionaries in Korea, who received $1,000 a year from their denominational foundations, but it was enough to sustain his “Bohemian” lifestyle at the beginning.137 By 1892, funding issues forced Gale to join the American North Presbyterian Church Board. Nevertheless, he remained connected to the YMCA: in 1903, he established the YMCA in Korea and served as its founding president, with an initial mandate focusing on humanitarian work and medical missions for the poor who did not otherwise have access to health care.138
GALE & THEOLOGY
Ironically, despite his extensive background as a missionary, very little attention has been paid to Gale’s theological life. Korean scholars have actively studied Gale’s contributions to the study of Korean language and literature, but studies on Gale’s theological views and contributions are difficult to find.139 This is a direct reflection of the fact that Gale left a more substantial legacy as a literary scholar than a Christian missionary. His avoidance of denominational commitment was also a contributing factor: in addition to being influenced by the pan-denominationalism of the SVM, he was influenced by the non-denominational mission of British congregational minister Robert Whittaker McCall. The McCall mission, created in 1872, emphasized a movement away from a denomination-based approach in evangelizing, and focused on outreach efforts to assist the poor from a perspective of social justice. Gale had encountered the McCall mission during a brief stay in Paris during his second year of undergraduate studies, and his own philosophy on the mission fields in Korea reflected the spirit of ecumenism promoted by the McCall mission.140 Through his extensive travels and meeting with local Koreans, Gale was quick to recognize and appreciate the stark difference and the complexities of understanding the “Oriental Mind”:
137 IBID. 138 IBID. 139 Few exceptions in the field of studies on Gale’s theology include: Chŏngkyŏng Cho, “J.S. Galeŭi han'guginshikkwa chaehanhwaltonge taehan yŏn'gu” [J.S. Gale’s Perception of Korea and His Activities in Korea] Hansŏngsahak 3 (1985): 61-115; Gyumu Han, “Geirŭi han'gugŭishikkwa han'gukkyohoee kkich'in yŏnghyang, 1898-1910 nyŏnŭl chungshimŭro” [Gale’s Perception of Korea and His Impact on Korean Churches, Focusing on 1898-1910 period], Han'guk kidokkyowa yŏksa 4 (1995): 161-76; Gyŏngbae Min, “Geirŭi sŏn'gyowa shinhak: kŭŭi han'guk chŏngshinsaeŭi hamnyu,t'e”, [Gale’s Mission and Theology: His Spiritual Unity], Hyŏndaewa shinhak 24 (1999): 149-72. 140 See “The McCall Mission,” The Presbyterian Record for the Dominion of Canada 13-14 (January 1888), Montreal: Gazette Printing Co, 1889.
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The great problem that confronts all work in the Far East is the Oriental mind. It is comparatively easy to reach the heart, to gain the affection and esteem of the people, and yet at the same time to be perfectly mystified by the peculiar mental make-up that is the groundwork of all. So much of life seems reversed or standing on its head in their universe of thought, just as is actually the case in the universe of matter…with all due respect to Korea, one cannot but see that love has yielded up the ghost to what seems to be necessity. Unselfish love is a quantity foreign to the Oriental mind; in fact, the Korean has no true word for love in his vocabulary; you have to arrive at the thought by a combination of terms. He talks of kindly condescension, reverence, esteem, etc… but he has no general word for love. 141
Such combination of fascination, curiosity and desire to learn would guide Gale’s journey in Korea. Gale also wrote regular columns in the Toronto Globe. In 1890, for instance, the Globe published “In Far Korea: A City Unknown to Newspaper Reporters” and “Letters from Missionary Gale: Glimpses of the People of the Land of Morning Calm,” with illustrations of the landscapes in Korea drawn by Gale himself.142 A talented artist, Gale enjoyed drawing maps of Korea as well as works depicting the general Korean way of life. His portrayals of the nation’s people and its landscape were often the first presentations that the average Canadian would encounter.143
Figure 1: Map of Seoul drawn by James S. Gale (1901)
Source: Young Sik Yoo, The Good Pastor: In Celebration of Dr. James Scarth Gale, the First Canadian Missionary to Korea, 1988-2008, [Mississauga, Ont]: Society for Korean and Related Studies, 2008.
141 Gale, Korean Sketches, 175. 142 “Mission work in Korea – Interesting Report from Missionary Gale,” The Globe, April 11, 1891.
143 See the Gale collection at the Fisher Rare Books Library at the University of Toronto for vivid examples.
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GALE’S KEY ACHIEVEMENTS
Unlike many missionaries who barely spoke Korean and therefore restricted their social circles to fellow Western missionaries, Gale’s mastery of the Korean language not only enabled him to access some of the vernacular Korean literature, but also cultivate meaningful friendships with the Korean people. Within the first three years of his arrival, Gale translated the Bible into vernacular Korean and created the first-ever Korean-English dictionary. When Western interests in Asia were predominantly focused on Japan rather than Korea, Gale’s work on Korea was important both for its originality and high quality.144 He also published over a dozen books about
Korean history, language and culture, and wrote regularly for the Royal Asiatic Society.145 Gale’s translation of English materials into Korean, a pastime he undertook almost immediately after arriving in the country, blossomed when he was appointed to the Board of Translators of the Bible Society in 1892. He became the first to translate popular Western literature such as John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress (1895) to Korean; his translations of Korean Folk Tales (1913) and Cloud Dream of the Nine (1922), marked the first instances of Korean vernacular literature translated into English, and Gale’s works are still studied by Korean scholars for their advanced understanding of the Korean language and culture.146 In 1897, Gale was ordained in the Presbyterian Church, after which he devoted his life towards more pastoral duties and wrote more about Korean politics. Gale’s history of the Korean people became standard reading for many missionaries and foreign residents, as it was rich with materials on Korean ethnology, folk tales and historical allusions.147
144 Kim In-su trans., op.cit.
145 Amongst Western missionaries who operated in Korea in the early 20th century, Gale also remains as one of the most widely-remembered figures. A special documentary on the life of James S. Gale produced by the CBS (Christian Broadcasting System) in Korea can be accessed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sRCBchNpcD8 (Korean language)
146 See for instance, Sang Hyeon Yi, “Yumongch'ŏnjat'em sojae yŏngmimunhakchakp'umgwa keil (J. S. Gale) ŭi kuk'anmunch'e pŏnyŏkshilch'ŏn”, [English Literary Works in J.S. Gale’s Yumongchonja and His Korean-Chinese Style Translation Practice - A Protestant Missionary’s Project and Journey toward Modern Korean Style], Sŏganginmunnonch'ong 42: 99-154; Sang Hyeon Yi, Han'guk kojŏn pŏnyŏkka ŭi ch'osang: Keil (James Scarth Gale) ŭi kojŏnhak tamnon kwa kososŏl pŏnyŏk ŭi chip'yŏng [Portrait of translator of Korean classics], Seoul: Somyŏng Ch'ulp'an, 2012. 147 Scott, 18-19.
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Figure 2: Dictionaries & Books Translated by James S. Gale
Source: Young Sik Yoo, The Good Pastor: In Celebration of Dr. James Scarth Gale, the First Canadian Missionary to Korea, 1988-2008, [Mississauga, Ont] : Society for Korean and Related Studies, 2008.
In his personal relationships with local Koreans, Gale was particularly instrumental in supporting a young man who would later become the first President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee. For Rhee, Gale was a spiritual mentor and an intellectual guiding force. In August of 1904, when American missionary Horace Allen refused to write a letter of recommendation for the young Rhee, Gale endorsed his plans to study in the United States and wrote a compelling letter of recommendation to “Christian friends in Washington, D.C. and other parts of America,” saying that Rhee would be an instrumental force for Korea’s independence movements.148 However, Gale’s relationship with Koreans was not restricted to the political elite; his home in Wonsan was known as the “House of Jesus” because he often welcomed Koreans for tea and snacks, and gave away Western sweets other household goods. He was widely known for his friendship with Koreans from lower social classes, such as Chan-Ik Goh.149 Goh, a wanderer, drunkard and mute, ran into Gale on the streets in Wonsan in July
148 Nak-Hwan Kim, “Pastor Gale and Young Syng-man Rhee,” in Nak-Hwan Kim, “Pastor Gale and Young Syng-man Rhee,” in Taehan yesugyo jangnohoe yŏndonggyohoe, Chosŏnkwa chosŏnin ŭl kkaeuch'igi wihae hŏnshinhan keil moksa t'ansaeng 150chunyŏn Kinyŏm Nonmunjip [Anthology on the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Pastor Gale Who Dedicated His Life To Choson and the People of Choson], (Seoul: Yŏndonggyohoe, 2013), 35-36.
149 Choon-Sup Goh, “The Nobel Prize that Pastor Gale Wanted to Give to Chan-Ik Goh,” Taehan yesugyo jangnohoe yŏndonggyohoe, Chosŏnkwa chosŏnin ŭl kkaeuch'igi wihae hŏnshinhan keil moksa t'ansaeng 150chunyŏn Kinyŏm Nonmunjip, [Anthology on the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Pastor Gale Who Dedicated His Life To Choson and the People of Choson], (Seoul: Yŏndonggyohoe, 2013), 7-24.
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1892. In what seems like a contemporary biblical tale, Goh reportedly had an “awakening” experience the evening he ran into Gale that has been likened to that of the Christian apostle St. Paul. He ran to Gale’s home that night, and from that point, would serve as Gale’s closest confidant for the next sixteen years.150 Until his death at an age of 51, Goh assisted Gale in evangelizing, lending his vocal and choreographical skills in creating Korean hymns using Korean instruments. When Goh passed away, Gale’s spent weeks mourning and said that half of his own body had perished as well with Goh’s passing.151
JAPANESE IMPERIALISM & CANADIAN MISSIONARIES
Considering that Gale’s time in Korea coincided with an extremely turbulent period in Korean history with the decline in Chinese influence, annexation by Japan, and the expansion of missionary activities, important questions arise in terms of how Canadian missionaries perceived Japanese imperialism. Like other Western missionaries, Gale initially held a more favourable view of Japan, at least in the early stage of annexation.152 The Globe’s analysis in September 1907, as reported by Rev. Jonathan Goforth, offered an acute assessment of general Canadian missionaries’ attitudes towards Japan:
…As a matter of fact, practically all the missionaries were pro-Japanese before and during the war, and, therefore, the things that he says now are wrung by the necessity of the situation from an almost unwilling witness. It is of course scarcely necessary to say that the letter which follows and another yet to be published were written a month ago before any symptoms of the British Columbia race crisis had been discovered…153
150 IBID. 151 IBID. 152 Young-Sik Yoo, Ph.D. Dissertation, 195-6.
153 “Has Success in War Spoiled the Japanese? A Remarkable Article on Conditions in Korea, as seen by Rev. Jonathan Goforth, the Well-known Missionary – Oppression, perfidy, Cheating, Among the Wrongs Presented – Specific Instances of the Policy Pursued for the Destruction of the Hermit Kingdom,” The Globe, September 12, 1907.
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At least in the early stage of Japanese colonization of Korea, which informally began in 1905 and formally assumed in 1910, the Western perception -- and that of the missionaries -- was influenced by the rhetoric used by the Japanese government. In 1907, Prince Ito Hirobumi, who also served as the Japanese Resident-General in Korea, reportedly said that he had been “opposed steadfastly to the annexation of Corea”:
Annexation is no part of the Emperor’s plan, unless it should prove quite unavoidable…I want the missionaries of America and England to know that I am anxious to help them. We are all working for a common object…namely the building up of civilization. But the missionaries should not mix into politics; let them attend to their work and I will confine my energies to mine. It is certain, however, that each of us can help the other. What matters the color of skin or the religious belief if we are working together for the good of humanity! Japan has counted the cost of these reforms in Corea and nothing shall prevent us from carrying them out. If the people of Corea refuse to accept this far and friendly assistance, they will, by their own act, write annexation into history, for as a nation divided in sentiment from Japan, Corea cannot stand.154
While the notion of “no annexation” would prove to be a total fabrication in less than two years, it did have an impact on the general Western attitude which saw Japan as a rising beacon of civilization in Asia. Gale’s own views towards Japan seemed to stem from a more general appreciation of Asian civilization: namely his appreciation of Chinese culture and recognition of China’s influence over Korea. Politically, Gale believed that Japan was more powerful than China at the time, and the at-times antagonistic relationship between the three countries was tilted in Japan’s favour. In Gale’s own words: “Three great nations [China, Japan and Russia] press close up around Korea. Japan to the fore, a first-rate power, is in command.”155
Nonetheless, actual developments on the ground in Korea soon changed the Canadian missionaries’ assessments of Japan and the impact of annexation. For instance, Rev. Goforth from the Canadian Presbyterian Church based in Changtefu, Homan, noted that his view
154 “Korea’s Fate Lies in Her Own Hands,” The Globe, Sept 23, 1907. 155 Gale, Korea in Transition, 134.
53 fundamentally changed after visiting Korea “from pro-Japanese to decidedly anti-Japanese.”156 Gale, too, would also eventually change his position as he witnessed growing atrocities committed by the Japanese colonial authorities:
The writer [Gale himself] used to imagine that Japan would prove an expert at reading the Korean mind, seeing that she was an Oriental herself, and was therefore within the charmed circle of the Far East, but he has changed his mind. Japan knows little or nothing of what Korea means or matters. The methods she adopts, the words she speaks, the announcements she makes prove her ignorance. It is not unfair to say that she is wholly unaware of the kind of being she has to deal with, and so today has resulted to the bayonet and gun-butt to solve her problem. 157
These changing views about Japanese imperialism were also reported in newspapers back home in Canada, in addition to mission reports and oral presentations that missionaries would later provide in congregations. Reports about Japanese atrocities would be featured with greater intensity and frequency in papers such as The Globe in the aftermath of the First World War, particularly since the March 1st movement in Korea. These reports will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter in relation to the work of Dr. Schofield.
OLIVER R. AVISON (1860-1956)
Celebrated today for his contributions to the Severance Hospital in Seoul, Dr. Oliver R. Avison made tremendous contributions to the advancement of medical science in Korea.158 Avison received his medical training from the University of Toronto, at the College of Pharmacy in 1884 and the Toronto Medical College in 1887. Avison was in practice and teaching at the Toronto Medical College when Dr. H. G. Underwood visited Toronto to search for someone with
156 IBID. 157 Young Sik Yoo, Ph.D. Dissertation, 191.
158 See Hyŏng-u Pak, Severancewa hanguk uiryoui yumyong [Severance and Korean Medical History], Seoul: Chungnyun Uisa, 2006; Jai Keun Choi, “T'ŭkchimnonmun: chejungwŏnŭi sŏllipkwa sŏn'gyosadŭrŭi yŏk'al”, [Special Report: Establishment of chejungwŏn and the role of missionaries], Yonsei University Medical History Research Centre, Yonsei Medical Journal 18 no. 1 (2015): 7-46; In-Sok Yeo, “Severance Hospital: Bringing Modern Medicine to Korea,” Yonsei Medical Journal 56 no. 3 (2015): 593-597.
54 medical expertise to help with the Royal Hospital in Seoul.159 As an active member of the YMCA at the University of Toronto and the Corean Union Mission, Avison had long been interested in overseas missions.160 Compelled by Underwood’s plea, Avison offered to join the
Board of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S. for service in Korea.161 Among the first groups of Canadian missionaries, Avison was the only one to be sent from a church mission board. Avison was particularly appealing as a missionary because of the need to recruit professionals as opposed to those strictly capable of proselytizing, especially in light of Korea’s official ban on religious conversion. Throughout his time in Korea, Avison played an instrumental role in developing Korea’s medical education. Most notably, Avison was heavily involved in the Chejungwon, the first Western medical institution in Korea, which was later re-established as the Severance Hospital under Avison’s leadership. In addition to developing curriculum for medical education and generating awareness about public health, Avison also served as a personal physician for King Kojong in 1895, supported Syngman Rhee and his work for Korea’s independence movement overseas in the U.S., and assisted a number of well-known Korean independence activists like Maria Kim, Chang-Ho An, and Pilsoon Kim, as they fought against the Japanese colonial rule.162
Avison arrived in Korea in July 1893 with his wife and three children. He was a man of delightful personality, as one of his former students described: “Tall, fair-haired, bearded and bright-eyed, brimming with enthusiasm and self-confidence, he had the gusto of a young Teddy
159 See Allen DeGray Clark, Avison of Korea: The Life of Oliver R. Avison, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1979. 160 Sun Ho Lee and Hyeong-U Park, “Oliver R. Avison’s role as a medical missionary,” Boundaries of History 84, no. 9 (2012): 147. 161 Scott, 24-25. 162 For an in-depth research on Avison, see Sun Ho Lee, “Oliver R. Avison’s Mission Work and Ecumenism,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Seoul: Yonsei University, 2010; Sun Ho Lee, “Ollibŏ al ebisŭnŭi p'ŭllech'ŏ kyehoege taehan yŏn'gu” [Research on Oliver R. Avison’s Life], Han'guk Kidokkyoshinhangnonch'ong, 77 (Seoul: han'guk kidokkyohak'oe, 2011); Allen D. Clarke, Ebisŭn chŏn'gi, han'guk kŭndae ŭihagŭi kaech'ŏkcha [Avison’s Life: The Pioneer of Korea’s Modern Medicine], (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1979); Yonsei Medical Centre, Ebisŭn paksa naehan 100chunyŏn kinyŏm kangyŏnjip, [A commemorative publication for the 100th anniversary of Dr.Avison’s arrival in Korea], Seoul: Yonsei Medical Centre, 1993.
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Roosevelt and the same flair for leadership.”163 Shortly after his arrival in Korea, Avison was appointed as the physician to the King and was frequently called to the Royal Palace for medical service. After the murder of Queen Min by a Japanese assassin, Avison became one of the three missionaries who were asked to be on duty to watch over the King at night. Based on his skills in medical administration, organization and fundraising, Avison was soon appointed as the superintendent of the Royal Hospital in Seoul in the winter of 1893.164 It was the first hospital in Korea and was under missionary supervision by royal request.
Figure 3: Image of the Severance Union Medical College (1956)
Source: In-Sok Yeo, “Severance Hospital: Bringing Modern Medicine to Korea,” Yonsei Medical Journal, May 2015; 56(3):593-597.
Upon his appointment, Avison soon realized that cronyism and corruption dominated the Royal Hospital, resulting in the misuse of funds that led to budgetary deficits and the malfunctioning of key hospital services. Avison insisted on independence from the government’s control in exchange for his continued missionary cooperation, and finally, in 1895, the management of Royal Hospital was transferred to the Presbyterian Mission.165 Avison realized that more capital was needed to establish a hospital accessible to all members of the local
163 Kwang-nin Yi. Ollibŏ Al Ebisŭn ŭi saengae: Hanʼguk kŭndae sŏyang ŭihak kwa kŭndae kyoyuk ŭi kaechʻŏkcha, [Life of Oliver R. Avison: Pioneer of Modern Western Education and Modern Education in Korea], (Seoul: Yŏnse Taehakkyo Chʻulpʻanbu, 1992), introduction. 164 See Allen DeGray Clark, Avison of Korea: The Life of Oliver R. Avison, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1979. 165 Yonsei University Medical Research Centre, Tong Asia yŏksa sok ŭi sŏn'gyo pyŏngwŏn [Mission Hospitals in the History of East Asia], (Seoul: Yŏnse Taehakkyo Ŭihaksa Yŏn'guso, 2015), 190-193.
56 population. He traveled to the Ecumenical Missionary Conference in May 1900 in New York City, where he managed to inspire Louis H. Severance, a wealthy steel magnate from Cleveland and executive from Standard Oil, to donate money to the cause.166 The first gift from Severance was $10,000 for the purchase of the site, construction costs, and equipment. Designed by a Toronto architect named H.B. Gordon, the first-ever public hospital in Korea was completed in September 1904.167 Avison became the head of the Severance Hospital and further played an instrumental role in developing it into a teaching institution. In the first school term alone, Avison began translating textbooks on anatomy, physiology, chemistry and pathology. Seven young Korean students were already studying them in mimeographed form and receiving practical training in hospital pharmacy, dispensary and wards. The medical committee of the Northern Presbyterian Mission reported in 1905 that Dr. Avison had prepared curricula for a seven-year course in medicine and three years in pharmacy, and recommended the approval of accepting more students for teaching purposes at the Severance hospital.168
The first group of graduates from Severance Medical College received their diplomas in June 1908 in a graduation ceremony attended by the Royal Family and foreign diplomats. They became the first Koreans to receive a government certificate and a license to practice medicine. Avison also realized that there was a shortage of educational materials, so he translated key medical books himself.169 There was also a severe shortage of nurses, since cultural norms in Korea prevented women from attending to male patients. Avison was instrumental in founding a Christian nurses’ training school, which produced its first class of Korean nurses in 1908. From 1915, the Japanese forbade Christian instruction, but Yonsei became the first accredited post- secondary educational institution in Korea. By 1934, the medical college was recognized by the Japanese government in Tokyo, meaning that its graduates could practice anywhere in the
166 IBID. 167 Scott, 26.
168 Kwang-nin Yi. Ollibŏ Al Ebisŭn ŭi saengae: Hanʼguk kŭndae sŏyang ŭihak kwa kŭndae kyoyuk ŭi kaechʻŏkcha, [Life of Oliver R. Avison: Pioneer of Modern Western Education and Modern Education in Korea], (Seoul: Yŏnse Taehakkyo Chʻulpʻanbu, 1992), 68. 169 Douglas Jay, former principal of Emmanuel College, writes of “Avison’s Pagoda” in The United Church Observer, March 2006.
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Japanese empire.170 Since then, the Severance Hospital has flourished in both its medical practice and teaching capacity. The Hospital currently has over 7,000 employees including 2,000 physicians, and over 24,000 students have graduated from the medical program.171
Figure 4: Severance Union Medical College’s first graduating class (1908)
Source: Yonsei University College of Medicine, “Introduction,” http://medicine.yonsei.ac.kr/en/About_YUCM/Introduction/ (Accessed May 20, 2017)
For his exceptional contributions to medical education in Korea as the first director of Severance Hospital and royal physician, the Li Dynasty awarded Avison the “Taeguk Grade IV Medal” in 1906 and a special plaque of appreciation in 1907. From 1913 to 1934, Avison served as the president of the Severance Union Medical College, and concurrently served as the President of the Chosun Christian College from 1916 to 1934. The merger of the two colleges in 1957 led to the creation of the biggest private institution for higher medical education in Korea, the Yonsei University.172 After 50 years of service in Korea, Avison retired in 1934, and was awarded a “Medal of Independence” by the government of Republic of Korea in 1954. One of Avison’s sons, Dr. Douglas Avison, born in Pusan in 1893, also spent most of his productive years in Korea as Professor and Chairman, Department of Pediatrics at the Severance Union
170 IBID. 171 Yonsei University Health System, “A Brief History of Severance Hospital,” http://www.yuhs.or.kr/en/inter_healthcare_center/inter_health_severance/intro/
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Medical College. He asked that his body be cremated and the ashes buried in the Foreign Cemetery in Seoul, which was done, along with his wife Katherine’s ashes. 173
“This stone monument was constructed in the Republic of Korea by the alumni of Yonsei University Medical College and shipped to Canada in 1985, and is currently found at Victoria College near Avenue Road and Charles St. at the University of Toronto. It pays tribute to three early Canadian medical missionaries: Dr. Oliver R. Avison, Dr. Stanley H. Martin, and Dr. Florence J. Murray.”
Figure 5: Korean Pagoda at Victoria University (Source: Photo by the author)
The stone pagoda in front of Victoria University, erected as a memorial to Dr. Oliver Avison, Dr. Stanley Martin, and Dr. Florence Murray, remains as a symbol of the contributions of the Presbyterian Church of Canada and the United Church of Canada to the development of medical education and practice in Korea, and it also reflects the gratitude of the people of Korea for the dedicated work of Canadian medical missionaries in Korea.174 An editorial in the Toronto Star in 1986 noted that Dr. Avison’s humanitarian work and dedication were “on par with those of Livingston and Schweitzer,”175 and noted that “Dr. Norman Bethune has become a very famous Canadian in China, because he served in a battle against Japanese invaders in 1938-39, and Mao Tse Dong wrote an essay about him. Every Chinese scholar coming to Canada is urged to visit Dr. Bethune’s birth place at Gravenhurst in central Ontario.”176 It continued, “Long before Bethune’s contribution, Avison set up medical institutions and saved the lives of over a
173 IBID. 174 Victoria University Archives President’s Fonds – Goldwin S. French, “Acceptance of Memorial” Arts Committee – Pagoda, 1985-1998, University of Toronto: Victoria University Archives. 175 Donald Jones, “Deep for Seoul’s Soul”, Toronto Star, January 3, 1986. 176 IBID.
59 million people in Korea and consequently, Koreans will wish to respect and honour the Canadian doctor as a founder of Western medicine in Korea.”177
The Pagoda opening ceremony brought together some Koreans, like Dr. Bong H. Hyun, who was a beneficiary of Canadian missionaries and who later became a Professor of Pathology at UMDNJ – Rutgers Medical School in New Jersey and the President of the Severance Alumni Association. In his letter to Prof. Kenneth R. Bartlett, Acting Vice-President of the University of Toronto, on September 9th, 1985, Hyun wrote how his father was a graduate of a Canadian Mission High School who worked closely with Canadian missionaries until 1936. Dr. Hyun’s childhood home in North Korea was next door to Dr. Florence Murray.178 Hyun was one of many who received a Canadian Mission Scholarship as a student at the Severance Union Medical College, an example of the work of Canadian missionaries carrying on through the lives of Koreans.179
DR. FRANK W. SCHOFIELD
If Gale left his mark on culture and Avison on medicine, Dr. Frank William Schofield remains a highly respected figure as the 34th Patriot of the Korean National Independence Movement (after the thirty-three signatories of the Declaration of Independence). To date, Schofield remains as the only foreigner buried in the Patriot section of the National Cemetery in South Korea.180 Schofield first came to Korea in 1916 at Avison’s invitation; Avison was serving as the Dean of the Severance Medical School in Seoul at the time.181 While forced to leave Korea in 1920 by the Japanese colonial authorities, Schofield returned in 1958 as a national
177 Yong-Seung Chung, “Letter to the Editor,” Toronto Star, March 2, 1986. 178 Dr. Murray established one of the first modern tuberculosis sanatorium in 1928 and founded one of the finest nursing schools in 1929. 179 “A Letter from Dr. Bong H. Hyun to Prof. Kenneth R. Bartlett,” University of Toronto: Victoria University Archives, Sept 9, 1985.
180 Chang-nak Yi, Minjok taepʻyo 34-in Sŏk Ho-pʻil: Pʻŭraengkʻŭ Williŏm Sŭkʻopʻiltŭ, [Frank William Schofield: The 34th National Patriot], (Kyŏnggi Sŏngnam: Param Chʻulpʻansa, 2007), 38.
181 Chang-nak Yi. Han'guk ttang e much'irira: P'ŭraengk'ŭ Williŏm Sŭk'op'ildu Paksa chŏn'gi, [I Wish to be Buried in Korea], (Seoul: KIATS Press, 2016), 47.
60 guest at the invitation of President Syngman Rhee, whom he had met while helping with Korea’s independence movements. From then until his death in 1970, Schofield remained in Korea to teach and help the poor, while also offering advice to the Canadian government on humanitarian assistance.182
In a letter to Schofield, Avison described the Severance Medical School he had helped to establish in 1909 and noted how it was making great contributions to the Korean society. Avison also noted that he needed a teacher of bacteriology -- there were many qualified bacteriologists, but he was looking for someone willing to come to Korea, a poor, distant and underdeveloped country.183 While his colleagues at the Veterinary College were against the idea, especially in light of a case of paralysis in his left arm and right leg, Schofield was moved by Avison’s letter and a desire to do something for the Korean people. At Severance, Schofield taught bacteriology and sanitation, but since he did not speak Korean, his lectures were delivered through an interpreter. Frustrated at the time-consuming nature of interpretation, Schofield decided to learn Korean with the help of Mr. Mok Won-Hong, who became his language teacher and interpreter.184 While he was initially invited for medical work, his real impact in Korea would be in the realm of politics.
Before analyzing Schofield’s work, it is important to consider developments in international relations that affected Korea’s domestic political situation. Of central importance during Schofield’s time in Korea was the end of the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference, and Korea’s search for independence in light of President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points. In the aftermath of the First World War, statesmen gathered in Paris primarily to negotiate the new boundaries of Europe in search for peace, but their decisions had ramifications for Asia, Africa and the Middle East.185 In particular, the notion of “self-determination” became
182 Jin Young Choi, “Dr. Frank William Schofield and His Place in Korean History,” Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch, Transactions Vol. 65 (1990): 330-331. 183 IBID, 46-47. 184 Yi, I wish to be buried in Korea, 46-7. 185 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World, (New York: Random House, 2001), xxix.
61 both a source of hope and confusion. In Korea, such hope was expressed through a public demonstration organized by Korean nationalist leaders, with Schofield’s help both before and during the event.
The planning began when Yi Gap-Sung, whom Schofield knew through the Severance Hospital, visited him in February 1919 to ask for his help. Yi spoke about Dr. Alfred M. Sharrocks, who was a missionary and the director of the Jesuit hospital in Sunchon, Korea. Dr. Sharrocks had heard about President Wilson’s Fourteen points during his visit to Washington in January 1918, including the principle of self-government. Encouraged by this proposal, representatives from various occupied countries had gathered in Washington to discuss implications for their own national circumstances.186 Dr. Sharrocks met with Syngman Rhee and Changho An, well-known Korean nationalists who were active in the United States. Rhee and An told Dr. Sharrocks that they needed a clear and unequivocal expression of the Korean people’s desire for independence and support for their activities to make their fight more effective. Dr. Sharrocks was asked to convey this message to Korean leaders upon his return. Yi confided in him that there had already begun an organizing movement by political leaders such as Gi-Dwok Kang, Moonbo Kim, Seogguk Kim, and others who were meeting in secrecy. However, they needed someone who could serve as the messenger between Korea and the outside world, as most Korean leaders were very limited in their understanding of the world affairs because of the strict surveillance of the Japanese police.187 This was where Schofield’s help could be most effective. Schofield replied: “As you know I was born and raised in England. I love my homeland as much as any Englishman, but I do not think it is right that England has so many colonies. In the future, no country will be able to hold its colonies very long. I am sure of that.”188 While the Korean leaders organized themselves and decided that 33 signatories would be chosen for the declaration on March 1st, Schofield served as a source of information for foreign media, and also produced photographic records of the public demonstration.
186 Yi, op.cit, 47. 187 IBID. 188 IBID.
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Figure 6: Image of crowd outside of city hall taken by Schofield on March 1, 1919.
(Source: Dr. Schofield Memorial Foundation www.drschofield.org/)
On March 1st, 1919, hundreds of thousands of Koreans marched to declare Korea's right to independence from Japanese rule. Inspired by the rhetoric of “self-determination”, 33 religious and civic leaders proclaimed Korea's Declaration of Independence, asserting Korea's right to liberty and equality within the world of nations. Brilliantly organized and pacifist in intent, the March First movement was the beginning of a wide popular movement against Japanese rule.189 The Japanese authorities were caught by surprise. Many Koreans went around shouting "Long live Korean Independence!"190 Over the following months that summer, more than a million Koreans across the peninsula participated in demonstrations and protests, involving young and old, men and women, poor and rich, and religious and secular Koreans from every province.191 The March First movement was an unequivocal expression of Korean nationalism as a mass phenomenon, bringing Korean nationalism beyond the sphere of the bourgeois intelligentsia and into the national conversation.
It is important to note that there were different reactions from the Canadian missionaries about the March 1st protest, as seen particularly in the case of Gale. In his letter to former British Ambassador to the U.S. Lord James Bryce about the pro-independence demonstration on March 1st, 1919, Gale noted:
On the first of March...A manifesto suddenly made its appearance and was handed about the streets of Seoul by the hundreds, announcing the independence of Corea and the freedom of Corean people…the
189 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and International Origins of Anti-Colonial Nationalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 119. 190 Robinson, 3. 191 Manela, 119.
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demonstration was purely a peaceful one, of the nature of passive resistance. They met in groups, unknown to the police, all over the land and announced their independence. No violence was to be restored to, and no resistance was to be offered of any kind, but this announcement only, that they were Coreans and would never accept the rule of Japan.192
For Gale, the situation in Korea reminded him of the French-English struggle in Canada, which reflected his fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Japanese occupation, at least in the initial stage. Gale wrote that the Japanese efforts to exert its influence over Korea were essentially an attempt to “Japanize” the Koreans: “In Canada, French Canadians never became Englishmen and never were asked to be. So it would [should] be here in Korea.”193 The analogy, in hindsight, was completely incongruent and Lord Bryce’s response reflected the geopolitical realities of Anglo-Japanese alliance:
Because they [Korea] are technically now subject to Japan, and we could not interfere with the control Japan exercises except by laying ourselves open to have questions brought up which we could not admit to be within scope of the [Paris] conference, such, for instance, as to those of Egypt, South Africa, and Ireland, although, I need hardly, say our purposes and policy are entirely different from those which Japan has been following.194
Unlike Schofield, Gale’s pro-Japanese views in the early stage led Korean intellectuals to denounce Gale’s politics, both before and after annexation. Later in 1927, Yun Chi-Ho, a well- known Korean intellectual who was a member of the Korean Independence Club, recalled that it was “somewhat sad that [Gale’s] too pronounced pro-Japanese attitude…estranged the young men of Korea from him.”195
192 Gale’s letter to Bryce, dated March 10, 1919, MS 245, Box 10, University of Toronto: Fisher Rare Books Library. 193 Gale’s letter to Bryce, dated March 10, 1919, MS 245, Box 10, U of T Thomas Fisher Library. For security reasons, Gale sent his letter via Bishop Mark Napier Trollope, who was a British Anglican missionary. Trollope was considered to have the same view on Japanese colonization as Gale, as seen in Yoo, op cit., 191. 194 Bryce Letter to Gale dated May 24, 1919, MS245, Box 10, University of Toronto: Thomas Fisher Library. 195 Byeong-Gi Song ed, Kugyŏk Yun Chʻi-ho ilgi, [Diaries of Yun, Ch'i-ho], vol. 9, (Seoul: Yŏnse Taehakkyo Chʻulpʻanbu, 2001), 118.
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Schofield’s conflict with the Japanese colonial authorities came to a head after the nation- wide independence demonstrations of March 1919.196 The Japanese government noted that Schofield was the “#1 culprit” and “the most dangerous figure” in terms of Korea’s independence movement, and was closely monitored even by the missionary community.197 While many Western missionaries either blindly supported Japanese imperialism or remained silent for the fear of retribution, Schofield was actively engaged in the struggle for Korean independence. He believed that the Western world should witness and condemn the atrocities he saw being committed by the Japanese colonial authorities, such as the burning of Christian villages, torture, abduction, and other forms of violence.
In addition to his reports from the ground, Schofield also shared his experiences with a Canadian audience during his visit to Canada in 1920. At the Central YMCA on July 12, 1920, Schofield described the Japanese treatment of Korea as “worse than that of Russia in the time of the Czar,” and that the Japanese also introduced the old Russian police spy systems, including the use of torture, to terrorize the Koreans and force them to adopt the Japanese customs, language and nationality. Schofield described the Koreans as “primarily pacifist” and the Japanese “essentially militaristic,” and that the Koreans were “a lovable race, tall, strong and robust.”198 Schofield also spoke at length about Korea’s history extending back some 4,000 years, highlighting inventions such as paper, movable type, and a widespread education, and how the Japanese forces “flooded the country with gendarmes, police and soldiers.”199 Stressing that “the Christians have always led in the movement for independence” and Korean-Christians were even “making converts in the prisons; the native converts are making Christians among the men and women imprisoned faster than the churches,” Schofield also spoke of the burning of many Christian churches by the Japanese police and fireman, as well as instances of torture, including a nurse who was burned with hot irons. There were American missionary reports which made their way into the Canadian newspapers as well. For instance, the Rev. Edward Thwing wrote in
196 A. Hamish Ion, The Cross and the Rising Sun, 14. 197 “Missionary Blamed for Korean Unrest,” Japan Advertiser, December 10, 1919. 198 “Korea Groans Beneath Yoke of Oppressor: Medical Man from Seoul Voices Nation’s Cry for Liberty: Victim of Aggression: Jap Police System Cruel as That of Imperial Russia,” The Globe, July 12, 1920. 199 IBID.
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May 1919: “…the lower Japanese officials and soldiers have acted like [...] savages in dealing with this particular situation… A small boy of ten years shot through the back… An unresisting old man of 65 years, pounded, kicked and beaten by several Japanese soldiers, until he could not walk… A crowd of about twenty school girls, who were quietly walking along the public road, not even shouting, chased by soldiers, beaten with guns, knocked down, and so shamefully treated that it made one’s blood boil...”200 The brutality of the Japanese rule, which Koreans could not effectively transmit to the rest of the world, was acutely recorded and disseminated by missionaries like Schofield.
INTERWAR PERIOD & CANADIAN MISSIONARIES
To fully appreciate how it was possible for the Japanese government to persist in their outright violations of the Korean people, it is important to turn briefly to the historical development of the interwar period in Asia. With the blessing from Great Britain, driven by their own internal political and economic needs, Japan abandoned its traditional isolationist tendency at the turn of the century and looked outward, quickly becoming a new imperial power in Asia. Japan's successful expansion into Manchuria, Taiwan, Korea and an array of Southeast Asian countries throughout the 1920s and the 1930s raised alarms in China, which correctly perceived a threat to the traditional Sino-centric order in Asia. Empire and expansion were “popular motifs,” as Carol Chin argued, in the late Meiji ideology.201 In fact, the Japanese wartime empire only continued to grow while Western countries were suffering from the Great Depression. It was only through the atomic bomb and the Japanese defeat at the end of the Second World War that the Japanese empire would eventually come to collapse.202 Ironically, American policymakers became worried about the complete collapse of occupied Japan in the post-WWII period. In their view, Japan had the potential to become a new hub for communism and create chaos in the region. American statesmen like John Foster Dulles, who saw Japan as the key to
200 “Jap Rule in Korea Brutal: Presbyterian Missionary to China Tells of Incidents He Has Witnessed,” The Globe, May 24, 1919. 201 Carol Chin, Modernity and National Identity in the United States and East Asia, 1895-1919, (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2010), 162. 202 Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, (London: Praeger, 2002), conclusion.
66 the American effort to "resist and throw back communism in Asia," pondered about the possibility of Japan depending on trade with China, “which would expose Japan to successful Chinese blackmail at a subsequent date.”203 The Truman administration, fearing a domino effect and the changing of tides in the Southeast Asian region, quickly reversed its course in the occupation policy. Aimed at creating a secure Japan, various measures were adopted by Washington to spur the economic recovery in Japan through industrialization and trade.204 In doing so, American policymakers came to link Japan together with Southeast Asia under the aegis of “containment”— economic and military concerns were now tightly linked.
How informed were Canadians on the Japanese atrocities? This period also saw the beginning of visits from church leaders and university representatives to get a better sense of the situation on the ground in the Korea mission. Rev. F. C. Stephenson, from the Missionary Educational Secretary for the Methodist Church, went on a tour of the Orient in July 1920, including Korea, and “motion pictures” of missionary activity in all spheres, such as evangelical, educational, medical, industrial and agricultural, were taken.205 Dr. James Endicott, an offspring of a Canadian missionary in China, also went on a tour of China, Korea and Japan in 1927.206 The Principal of Emmanuel College also travelled to Korea and other parts of Asia in 1927, and his detailed diaries are still kept at the Emmanuel College Library Archives at the University of Toronto. 207 Their activities were considerably restrained as Japanese surveillance was very strict, but they nevertheless offered opportunities to confirm the reports sent by the missionaries.
In the meantime, Canadian missionaries in Chientao, Manchuria also protested against gross human atrocities committed by the Japanese troops, stating that as far as political questions are concerned, their policy has been “no neutrality on brutality” when methods of torture were
203 Ibid, 413. 204 Michael Schaller, "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia," Journal of American History (Sept 1982): 69. 205 “Tourists and Missionaries,” The Globe, July 15, 1920. 206 “Moderator to Visit Missionary Fields of United Church: Rev. Dr. Endicott to Visit India, China, Korea, Japan and Africa,” The Globe, October 2, 1926. 207 Emmanuel College Archives, “Principal’s Office Fonds,” Asia 1927, Toronto: Emmanuel College Archives.
67 rampant, especially on old men and women, as well as children.208 “Canadians may well be proud,” the report continued, “that missionaries from this country have stood at their post and, by their very presence in the country, have so far prevented outrages by the Japanese troops and police trained according to Prussian methods, and which therefore know no other means of repression than those of terrorism.”209 The Japanese atrocities committed in Chientao, a Manchurian community just over the Korean border -- where Japanese forces indiscriminately shot hundreds of villages, burned villages, schools, church and crops -- were made public by the Canadian missionaries stationed in Manchuria and Korea.210 Eye-witness reports from Canadian missionaries such as Dr. H.S. Martin of Newfoundland, a physician based at the Canadian Presbyterian Mission at Yong-Jung, as well as the Rev. W.H. Foote, all pointed to the indiscriminate burning of civilians by the Japanese forces, which stood in absolute contrast to the statements issued by the Japanese Bureau of Educational Affairs from the Government-General of Choson.211 The Japanese publication argued that “since the annexation of Korea by Japan, the Government-General has continued to deal with all religious matters, as did the Residency- General, in a liberal and fair spirit. Not only has the freedom of religious belief been respected but the propagation of any religion whatever has been permitted.”212 It also accused the foreign missionaries working in Korea as “wicked plotters engaged in inciting their Korean followers into revolt against the Government.”213
In addition to Schofield, other Canadian missionaries on the ground in Korea continued to write about Japanese atrocities for the Canadian audience at home and also called for more missionaries to sign up to serve in Korea. 214 Rev. J. M. Scott, pastor of St. John’s Presbyterian
208 “Presbyterians Explain Stand Over Protests: Deny any Political Bias: Not aiding Koreans in hostility to Japan, Asserts Church statement,” The Globe, December 15, 1920. 209 IBID. 210 “Say Japs Slew Wantonly and Fired Villages,” The Globe, January 20, 1921. 211 “Christianity in Chosen,” The Globe, June 27, 1922. 212 IBID. 213 IBID.
214 At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Presbyterian Foreign Board of Missions yesterday letters were received from Korea expressing satisfaction that the Eastern and Western committees of the
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Church who was serving in Korea, wrote in the Globe about “the injustice and undeserved suffering…to some of the native Christians” and that the Japanese administration arrested over 159 men and there were some 106 prisoners.215 Regular in-depth reports appeared in the Globe by Canadian missionaries to highlight the cruelties inflicted on Koreans, with headlines such as “Japs use Koreans as Huns Belgians.” Heavily emphasized in these reports was the idea that the cause of the independence movement had to do with a decade of “oppression and cruel treatment which the natives have suffered from their ruthless conquerors” highlighting “the reign of terror throughout the entire country.”216 The report mentioned above that compared the Japanese methods to that of the “Hun” stressed that “militarism, of whatever national brand, knows no other method than that of rule by the sword.”217 These news reports provided a detailed description of atrocities being committed by the Japanese authorities.
Soon enough, under Japanese threats, many Canadian missionaries returned to Canada and continued to urge for more support through local communities. These oral reports were significant because the Japanese government continued to deny the atrocities being committed, and because of political oppression at home, Koreans could not speak up for themselves.218 At her presentation at Kew Beach Presbyterian Church in Toronto on January 9th, 1921, Miss Edna McClellan stressed that “the most of you heard is only part of the truth regarding the treatment of
Presbyterian Church would share in the work of Korea. The need at present in the Korean field is that of men; no less than thirteen new men are asked for to deal adequately with the work. There were also continued call for more missionaries, see “Korea Sends a Call for More Missionaries,” The Globe, September 20, 1913; “Canadian Work in the Far East: Several Missionaries Leave for India, China, Japan, and Korea,” The Globe, August 18, 1917.
215 “Evidence Hastened by Torture in Korea; 106 Persons Sentenced,” The Globe, January 9, 1913.
216 “Japs use Koreans as Huns Belgians: American Missionaries Report Barbarous Cruelties on Innocent People,” The Globe, March 19, 1919.
217 “Mission Work for Koreans: Miss Pooley Tells of Conditions in Far Eastern Country,” The Globe, September 2, 1919; “Brutal Rule over Koreans: Japs, in Quelling Rebellion, Use Methods of the Hun, Blame the Christians,” The Globe, July 12, 1919.
218 “A Japanese Official Denial,” The Globe, December 8, 1920; “Korea Groans Beneath Yoke of Oppressor: Medical Man from Seoul Voices Nation’s Cry for Liberty: Victim of Aggression: Jap Police System Cruel as That of Imperial Russia,” The Globe, July 12, 1920.
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Korean revolutionaries by the Japanese,” and that the Japanese militarism was “not behind that of Germany…who burned the wounded alive.”219
Missionaries like Avison also returned to Canada to share their experiences. Avison, speaking to an audience at Knox Presbyterian Church in Toronto on June 8th, 1924, was still hopeful after serving as a medical missionary in Korea for 31 years: “Little Korea, which has no material power, no great material wealth, and certainly no military efficiency, may become the spiritual leader in North Asia and undertake a great deal of spiritual work which would otherwise have to be done by people from the Western part of the world.”220 Avison noted that with their “sense of humour and a peculiar spiritual capacity,” the Korean people were the “Irish of Asia” and “it is not hard for them to realize God,” and build their own churches and support them with their own money. When Avison first went to Korea 31 years prior, there were fewer than 100 Christians in Korea, compared to over 300,000 Christians at the time of his speech.221 Avison stressed that 17,000 more doctors were needed in Korea, but that these doctors could be found locally if the Koreans received proper education. During his sermon at the Sherbourne Street Methodist Church on June 15th, 1924, Avison also emphasized how Koreans were “an intelligent and inventive” people, with a “spiritual capacity greater than any other Asiatic.”222 Other missionaries, like Rev. Dr. R. A. Hardie and Mrs. Hardie, who served for some forty-three years in Korea, also spoke of their long term service, that “…The Koreans have shown remarkable ability, and gradually the Koreans are being introduced by the Japanese government into official positions.” Hardie also noted that the Korean churches were showing a strong tendency to become self-supporting, potentially helping with missions in the future in China and India.223
219 “Says Koreans are Murdered by Jap Troops: Returned Missionary Accuses Japanese of Terrible Treatment of Natives,” The Globe, January 10, 1921. 220 “People of Korea Prove Responsible: Dr. O. R. Avison Tells Story of Progress in Christianity,” The Globe, June 9, 1924. 221 IBID. 222 “Considers Korea Spiritual Centre of Northeast Asia: Dr. O.R. Avison, Medical Missionary, Relates Story of Progress,” The Globe, June 16, 1924. 223 “Korea Missionaries are Revisiting City: Find People Being Placed in Official Positions by Japan,” The Globe, September 28, 1932.
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To what extent did these reports from missionaries have any practical implications? To begin with, they provided the first-ever direct accounts for ordinary Canadians who may have never heard of Korea. Moreover, they helped with fundraising for the mission work in Korea. For instance, at the annual meeting of Toronto Conference Branch of the United Church of Canada, a total of $163,072.11 was raised for the mission work in Korea, following a presentation from Mrs. Induk P. Kim of Korea, one of the leaders of the Student Volunteer Movement in Korea well known for her advocacy for girls’ education in Korea.224 The Women’s Missionary Society of the United Church of Canada alone pledged $23,500 to help build schools for girls in Korea after hearing Ms. Park’s story.225 These reports of the Canadian missionaries, both in newspapers and in sermons or speeches in churches and community centres, greatly contributed to Canadian public understanding of the peninsula at a time when Japanese propaganda concealed the atrocities being committed on the ground in Korea. Some of the Canadian soldiers who later served in the Korean War were among those in audience, which illustrates the long-term impact of the mission work at home.
CONCLUSION
This chapter examined the beginning of Canadian-Korean relations in the late 19th century, through the lens of early Canadian missionaries. Through cultural, intellectual, religious and medical works, Canadian missionaries set a very solid foundation in building a lasting relationship between Canada and Korea. The historical timing for this missionary enterprise was very critical, because Korea found itself caught between the shifting regional orders of China and Japan. In the face of oppressive Japanese colonial rule, many Koreans turned to Western missionaries for the source of new knowledge and enlightenment, and support for their independence movements. The Canadian missionaries, inspired by the Student Volunteer Movement and the “calling” to win Asia for Christ, arrived in Korea with great eagerness. To be sure, the “Canadian” aspect of the missionaries requires some qualification, since some of them had British heritage and many were paid through the American church boards. The Canadian
224 “Pastor Received His Salary in Rice from Korean Women,” The Globe, March 7, 1929. 225 “Romance Not Dead in Mission Work This Case Proves: Without Blare of Trumpets $23,500 collected for Korean School,” The Globe, January 8, 1929; “Masqueraded as Boy Fought Them Also to Gain Schooling: Mrs. Induk P. Kim of Korea to Address Missionary Conference,” The Globe, March 5, 1929.
71 missionaries as a group were also much smaller and poorly funded than their American or British counterparts. That said, the early unofficial encounters between Canadian missionaries and the Korean public must nevertheless be examined carefully because of the impetus it provided in terms of Canadian perceptions of Korea and the lasting impact of these encounters.
James S. Gale’s literary translations, for instance, opened up a new cultural domain both for the Korean literary sphere and the Canadian public at home. His books, dictionaries, maps, and other writings both marked one of the first attempts to truly reveal the Korean culture to the Western world and to introduce Western literature to the Korean community. Gale’s work in the creation and dissemination of knowledge, made possible because of his own linguistic genius and the relationships he cultivated with the local Korean assistants, stands out due to its sheer volume, high quality, and persistence. To this date, Korean scholars continue to actively study Gale’s early translations because of his acute understanding of Korean language and culture.
