Love's Reason in Othello Author(S): E

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Love's Reason in Othello Author(s): E. K. Weedin, Jr. Source: Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, Vol. 15, No. 2, Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama (Spring, 1975), pp. 293-308 Published by: Rice University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/449673 . Accessed: 22/03/2013 13:31

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This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Love's Reason in Othello

E. K. WEEDIN,JR.

Among Shakespeare'stragedies, none- not even King Lear-matches Othello in the persistenceand thoroughnesswith which it anatomizesthe operationof reason in man. No otherof the tragediesis so occupied with "judgment" in both public court and privaterumination. There are two distinct sortsof reasoningexercised in thedrama, one displayedby lago, and anotherby the Duke, Desdemona,and, earlyin theplay, Othello. The tragedyoccurs in Othello's relinquishing of the one sort while remainingpersuaded, under lago's tutelage,that he is still using it when he judges, sentences,and executes Desdemona. A close ex- aminationof both kindsof reasoningwill clarifythe place of reason withinthe play and make some commentsupon theplay's otherma- jor concern,love. It will offera differentstatement of thenature of the tragedyfrom that suggested by critics who argue thatOthello's error is to reasonwhere he ought to love, it will tryto show moreexactly than has been so fardone the sortof reasoningthat lago displays throughoutthe drama, and itwill arguethat the distinct nature of the tragedyand thesubtle differences between the two kinds of reasoning wereevident to a largenumber in Shakespeare'saudiences. More than the opposition betweentwo ways to reason is involvedin theircon- flict,for each mannerof reasoningis based upon an assumptioncon- cerninghuman natureand the universethat man inhabits.In the strugglebetween lago and Desdemona and the struggle within Othello, the view of man in such a world as that of this play is revealed. It is not Othello's errorto reason wherehe should love;' it is his error,as he realizes,to love "notwisely." Love in thisplay, unlike that in Romeo and Julietand Antonyand Cleopatra,not only is suscepti- ble to reason'sguidance, it ought to be so governed.Were it to be,lago would be powerlessin his attackupon Othello's love forDesdemona. It is nota purerlove (one unmitigatedby such rational actions as "im-

I "The momentOthello asks forproof of lago, he has steppeddown fromthe 'higher' world into the worldof that'lower' reasoningwhich will destroyhim; it is a fallof an archetypaldesign." TerenceHawkes, "lago's Use ofReason," Studiesin Philology,58 (1961), 167.

This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 294 OTHELLO putation," "indict[ment]," "arraign[ment],"and "judgment"- some of the very many legal terms noticeable in this play's vocabulary)that Othello needs; he needs a pureruse of reason,one unmitigatedby such irrationalactions as doubtingbefore one sees, and provingbefore one informsthe accused of the chargesor even calls fortestimony from the accused or otherpertinent witnesses. Lamentable and terrifying,however, as are Othello's errorsin reasoning,they are clearlydistinct from lago's exerciseof it. lago's mostexplicit and closelyargued remarkson theoperation of reason and thenature of man occur when he converseswith Roderigo near the end of I.iii:

'Tis in ourselvesthat we are thusor thus.Our bodies are our gardens,to the which our wills are gardeners;so thatif we will plant nettlesor sow lettuce,set hyssop and weed up thyme,supply it withone genderof herbsor distractit with many-either to have it sterilewith idleness or manuredwith industry-why,the power and corrigibleauthority of this lies in our wills. If thebalance ofour liveshad notone scale of reason to poise anotherof sensuality,the blood and baseness of our natureswould conductus to mostpreposterous conclusions. But we have reasonto cool our ragingmotions, our carnal stings,our unbittedlusts; whereof I takethis that you call love to be a sect or scion. (319-331)2

These lines are takenby scholarsas sayingquite different,even op- posite things.It is importantto come to as exactand accuratean un- derstandingof lago's remarksas we can because theydisclose the sort of reasoningthat he is going to use throughoutthe play, thesort of reasoningupon which the success of his machinationswill largely depend. In his discussionof thespeech, J. V. Cunninghamsays that lago "picks up Roderigo'sassertion that it is not in his powernot to be a sinningfool, to go kill himselffor love, and maintainsthat we do have thepower to makeourselves one thingor theother, good orevil, to controlor not to controlour bodies, our lowernatures, and that this power is our will. This, so faras I can see, is a notoriouscom- monplaceof theChristian tradition, as well as ofthe Aristotelian. It is plain and hoaryorthodoxy."3 In Magic in the WebRobert Heilman refersto thisparagraph by Cunningham to notehis agreementwith

2A11quotations fromShakespeare are takenfrom William Shakespeare:The Com- plete Works,gen. ed. AlfredHarbage (Baltimore,1969). 3James Vincent Cunningham, Woe or Wonder: The Emotional Effect of Shakespearean Tragedy(Denver, 1951),p. 25.

This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions E. K. WEEDIN, JR. 295 it,calling lago's remarks"a traditionalexhortation on theutility of will and reason."4 Hardin Craig, however,studies lago's argumentand concludes that"Iago ... offersa grandperversion of thetheory that good is the end and purposeof reason."5 The theoryto which Craig refersis one expounded by many of the Christianhumanist philosophers and divineswriting before and duringthe time of Othello. It is theone of which Cunninghamoffers a paraphrase,but his paraphrasediffers subtly and significantlyfrom the theory shared by so many Renaissancewriters, as does lago's account. Far frompresenting to Roderigo "plain and hoary orthodoxy,"Iago, by a deftrearrange- mentof theterms used to framethe orthodoxy, rehearses not "a grand perversion"but a distinctlyand subtlydifferent scheme of man's soul. I say "rehearses"because Iago's profferednotions are new only in thesense that they were newer and less widelyknown to Shakespeare and his audience than those of the Christian humanists. Iago's thoughtshere are not original, but theyare current.The commen- tarieson man's naturerecently written by such personsas Machiavelli and Montaignepossessed as antique a heritageas did thoseby other sixteenth-centurywriters, such as Charron and Hooker, but the theoriesorganized by the lattertwo had been receivedfrom a large numberof medievalscholars who had sharedand refinedthe ideas over a long period of time. Far fewerwriters during the medieval period had dealt with the theoriesproposed by Montaigne and Machiavelli,who werequestioning the firmlyestablished medieval and now Renaissance assumptions,but these "newer" arguments werescarcely unknown to a reasonablylarge portion of learnedpeo- ple in Shakespeare'saudience. "Elizabethan playwrightsand playgoers ... undoubtedlywere familiar," as Lawrence Babb states, "with the ratherbroad psychological principles upon which one findsgeneral agreement in learnedworks."6 At the timeof Othello thesereasonably learned would surelyhave been familiarwith the two major opposing schools of psychology and moral philosophy,and the uneducated,also, would have been familiarwith at least the notion of man's soul setdown by Hooker (even if theycould not read him) because theseassumptions about

4RobertB. Heilman, Magic in the Web: Action and Language in Othello (Lex- ington, 1956),p. 195. 5Hardin Craig, The Enchanted Glass: The Elizabethan Mind in Literature(New York, 1936),p. 27. 6Lawrence Babb, "On the Nature of Elizabethan Psychological Literature,"in JosephQuincy Adams MemorialStudies, ed. JamesG. McManaway,Giles E. Dawson, and Edwin E. Willoughby(Washington, 1948), p. 520.