Dr. Oliver R. Avison’s work as a medical missionary was also notable for the tremendous vision and lifelong dedication in modernizing Korean medical education. Even after he retired from the American Presbyterian Mission in 1932, Avison remained in Korea until being repatriated after the opening of the Pacific War. While Gale had remained publicly silent on political developments in Korea under the Japanese colonial rule, Avison was a strong advocate of Korean independence.226 In the farewell address for Avison, his Korean friend Yun Chi Ho recalled:
We are losing a great public benefactor… you leave us with three great institutions, Severance Hospital, the Medical College and the Chosun Christian College, to perpetuate your memory to the end of time. Your greatest monument, however, will be the never-ending stream of graduates from the College and the patients who will benefit by the healing ministrations of the Hospital.227
Contemporary interest and respect for Dr. Schofield resonates widely across the Korean public mind even to this date -- rare for Western missionaries who served in Korea. Schofield
226 Ion, 32. 227 Scott, 26.
72 received a national presidential recognition in 1960, and remains a widely revered figure in Korean public consciousness. This can be seen even in Canadian-Korean communities: the Dr. Schofield Foundation recently enacted a monument at the Toronto Zoo in his honour, reflecting Dr. Schofield’s background as a veterinary doctor.228 Dr. Un-Chan Chung, a former President of the Seoul National University and a former Prime Minister of South Korea, was one of the students adopted by Schofield, receiving financial support and both intellectual and moral mentorship from him for a decade between 1960 and 1970. Chung recalled that he learned everything he needed to know in life from his interactions with Schofield, who taught him to “be like a tiger against the powerful and be like a dove for the weak.”229 Before his deportation in 1920, Schofield encouraged his students at Seoul National University to support the March 1st Movement, often lecturing them about principles of self-determination and constitutional democracy instead of the biology for which they came. Schofield, along with many other Canadian missionaries, continued to remain involved with the Korean file, even when they were forced out of Korea during the interwar period. The missionary updates in newspapers, as well as oral reports, all served to remind Canadians about the dire political and humanitarian situation on the ground in Korea. These early encounters would have long-term consequences with Canada’s future engagements in Korea, particularly with the Korean War and subsequent involvement with aid programmes, as well as the rise of Korea’s strategic importance for Canadian foreign policy.
228 The Schofield Memorial Foundation,Sŭk'op'iltŭr han'gukŭl saranghan k'aenadain [Dr. Schofield: A Canadian Who Loved Korea], (Toronto: The Schofield Memorial Foundation, 2005), 5. 229 Jang-Nak Yi, op.cit, 23-25.
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CHAPTER 2
Division of the Korean Peninsula & Canada’s Official Engagements
“We certainly knew of all the hard work by our missionaries in Korea…there were reports in the newspapers, church bulletins, and some of us even heard them speak at our church meetings. When we were on the battlefields…we gave what we can, in terms of canned foods and money... The thankfulness and the greatness of the Korean people, how they treat Canadians…it made you feel really good.” 230
– John Kolanchey, 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Regiment in Korea
***
The end of the Second World War brought about tremendous changes in international relations, not only for European powers, but also for countries in Asia. Japan’s surrender had immediate consequences for countries like Korea, which had been under the Japanese colonial rule for nearly four decades. While the Koreans may have briefly rejoiced at their liberation, the political situation on the Korean peninsula more complicated than ever before. The Korean peninsula became embroiled in a serious political rivalry, with the rise of competing political leaderships. The Soviet Union and the United States competed for dominance on the peninsula and, after arbitrarily drawing the 38th parallel to divide Korea, each superpower backed different political factions. At American insistence, a committee called the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was set up to supervise elections on the Korean peninsula. Canada was selected to serve on UNTCOK, with Dr. George Patterson as its representative, which marked its first official engagement with Korea. Yet, the UN’s efforts to settle the domestic political differences in Korea failed and Korea only continued to exist as a theatre of the Cold War for civil servants in Ottawa.
230 Author’s interview with Mr. Kolanchey, May 15, 2017. Mr. Kolanchey’s interview with the Memory Project through Historica Canada can be accessed at http://www.thememoryproject.com/stories/3241:john-kolanchey/
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When the Korean War broke out, Canada participated as the third-largest troop deploying country, although its motivation stemmed from relationships with the United States and the United Nations rather than any specific policy on Korea. Missionaries had done wonderful work in Korea, but their knowledge remained at individual grassroots levels and congregations, which were far from the minds of policymakers in Ottawa. From the Korean perspective, Canada was not a country of focus or priority for its external relations, largely because of the overwhelming influence of the United States and the outbreak of the Korean War. The earlier missionary connection re-surfaced during this period, as Canadian missionaries returned to Korea and the United Church of Canada became involved with aid programs over the course of the Korean War. Many Canadian soldiers who served in Korea were also familiar with the work of Canadian missionaries. Hence, there was a clear disconnect between unofficial missionary understanding of Korea and what the officials in Ottawa knew about the country. The discussion in this chapter focuses mostly on South Korea, rather than both Koreas, since Canada only recognized South Korea after the division of the country into two Koreas.
This chapter examines the evolution of Canadian-Korean relations from 1945 to 1953 and argues that the Cold War politics largely dictated the Canadian approach towards the Korean peninsula during this period. Canada’s first official engagement in Korea in 1947 through UNTCOK in fact reflected its physical and psychological distance from Korea, and illustrated a vivid difference between the American and Canadian position on Korea. To fully appreciate the evolution of the Canadian attitude and approach towards Korea, it is first necessary to examine the complexity of the political situation on the Korean peninsula starting with Korea’s liberation in 1945, the rise of competing political factions, and the country’s division at the 38th parallel by the United States and the Soviet Union. These international and domestic developments all set the tone for Canada’s engagement with Korea; the Canadian approach to the Korean peninsula was largely reflective of its attitudes about the early Cold War in Asia. When Canada began its involvement on UNTCOK, Korea was still a distant, foreign territory of no immediate consequence for Ottawa. Nevertheless, Canada’s participation in the Korean War elevated Korea’s strategic importance for Canadian foreign policy, one that could no longer be casually abandoned.
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END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR & KOREA’S LIBERATION FROM JAPAN
Canada’s official engagement with Korea in 1947 was a consequence of the political turmoil in the aftermath of the Second World War, much of which was beyond the control of the Korean people. To understand why and how Canada became involved with UNTCOK, it is useful to analyze the developments on the Korean peninsula, as well as the changing dynamics in international relations. The Allied victory and the end of the Second World War brought immediate changes in the Asia-Pacific region, most notably in Japan’s former colonies. On August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender, stating: “Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.”231 Known as the “Jewel Voice Broadcast,”232 the announcement effectively ended the Second World War, liberating the Korean peninsula from four decades of colonial rule. Reaction in Seoul was remarkably muted. While flyers had been posted advising the people of Chosŏn to listen to an impending major radio announcement, only a few Koreans owned personal radios and the first half of Hirohito’s address was marred by static. It was also delivered in the archaic Japanese used by the Imperial Family and more traditional Samurai families. It was not until the following day, after the arrival of the morning papers, that Koreans fully understood this message.
The atmosphere in Korea on August 16th was one mixed with joy and fear, as many citizens still could not believe the news. Some pulled out their white traditional garments to join the march, shouting “Korean independence forever” on the streets. Korean nationalists were ready to seize the moment. The new Declaration of the Republic of Korea proclaimed: “We are determined to demolish Japanese imperialism, its residuary influences, anti-democratic factions, reactionary elements, and any undesirable foreign influence in our state, and to establish our complete autonomy and independence, thereby anticipating the realization of an authentically democratic state.”233 In Seoul, Yŏ Unhyŏng, one of the key nationalist leaders, delivered a speech a day after Hirohito’s surrender address stating: “Let us forget what we suffered in the
231 Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 526. 232 This speech was otherwise known as the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War. 233 Ian Buruma, Year Zero: A History of 1945, (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 265; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-47, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 88.
76 past. We must build on this land of ours an ideal society, a rational paradise. Let us set aside individual heroism and progress together in an unbreakable union.”234 The crowd, about 5000 in number, carefully listened to his emotional and forceful speech.235 In exchange for a guarantee of safety for Japanese subjects on the Korean peninsula, Yŏ requested the immediate release of political prisoners throughout Korea; non-interference on the maintenance of public safety and political activities; non-interference on organizing youth and student movements; non- interference on the involvement of labour and farmers in nation-building activities; and the guarantee of a food supply for Seoul in the next three months. 236 The Japanese authorities promptly agreed to all of these terms and Yŏ formed the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence in Seoul with other patriots, including communists just released from Japanese jails. 237 But many others chose to stay at home because they still feared the Japanese authorities. Despite such high hopes, confusion and chaos ensued in the aftermath of the news of liberation.
Figure 7: Yŏ Unhyŏng and the crowd at the Hwimun Middle School, Aug 16, 1945
Source: Photo © Kuksa p'yŏnch'an ŭiwŏnhoe [National Institute of Korean History), http://db.history.go.kr
234 Ian Buruma, Year Zero: A History of 1945, (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 262-63. 235 “Yŏ unhyŏng yŏnsŏlmun yoyak”, [Condensed summary of Yŏ Unhyŏng’s Speech], Maeil shinbo, Aug 17, 1945. http://db.history.go.kr (Accessed March 1, 2017) 236 Bruce Cumings has argued that the views held by the Americans and conservative Koreans or “pro- Japan” Koreans converged on the issue of the role of state. The Americans sought to build a state that would have sufficient power to maintain stability, law and order, and prevent an orientation of southern Korea away from American interests – or towards perceived Soviet interests. The Koreans sought to build a state that could preserve economic and social privilege, while promoting aristocratic status and landed wealth. Collaborators in colonial rule sought to prevent the purgative that liberation seemed to promise. Hence, both the Americans and the Koreans felt a need to involve Korean nationalists into the government in order to justify their self-serving policies. Soon enough, Syngman Rhee would emerge as the perfect candidate. (Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 430-31.) 237 IBID.
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POLITICS OF THE COLD WAR & A DIVIDED PENINSULA
While Koreans debated the future of their nation after liberation from Japan, their future had already been largely negotiated by the great powers even before the Second World War came to an end. Based on the directives of the Cairo Conference of November 1943, the Allied powers agreed that their Korean trusteeship would establish a provisional government for the whole country and, “…in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.” 238 Yet, precisely how Korea could achieve its independence remained unclear. From the beginning, the focus of negotiations remained on trusteeship rather than sovereignty. Much of it, unfortunately, depended on the desires of the great powers, rather than the desires of the Korean people. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed a U.S.-Soviet-Chinese trusteeship over Korea. 239 This pledge was reaffirmed in Moscow in December 1945: the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed that a provisional Korean democratic government should be set up for all of Korea, with a view toward the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state. Subsequently, the Allied powers, rather arbitrarily, divided Korea into two distinct spheres of influence -- the North and the South.240
Beyond these few words, there was no clear agreement among the wartime Allies and no practical planning in Washington about the post-war future of the Korean peninsula.241 Since Korea had been a part of the Japanese empire -- and an important part -- the Allies determined that their military forces must occupy the peninsula. 242 The division and trusteeship had been an American proposal to the Soviets, and no Korean experts were consulted in the entire process. Canada was also not part of any of the discussions by the great powers and it would not be until
238 United States of America. Department of State, “1943 Cairo Conference,” https://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/107184.htm (Accessed Jan 10, 2015) 239 United States of America. Department of State, “Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945” Foreign Relations of the United States. (1945) 240 Young-Woo Han, Tashi ch'annŭn uri yŏksa [Re-Claiming Our History], (Seoul: Gyeongsewon, 2003), 573-579. 241 IBID. 242 See Hakjoon Kim, “The American Military Government in South Korea 1945-1948: Its formation, policies and Legacies,” Asian Perspective 12, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1988).
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1947 when official discussions emerged in Ottawa about the Korean peninsula. During those discussions, it was agreed that a Joint Commission was to be established to work out the long- range political and economic problems, including the establishment of a provisional democratic structure. In addition, a Joint Conference was set up to deal with immediate and pressing questions, such as administrative and economic issues. Unfortunately, both the Joint Commission and the Joint Conference, which met for some 24 sessions, accomplished very little because the Americans and the Russians disagreed on practically every point.243 Seeing that there were serious delays with the establishment of a united government, Koreans also organized themselves to form a government in the North and the South.244 Washington expected that the division of Korea would be “purely a temporary one to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese troops in that country,” and that the joint control would then extend throughout Korea.245
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs and later Secretary of State, confessed that neither he nor any of the others involved were aware that the Russians and Japanese had already discussed, at the turn of the century, dividing Korea into spheres of influence at the 38th parallel. Rusk wrote, “Had we known that, we almost surely would have chosen another line of demarcation.”246 Rusk’s views were later echoed by Gregory Henderson, a former U.S. Foreign Service officer, who would later lament in 1974:
No division of a nation in the present world is so astonishing in its origin as the division of Korea; none is so unrelated to conditions or sentiment within the nation itself at the time the division was effected; none is to this day so unexplained; in none does blunder and planning oversight appear to have played such a large role. Finally, there is no division for
243 Dean Acheson, “The Problem of Peace in Korea: An Oral Report,” October 24, 1952. Also see United States Department of State “Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945”, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. 244 Han, 572.
245 Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 60. From the American point of view, Goodrich argues that the United States had a number of other goals: 1) to prevent the occupation of all of Korea by Soviet forces, which was considered unavoidable in the absence of such an arrangement; 2) to place the United States in as strong position as possible to implement the promise of Korean independence; 3) to provide for the security of Japan and of the United States forces during the period of military occupation of Japan; and 4) to limit the area of Communist control. 246 Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US Policy in the United Nations, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 60.
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which the U.S. government bears so heavy a share of the responsibility as it bears for the division of Korea.247
The 38th parallel was incorporated, again in a hurry, into General Order Number One for the occupation of Japanese-held territory.248 Although the American forces would not arrive on the Korean peninsula for several weeks, the Soviets stopped their southward advance at the 38th parallel, thereby cementing the division.249 Considering the industrial concentration in the north and agricultural richness in the south, the division of two Koreas at the 38th parallel was hardly logical from an economic standpoint.250 The division caused an unequal distribution of resources, as two-thirds of Korea’s 30 million citizens lived in the south, and only one-third lived in north.251 The South had mainly light industries; heavy and chemical industries were concentrated in the North. As a result, Seoul was effectively cut off from nearly 80per cent of the country’s supply of chemicals, ceramics, gas, electricity and coal, as well as all of its mineral resources, such as magnesite, phosphate and pyrite. Seoul’s manufacturing output immediately plummeted to 15 per cent of what it had been in 1939.252 Furthermore, the displacement of people in the North resulted in an influx of approximately 1.7 million people into the southern part of the peninsula between 1944 and 1949. Such rapid population expansion (a 27-per-cent increase in five years) placed a great strain on the country’s food, housing and other resources.253 The division of the Korean peninsula resulted in serious political and economic consequences, none of which figured prominently in the Allied planning process.
247 Oberdorfer, 7. 248 United States Department of State, “General Order Number One - Diplomatic papers, The Far East, China,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS- idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945v07&page=530&isize=text (Accessed February 17, 2014)
249 Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 6. 250 Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam, (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 3. 251 Acheson, 11. 252 Chung, 8-9. 253 Ibid., 9.
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INTERNAL KOREAN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POST-WWII PERIOD
It is easy to gloss over domestic political developments in Korea during this period, especially given the looming shadow of the early Cold War and the dynamics between the United States and the Soviet Union. But the domestic context on the Korean peninsula in the late 1940s is very important, and the division would eventually prompt Canada’s official engagement on the Korean peninsula as well. While the great powers and the United Nations were occupied with the fate of the peninsula, Koreans became more polarized across the 38th parallel. Decades of Japanese colonial rule meant severe oppression of political mobilization, and Koreans quickly organized themselves the aftermath of liberation.254 Yet the excitement quickly turned into confusion and fear in the South, marked by political rivalries, multiple assassinations, coup attempts, and labour strikes in protest against the U.S. military occupation. In particular, frustrations built up over the American preference for conservative Korean elites, whose patriotic values were questioned by the public. 255 In general, communists and left-wing nationalists were more favourably received by the Korean public than conservative elites in government and business, as many of the latter had collaborated with the Japanese during the colonial rule under the rhetoric of “progress” or “modernity.”256 Koreans also resented the lack of consultation about their country’s future, in light of the lack of progress made by the Joint Commission and the Joint Conference. In a remarkably short span of just a few years, the South and the North not only adopted but further solidified two very different political systems promoted by the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition to regional differences, there were extreme political rivalries within each region, which further complicated Korea’s transitional period.257
In both North and South, a separate Korean People’s Committee took over from Japanese administrators, with popular backing from local Koreans. In the South, Yŏ had a long history of
254 Young-Iob Chung, South Korea in the Fast Lane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), introduction. 255 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 430-31. 256 Also see Carter J. Eckert, Offspring of Empire: the Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991.
257 For a detailed account on this topic, see Myŏngnim Pak, Hanʼguk chŏnjaeng ŭi palbal kwa kiwŏn [The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins], Seoul: Nanam Chʻulpʻan, 1996. Volumes I & II.
81 fighting for Korea’s independence.258 He was greatly inspired by the notion of equality brought by Christianity and quickly launched other social reforms after re-gaining control from the Japanese colonial administration. Yŏ believed in the unity of the political left and right for Korea’s independent future, but faced stark opposition from both sides as well as landowners and other members of the Korean elite, many of whom had collaborated with the Japanese. He organized the Committee for the Preparation of National Reconstruction, and established the Korean People’s Republic by September and joined as its vice-chairman. When the American Military Government in Korea outlawed the Korean People’s Republic, Yŏ then established the Korean People’s Party (Chosŏn Inmindang) in November 1945, and in February 1946, his party joined the left-wing Korean National Democratic Front (Chosŏn minjujuŭi minjok chŏnsŏn), supporting the implementation of the Allies’ Moscow Agreement.259
By December 1945, the Soviet occupation forces in the North installed Kim Il Sung as the chairman of the North Korean branch of the Korean Communist Party. Kim was a young guerrilla fighter in his thirties who had spent most of the war in a Soviet army training camp near Khabarovsk. The Soviets quickly took over control from the People’s Political Committee and focused on purging collaborators and “reactionary elements.”260 Kim became the Chairman of the Interim People’s Committee by 1946 and the top Soviet commanders called him a “national hero.” Using Soviet equipment and advisers, Kim established the Korean People’s Army and aligned with the Communist Party of Korea to solidify his control. By 1946, North Korea had a
258 Trained at the Presbyterian Theological Seminary in Pyongyang between 1910 and 1914, he had been largely influenced by Christianity and fought for Korea’s liberation in China until 1918. He joined the Korean Provisional Government’s legislative assembly when it was in exile in Shanghai, and was also actively involved with the Korean Youth Independence Association in Tokyo in 1919. While it is difficult to locate precise dates, scholars now agree that the then went to Moscow to learn more about communism. When he returned to Korea, Yeo was then imprisoned for three years until 1933 by the Japanese. Upon release from prison, he served as the president of the JoongAng Ilbo newspaper, until it was shut down by the Japanese in 1936. He was imprisoned again, and by the time he made his speech on Aug 15th in Seoul, he had just been released from prison. See Andrew C. Nahm and James E. Hoare, “Yeo Un- Hyeong,” Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Korea, Wilson Centre Digital Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/resource/modern-korean-history-portal/yeo-un-hyeong (Accessed Nov 19, 2016)
259 IBID. From 1946, when he began to lead a movement for political unity in the south, he was subject to a dozen terror attacks and was ultimately assassinated on the road in Seoul in July 1947.
260 Han, 575.
82 full-fledged communist regime. 261 It helped that right-wing forces and Christians had migrated to the South, so resistance against Kim Il Sung remained very weak. Kim’s biggest rival party, the Choson Tongnip Union, was seen to be too close to the Chinese communists and therefore did not receive the support of the Soviets.262 Administrative reforms and land reforms, as well as nationalization of major industries, quickly began in the North under Kim’s leadership. By 1948, the division between North and South would be cemented with the birth of the Republic of Korea on August 15th and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Sept 9th.263
To what extent did Canadians follow internal developments on the Korean peninsula? None of the domestic political issues in Korea really registered much in the minds of Canadian policymakers, whose primary attention remained on Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. 264 Canadian historian Greg Donaghy once argued that Canadian-Korean relations largely developed during this period in the Cold War’s shadow; in his own words, “Canada in 1947 was not a Pacific nation, but a North Atlantic one, whose economic, political, and cultural interests lay largely in Western Europe and the US.”265 Donaghy’s assessment holds a lot of truth, given the lack of official Canadian government’s attention on the Korean peninsula at the time.
Throughout the late 1940s, church leaders and missionaries continued to call for more missionaries and assistance in Korea. For instance, Mrs. H. D. Taylor, overseas executive secretary and the only woman member of the United Church delegation from the mission to the Orient, spoke at the annual meeting of the Dominion Board of the United Church of Canada at the Bloor Street United Church, stressing that “Korea is in the throes of national reconstruction but torn by differing theories of government,” and that “the Christian church is thus presented with a strategic opportunity to present Jesus Christ…and a real contribution to make because the
261 Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (New York: Basic Books, 2014), conclusion. 262 Han, 576. 263 Ibid, 574. 264 Robert Bothwell, “Eyes West: Canada and the Cold War in Asia,” Greg Donaghy ed, Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943-57, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1998. 265 Greg Donaghy, “In the Cold War’s Shadow: Canada and South Korea 1947-72,” Presentation Notes at the CANKOR 50 Conference, (Toronto: Munk School of Global Affairs), April 27, 2013.
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Christian church includes in its membership all racial groups.”266 There were also reports that the Christian missionaries were being targeted by the communists from North Korea,267 which brought the ideological battle to very personal levels for ordinary Canadians.
UN TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA & CANADA
The emergence of different political leadership in the North and the South meant that it was becoming increasingly more difficult to set up a unified governing body for all of Korea, especially after the July 1947 assassination of Yŏ, who was a firm believer in unification. The United States, under President Truman, also began pursuing a more aggressive policy to fight the Cold War, and brought the Korean Question to the United Nations. The UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), composed of representatives of nine nations,268 was set up to supervise elections throughout Korea to recognize the “urgent and rightful claims to independence of the people of Korea.”269 The Soviets objected, since it was seen that North
Korea, with a smaller population than the South, would be put to a disadvantage.270 Canada was chosen as one of the nine countries to be represented on this Commission and was expected to play an important role in advising the drafting of a constitution for Korea and in the preparation of the report to the UN General Assembly.271 The UNTCOK would facilitate and ensure that a free election would take place on the basis of adult suffrage for the freedom and independence of the Korean people. The delegates of the UNTCOK arrived in Seoul on January 8, 1948. Because of Soviet objections to the validity of the UNTCOK, the Ukrainian delegate had withdrawn, but all others (from Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Syria)
266 “Send Us Missionaries: Plea of Orient to the West,” Globe and Mail, May 26, 1948. 267 “Monks and Nuns Arrested in Korea,” Globe and Mail, June 22, 1949; “Korea Briefs,” Globe and Mail, July 3, 1950. 268 The membership would include Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria, and the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic as commission members. Ukraine would later withdraw due to the Soviet pressure. 269 Dean Acheson, “The Problem of Peace in Korea: An Oral Report,” October 24, 1952. 270 Han, 573.
271 L. B. Pearson, “Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs,” Ottawa, Nov 10, 1947, DCER, Vol 13, 970-971.
84 made it on time for the first meeting of the Commission on January 12th at the Deoksu Palace, where the last King of Chosŏn had stayed until 1926 and where the meetings of the U.S.- U.S.S.R. Joint Committee were held until 1947.272
Political leadership in Canada under Prime Minister W.L.M. King was extremely skeptical about getting involved in Korea. His views were not really specific to Korea; rather, King was seeking to avoid too much prominence for Canada in dealing with a potentially volatile country on the frontier between the Soviet Union and its allies and the West. Before the Second World War, King had been considered isolationist in his tendencies, and was now returning to that approach. He did not want unnecessary foreign entanglements. King told Lester B. Pearson and Louis St. Laurent that he preferred to keep “Canada out of trouble and not allow it to be used as the cat’s paw273 of the United States policy.”274 King later noted in his diary on December 18, 1947: “I felt a great mistake was being made by Canada being brought into situations in Asia and Europe of which she knew nothing whatever, of interfering with Great Powers without realizing what consequences might be.… We knew nothing about the situation and should keep out of it.”275 King trusted neither Pearson’s judgement nor his character, which he thought too malleable. He wrote: “I imagine that the truth is that Pearson with his youth and inexperience [Pearson was only 50] and influenced by the persuasion of others around him, had been anxious to have Canada’s External Affairs figure prominently in world affairs...”276 Rumours that there was disagreement in Ottawa over Korea soon reached Washington. Worried about Canada’s potential withdrawal from the UNTCOK, the American Acting Secretary of State urged:
…particularly in light of the fact that Canada has repeatedly demonstrated that it can make one of its greatest contributions to the United Nations in the high qualities of leadership and competence of its representative on the UN bodies…Canada’s prestige in international affairs and recognized interests in the peace of the Pacific would enhance the standing of the Commission. The United States views the participation of the
272 IBID. 273Also see John Price, “The Cat’s Paw: Canada and the UN Temporary Commission on Korea,” The Canadian Historical Review 85.2 (2004), 297-324. 274 Lester B. Pearson, Memoirs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 137. 275 W.L.M. King “Extract from Diary of Prime Minister,” Ottawa, December 18, 1947, DCER Vol 13 (1947), 977. 276 Ibid.
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Canadian representative in the work of the commission as essential to such success…277
The American insistence on Canadian participation in the UNTCOK prompted the Department of External Affairs (DEA) to seriously consider the strategic importance of Korea for Canadian foreign policy. The DEA’s outlook on Canada’s role in the world was markedly different than the views espoused by King. The Cold War figured prominently and the principles set forth by St. Laurent, Canada’s Minister of External Affairs at the time, reflected a new direction that would guide Canadian foreign policy in the decades to come. Delivered at Convocation Hall at the University of Toronto on January 13, 1947, St. Laurent’s Gray Lecture set an important direction for the future of Canadian foreign policy. It identified five key principles as the guiding posts for Canada’s Cold War: 1) preservation of national unity; 2) respect for rule of law; 3) belief in political liberty; 4) respect for Christian values; and 5) willingness to assume responsibility in the international arena.278 St. Laurent highlighted that, as a secondary power, it was important for Canada to assume responsibilities that were proportionate to its capabilities, but remain fully supportive of the United States in the Cold War.279 Rule of law and political liberty would both become relevant considerations in the case of Korea, as well as fulfilling Canada’s responsibilities in the Cold War. For the DEA, the geographic position of Korea was seen to be of vital importance to the security of East Asia in the minds of policymakers in Ottawa.280 It was initially believed that the appointment of a Canadian representative on the UNTCOK would provide “a remarkably good opportunity for the
277 “Acting Secretary of State of the United States to Prime Minister,” December 30, 1947, DCER, Vol 13 (1947), 999.
278 Louis St. Laurent, “The Gray Lecture 1947,” as seen in Jack Granastein ed., Canadian Foreign Policy Historical Readings, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986; also see John Kirton,”The Rule of Law from Gray Lecture to Global Leadership,” G8 Research Centre, www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton2007/kirton_rule- of-law_070121.pdf 279 Also see Adam Chapnick, Canada's Voice: The Public Life of John W. Holmes, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009. 280 The mere fact that Korea was a fault line between the United States and the USSR would make it a strategically important place, but Korea was also surrounded by powerful neighbours such as China and Japan, which were also important in the Cold War period.
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Department [of External Affairs] to acquire a fund of information about Korea that it could not readily gain in any other way.”281
Pearson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, summarized for his minister, St. Laurent, the “special Canadian interests [in Korea] such as missionary activity, pre- war business interests and possible future commercial relations” as well as “general, political and strategic interest in the solution of the Korean question.”282 The DEA memorandum to the delegation to the UN General Assembly stressed that “Korea’s strategic geographic situation, between areas of Soviet and the United States influence, is of importance to Canada as a potential trouble spot in the Northeast Asia.”283 In terms of trade, the two-way exchange was marginal: in the period between 1917 and 1941, total Canadian exports to Korea were valued at over $2,000,000 (which roughly translates to about $80,000 per annum), while Korean exports to Canada were only several thousand dollars per year.284 In principle, Canada, as an exporter of both raw and manufactured goods, would have an eye on trade with Korea in the future, but for the time being, economic considerations were not especially important.
Pearson concluded, “Canada, as a North Pacific power and a new member of the Security Council, cannot easily ignore efforts now being made to find a satisfactory settlement of Korea’s status. This settlement may influence the strategic balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States in a Northwest Pacific area. There is a close similarity between the interdependence of Canadian and American security interests in the North Pacific.”285 The Chiefs of Staff Committee, also consulted, argued that from the strategic point of view, the Canadian delegation should support proposals for the early unification of Korea to establish a democratic government that would be friendly to the United States and Canada. Until such
281 “Memorandum by Head, Third Political Division” Ottawa, November 8, 1947, DCER, Vol 13 (1947), 965 DEA/204-A (s), 965. 282 “Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary-General, Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations,” DCER, vol. 13 (1947) DEA/5475-CS-40, 951. 283 “Extract from Memorandum for Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations,” DCER vol. 13 (1947) DEA/9770-A040, 952-55. 284 Because Korea’s economy was warped into the larger economy of the Japanese empire, these figures may not be considered as normal conditions of trade. Source: K-Stats (Korean International Trade Association), “Canada-Korea Trade,” http://www.kita.org/ (Accessed Jan 20, 2015) 285 See John Price, “The Cat’s Paw: Canada and the UN Temporary Commission on Korea,” The Canadian Historical Review 85.2 (2004) 297-324
87 guarantees could be provided, the Canadian delegation should support the continued occupation by the US forces of Southern Korea.286 The Cabinet conclusions from Dec 18, 1947 underlined that the “Canadian representative would be expected to take an important part, would continue throughout 1948 and it was desirable that someone familiar with Far Easter problems should be selected.”287
Ultimately, Dr. George Patterson was deemed suitable as the Canadian representative because of his experience in China and Japan. 288 Patterson was an interesting character. After studying theology at Victoria College at the University of Toronto, he then went to Japan as a missionary for the Canadian Methodist Church (later the United Church of Canada). He remained in Japan until 1916, and enlisted to serve in the Canadian Field Artillery division from 1916 to 1919. 289 In 1921, he returned to Japan with the National Council of the YMCA of Japan. He returned to Canada in 1932 to work for the YMCA of Canada, and stayed in the Toronto YMCA organization until 1943. In 1943, he was hired by the Department of External Affairs to establish the Canadian Legation at Chongqing, China, where he served as a counsellor from 1943 to 1945.290 From August 15 to November 15, 1947, he served as the acting head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo during the absence of Dr. E. H. Norman, and was designated as the Canadian delegate to UNTCOK.291 Patterson thus linked the earlier missionary culture to the realities of postwar diplomacy; because of his theological background, he brought
286 W.W. Bean, “Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,” DCER, Vol 13 (1947), DND/Vol 68, 969. 287 Cabinet Conclusions, U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea; Canadian representation, Dec 18, 1947, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 2641 Access Code: 20, http://www.bac- lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/cabinet-conclusions/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=6179 288 “Memorandum by Head, Third Political Division” Ottawa, November 8, 1947, DCER, Vol 13 (1947), 965 DEA/204-A (s), 965. 289 UN Temporary Commission on Korea, “Biographic Note on G. S. Patterson” Kuksa p'yŏnch'an ŭiwŏnhoe (National Institute of Korean History), Nov 14, 1948, http://db.history.go.kr/item/imageViewer.do?levelId=pu_002 290 L. B. Pearson, “Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs: Canadian Representative on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea,” Dec 3, 1947, Ottawa, DCER, Vol 13, 974. 291 UN Temporary Commission on Korea, “Biographic Note on G. S. Patterson” Nov 14, 1948, Kuksap'yŏnch'anŭiwŏnhoe (National Institute of Korean History), http://db.history.go.kr/item/imageViewer.do?levelId=pu_002
88 a different approach to international affairs. And though nobody expected this at the time, Patterson would soon become one of the most vocal critics of the Commission.292
Patterson’s experience on the UNTCOK was marked with frustration and discontent. Upon his arrival in Seoul, he reported to DEA that the Soviet Union had rejected the Commission’s jurisdiction, and he expressed his belief that coming to Seoul without the agreement of the Soviet authorities seemed like a “serious blunder.”293 Patterson also lamented the reliance of the Commission on the U.S. Occupation Forces for basic needs, and the difficulty in consulting Leftist representatives, or any other Koreans for that matter, in light of close relationship between the Korean rightists and the U.S. Occupation. While every delegate brought a different perspective, the U.S. retained the legal and effective authority in South Korea, and UNTCOK had powers only to consult and observe. During almost all of its existence, UNTCOK relied upon the U.S. Occupation Forces for a roof, food and transportation, all given willingly and amply.294 Because of the Soviet objection, the Commission could not travel to the North and the UNTCOK had to request instruction from the Interim Committee of the United Nations.
Figure 8: The UNTCOK Headquarters in Seoul (1948)
Source: National Archives of Korea
292 IBID. 293 “George Patterson to SSEA,” 1, 25 January 1948, 3, file 204-A(s), Vol. 5779, RG 25. Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 294 Gordenker, 430.
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On March 1, 1948, Y.K. Liu, the acting chair of UNTCOK, announced that the Commission would observe elections in the South alone, to be held no later than May 10th. This proposal, which was largely the idea of the Americans, was intended to support the right-wing factions in South Korea, led by Syngman Rhee. Patterson wrote to External Affairs: “I have grave doubts whether this step will lead to the unification of Korea. I have grave doubts whether the National Government which may emerge out of these elections will be really national. I have grave doubts whether we can ensure a free atmosphere for the elections.”295 When the Interim Committee convened for its final vote on February 26th, the result was 31-2, with Canada and Australia voting against the resolution. Yet before a formal meeting of the UNTCOK could take place to consider the results from the Interim Committee, the commanding general of the U.S. occupation force, General John R. Hodge, and the U.S. military administration exerted pressure on the Commission – including issuing threats to withdraw funding – and announced that they would supervise elections in the South alone.296 By this point, External Affairs was still instructing Patterson to oppose any association of the Commission with the conduct of elections in South Korea only. 297
At the UNTCOK meeting on March 9th, Patterson requested a public statement clarifying that the March 1st announcement was an informal view, but only India supported Patterson’s request. Patterson subsequently left the meeting, which prompted other members of the Commission to re-consider their positions.298 Soon after, in another vote, the Commission resolved to follow Patterson’s advice and issued a statement that its authorization of elections should be considered purely informal. Patterson forthwith rejoined the Commission. The Commission agreed to observe elections announced by the Commanding General of the U.S.
295 “George Patterson to SSEA,” 14 February 1948, 3, file 204-A(s), vol. 5779, RG 25. Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 296 Price, 313. 297 “SSEA to Liaison Mission in Japan,” 6 March 1948, 175, DCER, vol. 14 298 Cabinet Conclusions, “United Nations: Korea Commission,” March 10, 1948, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 2641 Access Code: 20, http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics- government/cabinet-conclusions/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=6651
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Forces, as long as the elections were held “in a free atmosphere”299 even though Patterson had told them that a number of leaders in the South were considering the possibility of a North-South political conference as a step towards forming a national government.300 The Cabinet in Ottawa also agreed that Patterson should be instructed to serve on the Commission for observation of the elections to be conducted in South Korea by the U.S. military government.301 Patterson’s interventions greatly irritated General Hodge, who labelled him “the number one outspoken apologist for Soviet Russia and for communism that I have encountered for many months.”302 Hodge got his way, and elections were held in the South only, for a National Assembly that had a pronounced rightward tilt.
Patterson’s personal frustration was a reflection of the general outcome of the works of the UNTCOK. After two years of lack of progress, the work of the Joint Commission came to an end. With no involvement of Korean people, and in light of the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the American delegation then presented the UN General Assembly with a plan that reflected American strategic goals, Soviet objections and a Korean desire for unification.303 An election was to be held in Korea by the end of spring, observed by the UN Commission. The elected representatives could then form a government, establish a security force and accept transfer of governmental functions from the military regimes, after which the occupational forces would withdraw from Korea. 304 Even after
299 Cabinet Conclusions, “United Nations: Korea Commission,” March 18, 1948, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 2641 Access Code: 20, http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics- government/cabinet-conclusions/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=6697 300 Patterson first communicated this information to Herbert Norman in Tokyo in a personal letter written on 28 January 1948. (Price, 320.) 301 Cabinet Conclusions, “United Nations: Korea Commission,” March 18, 1948, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 2641 Access Code: 20, http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics- government/cabinet-conclusions/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=6697 302 “Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State,” 26 February 1948, vol.6, 1133 FRUS, 1948. In his discussions with Patterson, Hodge referred to a “Canada spy ring” which Patterson denied. The U.S. military made similar charges against Herbert Norman which led to his recall from Tokyo in October 1950. (See Price, 320) 303 See Tae-Gyun Park, “The Ugly Duckling: The Activities of the Canadian Delegate in UNTCOK and Koreans’ Evaluation” Comparative Korean Studies, Vol. 13, No.1. (2005)
304 Leon Gordenker, “The United Nations, Occupation and the 1948 Election in Korea,” Political Science Quarterly 73, no. 3 (September 1958), 426-28.
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Patterson’s experience with UNTCOK, Korea still did not register very much in the minds of Canadian policymakers. Acting Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent refused to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1948, saying that “Korea was still a long way from Canada.”305 This rather casual dismissal of the notion of having Canada represented in Korea is significant. It underlines the fact that Canadian involvement in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea should be seen as an attempt to fulfill its UN commitments, rather than a genuine interest in Korea.
In August 1948, St. Laurent, who had succeeded King as Secretary of State for External Affairs two years earlier, won the leadership of the Liberal Party, though he did not assume the mantle of Prime Minister until November 15, 1948. As a consequence, the political direction of the Department of External Affairs was for a considerable time in the hands of an acting minister, the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton.306 In line with the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada soon backed a UN resolution in 1948 that recognized the Republic of Korea as the legitimate government south of the 38th parallel, but otherwise kept its distance. Late in 1948, the Soviet Army went home, turning North Korea over to Kim Il Sung’s regime, which it had created. In June 1949, the U.S. troops followed suit in the South. Before the summer was over, a major civil war broke out, with clashes of battalion size along the 38th parallel. This was certainly not the first attempt at conflict -- many scholars argue that there had been various incidents of low-scale warfare prior to what is normally seen as the official start of the Korean War.307 Each side was building its forces with an eye to gaining military supremacy and achieve the goal of ultimately re-unifying two Koreas. But the Communists were more organized, better funded, and had more military capability than the South, mostly because of strong Soviet support.
305 “Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs,” Ottawa, 15 October 1948, DEA/50068-40, DCER Volume 14-1119 FAR EAST Part IIL Koreas; Robert Bothwell, “Eyes West: Canada and the Cold War in Asia,” in Canada and the Early Cold War, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998), 65-66. 306 Robert Bothwell, “Eyes West: Canada and the Cold War in Asia,” in Greg Donaghy ed. Canada and the Early Cold War, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998), 65-66. 307 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), conclusion.
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THE RISE OF SYNGMAN RHEE & FORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Once the United States Forces left Korea with its objective (withdrawal) accomplished, a new Republic of Korea was created – again only in the South – and Syngman Rhee (1875-1965), a fervent nationalist with strong American connections, became the first president of the Republic of Korea. Born in the Hwanghae province in the North, Rhee completed a traditional Confucian education and entered a Methodist school, where he learned English. In 1896, he joined other young Koreans to form the Independence Club, which fought for Korean independence from Japan. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Independence Club had strong roots to the Canadian missionaries and Rhee had been influenced by Gale and Schofield.308 This club was shut down by right-wing forces in 1898, and Rhee was imprisoned until 1904. He then went to study in the United States with Gale’s letter of reference, and received a Ph.D. in political science at Princeton, becoming one of the first Koreans to earn a doctorate at an American university.309
In many ways, Rhee was a product of a deeply-rooted Confucian culture who deeply embraced Western liberal values. Rhee was 73 years old when he became the president, and his agility and patience proved to be his greatest assets. When he was in exile in the U.S. in early 1945, he knocked on the doors of corridors in Washington D.C., introducing himself as “Minister Plenipotentiary” of a failed regime in exile. Rhee was clearly the American choice for the Republic of Korea. Washington valued Rhee’s mastery of political skills, pro-Western outlook and prestige as a patriot who had devoted his life to the goal of Korean independence. Rhee also needed Americans to consolidate his power and protect the South against communism.310 He enjoyed the support of General Hodge and the U.S. Occupation Forces at large, while the Left slowly saw its public support erode.311 The May 10th election served to formalize Rhee’s newly
308 See Yoo’s Chak’han Mokja for more in-depth discussions on these connections. 309 See Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, Master of Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and Seoul-Washington Alliance 1953-1960, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001. 310 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 431. 311 See Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, “Carrot and the Leash: Eisenhower, Syngman Rhee and the Dual Containment of Korea” Ph.D. dissertation, New Haven: Yale University, 1999. Kim portrays Rhee as a master diplomat who, by posturing as “difficult, capricious, irrational, unpredictable, authoritarian and intensely annoying” to the American counterparts, succeeded in manipulating American leaders for Korea’s national interests.
93 formed government and further exacerbated the political polarization between the North and the South. After the election, the Commission members flew to Shanghai to draft their report and soon lost touch with the U.S. forces still based in Seoul. The Canadian concern about the omission of the northern part of Korea in the election process would quickly fade in the post- election phase. 312
THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR
On June 25, 1950, at the instigation of Kim Il Sung, and with the knowledge, assistance and consent of the Soviet Union, North Korea invaded the South in a surprise attack. The outbreak of the Korean War does put George Patterson’s activities in 1948 in a more favourable light than in General Hodge’s abusive description. It is at least arguable (and very competent South Korean scholars do argue this) that the decision to rush elections in 1948 and the consequent establishment of two Koreas might have been mitigated, if not avoided, had Patterson’s cautionary advice been taken seriously.313 This is not to excuse the rashness and arrogance of Kim Il Sung in launching the war, but it does raise the question of whether Kim Il Sung should be held entirely accountable for the outbreak. Ultimately, the Korean War would last longer than anyone – including Stalin and Kim Il Sung – had expected or wanted. In a relatively peaceful post-WWII environment, the Korean War brought two superpowers, east and west, to confront each other directly on an unfamiliar and largely unknown battlefield.
The Korean War is also seen as one of the major turning points in the Cold War, as Western countries fought to resist the "communist aggression" under the auspices of the United Nations. According to one historian, it was “quite possibly the most important event since the Second World War” and “a substitute for World War III.”314 In the words of then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, “If the best minds in the world had set out to find us the worst possible location to fight this damnable war politically and militarily, the unanimous choice would have
312 Gordenker, 449-50. 313 See Tae-Gyun Park, “The Ugly Duckling: The Activities of the Canadian Delegate in UNTCOK and Koreans’ Evaluation” Comparative Korean Studies, Vol. 13, No.1. (2005) 314 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 1.
94 been Korea.”315 Korea became one of the bloodiest battlefields, with the ravages of the armies rampant from Nakdong to Yalu, involving constant sea and air campaigns. Between the summer of 1950 and 1953, the Americans sent around 300,000 armed personnel to the ground in Korea. 316
The timing of the Korean War had tremendous implications from the perspective of American policymakers, in light of the perceived “loss of China” to communism. The triumph of Communists in 1949 led to a clash between Chinese nationalism and the Open Door ideology pursued by the United States. The illusion of a "special relationship" between China and the United States began to be formed in the 19th century by Americans in China who envisioned the positive ways in which some Chinese people came to perceive the United States. American experts on China shared the views of people like Pearl Buck, a daughter of an American missionary who actively called upon the need for Americans to protect the Chinese people against aggressive Japanese forces.317 Furthermore, John K. Fairbank, a well-respected interpreter and academic, wrote a book which became popular called, The United States and China, which emphasized the traditional friendship between the two countries. This book became the standard text on China and American policy on China, and argued that there was a predominant "pro-American" feeling amongst the Chinese based on the years of well-intentioned good works done by Americans -- and that the Communists were attempting to undo said image.318 When China and the United States parted ways in 1949 and 1950, Dean Acheson referred to "our historic policy of friendship for China." Even as Chinese and American soldiers were aiming at each other over the course of the Korean War, Acheson argued that a "deep
315 David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, (New York: Hyperion, 2007), Introduction. 316 William Stueck ed. The Korean War in World History, (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 186. 317 Michael Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 299. 318 Michael H. Hunt, "Pearl Buck -- Popular Expert on China, 1931-1949," Modern China (January 1977), vol.3; John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1958), 1-7.
95 interest in and friendship for the Chinese people" was still relevant in America's China policy.319 So the special relationship between the US and China, perceived, imagined and expressed by American politicians, was very much real.
But such sentiments did not last forever. Chinese nationalists argued that the "democratic individualism" brought by Americans ran contrary to the "basic Chinese way of life."320 From late 1949 to early 1950, Sino-American relations continued to deteriorate, as evidenced by the Communist leader's stubborn attitude towards the recognition problem, Mao's criticism of the China White Paper321 and anti-American propaganda, as well as the imprisonment of American diplomats. Washington continued to avoid the recognition of Communist China and showed support for Chiang's regime, adding fuel to the growing hostility.322 In Washington, American policymakers feared that the Communist victory in China would subsequently lead to the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. By mid-1949, the Open Door policy was effectively in ruins and the American diplomatic connection was eliminated by the spring of 1950. The Soviet Union effectively came to build a "special relationship" with China, as marked through the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty.323 In conjunction with the shock resulting from the atomic bomb explosion launched by the Soviets in the summer of 1949, it became all too obvious that the strategic picture was changing in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the nature of Sino- American relations.324
To what extent was the United States responsible for the outbreak of the Korean War? Among the most controversial statements made by the United States in the early Cold War in
319 Dean Acheson, United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1949), iii, xv-xvii, as seen in Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship, 300. 320 Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship, 308. 321 In August 1949, the Truman administration published the "China White Paper," a massive volume of documents to defend the U.S. administration against the charges from the public that it had "lost" China. It would be difficult to disagree with Dean Acheson's claim that the outcome of the Chinese civil war had been beyond the American control but the effort to share the news with the public came all too late. (See Warren Cohen, Op.Cit., 199). 322 Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), chapter 4, passim. 323 Hunt, 309. 324 Chen, op ci.
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Asia is Dean Acheson's National Press Club Speech of January 12, 1950. Acheson defined the American "defensive perimeter" in the Pacific as a line running through Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines, essentially excluding guarantee of American military protection to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Republic of China on Taiwan. For other areas of the Pacific, Acheson stated:
...so far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack…Should such an attack occur, one hesitates to say where such an armed attack would come from -- the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations. 325
Roughly six months after Acheson’s speech, North Korea launched a military offensive across the 38th parallel, and critics have pointed to Acheson’s National Press Club Speech as giving the “green light” to Kim Il Sung.326 Canadians did not necessarily share the same assumptions about China as the American diplomats did, but the loss of China and the spread of communism were still very much in the collective psyche of the Western powers during this period.
CANADIAN RESPONSE TO THE KOREAN WAR
The outbreak of the Korean War caught Canadian civil servants by surprise, many of whom were away in the cottage country for summer vacation.327 From the very beginning, the
325 Dean Acheson, “Extemporaneous remarks made by the Hon. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State before the National Press Club, Washington, DC, " January 12, 1950 Truman Library Online Archives, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-3-13.pdf ; James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), argues that Congressional rejection of aid to Korea played a larger role than anything Acheson said.
326 Historian James I. Matray noted, “More than fifty years after the start of the Korean War, countless South Koreans still hold Acheson responsible for igniting this fratricidal conflict. The United States, they bitterly maintain, committed an act of betrayal toward Korea ranking with President Theodore Roosevelt's approval of the Taft-Katsura Agreement in 1905 and President Harry S. Truman's agreement to divide the peninsula forty years later at the end of World War II.” Matray argues that Acheson’s address had little if any impact on Communist deliberations. “Stalin worried about US military intervention until the moment the Korean War began. Moreover, he feared that North Korea could not survive an attack that he was certain South Korea would stage in the future.” (See James I. Matray, "Dean Acheson's Press Club Speech Re-examined," The Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. XXII, No.1, Spring 2002). 327 See Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974.
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Korean War was seen as a case of communist aggression, defined by crossing of the 38th parallel. The UN Security Council was quick to recognize that the attack by the North “constitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggression.”328 Canadian official views, therefore, were very much in line with the views of the United States and the United Nations. The Foreign Relations of the United States documents on the "Outbreak of Hostilities in Korea"329 provide useful glimpses into how the American policymakers perceived the Korean War at the time. Washington immediately called the attack “unprovoked” and an “act of aggression” from the North.330 The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kirk) bluntly stated to the U.S. Secretary of State that the United States should “answer firmly and swiftly as it constitutes a direct threat to our leadership of free world against Soviet Communist imperialism,” thereby framing the conflict squarely in the Cold War perspective.331 Washington believed that the Korean War presented an opportunity to show the meaning of “firmness” and that a failure to take action could even lead to another world war.332
Canadians shared much of the American assumptions about the Cold War. If the choice of the enemy was important for preserving national unity and facilitating Canada’s participation in the Korean War, the timing of the Korean War was just as important. Having just paid the
328 United States Department of State, “UN document S/1495,” FRUS, 25 June 1950.
329 United States Department of State, “Volume VII: The Outbreak of Hostilities in Korea: Response of the United States and the United Nations to Events in Korea, June 24-30, 1950,” Foreign Relations of the United States,
98 price for appeasement and not suppressing Hitler’s aggression soon enough, there was hope for new world peace. The United Nations was the embodiment of a new ideal for collective security, which Canada strongly believed in. It is important to note that at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War, Korea was largely an unknown territory for most Canadians. Minister of Defence Claxon noted: “… Korea was an obscure place on the Western side of the Pacific, a place of indeterminate status, best known perhaps because the people were known to wear strange hats."333 Yet, the survival of the United Nations, or the preservation of the legitimacy and relevance of an international institution created in the aftermath of the Second World War, most certainly guided the direction of Canada’s policy on the Korean peninsula.
Speaking in the House of Commons, St. Laurent urged, “Let us be men and let us face realities and do what we think will be the most efficient and the most effective as our contribution to the up-building of the international forces.” 334 St. Laurent emphasized that Canada had obligations “as a member of the United Nations, as a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty and for the joint defence with the United States of the North American continent.”335 Claxton was also very explicit about the relationship between Canada’s defence policy and United Nations objectives: “Since the United Nations Charter came into effect on June 26, 1945, one of the objectives of defence policy in Canada has been to carry out any undertakings into which we might enter under that Charter." 336 The Canadian government argued that North Korea’s attack on the South was a “breach in the outer defences of the free world” and firmly believed in Canada’s obligations, both as a member of the United Nations and the North Atlantic
333 Library and Archives Canada, Claxton, Unpublished Memoirs, 1120. 334 Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967), 309.
335 Lester B. Pearson, Canada and the Korean Crisis, (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1950), 13.
336 “The Canadian government’s view is that the chance of maintaining peace will increase as the forces opposed to aggression become stronger.… The objectives of our national defence are simple and clear. They are 1) the immediate defence of Canada and North America from direct attack; 2) the implementation of any undertakings made by Canada under the charter of the UN, or under the North Atlantic treaty or other agreement for collective security; 3) the organization to build up our strength in a total war. Action taken by the Canadian armed forces to carry out the objectives of the charter of the UN and the NA Treaty must be regarded as action taken for the defense of Canada.… To assist the UN forces in Korea, Canada sent three destroyers and they have given a good account of themselves. They are being successively replaced by other destroyers.” (Speech by the Hon. Brooke Claxton, “The Defence Program,” House of Commons Debates Official Report, 5 February 1951.)