This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 296 OTHELLO man, his reason,and his laws had been so long and so widelyknown bythe world in whichall theElizabethans lived. One could notmake his requiredattendance to the weeklysermons without receiving a detailed account of the divine's arguments and the opposing argumentsagainst which he inveighed.It is partof lago's skill that his views of thesoul appear innocentby virtueof theirbeing hoary doctrine.They slide past Roderigo withoutarousing any expressed uneasinessor dispute.But Roderigois a gull and he is wroughtupon by his passion for Desdemona. On the otherhand, it is likelythat lago's smoothsententiae alerted many of the playgoers to muchof the play's matter.The uneducated would have realized that lago was depictingman and reason's place in his naturein a wayout of keeping withmost received beliefs of the time; the learned would have seen more exactlythe sort of reasoning thathe was advocatingand the view of human naturethat he held. Placed as it is in an earlyscene, one in which much importantaction depends upon theexercise of reason,lago's attractivemetaphor of thesoul's gardenis thefirst in- dicationto all membersof the audience of his distinctiveway of direc- ting his thoughtsand actions. lago's openingargument to Roderigo,"our bodiesare our gardens, to thewhich our wills are gardeners;so thatif we will plantnettles or sow lettuce,set hyssop and weed up thyme,supply it with one gender of herbsor distractit with many-either to haveit sterilewith idleness or manuredwith industry-why, the power and corrigibleauthority of thislies in our wills," makestwo revealing assertions of much con- sequence in theplay. Let us consider,first, how thesetwo assertions differfrom the theoriesput forthby the Christianhumanist moral philosophers.It is truethat "flowers,as such,are not at all common in the emblembooks." 'Hyssop is not a vicious herb,contrasted by Shakespearewith the thymewhich lago would supplant with the hyssop.(Indeed hyssop was eventhought a remedyfor some wounds.) But the remainderof lago's horticulturalconceit makes evidenta largepart of whatthe Christian humanists would see as lago's misap- prehensionof man's soul. There have been in the world's history timesin which idle behaviorby man was held an acceptable alter- native to industriousness,but Renaissance England was not one of them.In one of severalbooks fromthe time that are devotedto an ex- egesis of man's propernature, Charron offers a piece of agricultural philosophizinghimself: "Idle and unmanuredgrounds, if they be fat and fertile,abound with a thousandkinds of wild and unprofitable

7RosemaryFreeman, English Emblem Books (London, 1948),p. 93.

This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions E. K. WEEDIN, JR. 297 hearbs,untill theybe sowed with otherseeds."8 Moreover, though hyssopand thymewere of equal value in a garden,one neversensibly elected to "plant nettles." An important pair of words that Shakespearebalanced against each othercomplete his silent com- mentaryon lago's gardeningadvice. No matterin which sense the word "supply" is takenat the timeof Othello, it is a "good" action; thatto which thesupplying is done is made satisfied,even fulfilled. On the opposing hand, "distract"had nothing but unfortunate meanings,which could be so seriousas "to draw or turnaway from actual position,destination, or purpose . . . to perplexor confuseby divergentaims or interests;to cause dissensionor disorderin" (OED). In his selectionof examples of alternativemodes of behavior(in- dustriousnessand idleness,supplying and distracting),lago is no nearer such writersas Machiavelli and Montaigne than he is the Christianhumanists. Machiavelli no moreproposes aimless slothor distractingconflict within oneself as proper conduct than does Hooker.But, then, does one eversee lago idle in Othello?lago is offer- ing noticeablyextreme examples of behavioras thepoles of a man's choices in orderto give sharp point to theprinciple upon which the choosing is based. It is his voicingof and adherenceto thisprinciple forelecting proper actions throughoutthe play thatallies lago with Machiavelli's view of man and opposes him to Hooker's. He offers such conductas desirableand approvable because of his conception of thewill: thewill is thegardener; the will makesall decisionsand governsall actions in a properlyfunctioning man; thewill has the powerand theright, with all thelogic of tautology,to choQsewhat it wills, even idlenessor distraction.Such a notion is a cleardistortion of Renaissance England's orthodox psychology and theology. Hooker iteratesa commonplacewhen he writes:"To choose is towill one thingbefore another. And to will is to bend our souls to thehav- ing or doing of thatwhich theysee to be good." The corrigible,the controllingand correcting,authority lies, then,not in our will butin thatby which we can distinguishgood. "Goodness is seen with the eyeof theunderstanding. And the lightof thateye is reason."'0 By "goodness,"Hooker meansvirtuous thought and deed. In a uni- versegoverned by the Firstand Second Laws Eternal,the exercise of man's reason in keeping withsuch governanceleads him to conduct his thoughtsand actions in a way that benefitshimself and every

8PierreCharron, Of Wisdome Three Bookes, trans. Samson Lennard (London, 1630),p. 58. 9RichardHooker, The Worksof ... Richard Hooker, ed. John Keble, 5thed. (Ox- ford,1865), I, 220. '?Hooker, p. 220.

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otheraffected man. The universeposited by Cornelius Agrippa and Machiavelli is not ruledby such eternalprinciples. Machiavelli con- curswith Hooker thatman's reasonreveals what is good and proper for him, but the good need not be virtuous. It need only be pragmaticallybeneficial, and it need be beneficialonly to him. Whetherit benefitsothers as well, letalone is in keepingwith such a thingas the Second Law Eternal,is, at best,a secondaryconsidera- tion. It is thissort of reasoningthat Iago chooses,unfettering (as he sees it) his will fromsubservience to right,virtuous reason. His descrip- tion of thefunctions of will and reasonshows thathe is indeedwhat he has been called moreoften than precisely,Machiavellian: "If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason,to poise anotherof sensuality,the blood and basenessof our natureswould conductus to mostpreposterous conclusions. But we havereason to cool our raging motions,our carnal stings,our unbittedlusts; whereof I takethis that you call love tobe a sector scion." He seesreason in man as one halfof a scale, a half thatis presentto keep in equilibriumwith theother half,sensuality. Compounding lago's beliefthat the-will, even when reasonoutweighs sensuality, can electa courseof conduct vicious to othermen is his disagreementwith the Christianhumanists' belief that man's soul is orderedin a hierarchicscale, not one of equals balancingeach other.The secondhalf of Iago's speechsounds a little more orthodox than the firsthalf, but the audience, having been alertedby Shakespearein thefirst half, would have been likelyto see the full extentof lago's misapprehension.Hooker, again, statesthe conventionalassumption: "The Will, properlyand strictlytaken, as it is of things which are referredunto the end that man desireth, differethgreatly from that inferiornatural desire which we call Appetite.The object of Appetiteis whatsoeversensible good maybe wishedfor; the object of Will is thatgood which Reason doth lead us to seek.. .. It is notaltogether in our powerwhether we will be stirred withaffections or no: whereasactions which issue fromthe disposi- tionof theWill are in thepower thereof to be performedor stayed.""I The powerresides, of course,in governmentexercised by thereason. Charron, in Samson Lennard's translation, sets forth man's "reasonable Soule" in an exact and rigid hierarchy:

The action and office,or exerciseof thisforce and power, which is to assemble,conjoin, separate,divide the things,

"Hooker, p. 221.

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received,and toadde likewiseothers; this is discourse,reasoning. The repetitionand action of ruminating,reconcocting, tryingby the whetstoneof reason, and rewardingof it, to framea resolutionmore solide: this is judgment. The effectin theend of understanding:this is knowledge, intelligence,resolution. The action thatfolloweth this knowledge and resolution, which is to extenditselfe, to put forward,and to advance the thingknowne: this is will.'2