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Treaty.337 St. Laurent’s announcement to the House of Commons on the 30th of June, 1950 was a blunt expression of such view: “Our responsibility [in Korea] arises entirely from our membership in the United Nations,” he said, adding that the Security Council had recommended the U.N. member states to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”338
As well, the U.N.-led action provided more room for countries like Canada to increase their level of influence on the international stage.339 Claxton recalled, “One thing I think we did more than any of the other thirteen participating countries was to emphasize the U.N. objectives and character of the forces.”340 In keeping with Canada’s commitment to the U.N. Charter, aggression against South Korea was, by direct implication, aggression against the U.N. 341 The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, told his Prime Minister, “We have made it absolutely clear in Washington that if Canada is to help, it must be to help the U.N.”342 The Prime Minister agreed and announced to the Cabinet: “Any Canadian action should follow from a concerted U.N. decision and as a result of joint action.”343
Discussions quickly ensued in the Cabinet in Ottawa about Canada’s official response to the Korean War. On June 28th, Pearson spoke to the Cabinet about the military situation in Korea: there seemed to be a 50-50 chance of holding the South Korean bridgehead. 344 Pearson reported that “recent information indicated that the South Korean position was deteriorating rapidly and that the capital had been lost to the North Korean forces.” Pearson also cited the
337 Library and Archives Canada, Statement by the Prime Minister, 19 July 1950, Claxton Fonds. 338 Library and Archives Canada, Statement by the Prime Minister, 30 June 1950. Claxton Fonds. 339 Stairs, 94. 340 Library and Archives Canada, Brooke Claxton, Unpublished Memoirs, 1150. 341 L.B. Pearson, “Memo for the Prime Minister,” 27 June and 4 July 1950, DCER, vol. 16, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1950), 49. 342 L.B. Pearson, “Memo for the Prime Minister,” 27 June and 4 July 1950, reprinted in Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 16, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1950), 49. 343 “Extract from Cabinet Conclusions,” June 28, 1950, DCER volume 16, Chapter II: Korean Conflict Part I – Creation of the UN Unified Command, PCO.
344 Cabinet Conclusions. “External Affairs: Korean Situation” June 28, 1950, RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 2645, Access Code 20, Item 9996.
100 swift actions undertaken by the U.S. air and naval forces, as well as U.K. naval forces. 345 Noting the request from the American ambassador for a troop commitment from Canada, as well as promises made by other United Nations countries, Pearson urged that a brigade group be specially recruited as volunteers for a United Nations force to fight in Korea. He urged, “Canada had every interest in strengthening the U.S. position as a leader in the struggle against Communism. The lesson of effective United Nations co-operation would not be lost on the U.S.S.R.”346 Pearson was supported by Minister of National Defence Brook Claxton, who pointed at the “lack of available United Kingdom strength” and suggested the ways in which a ground force could be raised for use in Korea.347 In appealing for volunteers for the “special force” for Korea, Claxton urged: “We must meet aggression with trained united strength. Expanding the Canadian army in this way is part of the effort of our country and of our allies to prevent war and preserve peace. Trained united strength is needed to prevent aggression.”348 Pearson noted that this resolution appeared to create the situation envisaged in the PM’s declaration in the House of Commons on June 30th, and the Canadian representative in Tokyo had seen General MacArthur and ascertained from him that a “Canadian contribution of three destroyers would be extremely welcome.”349
CANADIAN PRESS
While the Korean War has often been referred to as a “forgotten war” in Canadian history, newspaper editorials published between 1950 and 1951 demonstrate very active coverage of the Korean conflict. A review of key newspapers across Canada, such as the Vancouver Province, Winnipeg Free Press, Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail, Montreal
345 IBID.
346 Library and Archives Canada, “Korea; General Situation; Request for Contribution of Canadian Forces,” 1950/07/28, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 2645.
347 IBID.
348 Brooke Claxton, “Formation of Commonwealth Division in Korea,” Claxton Papers, 21 February 1951. Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada.
349 Cabinet Conclusions. “External Affairs: Korean Situation – Canadian Participation,” T-2366, July 12, 1950, RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 2645, Access Code 20, 10022.
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Gazette, Le Devoir, and the Halifax Chronicle-Herald all point to very intensive coverage on the role that Canada played during the Korean conflict, the threat of Communism, and Canadian attitudes towards the United Nations. 350
On June 26, 1950, the conservative newspaper the Globe and Mail produced a full-page article on the Korean War with the headline “UN Declares Reds Guilty: War in Korea,” featuring a map of the Korean peninsula with the communist advance. Most of these articles on the front page came from the New York Times, which played an important part in establishing a common perception between the two neighbouring countries. 351 North Korea’s attack was seen a
“complete surprise,”352 which threatened international peace and security353 with the potential to turn into World War Three.354 It was also widely assumed that the Soviet Union was behind the
North Korean forces while the South Koreans were the “most Americanized.”355 Already by the next day, the editorial section of the Globe and Mail read: “Clearly, it is Soviet Communist
350 See Andrea Quaiattini, “Hot Off the Presses in the Cold War: Canadian Newspaper Editorial Coverage of the Korean War, 1950-1951.” M.A. Thesis, Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2010.
351 Some other articles on the front page of the Globe and Mail on 26 June 1950 included: “Attackers Pushed Back At One Point”; “U.S. Fighter Plane, Russ-Made Craft Mix in Dogfight”; “Hear Military Supplies on Way From Japan” and “Strong Action Demanded of U.S. Washington View.”
352 “The North Korean attack was a complete surprise to almost all observers here, though it has long been believed that such a move would be made eventually.” (“U.S. Plane for Korea Turns Back,” Globe and Mail, 26 June 1950).
353 "The UN Commission in Korea warned today that the fighting in the country was assuming the character of full-scale war and might endanger international peace and security." ("International Peace Threatened by Outbreak in Korea, UN Warning,” The Globe and Mail, 26 June 1950).
354 Tchi Chang-yun, South Korean minister to Britain, said that the North Korean invasion of his country “assumes the proportions of an international affair which might lead to a third world war ... this is not a local civil war. It assumes the proportions of an international affair which might lead to a third world war, because on the one side you have the communist regime and on the other the free countries. Korea will resist this aggression to the very last. The whole world knows what is going on in Korea ... it is not only a question of saying that it constitutes an eventual threat to Formosa. It affects the whole of Southeast Asia. It is easy preventing a war in the beginning when it is small.... Therefore, statesmen who are well aware of this should do their best to check aggression. It is not a case of saying that America will act because this is not only an American problem. It is a problem for all the democratic countries, including Britain and France.” (“Korean Minister Fears World War Outbreak,” The Globe and Mail, 26 June 1950.)
355 Walter Sullivan, “Opposing Armies in Korea Trained by US Soviet,” New York Times, 26 June 1950.
102 imperialism that is waging war on the Republic of Korea and…waging it with marked success. It is just as clear that this aggressive action is a challenge and a test for the West.”356
The regime in power in South Korea was seen as “legitimate” and even “respectable,” because it was set up by the authority of the United Nations after the U.N.-supervised free elections. In many ways, it can be argued that the United States used the U.N. elections as a way of legitimizing the results for the world public opinion. The Communist aggressors, on the other hand, had “no more status than bandits and guerrillas” and were only important as “Moscow’s agents.” It was believed that Korea was singled out by the Soviet Union because no serious resistance was expected and its capture would “round out Communist control of the Asiatic mainland,” with Manchuria as a base.357 Subsequently, throughout June and July, the press called for action from the Canadian government, with a firm conviction that everything possible must be done to keep the outbreak from spreading beyond Korea.
CANADIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA & THE UN
The U.N. Security Council approved a resolution on Friday, July 7, 1950 providing for a unified command of any forces provided by members of the United Nations for the defence of Korea, and requesting the United States to designate a commander for such forces. Subsequently, President Truman named General MacArthur to this command. On July 21st, 1950, the Acting Permanent Representative of Canada wrote to the U.N. Secretary-General: “The Canadian government, having in mind its defence responsibilities, including those as a member of the United Nations, is taking immediate steps for strengthening and increasing its armed forces.”358 At the cabinet meeting on Nov 29, 1950, Claxton reported that Canada was in negotiation with the United States to replace a third Canadian destroyer in Korean Waters. The Canadian airlift had been remarkably successful, at one time providing about one-sixth of the total U.N. airlift for Japan. Altogether, some 3,000 passengers had been transported by the Canadians, and up to 250 hours flying time per aircraft per month had been achieved. Here again, plans to withdraw some
356 Editorial, Globe and Mail, Tuesday, June 27, 1950. 357 IBID. 358 United Nations Archives, “Letter from the Acting Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN,” Canada File, 21 July 1950.
103 of the aircraft seemed undesirable and it was proposed that Canada should leave them in service, rotating the crews. The latter were gaining valuable experience in transport operations of the most difficult kind. 359
With respect to Canadian ground forces, Claxton had recently visited Fort Lewis, where about 6,000 of the Special Forces were now in training. One battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Regiment had departed for Korea and would arrive in about two weeks to join the advance party of 345 persons already there. It was proposed to continue training such troops, as they were not needed in Korea at Fort Lewis until March 31st, 1951 when, with training completed, the men would be returned to Canada and could be sent to Europe as part of the integrated force if that were considered desirable at the time. The battalion en route to Korea would not continue its training on arrival. Indications were that the battalion would be battle-worthy within two-and-a - half months or perhaps sooner, taking into account the type of fighting they were likely to be involved in. Altogether, the state of training and the morale of the Special Forces were most satisfactory, and relationships with the United States left nothing to be desired. 360 Ottawa also decided to “authorize the recruitment of an additional army brigade,” to be called the Canadian Army Special Force. It was intended to be specially trained and equipped to carry out Canada’s obligations under the U.N. Charter of the North Atlantic Pact. Naturally, this brigade would be subject to the approval of the Parliament, to be made available for service in Korea.”361 It helped that some of the Second World War veterans who had difficulties adjusting to civilian life were enthusiastic about returning to battlefields.362 When the recruitment centres opened across the nation the next morning, hundreds of men were already in line, and many more came the next day—when the recruitment was actually supposed to start. All of them, including many French-Canadians in Quebec, showed up with eagerness to help in a faraway land. Some were those who just wanted to get back to a military life. Until the very last minute,
359 Canadian Participation in Korean Operations, T-2367, Nov 29, 1950, RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 2646, Access Code 20.
360 IBID. 361 Government of Canada, “Canada and the Korean Crisis”, (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1950), 18. As seen in Bercuson, Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 34. 362 Ted Barris, Deadlock in Korea: Canadians at War, 1950-53, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1999), 36-8.
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Ottawa debated about committing troops to Korea, remembering the effect of conscription on national unity. Cabinet members were aware that the Korean War had the potential to divide public opinion between English-Canada and French-Canada, an issue that could not be ignored by any sensible politician.363 Nevertheless, some 3,100 soldiers enlisted from Quebec, thereby proving that overseas engagement need not be a matter of national disunity.364 Maurice Duplessis, the Premier of Quebec at the time, promoted a strong anti-communist ethos, so the Korean War did not ultimately cause a crisis in national unity as some had feared.
Canada had to draw on a rather small professional army for the Korean War, so the majority of Canadian forces managed to sustain themselves entirely by voluntary recruitment. Most Canadian soldiers in Korea had varying degrees of skills and training, and the European- style training did not prepare them well for the “small-unit, hit-and-run patrol actions” that characterized the Korean conflict. Claxton recalled in his unpublished memoirs: “As for the quality of the men themselves, like all forces voluntarily raised, they were of all kinds. But also like forces voluntarily raised they were not a complete cross-section of the community. The call to go and fight in Korea appealed to those who were particularly adventurous, who wanted to travel and see far-off places. It appealed to those who wanted to fight. It appealed to many who after services in the Second World War had never completely adjusted themselves to the life on city street. It appealed to some who frankly wanted to escape from responsibility or obligation at home. While there were some misfits who had to be weeded out, generally speaking they were a good lot and they became magnificent fighting soldiers. None were murderers.… There were not 10,000 deserters but 427, under the circumstances a very modest number.” 365
Figure 9: Canadian Soldiers in the Korean War (Source: Canadian Armed Forces, Army Public Affairs)
363 Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion, 87. 364 R.A. Mackay, Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 296-97.
365 Library and Archives Canada, Brooke Claxton, Unpublished Memoirs, 1449.
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Claxton’s explanation of motivations for Canadian soldiers who volunteered to serve in Korea is also confirmed by a recollection from one of the few Korean War veterans still alive today, Jean-Paul St. Aubin.366 St. Aubin was a young civil servant working for Veteran Affairs Canada when he heard the news about the Korean War and signed up in 1951 because he wanted to “go on an adventure.” He recalled that this was true for many of his fellow soldiers who had heard about Korea from missionaries’ work. 367 Nevertheless, Claxton recalled the anxiety felt within the Canadian Forces at the time: “Could we pick up recruiting from a virtual standstill and within a month, recruit men enough to maintain in the field 10,000 miles away from Ottawa a force of some 6,000 in the Army alone and meet wastage and casualties on scales that could not be even guessed at?”368 In the end, much of Canada’s military experience in Korea turned out to be an exercise of improvisation in both training and leadership. Regardless, Claxton noted in his memoirs a high morale in the Canadian troops, many of whom had been depressed by the realities of civilian life in the post-WWII era. Claxton’s views were confirmed by many religious leaders who visited the battlefields and reported the good morale found among the troops.369 Claxton noted in his unpublished memoirs: “The morale of the Forces seemed to be excellent. It comes from the confidence the boys have in their officers and NCO’s, on account of their competence and qualifications as chiefs; of the good food and also of their hope for their return to Canada in the near future, thanks to the rotation system carried out. Though most of the Forces are under canvas or in dugouts, yet the uniforms are clean and the heaving good. They salute the officers regularly and willingly. The whole of the 25 CIB is conspicuous for their discipline and alertness.”370
Claxton’s views were confirmed by the visitors to the fields, such as Reverend William F. Barfoot of the Church of England. Upon returning to Canada after a visit to the fields in Korea, Rev. Barfoot spoke about the sense of morale found in the Canadian troops: “Nothing could be
366 Telephone Interview with Jean-Paul St.Aubin, May 23, 2017. 367 IBID. 368 Library and Archives Canada, Brooke Claxton, Unpublished Memoirs, 1144.
369 IBID.
370 IBID.
106 more destructive of morale than the impression that seems to be fairly general that the war in Korea is an insignificant sideshow. The numbers of our troops are small but they are our men fighting in our battles and should have the whole-hearted support of our people.”371 Ultimately, a majority of the Canadian Army’s small officer corps served in Korea, including an entire generation of junior officers who had been too young to serve in WWII. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Korean veterans, with their shared experience in the Far East, continued to hold prominent positions in the Canadian Army.372
EFFECT OF THE KOREAN WAR ON THE CANADIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY
In many ways, the Korean War also served to galvanize the defence and military preparedness of the Canadian forces. In January 1951, the Canadian government announced its plans for the Department of Defence Production, headed by C.D. Howe. Ottawa also announced it would spend $5 billion on rearmament, which reflected 23 per cent of its gross domestic product.373 By 1953, Canada was allocating $1.9 billion annually to defence, 7.6 per cent of its GNP, fully equipped with 17,000 men for the Navy, 45,600 for the Air Force and 50,000 for the Army.374 The commitment to the Korean War was remarkable from the Canadian military standpoint because of the transformation that took place in a matter of few years. As Claxton remembered, “[a] good many people had doubts about our capacity to raise the Special Force at this time. Until the NATO and the Korean War came along, we had been planning our armed forces on the basis of strength of about 50,000 for all three, the total establishment authorized by
371 Library and Archives Canada, “Letter from the Most Reverend W.F. Barfoot, The Church of England in Canada, Office of the Primate to Brooke Claxton, (December 11, 1951)” Claxton papers, MG32 B5 Vol97. 372 William Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 373. In addition to their influence in individual units and commands, General Allard and Dextraze went on to serve as chiefs of defence staff in the late 1960s and early 1970s, while General Ramsay Withers, who saw action in Korea as a young signals officer fresh out of the Royal Military College, held that position during the 1980s. 373 Defence spending in Canada, which stood at $196 million in 1947, reached $385 million in 1949 and $787 million in 1950. In 1951, it would reach $1.45 billion, rising to $1.95 billion in 1952. See Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-84, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 94. 374 Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein. Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the Twenty-First Century, (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008), 186.
107 the Cabinet.”375 In the late 1940s, Canada’s navy consisted of 8,900 men, the air force of 16,400 and the army of 20,000. None were ready to be put into work right away: the fact that Canada’s total defence budget was around $385 million in 1949 perhaps explains why all of these forces were terribly in need of additional equipment and training.376 Canada’s defence budget in proportion to national income was about one-third of the figures in the United States and the United Kingdom, and considerably less than practically all of the countries in the NATO.377 While smaller in sum than the American contribution, Canadian contribution to the Korean War was significant enough to be noticed and demonstrated Canada’s willingness to assume responsibilities in times of international crises.378
MISSIONARIES & THE KOREAN WAR
Upon arriving in Korea after some thirty days of travelling by sea, Canadian soldiers were struck by the dismal state on the ground, the poor level of hygiene, the lack of food and the smell. In the words of one Korean War veteran: “When we arrived, Korea was nothing like what we had imagined. There were fields of dung everywhere, hungry children on the street, and so little to eat. Yet we felt a sense of duty to save people from communism, and we knew of the works of our missionaries who went there to spread the words of gospel.”379 John Kolanchey, one of the Korean War veterans who served in the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Regiment in Korea, still fondly recalls how he had heard about the missionaries work through his church congregation, like many other soldiers who served with him in Korea. Many of them had seen their parents donate money for hospitals and schools in Korea through fundraisers at church, read about the Far Eastern missions through church bulletins, and some were in regular contact with the missionaries who had returned to Korea since the late 1940s.
375 Library and Archives Canada, Brooke Claxton, Memoirs, 1144. 376 Hillmer and Granatstein, 186. 377 Brooke Claxton, “Defence Meetings November 26 to December 14, 1949,” St. Laurent papers box 175. Library and Archives Canada. 378 Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion, 89. It is important to underscore the fact that the rearmament in preparation for mobilization still remained as Canadian government’s top priority and Europe, not Korea, remained the centre of attention from Ottawa’s perspective. 379 For more interviews with the Korean War veterans, check out Historica Canada’s Memory Project. < www.thememoryproject.com>
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Kolanchey recalled that some soldiers were using their wages to support the Korean orphans. 380 There were also calls for continued support for mission work in Korea, such as the Homemaker update from June 26, 1952 in The Globe and Mail, which quotes from Lt. Col. J. R. Stone of the Princess Patriots saying that “Eventual rehabilitation of the South Koreans would be better done by missionaries with money made available to them than by elaborate government agencies.”381
Over the course of the 1950s, Canadian missionaries continued to call for more help, even though many had to evacuate with the outbreak of the Korean War.382 In a presentation to a congregation in Toronto, Miss Daniels, daughter of a United Church minister who served as a missionary in Korea, described Communist efforts to win over the people of the Far East as a “snare and a delusion” and she did not believe that the war in Korea was a “civil war in the proper sense…it was primarily an example of aggression sponsored by the Communists with direction from Moscow.”383 Throughout the Korean War, church boards across Canada continued to collect and send aid to Korea, mainly organized by the Women’s Missionary Society of the United Church of Canada and the Presbyterian Women’s Missionary Society.384 During the War, many Canadian missionaries still remained on the ground for relief and evangelistic work, including Dr. E. J. O. Fraser and Rev. Dr. William Scott, who coordinated over 50 tonnes of clothing for the relief of Korean civilians, valued at $150,000 and financial aid valued over $10,000.385 There were ideological assumptions about sending aid to Korea as well - - that poverty “favours the Communists and not the Christians in the Far East” -- and church
380 Author’s interview with Mr. Kolanchey, May 15, 2017. Mr. Kolanchey’s interview with the Memory Project through Historica Canada can be accessed at http://www.thememoryproject.com/stories/3241:john-kolanchey/ 381 Mona Puser, “The Home Maker: Need for Relief of Misery in Korea,” The Globe and Mail, June 26, 1952. 382 “Flight from Korea Told in Letter from Missionary,” Globe and Mail, July 7, 1950; “Korean War Briefs,” Globe and Mail, July 10, 1950; O. M. Green, “The People of Korea,” Globe and Mail, July 15, 1950; “Missionary Tells of Trip from Seoul,” Globe and Mail, July 18, 1950. 383 “Missionary Sees Korean Freedom with UN Help,” Globe and Mail, Sept 15, 1950. 384 “Vote $5,000 for Relief in Korea,” Globe and Mail, Oct 7, 1950; “Urges Help for Koreans,” Globe and Mail¸ November 14, 1950; “Two Retired Missionaries Volunteer to Return to Korea,” Globe and Mail¸ April 12, 1951. 385 “Missionaries in Korea to Get Jeeps,” Globe and Mail, November 5, 1951; “United WMS Sending Aid for Koreans,” Feb 1, 1951; “Tells of Goods Sent to Korea,” February 13, 1952.
109 leaders who visited Korea called for community campaigns to collect more aid and missionary personnel to the fields.386 In the aftermath of the Korean War, Canadian non-governmental organizations, such as the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, led by Dr. Lotta Hitschmanova, would take a leading role in relief efforts. 387
CONCLUSION
This chapter examined the evolution of Canadian engagement with Korea, by focusing specifically on the UNTCOK and the Korean War. At the end of the Second World War and subsequent liberation from Japanese colonial rule, it appeared as if the Korean dream for national autonomy might be realized. Yet, such hopes were short-lived, as the Korean peninsula became embroiled in the politics of the Cold War. The internal political division between the North and the South, coupled by the competition for influence by the Soviet Union and the United States, led to the division of the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel.
Canada was a member of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea which was mandated to supervise elections, with Dr. George Patterson as its representative. Patterson’s experience was a frustrating one, as he argued about the lack of legitimacy if the election would only be held in the South. The arbitrary division of the two Koreas would sow the seed for the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, resulting in millions of civilian casualties and tremendous destructions across the peninsula. Canada became a quick and willing supporter for the U.N. forces which backed the South Korean government when the Korean War broke out in 1950. For the first time in its history, Ottawa decided to dispatch troops to a remote and unfamiliar country in Asia, under the umbrella of the newly created United Nations. Eager volunteers from both English Canada and French Canada made up the Canadian Forces, rather than conscripts. The conflict was seen as a case of communist aggression which threatened international security, and while Korea was not very much known to Canadian policymakers at the time, Canadian participation was both helpful and meaningful for South Korea.
386 “Time Aids Reds, Missionary Says,” Globe and Mail, June 6, 1952; “United Church Seeks Personnel for Mission Fields,” April 26, 1952. 387 “Will Launch Relief Drive for Korea,” Globe and Mail, April 2, 1953.
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From Ottawa’s perspective, Korea was still a battleground in the Cold War rather than a country of significance for Canada. It held promises for growth, and Canadian missionaries and various church boards continued to call for more aid to help the Koreans. Hence, in the shadow of extremely costly politics of the Cold War, Canadian-Korean relations moved from unofficial contact through the missionaries to a significant government-level military engagement. As Lester B. Pearson, the President of the U.N. General Assembly, noted at the time of the Korean War Armistice on July 26, 1953: “This is the end of one chapter of bloodshed and fighting. But it is only the beginning of a new and difficult one – the making of peace.”388 By 1953, Korea existed in the Canadian mind – mountains, bitter winters, and a strategic asset that could not, now, be casually ignored or abandoned. Canadian development aid to Korea in the reconstruction phase would prove to be very important in its recovery phase.
388 UN Archives, “Statement by Lester B. Pearson,” Canada File, July 26, 1953.
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CHAPTER 3
“Milk for Korea”: Humanitarian Engagements After the Korean War
“….I can still see the face of a young Korean boy of high school age whom I met with a group of students the other day, who rather shyly waited after his friends had asked their questions, and then slowly raised his hand. His question was, “How can the United Nations bring peace to Korea?” I started to explain what had been going on in the Assembly debates, and how 54 nations out of 60 had agreed on a resolution sponsored by the Indian delegation aimed at resolving the prisoner of war issue which had deadlocked the Armistice negotiations, and how this had been rejected by the Governments of Communist China and North Korea. When I had finished my account he raised his hand again and said with a quiet persistence which symbolized, I think the deep desire, the agony, for peace which must fill the minds of the people of the war-torn and divided land: “Yes, I know, but when are you going to bring peace to my country?”389
- Lester B. Pearson, March 24, 1953
***
Canadian veterans from the Korean War returned home with vivid memories about the violent and destructive nature of warfare, the threat of communism, Korea’s dismal state of poverty and the special plight of orphans.390 Having fought for South Korea’s survival with its own soldiers, Canada now had a vested interest in safeguarding stability on the Korean peninsula. The humanitarian motives, seen with missionaries since the late 19th century, were re-vitalized in the post- Korean War period, most notably taken up by non-governmental organizations like the Unitarian Service Committee (USC). There were other efforts, mainly through the U.N. Korean
389 External Affairs Supplementary Paper, No. 53/13. An Address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered at the closing of the Centenary Celebration at St. Michael’s College, Toronto, March 24, 1953. http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b1641335/1?r=0&s=3 390 For interviews with the Korean War veterans, see “The Memory Project,” Historica Canada, http://www.thememoryproject.com/stories/Korea
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Relief Agency, which Canada contributed towards, as well as the Colombo Plan, which South Korea would later join in 1963.391 Until 1963, when Canada and Korea finally established diplomatic relations, much of Canadian-Korean interactions in the 1950s focused heavily on the aid programmes. Such humanitarian impulse, largely stemming from the Canadian public and organizations like the USC, effectively substituted for official policy-level engagement. It should also be underscored that there was a close connection between humanitarian aid and a strategic assumption of the Cold War: that economic underdevelopment made countries more vulnerable to the lures of communism. Ultimately, this chapter argues that Canada’s humanitarian engagement with South Korea between 1953 and 1963 was motivated by a humanitarian impulse arising from the Canadian public and a strong desire to preserve the South Korean state in the overall context of the Cold War.
“A VIRTUALLY BLANK CANVAS” & ST. LAURENT’S VISIT TO KOREA
In 1951, Canadian Minister of External Affairs Lester B. Pearson wrote in Foreign Affairs that Canada was painting its Pacific policy on a “virtually blank canvas.”392 While the Korean War galvanized the Canadian public’s attention on Korea, Pearson was right that Canada still had no official “policy” to speak of in terms of its engagement with the Pacific in general and the Korean peninsula in particular. The Treaty of San Francisco (1951), between Japan and the Allied powers, officially ended Japan’s position as an imperial power. Yet Korea was not one of the signatories and Seoul still relieved heavily on the American political support in the aftermath of the Korean War.393 Distinguishing Korea from the rest of the Pacific countries was a slow and gradual process.
391 National Archives of the Republic of Korea, “ROK Joins the Colombo Plan,” Department of Public Information, 1968, http://theme.archives.go.kr/next/daily/viewMain.do?selectDay=20140129
392 Lester B. Pearson, “The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 30: 1 (Oct. 1951): 17-30. 393 See United States Department of State, “China and Japan 1952-1954” Foreign Relations of the United States, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS- idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS195254v14p2.p0016&id=FRUS.FRUS195254v14p2&isize=text
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In the aftermath of the Korean War, a first-ever prime ministerial visit took place, which confirmed what Canadian officials had heard from the returning veterans. On February 4, 1954, two days after his 72nd birthday, Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent embarked on an ambitious tour around the world, which included a short trip to Seoul on his way to Japan.394 Asia remained at the top of St. Laurent’s priorities on this tour, in light of Canada’s rapid economic developments and the “astonishing rate” of inter-dependence between nations of the world. In his own words: “Our external policy has acquired a growing importance in the thinking of our people, and the importance of external relations has been reflected in the debates in the house and practically all aspects of the activities of those who are charged with the responsibilities of government.”395 St. Laurent also wanted to see for himself “the conditions existing in other parts of the world and to assure the governments of those countries of the sincerity of our desire to cooperate with them in our own interests as well as in theirs.”396 As he announced at the House of Commons before his departure on January 29, 1954, St. Laurent vowed to: “bring back with me and also to leave behind not only useful information but perhaps a clearer picture of the problems which all of us have to face together.”397
To what extent did St. Laurent’s visit reflect a change in Canada’s attitude towards Asia in general, and Korea specifically? As Canada’s Prime Minister from 1948 to 1957, St. Laurent arguably presided over one of most self-confident periods of Canadian history. Unlike Mackenzie King, whose chief concern during the Great Depression and the Second World War was national unity, Canada under St. Laurent was one of prosperity and optimism.398 The decline of British power also helped to transform Canada’s relations with the outside world, as well as Canada’s institutional mechanisms for conducting its external relations. Although it was not publicly known, Prime Minister St. Laurent had a strong “anti-imperialist streak,” and a sense of missionary charity. He also agreed with a belief held by some Canadians that colonial rule in Asia and Africa had been unjust and he supported giving modest aid to under-developed
394 CBC News Magazine, “Louis St. Laurent goes around the world in 42 days,” CBC News, Broadcasted March 14, 1954, http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/st-laurent-goes-around-the-world-in-42-days 395 Library of Parliament, HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES, 22ND PARLIAMENT, 1ST SESSION : VOL. 2, Jan 29, 1954. Hansard Canadian Parliament Historical Records, http://parl.canadiana.ca/ 396 IBID. 397 IBID. 398 “Louis St. Laurent,” Globe and Mail, July 26, 1973.
114 countries for recovery and reconstruction.399 His brief stop-over in Seoul marked the first-ever visit made by a Canadian prime minister to Korea, clearly prompted by the Canadian experience in the Korean War in addition to St. Laurent’s own interest in world affairs. As St. Laurent explained:
… That vast continent, which contains in fact well over half the world’s population, was once a vague and rather romantic concept far over the horizon for most of us in this part of the world. Today, we are vitally concerned with what happens in Asia. This concern arises both from our membership in the United Nations and from our membership in the commonwealth… We have joined with other members of the United Nations in helping to repel aggression in Korea… Our interest in Asia has also been increased as a result of the desire of our people to assist our Asian friends to improve their social and economic conditions. 400
The visit to South Korea left strong impressions on the Canadian delegation. In his diary entry on March 8, 1954, Charles Ritchie noted that the visit to Korea was filled with “the squalor of war-wrecked Seoul, bad oysters at dinner with horrible old Syngman Rhee, the visit to the Canadian troops at the front in Korea.”401 On the visit to the De-Militarized Zone, St. Laurent noted, “We saw on our side an impregnable defence line, and I was told that what was being done on the other side was just about the same. Their intelligence is that on neither side are there any evidences of preparations for offensives being made, but that on both sides they are very strongly entrenching their existing lines.”402 After the tour, a state dinner with Rhee’s entire cabinet and senior officials from the U.S. embassy was arranged at the last minute, as St. Laurent’s initial plan was to only visit Canadian troops still serving in Korea on his way to
399 Robert Bothwell, Penguin History, 381. 400 IBID. 401 Charles Ritchie, Diplomatic Passport: More Undiplomatic Diaries, 1946-1962 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1981), 69. 402 Library of Parliament, HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES, 22ND PARLIAMENT, 1ST SESSION : VOL. 3, March 18, 1954, Hansard Canadian Parliament Historical Records, http://parl.canadiana.ca/
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Japan. Although both leaders, two elderly and skillful politicians, had a lot in common, they disagreed significantly on the issue of Communist expansion and prospects for peace in Asia. St. Laurent believed that Russia and China would not be interested in any further military conflicts, while Rhee still believed in the feasibility of an aggressive military policy by the regime in North Korea, with the support of Communist neighbours. In his subsequent report to the House of Commons, St. Laurent lamented that Korea was:
…a terrible country in so far as terrain is concerned, and one cannot see why any one of those hills that were the scene of such bloody battles was of sufficient importance to justify the kind of fights that were made for their possession…President Rhee…[was] not too firmly convinced that the State Department is always right, but I did not get the impression that he was going to do very much about it.403
St. Laurent’s comments in the House of Commons were unusually candid. He saw Korea as a distant country, but his visit also confirmed that it was a suitable venue for Canadian aid. Korean officials at the time of St. Laurent’s visit were understandably more preoccupied with managing Korean relations with the United States than Canada. For South Koreans, Canada remained an important ally, especially given Canada’s contributions in the Korean War. Yet no record was found in the Korean diplomatic archives to document this historic visit. Still, Canadian-Korean relations gained a considerable depth over the course of the 1950s and by 1963, Canada and Korea would eventually establish diplomatic relations. To understand why Korea turned to Canada for help despite the substantial aid it received from the United States, we must first examine the role of foreign aid in reconstruction of South Korea after the Korean War, as well as the growing disenchantment between Seoul and Washington, which provided an opportunity for Canada to exert more influence.
403 Library of Parliament, HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES, 22ND PARLIAMENT, 1ST SESSION : VOL. 3, March 18, 1954, Hansard Canadian Parliament Historical Records, http://parl.canadiana.ca/
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Figure 10: Prime Minister St. Laurent in his visit to Korea (1954)
Source: Photo © Kuksa p'yŏnch'an ŭiwŏnhoe [National Institute of Korean History), http://db.history.go.kr
THE AFTERMATH OF THE KOREAN WAR: ECONOMIC & POLITICAL CHALLENGES
As witnessed by the visiting Canadian delegation, the Korean peninsula in the aftermath of the Korean War was in dire need of help. The stalemate in 1953, which put an end to some three years of fighting on the Korean peninsula, left many issues unresolved, with an unprecedented level of political, financial, human and social damage. Estimates vary in terms of the actual figures. Economically speaking, physical destruction of property in South Korea was estimated at around $3 billion USD in 1953 prices. Over 600,000 housing units had been destroyed, leaving many Koreans on the street, with damaged manufacturing capacity and infrastructure across the peninsula.404 Perhaps the greatest loss for the Korean society was found
404 Young-Iob Chung, South Korea in the Fast Lane: Economic Development and Capital Formation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 9.
117 in human casualties: out of a population of 20 million in 1950, more than 1.3 million people were killed, wounded, or went missing. Orphans, refugees, widows and the injured scrambled for water, food and housing on the streets. In terms of transportation, nearly 47per cent of the railroads, more than 1,600 roads and nearly 1,400 bridges had been damaged during the Korean War. By the time of the armistice in 1953, nearly 51 per cent of South Korean production facilities had been destroyed, with damages valued at over $549 million. A total of 68 per cent of all factories had been destroyed, amounting to as high as 70 per cent destruction in the textile and chemical industries. Most notably, rice production fell by 65 per cent over the course of the Korean War, which seriously damaged the South’s agriculture-driven economy and its own domestic consumption. South Korea’s per capita consumption was around $60 USD in 1953-54, which placed it on par with some of the poorest nations in Sub-Saharan Africa such as Rwanda.405
The dire state of the South Korean economy left a lot on the shoulders of South Korea’s President, an elderly statesman who looked up to the United States as a model for civilization and progress. As a young man, Rhee encountered Christianity through Western missionaries while he was incarcerated due to his involvement in the Independence club and other nationalist activities between 1899 and 1905. While he was imprisoned, it was Dr. Avison who sent him the English Bible and the Korean-English dictionary406 and Rhee was baptized with Gale’s help in
1904. 407 Throughout his studies at Harvard, Rhee kept in close touch with Gale about his career and developments in Korea, and Gale advised him to return to Korea and work at the YMCA in Seoul.408 Rhee received his Ph.D. at Princeton, and spent most of his time between 1912 and
1933 abroad to work on South Korea’s independence. 409 Rhee was a skilled diplomat, a shrewd politician, and a fervent anti-communist.410 But he did not receive widespread support from the
405 Ibid, 11-12. 406 Nak-Hwan Kim, “Pastor Gale and Young Syngman Rhee,” op.cit, 29. 407 Ibid, 35. Initially Syngman Rhee asked Gale to baptize him, which Gale declined because of denominational issues. 408 Ibid, 37. 409 Han, 569. 410 Also see Young Ick Lew, The Making of the First Korean President: Syngman Rhee's Quest for Independence, 1875-1948, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2014.
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Korean public, who saw him as an American puppet. Of 210 parliamentarians in the May 1950 election, for instance, only 30 of them supported Rhee, and while Rhee was re-elected in the 1956 election, there were growing political oppositions and public discontent about him. 411
The years from 1953 to 1957 marked a period of reconstruction for South Korea, with the surge of foreign aid as well. Although UN Korea Relief Agency provided a major flow of commodities to Korea in the 1953 to 1955 period, Washington soon decided that the aid should be bilateral. 412 The immediate priority for the government in Seoul was to carefully balance its relationship with the United States, while juggling with domestic economic reforms and reconstruction efforts.413 South Korean political leadership at this point was headed by aging Syngman Rhee, the right-wing politician favoured by the United States. As the first president of the Republic of Korea, with a background in independence movements in the interwar period and heavily influenced by his education in the U.S., Rhee was also a beneficiary of the work of Canadian missionaries, for it was Gale who helped to arrange his studies in the United States.414
Reconstructing the war-torn Korean peninsula was a massive undertaking for all parties: the political leadership in Seoul, the U.N. Korean Relief Agency, and the United States, which had begun its aid program for Seoul back in 1946. From 1946 to 1976, the United States provided $12.6 billion in economic and military aid to the Republic of Korea. This kind of long- term per capita assistance has not been found elsewhere in the world, with the exception of Israel.415 The total of $6 billion in U.S. economic grants and loans from 1946 to 1978 for South Korea can be compared to $6.89 billion for all of Africa and $14.89 billion for all of Latin America. Upon a closer look, the scale of U.S. aid to the Republic of Korea appears even more significant in the 1950s in light of its military contributions. With the military aid and spending
411 Han, 585. 412 Anne O. Krueger, The Development Role of the Foreign Sector and Aid, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 41.
413 For more details on the damages and reconstruction efforts, see Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw eds, South Korea: A Country Study, Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992. 414 Han, 568-569. 415 Jung-En Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 45.
119 on the U.S. troops stationed in Korea, the total for U.S. aid to South Korea amounted to more like $1 billion a year in the post-Korean War period.416 The sheer scale and length of U.S. aid to Seoul had multiple motivations based on ideological, strategic and political calculations. It reflected a belief in the U.S. administration that the Korean case was a test for American leadership in the broader Cold War context, as well as a recognition of Korea’s geostrategic importance in Northeast Asia.
RELIEF EFFORTS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS
The Canadian contribution to the Korean relief efforts materialized in many different forms, officially through its contribution to the U.N. Korean Relief Agency and the U.N. Relief Programme, as well as private donations made by individuals and non-governmental organizations. In 1953, the Canadian government donated salted codfish from Newfoundland and Quebec valued at $300,000 as an in-kind contribution to the U.N. Emergency Programme in Korea417, in addition to its fully paid financial contribution of $ 7,250,000.418 By March 1954, the Canadian government contributed an additional 1500 tons of Canadian salted cod valued at $450,000 to the U.N. Emergency Relief Programme in Korea. The Emergency Relief Programme, in which 36 countries participated, was inaugurated by the U.N. Command shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Its aim was to provide immediate relief to the Korean people in the form of food, clothing and medicine.419
416 In 1956, for instance, US economic aid to ROK was more than $326 million, military aid more than $400 million, and $300 million covered the costs of U.S. troops in Korea. (Woo, 46).
417 Cabinet Conclusions, “Donation of Canadian salted cod for Korean relief,” RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a-, Volume 2653, Access Code 12, Item # 13155 418 Department of External Affairs, Press release: Monday Dec 7, 1953 Accessed on Dec 10, 2016 from http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.sas_19531207EP/1?r=0&s=1 419 This programme was in addition to the long-range reconstruction programme carried out by the UN Korean Reconstruction Agency in which Canada, together with 33 other countries, participated and towards which the Canadian government has contributed $7,250,000.
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The UNKRA
In tandem with the Emergency Relief Programme, there was also the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency, which was established by the General Assembly Resolution 410A (V) of Dec 1, 1950, with power “to plan…and carry out a broad programme of relief and reconstruction in Korea.”420 Canada remained as a firm supporter of the UNKRA from the beginning, more so than the British or American governments.421 As Paul Martin, Acting Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, emphasized on March 9, 1953: Canada gave “its whole-hearted support to the Korean Reconstruction Agency and has done all in its power to enable the Agency to carry out the purposes for which it was established.” 422 Martin continued:
From the outset of the Korean conflict, the Canadian government recognized that there were essential aspects to the problem other than those concerned with military action undertaken by the UN in defence of the Republic of Korea. Now…we, along with other members of the United Nations, were at once conscious that there would be a progressive need by cooperative action of giving economic assistance to the Korean people to repair the ravages of war...423
Although UNKRA aid was smaller in scale than the aid from Washington, it was still notable for the number of participating member states it brought together and the wide range of activities which it undertook.424 In total, 36 nations contributed to UNKRA, supplying lumber for rebuilding homes, schools and factories, fertilizers to refurbish damaged land, and steel for
420 Department of External Affairs, Press release: Monday March 8, 1954 Accessed on Dec 10, 2016 from http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.sas_19540308EP/1?r=0&s=1 421 United Nations Archives, “UNKRA: Canadian Contribution,” New York: UN Archives, 1950-1953.
422 Department of External Affairs, “Statement by the Acting Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly by Mr. Paul Martin made in the First Committee,” March 9, 1953. http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b1641293/2?r=0&s=3
423 IBID. 424 See Gene M. Lyon, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953, Colombus: Ohio State University Press, 1961 & David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.
121 the construction of heavy industry.425 In February 1953, the first cargo of UNKRA’s relief grain arrived at the port of Busan. By early autumn of the same year, the first shipment of construction materials and equipment needed to rebuild Korea arrived. UNKRA’s first task was to deal with the issues of starvation that came as a result of Korea’s damaged output level. In 1953, over $11 million worth of grain and $9 million worth of fertilizer found its way to Korea through UNKRA. From the summer of 1955, a few hundred irrigation projects were carried out in different parts of Korea with the assistance of UNKRA engineers. The Agency also put a lot of effort into rebuilding forests in Korea, providing $42 million worth of seedlings to aid the ROK’s forestry programme and the reconstruction of the badly-damaged Central Forest Experiment Station in Seoul, which was completed by 1954.426
Though the general aims of UNKRA were noble, the Agency still faced a number of logistical problems, namely collecting pledges from its participating countries. Canada, the only country to have paid its pledge in full, was at the forefront of urging others to fulfill their commitments. As Senator Charles B. Howard, Canadian Representative in the Second Committee at the ninth session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, commented on December 10, 1954:
…Canada has been a member of the UNKRA Advisory Committee since its establishment by the General Assembly in December 1950. The Canadian Delegation has consequently had a direct and continuing interest in, and knowledge of, the development by the Agency of an overall programme from which the Korean people would derive the maximum degree of benefit. We realize the tremendous task facing the Republic of Korea in transforming its economy from one devastated by war to one which will ensure that the Korean people are enabled, once again, to enjoy a reasonable standard of living. 427
425 The United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (ARMS), “UNKRA in Action,” The UNKRA Archives, https://unarchives.wordpress.com/into-the-archives/ (Accessed February 2, 2015). 426 IBID.
427 Text of statement on Dec 10, 1954 by Senator Charles B. Howard, Canadian Representative in the Second Committee at the ninth session of the UN General Assembly, New York, From the Report of the Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, Ottawa: External Affairs, 1954. No. 54/48/UN 9/25, (External Affairs Supplementary Paper)
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Arguing that the UNKRA’s programme must be implemented to the fullest extent, Senator Howard argued that all members should not only make prompt payment of existing pledges, but also consider contributing more. Howard continued: “My Government is prepared to recommend that the Canadian parliament approve a new contribution to UNKRA, over and above that which has already been contributed by Canada.” 428 Ultimately, the Resolution 257 passed by a vote of 38 in favour to 5 against, which “recognized the importance of UNKRA’s programme for the relief and rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea” and the “urgent need of additional contributions from governments to enable the Agency to continue the implementation of that programme.” The resolution urged all governments to fulfill their financial obligations. Howard pledged that the Canadian government would be “prepared to recommend that the Canadian parliament approve a new contribution to UNKRA, over and above that which has already been contributed by Canada.” 429
THE COLOMBO PLAN
In addition to UNKRA, Canada was also a key member of the Colombo Plan, which had its origin in its membership in the Commonwealth. Launched on July 1, 1951, the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia was aimed at tackling the correlation between poverty and the spread of communism. 430 A core assumption of the Colombo Plan, as presented to the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Colombo, was that economic conditions, such as poverty, underdevelopment and high population growth, made countries in the Asia-Pacific region vulnerable to “communist subversion.” 431 Events in Asia, such as the resurgence of communism as seen with Mao’s victory in China, had raised alarm bells for Western policymakers. A British Foreign Office memorandum to the Cabinet read:
428 IBID.
429 IBID. 430 Denis Stairs, “Colombo Plan,” Canadian Encyclopedia, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/colombo-plan/ Accessed January 19, 2017.
431 Ademola Adeleke, “The Strings of Neutralism: Burma and the Colombo Plan,” Pacific Affairs, Vol 76, No. 4 Winter 2003-2004, 594-95.
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The United Kingdom, the old Commonwealth countries and the United States regard the area [South and Southeast Asia] as a strategic whole….the common policy is to prevent the spread of communism in the area. By checking the increase of poverty and social insecurity, by promoting stability and by encouraging a feeling of unity and solidarity among the countries of the Colombo region, the Colombo Plan is an important weapon against communism. 432
Considering the communist rhetoric on notions of equality, it was believed that improving standards of living and strengthening the capacity of non-communist governments in Asia would help improve regional stability.433 A signature feature of the Colombo Plan was its bilateral mechanism for aid arrangement under the broader multinational framework.434 It was intended to serve as a channel for Western aid, capital and technical assistance for Asian countries in need. As Ademola Adeleke aptly put it, the Colombo Plan was essentially “an instrument of containment and for that reason it was targeted at all the countries, Commonwealth and non- Commonwealth, within the strategic and security orbit of the Soviet Union and China.”435
What came as a surprise was the persistent effort made by South Korea to become a member of the Colombo Plan as of August 1957. South Korean diplomats approached the British ambassador to Korea, H. J. Evans, asking for help and the U.S. State Department vouched that the Colombo Plan membership would “make the Koreans feel that they were part of the members of the free world club.”436 Nevertheless, there was strong opposition from both Western countries and Asian countries like Ceylon, because South Korea was technically not located in Southeast Asia and could not realistically pose as a donor country the way Japan had
432 Memo by the Foreign Office to the Cabinet Working Party on Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia: Provision of Financial Assistance by the UK to Non-commonwealth members of the Colombo Plan, 21 July 1953, CAB 134/867. E.D. (S.A.) (53). 10, Public Record Office, London. As seen in Adeleke, Op.Cit. 433 IBID.
434 Ademola Adeleke, “Ties without strings? The Colombo Plan and the geopolitics of international aid, 1950-1980.”Ph.D. Dissertation, (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1996), 5. 435 Ademola Adeleke, “The Strings of Neutralism: Burma and the Colombo Plan,” Pacific Affairs, Vol 76, No. 4 Winter 2003-2004, pg 594-95.
436 Ademola Adeleke, Ph.D. Dissertation, 287.
124 done. Moreover, there were fears that approving South Korean membership would be like opening up the Pandora’s box for new applications from China, as well as countries in the Middle East and Latin America, therefore setting an undesirable precedent.437 Yet, with support from the Canadian High Commission and the U.S. Embassy in Ceylon, coupled with South Korean diplomatic missions to Asian capitals for support, South Korea eventually became a member of the Colombo Plan in 1963. 438
DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROK
Despite the appearance of cordiality and friendship, Seoul and Washington increasingly became irritated with each other over such issues as Rhee’s militaristic policy of advancing to the North for reunification, Korean-Japanese relations, and the allocation of foreign aid in the Korean economy. Rhee’s corruption and growing disenchantment with the U.S. government almost led the CIA to overthrow him in 1952 – and the relationship remained rocky until his eventual resignation in 1960.439 U.S. aid to South Korea also reflected a belief that South Korea might one day become like the United States. Yet, in focusing on agricultural produce and finished products rather than infrastructure and industries, and in insisting that much of it be procured through Japan, the U.S. administration also sowed seeds for discontent and frustration in the minds of Korean officials. There was a fundamental difference in how the United States envisioned the role of Japan in the regional dynamics of Asia-Pacific region, and how South Koreans viewed Japan.
437 Ibid, 189. 438 The Thirteenth Annual Report of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan (London, November 1964) provided a very acute analysis of economic developments in South Korea. In its detailed report, the Korea section concluded: “In 1963, emphasis was placed on investment in the industrial sector and infrastructure in accordance with the first Five Year Plan. In current prices, of a GNP of W366.0 billion in 1963, Gross Domestic fixed capital investment amounted to W50.7 billion or almost 14 percent of the total. Specifically, heavy investments were made in transportation, communications, electricity and manufacturing. Investment in manufacturing industry was attributable to the expansion of facilities in the private sector, including three cement plants, a nylon factory, and an oil refinery. All contributed significantly toward the strengthening of Korea’s industrial structure.” (Presented to Parliament by the Minister of Overseas Development by Command of Her Majesty, The Colombo Plan: Thirteenth Annual Report of the Consultative Committee, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, November 1964), 132. 439 Ibid.
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Dubbed “double usage of aid dollars,” Washington hoped that reconstruction efforts in the Korean economy would also boost that of Japan. While it is difficult to find direct evidence of Canada’s position on the triangular relationship between the United States, Korea and Japan, it is useful to recall the 1953 speech from Lester B. Pearson (the Secretary of State for External Affairs), called “Don’t let Asia split the West.” Arguing that “the greatest threat at the moment to the unity of purpose and policy of the Western grand alliance against Communism imperialism and aggression lies in the scope and nature of the menace of communism in Asia,” Pearson pressed that the differences in measures and approaches should be minimized, especially within the Western alliance.440 The Americans envisioned a system in which much of the aid purchased through U.S. funding would be spent on consumer goods produced in Japan, rather than capital investment that Rhee had asked for.