No one, least of all Hooker, denies that the reason can become clouded throughvarious agencies and then,by a wrongdecision, per- mit thewill to be exercisedin an unfortunateaction. But thecritical differencebetween Hooker and lago on this point is precisely Hooker's assertionthat such will can operateonly when thereason has failedto functionproperly: "Whereas therefore amongst so many thingsas are to be done, thereare so few,the goodness whereof Reason in such sortdoth or easily can discover,we are not to marvelat the choiceof evil even thenwhen the contrary is probablyknown. "13 One errsas a man ("I dare do all thatmay becomea man;/ Who daresdo moreis none.") whenhe plantsnettles, chooses to be idle,distracts his garden, speaks what lago speaks to Roderigo. But by lago's and Machiavelli'slights what becomesa man is what mostprospers him, and he is theautonomous judge of what prospershim, not a "right reason" implantedin him to enable him to determinewhat properly prospershim. Indeed, a Machiavellian errsunless he exerciseshis reasonand will so thathe profitsas muchas he can, notas muchas he ought. lago, then,in his remarksto Roderigo earlyin theplay "places" himself among all these widely known arguments.He disputes reason's naturaldisposition towardan absolute good mode of conduct (not towardan expedient,apparently self-serving action) and reason'sproper place as thenatural and rightfulhead of a hierarchy in man's soul. From the beginning of the play lago shows no reasonableregard for the order of any hierarchy.All thedisturbances and disruptionsthat he worksin theplay stemfrom his own disrup- tionof his own properservice to his general.As he saysto Roderigo, "I followhim to servemy turn upon him" (I.i.42), and "In following him, I follow but myself"(I.i.58). Perhaps, however,as has been frequentlyargued, any exerciseof

'2Charron,pp. 56-57. '3Hooker,p. 223.

This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 300 OTHELLO discursivereason, whether Christian humanist or other,is itselfan errorin certainareas of experiencein theworld of thisplay. Perhaps theaction of theplay reveals that, though reason may suffice to figure out thedestination of theTurks and similarproblems, it is too clumsy and faultyto distinguishand to directeither love and loyaltyor one's self-determinedself-interests. Othello may favor neither sort of rationality,but instead show thepreferability of love, a higherreason, to both.Terence Hawkes has argued forthe superiorityof such love over reason in the play by noting the distinctionbetween ratio superiorand ratio inferior:"The higherreason is an angelic quality in man,and itsmethod of knowing and ofacquiring knowledge is ex- actlythat of theAngels. No ratiocinationis involvedin it,and no dis- cursivethought-process is required;all knowledgeis infusedin a mo- ment,in an intuitiveflash.... The lowerreason, on theother hand, is of theorder most commonly thought of as 'rational,'and involves the logical, almost syllogisticprogression of the mind fromfact to factin a discursivemovement toward the contingenttruths of the world.The processis whollyratiocinative."'4 Hawkes findsthe love thatOthello feelsfor Desdemona representative of ratiosuperior until it faltersin III.iii underthe eroding force of lago's ratio inferior. An exampleof Iago's reasoningthat Hawkes citesis his definitionof love in lines immediatelyfollowing those already quoted fromI.iii: "It is merelya lust of the blood and a permissionof the will" (333- 334). "As an 'explanation,' " Hawkes states,"this is hardlyaccurate, hardly complete,but, by the light of the 'lower' reason, it holds water.""5 Hawkes argues,then, that lago's erroris to relysolely upon ratio inferior,and Othello's is to descend to it fromratio superior. That theratio superior was, blessedly,available to man is asserted by theChristian humanists. But thatman was wrong,in itsfrequent absence ("We must thinkmen are not gods"), to relyupon his own ratio inferioris a broaderclaim thanthat made bymost Renaissance writerson such matters.Hooker once moreoffers a generalproposi- tion: "There is not that good which concernethus, but it hath evidenceenough foritself, if Reason were diligentto search it out. Through neglectthereof, abused we are withthe show of thatwhich is not.'6 Man can, as in mostcases he must,arrive at thegood, the true,the proper decision and enactingof the decision by his own reasoning.Charron, by the use of his own discursiveratiocination, arrivesat a quite differentconclusion fromIago's: carnal love is

'4Hawkes,p. 162. '5Hawkes,p. 166. '6Hooker,p. 224.