Rhee fervently opposed such a “pro-Japanese” policy. He complained to Dulles on August 6, 1953, that “Over half of aid from the U.S. has been supplied through Japan, and aid should be used for Korea’s independent industrial base rather than Japanese economic revitalization.”441 Dulles simply replied that Japan occupied a critical “economic, political and strategic” location in the Pacific, advising Rhee instead to change his perception on Japan and “recognize Japan’s status and importance.”442 Throughout the mid-1950s, Rhee repeatedly protested to Washington that more capital should be directed towards building Korea’s industrial capacity, rather than importing goods from Japan. Enormous pressure was placed on Rhee, through the leverage of all of the aid capital, to get him to recognize Japan diplomatically. Nevertheless, the Americans still believed in creating a regional order with Japan at the nexus and then expanding the U.S. into a global hegemon through such security and economic
440 Department of External Affairs, Statements & Speeches, Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, “Don’t Let Asia Split the West,” Reprinted from World, Dec 1953 Accessed Dec 10, 2016 from http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.sas_195300005ES/1?r=0&s=3 441 Memo of the Meeting between President Rhee and U.S. Secretary of State J.F. Dulles, August 6, 1953, FRUS. 442 For more discussions on this subject, see Victor Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
126 connections. 443 Strictly speaking, it was more of an assumption than a coherent policy, but it still coloured the American approach towards the Asia-Pacific region.
As Korean scholar John Lie aptly described it, the U.S. aid policy for Korea was “ignorant of the proverbial injunction to give fishing poles, rather than fish, to people in need.”444 Nevertheless, U.S. aid was critical to underpin Rhee’s autocratic rule, and South Korean capitalists saw the need to develop a personal relationship with the president to gain access to commodities provided by American assistance. Rhee’s Korea was one where import quotas and licenses, access to loans, procurement of government contracts and other important decisions for state economy were processed in a non-competitive environment, which robbed it of the benefits of the capitalistic system that it sought to emulate. 445 At the same time, it was also a result of a tug of war between Washington and Seoul, especially President Syngman Rhee’s use of rhetoric and bluffing to maximize benefit from the U.S. while pursuing his own political goals of preparing for reunification of the two Koreas. Under the façade of close cooperation and partnership, there were many points of contention between the two governments, on both political and economic fronts.
The United States government’s growing disenchantment with Rhee was very illustrative of the growing tensions in the ROK-US alliance during this period. Chief among such tensions was Rhee’s vision for re-uniting the two Koreas and the American preference for constraint and stability on the Korean peninsula. Rhee persistently requested the full support of President Eisenhower for advancing to the North, which did not really resonate with the views of policymakers in Washington. In his letter to Secretary of State Dulles in July 1954, Rhee pleaded, “An adequate appropriation for arming and equipping the additional twenty Army Divisions and Sea and Air Forces to commensurate with the land strength, and for the manufacturing of arms and planes in Korea, should be made. The time element is very important
443 Steven Hugh Lee, “Development without Democracy: The political economy of US-South Korea Relations, 1958-61,” in Chang Yun-Shik and Steven Hugh Lee eds., Transformations in Twentieth Century Korea, (London: Routledge, 2006), 157.
444 John Lie, Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 29-30. 445 Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift, 69.
127 in stemming the growing tide of Communist strength. We are more than disturbed about the daily-worsening situation.”446 His request was not answered, but Rhee persisted with his belief that striking the North with all available force was a sure way for peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. On March 25, 1955, Marvin Stone from International News Service asked Rhee, “Mr. President, on your eightieth birthday, what would you like to receive most as a birthday present?” To this seemingly silly question, Rhee answered:
The best of all presents on my 80th birthday would be a public statement by the U.S. government that I was free to go ahead with our own plans for the unification of Korea. That would be the realization of my life-long objective, and at the same time, it would be a great contribution to the security of the United States and to the ultimate triumph of democratic principles throughout the world. 447
Rhee’s answer had an element of truth that is often overlooked in understanding Korean- American relations during this period. In addition to frictions at the leadership level, the civil servants in Seoul and the U.S. mission to Korea (Office of Economic Coordinator) diverged regularly on the direction, approach and substance of Korea’s public policy, largely on striking the balance between defence and economic development. The Korean War increased South Korea’s dependence on the U.S., but it also resulted in a tremendous expansion of the Korean army – from a force of about 95,000 at the outbreak of the war to 655,000 by March 1954. 448 By the mid-1950s, Washington was spending more than $500 million annually in support of South Korea’s armed forces.
Though there was a formal Agreement on Economic Coordination between the Republic of Korea government and the United States (signed in May 1952), much of the decisions were
446 “The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Secretary of State,” Seoul, 2 July 1954. Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, 1951–1959, FRUS, 1952–1954 VOLUME XV, PART 2, KOREA (IN TWO PARTS), DOC. 909. 447 Answers to Marvin Stone from International News Service, Syngman Rhee, Korea Flaming High: Excerpts from Statements by President Syngman Rhee, Seoul: Republic of Korea Office of Public Information, 1956. 448 Steven Hugh Lee, “The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency in War and Peace: An Economic and Social History of Korea in the 1950s,” in Chae-Jin Lee and Young Ick Lew (eds.), Hangukkwa 6.25 Chonchaeng, [Korea and the Korean War], (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2002), 357- 396.
128 made on an ad-hoc basis and left a lot to be desired in the minds of Korean decision-makers.449 The American logic was that defence formed a key policy priority on the Korean peninsula, while civil servants in Seoul complained that more resources were needed for economic recovery. 450 From 1953 to 1964, 43 per cent of the counterpart fund went towards the defence budget. When Paek Tu-Chin, Korea’s Chief Economic Coordinator, told the U.S. Secretary of State Dulles that additional assistance would be necessary for the long-term planning of the Korean economy, the Secretary simply responded: “American economic aid was not accorded on the basis of friendship but as a contribution to winning the Cold War.”451 Ottawa would only find out about these tensions in the early 1960s. The growing tensions between Seoul and Washington would serve as a major impetus for South Korea to look elsewhere in the 1960s, which had important consequences for Canada.
THE UNITARIAN SERVICE COMMITTEE (USC) & “MILK FOR KOREA”
In addition to government-level aid contributions, a key feature which distinguished Canadian engagement with Korea vis-à-vis the United States during this period was the degree of non-governmental involvement, which reflected a growing humanitarian impulse in the Canadian public. As Hector Mackenzie once noted, a spirit of “Canada’s nationalist internationalism” emerged throughout this era, as a distinctive feature in Canadian foreign policy. The notion that the Canadian national identity embodied caring more about those less fortunate, and that it was possible to make a difference in the world through our attitude, approach and action, became a cardinal tenet of Canadian distinctiveness. There was also a strong sense that the Canadian approach differed from those of other countries, most notably the United States, and that Canadian foreign policy should be guided by an exceptional commitment to a better world. 452
449 Kwangsuk Kim and Michael Roemer, Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea: 1945-75 Growth and Structural Transformation, (Harvard University Press: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979), 43-44.
450 IBID. 451 Steven H. Lee, “Development without Democracy,” 159; U.S. National Archives, RG 84 1956a 452 Hector Mackenzie, “Canada’s Nationalist Internationalism,” Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick Eds, Canadas of the Mind: The Making and Unmaking of Canadian Nationalisms in the 20th Century, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 90-91.
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Chief among such organizations was the Unitarian Service Committee (USC) of Canada, founded by Dr. Lotta Hitschmanova in 1945.453 A Czech refugee rescued from war-torn Europe,
Hitschmanova had a particular interest in helping children from conflict zones.454 Widely known as “Dr. Lotta” around the world, her grassroots leadership made tremendous difference in Canada’s humanitarian efforts. As early as July 1952, Hitschmanova was invited by the U.N. Korea Reconstruction Agency to make a fortnight’s visit and investigate a possible program.455 Although the Greek relief programme was at its height, she was keen to make the trip and told her directors that the agency could run both programmes and it would help the fundraising campaign in the fall. Hitschmanova’s trip to Korea in August was a difficult assignment. The monsoon rains had been followed by increased Chinese probing and patrolling around the Imjin River, and there was a severe lack of transport. Further complicating the investigation was the total absence of statistics and a noticeable lack of cooperation from Korean officials. Since its inception in the early 1950s until its eventual termination on December 31, 1978, the South Korea programme remained the single-largest program ever undertaken by the USC. By 1978, the USC had invested some $13 million in South Korea, which was more than half of the USC’s total income in funds and gifts-in-kind (mainly clothing, food and medical supplies). At the time of the withdrawal, Dr. Hitschmanova called it “the USC’s greatest success story during the past thirty-three years.”456
Hitschmanova returned from a second visit to Korea in August 1953 (just after the armistice) with two priorities: to raise funds to provide barley gruel for the children of Korea and to gather shoes and socks to protect them against frostbite. Thankfully at the YWCA in Seoul, there was a Korean woman, Esther Park, who connected Hitschmanova with three projects to help some of the six million children in the country. These projects included a “Milk for Korea” campaign, “Operation Codfish” to supplement diet for Korean children who suffered from
453 Joy Thierry Llewellyn, “Lotta Hitschmanova,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, http://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/lotta-hitschmanova/ (Accessed Dec 7, 2016) 454 USC Canada website, “About Us,” http://usc-canada.org/about-us/our-history/dr-lotta/item/40- biography-of-dr-lotta-hitschmanova, Accessed on February 1, 2015. 455 “Fifty Thousand Orphans Await Help,” Globe and Mail, Dec 5, 1957. 456 Report to the USC board, 14 May 1978 as seen in Clyde Sanger, Lotta and the Unitarian Service Committee Story, (Toronto: Stoddard Publishing Co., 1986), appendix.
130 malnutrition and shipments of Christmas gifts.457 There were efforts to adopt Korean orphans by
Canadian families458 and different groups took the lead in terms of sending food aid and clothing to Korean families. But Hitschmanova soon found that her annual fundraising tour was going badly across the Prairies. Grain sales had been slack and there was little ready cash. She was depressed when she walked into the Victoria Daily Times and told her story to Bruce Hutchison, the editor-in-chief. In response, Hutchison wrote a powerful editorial on the works of USC:
Among Canada’s major assets in world affairs, we would nominate Dr. Lotta Hitschmanova, the tiny woman with the big heart who, at the moment, is trying to save 700,000 Korean children from starvation this winter. Back from a heart-breaking look at Korea, Dr. Hitschmanova says that many such children – victims of an international convulsion beyond their understanding, waits in a world storm – will not see another spring if Canadians fail to feed and clothe them. When she tells us that last winter, many children’s feet had to be amputated because they froze for lack of clothing, the entire free world should take a good look at the mirror of conscience. And no one should look harder than Canadians, who have food and clothing in abundance to spare. 459
Figure 11: Lotta Hitschmanova in Korea, 1954 (Source: Photo © The Unitarian Service Committee of Canada)
457 Clyde Sanger, Lotta and the Unitarian Service Committee Story, (Toronto: Stoddard Publishing Co., 1986), chapter 5 458 “Drive to Aid Korean Orphans,” Globe and Mail, Feb 16, 1954; “Canadian Families educate Korean Orphans,” Globe and Mail, Oct 17, 1959.
459 IBID.
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Hutchison contrasted the USC’s “pitiful little budget of $125,000 for barley gruel” with the $2 billion that Canadians had already spent fighting the Korean War, “the source of all this suffering.” The Victoria Daily Times launched a Christmas campaign and raised nearly $12,000 in two weeks. It helped push Hitschmanova’s fundraising over the year’s target in the last few days and became the first of many such newspaper campaigns.460 These ads were fairly typical of aid publicity at the time. In a way, it was an extension of domestic anti-poverty efforts. Mrs. H.D. Taylor, Executive Secretary for Overseas Missions from the Women’s Missionary Society, continued to urge for church donations and support for Canadian government’s participation in U.N. relief work in her presentation at St. Paul’s United Church, urging that “mission boards have a special responsibility for long-term rehabilitation plans.”461
These efforts went hand in hand with some of the relief and aid efforts undertaken by church boards, most notably the United Church of Canada, which actively raised funds and dispatched personnel for relief efforts in schools and hospitals.462 The aid programmes were mostly directed at women and children, regardless of their Christian background, largely in shelters and orphanages. Canadian press reported that there were over 36,000 children in orphanages and the YWCA in Korea focused particularly in “helping war widows and young girls to become self-supporting.”463 In addition to working in orphanages, the YWCA was building elementary schools for neighbourhood children, operating feeding stations that served over 1,000 children a day, as well as a home for disabled women.464 There was a strong emphasis on building local capacity, as seen with the work of Barbara Broadfoot, a Toronto- trained home economist (and an offspring of a United Church missionary in Korea) who went to Korea as the National YWCA director of a rural training rehabilitation project near Busan.
460 See Lotta Hitschmanova, The USC Story: A Quarter Century of Loving Service by the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, 1945-1970. Ottawa: USC, 1970. 461 “WMS Told Korea Need Continuing,” Globe and Mail, April 9, 1954; “Korea Need Emphasized to Board,” Globe and Mail, May 29, 1954. 462 “Will Launch Relief Drive for Korea,” Globe and Mail, April 2, 1953. 463 “Korea Need Emphasized to Board,” Globe and Mail, May 29, 1954; “YWCA Projects in Korea Include 3 Orphanages,” Globe and Mail, October 20, 1954. 464 “YWCA Projects in Korea Include 3 Orphanages,” Globe and Mail, October 20, 1954.
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There, Broadfoot focused on building housing programs for teenagers but also developed, in cooperation with Korean leadership, a number of vocational training courses.465
THE “MILK FOR KOREA”
There were other programs, such as “Milk for Korea” campaign, which delivered a daily bowl of hot sweetened Canadian milk to over 25,000 primary school children in Seoul each day in 1952, followed by Canadian barley gruel to 125,000 Korean orphans in 1953. Canadian Brigadier J.M. Rockingham, who had been the 25th Brigade’s first commander in South Korea, commended the USC’s Help Korea campaign, and praised it as a unique opportunity to help children, the war’s innocent victims. The campaign was a big success. Within two months, the USC raised $50,000, and during a flying visit to New York Hitschmanova persuaded UNKRA to pay all the ocean transportation costs, and ordered 31,750 kg of skim milk power, which was half the price of whole milk powder and kept better. In mid-November, a first railway carload left the Gananoque milk factory, decked out with Canadian and Korean flags, for a ship in Vancouver that would get the milk powder to Seoul in time for distribution in 76 schools at the start of the January term. By the end of January, 110,000 kg of milk powder had been shipped, enough to continue milk distribution for the worst three months of winter.466
OPERATION CODFISH
Dubbed “Operation Codfish,” the USC also sent over 350,000 pounds of dried salted codfish to orphanages and hospitals in Korea by early January 1955, in an effort to supplement the children’s protein-deficient diet.467 Hitschmanova had agreed with the Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC) that the fish should go exclusively to children in orphanages and hospitals, just as 5500 kg of whole powdered sweetened milk, requested by a KCAC welfare officer in Seoul, should go to infants up to 12 months old suffering from malnutrition who had been taken into that city’s institutions. She complained forcefully to UNKRA when she found
465 Mary E. James, “Canadian Girl Administers Korean Rural Project,” Globe and Mail, January 30, 1954. 466 IBID. 467 “USC Seeks to Aid Korean Widows,” Globe and Mail, Dec 19, 1955.
133 out later that the KCAC had allocated the codfish also to “welfare institutions and medical care facilities (including leprosaria) and other vulnerable groups of indigent persons,” and that some of the milk had been given to 14-year-olds in Seoul’s children’s hospital who could easily have had UNICEF skim milk. The whole operation had three consequences, one a light-hearted reaction and the others raising serious questions. The first of these consequences was that Hitschmanova earned the odd nickname “Auntie Codfish” in Korea. The serious questions were the need it raised to have someone in Korea who would act as supervisor of USC projects and the importance of a careful survey of Korean children’s needs, so that the agency could decide whether to shift from this kind of emergency aid to long-term programming. 468
Figure 12: Images of Korean Orphans & UN Soldiers Source: Christian Times Korea http://www.christiantimes.ca/bbs/board.php?bo_table=mission&wr_id=119&page=3
On the ground in Seoul, Canadian soldiers also supported the orphans, both financially and socially. On the eve of Christmas in 1954, for instance, 15 soldiers from the Canadian Provost corps sat down for Christmas dinner with 12 children from the Do-Bong Orphanage in Seoul, providing them with gifts sent from Canadian families.469 Korean War Veteran, Jean-Paul St. Aubins, recalled that it was very common for many regiments to adopt orphans, and it was also common for the Canadian soldiers to bring canned food and clothes to orphanages nearby, where some of the missionaries were stationed. Such practice was found in other units, including
468 Clyde Sanger, Lotta and the Unitarian Service Committee Story, (Toronto: Stoddard Publishing Co., 1986), chapter 5 469 “Canadians Share Christmas Dinner with Seoul Orphans” Globe and Mail, Dec 24, 1954.
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American, British and Turkish bases, because the children were most affected by the prolonged warfare.470
On January 13, 1955, the USC noted that it had shipped more relief goods abroad in 1954 than in its 9.5 years of operation. The total value of relief goods shipped abroad in 1954 was around $359,906, the highest fundraising campaign it had managed in its history. The largest sum of its relief efforts went to Korea ($287,373), followed by Greece, France, Austria, Italy and India. 471 From 1955 onwards, the USC focused on other forms of aid to Korea, such as sewing machines to Korean Widow Rehabilitation Centres for women who were training to learn skills after losing their husbands in the Korean War. The USC aid also went towards rebuilding Korea’s school system, to repair and re-equip the war-damaged schools to provide more access to education for Korean children.472 In light of the fact that over 40 per cent of Korea’s 50,000 war-affected children were being cared for in an institution, the USC also launched an “adopt-a- child” program under its Foster Parent Scheme, which would cost $60 a year per child.473
The USC believed that relief should be brought to those in greatest need, regardless of nationality, color or creed. An adopted child would live in a USC sponsored home and be given food, clothing, medical care and basic education. The Canadian foster-parent received a case history and a picture of the child. In the fall of 1957, the USC aimed to raise a total of $140,000 before Christmas, to create an out-patients’ clinic for tubercular children in Korea, amongst many other goals. 474 Throughout 1956 and 1957, the USC continued to press the Canadian public about the abject poverty and unemployment situation in Seoul, as well as the high rate of deaths amongst infants in Korea. The USC campaign aimed to raise awareness among Canadians that over 50,000 children in Korea were left homeless, hungry and ill in the
470 Interview with Jean-Paul St. Aubin, May 23, 2017. 471 “Unitarians Ship More Relief Goods,” Globe and Mail, Jan 13, 1955. 472 “USC Seeks to Aid Korean Widows,” Globe and Mail, Dec 19, 1955. 473 “Christmas for Orphans possible through fund,” Globe and Mail, Dec 6, 1956.
474 Clyde Sanger, Lotta and the Unitarian Service Committee Story, (Toronto: Stoddard Publishing Co., 1986), chapter 5
135 aftermath of the Korean War, and urged the Canadian public to give generously by writing to 78 Sparks Street in Ottawa.475
A survey of the Globe and Mail coverages in the immediate post-Korean War period featured regular updates about missionaries who visited Seoul476, and a call for more financial aid for relief work in Korea,477 and a plea for Korean Christians in need of local aid.478 Miss Laura Pelton, overseas secretary of the Presbyterian WMS, speaking at the November meeting of Toronto East Presbyterian in Knox Church, said “the people of other countries should not be thought of as heathen in far-away romantic lands, but as people who need to be fed, clothed and educated.”479 From 1951 onwards, there were updates about the Women’s Missionary Society of the United Church of Canada, such as $5,000 raised for the U.N. Army for general relief, including clothing, food and drugs480 and $150,000 worth of clothing (50 tons) for Korean civilians, and Red Cross donations to Korea.481 This press coverage had three key running themes: first, Canadians had vested interest in ensuring the freedom and survival of the Korean people; second, time and poverty only helped the Communist cause482 ; and, third, there was always a call for ministers, women missionaries, teachers, doctors, nurses and technical specialties for work in the mission fields.483 The press coverage certainly helped in terms of outreach, and Canadian families donated generously throughout this period.
475 “Fifty Thousand Orphans Await Help,” Globe and Mail, Dec 5, 1957. 476 “Missionary Sees Korean Freedom with UN Help,” Globe and Mail, Sept 15, 1950 477 “Vote $5,000 for Relief in Korea,” Globe and Mail, Oct 7, 1950. 478 “Korean Christians Seek Local Aid,” Globe and Mail, Dec 20, 1950.
479 “Urges Help for Koreans,” Globe and Mail¸ November 14 1950. 480 “United WMS Sending Aid for Koreans,” Globe and Mail, Feb 1, 1951. 481 “Tells of Goods Sent to Korea,” Globe and Mail, Feb 13, 1952. 482 “Time Aids Reds, Missionary Says,” Globe and Mail, June 6, 1952. 483 “United Church Seeks Personnel for Mission Fields,” Globe and Mail, April 26, 1952.
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KEY MOTIVES AND INTERESTS FOR CANADIAN ENGAGEMENT IN KOREA
To understand how and why Canada was able to contribute significantly towards humanitarian efforts in Korea, it is necessary to turn to the domestic Canadian economy in the post-WWII era.484 Canada experienced a steady growth rate of 4.5 per cent in its economy between 1951 and 1956.485 Wartime shortages and wartime savings sparked a consumer boom, while American investment flowed into the economy. 486 Growing population and income, rising labour-force participation rates, new infrastructure developments, more education and training, and new resource discoveries all contributed to the growth of the Canadian economy at large.487 Strong consumer spending, a direct result of the overall rise in income, also added fuel to the Canadian economy. Unemployment, essentially non-existent during the war, remained at historically low levels until the late 1950s.488 The Korean War also helped to galvanize Canadian economy: Ottawa’s expenditures increased by over 30 per cent in real terms in 1951 and 23 per cent in 1952, as Canada embarked on a major rearmament program, placed a garrison in Europe, and contributed to the war in Korea. Exports boomed, as the war created a demand in the United States for Canadian resource products in particular.489 The relative strength of its domestic economy and the wealth enjoyed by ordinary Canadians played an important role in terms of Canada’s prompt payment for UNKRA and its insistence to other Western allies to support the emergency relief efforts in Korea.
For Canada, ensuring that small powers were not taken for granted and asserting its own voice on the international stage remained a top priority in the early stage of the Cold War. Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. Hume Wrong once argued on the principle for functionalism: “As a secondary country, we have not a great enough influence to make our views prevail. We
484 The period between 1945 to 1973 was one of the most prosperous periods in Canadian history. By 1944, for the first time in 150 years, Canada’s GDP per capita surpassed that of Australia. See Kenneth Norrie, Douglas Owram, J.C. Herbert Emery. A History of the Canadian Economy, Toronto: Thomson and Nelson, 2008. 485 The only exception was in 1954, when the real GNP actually declined. See Norrie & Owram, 559. 486 Robert Bothwell, Penguin History of Canada, (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2006), 364. 487 Kenneth Norrie and Douglas Owram, A History of the Canadian Economy, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 2003), 559. 488 Bothwell, Penguin History of Canada, chapter 13. 489 Ibid, 563. Automobile sales, for instance, jumped from 78,000 new cars sold in 1946 to 159,000 in 1947, most of which were paid in cash without loans. (Bothwell, Penguin History, 365).
137 should, however, be in a position at least to decide what is not acceptable and to advocate greater changes or additions to it our particular interests.”490 Those interests included multilateral cooperation to promote national security, freedom to diverge from the United States on foreign policy, and fairer representation of the smaller and medium-sized powers on the most significant UN bodies. What became known as the “functional principle” – the idea that non-great powers should be granted influence in world affairs on a case by case basis commensurate with their capacity and willingness to contribute – formed the basis of Canadian foreign policy for much of the 1950s.491 During this period, the Department of External Affairs focused its efforts on the elements of the UN Charter that played a lesser role in the U.S.-U.K.-USSR negotiations. As two analysts from the DEA reflected in 1956: “Membership in the United Nations, insofar as it means an increase in responsibilities without an appreciable advance in influence, exacts a price that is far from negligible in return for its contribution to the creation of the kind of world that Canada’s national interests demand.”492
SOUTH KOREAN PERSPECTIVE & FORMATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The internal documents of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs throughout the late 1950s emphasize “the gratitude” that the Korean government wished to express for Canadian participation in the Korean War, as well as the generosity shown through Canada’s aid programme.493 Moreover, missionary connections, such as the return of Dr. Schofield to Korea, continued to be relevant during this period, as seen in the correspondence from Syngman Rhee to Dr. Schofield in January 1958 (See Figure 13 below). Schofield returned to Korea to resume teaching and helping orphans and mentoring Dr. Un-Chan Chung, who would later become South Korea’s prime minister. However, Korean archival documents from the 1950s are heavily
490 John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power, (Ottawa: Carleton Library, 1976), 60. 491 Adam Chapnik, “The Department of External Affairs and the United Nations Idea, 1943-1965” in Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll Eds., In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009. (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2011), 84-85. Also see Adam Chapnick, Canada's Voice: The Public Life of John W. Holmes, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009. 492 F.H. Soward and Edgar McInnis, Canada and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 1956), 219. 493 “Memorandum to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,” Diplomatic Relations with Canada, 722.2CN, Reg#611, Film C-0003, File 27, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives of the ROK.
138 concentrated on its relationship with the United States rather than Canada. One issue of concern for the South Korean government was the establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada.
Figure 13: Syngman Rhee’s letter to Dr. Schofield (January 30, 1958) Source: Presidential Archives of the Republic of Korea
In July 1961, the Korean ambassador to Washington, Chung Il-Kwon, raised the diplomatic representation issue again with Canadian Foreign Minister Howard Green during a goodwill mission.494 Green and the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa remained unenthusiastic, but also could not find a suitable reason to reject the request automatically. At this point, the market in South Korea was still heavily reliant upon U.S. aid and the Korean market, with its constantly-changing financial regulations, was seen as “difficult, extremely competitive, and risky” according to Canadian trade commissioners. 495 The new military government led by Park Chung-Hee raised concerns in Ottawa on grounds of political legitimacy and constitutional legitimacy. Uncertain about the benefits of official diplomatic ties, the Department of External Affairs asked Fred Bull, Canadian Ambassador in Tokyo, for advice.496 Bull, who once served as the deputy minister of Trade and Commerce, was a strong believer in modernizing Canada’s trade activities oversees. His posting in Tokyo was a reward for outstanding service in the limited world of trade commissioner service at the time. He was very likeable and his advice would have been taken seriously in Ottawa because of his eminence as a very senior civil servant. He believed that dual accreditation might bring increased prospects for trade relations
494 DEA, “Dispatch: Ottawa to Tokyo, 24 July 1961, Y-421,” RG 25, Vol 6665, File 12087-40, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 495 R.G. Woolham, “Annual Statement of Trade Prospects,” 31 October 1959, RG 25, Vol 6269, File 10648-40, LAC. As seen in Greg Donaghy, Presentation notes at the CANKOR50 conference 496 Norman Robertson, “Memoranda for the Minister, 11 July 1961 and 15 September 1961,” RG 25, Vol 6665, File 12087-40, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada.
139 and also believed that it would help Canadian missionaries and teachers in Seoul in terms of consular services. Bull also believed that there was a strong political incentive for forging diplomatic relations with Seoul:
Canada has an opportunity and perhaps some responsibility to help show the South Koreans that fulfillment of their aspirations can best be achieved through association with the free world and through the pursuit of a truly democratic way of life. We have not as many good friends as we could wish in Asia and it seems to me most important at this stage that we should take positive measures to provide Korea with co- operation and assistance as a means of keeping this country on our side.”497
Bull’s arguments had a strong appeal to the civil servants in the Department of External Affairs, but it would meet an unlikely opposition. Prime Minister Diefenbaker raised concerns about the viability of expanding Canadian diplomatic representation when the economy was not doing well498 and hesitated showing support for a military regime that had seized power from a democratically-elected government. 499
In the meantime, members of the Canadian embassy in Tokyo visited Seoul to further explore the Korean proposal.500 In light of concerns related to costs and personnel, Seoul finally opted for the option of accrediting its U.N. ambassador to Ottawa. On April 23, 1962, Bull and his team visited the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and noted that the Canadian government’s delay had to do with financial considerations and the possibility that a change in the government with the forthcoming election might bring positive outcomes for diplomatic relations with Korea.501 Seoul also pressured its Ambassador to Washington D.C., Soo Young
497 “Tokyo (Bull) to Ottawa,” 22 September 1961, RG 25, Vol 6665, File 12087-40, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 498 “H.B. Robinson to Far Eastern Division,” 1 November 1961, RG 25, Vol 6665, File 12097-40, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 499 “Far Eastern Division to USSEA,” 25 October 1963, RG 25, Vol 10070, 20-1-2-ROK, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 500 “Letter from Bruce A. Keith (Counsellor) to Lee Won Kyung, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Korea,” 14 February 1962, Diplomatic Relations with Canada, 722.2CN, Reg#611, Film C-0003, File 27, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives. 501 “Meeting Log between Minister of Foreign Affairs and Canadian Ambassador Bull,” April 23, 1962, Diplomatic Relations with Canada,722.2CN, Reg#611, Film C-0003, File 27, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives.
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Lee, to continue to find ways of improving Korea’s public image with officials in Washington through publication and direct contacts. 502
At the meeting with Canadian officials on August 9, 1962, at the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, Lee once again raised the importance of establishing diplomatic relations to G. P. de T. Glazebrook,503 Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs (in charge of Far Eastern Affairs).504 Highlighting efforts made by the Korean government to establish diplomatic relations with Canada, Lee emphasized historical ties from the missionaries in the late 19th century, such as Dr. Oliver Avison, who founded the first medical college in Korea which “produced fifty-seven Koreans of Western medicine,” one of which happened to be Lee’s father. He also argued that there was much room for flexibility in terms of the nature of diplomatic relations: “On the part of my Government, chances are likely that either my colleague in Washington Ambassador Chung or myself, may be accredited in dual capacity.” He also noted that the Korean government “would not press for reciprocal or simultaneous appointment” for the Canadian Ambassador in Korea. Stressing good opportunities for economic relations between the two countries, Lee also suggested that Canadians might like to “participate in our great venture of Five-Year Economic Development Plan, particularly in the fields of hydro-electric power plants and oil refinery factory.”505 In fact, a Korean firm called Joong-Ang Industrial Co. was very much interested in working closely with Allis-Chalmers to export cement, as well as construct a hydro reactor, but the lack of an official diplomatic relationship posed a number of difficulties in shipping and transfer of technology.506
502 “Internal memo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Korea (June 29, 1969),” Diplomatic Relations with Canada 722.2CN, Reg#611, Film C-0003, File 27, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives. 503 G.P. de T. Glazebrook, Canada’s Defence Policy, Hamilton: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1937. Glazebrook was a historian who taught for some years at the University of Toronto after being fired for homosexual activities. This would be one of his last duties. 504 “Verbatim Record of the Conversation between Ambassador Soo Young Lee and Canadian Government Officials,” 9 August 1962, Diplomatic Relations with Canada 722.2CN, Reg#611, Film C- 0003, File 27, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives.
505 IBID. 506 “Summary of Meeting with the Canadian Ambassador to Japan and Mun-Yong Lee,” Nov 5, 1962, Diplomatic Relations with Canada ,722.2CN, Reg#611, Film C-0003, File 27, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives.
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Finally, on November 6, 1962, Glazebrook wrote to Lee that “Canada would be glad to accept the non-resident accreditation of a Korean Ambassador to Ottawa…This would constitute the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, even though the arrangement would not be as complete as we would like.”507 About two months later, on January 15, 1963, a joint communique was announced by Howard Green and his counterpart in Seoul, stating that a formal agreement had been made between the government of the ROK and the government of Canada to establish diplomatic relations in order to strengthen friendly relations. Ambassador Soo Young Lee presented his credentials on January 22, 1963, as Diefenbaker’s Conservative government was collapsing. Canada’s first resident ambassador, John A. Stiles, would not arrive in Seoul until 1974.508
CONCLUSION
In light of Korea’s economic situation in the post-Korean War era, as well as its heavy dependency on aid for reconstruction efforts, there was nothing inevitable about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and Korea in 1963. The battlefield experience over the course of the Korean War had reinforced the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula in the minds of Canadians, but Korea remained an aid recipient rather than a viable economic partner for much of the 1950s which reinforced the idea of a helpless and impoverished state. St. Laurent’s world tour and his short stop in Seoul reminded him of the state of poverty and hardship in Korea’s reconstruction phase, yet it was mostly UNKRA efforts and non-governmental organizations such as the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada which kept the relationship active in the late 1950s. South Korea, for its part, experienced one of its most politically contentious periods in the post-War era, marked by a weak domestic political leadership and growing discontent with the United States. The establishment of a diplomatic relationship between Canada and Korea would likely not have happened without Korean insistence, especially given Canada’s European orientation at the time. In the years to come,
507 “Letter from the Office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador Soo Young Lee,” Nov 5, 1962, Diplomatic Relations with Canada 722.2CN, Reg#611, Film C-0003, File 27, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives.
508 Alice Hoffenberg Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 267.
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Korea’s rapid economic transformation in the 1960s under the Park Chung-Hee regime would come as a great surprise to civil servants in Ottawa, propelling great changes in immigration and trade. The establishment of diplomatic relations signaled an important departure from a triangular relationship that involved the United States towards a more autonomous and intimate bilateral relationship between Ottawa and Seoul.
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CHAPTER 4
SHIFTING PARADIGMS OF THE COLD WAR ALLIANCE
“Canada, both as a country bordering the Pacific and as a middle power committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes, the deterrence of aggression and the creation of an international order which would flow from these, has an interest in the development of a strong and prosperous South Korea with stable political institutions responsive to the needs of its population. This, we consider, would provide the surest guarantee against a recurrence of the events of 1950-53, and the best hope of an eventual unification of the country by peaceful and domestic means. For this reason, we shall continue to be interested in the major domestic political developments which appear to have long-term significance, and particularly in those aspects of the general economic development of the country which might have a direct bearing on the direction of Canadian policy in the fields of trade and aid.”
– Paul Martin Sr. (1966) 509
***
The 1960s was a turbulent decade in the Republic of Korea. A military coup on May 16, 1961 (commonly known as the 5.16 coup d’état), organized by General Park Chung Hee and his allies, overthrew the democratically elected government of President Yun Bo Seon. Among the six principles put forward by the Military Revolutionary Committee on the morning of the 16th, key priorities included revisiting and strengthening national mechanisms to fight communism, strengthening ties with the United States, eliminating political corruption, resolving the national state of poverty towards an autonomous economy and developing national capacity to prepare for Korean reunification.510 While this coup was allegedly led by General Chang Do-Young, the
509 “Background information: Republic of Korea,” Department of External Affairs, July 26 1966, 20-1-ROK, Ottawa, Library and Archives. 510 Byŏnghun An, Sajin'gwa hamkke ingnŭn pakchŏnghŭi taet'ongnyŏng 18nyŏn 6kaewŏrŭi kirok [President Park Chung Hee: Record of Eighteen Years and Six Months with Photos], (Seoul: Giparang, 2012), 24-26.
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ROK Army Chief of Staff, Park Chung Hee was the real force behind it and Chang was soon arrested and stripped of his power in July 1961. The coup installed a Supreme Council for National Reconstruction with Park Chung Hee as its Chairman.511 This chapter focuses on South Korea’s economic and political transformations under Park in the 1960s and the implications for Korea’s recovery in Canadian-Korean relations. Specifically, it argues that shifting dynamics of the Cold War in Asia, namely the Vietnam War and the ROK-Japan rapprochement, coupled with domestic economic developments in Korea, elevated South Korea’s strategic importance for Ottawa.
THE RISE OF PARK CHUNG HEE
The Park Chung Hee era has long been a subject of great controversy, marked by exceptional economic transformation in South Korea, suppression of democracy and civil rights under military rule, as well as changing dynamics of South Korean external relations, in addition to Park’s own personality and legacy. It is impossible to understand South Korea’s rapid transformation in the 1960s without examining Park and his key policies, and consequently, the Canadian perspective and attitude towards the Park regime. Park Chung Hee’s popular legacy is one of a great nationalist, a leader who transformed a war-torn country into a highly industrialized one. Yet, it is equally important to remember that Park was actually one of the collaborators under the Japanese colonial era and was not fervently anti-Japanese in the way that Syngman Rhee once had been.
Called “Takagi Masao” during the colonial period, Park received a Japanese education in his youth and remained fascinated by the Japanese military and its values. Park also spent two years at the Manchurian Xinjing Officers School as part of training for the Manchukuo army. He graduated as one of the top students in his class and spent the last two years of schooling at the Japanese Military Academy in Zama as part of a Manchukuo ryuggakuseo (11th) class. Park valued the spirit of discipline, leadership and loyalty imparted by the Japanese and developed his
511 IBID.
145 attention to detail, precision and decisiveness through his military training.512 He was also influenced by the ideas of the Meiji Restoration and incorporated ideas of “rich nation, strong army” which would become a guiding principle later in his political career. Some of the key characteristics of the Meiji era, such as the rise of a modernizing elite, the dissolution of power bases and bringing the military and industrial production under the rule of the state, all became important pillars of Park’s governing style.513 Park’s views would have important implications later for South Korea’s historic rapprochement with Japan.
There was also growing discontent between the Park regime and the U.S. administration in Washington. Under the façade of a firm partnership during the Cold War, this decade saw growing disenchantment and disagreements between the United States and South Korea. To begin with, Park’s 5.16 coup was never endorsed by the United States. The U.N. Commander C.B. Magruder in Seoul issued a statement on the morning of May 16th, urging everyone to support the legitimate government led by Prime Minister Chang Myon, a message soon echoed by Marshall Green, the American Ambassador in South Korea. When it was found that Chang Myon had fled Seoul, Magruder and Green visited President Yun to suppress the coup – to which the President replied that he had no control of the Army and it was not feasible without American troops.514 In Washington, President J. F. Kennedy’s administration disapproved of this violent transfer of power. In the face of declining American aid, a crumbling economy and rising threats from North Korea, Park focused on developing South Korea’s economic base as the best “self-defense” mechanism against the spread of communism. Under Park, South Korea also embarked on a major search for new partners and allies – both because Park’s export-driven industrialization required new markets and because of the competition for international diplomatic recognition vis-à-vis North Korea. 515 Over the course of the 1960s, both Korean governments across the 38th parallel fought hard to be recognized as the sole legitimate government on the Korean peninsula, and new diplomatic relationships, memberships on
512 Young Jak Kim, “Park Chung Hee’s Governing Ideas: Impact on National Consciousness and Identity,” in Re-assessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 95-98. 513 IBID. 514 IBID.
515 See Park Chung Hee, Kukkawa hyŏngmyŏnggwa na, [The Nation, the Revolution and I], Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1963.
146 international bodies and new trade agreements were all seen as important moments of victory in expanding spheres of influence.
CANADIAN VIEWS ON PARK CHUNG HEE
The establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and South Korea in 1963 did not result in an immediate change in Canadian policy on Korea, as Japan still occupied Canada’s attention in the Asia-Pacific region. Canadian assessment of Park Chung Hee only appeared by 1965, at least in official DEA files, and mostly through the dispatches from the Canadian Embassy in Japan. R. P. Bower, who served as Canadian ambassador to Japan, was accredited to serve concurrently as the ambassador to Korea as of Nov 11, 1964. Ottawa’s attitude towards the Park regime and the Korean situation began to shift by early 1965. An internal assessment from the Department of External Affairs on February 29, 1965 underlined: “Although the Park regime is far from perfect in Western eyes, it is probably the best possible under the circumstances.”516 Dr. Schofield remained in close contact with the DEA over the course of the 1960s. In a letter to the Tokyo Embassy in September 1966, K. Goldschlag, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, wrote:
Dr. Schofield told us that President Park remains in full control of the Government and has by no means become a figurehead as yet. His greater experience in office has enabled him to be more relaxed personally and more liberal in his rule. Particularly important, as he is yet untouched by the corruption which is prevalent within the Korean government, and even the opposition is willing to admit this.517
Schofield also informed the DEA’s Far Eastern division that “a certain amount of political terrorism” had already taken place, and “democracy is too new for these aberrations to have been rooted out as yet or for there to be any real give and take between Government and
516 Department of External Affairs, “Confidential Memo: Suggested Visit by the South Korean Minister,” February 29, 1965, ROK 20-1-1, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, Accessed 10 June 2015.
517 Library and Archives Canada. “KOREA: Discussion with Dr. Schofield,” Letter to Tokyo Embassy, From K. Goldschlag, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sept 7, 1966, 20-ROK-1-4 “Political Affairs – Internal Policy – South Korea 1963-1967”
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Opposition.”518 Noting that Park’s election victory was “inevitable,” due to the opposition’s lack of unity, he also claimed that the Vietnam War had been a “great blessing” to the Korean economy.519 Moreover, according to the assessment made by the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, those involved in the election in 1967 held a rather favourable view of Park, noting that he had “clearly grown in political stature under the burdens of his office…” and that over the past four years, he had “quietly and deliberately strengthened his position as leader and earned a measure of respect if not of personal popularity.”520 It appears that Park Chung Hee had a fairly productive relationship with Dr. Schofield, at least judging from their regular communication.
Figure 14: President Park Chung-Hee’s Letter to Dr. Schofield (May 29, 1967)
Source: Presidential Archives of the Republic of Korea
518 IBID. 519 IBID. 520 Library and Archives Canada. “Korea: The Political Scene,” From the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Feb 17, 1967. 20-ROK-1-4, “Political Affairs – Internal Policy – South Korea 1963-1967.”
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VIETNAM & THE COLD WAR ALLIANCE As Schofield correctly pointed out, the Vietnam War brought great changes to South Korea’s outlook on the world. Before proceeding to the internal workings of the Park regime, it is useful to first examine the broader international context of the Cold War in Asia. Throughout the Cold War, Asia remained an important theatre, including the change in the assumed "special relationship" between the United States and China521, the experience of the Korean War, and the prolonged and costly experience of the Vietnam War. Although it is true that the Canadian foreign policy outlook was mostly oriented towards Europe throughout the Cold War, Asia nevertheless remained as an important hotspot in the minds of Canadian policymakers as well. South Korea’s enthusiastic participation in the Vietnam War, as well as corresponding political and economic gains, stood in sharp contrast to the Canadian approach and attitude. Unlike Park, Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson saw limits to American power and resources in Vietnam. While it is true that Canada undoubtedly positioned itself in the Western camp, Canadian policy in Asia was different than that of American policy. Having seen the expansion of American efforts in the Korean War, Pearson was also wary of waging wars abroad with no clear exit plan. Canada’s involvement in Indochina began with the International Commission on Supervision and Control in 1954 and the country kept its distance, aside from some 20,000 to 30,000 Canadians who served in the American Armed forces during the Vietnam War.522 Domestically, there were strong voices of anti-war and anti-American protests, especially because advancement in communications technology made it easier for average Canadians to follow developments like air bombings in Vietnam. Mitchell Sharp, Minister of External Affairs under Prime Ministers Pearson and Trudeau, later reflected: “…The general feeling in the circles which I moved in the civil service and in the public service was that the Americans had made a mistake.”523 Hence, while Pearson fully understood that South Vietnam became a symbol of American credibility in the Cold War, he remained skeptical of the choice of
521 For a very good overview of the evolution of Sino-American relationship, see Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. 522 Bothwell, Alliance & Illusion, 195 & 213. 523 Ibid, 213-214.
149 time and place.524 Pearson’s speech at Temple University in Philadelphia in April 1965, where he praised American peacekeeping efforts in Vietnam but also called for a pause in American air bombing, was met with scorn. “You pissed on my rug,” Johnson snapped at Pearson when they met for a retreat at Camp David.525 While Pearson’s Temple Speech did little to damage
Canadian-American relations526, it provides a vivid illustration of difference in attitude between Canada and South Korea with regards to the American war in Vietnam.
In hindsight, the Canadian decision to not participate more actively in the Vietnam War seems to have been a sound decision. The Vietnam War marked one of the longest and most polarizing wars in the history of American foreign relations, spanning over three decades, costing billions of dollars and causing devastating civilian casualties. "We find genuine tragedy,” said Karl Jaspers on Vietnam War, “...only in that destruction which does not prematurely cut short development and success, but which, instead, grows out of success itself." 527 In fact, the “tragedy” of American involvement in Vietnam has been a subject of immense scholarly attention, encompassing the origins, escalation and eventual withdrawal.528 Scholars remain divided on the causes of American involvement in Vietnam; some have also argued that the American policymakers were "trapped by success" and did not fully realize the limits of the new American imperialism.529 Others have argued that rather than "getting stuck" because of the lack of foresight, the United States intentionally chose war and it was the need to prove American infallibility that ultimately led to the America's longest war.530 The containment policy and the
524 Robert Bothwell, Penguin History of Canada, 416-417. 525 IBID. 526 Robert Bothwell, “Eyes West: Canada and the Cold War in Asia,” in Greg Donaghy, Canada and the Early Cold War 1943-1957, (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), 60. 527 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1959), Preface. 528 David Anderson, “The Vietnam War,” in A Companion to American Foreign Relations, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 310.
529 David Anderson, Trapped by Success: the Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991; Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
530 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: the Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1999; George C. Herring, America's Longest War: the United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, New York : Wiley, 1979.
150 fear of “losing” Vietnam certainly remained at the core of this devastating warfare. Robert Schulzinger, Professor of History and Director of the International Affairs Program at the University of Colorado at Boulder, put it aptly when he said: “From the beginning, the United States fought in Vietnam to influence others’ opinions of what the United States would do elsewhere.”531
Despite the tragic consequences of the Vietnam War, the experience was not entirely negative for South Korea’s political and strategic interests. It was also something that President Park intentionally sought to bargain with the United States under careful strategic calculations. In his state visit to Washington DC in November 1961, Park told President John F. Kennedy that South Korea was ready to dispatch troops to South Vietnam on request. But at this point, President Kennedy simply said he would keep him posted on further developments and that he hoped that the situation in Vietnam would not deteriorate further to require South Korean assistance.532 When the request for help was finally made from the Lyndon B. Johnson administration in 1965, Park hand-picked one of the best units of South Korea’s army, the Tiger Division, responsible for the defense of Seoul, to be the first combat force to Vietnam.533
Dispatching the Tiger Division to Vietnam at a time of high military tension with North Korea was an intentional political decision to show South Korea’s full-fledged support for the American leadership in the Cold War. From the beginning of his political rule in 1961, Park consciously built up an image as a Cold War warrior against the North, lest the opposition would accuse him of being a communist sympathizer. As the leader of the military junta, Park maintained that “the international communist conspiracy” was an imminent threat to the free world. The dispatch of combat troops to South Vietnam was an integral part of his effort to
531 Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 329. 532 See Department of State, “Memo for Conversation, Park and Kennedy,” November 14 and 15 1961, Box 128, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library as seen in Hong Kyu-dok, “The Diplomacy of Dispatching Troops to Vietnam and Security Syndrome: An Evaluation of South Korea’s Foreign Policy in the 1960s,” Korean Journal of International Relations 22, no.2 (1992): 27 and Dong-Ju Choi, “The Political Economy of Korea’s Involvement in the Second Indo-China War,” 93-94. 533 Research Institute for Defense and Military History, Fifty Years’ History of the Korean Armed Forces, (Seoul: Research Institute for Defense and Military History, 1998), 210.
151 demonstrate his ideological conviction.534 For Park, becoming an indispensable strategic ally for the U.S. in its Cold War campaigns would also discourage American political elites from collaborating with the anti-Park opposition forces within South Korea.535 With some 310,000 soldiers, South Korea was the second-largest troop committing country after the United States, and more than 5,000 South Koreans died during combat in Vietnam.536 In addition to heavy military commitment, South Korean businesses were also actively involved in supplying goods over the course of the Vietnam War.537
South Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War remains as a very controversial topic in Korean history. Some have argued that President Park essentially “sold off” South Korean soldiers as a bargaining chip for more U.S. aid and security assurance538, while others have argued that the war presented many opportunities for economic growth and real-combat experience for South Korean armed forces. An important dimension of the former view concerns the “tug of war” engaged between the Blue House and the White House: having assumed power through force, Park faced a serious need to earn the trust of the United States. In fact, such views are found in American politicians as well, as illustrated when one U.S. Senator once called South Korean military troops fighting in South Vietnam “mercenaries.”539 This kind of characterization assumes that ROK forces were victims of American imperialism in Asia and that South Korea gave in to American pressure and “sold its blood for money,” with very little agency. While it is true that the soldiers were paid handsome wages by the American government, it must be remembered that South Korea’s decision to engage in Vietnam was intentionally made by
534 Kyu-dŏk Hong, “Unequal Partners: ROK-US Relations during the Vietnam War,”Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1991. 535 Kim and Vogel eds, The Park Chung Hee Era, 404. 536 Frank Baldwin, "America's Rented Troops: South Koreans in Vietnam," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (Oct-Dec 1975), 36. 537 Glenn Baek, “A Perspective on Korea’s Involvement in Vietnam War,” Asan Issue Briefs, Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies (2013) http://en.asaninst.org/contents/issue-brief-no-53-a-perspective-on- koreas-participation-in-the-vietnam-war/ Accessed on April 12, 2017.
538 Honggu Han, “Dispatch to Vietnam War and the Road for National Development,” Han, Honggu. “Dispatch to Vietnam War and the Road for National Development,” in Byeong-Chun Lee ed. Kaebal tokchaewa pakchŏnghŭi shidae, [The Park Chung Hee Era and Development Dictatorship] (Seoul: Changbi, 2003), 287-309, passim. 539 U.S. Senate, “United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,” Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, (Washington DC, 19970), 1566-1568.
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President Park himself, rather than an acquiescence to American pressure as some have suggested. From 1965, when the ROK forces were formally dispatched to Vietnam War, the Johnson administration started praising the Park regime for exceptional political leadership and reduced its involvement in domestic South Korean affairs.540 Moreover, South Korean war veterans who served in the Vietnam War have also spoken out in more recent history, arguing that they were genuinely interested in earning wages abroad and that the experience had a tremendous effect on modernizing the South Korean army and economy. 541
The Canadian Embassy in Tokyo was closely monitoring South Korea’s engagement in Vietnam. Bower noted in 1966 that the U.S. procurement for the war in Vietnam was “the single most important factor” affecting South Korean foreign relations. The American government had established a procurement agency in Korea, for both military and non-military goods such as cement, clothing and shoes. Bower emphasized that through these deals, Korean businesses were “consolidating and learning from experience.”542 Once it was announced that South Korea would participate in the Vietnam War, Park sought to maximize economic benefits from the United States. When Park came into power in 1961, nearly 3 per cent of South Korea’s annual imports came from American aid, which added up to 12 per cent of its gross national product. From a peak of USD $230 million in U.S. aid in the 1959-1963 period, aid decreased to USD $110 million in the 1964-68 period. This was partly a result of changing political priorities in the domestic realm of the United States, but the reduction also propelled Park to pursue a quick settlement with Japan for diplomatic normalization and to negotiate the details of reparation funds.543 As the U.S. aid was on decline, Park moved quickly to secure an export market for
540Also see, Kyu-dŏk Hong. “P'abyŏng oegyo-wa Anbo Sindŭrom: 60 nyŏndae Han'guk oegyo Chŏngch'aegŭi P'yŏng-ga,” [The Diplomacy of Dispatching Troops to Vietnam and Security Syndrome: An Evaluation of South Korea’s Foreign Policy in the 1960s], kukche chŏngch’I nonch’ong, [Korean Journal of International Relations] 22, no.2 (1992).
541 Glenn Baek, “A Perspective on Korea’s Involvement in Vietnam War,” Asan Issue Briefs, Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies (2013) http://en.asaninst.org/contents/issue-brief-no-53-a-perspective-on- koreas-participation-in-the-vietnam-war/ Accessed on April 12, 2017.
542 “From R. P. Bower to Under-secretary of state for external affairs -- Farewell visit to Korea,” April 28, 1966 (20-1-2-ROK FILE), Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 543 Ibid, 408.
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South Korean goods and services in Vietnam, while also showing fervent support for American efforts in Vietnam in non-military spheres as well.
From 1965 when the South Korean troops were dispatched to Vietnam, U.S. military assistance to South Korea increased to 7.2 per cent of the South Korean GNP (compared to 4.6 percent the previous year). 544 The Vietnam War also brought windfall payments for troops, procurement and various other civilian contracts.545 Of particular significance were merchandise exports to Vietnam which reached a peak of nearly USD$14 million in 1966. Most of the war- related dollar earnings came from “sales to the US forces” and offshore procurement for the U.S. forces, which included payments to the South Korean contractors in Vietnam and costs of maintaining the ROK troops in Vietnam.546 Whatever the true motives were, Park’s decision to send the South Korean troops to Vietnam had tremendous economic benefit for the South Korean economy, most notably in pushing the South Korean industrialization process.
PARK’S ECONOMIC POLICIES & SOUTH KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION
To fully appreciate the Canadian views on the Park regime, it is useful to step back and examine some of the key policies undertaken by the president himself between the 5.16 coup and the mid-1960s. A key mantra of state intervention in Korea focused on “Jarip Gyeongje” (autonomous economy) because dependence on foreign aid and investment created a vicious cycle of poverty in South Korea, what Oh Wŏnch'ŏl, Park’s chief economic advisor, called “a
544 While estimates vary slightly, scholars generally agree that the U.S. government spent about USD $970 million during the 1965-70 period as a financial support for South Korean troops dispatched to South Vietnam. Furthermore, when procurement and other civilian contracts are added, the total South Korean earnings from the Vietnam War has been estimated at over a billion US dollars between 1965 and 1972. South Korea also reaped indirect benefit in gaining US assistance in securing foreign loans which reached $2.7 billion by 1971. Economic Planning Board, Economic Policy during the Developmental Decades: Twenty Years of the Economic Planning Board, 1982, 990. 545 Woo, 85. 546 Receipts from these sources doubled from 1966 to 1969. Kuznet has noted that according to testimony before the U.S. senate, military equipment originally valued at 3.4 billion dollars had been paid to finance Korean combat troops in Vietnam since 1965 (New York Times, March 29, 1970 p.1) and because of the difficulties of measurement in depreciation of equipment, the actual amount of Korea’s earnings during the Vietnam War would be much higher. (Kuznet, 35).
154 bankrupt economy.”547 In 1961, South Korea’s per capita income was only about USD $82, and lagged behind North Korea in terms of per capita income and industrial capacity.548 In addition to South Koreas’s fundamental lack of natural resources endowments, American aid was also declining around this period.549 In the early 1960s, South Korea did not have sufficient resources to execute its economic development policies, but was not willing to depend heavily on American investment. From the beginning, the economy and defence formed the central pillars of the Park regime.
The overwhelming dependence on the American aid was something that the Park administration was very much concerned about. In 1961, over 52 per cent of South Korea’s national budget relied upon the U.S. aid. President Park lamented that “Though nominally independent, the real worth of the Republic of Korea, from the statistical point of view, was only 48%...From 1956 to 1962, we have received, on average, some 280 million dollars of economic aid each year and some 220 million in military aid.”550 In 1960, 95.1 per cent of South Korea’s defence budget was also financed by the United States, a figure which would eventually see a reduction to 16 per cent in 1970.551 Because much of the American aid was also directed towards the defence budget, there was very little regard for the awful state of poverty seen in the lives of average Koreans. A key challenge facing South Korea was that American aid was declining rapidly from 1959 onwards. The ratio of import versus export for South Korea in 1960 was roughly at 10:1, and much of its imports consisted of agricultural goods such as wheat, barley, and pulp and paper, as well as oil and cement, which had direct consequences for the quality of living for average Koreans.552 To tackle such heavy dependence on foreign capital and aid, the
547 Wŏnch'ŏl Oh, Pulgurŭi tojŏn han'gangŭi kijŏk: pakchŏnghŭinŭn ŏttŏk'e kyŏngjeganggung mandŭrŏnna [An Invincible Challenge and the Miracle of Han River: How Park Chung Hee Made an Economic Powerhorse], (Seoul: Tongsŏmunhwasa, 2006), 55-56. 548 Charles Harvie and Hyun-Hoon Lee, Korea’s Economic Miracle: Fading or Reviving? (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 19. 549 IBID. 550 Park Chung Hee, Gukgawa Hyeokmyunggwa Na, [The Country, the Revolution and I], (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1963), 172-173. 551 Ibid, 57. 552 Wŏnch'ŏl Oh, 56.
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Park regime believed that an “upgrading” of the industrial structure was necessary to fundamentally resolve the balance of payment problem.553
With the installation of the Park regime, economic growth became a central preoccupation for the South Korean government, with its best brains deployed towards economic planning and execution.554 To reduce dependency on the American aid, South Korea turned to other forms of foreign loans, and the government decided to back the private sector borrowing since domestic firms lacked the international credibility to raise capital on their own.555 Over a remarkably short period, the Park regime implemented a wide range of policies which essentially promoted state-led and export-oriented industrialization.556 Rooted in economic nationalism, new policies included preferential allocation of subsidized credits, exemption of tariffs on raw materials, intermediate goods and capital goods, as well as a variety of tax incentives, license privileges, technological aid, and infrastructural benefits like industrial complexes.557 Between 1965 and 1986, the South Korean economy showed exceptional growth, with an annual per capital GNP growth of 6.7 per cent, compared to 2.9 per cent for the developing countries as a whole. Korea’s manufacturing growth rate between 1965 and 1980 was at 18.7 per cent compared to 13.2 per cent for Singapore, 9.6 per cent for Brazil, 9.5 per cent for China and 4.3 per cent for India.558 The sustained growth in per capita real output over three decades can be seen as a result of the export-oriented industrialization strategy in the 1960s, according to the Korea Development Institute report.559 While South Korea initially followed import substitution
553 Also see Economic Planning Board, Gaebal Nyondaeui Gyong-je Jonggcheck, [Economic Policy in the Developmental Period], Seoul: EPB, 1989. 554 Woo, 116. 555 Kim Chung-Yum, From Despair to Hope: Economic Policymaking in Korea, 1945-1979, (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2011), introduction. 556 Haeran Lim, Korea’s Growth and Industrial Transformation,(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 42- 60, passim; Kwang Suk Kim and Sung Duk Hong, Accounting for Rapid Economic Growth in Korea, 1963-1995, (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1997), 4-10.
557 Kyŏngje Ch'ammo Ponbu [Economic Planning Board]. Kaebaryŏndaeŭi Kyŏngjejŏngch'aek - Kyŏngjegihoegwŏn 20 Nyŏnsa, [Economic Policy during the Developmental Decades: Twenty Years of the Economic Planning Board], (Seoul: Miraesa, 1982), 40. 558 Ha-Joon Chang, The East Asian Development Experience: The Miracle, the Crisis and the Future, (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2006), 63. 559 Kwang Suk Kim and Sung Duk Hong, 6.
156 in non-durable consumer goods, the Park regime quickly switched to an export-oriented industrialization strategy in 1962-63, accompanied by the exchange rate reform of 1964-65.560 The inward-looking “easy import substitution” strategy was seen to be inadequate because of distortions imposed by excessive state intervention in various markets.561
In fact, there was a very strong correlation between the rapid growth of the Korean economy following the shift towards an export-led industrialization strategy. South Korea’s merchandise exports, which stagnated in the 1950s, began to increase rapidly from the early 1960s. The exports totaled only USD $55 million, or 2 per cent of GNP in 1962, but increased to USD $15.1 billion, or 23 per cent of GNP, in 1979. This meant an average annual increase of 39 per cent in exports. 562 The rapid growth of exports was also a result of a major diversification of export products. Prior to 1962, South Korea exported primary products such as tungsten, iron ore, fish, raw silk, and coal, but after 1962, South Korean exports also consisted of manufactured goods. In 1962, manufactured goods consisted of 27 per cent of South Korean exports but the figure increased to 90 per cent by 1979, encompassing products such as textile fabrics and products, home electronics, electronics parts, industrial electronics, ships and general machinery.563 By any international standard, South Korea achieved unprecedented industrialization over the course of two decades, by encouraging private sector firms to exploit its comparative advantage in exports.564
To what extent was the South Korean political leadership responsible for these economic plans? Memoirs by Park’s top aides, such as Kim Chung-Yum who served as Minister of Commerce and Industry, Minister of Finance, and later as Park Chung Hee’s Chief of Staff from
560 IBID. Some scholars have argued that the Park regime frequently engaged in a trial-and-error approach to flesh out their economic planning and various five year plans should be seen as a framework subject to interpretation rather than a definitive guide. For more on this subject, see Jong-Chan Rhee, The State and Industry in South Korea: The Limits of the Authoritarian State, London: Routledge, 1994. 561 Chang, Op.Cit, 64. 562 IBID. 563 Bank of Korea, National Income Accounts, 1984, as seen in Kwang Suk Kim and Sung Duk Hong, 7. 564 Dong-se Cha, Kwang Suk Kim and Dwight H. Perkins eds., The Korean Economy 1945-1995: Performance and Vision for the 21st century. (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1997), 347.
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1969 to 1978, or Oh Wonchul, who essentially wrote the Five Year Plans, shed some light into the internal workings of the Park regime. While they bring their own biases, “big push partnerships” where the state shared the investment risks of the private sector and offered performance-based rewards played central roles in encouraging innovation and growth.565 Many of Park’s state-led policies carried a considerable degree of risk, especially because of the mantra of the free market economy and trade liberalization that dominated the field of development economics during this period.566 Based on the First Five-Year Plan (1962-66), the state took charge of investment for all aspects of manufacturing industries.567 South Korea would earn foreign currency by exporting primary products and would undertake massive investment projects in basic industries such as steel and machinery.568 A key focus in the First Five Year Plan was to switch from agricultural productions to manufacturing industries, such as textiles, using technological advancement, cheap labour, and greater efficiency.569 There was a strong underlying assumption that “industrial deepening” was critical for achieving economic self-
565 Kim Chung-Yum, From Despair to Hope: Economic Policymaking in Korea, 1945-1979, (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2011), introduction. 566 See Ha-Joon Chang, “The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1993, 17, 131-157; Stephen Haggard, Byoung-Kook Kim and Chung-In Moon, “The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-66,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 50, No. 4 (Nov 1991), 850-873. 567 National plans were an important part of development discourse during this period. In the mid-1960s, Albert Waterson wrote in his widely used textbook, Development Planning: “Today, the national plan appears to have joined the national anthem and the national flag as a symbol of sovereignty and modernity. But it is only within the last decade…that the diffusion of development planning became world- wide. Planning in the Third World became “both inevitable and necessary.” In the 1950s, most developing countries advocated import-substitution industrialization strategy (ISI) – the manufacture at home of what had been imported before. Economists believed that expanding the domestic industrial base was the shortest route to the development. An export-oriented industrialization strategy entails stimulating domestic industrial production by meeting external demands. In practice, the two had to go hand in hand. Park’s five-year plan was by no means the first economic plan in South Korea’s history. Rhee’s economic advisers had formulated a three-year plan (1960-62), but his government was overthrown by the April Student Revolution before it was implemented. Similarly, the Chang Myon regime had a five year plan (1962-66), but that government was overthrown by the military before it could even be started. (John Lie, Han Unbound, 55). 568 In the 1950s, an American economic advisory team to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) also prescribed a similar strategy. This group argued for a program of infrastructure investment and import-substitution that would make Korea “self-sufficient” in five years, to be financed by large infusions of development assistance and greatly expanded primary exports. 569 Anne O. Krueger, The Developmental Role of the Foreign Sector and Aid, op.cit.
158 reliance.570 The Park regime also made intentional efforts to reduce reliance on U.S. aid. While this turn for a greater self-efficiency was prompted by the American desire to reduce their spending on Korean aid and defence, Park also realized that reducing American aid was fundamentally necessary for South Korea’s balance of payments. Subsequently, South Korea contracted its first loan with the World Bank in 1962 and signed its first agreement with the IMF in 1965. Park’s willingness to cooperate with the World Bank served his political and economic agendas: domestically, it provided a powerful and persuasive justification to the Korean public for the existence of an authoritative government devoted to economic development.”571
Despite Ottawa’s generally positive view on the Park regime, the relationship between Canada and South Korea remained largely insignificant for the first half of the 1960s. It was South Korea which proposed the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, proposed a bilateral trade agreement on a most-favoured nation basis as early as 1962, expressed interest in instituting a large-scale movement of South Korean nationals to Canada, and asked for more Canadian aid under the Colombo Plan. The Department of External Affairs memo concluded that “Canada has in practice been less than forthcoming in its relations with South Korea; consequently South Korea has some reason for feeling that it is being deliberately ignored by Canada.”572 The DEA also recognized that the government of South Korea was “in considerable need of Canadian help, both moral and physical” and despite its instability, the South Korean government is “firmly committed to the West and would certainly appreciate Canadian moral help and guidance, something now afforded almost entirely by the United States.” 573
570 Ultimately, the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan performed dismally and the promised takeoff of investment never materialized. The only sign of progress that emerged from the two years of military junta rule was the unforeseen export increase in the industry sector. (See Byung-Kook Kim, “The Leviathan: Economic Bureaucracy under Park,” The Park Chung Hee Era, 210.) 571 Eric Toussaint, “South Korea: The Miracle Unmasked,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 41, No. 39, (Sept-Oct 2006), 4211-4219. 572 IBID. 573 IBID.
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South Korea’s Rapprochement with Japan
South Korea also faced another key challenge at the regional level, namely reconciling its historic antagonism and troubled past with Japan. The 1965 normalization treaty with Japan was arguably one of the most significant moments in the political history of South Korea, considering how the two neighbouring countries did not have relations for 20 years, and that the ROK government had resisted all efforts by the U.S. to form an ROK-Japan alliance as the key to the post-War and Cold War order in East Asia. While there had been earlier efforts at reconciliation by the Rhee government, lack of political leadership and persistent colonial memory served as a stumbling block in the normalization process. When Park came into power in 1961, Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda assured him that normalization would only be a matter of time.574 Park saw it as his mission to deliver South Korea from the cycle of poverty, and in light of the reduced aid from the U.S., he saw uncapped opportunity in the Japanese market. By 1963, South Korea owed USD $130 million in debt to Japan and its exports to Japan accounted for only 16 per cent of its imports. The normalization of relations with Japan in late 1965 had immediate consequences: Japanese reparations of $500 million and the inflow of private investment and technology from Japan. The Park regime also emerged stronger in terms of managing domestic political opposition.575
The Park regime calculated that a quick normalization would cover the trade deficit and debt and also guarantee financial inflow for the Five Year Plan.576 In Seoul, a throng of demonstrators gathered to oppose any attempt to restore relations with, and become economically dependent upon, Japan. Anti-Park forces called Park a “national traitor” who was selling out Korea for quick financial gains. In turn, these street demonstrations gave rise to the growth of repressive policies in the Park regime. While negotiations stalled, President Johnson stressed that he considered ROK-Japan normalization as a “top priority” for his presidency. This statement moved the American Embassy to secure some deals which resulted in a proposal to
574 Woo, 85. 575 Edward S. Mason, Mahn Je Kim, Dwight H. Perkins et al. Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea 1945-1975: The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 48. 576 IBID.
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Park. It contained the “necessary backbone” to conclude the deal, including a package of economic incentives, open partisanship with the governing party and even threats to anti-Park forces. Ultimately, against many odds, on June 22, 1965, the normalization went ahead, which brought immediate financial benefits, including lump-sum grants, preferential loans and reparations for colonial wrongdoings which amounted to some USD $800 million, along with a new market access. 577
With the Vietnam War and normalization with Japan in the background, by the time H.O. Moran was accredited as Canada’s ambassador to South Korea in the summer of 1966, there was a clear mark of departure in how the South Korean file was perceived in Ottawa. Moran arrived in East Asia with considerable experience in aid and development issues, based on his work in the External Aid Office, and a fairly well-developed working relationship with Paul Martin Sr. Moran later recalled that the formal presentation of credentials in the Blue House was “a brief and dignified ceremony made more impressive by a well drilled guard of honour consisting of units from the army, navy, air force and marines plus a 35-piece military band which distinguished itself with its playing of ‘O, Canada!’” President Park took great interest in Moran’s military background in the Second World War, and Moran found that Park had characteristics so frequently found in firm and tough-minded rulers—short and slight, soft spoken and almost shy in manner.578
Bower also pointed out that Seoul’s normalization of relations with Japan were of “paramount importance” for South Korean morale. The rapprochement with Japan not only “opened the door to closer relationships on the business level and provided benefits to Korea from the terms of settlement,” but also “reduced the Korean isolation and brought the nation into the orbit of Far Eastern consultations and decisions.” 579 Though it was still difficult to “distinguish a Korean from a Japanese on the street,” Bower noted that the “Korean people have a spontaneous charm which is immediately apparent,” and there was “none of the artificiality
577 See Chae-Jin Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. 578 A memo from H.O. Moran in the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Aug 14, 1966 – 20-ROK-1-6), LAC. 579 R.P.Bower, “Confidential Memo on the Farewell Visit to Korea,” April 28, 1966, RG25, 20-1-1-ROK, LAC.
161 which characterizes so much of Japanese life.”580 Furthermore, Bower argued that covering Korea from an office in Tokyo “can never be completely satisfactory…the Koreans may accept it, but they don’t like it. Nor is it possible for us to get the maximum out of association.”581 In calling for the opening of a separate mission in Seoul, Bower concluded that Korea “is a delightful and deserving country in need of all the help and understanding it can get.”582
THE COLOMBO PLAN IN THE 1960s
Canada’s humanitarian engagements with South Korea continued throughout the 1960s, mostly under the Colombo Plan. Canada, as a member of the Commonwealth, was a founding member of the Colombo Plan, as expected. What was surprising was the persistent effort made by South Korea to become a member of the Colombo Plan as of August 1957. South Korean diplomats approached the British ambassador to Korea, H. J. Evans, asking for help and the U.S. State Department vouched that the Colombo Plan membership would “make the Koreans feel that they were part of the members of the free world club.”583 Nevertheless, there were strong oppositions from both the Western countries and Asian countries like Ceylon, because South Korea was technically not located in Southeast Asia and could not realistically pose as a donor country the way Japan had done. Moreover, there were fears that approving South Korean membership would be like opening up the Pandora’s box for new applications from China, as well as countries in the Middle East and Latin America, therefore setting an undesirable precedent.584 Yet, with support from the Canadian High Commission and the U.S. Embassy in Ceylon, coupled with South Korean diplomatic missions to Asian capitals for support, South Korea eventually became a member of the Colombo Plan in 1963.585
580 IBID. 581 IBID. 582 IBID.
583 Ademola Adeleke, Ph.D. Dissertation, op.cit, 287. 584 Ibid, 189. 585 The Thirteenth Annual Report of the Consultative Committtee of the Colombo Plan (London, November 1964) provided a very acute analysis of economic developments in South Korea. In its detailed report, the Korea section concluded: “In 1963, emphasis was placed on investment in the industrial sector
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Under the Colombo Plan, official and unofficial Canadian aid to Korea assumed various characteristics, mostly in the form of technical education and dairy cattle aid projects. The total amount was very small – about $77,000 between 1964-66, for instance, which was used entirely to bring Korean students to Canada. Agricultural projects and development loans for technical assistance in the amount $1 million were also agreed upon over the course of the 1960s. At the Korean insistence, Canada also committed to a CDN $25 million subscription to the Asian Development Bank to finance projects in Korea.586 The missionary connection never completely disappeared. For instance, K. Goldschlag, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, noted that “Dr. Schofield is very much in favour of maximum Canadian aid to South Korea…As regards to the economics of the proposal, Dr. Schofield, whose career prior to his return to Korea was mainly as a professor at the Ontario Veterinary College, pointed out that the Korean government is undertaking a large and expensive dairy development program, which it will pursue with or without Canadian assistance.”587 Reflecting upon his decades of experience in Korea, Schofield made a proposal that a number of young Korean farmers should be brought to Canada to undertake on-the-job training on Canadian farms. Schofield made a compelling argument that a complete isolation for a time from the traditional approach to farming and the social pressure that village life involves might be the only way to develop a genuinely modern approach to farming in the minds of at least some young Korean farmers.588 In addition, training and experience in a Canadian environment would obviously be of considerable value to Korean
and infrastructure in accordance with the first Five Year Plan. In current prices, of a GNP of W366.0 billion in 1963, Gross Domestic fixed capital investment amounted to W50.7 billion or almost 14 percent of the total. Specifically, heavy investments were made in transportation, communications, electricity and manufacturing. Investment in manufacturing industry was attributable to the expansion of facilities in the private sector, including three cement plants, a nylon factory, and an oil refinery. All contributed significantly toward the strenthening of Korea’s industrial structure.” (Presented to Parliament by the Minister of Overseas Development by Command of Her Majesty, The Colombo Plan: Thirteenth Annual Report of the Consultative Committee, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, November 1964), 132.
586 “Discussion with Dr. Schofield,” Letter To Tokyo Embassy, From K. Goldschlag, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sept 7, 1966, 20-ROK-1-4 “Political Affairs – Internal Policy – South Korea 1963-1967”, LAC. 587 IBID. 588 Internal Memo, “Visit of Dr. Frank Schofield and Possible aid projects: South Korea,” July 13, 1966, Ottawa: Far Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs, 20-1-2-ROK, LAC.
163 farmers. Schofield stressed that South Korea also faced a serious shortage of technical training facilities, as well as an unemployment problem with its youth.589
Eventually, Schofield’s suggestions were taken up by the government of Ontario, which provided CDN $100,000 through an agricultural aid program to South Korea in the fall of 1967. Announced by External Affairs Minister Paul Martin and Ontario Agricultural Minister William Stewart, the program involved bringing 30 young Koreans to farms in Ontario for agricultural training.590 The Korean Ministry of Agriculture announced this new program with a great sense of enthusiasm on Oct 13, 1967. The Korean trainees would receive technical training at a school in Central Ontario for two months as of November 1967 and then would be placed for a full year of training in Canadian farms across Ontario.591 However, despite the best intentions, the program itself turned out to be a failure, with the South Korean media reporting the exploitation of these trainees, who worked seven days a week with the wage of CAD $25 per month.592 The group of trainees included five future senior civil servants from the Korean Ministry of Agriculture, who most likely would have brought the experience of this program to the attention of Korean government.
Aside from the Colombo Plan initiatives, Canadian non-governmental aid programs to Korea continued actively throughout this period. For instance, torn nylons discarded by Canadian women were collected and sent to South Korean widows and children throughout the spring and summer of 1965.593 According to Paul Larkee, the supply and social assistant of the United Church Women’s Edmonton Presbyterian Board, about 2.5 tonnes of nylon (or 125,000 pairs of stockings) were made into a variety of goods by South Korean women working in homes or at factories. After the nylon was dyed or bleached, they were made into gloves, socks and many novelties and sold in South Korea, with the proceeds going directly to widows. These cottage
589 IBID. 590 “Government of Ontario Provides Agricultural Aid to South Korea,” Globe and Mail, Oct 30, 1967
591 “11 Wŏre kisulcha bangga nongŏp shilmu gyoyuk patke,” [Technical trainees to receive agricultural practical training in November] Maeilgyŏngje NAVER Digital News Archive. (http://newslibrary.naver.com), Oct 14, 1967. 592 “Kap'agyŏn yŏnsusaeng malssŏng” [Troubles caused by overseas trainees], Kyŏnghyang shinmun March 23, 1968. 593 “Old Nylons Give Work to Koreans,” Globe and Mail, June 17, 1965.
164 industries were started in 1950 by a Toronto Anglican Church missionary in South Korea, and by 1965, about 120 Albertan United Church groups participated in collecting and sending old nylons to Seoul.594 When South Korea suffered through one of the heaviest floods in July 1965 -- with over 150,000 people being displaced and 2,400 houses washed away, 4,000 homes destroyed, and 15,000 homes submerged -- it was the Canadian Red Cross that took the lead in relief efforts and immediately made $5,000 available and collected blankets and other emergency aid materials.595 These humanitarian efforts were important partly because of connections to church boards, which had originated well before the Korean War began, but also because of the voluntary and widespread nature of the efforts. They were reflective of the broader Canadian approach towards Korea since the 1950s, such as the adoption of orphans, food aid and clothing drives.
While it is difficult to find Korean government records about Korean reactions to Canadian aid, interesting perspectives can be found in popular Korean newspapers. Over the course of the 1960s, there was also active coverage of Korean orphans who benefitted from non- governmental aid. For instance, on March 21, 1963, Kyounghyang newspaper reported that about sixty orphans from the Korean War who barely finished elementary school received scholarships to proceed their studies, thanks to donations from the Holton church in Hamilton, Ontario. The parishioners had heard about these orphans through Mr. Hae-Hwan Oh, a medical doctor who was studying in Hamilton on exchange.596 Koreans who were on technical exchanges through the Colombo Plan also wrote about their experiences. Mr. Han-Hyeok Suh, who stayed for seven months in 1965 in Canada for agricultural training under the Colombo Plan, reported in detail about “the vast land mass, which is about 450 times the size of homeland,” and about the revised immigration policy in 1962 which “focused on educational qualifications and skills level, regardless of ethnic background or the colour of skin…” with “excellent support for finding employment and loan programs.”597 Another trainee from the Bank of Korea, Mr. Nam-Joon Jo,
594 IBID. 595 “Canadian Red Cross Gains Fame Through Floods,” The Globe and Mail, July 22, 1965. 596 “K'anadaŭi uŭiro chinhakkil yŏllyŏ,” [Canada’s Support Opens Door for Education,] Kyŏnghyang shinmun, March 21, 1963.
597 “ Yŏgwŏne mudŏon ŏnjŭng (sang) naega pogo nŭkkin haeoegyŏngje sŏhanhyŏng k'anada”, [Testimonials from Passport – Part I – Foreign Economy As I Witnessed It – Seo Han Hyeok from Canada], Maeil gyŏngje, Oct 29, 1966. NAVER Digital News Archive. (http://newslibrary.naver.com)
165 who completed agricultural training at the University of Manitoba in 1966, reported his amazement “at the peaceful border between the United States and Canada” after his visit to North Dakota, as he reflected upon the divided peninsula at home. Jo also lamented that despite the trade agreement reached between Canada and the Republic of Korea, Korean exports suffered from third-party contracts through Japan and the United States and hecalled for building a stronger base for direct exports. 598
EXPORT-LED INDUSTRIALIZATION & TURNING TO NEW MARKETS
In light of changing dynamics in Asia, what motivated South Korea to pay more attention to Canada? The answer rested on economics: market access and potential for exports. The Park regime and Korean policymakers believed that to become truly independent, the South Korean economy must have sufficient technological capability that would allow a reasonable living standard without a chronic balance-of-payments deficit. Hence, various Five-Year Plans and efforts of the Economic Planning Board focused on strengthening the Korean industrial structure, for an eventual shift towards heavy and chemical industries, as well as capital and manufacturing industries. 599 In doing so, South Korea sought to move away from its dependency on the United States and cultivate relationships with new allies and markets. State intervention and an expansionary macroeconomic policy resulted in spectacular economic growth at a remarkable speed in South Korea throughout the 1960s. What differentiated Korea from other developing countries was that the South Korean state was willing and able to withdraw support whenever performance lagged in the private sector. “Such state discipline,” economist Ha-Joon Chang wrote, “acted as a powerful incentive for the firms to enhance their performance and technological capabilities, especially when combined with the strategy of industrial upgrading.”600 Export-driven policy focused on labour-intensive industries -- using the abundant
598 “Yŏgwŏne mudŏon chŭngŏn naega pogo nŭkkin haeoe kyŏngje chung k'anada chonamjun,” Testimonials from Passport – Part II – Foreign Economy As I Witnessed It – Cho Nam Jun from Canada], Maeil gyŏngje, Oct 31, 1966. NAVER Digital News Archive. (http://newslibrary.naver.com) 599 Ibid. 600The practice of giving priority to certain industries identified as important originated in the very early years of Korean development, with the designation of cement, fertilizer, and oil refining in the first Five Year Plan (1962-66) as basic industries. In the second Five Year Plan (1967-1971), chemical steel and machinery were designated as priority sectors. And during the third and fourth Five Year Plan periods (1972-1981), especially through the HCI programme announced in 1973, non-ferrous metals,
166 and well-educated labour force in South Korea -- which also tackled the chronic unemployment problem faced in the Korean economy.601
The Park government chose several industries at a time as “priority” sectors and provided massive support to them, such as subsidized credits and foreign exchange, state investment funds, preferential tax treatments, and other measures such as import protection and entry restrictions. In return, they became subject to state controls on technology such as production methods and products, entry, capacity expansion and prices.602 These loans served as a key bargaining chip for the Park regime. No company could borrow on the international market without the state’s approval, thus giving enormous control to the Park regime for who would be eligible for these loans. Then, the government subsequently subsidized some of the loans, often at a negative interest rate vis-à-vis inflation. According to Ha-Joon Chang, the accumulation of research in the last few decades has made it clear that the state played an important role in Korea’s economic transformation in the 1960s.603 Chang argued that “attempts to play down the role of state in Korea are unconvincing, both on theoretical and empirical grounds.”604 In Chang’s words, the Korean policymakers regarded competition “as a means to achieve efficiency” rather than as an end in itself.605 South Korea’s annual per capita GNP growth remained steadily around 6-7 per cent between 1965 and 1986, with about an 18 per cent
shipbuilding, and electronics were added to the list of priority sectors. The practice continued in the fifth and the sixth Five Year Plan periods (1982-991) during which machinery, electronics, automobile, chemical, shipbuilding, and various high-tech industries (semiconductor, new materials and biotechnology) were designated as priority sectors. See Chang, 142- 148. 601 Sung-Hee Jwa, A New Paradigm for Korea’s Economic Development, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 5. 602 The most important tool of such policy was the use of “policy loans” (i.e. loans with subsidized interest rates and priorities in the credit rationing) which accounted for 57.9% of total bank loans between 1962 and 1965. (See Chang, 141). 603 It is important to note that this is largely an English language debate, since the very notion of a development state, arising during the Cold War, forced acknowledgement that capitalism was not entirely laissez-faire. 604 Ha-Joon Chang, “The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 1993, 17, 138. 605 Chang, 140; This view is exemplified in the 6th Five Year Plan, which states that “collusive behaviour should be allowed, and even encouraged, in promising industries, which need to increase R&D, improve quality, attain efficient production scale, and to declining industries which need to scale down their capacities.” (p.79)
167 manufacturing growth rate.606 Both employment and labour productivity increased strongly in the 1960s. 38 Capital formation and the share of capital formation in total output accelerated in 1963; exports doubled from 1963 to 1965, and almost doubled again from 1965 to 1967 and from 1967 to 1969.607 Less than a fifth of South Korea’s total exports were manufactured goods in 1957-59 but manufactured goods made up more than three-fifths of the total exports by 1969. South Korea’s strong performance in the 1960s is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that the decade was an era of global trade liberalization, but Park’s policies for the most part used protectionism and state-driven industrialization.608
As part of cultivating a more independent economy, the South Korean government placed a heavy emphasis on distancing itself from dependence on the United States throughout the 1960s and began its search for new partners. 609 Korea used international trade as an essential component of its development policy. Trade helped Korea to discover its comparative advantage and identify productive uses for capital. Imports allowed firms and individuals to coordinate economic activities from upstream to downstream and across different sectors, without having to produce everything domestically. Exports helped Korea to overcome the limits of its small domestic market and exploit scale economies. Trade also offered great learning opportunities and market tests for government policies and corporate strategies. 610
The 1960s also saw a clear outward expansion of South Korea’s trading relations with the outside world, which must also be seen in the broader Cold War context. While North Korea’s diplomatic relations used to be confined solely to other socialist states until the late 1950s, it began actively expanding economic and political ties with newly emerging nations of the Third
606 Most developing countries had the annual per capital GNP growth rate of 2.9% during this period. Manufacturing growth rate for Singapore was at 13.2%, Brazil at 9.5%, China at 7.4% and India at 4.3%. See Ha-Joon Chang, “The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 1993, Vol. 17, 131-157.
607 See P. W. Kuznets, “The Korean Take-Off,” Economic Growth Centre Discussion Paper No. 109, New Haven: Yale University, January 1971. http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp109.pdf 608 Kuznet notes that value added per worker in agriculture averaged 127 thousand won in 1968 while the figure for manufacturing was 340 thousand. (Ibid, 6) 609 Korea International Trade Association, History of Korean International Trade, Seoul: KOTRA, 2010. 610 Kim Chung-Yum, From Despair to Hope: Economic Policymaking in Korea, 1945-1979, (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2011), chapter 7.
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World from the 1960s onwards. Over the course of the 1960s, North Korea normalized relations with some two dozen new governments, mostly in Africa and the Middle East. Pyongyang also tried to use its new diplomatic stature to advance its agenda in the United Nations, advocating for DPRK participation in the General Assembly debates on the Korean question, an end to U.S. dominance in U.N. activities on the Korean peninsula and the removal of U.S. forces from South Korea. 611 North Korea also expanded trade and military exchanges with non-socialist Third
World countries, such as Indonesia, India, Burma, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, to name a few.612 In 1965, Kim Il Sung made a first visit outside the Soviet bloc since the founding of the DPRK at the tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference on Afro-Asian Solidarity in Indonesia.613 Kim gave a major speech in Jakarta, where he outlined the basic principles of Juche, called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, and vowed to strengthen the anti-imperialist movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It appeared as if Kim had suddenly emerged as a leader of the nonaligned countries of the Third World.614
President Park also no longer fully trusted the American government to defend South Korea from the North, and wanted to build an autonomous defence industry, but lacked resources to do so. Diversification of South Korea’s foreign relations, therefore, served the triple purposes of market access but also new allies, international recognition and solidifying political legitimacy. Until 1962, South Korea’s trading relations focused mostly on Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines (1961), Taiwan (1961), Thailand (1961) and Malaysia (1962). From 1963 onwards, South Korea’s trade policy extended to European and Latin American countries and resulted in trade agreements with countries such as France (1963), Brazil (1963), Italy (1965),
611 Although Latin America was mostly dominated by the United States, Che Guevara visited the DPRK twice in the early 1960s and years later, Che Guevera postage stamps were still for sale in Pyongyang. (See Charles Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, 143-145). 612 George Ginsburg and Roy U.T. Kim, Calendar of Diplomatic Affairs, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1945-1975 (Moorestown, NJ: Symposia Press, 1977), 71. In the Middle East, North Korea’s first diplomatic success was with the Nasser government of Egypt, to which the DPRK had given token financial assistance during the Suez Crisis. In 1961, North Korean delegation visited Egypt to discuss establishing consular relations, as well as in South Yemen, Morocco and Iraq. North Korea officially condemned Israeli actions in the Middle East as complicit with US imperialism, and sided with the Arab states against Israel in the 1967 war. 613 Indonesian president Sukarno had visited Pyongyang the previous year and he seemed to have been greatly impressed by North Korea’s self-reliance strategy and Kim’s leadership. (Armstrong, 145). 614 Charles Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, 145.
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West Germany (1965), Mexico (1966), Australia (1965) and Japan (1966). Canada fit into this pattern, as a Canadian-Korean trade agreement also came to fruition by the end of 1966.615
Canada certainly featured as a “friendly” country in the Park regime’s search for new partners, not just because of the Korean War involvement, but also because of the enduring legacy of the Korean missionaries. By 1962, President Park Chung Hee sent South Korean diplomats to knock on the doors of Ottawa and seek a closer trading relationship, albeit with no visible success.616 The civil servants in Ottawa followed Korea’s economic, diplomatic and political developments carefully, especially in light of continued South Korean pressure for a resident Canadian Ambassador in Seoul and Korea’s proposal for a bilateral trade agreement on a most-favoured nation basis.617 According to the accounts by the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, South Korean suggestion for a bilateral trade agreement on a most-favoured nation basis was rejected, as Canada was concerned about “being flooded with South Korean low-cost textiles.”618 In the early 1960s, Korea was seen as a sub-branch of the Tokyo embassy, a backwater in Canadian policy with the Canadian government’s attention fixed in Japan. It was, after all, hard enough for Canadians to grasp that Japan was no longer mainly a source for cheap curios, but a formidable industrial and financial power. But seeing Korea through the lens of an outdated, if benevolent, formula did have an impact on future decades of Canadian-Korean relations. South Korea in the early 1960s was still heavily reliant on external aid, and with 70 per cent of the national budget going towards defence and the containment of communism, Korea still needed help to support its population. These views are acutely illustrated in the report from the Canadian Ambassador to Japan, R. P. Bower (who was also cross-appointed to Korea), who
615 By the end of 1970s, South Korea reached trade agreements with 21 countries and received membership in 42 international organizations. See Yeon-Ho Lee, “1960 nyŏndae muyŏkchŏngch'aek“ [Trade Policy in the 1960s], Policy Analysis by the National Archives of the ROK, Oct 13, 2008 http://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=008830 616 For a very contemporary analysis on Park Chung Hee and his policies, see also: Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel Eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), introduction. 617 The Treaty would eventually be signed by December 1966, but Canadian reaction to the Korean proposal was lukewarm at best in the early 1960s.
618 “DEA Memo – Suggested visit by South Korean Foreign Minister, Feb 26, 1965,” ROK-20-1-20, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada.
170 noted that “…uneasy over recent international developments, the Koreans grasp at any symbol of moral and physical support from the West…”619 Bower continued, “With regards to Canada, Koreans are interested in promoting emigration, in increasing trade and in securing additional aid.”620 While the South Korean government was trying, Bower concluded that the progress to date had been disappointing.
The signing of first trade agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea on Dec 20, 1966 marked an important occasion, particularly considering how quickly South Korea turned from an aid recipient to a viable trading partner. South Korean Foreign Minister Tong Won Lee and Ambassador Sun Yup Paik met with External Affairs Minister Paul Martin and Trade and Commerce Minister Robert Winters at the Chateau Laurier in Ottawa for the signing, and the agreement focused specifically on goods of interest to Canada, such as wheat, barley, flour, softwood lumber, pulp and newsprint, asbestos and base minerals. At the ceremony, Tong Won Lee made a number of remarks about the history of Korean-Canadian relations, emphasizing the positive role of Canadian missionaries in Korea.621 South Korea agreed to place voluntary restraints on its exports to Canada if they threatened domestic industries in the Canadian market. 622 By 1970, Canadian exports to Korea reached CDN $18.8 million of goods, mainly in asbestos, wheat, sulphur and pulp. Canadian imports from Korea also increased to CDN $15.8 million and included sweaters, wigs, footwear, cotton and synthetic textiles.623 The Park government saw the expansion of trade relations as important in winning legitimacy for South Korea’s rivalry with the North, and it sought to continue the discussion on establishing a resident Canadian mission in Seoul.624
619 “Letter No. 561 from the Canadian Ambassador, Tokyo, Japan dated Nov 17, 1964” ROK-20-1-20, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 620 IBID. 621 Department of External Affairs, “Visit of Dr. Tong Won Lee, Foreign Minister of the ROK to Canada,” Dec 19-21, 1966, RG25, 20-1-2-ROK, Ottawa: Library and Archives of Canada. 622 “South Korea and Canada Sign Trade Accords,” The Globe and Mail, Dec 21, 1966. 623 “Canada, Korea Enjoy Rapid Trade Growth, Closer Relations,” The Globe and Mail, March 15, 1971. 624 Department of External Affairs, “An Internal Memo from the Minister of Trade and Commerce,” Dec 20, 1966, RG25, 20-1-2-ROK, Ottawa: Library and Archives of Canada.
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EXPLAINING SOUTH KOREA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH
A number of factors have been proposed to explain South Korea’s rapid economic transformation in the 1960s. Scholars have generally been divided into two main camps in debating the reasons for South Korea’s remarkable economic growth during this period. The neoclassical position points to the policy reforms of 1964 and 1965 that led Korea down the path of export-led growth, claiming those reforms were the main cause of the South Korean economic success. Scholars in this camp such as Anne Krueger and Paul Kuznets have argued that the policy reforms turned Korea towards a more market-oriented direction to exploit its comparative advantage in the world economy. 625 By contrast, the developmental state group argues that it was predominantly the heavy intervention of the Korean government in the economy that led to the South Korean take-off; even after the shift towards an export-oriented growth, it was state- directed planning under the Park regime that promoted rapid economic growth.626 From the 1990s onwards, notable South Korean scholars such as Byung-Kook Kim and Meredith Woo have argued that more attention must be paid to the political economy of South Korea’s economic development, both domestically and internationally, especially because of strategic issues arising from the Vietnam War and improved relations with Japan. 627 My own view, and a key underlying assumption of this chapter, is that to fully understand South Korea’s economic growth, both the export-led industrialization policy and changing circumstances of South Korea’s foreign policy must be examined. State-directed planning, strong economic growth and
625 Charles R. Frank, Kwang Suk Kim, and Larry E. Westphal, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea, New York: Columbia University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975; Paul W. Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977; Anne O. Krueger, The Development of the Foreign Sector and Aid, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, (Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea 1945- 75), chapter 3. 626 Richard Leudde-Neurath, “State Intervention and Export-Oriented Development in South Korea,” in Gordon White and Robert Wade, eds., Development and States in East Asia, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, [Research Report #16], 1985; Leroy Jones and Il Sakong, Government, Business and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, [Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945-70], 1980; Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 627 Meredith Jung-En Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991; Stephen Haggard, Byoung-Kook Kim and Chung-In Moon, “The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-66,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 50, No. 4 (Nov 1991), 850-873.
172 self-sufficiency were seen as key cornerstones for resisting communism by the Park regime, but the changing dynamics of the ROK-US alliance, as well as its outward orientation in foreign policy, were also very important in terms of export growth and finding new allies like Canada. A very important theoretical and intellectual discourse also emerged during this period, which merits further examination because it laid the foundation for a shift in official Canadian attitude towards Korea.
W.W. ROSTOW & THE “TAKE-OFF”
At the time, and at a theoretical level, Walt W. Rostow and his famous work, The Stages of Economic Growth, became very popular amongst Korean intellectuals. 628 Indicating the tidal nature of intellectual fashion, it was of course very popular in Canada too at the time, and doubtless served as the basis for common understandings between Canadians and Koreans. Rostow was an American economist and political theorist who later served as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson from 1966 to 1969. Rostow argued that economic growth was a multi-staged process, motivated by a desire for a higher quality of life and profit. According to Rostow, modernization process was characterized by a crucial “take-off” period of rapid growth stimulated by the expansion of a few key economic sectors. As the subtitle, A Non-Communist Manifesto, indicated, Rostow presented his model as a counter-argument to the Marxist system and suggested a model for development for various countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.629 Rostow’s theory was introduced in the late 1950s to early 1960s by well-known economists in newspapers and journals in South Korea, influencing South Korean thinking on balanced growth. 630
One of the most important incidents for the Korean economists was a visit from the master to Seoul on May 3, 1965. After a long conversation with President Park Chung Hee, Rostow visited the Seoul National University and delivered a presentation called “Economic
628 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, London: Cambridge University Press, 1960. 629 Tae-Gyun Park, “W.W. Rostow and Economic Discourse in South Korea in the 1960s,” Journal of International and Area Studies, Volume 8, Number 2, 2001, 55-66. 630 IBID.
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Development in Asia,” to an audience of prominent academics and students in Seoul. There, Rostow argued that South Korean economy was at the take-off stage and emphasized the role of agriculture, which would not only solve a basic necessity of the Korean population but also provide raw materials for industrialization. There were some serious disputes on economic development planning in South Korea and criticisms of Rostow’s presentation. Nevertheless, the term “take-off” (doyak in Korean) became an important catchphrase in the South Korean discourse on economic growth during this period. 631 Professor Tae-Gyun Park of the Seoul National University noted that in the academic collection Theory and Condition of Korea’s Economic Development published by the South Korean Cabinet in 1969, there were 17 articles written by the prominent economists who were involved in the Park regime’s economic policymaking process at that time. Over half of the authors began their articles by discussing the “take-off” theory and most of them attempted to analyze South Korea’s economic condition using Rostow’s theory.632 Rostow called this group of bureaucrats his “take-off boys” and regarded Korea as one of the successful examples of his ideas on foreign policy as well as take- off theories.
The Canadian assessment of Korean economic developments used the very language of “take-off” theory used by Rostow as well. Klaus Goldschlag, Deputy Under-Secretary of the department, was asked to assess Canadian assistance to Korea in December 1965. Citing political and economic reasons for providing capital assistance to South Korea, he argued that “the same broad political considerations apply in South Korea as in Southeast Asia, where the government is committed to an expanded aid programme aimed at underpinning the political situation by economic means.” Furthermore, the Park regime’s diplomatic success in normalizing relations with Japan was also seen in positive light. Goldschlag urged that this may be a “particularly good time” in economic terms to provide South Korea with a measure of capital assistance:
631 Tae-Gyun Park, currently a professor in the Department of History at the Seoul National University, noted that there were few university entrance exams that did not contain a question on take-off theory throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s. Also see Tae-Gyun Park, “Pakchŏnghŭi Chŏngbu Shigirŭl T'onghae Pon Palchŏn'guk-ga Tamnone Taehan Pip'anjŏk Shiron”, [Re-assessing the Developmental State Theory Through the Park Era], Quarterly Review of Korean History, Vol. 74, 2009. http://www.koreanhistory.org 632 Tae-Gyun Park, Interview with W.W. Rostow, 1985, as seen in Park, 65.
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Exports are doing well; the present regime has received good marks from the IMF for its economic and financial policies; the recent agreements with Japan would bring about a sizeable influx of badly-needed investment capital and the Korean government is planning a massive increase in domestic development expenditure. They seem to be aiming quite seriously at a situation of economic take-off.633
In the backdrop of intellectual excitement about South Korea’s “take-off” on the one hand and continued Canadian aid on the other hand, the farewell letter from Ambassador R.P. Bower provided a very telling account of changing Canadian perceptions of Korea by 1966. The Tokyo-based Bower reported to Under-Secretary Norman Robertson in April 1966 that “the outstanding impression gained from my farewell visit to Korea from April 3rd to 7th was that exceptional progress had been made in almost all areas”634 since his last visit in May 1965. President Park Chung Hee proudly claimed in January 1966 that “next year will be the year of economic takeoff,” and South Korean Prime Minister added, “If we can realize our plans, we can stand on our feet economically within five years or so.”635 Bower noted the South Korean transformation at length:
This impression was confirmed by every single diplomatic officer or westerner I met. Even without this supporting judgment, it was manifest that in Seoul, at least a remarkable change has taken place. There is a substantial amount of new building going on and land values in the city are climbing steeply. Wages and costs are rising, and while unemployment and surplus population continue to create serious problems, the entire atmosphere is one of confidence and progress. The improved situation can be seen in many small things, the people on the streets were generally better clothed while the number of bullock carts that cluttered the roadways on previous visits had almost disappeared. 636
In fact, the Globe and Mail had also reported at length for the first time by early January 1966 on South Korea’s economic success. The coverage noted how South Korea’s export earnings had nearly quadrupled to USD $128 million by 1966. In particular, shipment of
633 Klaus Goldschlag, “Canadian Assistance to Korea,” Dec 9, 1965, Ottawa: Far Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs, 20-1-2-ROK, Library and Archives Canada. 634 R.P.Bower to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, “Farewell Visit to Korea,” April 28, 1966, Ottawa: Library and Archives, 20-1-1 ROK. 635 “South Korea Climbing Out of Rut: Exports Quadrupled in 4 Years,” Globe and Mail, January 4, 1966. 636 R.P.Bower to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, “Farewell Visit to Korea,” April 28, 1966, Ottawa: Library and Archives, 20-1-1 ROK.
175 manufactured goods multiplied by 10 times between 1962 and 1966, and accounted for 64 per cent of South Korean exports by 1966. Ranging from nylon stockings to transistor radios and women’s clothing, South Korean goods made their way to countries in the Middle East, Africa and North America. 637 Noting that the entire atmosphere in Seoul was “one of confidence and progress,” Bower cited that the “single most important factor affecting the Korean position at the moment is U.S. procurement for the war in Vietnam.” The U.S. government had established a procurement agency in Korea, for both military and civilian goods, ranging anywhere from textile to cement to household utensils. 638 Goldschlag’s reference to Korea’s economic “take- off” merits further attention, for it doubtless served as the basis for a common understanding between Canadians and Koreans. While no single explanation could account for the complexity of various forces at play for South Korea’s enormous economic transformation during this period, the intellectual preoccupation surrounding South Korea’s economic “take-off” was a very interesting one. A DEA memo in 1966 also noted: “All in all, the prospects for the Korean economy are mildly hopeful. In the absence of external conflict or internal instability, it is now being assumed by the Korean government that economy is coming within sight of the “take off stage.”639
Trade between Canada and Korea remained small at this point, but between 1964 and 1965, there was a significant reversal in terms of exports and imports. In 1965, Canadian exports to Korea amounted to about CAD $823,000 ($1,096,000 in 1964) while imports from Korea in 1965 amounted to about CAD $1,468,000 ($473,000 in 1964). To put this in perspective, Korean export to Canada increased by three times over the course of one year, by a value of $995,000. Much of the exports consisted of textiles and apparel, which was one of the key industries that the Park regime focused on. 640
637 “South Korea Climbing Out of Rut: Exports Quadrupled in 4 Years,” Globe and Mail, January 4, 1966. 638 IBID. 639 “Background information: Republic of Korea,” Department of External Affairs, July 26, 1966, 20-1- ROK, Ottawa, Library and Archives. 640 IBID.