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"naturall,and (keepingitselfe within it owne bounds) just, lawfull, and neccessarie.''17 It is lago's conception and operationof reason thatlead him to his beliefsabout thelove of Desdemona forOthello and forCassio, Cassio's love forDesdemona, and even his own love forDesdemona (II.i.281-282,286ff.). It is lago's particularuse of his ratio inferior,not his use of it at all, thatresults in his definitionof love. It is a similarbut, again, importantlydistinct use of reason by Othello thatcauses his turningfrom Desdemona to lago. The veryscene in which lago addressesto Roderigo the "garden speech" offersa "scene" withinthe scene demonstratingthat reason can determine,beyond a reasonabledoubt, the presenceof love and theabsence of merelust or witchcraft.The senate'strial of Othello is one ofa seriesof actions thatmakes clear thatin thisplay love can be intelligentlyand accuratelydiscussed and apprehendedin discursive, ratiocinativeterms. There is a group of words to which I referred earlier-advocation,arraign, imputation, indict, judgment, perjury, suborn,witness, proof, justice, confession, guilt (to mentionthe prin- cipal ones)-present throughoutthe play, a group of words whose conjunction of specificallylegal and general layman's meanings repeatedlyinduces theaudience to look upon privatejudgment as a process preciseand formalas any judgment arrivedat in a public court.Not only themeanings of thesewords make such a connection evident;their careful placement in both public and privatescenes (indeed,"hearings") alertsthe audience to theplay's particularjoin- ing of the two in a significantpattern. In I.iii all judgmentis arrivedat in a public court.There are two judgments,arrived at by twodifferent kinds of logic. Forty-fivelines are expendedupon thefirst, suggesting that the senate's conclusion regardingthe destination of theTurkish fleetis of moreimportance than merelydeciding where Othello should be sent. Especially in view of thelater absence of a battle,a five-linedirective by theDuke would have been enough tolet the audience know thatOthello was to go to Cyprus.The lengthydiscussion concerningthe Turkish fleet offersa demonstrationof sensible deduction. Conflictingreports claim that the fleetis makingfor Rhodes and forCyprus. The First Senatordenies the likelihood of the formerbecause it yieldsto "no assay of reason" (18). He then lists threepremises that make it reasonableto conclude thatthe Turks will attackCyprus rather than Rhodes. The Duke agrees,and immediatelya messengerenters with news showing thatthe senator reasoned correctly. He has done so by

I7Charron, p. 87.

This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 302 OTHELLO deducingfrom the nature of theTurks (at presentabroad toconquer) and thenature of Cyprus(more desirable and moreconquerable than is Rhodes) thelikely behavior of the Turks. It is worthnoting that the Venetianscannot arriveat an accurateestimation of thenumbers of theTurkish fleet because herethey have onlyreport, hearsay, and cir- cumstantialevidence for guidance. At this point, Othello, Brabantio,and theirparties arrive. The Duke is, of course,in chatge of Othello's trial,and he comes to his judgmentby means thatdiffer from the senator's on thefleet. He does notdeduce frompremises but insteadconducts a hearingto gatheras much testimonyas he can regardingthe conflicting claims of Braban- tioand Othello.Brabantio believes that he is arguingfrom reasonable premisesabout thenatures of Desdemona and Othello: "It is a judgment maimed and most imperfect/That will confessperfection so could err/Against all rules of nature" (99-101). Othello must have stolenher from herself by witchcraft. But theDuke, whose firstaction to resolvethe dispute was to ask Othello to speak in his own defense (74), now tells Brabantio:

To vouch this is no proof, Withoutmore certainand more overttest Than thesethin habits and poor likelihoods Of modernseeming do preferagainst him. (106-109)

Premisesin thiscase arenot sufficiently conclusive in one directionor theother. Testimony must be heardfrom those with pertinent information, namely Othello and Desdemona. As one would expect, Othello defendshimself, but it is his notion to call Desdemona to "witness"(170) what he has claimedabout theirlove. Her testimony corroboratesOthello's, thereis no one to supportBrabantio's surmise of witchcraft,and the Duke dismissesthe charges.By conductinga sensible hearing, the Duke has seen the absence of mere lust and witchcraftand the presence of love persuasivelytestified to and demonstrated. Had Othello so conductedhis trialof Desdemona, he would have arrivedat thesame conclusionsregarding her love forhim as did the Duke. That he understandsthe propermeans of determininga just judgmentis made evidentbefore he begins the trial:

'Tis not to make me jealous To say my wife is fair,feeds well, loves company, Is freeof speech, sings,plays, and dances; Wherevirtue is, theseare more virtuous.