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Figure 15: Ambassador H. O. Moran presenting his credentials to President Park Chung Hee on July 25, 1966
Source: Dae-Han K-News 581, “Blue House News” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SyHfjIdwdf0
A NEW WAVE OF KOREAN MIGRATION TO CANADA
Korea’s economic growth and outward export policy also had implications for Korean migration to the Western world. At a press conference on Nov 5, 1964, President Park spoke of his upcoming visit to West Germany in December, saying that he hoped the upcoming visit would “establish the foundations for the official advancement of Korean diplomacy in the western world.”641 In light of dire unemployment situation at home and in a desperate attempt to earn foreign currency, the Park had government dispatched a wave of miners and nurses to West Germany.642 Amongst 2,800 people who had applied, 367 fit and educated Korean men were chosen for the first dispatch in December 1963, and their names were listed in every newspaper in South Korea as heroic figures. In total, about 8,300 Korean miners were sent to work in West Germany on a three-year contract. Concurrently, some twenty female nursing school students were sent to West Germany in 1962, and between 1966 and 1976, more than 13,000 nurses were sent to Germany from South Korea. Many of the miners and nurses believed in the patriotic
641 “West Germany as the Foundation for Entry to the West,” Press Conference Notes with President Park Chung Hee, Nov 5, 1964, Park Chung Hee Presidential Library Digital Archive, Accessed on April 20, 2017 http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr/#!/detailed/newspaper/1128 642 “Sixty Years of the Republic: Koreans Go To Work in West Germany,” The Chosun Ilbo, July 18, 2008, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/07/18/2008071861029.html
177 cause: at a local community centre in the German city of Duisburg on Dec. 10, 1964, some 400 miners wept as President Park delivered his speech:
Looking at your tanned faces, my heart is broken. All of you are risking your lives every day as you go down thousands of meters underground to make ends meet…Although we are undergoing this trying time, we are not supposed to pass poverty onto our descendants. We must do our part to end poverty in Korea so that the next generation doesn't experience what we are going through now.643
Upon completing their three-year contracts in West Germany, many of the miners and nurses chose to migrate to North America, rather than returning home to South Korea. For some, they feared about finding work with their injured bodies (many miners suffered from injuries at work), and others dreamt of a new life overseas. There were frequent marriages between miners and nurses as they coped with difficulties of life in West Germany and many hoped for a better life in Canada or in the United States. Between 1967 and 1971, a new wave of South Koreans arrived in Canada, ranging from 500 to 700 in number, many of whom were ex-miners and nurses from West Germany. 644 It was commonly known that immigrating to Canada was an easier process than the United States, and if they applied for immigration through the Canadian Embassy in West Germany, the Korean miners and nurses often received permanent residency in 2-3 months.645 Many settled in Toronto, Hamilton, London, and Waterloo, but some went as far as Vancouver, Calgary and Montreal. Many of them formed the first generation of Korean communities. By 1970, more than 900 Koreans immigrated to Canada, many of them with professional backgrounds. As of end of 1970, some 4,000 Koreans were living in Canada and a regular South Korean trade mission visited Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal in search of business opportunities.646
643 “When Park Spoke, Everybody Cried,”
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Ambassador Bower met again with President Park in April 1966 during his farewell visit. At this meeting, Bower found President Park to be “relaxed”, “confident” and “forthcoming”, and reasoned that Park’s confidence stemmed from “experience at governing democratically, with the obvious success of his economic programme and with the nation-wide support that his party appears to have developed.”647 After planting Canadian maple trees at the Blue House and the Prime Minister’s residence, Bower and President Park discussed reforestation in Korea, which was an issue that President Park cared very much about. Immigration was another topic of interest and President Park asked about the prospects of Korean emigration to Canada, citing the example of Korean miners to Germany.648 Korean migration to Canada was still being handled through the Canadian office in Hong Kong at this point, since there was no resident Canadian embassy in Seoul. With a high unemployment rate and the need to earn foreign currency for domestic economic planning, remittances sent by Korean miners in Germany were making an important contribution to the Korean economy. As Bower discussed in his meeting with President Park, there were some Canadian businesses showing interest in Korean miners. For instance, MacIntypre Porcupine expressed an interest in obtaining 4,000 Korean miners for their Canadian holdings.649
Historically, Canada relied upon Western Europe and the United States as major sources of its immigrants. By the mid-1960s, the Canadian government realized that more immigration was needed, particularly for skilled labour and technical professionals. Educated, skilled workers could only be found in large numbers in part of the world traditionally restricted by Canadian immigration policy: Asia. Hence, in 1967, a new ‘points system’ was introduced whereby applicants were assessed according to objective criteria of education, skills and resources, regardless of their country of origin or racial background.650 The 1967 immigration reform,
647 “From R. P. Bower to Under-secretary of state for external affairs -- Farewell visit to Korea,” April 28, 1966 (20-1-2-ROK), LAC. 648 IBID. 649 IBID. 650 See Reg Whitaker, Canadian Immigration Policy Since Confederation, St.John, NB: Keystone Printing, 1991;; Eleanor Laquian, Aprodicio Laquian and Terry McGee, The Silent Debate: Asian Immigration & Racism in Canada, Vancouver: Institute of Asian Research, 1998; Valerie Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-1990¸Toronto: Dundurn
179 although not completely free from biases, marked a watershed in Canadian immigration policy, especially for Asian migrants. Immigration statistics from 1967 showed that there was a sudden increase in the proportion of immigrants from Asia and Africa, with a corresponding decrease in the proportion of immigrants from Europe.651
Based on the coverage of the Korea Times Daily, which became the main ethnic newspaper for the Korean community in Canada, the early Korean settlers mostly socialized with each other through university alumni networks and church groups rather than integrating into mainstream Canadian society. This period also saw the beginning of Korean communities in areas such as the Bloor/Christie intersection in Toronto. The Multicultural History Society of Ontario has a rich collection of sports groups, holiday gatherings and Bible study groups that were formed during this period across Ontario and it appears that many early settlers started their own businesses such as convenience stores, dry cleaners and gas stations, rather than utilizing their professional backgrounds in engineering, law or nursing. Soon enough, various business associations, scholarship foundations and funds for disaster relief in South Korea became institutionalized, many of which found roots amongst business owners in the GTA region.652
While Martin believed that foreign policy was deeply rooted in long-standing historical and geographic forces, he was prepared to admit that changes had to be accommodated.653 Martin contended, “Foreign policy is not something to be chopped and changed. Foreign policy evolves and fundamental reversals or changes are not easy to come by and they are so often counter-productive.”654 While his statement was not specific to Korea, it reflected a cautious turning of attention towards Asia in the Department of External Affairs. Martin also placed a
Press, 1992; Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. 651 Department of Justice, “Changing Immigration Pattern and the Emergence of “Visible Minorities,” Cultural Diversity in Canada: The Social Construction of Racial Difference, http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/rp02_8-dr02_8/p3.html
652 Korean Canadian Cultural Association. K'aenada Haninsa [History of Korean Immigration to Canada]. (Toronto: KCCA, 2013), 55-56. 653 Greg Donaghy, The Grit, preface. Greg Donaghy, in his recent biography of Paul Martin Sr. called him an “unshakeable Grit, who inherited a strong Liberal partisan identity rooted in the reform traditions of the clear grits of pre-confederation Ontario.” Martin was a believer in a tolerant and civil politics that sought to unite Canadians in their shared struggle for a more just and equitable social order. 654 Martin, “At the Right Hand,” 9.
180 great emphasis on personal diplomacy and direct contact with his political counterparts. He argued, “The only real instrument a foreign minister has is discussion…and while you have reports from your ambassador, you must remember that those are not more than reports. I think the good active foreign minister is the man who tries to get at the source of things. There is no better source than the man who makes the policy.” 655
Martin was now prepared to have Canada pay more attention to South Korea and wanted his diplomats to play an active role in improving relations. He instructed Moran that while his responsibilities in Japan would inevitably take first priority, “You and your staff will wish to devote as much time as possible to Korea, not only because of the growing importance of Korean-Canadian relations but also because of the intrinsic interest of Korea as a developing country and as one of the key areas in the present Asian crisis.”656 In his letter of instructions to Moran, Martin emphasized the potential for a more active migration between Canada and Korea, the first time this idea had been mentioned in the Department of External Affairs. Largely, it derived from the boom in the Canadian economy, which produced a sense of labour shortage in Canada. There had already been a smaller-scale movement of South Korean students who were sponsored by the United Church Boards and by individual missionaries to come to Canada, even before the outbreak of the Korean War, although they were very limited in numbers. Martin noted:
The question of immigration from Korea is one which may take on greater importance over the period of your mission. The Korean level of education is high; there is a surplus of university graduates in some fields which may be of interest to Canada; the Korean government encourages emigration as one means of relieving population pressure; and many Canadians who have had relations with Korea have been favourably impressed with the calibre of potential immigrations. I would be grateful, therefore, if the subject of Korean immigration to Canada could be studied by yourself and your staff in order both to determine the potential scale of migration from Korea to Canada and the desirability of modifying the procedures and channels through which Korean immigration is now carried out. 657
655 Norah Story interview with Paul Martin [1969-70], Martin Papers, vol.353, tape A-7, side1, LAC as seen in Greg Donaghy, Grit: The Life and Politics of Paul Martin Sr., (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015), 190. 656 Paul Martin to H.O. Moran, “Confidential Letter of Instruction,” Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, July 29, 1966. Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 657 “Confidential letter of instruction” to H.O.Moran from Paul Martin, July 29, 1966, Ottawa, Op. Cit.
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Concurrently, the Department of Manpower and Immigration carried out a detailed study of immigration potential for selected Asian countries, including South Korea.658 Because there was no Canadian consular officer resident in Seoul, the British embassy in Seoul handled on-the-spot consular and immigration affairs. Officially, there were only about 70 Canadians residing in South Korea – all of whom were missionaries and their dependents. Immigration application forms could be obtained from the British Embassy in Seoul, but they had to be processed through the Canadian immigration office in Hong Kong. Hence, there were significant institutional difficulties for Koreans residing in Seoul to immigrate to Canada, even though the South Korean government was anxious about the high unemployment rate and its surplus of university graduates.659
Martin maintained that Canada had an interest in the development of a strong and prosperous South Korea with stable political institutions responsive to the needs of its population. Ottawa thus had a vested interest in major political developments in South Korea, particularly those affecting the economy, and thus trade and aid with the country. Martin stressed to Moran that “the Korean government would be largely receptive to Canadian influence – the Korean War was not forgotten and there was much that Korea hoped from Canada in the way of political support, trade, aid and immigration.” 660 He further argued, “not only our general policy on South Korea, but also the continuing Canadian commitment arising from our participation in the U.N. police action of 1950-53 lead us to maintain our efforts to contribute in all appropriate ways to these goals.” 661 The letter concluded, “A well-informed understanding of the foreign policy of Korea, which is at the hub of the ideological, political and military tensions
658 The publication of the White Paper in 1966 by the Department of Manpower and Immigration, followed by the Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee hearings, attracted broad participation and attention by politicians, special interest groups, church groups, ethnic groups, academics, and the media. (see Kelley and Trebilcock, 333). 659 Department of External Affairs, “Appendix to the Instructional Memo to H.O. Moran,” RG25, 20-1-1- ROK, Ottawa: Library and Archives. 660 Paul Martin to H.O. Moran, “Confidential Letter of Instruction,” RG25, 20-1-1-ROK, Ottawa: Library and Archives. 661 Paul Martin to H.O. Moran, “Confidential Letter of Instruction,” Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, July 29, 1966. RG25, 20-1-1-ROK, Ottawa: Library and Archives.
182 of Asia, can be of significant assistance in the formulation of Canadian policy for Asia as a whole.”662
Internal views at the Department of External Affairs in July 1966 also confirmed Martin’s views that the South Korean economy was “only now beginning to develop at a satisfactory rate and along sound lines.”663 Despite massive American aid poured to South Korea since the 1948, the memo noted that “the weakness of previous governments and the nature of their economic policies served as a deterrent for progress in the Korean economy.”664 Although there were still issues of low domestic saving, a high inflation rate, and a high unemployment rate, the prospects for the Korean economy were “hopeful,” and within sight of the “take-off stage.” 665 Trade between Canada and the ROK remained fairly small at this point. In 1965, Canadian exports to South Korea amounted to about CDN $823,000 and imports from South Korea amounted to about CDN $1,468,000. Major items exported to South Korea were asbestos and newsprint; about 75 per cent of Canadian imports from Korea consisted of textiles and apparel. 666
For South Korea, which was searching for a new destination to send its labour force much like the way it did with West Germany, Canada appeared to be a promising country. It was not until the end of 1964 that discussions surfaced in Ottawa about having the Canadian Ambassador in Tokyo concurrently accredited to Seoul. Canadian attention on Korea stemmed largely from geopolitical considerations of the Cold War. Paul Martin Sr., Secretary of State for External Affairs at the time, argued that “In light of the growing South Korean international
662 IBID. 663 Department of External Affairs, “An appendix to Paul Martin’s Letter of Instruction to H.O. Moran,” Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, July 29, 1966. Library and Archives Canada.
664 Within the last three years, partly as a result of greater political stability and firm economic measures by the Park government, a substantial improvement has been evident in the general economic situation. Gross national product has increased by about 6% annually in real terms since 1960 and the IBRD has commented favourably on the assumptions behind Korea’s new Five Year Plan which envisages GNP growth at about 7% per annum. Foreign capital from Japan and other sources is being attracted on a rising scale. Exports are also increasing at a highly satisfactory rate, having climbed from $35,000,000 in 1960 to $250,000,000 this year. In part, however, this is attributable to the Vietnam boom. Some 60% of total exports are currently made up of manufactured goods. 665 Department of External Affairs, “An appendix to Paul Martin’s Letter of Instruction to H.O. Moran,” Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, July 29, 1966. Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 666 IBID.
183 rivalry with the Communist regime in North Korea, there is an important western interest in supporting the international position of Korea.”667
CONCLUSION
This chapter examined how South Korea, with its exceptional economic growth over the course of the 1960s, emerged as a country of major consequence for Canadian policymakers. The first half of the 1960s, even until the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, left very little room for excitement, for the nature of the relationship was mostly procedural. While Canada had a general interest on South Korea because of its earlier missionary enterprise and its active participation in the Korean War and humanitarian aid, these previous experiences also seriously constrained its ability to perceive Korea as an equal partner. Yet, the sheer growth of the South Korean economy in the second half of the 1960s brought about many unintended consequences. Despite his many faults, President Park and his various policies were successful in turning South Korea from an aid recipient to an important economic player in East Asia. South Korea’s efforts to achieve a greater degree of autonomy from the United States, while also taking advantage of the Vietnam War and diplomatic rapprochement with Japan, gradually changed Canadian perceptions of Korea. Nevertheless, the outdated missionary approach, best illustrated by Schofield’s initiative for agricultural training, continued to delay Canada in forging a relationship of equals with Korea. While Seoul swiftly turned from an aid recipient to a viable trading partner, Ottawa also had to adjust its policies since economic developments in Korea made the humanitarian approach obsolete. From the South Korean perspective, growing tensions with the United States, participation in the Vietnam War, and rapprochement with Japan all had serious implications for its industrial capacity and outlook on its foreign relations. In terms of their foreign relations, Canada and Korea both made efforts in the 1960s to be more autonomous in their foreign policies amidst the shadow of the Cold War and the looming presence of the United States. It was a difficult process, muddled with ambiguities and ironies as they carefully negotiated their strategies for cooperation and disagreements with the U.S. The first-ever trade agreement between Canada and Korea in
667 Paul Martin, “Confidential Memorandum for Cabinet: Diplomatic Accreditation to Korea,” July 30, 1964, ROK 20-1-1, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, Accessed 10 June 2015.
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December 1966 was a testament to their mutual efforts in growth and trust and marked an important turning point in the bilateral relationship. Coincidentally, President Park’s policy of earning foreign currency by sending off miners and nurses to Germany resulted in the first official wave of Korean immigrants to Canada.
In diversifying their external relations, both diplomatically and commercially, South Korea found a natural partner in Canada, a key ally from the Korean War. Canada, for its part, also saw important strategic, economic and political reasons to support South Korea. However, such desire for a more meaningful relationship did not automatically result in a stronger bilateral relationship between Canada and South Korea during this period. Primarily, the politics of the Cold War and, most notably, the Vietnam War was a major preoccupation for both countries, even though the nature of their involvement could not be more different. South Korea also had regional issues to manage, such as the diplomatic rapprochement with Japan, which faced a lot of domestic dissent. Moreover, as South Korea was an aid recipient under the Colombo Plan, especially in the early 1960s, the Canadian government initially saw Korea as an underdeveloped country in need of help. Hence, it took time, persistent diplomatic efforts from South Korean officials, as well as South Korea’s industrialization, for Canada to fully recognize Korea as an equal partner.
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CHAPTER 5
“THE TAKE-OFF” PHASE: ECONOMICS OVER POLITICS
“Canada still maintains a presence in the Participating Nations Advisory Group to the UN Command. It is also an extremely important factor in our considerations that changing power relationships in the Asian Pacific area are again making Korea a potential source of danger to the stability of the region. A large number of the Korean people are unaware of Canada in a general way, and Canada is regarded with great affection, partly because of its role in the Korean War, but also because of the work of early Canadian missionaries in bringing educational and social benefits to Korea.”668
- Department of External Affairs (Canada) Memo (1972)
***
The 1970s marked an era of surprise and unexpected growth in Canadian-Korean relations. South Korea’s rapid industrialization in the 1960s and the growing importance of bilateral trade between Canada and Korea allowed for more substantial commercial engagements between the two countries over the course of the 1970s. The Park regime in South Korea launched a new Yushin system in 1972 to deal with domestic pressures and political opposition. The word “Yushin” literally meant “renewal” or “restoration” in Korean, but the actual term invoked sentiments of the Meiji restoration in Japan. Shortly after being sworn in in 1972, Park declared a state of emergency based on the “perilous realities of the international security order from the Cold War to the emerging environment of détente.” 669 Under the Yushin system, Park proclaimed martial law across the country, effectively assuming a dictatorial rule and turning
668 D.G. Longmuir to A. J. Andrew, Director-General of the Bureau of Asian & Pacific Affairs at the Department of External Affairs, “Opening of New Posts – Korea” (20-1-2-ROK), 13 January 1972, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 669 Hyug Baeg Im, “The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled” in The Park Chung Hee Era, 233-262.
186 back the clock on South Korea’s constitution. Censorship of the press, publishing and broadcasting immediately went into effect. The Fourth Republic was one which would grant the president the right to proclaim emergencies, dissolve the legislature, and nominate one-third of the judiciary sector.670 Park justified the new measures as mechanisms to deal with rising tensions on the Peninsula caused by North Korea’s military provocations in the 1960s, and to also prepare the way for eventual peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. Yet, Park’s policies led to great tensions, both on human rights and security grounds, between the ROK and the U.S., which in turn raised concerns in Korea about the United States as a reliable ally.
Nevertheless, difficulties with the United States did not automatically prompt Seoul to turn to Ottawa, since Canada’s recognition of China, its decision not to participate in the Vietnam War, and its willingness to do business with North Korea all raised concerns in the minds of South Korean policymakers. In Canada, there were attempts to diversify Canada’s foreign relations, most notably through the Third Option, in recognition of Canada’s heavy dependence on trade with the United States as well as growing dissent from the Vietnam War experience. From the Canadian perspective, preserving peace and stability on the Korean peninsula was important in its overall approach towards the Pacific Rim, in addition to diversifying its trade relationship. Stability on the Korean peninsula, as well as inter-Korean relations, had clear strategic implications for the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and Canada during the Cold War. The establishment of a Canadian embassy in Seoul in 1973, therefore, had both symbolic and practical implications: it reflected Canada’s growing political and commercial interests in the Asia Pacific region, and facilitated a more effective institutional mechanism for trade and immigration. 671 But beyond official relations, Seoul and Ottawa had to move forward as allies in the Cold War and manage their own relations with the United States. Political differences were real between the Trudeau government and the Park regime, but both shared a desire to increase exports and expand trading relationship in the 1970s.
670 “60 Years of the Republic: The Yushin Constitution,” Chosun Ilbo, Aug 28, 2008, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/08/28/2008082861026.html 671 “Farewell Call on the Secretary of State for External Affairs by Ambassador Pil Shik Chin of the ROK, January 25, 1974- The Republic of Korea – Recent developments: Foreign Policy,” as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada.
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This chapter argues that despite their political differences, Canada and the ROK saw a clear convergence of their economic interests in the 1970s, which resulted in an unprecedented growth in trade. Thorny issues, such as Canada’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China, the Yushin and Park regime’s violation of human rights, and Canada’s interest in selling wheat to North Korea all caused frictions, but not enough to seriously affect the flow of trade. In the first half of the decade, Canadian exports increased by 250 per cent and Korean exports to Canada increased by a stunning 750 per cent, a trend that continued well into the 1980s (See Table 1 next page). Concurrently, an increasing number of high-skilled Koreans migrated to Canada, making Korea an important source country for the Canadian labour market. The number of Korean migrants to Canada increased from 991 in 1970 to 41,123 in 1980.672 South Korea found an important market in Canada, where there was a high demand for manufactured goods, especially textiles and electronics. South Korean efforts to pressure Canada on the wheat sales and the PRC recognition were largely dismissed by Ottawa’s civil servants and Canada largely overlooked Park’s human rights record, all of which demonstrates how trade, not politics, dictated the course of bilateral relations. This period also saw the emergence of government-level policy between the two countries and an outburst of formal mechanisms and institutions to facilitate and encourage a stronger bilateral relationship. The new relationship was substantively different than the old one, a major shift in terms of how the two countries recognized each other’s importance.
672 “Embassy of the ROK in Ottawa: Briefing Notes,” Preparation for the Visit of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan to Canada,” (1982), CN 724.11, File No. 9469, (Seoul: ROK Diplomatic Archives). Vol 1, Pg 4-7.
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Table 1: Canada-ROK Bilateral Trade (1969-80)
Units: $1000 CAD, Kg, % source: K-Stats Korean Export to Canada Canadian Exports to S. Korea Year NET Amount % change Amount % change
1969 15,114 - 22,320 82.7 -7,206 1970 19,553 29.4 23,165 3.8 -3,612 1971 28,935 48.0 38,960 68.2 -10,025 1972 58,915 103.6 35,993 -7.6 22,922 1973 124,881 112.0 82,545 129.3 42,336 1974 166,764 33.5 115,702 40.2 51,062 1975 197,347 18.3 150,175 29.8 47,172 1976 314,129 59.2 115,852 -22.9 198,277 1977 298,756 -4.9 149,634 29.2 149,122 1978 327,173 9.5 204,033 36.4 123,140 1979 387,643 18.5 326,348 59.9 61,295 1980 343,446 -11.4 378,429 16.0 -34,983
TRUDEAU & THE “PACIFIC TURN”
The rise of Pierre E. Trudeau to power in Canada had important consequences for Canada’s Cold War policy and, consequently, its outlook on the world. In 1968, the Liberals won a majority in the House of Commons and seats in every part of Canada. Trudeau was much younger, more adventurous than his predecessors, and willing to look beyond the traditional North Atlantic Triangle in understanding Canada’s external relations.673 His arrival at 24 Sussex Drive raised hopes for a change in the general direction of Canadian foreign policy. Outwardly
673 John English, Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2009), 6.
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Canadians saw his elegant wardrobe and charismatic personality and they assumed a sophistication to match. Trudeau brought a worldview shaped by his international travels, calling himself a “citizen of the world.”674 The Winnipeg Free Press noted, “Canadians are looking to Mr. Trudeau for great things, much in the manner that those Americans who elected John F. Kennedy as their leader expected great things from him.”675 The new hype surrounding Trudeau reflected the Canadian public’s desire for change, a desire enhanced by the experience of Vietnam War. By the early 1970s, it was clear that the Americans had lost the Vietnam War – broadcasters were providing live coverage of civilians being killed and bombings that destroyed all parts of Vietnam. The coverage fueled anti-war and anti-American sentiments in some members of the Canadian public. 676
Trudeau’s dislike of what he took to be the domination of NATO over Canadian foreign policy and his discomfort with the North Atlantic Triangle heralded a new “Pacific direction” in Canadian foreign policy. Undoubtedly, the United States remained as Canada’s closest neighbour, its biggest trading partner and its most important relationship on the political and strategic level, especially during the Cold War. As Louis St. Laurent articulated in the Gray Lecture, Canada was committed to doing its share to defend freedom and security and to act as a faithful ally in the Cold War. 677 Canada had fought in the Korean War, served on the truce supervisory commission in Indochina in 1954, stayed there throughout the 1960s (until the end of the American phase of the war in 1973), and justified its lack of participation in the actual Vietnam War through this role.678 The key difference under Trudeau was his personal belief that Canada needed to broaden its foreign policy priorities and establish productive bilateral relations
674 Ibid, 59. 675 Three decades later, Peter Gzowski, recalled that “to those of us who had been swept up in the American promise of John F. Kennedy and still mourned his death, Trudeau was especially inspiring. He was glamorous, he was sexy, and he was ours – the perfect symbol of the newly invigorated Canada that had emerged from Expo and the centennial celebrations.” “Watch Me,” in Trudeau Albums, (Toronto: Penguin Studio, 2000), 67. 676 Robert Bothwell, The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 82. 677 Louis St. Laurent, “The Gray Lecture 1947,” as seen in Jack Granastein ed., Canadian Foreign Policy Historical Readings, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986. 678 Robert Bothwell, Your Country, My Country: A Unified History of the United States and Canada, 268.
190 with more countries. Trudeau’s cozy relationship with Fidel Castro and Canada’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1970 were closely monitored by Washington as well. 679
Aside from military and political relations, however, there were also underlying tensions in Canadian-American relations on the economic front. In 1971, the U.S. faced its first trade deficit since the 19th century, a shock that called for a total re-assessment of American policy. Washington’s solution was the “Nixon shokku,” which saw the U.S. abandon its role as caregiver to the international economy. Nixon’s Treasury Secretary, John Connally, famously explained this more unilateral and nationalist tack in international economic policy, stating: “My basic approach is that the foreigners are out to screw us. Our job is to screw them first.”680 Canada, to its surprise, was not spared; despite being America’s biggest trading partner for decades, Connally decided it was part of the problem and Canadian-US frictions continued to rise throughout the early 1970s.681 In light of the general global economic atmosphere, Trudeau also saw a clear need for reinforcing Canada’s autonomy and launched new initiatives to resist too much American influence on the Canadian identity. Rethinking the Canadian-American relationship inevitably led to increased tension, a situation not helped by a poor relationship between the Prime Minister and President Nixon.682 According to one American diplomat, Trudeau was “brilliant, and we recognized the man’s brilliance, and his experience, but we were impatient with his advice at times, [his] sermonizing, and his needles.”683
Trudeau’s sentiments were reflected in the new, albeit unsuccessful, “Third Option” policy in 1972, brought in by his External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, which advocated for
679 See Robert Wright, Three nights in Havana: Pierre Trudeau, Fidel Castro and the Cold War world, Toronto: Harper Collins, 2007; Pierre Trudeau and Jacques Hébert, Two Innocents in Red China, Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2007. 680 Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750, (New York: Norton, 1989), 612. 681 In 1970, Canada recorded a trade surplus in trade with the United States in automobiles and automobile parts, part of a global surplus in merchandise trade. (Bothwell, 322). 682 Kissinger once wrote that “It cannot be said that Nixon and Trudeau were ideally suited for each other. Nixon would have been tempted to identify the sophisticated and non-conformist Trudeau with his “enemies” in the eastern establishment. See Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 316. 683 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984, 314.
191 diversifying Canada’s trade relations.684 The Third Option represented a shift in focus away from the status quo as well as an opening to the Pacific and Europe. South Korea, obviously, lay in that direction of the Pacific.685 It should be stressed, however, that Trudeau had many other foreign policy issues which occupied him during this period, including the “Third World,” the Commonwealth, and la francophonie. With regards to Asia, the People’s Republic of China and Japan took priority for obvious political and commercial interests. Establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC was one of Trudeau’s early foreign policy priorities, as he had personally travelled to China in the 1940s and in 1960. Trudeau, being fixated on process, also focused on re-organizing the institutional mechanisms of Canada’s foreign aid.686 Formal recognition and the exchange of embassies with Beijing seemed to give substance to Trudeau’s Pacific turn in foreign policy: Canadian historian Greg Donaghy has argued that South Korea was largely neglected while Canada focused its attention on Beijing.687 Donaghy’s observation is true, but there were other countries in the Pacific that demanded Ottawa’s attention. Japan and Indonesia were also objects of prime ministerial consideration, and in Japan’s case, its importance was undeniable as its economy grew remarkably throughout the 1970s, raising Canadian hopes for increased trade.
Beyond Japan, there was also Korea: both the whole peninsula and the two separate countries, one of which Canada already had a good relationship with. The Pacific paper in Foreign Policy for Canadians, which was the report of the DEA Review (1969-70) that Trudeau had ordered, noted that instability continued to characterize the broad political situation in the Pacific and that the paramount problem in the Pacific in recent years was the search for a more stable and mutually acceptable balance of power and influence among the big four powers in the
684 See Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy¸ Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. 685 Also see Robert Bothwell, “Eyes West: Canada and the Cold War in Asia” in Greg Donaghy ed., Canada and the Early Cold War, Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998. 686 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion, 311; Also see A. J. Andrew, The Rise & Fall of a Middle Power (Ch.6) 687 Greg Donaghy, "In the Cold War's Shadow, Canada and South Korea 1947-72," Presentation Notes at the Canada-Korea Past, Present and Future Conference, Munk School of Global Affairs, Toronto: April 27, 2013.
192 area.688 The paper highlighted that Canada’s influence in the Pacific was not that of a great power, but that Canada would nonetheless be affected by the consequences of major disturbances in the area, an example of which would be another outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Such a possibility, the paper remarked, pointed to Canada’s need for adequate strategic, political and economic information to permit the government to keep its assessment of Canadian interests in the region fresh and up to date, and to make adjustments to the changing realities of the situation in the light of Canada’s interests and capabilities.689 Internal assessments at the Department of External Affairs in 1973 concluded: “As Korea is now at the point of economic take-off, Canadian aid will be limited to occasional technical assistance” and argued that the character of Canadian economic relationship to [South] Korea will significantly change.690
Nevertheless, the Third Option and Canada’s Pacific Turn did not result in a major policy changes overnight, especially with regards to Canadian-Korean relations. Beyond trade, there was the question whether the grouping together of all of the countries on the other side of the Pacific could possibly outweigh Canada’s relations with Europe, not to mention the United States. Of the Pacific countries, only Japan was a democracy, and though democratic government was only one factor in determining Canada’s relations with other countries, it was a barometer for fellow-feeling. For its part, Japan’s main interest in Canada was for affordable “rocks and logs” as Greg Donaghy aptly put it.691 There were other issues which took the attention of civil servants in the DEA. Canada’s relationship with India faltered over its nuclear testing in 1974, and Commonwealth ties like Australia and New Zealand were largely taken for granted at this point.692 Tom Delworth, a seasoned diplomat in the Department of External Affairs who would
688 The 1960s was a tense time on the Korean peninsula, with the Pueblo incident (1968) and the EC-121 shoot-down over the DPRK. See: “Pueblo incident,” Britannica Encyclopedia, https://www.britannica.com/event/Pueblo-Incident 689 Mitchell W. Sharp, Foreign Policy for Canadians, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970. 690 P.H.Chapin, “Visit to Canada by the Minister of Commerce and Industry of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Nak-Sun Lee: Canada-Korea General Relations,” 5 November 1973, as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada 691 See Greg Donaghy, “Smiling diplomacy’s redux: Trudeau’s engagement with Japan, 1968-76,” in Greg Donaghy and Patricia Roy, Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the 20th century, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008), 190-206. 692 Tom Delworth, cited in Greg Donaghy, “Parallel Paths: Canadian-Australian relations since the 1890s,” in Kate Burridge, Lois Foster and Gerry Turcotte, eds, Canada-Australia: Towards a Second Century of Partnership, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press and the International Council of Canadian Studies, 1997),
193 later become the Director General of Asian and Pacific Affairs, also argued that Canadian policy “had not yet begun to take into account the growing political strength of Korea, Indonesia and China.”693 Partly, this was a generational issue among policymakers: those Canadian diplomats who joined the DEA in the 1930s and 1940s had a North Atlantic perspective on Canadian foreign policy and tended to see Asia as a foreign territory. Newer hires had a more global outlook.694
Commentators at the time noted the problem of dissonant political values and practices. The retired diplomat and prominent foreign affairs commentator John Holmes put it bluntly in 1971: “The notion of the Pacific Rim in Canadian foreign policy is a sheer gesture… a common ‘Pacific Policy’ towards New Zealand and Korea would make no more sense than a common policy linking New Zealand and Poland.”695 It was not a flattering comparison. Under President Park, Korea was not a democracy, but at least it was not a rigid communist dictatorship like Poland. In the Cold War environment, Canadians kept a close watch on Korea, because another conflict on the Korean peninsula would create major instability in the Asia-Pacific region. Holmes pointed out that Trudeau had been reminding Canadians that they had frontiers west and north as well as east. As for the South (the United States), it was so important, so overwhelming, that it was specifically left out of Trudeau’s external affairs study, Foreign Policy for Canadians. Holmes, who had once been assistant Under-Secretary for Asia, argued from his own experience as a diplomat that “Trudeau was only drawing their attention to the obvious because Korea, Indo- China, Japan and China have in fact preoccupied and involved Canadians in the past two decades at least as much as Europe.” 696 Essentially, Holmes argued that Canada’s economic, and indeed its political, relations with Asian countries were all ad-hoc in nature and the emphasis on the Pacific in the latest White Paper should be understood in an attempt to counterbalance “a new exclusiveness on the part of the Europeans and the increasing economic and cultural thrust of the
33. On relations with India, see Mary Halloran, “Mrs.Gandhi’s bombshell: Canadian reactions to India’s nuclear detonation, 1974-76,” in Christopher Raj and Abdul Nafey eds., Canada’s Engagements and Relations with India, (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2007), 279-91. 693 Greg Donaghy, “To Know and Be Known: The Department of External Affairs and the Creation of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 1978-84,” International Journal, Vol 64, No.4, Canada and Asia (Autumn, 2009), 1041 694 IBID. 695 John W. Holmes, “Canada and the Pacific,” Pacific Affairs, Vol 44, No. 1 (Spring 1971), 8. 696 IBID.
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United States.” 697 From a strategic perspective, the markets in the Pacific appeared promising to Canadian businesses with their vast populations and rapid development, offering the promise of a counterbalance of proportions sufficient to shift Canadian dependence on the United States.
SOUTH KOREA’S FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES
While Canada began to pay more attention to the Asia-Pacific region for commercial interests, South Korea’s chief incentive for a closer relationship with Canada stemmed from political and diplomatic reasons. Since its founding, South Korea’s foreign policy preoccupation remained its competition vis-à-vis North Korea. Seoul desired to protect its international status, an objective that translated into forming diplomatic relations, forging trade agreements, and generally developing a more outward-looking foreign policy. The early 1970s was the time when North Korea “broke out to the world” and Kim Il Sung announced this decade in his country as the “nonaligned” era and a model for post-colonial nation-building. North Korean trade with the ‘Free World’ rose dramatically with the relaxation of the Cold War hostilities in the early 1970s. Enjoying good relations with both China and the USSR, North Korea “felt secure enough to pursue its own version of détente with the West” and Kim Il Sung claimed that the DPRK was willing to engage with all countries.698 North Korea’s rapid expansion in the 1970s was essential to understanding the domestic political priorities of the ROK. Within South Korea, increased interference from the North and events like the 1968-1969 Pueblo incident, in which Pyongyang captured an American spy ship and held its crew for a year, were used to justify the Yushin rule. Tight security for a greater freedom was how the Park regime justified itsauthoritarian rule, marked by press restrictions, human rights abuses, oppression of freedom of expression, political
697 Ibid, 17. Holmes, particularly in his role as the director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, kept a special interest on Asian matters and mentored a number of emerging scholars who would later play an important role on Canada’s relations with Asia, such as Denis Stairs, Douglas Ross and Paul Evans. Adam Chapnick, Canada’s Voice: The Public Life of John W. Holmes, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 194. Chapnick noted that Denis Stairs’ seminal work on the “diplomacy of constraint” during the Korean War was made possible because of various connections that Holmes offered to Stairs. 698 Charles Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World 1950-1992, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2013), 169-170.
195 prisoners, and the iron rule of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in all fabrics of the Korean society.699
The battle for diplomatic recognition between the two Koreas gained a new sense of momentum by the early 1970s as North Korea stepped up its engagement with the West. In 1972, Kim Il Sung conducted his first interview with American journalists.700 A year later, the DPRK paid for a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, which provided good propaganda material for internal DPRK consumption, if nothing else. 701 The North also increased its trade, including nearly $600 million in contracts signed with Japanese and West European companies, which peaked in 1972. These were small trade deals by European standards, but they were disproportionally important for North Korea, especially when accompanied by promises of further growth. Japan, France, and West Germany proved North Korea’s most important trading partners, but after North Korea successfully normalized relations with Northern and Western European countries, it also built relationships with Austria, Finland, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.702 While North Korea was still behind the South in terms of the number of countries recognizing its legitimacy, the 1970s saw the DPRK establishing relations with eleven countries in Europe, ten in Latin America and the Caribbean, three in the Middle East, thirteen in the Asia-Pacific, and twenty-seven in Africa. The notion of self-reliance, Juche, was widely used as a model in North Korea’s “Non-aligned” diplomacy.703
Canada was also one of the countries that Pyongyang reached out to, specifically to buy Canadian wheat in the early 1970s. This was partly a result of active lobbying efforts from the Canadian Wheat Board, which approached both Seoul and Pyongyang in 1971 to negotiate the sale of grain products. The Grain Division at the Department of External Affairs noted, for
699 See Young Jick Kim, “The Security, Political, and Human Rights Conundrum, 1954-79,” The Park Chung Hee Era, 457-482. 700 See the Cold War International History Project for activities between the American leftists and the DPRK during this period. < https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/cold-war-international-history-project> 701 “Talks with the Journalists of the US Newspaper, New York Times,” in Kim Il Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea, (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 157-72. 702 Armstrong, 171. See also: Leonid A. Petrov, “Australia and the DPRK: A Sixty-Year Relationship,” Pacific Focus 23, No.3 (Dec 2008), 318-20. 703 Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 11. See as well: Jae-Jung Suh, Origins of North Korea’s Juche: Colonialism, War and Development, Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2013.
196 instance, that even though the Canadian Wheat Board visited Seoul on several occasions to negotiate wheat and barley contracts, Koreans asked for 20-year terms (American terms) when the normal commercial term was for three years. Ultimately, South Koreans favoured the deal offered by Australia, a sale of 150,000 metric tonnes on commercial (up to a three-year credit) terms. 704 But South Koreans still did not want Canada to do business with North Korea and tried to lobby the Canadian government to stop them from approaching Pyongyang.
On New Year’s Eve in 1971, the South Korean Foreign Minister in Seoul, Yong-Sik Kim, met with Canadian Ambassador H. O. Moran to explain South Korea’s position and requested that the Canadian government forbid the staff of the Canadian Wheat Board from visiting North Korea. In return, Moran reasoned that the Wheat Board was not a government entity, and as a marketing agency, its salesman could travel anywhere to sell wheat. Even if the staff of the Canadian Wheat Board visited North Korea, it would have no political message and would not reflect any change in Canada’s attitude towards South Korea.705 Not satisfied, the South Korean Minister provided four detailed reasons why Seoul opposed any engagement by the Canadian Wheat Board with North Korea. First, South Korea, as the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula, opposed any of its allies from having any form of contact with North Korea. Second, North Korea was still maintaining its policy of aggression and having any foreign supplies ultimately strengthened North Korea’s potential for attack and encouraged the regime. Third, Communists, especially the North Koreans, made no distinctions between government entities and non-governmental entities, and would take every possible opportunity to use the visit for political propaganda. Fourth, if a country like Canada, which has traditionally enjoyed a strong political alliance with South Korea, makes any form of contact and develops a relationship with North Korea, it would put the South Korean government in a very difficult position. There was an election coming up in the spring in South Korea, and if the Canadian
704 “Canada-Korea Bilateral Issues raised by Ambassador Chin with Minister J. L. Pepin on Jan 18, 1972,” ROK 20-1-2 Files, LAC.
705 “Conversation with Ambassador Moran on December 31, 1971, Establishment of a Canadian Embassy – Canada- 1966-73,” File # 722.32 CN, #5829, North America Division I, Roll 0022-49. Seoul: Diplomatic Archives of the ROK.
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Wheat Board staff visited North Korea, it would make headlines not only in North Korea but in Japan and in domestic newspapers in South Korea and cause great damage to Canadian-South Korean relations. 706 Moran simply responded that he would report this meeting to Ottawa. Despite such detailed requests from the South Korean government, the Canadian Wheat Board proceeded with the sales with North Korea in April 1971, selling some 3.7 million bushels of wheat worth about $7 million.707 In a letter to Jean-Luc Pepin, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, the Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Wheat Board wrote about his visit to North Korea: “Generally speaking, we were impressed by what we saw, and were surprised by the degree of industrialization and by the standard of living, which seemed to us to be higher than China. It is quite possible, therefore, that there might well be a market for Canadian goods other than wheat.”708 In fact, as expressed in the letter to Otto E. Lang, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, the Canadian Wheat Board was interested in further pursuing opportunities for trade with North Korea, such as facilitating a visit to Canada by a North Korean delegation or further negotiations in Vienna or Pyongyang. The purpose of the letter was to raise a complaint since the North Koreans were not allowed to visit Canada. “We are disturbed,” the letter from Assistant Chief Commissioner continued, “that international politics should be allowed to interfere with the possible desire of a North Korean group to visit Canada…Whether or not in fact any business does materialize with North Korea, it seems to us that there is an important question of principle involved.”709 While the DEA was of the view that the Canadian Wheat Board should be more careful since Canada did not recognize the DPRK, the prevailing view at the Ministry of ITC was that business and politics should not be confused.
North Korea’s proactive diplomacy pushed Seoul to adopt a more flexible attitude in its foreign policy. The South Korean government had previously avoided contact with communist countries. The changing dynamic of international politics in the 1970s—namely détente—forced a change and the South Korean diplomatic service devised a new protocol for its diplomats that
706 IBID. 707 “Wheat sold to North Korea,” The Gazette, April 7, 1971 708 “Political Affairs - Policy And Background - Canadian External Policy And Relations - Korea, Democratic People’s Republic, 1970s” RG 25-A-3-c. LAC. 709 IBID.
198 encouraged relationships with non-hostile communist states. Park’s government also paid careful attention to new U.N. member states from Africa, many of which were francophone countries, and it began to dispatch doctors, medical supplies and Taekwondo masters to cultivate cultural and political relationships with the non-aligned countries.710 The primary objective of these outreach efforts was to gain votes at the United Nations on Korean issues in support of South Korean positions versus the North, but the move also reflected a desire to diversify diplomatic and trading relationships. 711 Seoul thus pushed to establish diplomatic relations with Finland, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, engagement that resulted in 79 new diplomatic relationships between 1961 and 1973. Of these new ties, 39 were with the non-aligned group in the Asia-Africa region and 28 were with newly independent countries in Africa.712 Confidential analysis in the Asia Division (O.A.R.) noted that the Republic of Korea was “officially attempting to diversify its procurement requirements in world markets away from Japan and the United States,” and that Australia and France were benefitting from this shift. It also noted that “Seoul has the ability to hurt or assist us commercially…In fact, OSROK (Office of Supply, Republic of Korea) alone annually sources more than 10% of ROK’s imports on behalf of Korean government departments.”713 Noting that Canadian exports to the ROK reached $18.81 million in 1970, it was important for Canada to fully capitalize on the opportunities for the wheat market and for Canadian cattle, which took many years and Canadian funds to establish.
In 1970, Pil Sik Chin, South Korea’s former vice-minister of foreign affairs, was sent to Ottawa as the new ambassador with a clear mission from President Park Chung-Hee to further develop diplomatic ties between Canada and Korea.714 A seasoned diplomat in his mid-40s, Chin enjoyed the reputation among Canadians for being “articulate, well-informed, friendly and obviously anxious to help.”715 He began his diplomatic career at the age of 25 (in 1948 when the ROK government was just established), and was in the midst of a posting in Chile when he
710 Changhoon Kim, Han'guk oegyo ŏjewa onŭl, [The Past and Present of South Korean Diplomacy], (Seoul: Darakwon, 2002), 114-116. 711 Charles Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World 1950-1992, 169-170. 712 Chang-Hoon Kim, Ibid. 713 “Political Affairs - Policy And Background - Canadian External Policy And Relations - Korea, Democratic People’s Republic, 1970s” RG 25-A-3-c. LAC. 714 See Korean Canadian Cultural Association, op. cit. for a detailed background on Amb. Chin. 715 “Briefing Book,” 6 January 1970, RG 25, Vol 8776, File 20-1-2-ROK, LAC.
199 received the call from Seoul for his next job in Ottawa. As Chin noted in his memoirs, he received a clear order from President Park to “get a Canadian resident mission in Seoul,”716 and noticed that there was almost little to no interest in Canada for advancing bilateral relations with the ROK. Chin believed that the establishment of a resident mission would be the first step towards a serious bilateral relationship, and the South Korean government also believed that it would help solidify Canada’s support in its diplomatic battle vis-à-vis North Korea.717
In addition to changing perceptions about South Korea’s economic value for Canada, Ambassador Chin lobbied hard to establish a Canadian embassy in Seoul. After meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau on February 17, 1970, Chin described the prime minister as showing “intense curiosity” about the situation in Korea about political, military and economic developments since the Korean War, about the severity of threats from North Korea, including contingency plans in the event of another crisis, and about the prospects of reunification on the Korean peninsula.718 He found Trudeau to be extremely attentive, genuine, and emphasized that he showed a keen interest in visiting Korea. As it turned out, he should have added “eventually” to his glowing report: Trudeau did not visit until September 1981. Chin pressed him about the feasibility of establishing a Canadian embassy in Seoul in light of Korea’s economic growth, the expansion of trade between Canada and the ROK, as well as the overall importance of Canadian- Korean relations in Canadian foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The Prime Minister responded that Canada was facing serious budgetary constraints, particularly a need to defend against inflation, but promised that an embassy in Seoul remained a high priority.719 Trudeau also reassured the Ambassador that Canada’s diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic
716 Seaborn to Ralph Collins, Assistant USSEA for Asia-Pacific, 19 January 1970, RG 25, Vol 8776, File 20-1-2-ROK, LAC.
717 Pil Shik Chin, Oegyogwanŭi hoego: Chinp'ilshing Taesa Hoegorok, [Reflections of a Diplomat: Reflections of Ambassador Pil Shik Chin], (Seoul: Oegyo Tʻongsangbu Oegyo Anbo Yŏnʼguwŏn, 1999), 155. 718 Pil Shik Chin, “Report on the Meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau on February 3, 1970 – From the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Ottawa for the Minister of Foreign Affairs,” k'aenada chŏngse, CN722, File no. 3917, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives of the ROK, February 17, 1970. 719 IBID.
200 of China, then under negotiation, had been decided a long time before and would have absolutely no negative consequences for Canada’s relationship with South Korea.720
Nevertheless, Chin continued his efforts, using graphs and charts that showed Canadian diplomatic representation in countries that had less economic value than South Korea, and he took every opportunity to remind Canadian diplomats that they must balance recognition of the PRC with a stronger relationship with Seoul. He reminded them that South Korea’s economy had great potential and emphasized the friendships formed between Canadians and Koreans on the battlefields of the Korean War.721 At every possible opportunity, he urged Mitchell Sharp that a resident mission to Seoul would advance Canada’s Pacific interests.722 While Sharp respected Chin’s ideas, he stressed that these matters were ultimately out of his own control. Chin did however persuade Sharp’s predecessor, Senator Paul Martin Sr., who led Canada’s delegation to Park’s third inauguration in summer 1971, of the need for an ambassador in Seoul. 723 Chin had other allies in Ottawa. In a confidential memo in 1972, Arthur J. Andrew, the Director-General of the Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of External Affairs, argued:
From the Canadian point of view, the main programme justification for the opening of an Embassy in Seoul arises from the favourable commercial prospects and from the fact that Korea is a significant source of immigrants. It is also an extremely important factor in our considerations that changing power relationships in the Asian Pacific area are again making Korea a potential source of danger to the stability of the region.724
Andrew stressed that opening a new post in South Korea was “the most urgent requirement” because it would be reinforcing a positive image for Canada. This was beneficial because, as he further explained, large numbers of Koreans were “unaware of Canada in a general way, and
720 IBID. 721 Seaborn to H.M. Maddick, General Director, Trade Commissioner Service, 24 April 1970, RG 25, Vol 8776, File 20-1-2-ROK, LAC. 722 Pil Shik Chin, “Reflections of a Diplomat: Diaries of Ambassador Pil Shik Chin,” (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs IFANS, 1999), 157. 723 Greg Donaghy, Presentation Notes at the Canada-Korea Conference at the University of Toronto (2013); Paul Martin, A Very Public Life, Vol II: So Many Worlds, Ottawa: Deneau, 1983, 672. 724 A.J. Andrew, “Confidential Memo,” January 13, 1972, ROK 20-1-2, LAC.
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Canada is regarded with great affection, partly because of its role in the Korean War, but also because of the work of early Canadian missionaries in bringing educational and social benefits to Korea.”725
Andrew’s views were soon confirmed when Canada’s Industry Minister, Jean-Luc Pepin, embarked on a visit to Korea in early 1972, accompanied by Robert Lee, an officer based in the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo. 726 Pepin’s visit favourably impacted Ottawa’s position on establishing a resident embassy in Seoul.727 It was also significant that trade between Canada and the ROK had virtually doubled every year since 1971: in 1971, bilateral trade totalled $42 million, in 1972, $75 million, and in 1973, it exceeded $150 million worth (wood pulp, telecommunications equipment, minerals) and imported about $90 million worth (clothing apparel, electronic consumer goods, plywood).728
The new Canadian embassy finally opened in Seoul in late 1973 and Ottawa emphasized that the undertaking was made after a “very careful look at our key global priorities and we were satisfied that a resident embassy in Seoul would further Canada’s national interests in a tangible and enduring way.”729 The final decision was a recognition of the ROK’s remarkable development record and its future potential as an industrial power in Asia. The decision was warmly welcomed by Seoul, which had been urging such a move since formal diplomatic
725 “A. J. Andrew’s Correspondence with A. F. Broadbridge, Pacific Division” January 14, 1972, ROK 20- 1-2- ROK, LAC. 726 See the “K'aenada sanggong janggwan panghan,” [Visit of Pepin J.L. Canada’s Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce], January 29-31, 1972,” CN 765.422.CA, File 5544, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives of the ROK. 727 Interview with Bob Lee, Oct 10, 2015; Department of External Affairs Pacific Division, “RE: Opening Korea,” July 31, 1972, LAC. 728 Trade with North Korea had been minimal, the only noteworthy items Canadian grain exports of $7 million in 1971 and $11 million in 1973. Bilateral Discussions between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo of the ROK, “Korean Question at the UN”, Sept 20, 1974, as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, LAC. 729 A. J. Andrew, Director-General, Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs “Canada’s Relations with the Republic of Korea” Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, ROK 20-1-20. (January 2, 1973) The timing of the opening of Canadian Embassy in South Korea is very important, particularly because it came shortly after budgetary cuts in the Department of External Affairs and the costs involved in setting up the Embassy were very significant
202 relations had been agreed to in 1963.730 By the time the Canadian embassy opened in Seoul in 1973, Canada’s bilateral trade with South Korea exceeded $150 million. Canada was the ROK’s fourth-largest customer and twelfth-largest supplier, so there were clear commercial interests. 731 For the South Korean government, wary of North Korea’s outward expansion of its ties with members of the non-aligned movement, the establishment of the Canadian embassy had a special political importance as well.732
Toronto became a hub for new Korean immigrants -- many families opened small businesses around the Bloor and Christie area -- with the fact that Toronto was Canada’s business hub being a natural pull factor.733 Advancing economic interests and fostering the trade relationship were seen as crucial components in this process, along with resource cooperation, technical cooperation, and increased opportunities for investment and job training. Seoul also hoped for a stronger support from the Canadian government to identify and suppress pro-North members of the Korean Diaspora under the auspices of promoting a free and liberal society.734 While it is difficult to determine how successful these efforts were, it is evident that North-South relations formed the core preoccupation for South Korea’s approach towards Canada, in direction, tone and substance.
After Canada’s last aid shipment735 of dairy cattle in 1972, commercial interests and South Korea’s economic potential became key guiding principles in the Canadian approach
730 A. J. Andrew, Director-General, Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs “Canada’s Relations with the Republic of Korea” Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, ROK 20-1-20. 731 “Farewell Call on the Secretary of State for External Affairs by Ambassador Pil Shik Chin of the ROK, January 25, 1974- The Republic of Korea – Recent developments: Foreign Policy,” as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada 732 For more details, see “Chu k'aenada daesagwan kwanjŏ maeip”, [Purchase of a Resident ROK Embassy in Canada - 1970], CN1285.22, No. 3972, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives of the ROK. 733 “Toronto Konggwan hwaltongbogo” [Consular Reports: 1973-74 TORONTO],” CN773.1, No. 6576, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives. 734 “Trudeau, Pierre E. K'anada susang panghan, 1981.9.27-29” [Background notes in preparation for the visit of Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau] Sept 1981. CN 724.22, No. 15569, Seoul: Diplomatic Archives, 735 Canada provided a long-term loan of $1 million, which Korea used to purchase about 1500 cows and some dairy equipment from Canada. In March 1970, a bilateral agreement was signed, involving shipment of $2.5 million worth of wheat to Seoul under CIDA’s program. See “Canada, Korea Enjoy Rapid Trade Growth, Closer relations,” Globe and Mail, March 15, 1971; Canadian Wheat Aid, National Archives of Korea, BA0138960, Economic Development Branch: International Cooperation Section, 1971; Arrangement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Canada
203 towards the Korean peninsula.736 Agriculture was one of Canada’s key economic theatres for broadening ties with countries like China and Cuba in the early period of bilateral relations, and wheat trade was important for Canadian-Korean relations as well. As the U.S. capital aid to Korea declined, the Koreans had to purchase machinery and equipment on the international market. “Since most of what they presently have is an American design,” one memo in the Department of External Affairs noted, “Canadian manufacturers have the advantage in producing equipment which generally is compatible with that supplied from the United States. We, therefore, face a slight advantage technologically over the European and perhaps in some cases Japanese suppliers of competing items.” 737 From 1973 onwards, within the Pacific Division, a very explicit set of economic objectives concerning Canadian-Korean relations were established. One briefing document noted:
Our broad objectives are to promote and maintain good relations between Canada and the ROK, to cooperate with this rapidly-developing country in matters of mutual interest including development assistance, and to encourage the maintenance of stability in the Korean peninsula. We also intend to expand and develop Canada’s trade and economic relations with Korea and improve access for Canadian goods and services; to increase Canada’s share of the Korean import market, particularly for fully manufactured, high tech goods and services, and to identify and develop opportunities for Canadian private investment and joint ventures in Korea. 738
Beyond diplomatic efforts, the real importance of South Korea from the Canadian perspective stemmed from South Korea’s rapid economic growth. During the Park era, the growth rate of South Korea’s Gross National Product averaged 8.5 per cent per annum. Exports, which stood at a mere USD $100 million in 1964 when the Park government launched export-led industrialization, had risen to USD $10 billion in 1978, the year before Park’s assassination.
concerning the Canadian Assistance of Wheat, Accessed on 1 October 2015, http://61.72.226.18/inter_treaty_real.nsf/alldoclist/4CCAB48EEFA9C09B4925694B000B51F6?opendocu ment&skin=skin01
736 J. Blair Seaborn to Tom Brett, “A briefing note,” July 31, 1969, (ROK 20-1-2), RG25, LAC. 737 Department of External Affairs Pacific Division, “Canada-Korea Trade Relations,” January 1972, Ottawa: Library and Archives. 738 P.H. Chapin, “Visit to Canada by the Minister of Commerce and Industry of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Nak-Sun Lee: Canada-Korea General Relations,” 5 November 1973, as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, RG25, LAC.
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From the beginning of his military junta, Park promoted an “economy first policy,” prioritizing economic growth and anti-communism as prerequisites for “restoring” democracy.739 Park’s economic strategy was extremely successful. To put things into perspective, South Korea’s GDP per capita in 1968 was roughly USD $190 while Canada’s GDP per capita was around USD $3400. Between 1965 and 1971, the volume of trade between Canada and the Republic of Korea grew by 27 times.740 Growth continued to accelerate over the course of the 1970s. In 1971, Korea ranked in 26th place among Canada’s trading partners (a significant change from 116th place in 1965).741 South Korea’s exports to Canada doubled from around CAD $28 million in
1971 to $58 million in 1972, and then again to over $124 million in 1973.742 By 1979, South Korean exports to Canada would reach CAD $387 million, and two-way trade between the two countries would total over CAD $713 million.743 Over the course of the 1970s, the volume and growth rates of Korean-Canadian trade would skyrocket, with South Korea enjoying a trade surplus every year between 1972 and 1979.744 In addition to the increase in the volume of trade, the type of goods traded also became more diversified, reflecting South Korea’s growing competitiveness. The complementary nature of the two economies -- one specializing in primary products and another in manufactured goods -- might suggest that there would be few areas of friction, although the biggest sales, CANDU reactors, would stir up one of the hottest debates about Canada’s industrial policy.745 Canada exported asbestos, wheat, sulphur, pulp, and newsprint to Korea, while South Korea exported sweaters, garments, wigs, footwear, cotton and synthetic textiles to Canada.746
739 Hyung-A Kim and Clark W. Sorensen, Re-assessing the Park Chung Hee Era 1961-79, 2011, introduction. 740 World Bank GDP Per Capita Statistics http://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2- 59B2CD424B85&ss=1390030341854 741 “Korea Twenty Years Later,” Globe and Mail, June 25, 1970. 742 “Businessmen are urged to build Korean trade,” Globe and Mail, February 15, 1972. 743 K-Stats on Canadian-Korean Relations, Retrieved from http://stat.kita.net/main.screen (Seoul: Korea International Trade Association), Accessed June 2016. 744 IBID. 745 See the House of Commons Debates (1971-1973) for Hansard records of debates on CANDU sales, which reflected concerns about nuclear capabilities and undemocratic regimes. 746 “Canada, Korea Enjoy Rapid Trade Growth, Closer relations,” Globe and Mail, March 15, 1971.
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As the DEA analysis noted in 1977, Canadian-Korean trade from 1972 to 1977 grew at an exponential rate. From 1972 when total trade was $76.6 million, it increased 6.1 times to reach $466.7 million in 1977. While Canadian exports made impressive gains, Korea’s export performance resulted in a larger and much increased balance of trade in its favour. In 1977, Canada bought $322.7 million of Korean products, making Canada Korea’s fifth largest market (after the US, Japan, Germany and Hong Kong). Major imports included a wide range of textile products, mahogany plywood, canned mushrooms, television receiving sets and combination of radio-phonograph sets (See Figures 16-18 in the accompanying pages).747 The vast increase in Korean sales of textiles when combined with similarly large increases in textile exports from other low-cost countries resulted in Canadian market penetration of upwards of 50 per cent of multilateral global import quotas on clothing and apparel. Of concern to both countries was the growing number of anti-dumping and valuation investigations being conducted by Canadian authorities on various Korean exports. Korea quickly became the fourth-largest buyer of Canadian goods in Asia. Korea’s 1977 imports of $143.4 million put it well ahead of Canada’s fifth-largest Asian customer, Indonesia.748 Canada’s most important exports included wood- pulp, aluminum ingots, animal hides, coal, tallow and potassium chloride.
747 Department of External Affairs, “ROK: Commercial Overview,” 1972-1979, 20-1-ROK, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada 748 IBID.
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Figure 16: Canada-Korea Trade Relations Value of Total Exports to Canada & Imports from Canada, 1969-1988 (source: k-stat)
1,800,000
1,600,000 Exports to Canada Imports from Canada
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000 Canadian Dollars ($1000) Dollars Canadian 400,000
200,000
0
1983 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Year
Figure 17: Annual Growth Rate of the ROK Exports to Canada (1969- 1988)
120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0
40.0 Percentage 20.0 0.0 19691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982198319841985198619871988 -20.0 Year
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Figure 18 Annual Growth Rate of Canadian Exports to the ROK (1969-1988) 140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0
Percentage 20.0 0.0 -20.0 19691970197119721973197419751976197719781979198019811982198319841985198619871988 -40.0 Year
Source: K-Stats http://stat.kita.net/main.screen
(Korea International Trade Association, Dec 2015)
Enhanced diplomatic access between Canada and South Korea soon translated to closer cooperation in the international forum. At the United Nations, South Korean diplomats focused on enhancing the ROK’s claim as the only legal government of the Korean peninsula and achieved considerable success in making friends among the non-communist and less developed countries of Asia and Africa. In the 1970s, however, South Korea focused on protecting its position as a protégé of the U.N. in the face of the general reduction in East-West tension, the entry of the PRC as well as that of the two Germanies into the U.N., and the movement of a number of Western countries towards the recognition of the DPRK.749 In that process, Canada became a valued ally in leading the “Core Group” of countries that supported South Korea’s position. It was around this time that Canadian-Korean Parliamentary Group and Canada-Korea
749 “Memo for the Minister: A review of Canada’s Relations with Korea since 1967,” January 27, 1975 as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, LAC. RG25.
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Society also gained force.750 These groups, aimed at fostering relationships between parliamentarians and civil society between the two countries, became a forum for bilateral policy discussions and also provided a sense of continuity for issues of mutual concerns between the two countries. The Canadian Embassy in Seoul reported that the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the activities of the “Core Group” of countries which supported them in the U.N. on the Korean Question have been most useful and they were convinced that Canada played an important role in this group. Derek Burney, Director of the Pacific Division at the Department of External Affairs, also noted:
On the membership question, we continue to believe in the merits of universality and in the advantages of both Koreas becoming UN members. But in view of the importance of our bilateral relations with the ROK, we are not prepared to get out ahead of the ROK and against the ROK’s wishes to support North Korean membership in the UN or its technical agencies. 751
Canada felt little compulsion to establish relations with North Korea, which stemmed from “overriding interests in the South and the absence of any countervailing advantage to be gained in dealing with the North.”752 While the North Koreans continued to press Ottawa for official dealings and requests for visas to travel to Canada, all such requests were denied, and an internal DEA memo argued: “Probably the most significant reason for not recognizing the North has to do with Canada’s rapidly increasing economic stake in South Korea and our wish not to jeopardize this for insubstantial gains in the North.”753 It was true that Pyongyang, while agitation for closer relations with Canada, had not (with the exception of wheat and flour purchases in 1971 and 1973) taken advantage of Canada’s expressed willingness to discuss
750 From the Canadian Embassy, Seoul, Korea to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, “Republic of Korea: Quarterly Report – December 1, 1976 ~ February 28, 1977” March 11, 1977, as found in “Political Affairs- Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy and Relations – South Korea (From 75-04-01 to 77-12-31” File No. 20-1-2-ROK Volume 9, Volume Accession No. 16192, LAC. 751 “Farewell Call on the Secretary of State for External Affairs by Ambassador Peel Shik Chin of the ROK, January 25, 1974- The Republic of Korea – Recent developments: Foreign Policy,” as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, LAC. 752IBID. 753 “Memo for the Minister: A review of Canada’s Relations with Korea since 1967,” January 27, 1975 as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, LAC.
209 increased trade in Vienna. As a result, Ottawa felt little inclination to alter Canada’s traditional pro-ROK policy so long as the two Koreas remained at odds with each other and prospects for trade with the North remained slight.754 Hence, commercial interests had an important impact on Canada’s approach towards the two Koreas.
CONCLUSION
To what extent did Trudeau’s “Pacific Turn” have meaningful impact on the course of Canadian-Korean relations? Canadian foreign policy in the 1970s was occupied by many other issues under the broader umbrella of the Cold War, and its biggest trading partner continued to be the United States, despite its efforts at diversification in Europe and Asia. While the exponential growth in the volumes of trade between Canada and Korea in the 1970s was truly impressive, it had more to do with South Korea’s own economic growth and the value of the Korean market and its exports for Canada’s commercial interest, rather than a coherent policy- level approach from Ottawa. From Seoul’s perspective, Canada was another diplomatic battleground in its race for legitimacy vis-à-vis Pyongyang. The establishment of a resident Canadian embassy, therefore, was an important diplomatic gain, as well as enhanced Canadian support for the ROK’s position at the United Nations. However different their motives had been, South Korea and Canada reached a new level of relationship as viable business partners over the course of the 1970s. The next chapter will turn to the most important deal of Canadian-Korean commercial relations during this period, the export of CANDU reactors to Korea.
The 1970s was a special decade in the history of Canadian-Korean relations in terms of institutional mechanisms and the take-off in bilateral trade and expansion in relationship between the two peoples. While an official diplomatic relationship was established in 1963, it took a full decade until a resident Canadian embassy was set up in Seoul in 1973, largely in response to Korea’s economic growth and persistent diplomatic pressures. Under Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau, Canada heralded a new “Pacific” direction in its foreign policy, in recognition of the
754 “Memo for the Minister: A review of Canada’s Relations with Korea since 1967,” January 27, 1975 as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada.
210 growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region. While these efforts were delayed and did not entirely succeed at first, the 1970s marked a clear point of departure in terms of volumes of trade and Korean migration to Canada. Prior to the 1970s, Canadian-Korean relations had been largely low-key in nature, which generally assumed a secondary importance to their respective relationships with the United States. The United States was Canada’s top trading partner and the ROK’s security depended on the U.S. forces stationed there. The establishment of a Canadian embassy in 1973, therefore, had both symbolic and practical implications: it reflected Canada’s growing political and commercial interests in the Asia Pacific region, and facilitated a more effective institutional mechanism for trade and immigration.755 Stability on the Korean peninsula, as well as inter-Korean relations, had clear strategic implications for the Asia-Pacific region, the United States, and Canada’s position in the Cold War.
755 “Farewell Call on the Secretary of State for External Affairs by Ambassador Pil Shik Chin of the ROK, January 25, 1974- The Republic of Korea – Recent developments: Foreign Policy,” as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada
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Chapter 6 THE CANDU: The Game Changer
With South Korea’s rapid economic industrialization and the growing commercial interests between Canada and Korea during the 1970s, prospects for a more substantial trading partnership between the two countries continued to expand. In particular, the export of the CANDU reactors (CANada Deuterium Uranium), designed by the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), became a central issue in Canadian-Korean commercial relations.756 The sheer commercial value of the CANDU reactor, at about $576.5 million, made for the biggest, but also the most controversial, deal ever signed between Canada and Korea. The struggle over the CANDU export and soul- searching about Canada’s industrial policy reveal a great deal about competing national interests of both countries and the interplay of national and international priorities. Exporting the CANDU reactors became a matter of public importance, as Canada struggled with domestic economic pressures and the broader foreign policy objective of nuclear non-proliferation.757 To purchase CANDU reactors, South Korea eventually ratified the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, halted its efforts to acquire a French nuclear reprocessing plant, and placed enhanced safeguards on nuclear reactors.758
Despite its high commercial potential, there was nothing inevitable about the CANDU export to Korea, both because of public fears about nuclear proliferation, as well as complicated politics in the Western alliance, as the United States suspected that South Korea was planning to develop a nuclear weapons program. Canadian-Korean relations in the 1970s were primarily driven by economic interests for Canada and geopolitical interests for South Korea in the context
756 Since its creation in 1952, the AECL focused on developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy, through the use of heavy water and natural uranium, although it had produced plutonium for the American weapons program earlier in its history. See “CANDU History” http://www.candu.com/en/home/candureactors/canduhistory.aspx (Accessed Aug 12, 2016).
757 Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, (Toronto: U of T Press, 1988), introduction. 758 Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin eds., Canada Among Nations 2008: 100 Years of Canadian Foreign Policy, (Montreal: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs in cooperation with the Centre for International Governance Innovation, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 222.
212 of the Cold War. Changing dynamics in the Canadian-American-British collaboration on nuclear reactors influenced the CANDU deal and brought Canada and South Korea closer together in the process. Domestic interests also influenced Ottawa’s position, including AECL’s interest in exporting the CANDU technology to developing countries. The 1970s energy crisis also affected South Korean interest in atomic research and technology and the CANDU reactors, as did India’s nuclear explosion, Canadian concerns about the nature of political situation in South Korea, President Park’s nuclear agenda and North-South relations, and a scandal involving the AECL’s agent, Shaul Eisenberg. Growing public discontent about the United States in South Korea, coupled with fears about North Korea’s technological advancement, all played an added role in the South Korean decision-making process. Ultimately, the CANDU sales intensified Canadian interest on South Korea as a viable trading partner and also turned South Korea’s attention to Canada.
To be sure, there were international mechanisms in place to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology, meaning that efforts to engage with nuclear energy would not be a source of further conflict. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a landmark international treaty, was opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 1970. The safeguards system under the NPT was monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which verified compliances through regular inspections.759 Technically, South Korea had started its nuclear research as early as 1956, three years after it signed a mutual defence treaty with the United States. It was intended to be for scientific research for the peaceful use of atomic energy. South Korea had also joined the International Atomic Energy Agency, so its research programme had been under international surveillance since 1957. In 1964, South Korea ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, but the actual ratification was delayed because of North Korea’s delay in becoming an NPT member state. The Americans did not exert political pressure for Seoul to ratify the NPT immediately,
759 UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/ (Accessed May 1, 2017). The NPT has been extended indefinitely as of May 11, 1995.
213 seeing that the IAEA inspection and regulations would be sufficient to monitor South Korea’s nuclear projects, which were conducted in partnership with American scientists anyway. 760
By the time the agreement for the CANDU reactor sales to South Korea was signed on January 26, 1976, it marked the most stringent of all safeguards agreements to date, containing several important conditions which highlighted, at Canadian insistence, that nuclear cooperation was for peaceful purposes only.761 Canada insisted upon a requirement of prior consent for the retransfer of all nuclear equipment, material, facilities, fuel or technology. It also attached its prior consent requirement for the reprocessing of all generations of fuel. To make sure that its position was well-known on this issue, Canada sent an appended diplomatic note to the agreement where South Korea pledged that “In the event of non-compliance, all nuclear cooperation would cease and all nuclear items provided by Canada would be returned.”762 Some important questions arise: Did Canadians have legitimate reasons to be worried? How significant was the CANDU in the evolution of Canadian-Korean relations? Why did South Korea want nuclear technology and why did it choose Canadian option, with stringent terms?
Without a doubt, the sale of the CANDU reactors became the single-most important “game-changer” in terms of the Canadian approach towards Korea, shifting Ottawa’s traditional preoccupations on Japan and China in its Pacific policy.763 A memo from the Pacific Division of the Department of External Affairs noted in January 27, 1975 outlined the significance of the CANDU in Canadian-Korean relations:
Until the event of the CANDU sale to Korea, our general relations interest in Korea was [sic] largely derived from our interest in Japan for which the Korean peninsula has great economic and security
760 Byung-Kook Kim & Ezra F. Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era, 486-487. 761 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, “Taehanmin'guk chŏngbuwa k'anada chŏngbuganŭi p'yŏnghwajŏk mokchŏkŭl wihan wŏnjaryŏgŭi kaebal mit ŭngyonge issŏsŏŭi hyŏmnyŏkŭl wihan hyŏpchŏngŭi kaejŏngŭl wihan kyohwan'gaksŏ” [Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Canada for Cooperation in the Development and Application of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes], File #GOSI 446, Signed on 26 January 1976, Seoul: Treaty Web – Bilateral - MOFA, (Accessed 19 July 2017) http://treatyweb.mofa.go.kr/JobGuide.do# 762 IBID. 763 Interview with Robert Lee, first Canadian Trade Commissioner to Korea (Oct 2015) & interview with Derek Burney, former Canadian Ambassador to Korea (Oct 2016).
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significance. This sale alters the substance and significance of our bilateral relationship with Korea and because of its political and economic implications we will need to follow developments on the Korean peninsula closely. 764
Just a few years earlier in 1969, Canada had failed in its efforts to sell a CANDU reactor to South Korea. At the time, it was unsuccessful because American models were cheaper and more accessible. These deals were conducted through American companies, rather than through the American government. In 1973, the South Korean government approached Canada for the CANDU reactors, without even holding an international tendering process. President Park was well aware that Washington did not hold a favourable view towards South Korea’s investment in nuclear technology, and he found that Canada actually had the type of reactor that could be useful. Canada, through the Export Development Corporation and a consortium of banks, provided a loan of over $300 million to the South Korean government to facilitate this deal.765
But the CANDU export to Korea was more than just a business deal: it was a perfect microcosm of the tension between high-tech exports and nuclear non-proliferation.766 The deal’s commercial significance notwithstanding, the CANDU prompted intense public and political debate in Canada that nearly scuttled the entire affair. In South Korea, the deal remained mostly in the hands of a few technocrats, with the public having very little knowledge of the agreement. Canada’s internal debate about this nuclear reactor export really stemmed from the uniqueness of design and anti-nuclear sentiments: the CANDU’s pressurized heavy water system was based on using natural uranium as its fuel and heavy water as the moderator.767 While the fuel that has
764 “Memo for the Minister: A review of Canada’s Relations with Korea since 1967,” January 27, 1975 as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada 765 Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU Exports, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 114. 766 See as well Government of Canada – Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Nuclear Industry Review: Problems and Prospects, Ottawa: EMR, 1982; the anti-nuclear case is made by Gordon Edwards, “Canada’s Nuclear Industry and the Myth of the Peaceful Atom,” in Ernie Regehr and Simon Rosenblum, eds., Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race, Toronto: Lorimer, 1983. 767 Heavy water has the highest moderating ratio of any material in use as a moderator (water, graphite, etc). Moderating ratio is a term used to indicate the effectiveness of a substance in slowing down the neutrons needed to sustain the fission process without absorbing them. A. R. Burge, J.E.O. Davies, J. A. Weller et al., Nuclear Energy, (Toronto: Heritage Press Co. Ltd, 1975), 2.
215 been processed through the CANDU reactor could be discarded as waste, it still contained plutonium that can be further processed for sales to 3rd parties or weaponization.768
To fully understand the CANDU’s importance in the 1970s, it is critical to examine the historical roots and early influences of Canada’s traditional allies, the U.S. and Great Britain. The federal government had nationalized Canada’s only uranium mine in 1944, and asserted jurisdiction over uranium mining in general by 1946. It created two federal crown corporations, the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) and Eldorado Nuclear Ltd.; the AECL was responsible for nuclear research769 and Eldorado770 was responsible for the mining and refining of uranium. As historian Robert Bothwell noted in the official history of the AECL, “it had a scientific purpose, generally accepted; it had an energy future, largely unquestioned, and it played a role in defence and security through its contribution to the U.S. atomic weapons program.”771 Dating back to the Second World War, notable early developments in Canada’s atomic energy research, such as the establishment of the Chalk River laboratories and construction of the Canadian heavy water-moderated research reactors such as ZEEP, NRX and NRU received financial contributions from the U.S. and intellectual and technical support from the U.K.772 The British and the Americans stationed liaison officers at Chalk River and Canadians sent their own scientists and engineers to Savannah River (U.S.) or Harwell (U.K.). There were annual conferences at Harwell or at Chalk River and a regular exchange of latest advancements.773 The relationship between the atomic partners were meant to be kept in a cordial and cooperative spirit, and the exchange of information was mutually beneficial.
While there was a strong R&D focus in the early days of the AECL, attention on nuclear reactors soon shifted from scientific research to industrial usage and the design of Canada’s own
768 A. R. Burge, J.E.O. Davies, J. A. Weller et al., Nuclear Energy, (Toronto: Heritage Press Co. Ltd, 1975), 12. 769 See Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988. 770 See Robert Bothwell, Eldorado: Canada’s Natural Uranium Company, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984. 771 Robert Bothwell, Nucleus, 349. 772 Gord L. Brooks (Former AECL Vice President Operations, Design and Development Division and AECL VP and Chief Engineer,) A Short History of the CANDU Nuclear Power System, (Ontario: Ontario Hydro Demand and Supply Plan Hearing, 1993), 2. 773 Bothwell, Nucleus, 221.
216 nuclear reactor. After careful examination of various reactor types, Canada decided on the heavy-water, natural uranium-moderated power reactor, which became known as the CANDU. This design made best use of Canada’s experience with heavy water research reactors, and also enabled the use of Canadian uranium as reactor fuel without the necessity of enriching the uranium in foreign facilities; this meant Canada could avoid dependence on costly American facilities.774
In 1955, the first small-scale prototype CANDU type reactor was jointly undertaken by AECL, Hydro, and Canadian General Electric, although the first commercial CANDU reactor only began operations in Pickering in 1971.775 The fact that the Canadian system was different than other models was seen as a unique advantage, as it would target a niche market and avoid duplicating efforts made by the other competitors. Energy independence was an important part of political independence, a critical consideration for Canadian policymakers.776 As the CANDU became more industrial in its design, scientific cooperation among allies soon translated into a competition for intellectual property.777 After 1955, atomic research in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. moved in very different directions. Once the British understood that Canadians were unlikely to buy from them, scientists at the AECL saw a “cooling in attitude and a diminution in information flow.”778
The divergence in nuclear reactor designs amongst the allies in the post-1955 environment and the competition for export markets established an important context for the CANDU’s future. The differences in nuclear reactor designs are worth briefly examining, for they shed light on the competitive market that the CANDU had to penetrate in the developing world. The British focused on designing reactors that were primarily producing plutonium, with a strong military interest. Their magnox reactors used graphite rather than heavy water as a
774 Brooks, 2-3; See Bothwell, Nucleus, chapter 10. 775 François Bregha, “Energy Policy,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/energy-policy/ (Accessed 3 October 2016) 776 Bothwell, Nucleus, 346. 777 Ibid, 278. 778 IBID.
217 moderator and used gas as a coolant. Aside from export to Italy and Japan, magnox779 stations were mostly built for domestic usage and faced serious competition from the American reactors.
Funded heavily through government investment and military spending, the American reactors, called the PWR (pressurized light water reactor), used light water for moderating and cooling.780 While the Westinghouse company focused on its PWR model, its main competitor, General Electric, began building a boiling water reactor (BWR), which used light water as moderator and coolant.781 Westinghouse and GE had marginal differences in terms of technological advancement and both relied heavily on the support of the U.S. government for export.782 The American government actively supported its nuclear reactor industry, by declassifying data on the operation of power plants, concluding bilateral agreements with prospective markets, and exporting enriched uranium in tandem with American reactor models. 783 But sales remained relatively low, mainly because countries still preferred to develop their own nuclear industry and because there was still some degree of reluctance about the economies of scale with regards to nuclear energy. International safeguards on nuclear reactors applied across the boundaries. It was true that both Britain and the United States had the potential to be competitors to Canada, but they did not produce the type of reactors that South Korea was looking for.
Domestically, Ottawa’s interest in the CANDU reactors expanded as it continued to invest its resources and Canadian labour force in the nuclear energy industry. With heavy government investment, the CANDU was seen as a “distinctly Canadian system” that could compete against the British Magnox graphite-moderated model or the American light-water
779 For more details, see S. E. Jensen and E. Nonbol, “Description of the Magnox Type of Gas Cooled Reactor,” Roskilde, Denmark: Riso National Laboratory, 1999. Available from < http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/30/052/30052480.pdf> 780 For more details, see Jacopo Buongiorno, “Engineering of Nuclear Systems: PWR Description,” MIT: Centre for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems, https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/nuclear-engineering/22-06- engineering-of-nuclear-systems-fall-2010/lectures-and-readings/MIT22_06F10_lec06a.pdf 781 IBID. 782 For more details, see U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Nuclear Reactor Characteristics and Operational History,” Available from https://www.eia.gov/nuclear/reactors/stats_table3.html 783 Bothwell, Nucleus, 348-349.
218 designs.784 Concurrently, efforts made by the AECL and its President Lorne Gray to sell the CANDU and Canadian design to Britain over the course of the 1960s were largely frustrating and unfruitful. Gray was a likeable character, but “for reasons of pride, ideology, inertia, and industrial policy,” the British were unwilling to purchase Canadian technology.785 As of the early 1960s, no country had produced sufficient nuclear power to compete on equal terms with coal. Everyone was anxious to know if a nuclear miracle would ever happen and the Canadian nuclear industry, with its heavy-water, natural-uranium reactors, began to look abroad for potential commercial opportunities. Nuclear technology was a relatively specialized and expensive field, with significant investment in the construction of reactors and keeping up with latest technology.786 As soon as Canada’s own commercial interests became evident, “every dollar spent on a national design destined for the international market increased the AECL’s interest in seeing its design prevail.”787 As of 1973, there were only two functioning CANDU- type reactors: Douglas Point and Pickering. Early results were spectacularly good, in terms of cost efficiency, and it would be on that basis that export projection proceeded in the 1970s.788
Moreover, the nuclear industry became a key employer for the highly educated labour force from the mid-fifties to the late-eighties.789 By 1977, some 31,400 people were directly employed in the nuclear power industry, with over 76.5 per cent of them from the province of Ontario (in addition to over 85,000 indirect employment in the same period).790 In addition to being a largely public industry run by the government, the nuclear energy industry comprised a
784 A. R. Burge, J.E.O. Davies, J. A. Weller et al., Nuclear Energy, (Toronto: Heritage Press Co. Ltd, 1975), 12. 785 Ibid, 381. 786 Hon. Donald S. Macdonald, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, “Statement on Uranium Policy,” Sept 4, 1974 as seen in Canada, Energy Mines and Resources, 1976 Review of Uranium Enrichment Prospects in Canada, Ottawa. 787 IBID. 788 Gord L. Brooks (Former AECL Vice President Operations, Design and Development Division and AECL VP and Chief Engineer,) A Short History of the CANDU Nuclear Power System, (Ontario: Ontario Hydro Demand and Supply Plan Hearing, 1993. 789 Science Council of Canada, Canada’s Energy Opportunities, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), 21. 790 The Atlantic region employed 6.4%, Quebec employed 13.6%, and Western region employed 3.5% in the overall direct employment in the Canadian nuclear industry (1977). In developing a substantial and reliable nuclear power industry, it was also believed that specialist nuclear sub-sectors in research and development, manufacturing and construction have given added strength to their respective sectors by increasing the range of skills and technological adaptability. See above, page 14-15 & 26-27.
219 very significant portion of Canada’s capital investment. There were important spin-off effects in terms of research and development capacity in atomic physics, atomic energy, safety and environmental matters, and it was believed that Canada’s nuclear industry would give the nation a respected place in international nuclear affairs, such as non-proliferation and safeguards.791
In addition to the domestic desire to export the CANDU reactors, external circumstances in the Middle East also brought new attention to the development of nuclear energy in the 1970s. Oil and natural gas were in short supply in North America in the winter of 1969 to 1970 went into the history books as the coldest in thirty years. In the United States, President Richard Nixon imposed price controls on oil in 1971 as part of his anti-inflation program, which discouraged domestic oil production while stimulating consumption. Natural gas supplies were becoming more limited, largely because the regulatory system that controlled prices could not keep up with changes in markets.792 With the rise of electric utilities switching from coal to oil, the demand for low-sulfur oil suddenly surged. Most of it had to be imported from countries like Libya and Nigeria because the surplus oil production capacity in the United States disappeared.793 In October 1973, Arab oil producers placed an oil embargo on the United States due to its support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War; the embargo quadrupled the price of oil and sparked a major inflationary cycle in both Canada and the United States. The energy crisis of the early 1970s fostered a desire for energy independence from the Middle East and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Visible signs of shortage in energy supply became apparent in long lines for gas, rationing, thievery, and a general state of fear about the future price of oil.794 The phrase “energy crisis” entered the American political lexicon and there was a broad consensus that the U.S. was short in energy supply and thus vulnerable politically.795
791 Canadian Nuclear Association, Economic Impact of Nuclear Energy Industry in Canada, (Ottawa: Leonard & Partners Ltd, 1978), 17. 792 Also see Daniel J. Sargent, Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Renewal, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
793 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, (New York: Simon& Schuster, 1991), 590. 794 Brian Resnick, “What America Looked Like: The 1970s Gas Crisis,” The Atlantic, May 31, 2012 < http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/05/what-america-looked-like-the-1970s-gas- crisis/257837/> 795 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, (New York: Simon& Schuster, 1991), 590.
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The effects of the international oil crisis also affected Canada considerably, as it too found itself unprepared for the sudden increase in international oil prices.796 As Alastair Gillespie, Canada’s Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, noted in his memoirs, the oil crisis “affected all aspects of the government, all Canadian governments, and all governments of the world…runaway inflation, partly the product of the oil crisis also increased tensions in the federal-provincial relations.”797 Given the situation in the Middle East, the Canadian government felt a compelling need to develop a national capacity for energy production, by investing in scientific research and technological development. Donald Macdonald, the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, argued in the government’s 1973 energy policy document that nuclear energy was increasingly seen as the key to the future of Canada’s energy strategy.798 The Canadian Nuclear Association also emphasized: “Because of high fixed cost and lower fuel cost structure with nuclear power stations, every increase in the price of fossil fuels enhanced the competitiveness of nuclear power generation and consequently improved the attractiveness for nuclear reactors, domestically and internationally.”799 Minister Gillespie, who shared Prime Minister Trudeau’s view that the CANDU should be made available to other countries that needed energy, also recalled spending a substantial amount of time selling the CANDU reactors.800 However, despite the technical advantages and high hopes for the CANDU export as a “sleeping beauty” that could attract many foreign sales, Gillespie also recalled the shortage of export sales to generate economies of scale.801
796 François Bregha, “Energy Policy,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/energy-policy/ 797 Alastair Gillespie, Made in Canada: A Businessman’s Adventure in Politics, (Manitoba: Robin Brass Studio, 2009), 170.
798 IBID. 799 Canadian Nuclear Association, Economic Impact of Nuclear Energy Industry in Canada, (Ottawa: Leonard & Partners Ltd, 1978), 13. 800 Gillespie, 184. The Energy Strategy issued by Minister Gillespie in 1976 pointed out that the nuclear power stations existing, under construction and planned in Canada, employ the CANDU reactors developed in Canada. CANDU reactors use heavy water as a “moderator” enabling them to use natural uranium as fuel. The design is such that over 90% of a CANDU nuclear power station can be built or supplied domestically. From a Canadian perspective, CANDU offered many advantages and the Energy Strategy suggested that nuclear could provide about one third of the new electrical generating capacity required by 1990 with plants built nearly entirely with Canadian materials and equipment and powered by Canadian uranium. Gillespie admitted that while nuclear did become significant, particularly in Ontario, this analysis was too optimistic. 801 Also see Bothwell, Nucleus, 426.
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The CANDU reactors faced stiff competition from Canada’s Western partners, and companies therein, such as Westinghouse and General Electric in the United States, Framatome in France, or Siemens AG in Germany, and it had little success in other Western markets such as Australia, Italy or Britain.802 In the face of this competition and general uncertainty about the future of nuclear technology, Ottawa naturally sought new markets for the CANDU in the developing world. 803 Yet, there were serious constraints, such as being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the trustworthiness of the government in question, especially in light of public opinion in the Western world about dangers of nuclear proliferation.
Just as Canada concentrated its efforts on commercial prospects of the CANDU reactors, South Korea also faced compelling economic and political reasons to diversify its energy supply. In fact, South Korea’s interest in the CANDU reactors was directly related to the emergence of détente and changes in the ROK-U.S. alliance. The shift began with Nixon’s tour of Southeast Asia in the summer of 1969, when he laid out the Guam Doctrine, which stated that while the United States would uphold all its treaty obligations, it expected the allies to contribute to their own defence.804 Nixon’s main target was South Vietnam, where he sought to “Vietnamize” the ongoing war and phase out the use of American troops, but South Korea was also affected by this announcement. The Park regime depended heavily on the American support for its defence, and Nixon’s announcement came as a surprise. Park made it public that he felt a “sense of betrayal” from the U.S. government.805 Writing a personal letter to Nixon, Park outlined new threats from North Korea and asked if the U.S. forces could remain in South Korea until at least 1975, by when he expected his country to have sufficient capacity to defend itself.806 With the withdrawal
802 See Duane Bratt, “CANDU or CANDON’T: Competing Values behind Canada’s Nuclear Sales,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Spring-Summer 1998), 4. 803 IBID. 804 “Editorial Note,” Document No. 29, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-76, Vol I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i/20701.htm
805 Sangyun Ma and Wŏn'gon Pak, “Tet'angt'ŭŭi hanmigaltŭngr niksŭn, k'at'ŏwa pakchŏnghŭi” [ROK-US Conflicts during the Era of Détente: Nixon, Carter, and Park Chung Hee], Yŏksabip'yŏng, (Spring 2009), 116. 806 Park to Nixon, April 20, 1970,
222 of over 23,000 U.S. soldiers from South Korea in 1971, Park became even more disillusioned about the credibility of the ROK-U.S. alliance.807 Feeling a great sense of anxiety, Park asked if Washington could support modernizing South Korea’s military and stop any further troop withdrawals. 808 He vocally criticized what he saw as the American failure from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s to protect South Korea from North Korea’s provocations, to keep strong in Vietnam War, and to provide a solid commitment to the security of South Korea.809
Shifts in the ROK-US security alliance in the early 1970s propelled the South Korean government to take a more proactive approach for its defence capacity. Shortly after the 1971 withdrawal of U.S. troops, Park issued a special statement on the government’s Five-Year Military Modernization Plan (1971-1976) in tandem with a public appeal to Washington to meet its obligations with regard to Korea’s security. Park unambiguously demanded that the U.S. honour its Cold War commitment to the defence of Korea and give Korea “a guarantee of security first and then reduce the Army.”810 He was convinced that a more robust security policy would help South Korea adjust to the rapidly changing international security order with a greater degree of flexibility and be better prepared for heightened military tensions on the Korean peninsula.811 The sense of frustration and anxiety in the early 1970s was a mutual feeling between Seoul and Washington. Facing domestic financial pressures and the changing dynamics of the Cold War, Washington felt that the American commitment in South Korea was excessive and believed that Park had exaggerated the threats from North Korea. The American leadership also expected Park to be more cooperative, instead of being so demanding about more financial and military support. There was also a growing concern in the American public opinion about the nature of Park regime and its suppression of basic human rights.812
807 Jung Sik Um, “Park Chung Hee Administration’s Missile Development Strategy on the US Arms Transfer Restraint Policy,” The Journal of International Studies, 53 (1), March 2013, 151-183. 808 Ma, Op. Cit, 116. 809 IBID. 810 Hyung-A Kim, Korea’s Development Under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization 1961-79, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 110-111. 811 Hyung Baeg Im, “The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled,” as seen in Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel Eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea,” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 233. 812 Sangyun Ma, “Alliance for Self-Reliance: ROK-U.S. Security Relations, 1968-71,” Studies in U.S. Foreign Relations, Vol 39, No.1, 2007.
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Believing that the United States would no longer provide sufficient support for South Korea’s security, Park turned to science as a solution: developing self-sufficiency through technology to build defence capability and to gain greater economic autonomy from the United States. Since the end of the Korean War, South Korea had traditionally depended on foreign supply for its energy, most of which was imported petroleum procured through the United States. Much like the Canadians, the South Koreans saw nuclear power as an alternative energy source that might better enable domestic self-generation.813 For Park, nuclear energy held an important key for South Korea’s industrialization and he called for a campaign for “national scientization” to reach an export goal of $10 billion by early 1980.814 Park declared in 1973 that the Heavy and
Chemical Industrialization Policy would become a central part of the Yushin reform815 and he urged everyone to learn technological skills. This generated a massive expansion of vocational education, especially overseas training of scientists, engineers and other technologically skilled workers became a central part of his agenda.816
Just like in Canada, interest atomic energy research in South Korea pre-dated the 1970s energy crisis. As early as 1965, a special branch for atomic energy development was set up at the Blue House. By 1967, a feasibility study on the potential for nuclear energy was conducted, and initial estimates for reactors began pouring in by the summer of 1968 from General Electric, Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse in the U.S., as well as from the British Nuclear Export Executive in Great Britain.817 A twelve-year plan (1969-81) for nuclear research, issued by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) in 1968 and approved by the cabinet in 1969 as a blueprint for national energy autonomy, envisioned the development of a nuclear fuel
813 Bilateral Discussions between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo of the ROK, “Korean Question at the UN”, Sept 20, 1974, as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, Ottawa: LAC. 814 Hyung-A Kim, Korea’s Development Under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization 1961-79, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 166. 815 For more details on the Yushin reform and internal domestic developments under Park Chung-Hee, please see chapter 5. 816 Ibid. 817 Man-yong Moon, “Overview of Atomic Energy Development in the ROK,” National Archives of Korea, Dec 2006. http://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=000108
224 fabrication, a uranium refinement factory, and a reprocessing factory by 1981.818 The first contract went to Westinghouse in January 1969, to be built in Gori in Gyongsangnamdo by the spring of 1971. An important guiding principle in this process was that Korea had to build a system of manufacturing precision that was capable of producing high-grade weaponry, and to maximize production, the Korean defence industry should be managed within the framework of heavy and chemical industry development.819 For Park, education and technology held the keys for South Korea’s future, and subsequently, engineer-technocrats became central to his policy planning on nuclear energy development.820
Why did South Korea turn to the CANDU reactors if Westinghouse was already actively building a reactor in Gori? The answer actually rests with South Korea’s desire to develop its own national capacity for nuclear energy – and potentially nuclear weapons. In an interview with Gyeonghyang Newspaper, Lee Deok-Hee, the Director of Energy Research Development at KAERI, noted that the CANDU system was “less complex to build than other types of reactors, with ease of access to natural uranium and diversifying nuclear energy.”821 It was expected that South Korea would deploy its own engineers and scientists in the process of constructing the CANDU reactors, so that the first two reactors would be built in partnership with the AECL and the other two would be built independently by South Korean engineers. A South Korean news article highlighted that the CANDU, “developed by Canada with less advanced technical skills than the Gori Reactor by the United States, seemed more manageable in terms of technical expertise, and had comparable unit cost for atomic energy as the PWR.”822 Hence, in an effort to build national capacity for atomic energy, the CANDU was seen as the perfect fit for South Korea. There have been some conspiracy theories on this issue -- that what President Park really wanted to do was to develop South Korea’s independent nuclear weapons technology, under the
818 Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Hanguk wonjaryok yonguso 40 nyonsa, (Forty-Year History of KAERI), (Seoul: KAERI, 1990), 55. 819 Hyung-A Kim, Korea’s Development Under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization 1961-79, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 167. 820 Ibid, 187. 821 “Hanguk wŏnjaryŏk kisul chushik'oesa kyehoeng wŏnjaryŏng palchŏnso sŏlgyee uri kisulchindo ch'amyŏk'e,” [Our Technical Team To Participate in the KAERI Nuclear Reactor Development Plans,] Kyŏnghyangshinmun, July 3, 1978, NAVER Digital News Archive. (http://newslibrary.naver.com) 822 IBID.
225 disguise of nuclear technology. The proponents of this view argue that nuclear technology would have solved two of South Korea’s perpetual problems: dependency on energy imports and defence capacity against North Korea.
Given Canada’s desire to export the CANDUs for economic reasons and South Korea’s desire to acquire nuclear energy technology for industrial and political reasons, it appeared as if there was a perfect convergence of interests. However, for nuclear exports, the reality in the early 1970s was much more muddled, both because of unexpected development in India and strong public dissent in Canada. The debate about the potential weaponization was also intensified by concerns after the 1974 Indian explosion, as well as South Korea’s political leadership and geostrategic circumstances. On May 18, 1974, India detonated a nuclear device, using plutonium from a Canadian nuclear research reactor, causing an explosion equivalent to about 15,000 TNT (about the same size of the Nagasaki bomb.) 823 The Indians told the international community that it was a “peaceful” explosion in keeping with their peaceful diplomatic traditions, but the results of explosion were too plainly visible. India was not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and was simultaneously working on rocket development for possible use against its neighbours, China and Pakistan – against both of which India had fought wars. With the Indian explosion, another state had joined the nuclear weapons states.824
The International Atomic Energy Agency was not able to monitor the Indian use of CIRUS, the Canadian-supplied research reactor that had provided the plutonium. The Indian explosion proved that technical and economic barriers to nuclear weapons production were no longer sufficient, since the key ingredient for an explosion (plutonium) could be extracted from a supposedly peaceful nuclear reactor.825 The U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger blamed the Canadians and chose to deny that the United States made any contributions to the Indian bomb.826 The CIA was closely monitoring both the French government and the Canadian
823 Ron Finch, Exporting Danger: A History of the Canadian Nuclear Energy Export Programme, (Montreal-Buffalo: Black Rose Books, 1986), 82. 824 Robert Bothwell, Nucleus, epilogue. 825 Finch, 82-83. 826 Bothwell, epilogue.
226 government because the sale of reprocessing plant by Paris, coupled with Canadian nuclear reactors, would “give Seoul a nuclear weapons capability.”827
India’s explosion posed a serious challenge of credibility for the nuclear non- proliferation treaty (NPT), which became effective as of March 5, 1970. The NPT regime was intended to monitor all non-military nuclear development within a country but did not consider vertical proliferation among the nuclear powers.828 The Indian case proved that developing countries could develop nuclear weapons at a relatively low price and exposed a tremendous weakness of the NPT regime.829 The incident also posed a serious threat to the nuclear reactor industry in Canada, due to increased public concern and opposition. Just a few days after the explosion, on May 22, 1974, Mitchell Sharp, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, issued an official statement:
For all intents and purposes, India has now developed the capability of producing a nuclear weapon … bound to have serious and widespread repercussions throughout Asia and the world. Canada cannot be expected to assist and subsidize, directly or indirectly, a nuclear programme which … undermines the position which Canada has for a long time been firmly convinced is best for world peace and security.830
Sharp’s statement resonated widely with the Canadian public. Historian Duane Bratt, the author of The Politics of CANDU Export, argued that the Indian explosion unequivocally changed Canada’s view on nuclear export sales to South Korea.831 According to Bratt, in the early days of negotiations in 1973, Canada completely ignored the possibility of nuclear proliferation. “Whether that was due to the economic imperative of making the sale or the lack of concern with nuclear proliferation,” said Bratt, “is open to debate.”
827 CIA, “Western Europe, Canada, International Organizations,” SECRET – 123, No. 0226-75, July 14, 1975, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00865A001300320001-3.pdf 828 “Vertical” proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. See Atomic Heritage Foundation, “Nuclear Proliferation Today,” http://www.atomicheritage.org/history/nuclear-proliferation-today 829 Finch, 82-83. 830 Ibid, 84. 831 Interview with Dr. Duane Bratt, October 2015.
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After the 1974 explosion, pressures built in Canada, suggesting that unless strict nuclear safeguards were obtained, Ottawa must re-consider selling nuclear reactors to a country like Korea. As Jeff Carruthers, a journalist from the Globe and Mail, made note of : “the international and military pressures that might force an otherwise well-intentioned South Korean government to develop nuclear weapons despite agreements to the contrary with Canada.”832 This comment reflected a broader concern from the Canadian public. The anti-nuclear and disarmament movements in Canada, which had been largely dormant because the anti-Vietnam movement had soaked up so much of their attention between 1965 and 1974, suddenly gained force with the Canadian public.833 Canadians voiced concerns about the authoritarian nature of the Park regime, arguing that “the Canadian nuclear industry does not need this export business.”834 In Seoul, Canadian Ambassador to the ROK, J. A. Stiles, discussed this issue with his American counter-part, Ambassador Richard Sneider, saying that while the Koreans were “anxious” to purchase the CANDU reactors, Canadians were “reluctant” to do so because it could raise a risk of “diversion” of plutonium for military purposes. In his report to the State Department, Sneider then suggested that Washington could use its influence to ensure that Ottawa did not sell a nuclear reactor.835 Hence, South Korea’s ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) became an important pre-condition of the sale of a nuclear reactor to Korea, but also an issue of concern in Canadian-American relations as well. 836 By March 1975, Ambassador Sneider would advocate against “pussy-footing” and called for a more “direct, early and firm”
832 Jeff Carruthers, “Nuclear deals await decisions on safeguards,” The Globe and Mail, Nov 1, 1974. 833 Martin O Malley, “Selling welfare or war?” The Globe and Mail, June 9, 1975; Gen E.L.M. Burns, “Canadian Policy on reactors called risky,” The Globe and Mail, July 9, 1975; “In the reactor market, let the seller beware,” The Globe and Mail, July 15, 1975; “CANDU exports,” The Globe and Mail, Aug 27, 1975; Jeff Carruthers, “Veto sought over CANDU nuclear materials,” The Globe and Mail, Sept 24, 1975; Edward Clifford, “Extensive problems considered hindering further CANDU sales,” The Globe and Mail, March 25, 1976; Clive Cocking, “The Road to Destruction: Even the ‘peaceful’ use of nuclear power could mean our annihilation,” The Globe and Mail, May 1, 1976 834 Gen E.L.M Burns, “Canadian Policy on Reactors Called Risky,” The Globe and Mail, July 9, 1975. 835 U.S. Embassy in Republic of Korea telegram 7328 to Department of State, “Canadian Nuclear Reactor Program in Korea,” 4 November 1974, Secret Source: RG 59, AAD, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=3513492-Document-03-U-S-Embassy-in-Republic-of-Korea (Accessed May 1, 2017)
836 “The sale of a nuclear power plant to the Republic of Korea” (1974-12-19-1974-12-20), Cabinet Conclusions, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 6436 Access Code: 90 http://www.bac- lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/cabinet-conclusions/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=40050
228 approach to the State Department, considering Seoul’s determination to reach its nuclear goals.837
Canadian politicians also fiercely debated the CANDU export to South Korea in the aftermath of the Indian explosion. Cabinet conclusions from 1974 to 1975 demonstrate how the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan J. MacEachen, convinced the Cabinet of the need to have the ROK ratify the NPT and have Canada only supply the technology directly associated with the construction, operation and maintenance of the reactor.838 Disagreements amongst Canadian parliamentarians on the CANDU sales are well documented in the House of Commons debates, most notably between January 1975, when the AECL and the Korean Electric Power Company (KEPCO) signed a deal for a 600 MW CANDU, and January 1976, when the deal came into force. As Robert L. Stanfield, the Leader of the Opposition (Progressive Conservative), pointedly asked during the Question period on June 5, 1975: “In light of what took place in India and in light of the moral responsibility that any government has in a field like this, is the government of Canada prepared to proceed with the sale of the CANDU reactors in these circumstances with no way of preventing the use of such techniques and plutonium for non-peaceful purposes?”839 Prime Minister Trudeau responded that his chief concern was “the moral problem of sitting on our technology or sharing it and the rules for sharing it which will be the same whether it is South Korea or an advanced country or a developing country.”840 MacEachen further justified the safeguards in place:
…The safeguards which are provided for in the case of South Korea, in a sense, fall into two categories: The ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by South Korea which stipulates that the total nuclear system of
837 U.S. Embassy Seoul telegram 1637 to Department of State, “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” 12 March 1975, Secret, excised copy, Source: Source: RG 59, AAD, MDR release by State Department from P-reels http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=3513501-Document-10-U-S-Embassy- Seoul-telegram-1637-to
838 “The sale of a nuclear power plant to the Republic of Korea” (1974-12-19-1974-12-20), Cabinet Conclusions, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 6436 Access Code: 90 http://www.bac- lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/cabinet-conclusions/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=40050 839 House of Commons Debates, 30th Parliament 1st Session, June 5, 1975, Hansard: Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3001. 840 House of Commons Debates, 30th Parliament 1st Session, June 5, 1975, Hansard: Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3001.