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Nor frommine own weak meritswill I draw The smallestfear or doubt of her revolt, For she had eyes,and chose me. No, lago; I'll see beforeI doubt; when I doubt,prove; And on the proof thereis no more but this- Away at once with love or jealousy! (III.iii. 183-192)

The last threelines reveal a finelyaccurate sense of the judicial process.It is, in outline,how theDuke conductedOthello's trial.And theother lines of thespeech show thatOthello is awarealso of theim- portanceof makingreasonable deductions from premises. He is not hereworried by her "liberalheart" (III.iv.38). Her love is clearto him fromher nature, the evidence of her spoken and demonstratedlove for him,and theabsence of any evidence that testifies to any mitigation of her love. In less than fiftylines, he slips from his own formulationof judiciousness. The charges that lago brings against Desdemona beforeOthello are almostidentical with the charges that lago brings againstOthello beforeBrabantio. The Duke disprovesthem; Othello does not.lago himselfsays, "I speak notyet of proof" (III.iii. 196),but he does urge Othello to doubtbefore he sees:"I am topray you not to strainmy speech/ To grosserissues nor to largerreach/ Than to suspicion" (218-220).Othello's replygives the audience itsfirst clear sign thathe will misjudgeDesdemona: "I will not." He will not go fartherthan suspicion, but thatis as faras he needgo in orderfor lago to succeedagainst him. In anotherfifty lines, he accepts thecharges made againsther: "She's gone. I am abused,and myrelief/ Must be to loathe her" (267-268).He will swingback tojudging herinnocent at times(times when he remembersher nature), but thathe has come to convict her so soon reveals how far he has departed from his reasonablenessearlier in the scene. Moreover,he will go back to his knowledgethat one can reasonac- curatelyfrom premises, even naming some of the ones thathe has alreadylisted:

Othello: Hang her! I do but say what she is. So delicate with her needle! an admirablemusician! 0, she will sing thesavageness out of a bear! Of so high and plenteouswit and invention- Iago: She's the worse forall this. Othello: 0, a thousand thousand times!And then,of so gentlea condition! Iago: Ay, too gentle. (IV.i. 184-191)

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But now, havingjudged herguilty, to reasonintelligently from these still evidentpremises, he must deny the virtuethat theypossessed "wherevirtue is." Not only has he doubtedbefore he has seen,he has provedbefore he has seen. SurelyOthello's requestfor "proof" is not an irrationalor injudicious one. The Duke himselfsought proof. But the Duke, being head of the state,was required to investigateany charge brought by so responsible and importanta citizen (and memberof his government)as Brabantio.Othello need not,merely on lago's suspicions,entertain any of his own untilhe has seen. It is not his askingfor proof of a charge,but the time at whichhe asksfor it (prior to a reasonable need to do so), that shows the growing irrationalityof Othello. In askingfor "ocular proof"he is askingfor whathe had said would be thebeginning of his doubtof Desdemona, but what he now will considerconclusive evidence of her guilt. Worse,he will neversee whathe is askingfor, yet will thinkthat he has:

Iago: And did you see the handkerchief? Othello: Was thatmine? (IV.i.170-171)