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the country will be subjected to international inspection under the international agency. Second, we are negotiating a bilateral agreement with South Korea putting into effect the total range of safeguards which were announced by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources on Dec 20. This is the most complete possible range of safeguards available at the present time. The diversion of plutonium or material for non-peaceful purpose, is, of course, subject to the examination and inspection system of the international agency. 841
Over the course of the second half of 1975, MPs from the Progressive Conservative party continued to press the Prime Minister on whether Canada could demand assurances from the CANDU recipient country that it would not engage in the recycling of spent rods or plutonium made in atomic reactors.842 Trudeau emphasized: “We have made it clear that there will be no nuclear explosions, and as far as we are concerned, there is no such thing as a peaceful nuclear explosion...South Korea has undertaken the obligation to the international community not to develop or acquire nuclear explosives of any kind.”843
Internally, debates ensued in the House of Commons. Douglas Roche, the Progressive Conservative MP for Edmonton - Strathacona, called the CANDU sales a sheer act of madness: “A cloak of morality has been thrown over this madness. That cloak must be ripped away and the nuclear sale to South Korea exposed and stopped before it is too late.”844 Citing Trudeau’s speech to the Canadian Nuclear Association, Roche continued, “…it has suddenly become moral, even obligatory, to share nuclear technology with the developing world. Of course the Prime Minister has worked to achieve a foolproof inspection system to guarantee against nuclear bomb proliferation. The point is that we do not yet have an internationally recognized foolproof system.” 845 Roche stressed: “Instead of making a quick buck from South Korea under the guise of morality, Canada ought to be leading the way in strengthening and expanding international
841 House of Commons Debates, 30th Parliament 1st Session, June 5, 1975, Hansard: Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3001. 842 Martin O’Malley, “Selling welfare or war?” The Globe and Mail, June 9, 1975. 843 House of Commons Debates, 30th Parliament 1st Session, June 20, 1975, Hansard: Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3001. 844 House of Commons Debates, 30th Parliament 1st Session, Oct 23, 1975, Hansard: Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3001. 845 House of Commons Debates, 30th Parliament 1st Session, Oct 23, 1975, Hansard: Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3001.
230 cooperation in finding safeguard agreements... It is precisely because of our superiority in nuclear technology that we must put statesmanship ahead of salesmanship” 846
De-classified documents from the U.S. National Security Archives suggest that it was Seoul, not Pyongyang, which caused anxiety for Washington in the mid-1970s. According to a report to U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the U.S. intelligence apparatus detected that Park had plans to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons capability in the mid-1970s and had instructed South Korean scientists to develop both atomic weapons and long-range missiles for retaliation against North Korea by 1977.847 There were also growing feelings of discontent between Washington and Seoul about the future of South Korea’s defence policy; a telegram from the U.S. embassy in Seoul in July 1974 suggested a certain “visceral feeling” at the embassy, “based only on growing independence of [South] Korean attitude towards defense matters and increasing doubts about [the] durability of U.S. commitments,” and that “most senior ROK defense planners desire to obtain capability eventually to produce nuclear weapons.”848
To assess the state of South Korea’s nuclear program, the U.S. Intelligence Board even commissioned a study on “Potential for South Korean Nuclear Development,” in January 1975, which concluded that South Korea could have a nuclear weapons capability in the next ten years.849 While American efforts to pressure Seoul to ratify the NPT was unsuccessful, Canadian diplomat Gordon Longmuir told the U.S. Embassy that President Park made a decision to ratify the NPT “largely because of Canadian pressure in connection with the CANDU sale.”850
846 House of Commons Debates, 30th Parliament 1st Session, Oct 23, 1975, Hansard: Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3001. 847 William Burr eds, “Stopping Korea From Going Nuclear, Part I – The U.S. and the South Korean Nuclear Program, 1974-1976,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.582, March 22, 2017, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb582-The-U.S.-and-the-South-Korean-Nuclear-Program,- 1974-1976,-Part-1/ (Accessed April 12, 2017). 848 U.S. Embassy in Republic of Korea telegram 4957 to Department of State, “Korean Accession to NPT,” 30 July 1974, Confidential Source: Record Group 59, Department of State Records [RG 59), Access to Archival Databases [AAD], http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=3513489-Document-01-U-S- Embassy-in-Republic-of-Korea (Accessed April 19, 2017) 849 Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Officers, “Status of Work in Progress,” 10 January 1975, Secret, Excised copy, Extract Source: CIA Research Tool (CREST), National Archives, now on-line at CIA Web Site. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=3513497-Document-07-Director-of-Central- Intelligence (Accessed April 19, 2017) 850 U.S. Embassy Seoul telegram 1239 to Department of State, “Non-proliferation Treaty,” 26 February 1975, Confidential Source: RG 59, AAD, mandatory declassification review (MDR) release by NARA
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Furthermore, the State Department’s message to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul in March 1975 noted that the basic objective of the American policy is to “discourage ROK effort in this area and to inhibit to the fullest possible extent any ROK development of a nuclear explosive capability or a delivery system.”851
The CANDU certainly was not a sufficient or an efficient source of weapons grade uranium or plutonium but it provided important technology for nuclear energy and the potential for weaponization through re-processing plutonium. Given the tense political situation on the Korean peninsula, the possibility for weaponization was something that could not be wholly dismissed. In fact, all of the CANDU purchasers during this period were involved in either a regional conflict (India-Pakistan, Taiwan-PRC, and South-North Korea), or a potential regional conflict (Argentina-Brazil). It was likely that Canada’s CANDU export policy would probably have remained uncontroversial if it had not been for the recent Indian nuclear explosion.852 At a Cabinet meeting in 1976, the Minister of Supply and Services observed that “while Canada had been able to live down the consequences of the Indian detonation of a nuclear weapon, development of a bomb by another country would severely damage Canada’s international reputation. The credibility of Korea was not static and it had not given an unconditional agreement never to build a bomb in the future.”853 There were concerns, both on the nature of the Park regime and its violations of human rights, which merit further discussion.
Although in retrospect these concerns may appear exaggerated, there were legitimate reasons for Canadians to worry about selling reactors to South Korea. The DPRK, although a communist dictatorship, was doing very well economically. North Korea was also gaining and successfully expanding its diplomatic influences, most notably in the Middle East, South America, Africa and the Soviet bloc. To understand Park’s preoccupation in securing continued
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=3513498-Document-08-U-S-Embassy-Seoul-telegram-1239-to (Accessed April 19, 2017) 851 State Department telegram 048673 to U.S. Embassy Seoul, “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” 4 March 1975, Secret Source: RG 58, AAD: MDR release by State Department from P- reels, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=3513500-Document-09-State-Department-telegram-048673- to (Accessed April 19, 2017) 852 Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU Exports, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 114. 853 “Sale of CANDU Reactor to Korea,” Cabinet Conclusions, Jan 15, 1976, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 6495
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American support for the security of South Korea, the political fragility of the Park regime must be underlined. For Park, internal power consolidation and stability were intrinsically tied to containing North Korea’s threats. After his coup d’état in 1961, Park reinstated civilian government with presidential elections and the National Assembly by 1963, at the urging of the United States. But with the rapid rise of his moderate opponent, Kim Dae Jung, in the ’71 presidential election, Park quickly turned towards more centralization and right-wing politics, launching the Yushin system in 1972.854
Park’s rhetoric about “re-vitalization” suggested a new birth of “Korean-style democracy” to “nurture and develop liberal democracy more steadfastly, substantively and efficiently” 855 aimed at enhancing military security, improving inter-Korean relations and economic modernization. However, the Yushin system actually turned back the clock on South Korea’s constitutional progress: Park was guaranteed a lifelong presidency, and the new system gave him the power to rule without legislative and judicial checks and balances.856 Park’s official declaration of the Yushin system noticeably said nothing about changes in U.S. policy on Korea and the impact on that policy of U.S. rapprochement with China – mainly because American officials specifically requested that Park “omit” any mention of the subject from his initial draft to give room for flexibility in any change with their policies. 857
The Yushin system, in essence, was Park’s mechanism for restructuring the apparatus of government into that of a quasi-wartime state. It was aimed at minimizing national dependence on the United States on the one hand, and maximizing his centralized governing structure on the other.858 In what one scholar called a “Machiavellian” transition to the Yushin regime, Park managed to gain a greater freedom to maneuver in domestic politics by reinforcing a Red scare
854 James B. Palais as seen in Hyung-A Kim, Korea’s Development Under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization 1961-79, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), Preface. 855 Secretary Office of the President, Park Chung Hee Taet’ongryong yonsol munjim che gujip 9 [Collection of President Park’s Speeches, Vol 9.], Seoul: Secretary Office of the President, 1973, 299. 856 Hyung Baeg Im, “The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled,” as seen in Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel Eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea,” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 233. 857 Hyung-A Kim, Korea’s Development Under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization 1961-79, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004),141. 858 See Chung Hee Park, Korea Reborn: A Model for Development, Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice/Hall International, Inc. 1979.
233 and by reducing American capacity to intervene in South Korea’s domestic politics on the basis of its military and economic patronage.859 Park’s concerns translated into practical changes for taxation as well. With declining military aid from the United States, Park introduced in 1974 a national defence income tax surcharge of 10 per cent to finance the Forces Improvement Plan (1974-81), with the goal of surpassing North Korea on defence expenditures by 1976. In doing so, South Korea raised defence expenditures from 5 per cent of its GNP to nearly 7.5 per cent. Park increased South Korea’s defense expenditures from $719 million in 1975 to $1.5 billion in 1976, and again to $1.8 billion dollars in 1977.860 In particular, Park’s ambitions for nuclear weapons must be examined in detail, as well as the competition for recognition, legitimacy and survival between the two Koreas.
While it was not widely known at the time, Park’s focus on nuclear energy technology and reactors was closely related to the potential for nuclear weapons development. Nuclear technology was intended to serve the dual purpose of furthering South Korea’s economic development, while also acquiring technology that would eventually be useful as a deterrent against the North.861 Park’s daughter and later (impeached) president of South Korea, Park Geun-Hye, testified in 1994 that the American decision to pull out the Seventh Infantry Division in July 1971 was a key factor in her father’s interest in nuclear development.862 Contemporary Korean historians also agree that Park concurrently pursued nuclear energy development and
859 Ibid, 261. Im noted: “By timing the transition to the Yushin regime in October 1972, when the United States was busy negotiating the terms of peace with North Vietnam, Park was able to prevent the United States from voicing its dissent during the crucial days of regime change. Also, by linking the security crisis triggered by Nixon’s Guam Doctrine, Park made South Korea’s financial and corporate distress work in favour of his political interests and goals by using it to justify the establishment of presidential power to declare emergency economic measures.” 860 During the same period, North Korean defense expenditure grew at a much lower rate, rising from $770 million in 1975 to $1 billion in 1977. (See Taik-Young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power (London: Routledge, 1999), 80. 861 Soo Gwang Kim, “Analysis on the Nixon-Ford Administrations’ Security Policy for the Korean Peninsula: The Changes in the ROK-US Alliance System,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Seoul: Seoul National University, 2008.
862 Yong-Won Kang, “Haek kaebal, Kimilsŏng Kamunboda Taedam haettŏn Pakchŏnghŭi Kamun” [Nuclear development, The Park Family More Ambitious than Kim Il Sung Family], Wŏlgan chosŏn [Monthly Choson]. April 1994. http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002175168
234 nuclear weapons development in the early 1970s.863 By November 1971, Park suggested to O Won-Chol, then a newly appointed member of the Blue House senior staff in charge of defence- related heavy and chemical industries: “Our national security is vulnerable because of the uncertainty surrounding continued U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula…Can we develop nuclear weapons?”864 Park ordered his Deputy Prime Minister, Kim Hang Yol, to construct a special ministry for defence called the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and a clandestine weapons production committee.865 In addition to potential economic and security benefits, nuclear development served an important political purpose in the tug-of-war between Seoul and Washington. Within South Korea, nuclear technology was publicized as a means to achieve energy independence from the United States, while also competing against resource-rich North Korea.866
Given the already tense U.S.-ROK relations and the adverse effect that the news of nuclear weapons development could have on the relationship, Park conducted nuclear development in utmost secrecy. The South Korean decision to purchase the CANDU reactors from Canada must be understood in a rather complicated political environment that saw a growing disenchantment between Washington and Seoul.867 It was clear that none of the other Western powers in possession of nuclear technology, such as the U.K, France, and Canada, would support Park’s nuclear ambition if they were aware of his true intentions. Conducting nuclear weapons program covertly was a difficult task in light of a massive U.S. intelligence
863 Jung Sik Um, “Park Chung Hee Administration’s Missile Development Strategy on the US Arms Transfer Restraint Policy,” The Journal of International Studies 53 (1), March 2013, 151-183; Seung- Young Kim, “Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 12-4, (2001), 61-63; Soo Gwang Kim, “Analysis on the Nixon-Ford Administrations’ Security Policy for the Korean Peninsula: the Changes in the ROK-US Alliance System,” Ph.D. Dissertation¸ Seoul: Seoul National University, 2008; Chul-Ho Jo, “Park Chung Hee’s Nuclear Diplomacy and Changes in the ROK-US Relations,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Seoul: Korea University, 2001, 50-55. 864 Sung Gul Hon, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” as seen in Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel Eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea,” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 483. 865 Ibid, 167. 866 Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, "Park Chung Hee, the CIA, and the Bomb", Global Asia 6, no. 3 (2011). 867 Sung Gul Hon, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” as seen in Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel Eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea,” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 484
235 network that penetrated into Park’s own government.868 The ADD was put solely in charge of nuclear weapons design, delivery systems and explosion technologies, assisted by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), which focused on importing nuclear reprocessing and fuel fabrication technologies and facilities from France and Belgium.869 Because reprocessing the spent fuel could produce weapons-grade plutonium, KAERI’s attempt to purchase French technology was viewed by Washington as driven primarily by military goals, although KAERI justified its efforts as a search for alternative forms of energy.870
There were tantalizing hints about Park’s nuclear ambitions, both at home and abroad. According to testimonials by former high-ranking government officials who served in the Park government in the 1970s, Koreans were clandestinely searching for re-processing technology in Europe, most notably in France.871 Already by the spring of 1972, Park’s trusted Minister of Science and Technology, Choi Hyung-Sup, was sent to France to negotiate cooperation on nuclear technology and re-processing equipment.872 By 1973, the CIA was fully aware of South Korea’s intent to proceed with the CANDU reactors, and declassified U.S. State Department cables demonstrate how Park’s nuclear ideas made him an unpredictable and even dangerous, client.873 Donald Gregg, a former CIA agent who was stationed in Seoul in 1974-75 (he later served as the U.S. Ambassador to Korea and National Security Advisor to Vice-President
868 Even to ADD researchers, Park tried not to issue an explicit order for the development of nuclear weapons, lest the U.S. trace the program to the Blue House and accuse it of undermining the NPT regime. A former ADD researcher, in charge of nuclear weapons design between April 1971 and early 1975, reportedly said that when he met Park on the occasion of his appointment, Park emphasized: “We need to develop superweapons, and this has to be done secretly.” See Sung Gul Hon, 488 and JoongAng Ilbo, Nov 3, 1997. 869 Sung Gul Hon, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” as seen in Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel Eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea,” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 483.
870 Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, "Park Chung Hee, the CIA, and the Bomb", Global Asia 6, no. 3 (2011). 871 Quoted in Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jefferey J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1985), 505-6.
872 MBC Documentary, “Park Chung Hee: Nuclear Weapons Development,” Seoul: Broadcasted on Nov 7, 1999, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRzwskbQ_G0 873 Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, “Park Chung Hee, the CIA and the Bomb”, Global Asia, Vol 6. No 3. Fall 2011, 47-49.
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George H. W. Bush during the Reagan Administration), recalled that Washington was closely monitoring South Korea’s nuclear developments throughout the mid-1970s.874 “It also was a very touchy time for U.S.-South Korean relations,” Gregg recalled in a recent interview, “because by 1973 we had withdrawn from Vietnam or had been evicted. Park Chung Hee, the dictator, military leader was losing faith in us as a strong ally. He was acquiring weapons systems without telling us. He started a nuclear program which we discovered and stopped. It was a very interesting and difficult time for the relationship.”875 Park’s Prime Minister, Kim Jong Pil, reported having attended multiple meetings with President Valery Giscard D’Estaing in Paris from 1974 to 1975 to negotiate nuclear reprocessing technology, which would be critical for weaponization.876 During a trip to Washington in June 1975, Park told reporters that his country was capable of building nuclear weapons. 877 What made Park’s true intentions ambiguous was the difficulty in separating military from economic intentions in the nuclear development program. Much of what was required for nuclear weapons was also required for peaceful industrial use of nuclear energy.
Through the embassy in Seoul, Ottawa carefully monitored the political situation in Korea and singled out “political stability on the Korean peninsula” as one of Canada’s core interests.878 Ottawa concluded that while the regime was eventually becoming “civilianized,” many positions of power and influence were still held by serving or former military officers. South Korea also remained in a state of near mobilization, complete with curfews, much of it in preparation against a potential attack by the North Koreans. 879 However, the Department of
874 “Park Chung Hee began the nuclear development in 1972 and gave up by 1977: Interview with Donald Gregg,” May 12, 2011, Hangyeorae News, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/477753.html 875 Interview with Ambassador Donald P. Gregg Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History (FAOH) Project, Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy, March 3, 2004 https://cdn.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2010/2010gre02/2010gre02.pdf (See especially page 4) 876 Choi Joon Ho, “President Park’s Nuclear Project: Interview with Jong Pil Kim and how the CIA tried to contain Korea’s ambition,” Joong-Ang Daily, July 10, 2015, accessed from http://news.joins.com/article/18210193 877 Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU exports, (Toronto: U of T Press, 2006), 119. 878 P.H. Chapin, “Visit to Canada by the Minister of Commerce and Industry of the ROK, Mr. Nak-Sun Lee: Overview of Canada-Korea General Relations,” Nov 5, 1973 as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the ROK,” File 20-1-2-ROK, (1973- 1975), Vol 8776, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. 879 “Farewell Call on the Secretary of State for External Affairs by Ambassador Peel Shik Chin of the ROK, January 25, 1974- The Republic of Korea – Recent developments: Foreign Policy,” as found in
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External Affairs also concluded that there were other regimes around the world which presented far more concern than Park’s government in South Korea, and that some consideration must be made for the unique security challenges faced by South Koreans.880 The DEA was not pressing for the CANDU sale, but pointed out that withdrawal at that stage would gravely damage relations with Korea as it would imply that Canada had no confidence in the Korean government.881
Dispatches from Seoul concluded that the “future of the South Korean political process rested on external events and that North Korea’s intentions were an essential factor for assessing the domestic prospects of the ROK.”882 It also noted that South Korea’s primary occupation in terms of its external relations centred on North Korea.883 Gordon Longmuir, the Korea Desk Officer in the Pacific Division of the Department of External Affairs, observed:
The primary thrust of the ROK’s diplomatic activity is aimed at enhancing its international status and its claim to be the legal government of the entire peninsula. The ROK has had considerable success in wooing friends amongst the non-communist and less developed countries of Asia and Africa. Although the ROK is not a member of the United Nations, the world body plays a key role in the country’s external relations since the ROK was nurtured by a UN commission.884
Some in the Department held the view that Park’s position was an inevitable, even necessary, stage on the way to modernity. What mattered was that South Korea was anti-communist and
“Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada 880 “Memo for the Minister: A review of Canada’s Relations with Korea since 1967,” January 27, 1975 as found in “Political Affairs – Policy and Background for Canadian External Policy and Relations with the Republic of Korea,” File 20-1-2-ROK (1973-1975) Vol 8776, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada 881 “Sale of CANDU Reactor to Korea,” Cabinet Conclusions, Jan 15, 1976, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 6495 Access Code: 90 882 DEA’s memo noted: “Increased interference from the North, such as that which appears to be feared by the government and was used to justify the state of emergency, could lead to a freeing of political activity and perhaps render Park reluctant to give up office at the end of his present term. Continued improvement of the security situation, which on the surface appears to be the trend, could lead to a greater freedom although the process would nevertheless be firmly guided.” Republic of Korea Political Situation – Confidential – 20-1-2-ROK, January 8, 1972, Ottawa: Library and Archives of Canada. 883 Republic of Korea Political Situation – Confidential – 20-1-2-ROK, January 15, 1972, Ottawa: Library and Archives of Canada. 884 IBID.
238 supporting the South Korean economy was an issue of importance for Ottawa, mainly because it was becoming a significant trading partner for the Canadian economy. Canadian diplomats focused heavily on the trade potential of the South Korean economy rather than on concerns about the nature of Park’s regime. With Park, stability was assumed, which was an important consideration for Ottawa. As Monique Bégin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, stressed in the fall of 1975: “Who are we to pass judgement on political systems under which other people choose to live?”885 It can be deduced that Ottawa’s chief concern remained stability on the Korean peninsula – even if that stability was maintained through repression. Despite the diplomatic service’s preference for stability, concerns remained, particularly among the opposition benches and in the general public. On June 20, 1975, Allan B. McKinnon, the PC M.P. from Victoria BC, asked in the House of Commons:
Are our balance of payments difficulties so bad that we must sell the making of atomic weapons to South Korea, one of the most heavily armed, militaristic and unstable countries in the world? We now have the Prime Minister assuring us that South Korea promised they would not use reactors to develop explosive capabilities [but] South Korea has stated if they cannot remain under the US umbrella, they will develop their own bombs. 886
Mitchell Sharp, Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, emphasized that the CANDU reactor sales to Korea had “nothing whatever to do with our balance of payments situation,” and that Canada was only undertaking to negotiate based on the Korean assurance that they will “only use nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes.” However, there were serious concerns in the minds of Canadian public that the CANDU deal was in fact mostly financed through $330 million in loans to South Korea, made available through Export Development Canada, and another $60 million through Canadian banks. 887 One article in Maclean’s magazine argued, for
885 House of Commons Debates, 30th Parliament 1st Session, Oct 23, 1975, Hansard: Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3001. 886 House of Commons Debates, 30th Parliament 1st Session, June 20, 1975, Hansard: Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3001. 887 “Export Development Corporation (EDC) - Financing to Republic of Korea for nuclear power plant under section 31 of the Export Development Act,” (1975-03-06), RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 6456 Access Code: 90, Item No. 40383
239 instance, that: “If we have to loan people money at subsidized interest rates to buy CANDU at prices below cost and then bribe them to do it, how great is the accomplishment?” 888 Ultimately, South Korea agreed to sign the NPT and give up the idea of purchasing re-processing technology from France, bowing to Canadian pressure.889
The final complication involving the CANDU export to Korea involved Shaul Eisenberg who had been hired as AECL’s sales agent. Eisenberg was an Israeli businessman based in Tel Aviv. With the conclusion of the Korean contract in January 1976, the agent’s fee became due to Eisenberg.890 AECL President Lorne Gray had agreed to pay Eisenberg a fee of
$17 million plus another $3 million at a rate of $500,000 a year for six years.891 In part, Eisenberg’s fee became even more puzzling considering that Canada was already providing a significant loan to the Korean government to purchase the CANDU reactors.
Eisenberg was an interesting character, with a substantial business and political network in South Korea. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, there was almost no contact between Koreans and Jews – it was only during the Korean War that a temporary synagogue was built for some twenty Jewish-American soldiers. Eisenberg’s family, originally from Austria, had fled from the Nazis, found a new home in Tokyo around 1945 and began selling supplies to the U.S. forces. As a young man, Eisenberg joined the Betar movement, a revisionist youth Zionist group that came to Tokyo through Shanghai.892 He also married a Japanese woman, and began selling imported wood, steel and textile products in Seoul just before the outbreak of the Korean War. Eisenberg carried an Austrian passport, and was well-connected in South Korea. It has been
888 Quoted in Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, (Toronto: U of T Press, 1988), 436. 889 From the Canadian Embassy, Seoul, Korea to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, “Republic of Korea: Quarterly Report – December 1, 1976 ~ February 28, 1977” March 11, 1977, as found in “Political Affairs- Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy and Relations – South Korea (From 75-04-01 to 77-12-31” File No. 20-1-2-ROK Volume 9, Volume Accession No. 16192, Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada 890 IBID.
891 Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, (Toronto: U of T Press, 1988), 426. 892 Jayson Park, “Diplomat’s Diary - First Jew in Korea: Shaul Eisenberg who connected the East and the West during the Cold War,” Joong-Ang Sunday, Issue 233, Sept 18, 2011. http://blog.joins.com/media/folderlistslide.asp?uid=lyk3390&folder=151&list_id=12376818
240 generally assumed by Korean sources that the wife of former South Korean President Syng-man Rhee, who had an Austrian-Jewish background (Eisenberg was Jewish from Poland, originally), actively supported Eisenberg’s business.893
Eisenberg’s business continued to grow in the aftermath of the Korean War. After the May 16th uprising in 1961, which saw the overthrow of Rhee’s government and the rise of Park Chung Hee, as well as the decline in U.S. aid, Eisenberg intervened to bring a West German loan to Park’s regime. Because of Eisenberg’s working experience in Japan and President Park’s own affinity for the Japanese economy, it can be assumed that Park would have regarded Eisenberg with a benign eye. With the public outcry in Canada over this deal, Eisenberg’s “commission” was reduced to $18.5 million, and AECL retained him to negotiate the sale of a second reactor.894 The renegotiated $18.5 million agent fee still did not resolve the public’s concerns.
The original contract had Eisenberg as the recipient of $20 million. 895 Eisenberg took a hefty commission, but the loan financed much of the first five-year economic plan for the South Korean government, and the South Korean government still did not have enough credibility for international financing. 896 The renegotiated settlement, however, went to a number of companies which were subsidiaries of Eisenberg’s business in Tel Aviv. It was the manner in which the re-written contract was composed that leads one to question if AECL was attempting to cover up the recipient of the money. 897
No record has been found, either in the diplomatic archives of Seoul or Ottawa, that confirms Eisenberg’s bribery of South Korean officials or his dealings with Canadian diplomats. From the 1960s onwards, however, Eisenberg became a close confidant of Park and his high- ranking officials, bringing foreign investments in telecommunications development, cement factories, as well as the nuclear reactors from Canada in the 1970s. Nicknamed the “Elephant”
893 Jung-Hyun So, “Franchesca, MacArthur, and Eisenberg,” Woman Sense Magazine, http://www.womansense.org/sub_read.html?uid=16858, January 13, 2013 894 Telephone Interview with Robert Lee, Canadian Trade Commissioner to Korea in 1973, Oct 16, 2015. 895 Export Development Corporation, Annual Reports, 1974-9. 896 Jayson Park, Op. Cit. 897 Ron Finch, Exporting Danger: A History of the Canadian Nuclear Energy Export Programme, (Montreal-Buffalo: Black Rose Books, 1986), 59-60.
241 by his Korean staff at the Seoul office, Eisenberg had a strong physical presence but was a charming, soft-spoken man in person.898
The significance of Eisenberg’s role in the CANDU deal rests with AECL’s decision to look beyond what Gray described as “the cream” markets and its focus on Argentina and Korea. The arrangement with Eisenberg had the advantage that if he failed, he would not be paid, no matter his expenses.899 In a heated debate during question period, Maurice Dupras, the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, took on the responsibility of explaining what Eisenberg was doing on behalf of the AECL:
First, assistance in getting AECL’s office and personnel established in Korea; second, assistance with the entry and handling of all goods imported for the job…third, assistance, as necessary, with local subcontracts for labour material and services; fourth, advice on Korean laws and regulations affecting the execution of the main contract; fifth, commercial assistance to AECL in respect of dealing with the customer concerning changes in the scope of the work and the provision of spare parts; sixth, provide experienced staff in Korea and elsewhere as necessary to perform these functions.900
Eisenberg may indeed have performed the tasks listed by Dupras. According to the Auditor General, his commission included fees to “three agent consultants,” although the contract lacked details of the services these agents had performed.901 Hiring an agent for a big business deal was not unusual in Asian markets, and Eisenberg had already tried to penetrate the South Korean market for nuclear reactor deals as early as 1968.902 Numerous thermal stations and cement factories across South Korea, many of which played crucial roles in South Korea’s economic
898 Chang-Hyuk Kim, “Eisenberg’s role in the Rescue of Consul Lee Dae-Young,” http://news.donga.com/View?gid=67742388&date=20141108
899 Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, (Toronto: U of T Press, 1988), 426. 900 Quoted in Finch, Exporting Danger, 60. Exactly when AECL contracted Eisenberg is disputable. In Gordon Sims, “The Evolution of AECL” (M.A. thesis, Carleton University 1979), it is stated that Eisenberg was engaged in 1972. However, he also claims that Eisenberg and Gray were scheduled to meet with South Korean officials in regard to the original power reactors. This would imply Eisenberg’s involvement at least as early as 1968-69. See Finch, 165. 901 “Payments to Agents by AECL, “International Canada 7, (November 1976), 268. 902 Ron Finch, Exporting Danger: A history of the Canadian Nuclear Energy Export Programme, (Montreal-Buffalo: Black Rose Books, 1986), 59-60.
242 development and Park’s industrial policy, were financed through loans that Eisenberg brokered from major banks around the world. When Eisenberg initially told Gray that his fee would be 5 per cent of the contract, Gray did some research with other companies to see if it seemed reasonable, and was told that agents’ fees were to be expected in the Far East. They also agreed that Eisenberg would only be paid if the deal was successful, and Gray confirmed his contract with Eisenberg by Nov 28, 1972.903 It remains unclear whether the money was used for bribery, and precise terms of accounting remained ambiguous throughout. But unlike the public outcry in Canada, Eisenberg was mostly seen as a helpful agent from the South Korean perspective.
The controversies surrounding Eisenberg’s involvement reveal a great deal about the general state of confusion and lack of experience that Canada had in terms of its “Pacific Turn” and doing business in Asia. What is clear is that the Pacific Division at the DEA was still relatively a new entity in the early 1970s, with no one who spoke Korean. Their efforts during the decade were just on the cusp of serious consideration of the Korean market. When Canada’s first trade commissioner, Bob Lee, landed in Korea in 1973, having previously served at the Tokyo embassy, Canada had the technology but needed someone who understood the Korean market, and someone with sufficient political capital in the inner circles of the Park government.904 According to Bob Lee and John Harrington, who also served in the Canadian Embassy in Seoul at the time of the CANDU sales, specializing in commercial and political relations respectively, official Canadian understanding of the inner workings of the South Korean market or the bureaucracy of the South Korean government was very limited. Furthermore, while the Western missions were willing to share a frank assessment of the political situation in South Korea,905 the usual allies and sources of intelligence (Great Britain,
France and the United States) became Canada’s direct competitors for the CANDU deal.906
903 Bothwell, 426-427. Also see Robert Bothwell’s interview with L. Gray at the U of T Archives (Sept 9, 1986) 904 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “CANDU Agreement: Background,” Seoul: Diplomatic Archives of the ROK; Ron Finch, Exporting Danger: A history of the Canadian Nuclear Energy Export Programme, (Montreal-Buffalo: Black Rose Books, 1986), 58; Interview with Derek Burney (Oct 2016). 905 John Harrington, First Secretary for Political and Economic Affairs at the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo often travelled to Korea with the Norwegian Ambassador in Japan, and often visited the British, American and Australian embassies in Seoul for intelligence update. 906 Telephone Interview with John Harrington, Oct 3, 2015.
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While the investigation eventually came to an end, it did irreparable damage to the AECL’s reputation.907
By the time Canada and South Korea reached an agreement on atomic energy cooperation in 1976 and finalized the CANDU deal, it was agreed that Canada’s nuclear reactor would only be used for industrial, peaceful purposes. All necessary precautionary steps had been undertaken by the South Korean government, including ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Exporting the CANDU reactors to Korea was first and foremost an important commercial deal from the Canadian perspective, which was helped in part by the international energy crisis, but also complicated by other international events such as India’s nuclear explosion. South Korea, in search of energy autonomy and defence capacity against North Korea, found the CANDU reactors to be the perfect solution. Although serious public dissent and political debates about nuclear non-proliferation and Shaul Eisenberg’s involvement dominated the CANDU export to Korea, the sale still marked an export success for Canada in the face of major competitors in the U.S. and the U.K. and changed the balance of trade in Canada’s favour when the South Korean economy still grew at a faster rate than the Canadian economy. In 1981, Prime Minister Trudeau paid a visit to the CANDU reactors in South Korea during his tour of Asia, and Canadian-Korean relations assumed a new level of importance, both politically and economically, over the decade of the 1980s. For South Korea, the CANDU symbolized much hope in terms of gaining energy dependency and potentially developing defence capability against North Korea. Much of the new policy-level thinking and focused attention on bilateral relations owed their roots to the complex debates and controversies surrounding the CANDU export in the 1970s. Although nobody really realized it at the time, the CANDU brought Canada and Korea to directly confront and negotiate with each other, away from the usual influences of the United States, and marked a new important beginning of a true partnership.
907 Ibid, 435-436.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation examined the evolution of Canadian-Korean relations from 1888 to 1978, a period which saw a slow but steady growth of Canadian attention and interest in Korea, as well as the formation of a highly productive political and commercial relationship over the course of the Cold War. It examined various dimensions of bilateral history, ranging from missionary contacts to military engagements to humanitarian aid, and argued that ultimately it was South Korea’s economic growth and geostrategic considerations of the Cold War which fundamentally changed the nature of relationship between Canada and South Korea.
This study began by examining early contacts made by the missionaries, and how the missionary encounters set the foundation for the future evolution of Canadian-Korean relations. Over the course of the late 19th century to the early 20th century, Canadian missionaries served the role of human bridges and effectively transmitted knowledge about Korea to Canada well before official government-engagements in 1947 (The UNTCOK), in 1950 (the Korean War) and in 1963 (establishment of diplomatic relations). Canada’s early missionary engagements in Korea deserves serious scholarly attention, both because they signaled the beginning of a new era for ordinary Koreans in terms of access to Western knowledge, culture and religion, and also because of first impressions that were transmitted through the missionary reports from the field. The first chapter focused specifically on three Canadian missionaries, James S. Gale, Oliver R. Avison, and Frank W. Schofield, three men from the University of Toronto, who left an enduring legacy in Korean history. Despite the small size of their delegation and limited funding, Canadian missionaries were immensely successful in their literary translations, cultural engagements, and intellectual developments in the fields of science and medicine. The missionary approach was genuine, benevolent and selfless.
Unlike Western missionaries elsewhere in Africa or Latin America, Canadian missionary enterprise in Korea was overwhelmingly positive and wholeheartedly welcomed by the native population. Gale, with his fluency in vernacular Korean, actively interacted with Koreans of all backgrounds, and his literary contributions – both through his own writings and translations – expanded a shared space for knowledge between Canadians and Koreans. In that sense, the story of Canadian missionaries presents an interesting case with regards to missionaries as agents of
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Western imperialism. While there are often negative connotations about Western missionaries imposing foreign beliefs and culture to indigenous populations, such as in Africa and elsewhere, Canadian missionaries in Korea demonstrated a case of assimilation and meaningful contributions for the betterment of the Korean people. For instance, under Japanese colonial rule in Korea, Canadian missionaries like Schofield actively participated in Korea’s nationalist discourse and search for a new “Wilsonian moment,” along with Korea’s political activists. At home in Canada, many ordinary Canadians first heard about Korea through the presentations and reports by the missionaries, and some of them would later enlist to serve in the Canadian Forces when the Korean War broke out in 1950. The Department of External Affairs also turned to Dr. Schofield for advice in the 1960s for its aid programmes to Korea, and many missionaries remained active in supporting the mission in Korea, even after they returned to Canada. Hence, the missionary phase merits serious scholarly attention for the lasting impact in Canadian-Korean relations.
Nevertheless, the informal and benevolent relationship cultivated during the missionary phase did not immediately translate into policy-level engagement from Ottawa, and it was only in 1947 with the UNTCOK that Canada officially engaged with Korea. As Acting Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent put it in 1948, “Korea was still a long way from Canada.” 908 The end of the Second World War and Japan’s surrender appeared to bring new hope for Korea, but such optimism evaporated quickly with the division of the Korean peninsula. Arbitrarily, the Americans and the Russians agreed to divide the Korean peninsula into two parts at the 38th parallel, effectively separating the peninsula into two spheres of influence and political rivalry. Canadian representative on the UNTCOK, Dr. George Patterson, found the experience wholly frustrating because of strong American dominance. Therefore, Canadian participation on the UNTCOK must be seen as an attempt to fulfill its obligations under the United Nations, a newly created institution after the end of the Second World War, rather than a genuine interest on Korea. Canada’s participation in the Korean War, marked by eager volunteer troops from both English-Canada and French-Canada, was primarily aimed at preserving the legitimacy of the
908 “Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs,” Ottawa, 15 October 1948, DEA/50068-40, DCER Volume 14-1119 FAR EAST Part IIL Koreas; Robert Bothwell, “Eyes West: Canada and the Cold War in Asia,” in Canada and the Early Cold War, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998), 65-66.
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United Nations and supporting its ally, the United States. Canadians and Americans shared fundamental assumptions about the Cold War, but the “loss of China” had a greater impact on Washington than Ottawa. The Canadian approach to Korea remained much more distant and limited than the American approach during this period, as the Canadian government sought to limit its aid to under-developed countries.
In the aftermath of the Korean War, Canada still had no “Korea policy” to speak of, despite the recent involvement in the Korean War. Nevertheless, humanitarian aid, both in the form of the U.N. Korean Relief Agency and nation-wide aid campaigns managed by non- governmental organizations like the Unitarian Service Committee, substituted for Canada’s official policy during this period. Preserving the survival of the South Korean state became another means of fighting the Cold War – and Canadian help was especially welcome during this period because of the growing discontent between the United States and South Korea. Under the façade of a close alliance, Seoul and Washington disagreed substantially on how the aid should be used, which caused an on-going tug of war between Seoul and Washington. Amidst growing tensions, Canada, on the other hand, was seen as a dependable ally. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s visit to Korea in 1954 left vivid impressions on the dire state of poverty that South Koreans faced in the aftermath of the Korean War, and Canadian aid would continue to flow in the years to come. Canadian individuals continued to engage with the Korean War orphans and through humanitarian efforts such as the “Milk for Korea” and “Operation Codfish” campaigns led by the Unitarian Service Committee. Underdevelopment, poverty and aid were the key lenses through which Canadian policymakers approached Korea. Canada was at the forefront of urging other countries to fulfill their commitments to UNKRA, and the spirit of Canadian humanitarianism remained as a strong guiding principle in terms of Canada’s approach towards Korea during this period.
Over the course of the next decade, South Korea surprised policymakers in Ottawa with its rapid economic growth under the leadership of President Park Chung-Hee. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and the ROK in 1963, Ottawa still had to overcome an oversimplified understanding of Korea marked by extreme poverty. Park Chung Hee, a controversial figure in the South Korean history, applied his fascination with military- based rule and the success of the Japanese economy to design a state-led export development economy in South Korea. Rooted in economic nationalism, South Korea’s economy grew
247 exponentially over the course of the 1960s, and benefitted tremendously from its participation in the Vietnam War and rapprochement with Japan. Intellectually, Rostow’s “take-off” theory became immensely popular, both for South Korean and Canadian policymakers during this period. From the South Korean perspective, managing its relations with the United States posed a number of challenges, as well as its growing competition for diplomatic recognition vis-à-vis North Korea. South Korea’s insistence in having a resident Canadian embassy in Seoul, for instance, was entirely grounded on the need to prove itself as the sole legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. Slowly but surely, Canadian attention turned to South Korea’s economic transformation and consequently, its value to the Canadian economy. South Korea also began to actively search for new markets during this period for its export goods and Canada appeared as a new viable trading partner, which then shifted its traditional preoccupation on the United States. Over the course of the late 1960s to early 1970s, a steady stream of South Koreans began to arrive in Canada, marking the beginning of a Korean diaspora in Canada. Much of it had to do with the new points system introduced in the Canadian immigration system, rather than any specific attention on Korean migrants, but the new embassy and the points system certainly helped to attract more Koreans to Canada.
South Korea’s economic growth and its trading relationship with Canada peaked by the 1970s, which led to a true blossoming of the bilateral relationship. Ottawa was fascinated by South Korea’s economic transformation -- the South Korean economy grew at a level of about 6.5 per cent every year between 1961 and 1979. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau proclaimed a new “Pacific direction” in Canadian foreign policy, though it did not really have much effect on Canadian-Korean relations, as Japan and China were Ottawa’s preoccupation in the Pacific. The establishment of the Canadian embassy in Seoul in 1973 became an important turning point, in terms of intelligence gathering, administrative capacity for immigration, and also having a greater Canadian presence in South Korea in general. Geostrategic concerns still remained important, especially in light of the growing influence of the North Korean regime, but it was commercial interests that now mattered more for both Ottawa and Seoul.
The final chapter focused on the sale of the CANDU reactors to Korea, a major game changer in Canadian-Korean trading relationship. The sheer commercial value of the CANDU reactor, at about $576.5 million, made it the biggest deal ever reached between the two countries, but it was also extremely controversial because of the politics of nuclear technology. Essentially,
248 the CANDU sales required the Canadian government to give the benefit of doubt to the South Korean government about its true intent in terms of using the CANDU for strictly peaceful purposes. Canada’s struggle over the CANDU export and soul-searching about Canada’s industrial policy demonstrated the complex interplay of domestic and international policies and politics. Exporting the CANDU reactors became a very serious public question, as Canada struggled with domestic economic pressures and the broader foreign policy objective of nuclear non-proliferation. The problem was also further complicated by other international events, such as India’s nuclear explosion in 1974. South Korea, in search of energy autonomy and a defence mechanism against North Korea, found the CANDU reactors to be an attractive solution. Although serious public dissent and political debates about nuclear non-proliferation and Shaul Eisenberg’s involvement in the sale dominated the CANDU export to Korea, it still marked an export success for Canada in the face of major competitors in the U.S. and the U.K. and changed the balance of trade in Canadian favour when the South Korean economy still grew at a faster rate than the Canadian economy. In 1981, Prime Minister Trudeau included a visit to CANDU reactors in South Korea during his tour of Asia, and Canadian-Korean relations assumed a new level of importance, both politically and economically.
The evolution of Canadian-Korean relations has been a slow but steady series of a “leap of faith” for two distant countries that seemingly had very little in common. From the informal missionary contacts, to the UNTCOK and the Korean War, to humanitarian aid programmes to South Korea’s economic transformations and the export of the CANDU reactors, Canada remained a firm supporter of South Korea, even when the situation looked very grim and when Korea was a country of very little consequence in the overall direction of Canadian foreign policy. From the South Korean perspective, Canada also mattered very little and rarely appeared at all in the press or the government policy documents until the 1960s, when the Park regime turned to new export markets and new partners. Under the shadow of the Cold War, what is evident over the course of Canadian-Korean relations is the sheer degree of growth, resilience and partnership over some very turbulent and difficult periods in the 20th century. The story of Canadian-Korean relations in the 20th century demonstrates how commercial interests and geopolitical calculations of the Cold War shaped, influenced and dictated the nature of this bilateral relationship.
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NOTES ON ARCHIVAL SOURCES
Library and Archives Canada
• Department of Citizenship and Immigration – Files for the ROK (RG76) • Department of External Affairs (RG25) – ROK files • Department of Trade and Commerce (RG20) – ROK files • Privy Council Office (RG 2) Cabinet Conclusions • Brooke Claxton Fonds
National Archives and Records Administration
• Files of the Office of Korean Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Seoul, 1966-74 • Presidential Archives
Online archives and databases • CIA Electronic Reading Room (Freedom of Information Act – FOIA) • Cold War International History Project (Bulletin and Documents Readers) • Digital National Security Archives • Cabinet Conclusions • DFAIT Department in History • The Globe Historical Records • NAVER Digital News Archive & Library
United Nations • The United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (ARMS), UNKRA in Action • The United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (ARMS), Canada Files
Archives in Toronto • Emmanuel College Archives. Principal’s Office Fonds, Asia 1927. • James S. Gale Fonds at Fisher Rare Books Library (MS Col 245) • Korea Times Archives, Toronto • Multicultural History Society of Ontario Archives • Presbyterian Church Archives, Toronto • U of T Archives at Robarts Library, University of Toronto • University of Toronto Government Records Holdings, Robarts Library, Toronto, ON • United Church of Canada, Board of World Mission, Records of Associate Secretary for Korea, (Finding Aid 75) • Victoria University Archives – Goldwin French Fonds
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Published Primary Sources • Canada. Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Nuclear Industry Review: Problems and Prospects, 1982. • Canada, Department of Energy Mines and Resources, 1976 Review of Uranium Enrichment Prospects in Canada • Canada. Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations • Canada. Department of External Affairs, Report of the Agent General of the UN Korean Reconstruction Agency (Supplementary Papers No. 54/48/UN 9/25, 1954) • Canadian Heritage Collections (Dept of External Affairs Under Secretary Correspondence 1908-1952) • Canada. Department of Justice. “Changing Immigration Pattern and the Emergence of “Visible Minorities.” • Canada. Export Development Corporation. Annual Reports. 1974Canada. House of Commons, Hansard Debates (1950-1979) • Canada Treaty Series, Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea • Canada Year Book Historical Record • Global Affairs Canada. Trade department. “Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement.” • United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States • United States Energy Information Administration. “Nuclear Reactor Characteristics and Operational History.”
Korean Archival Sources • Diplomatic Archives of the Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Canada- ROK files, Daejeon, ROK • K-Stats on Canadian-Korean Relations, Retrieved from http://stat.kita.net/main.screen • Kuksa p'yŏnch'an ŭiwŏnhoe (National Institute of Korean History), UN Temporary Commission on Korea Files (1947-48) • Library of National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Seoul • Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Canada for Cooperation in the Development and Application of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes,” • National Archives of Korea, Canadian Embassy Files • National Archives of Korea, Department of Public Information, ROK – Colombo Plan • Park Chung Hee Presidential Library Digital Archive • Presidential Archives, Seongnam, Gyeonggi-Do, ROK • Seoul National University Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, Seoul • Yonsei University Canadian Studies Centre, Seoul • The Association for Canadian-Korean Cultural Exchange, Seoul • Library of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seoul
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Key archival records & files examined at the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea o Economic Cooperation Treaty between Canada and Korea (1955) o Diplomatic exchanges between Canada and Korea since the 1960s o Media reporting on Canada o Agricultural Cooperation Treaty between Canada and Korea (1965) o Civilian ambassadors (19962) o Establishment of Canada-Korea Cultural Foundation (1969-70) o Technological cooperation between Canada and Korea (1970s) o Records on trade between Canada and Korea & KOTRA (1970s) o Visit of Paul Martin and Lucien Lamoreux (1971-1972) o Establishment of Korean Community Centre (1971-78) o Reports on the political situation in Canada (1963-1980) o Canada-North Korean relations (1972) o Visit of J.L. Pepin (1971-2) o CANDU cooperation between Canada and Korea (1973) o Canada microwave facilities (1973) o Immigration issues (1970s) o Anti-Korean movements in Canada (1974) o INTELSAT cooperation between the province of Gangwon and Alberta (1974) o Aerial cooperation between Canada and Korea (1974) o Visit of major political figures from Canada (1976) o North America - Meeting of Mission Chiefs and attachés (1981) o Purchasing and building of the Embassy of Korea in Canada (1979-81) o Establishment of Korean Studies Program at the University of British Columbia (1980-1981) o Visit of Senator Jean Marchand for the ceremony of President Chun Doo Hwan (March 1981) o Review of properties for consulates in Canada (1979-1981) o North Korean- American Relations Academic Conference (1981) o Visit of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (Sept 27-29, 1981) o Lobbying efforts towards the hosting of 1988 Seoul Olympic (1981) o Plans to invite Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan (1981) o Overseas adoption of Korean orphans (1974-81) o Visit of Canada-Korea Parliamentary Friendship Committee (1981) o Anti-Korean activities in Canada (1976) o Korean-Canadian Resource Cooperation (1981) o Ambassadorial designations to Canada 1980-1981 (1980) o ICAO Meeting in Montreal (1980) o Reports from the Korean Consulates in Toronto and Vancouver (1980) o North Korean-Canadian relations (1979-80) o Current Affairs in Canada in 1980 (1980) o Establishment of the Korean studies program at the University of Toronto in 1977 (1977) o Korean War Veterans Association in Canada (1980)
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Interviews • Duane Bratt, Interview with the author, October 2015. • Derek Burney. Interview with the author, October 2016. • Donald P Gregg. “Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project.” Interview by Charles Stewart Kennedy. March 3, 2004. https://cdn.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2010/2010gre02/2010gre02.pdf • John Harrington. Interview with the author, October 2015. • John Kolanchey. Interview with the author. May 2017. • Robert Lee, Interview with the author. October 2015. • Senator Yonah Martin. Interview with the author. August 2013. • Jacques Morneau. Telephone interview with the author, September 2013.
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