He thentakes lago's word thathe has seen what he demandedto see. When, in V.ii, Desdemona realizesthat she is in jeopardyof having sentencepassed upon her,she makes the same requestthat Othello made of theDuke underidentical circumstances in I.iii: "I nevergave it [the handkerchief]him. Send forhim hither./Let him confessa truth"(67-68). The Duke immediatelyacceded; Othello replies,"He hath confessed,"a confessionthat Othello did not hear and im- perfectlysaw. He reliescompletely on just whatlago has offeredhim: "imputationand strongcircumstances/ Which lead directlyto the door of truth"(III.iii.406-407). Imputation and strongcircumstances were exactlywhat did not lead to truthin I.iii (or in II.iii's trialof Cassio, forthat matter). Othello has entirelymishandled the trialof Desdemona's innocence and the trial of his exerciseof reason, not even naming the charge to the accused or seekingevidence from a witnessother than lago until IV.ii. And then he refusesto accept Emilia's testimonybecause it disputes the sentence that he has already passed; when he asks Desdemona whethershe is not a whore, he shows again how horriblyfar he is fromthe Duke and fromhis own statedprocess of judgment. It is almostenough to make one thinkthat in thisplay love, par- ticularlysexual love, is not properlywithin the provinceof reason, can be attackedby reason but not defendedor detectedby it, must be

This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions E. K. WEEDIN, JR. 305 foundwanting when it appears beforeany privateor public bar of judgment.Brabantio's love fora daughtermakes it impossiblefor him to judge Othello or Desdemona accurately,and that love is, presumablyin thisplay, free from the complication of sexuality. lago urgesRoderigo, "Now, sir,be judge yourself,/Whether I in anyjust termam affined/To love the Moor" (I.i.38-40). He, too, in most productionsof the play, experiencesno sexual feelingin his bond withOthello. But thejustice, the rationality of his reasonsfor not loving theMoor has beenrightly questioned by most scholars of the play. Roderigo, admittedlyno touchstoneof the Rational Soul (while holding Desdemona to be in a "blessedcondition" and imperviousto Cassio, he maintainshis hope thatshe will permithim to enjoyher), cannot reasonadequately even about mattersin which love plays no part.lago does not need to urge Roderigo to be a judge of Othello's treatmentof lago, as an earlierexchange shows:

Iago: And I-God bless the mark!-his Moorship's ancient. Roderigo: By heaven, I rather would have been his hangman. (Ii.33-34)

Withthe exception of Othello's "Here is myjourney's end, here is my butt,/And veryseamark of my utmostsail" (V.ii.268-269),it is the most succinctpassing of judgmentand sentencein the play. There is, however,besides the Duke (who, not involvedin thelove thathe judges, is therebypotentially more able to judge), one other figurein theplay who is much involvedin thelove thatshe rationally,even legalisticallyjudges. Desdemona does resentOthello's treat- ment of her in III.iv, but immediatelyupon her resentmentshe decides thatit is unjust:

Beshrewme much, Emilia, I was, unhandsomewarrior as I am, Arraigninghis unkindnesswith my soul; But now I findI had subornedthe witness, And he's indictedfalsely. (III.iv. 150-154)

Shakespeare's accumulation here of legal terminologyinsistently carriesthe audience back to I.iii. In this later scene Desdemona is much like the FirstSenator in her reasoning.She can thinkof no reason forOthello to feelanger towardher; thereforeshe concludes thatsome otherirritation (a matterof state,probably) causes him to

This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 306 OTHELLO direct his displeasure even against her. Like the First Senator, Desdemona reasons sensibly fromreasonable premises. Like the Duke, she discoversno evidence to support her own momentary charge against Othello, and she findsagainst her testimonyas the Duke foundagainst Brabantio's. Unlike thatof theFirst Senator and theDuke, however,her reasoning is based on premisesthat turn out to be incorrect.The Turks behavedrationally in makingfor Cyprus rather than Rhodes. Othello does not behave rationally in his jealousy for Desdemona. Her erroroccurs not in reasoningabout love. Her wordsand heractions show pointedlythat it can be done: herlove is eminentlyrational and fine.Her errorlies in assumingthat thelove feltfor her is correspondinglyrational. Yet even thiserror is largelyaverted by her soul's sure knowledgeof human nature:"We must thinkmen are not gods" (III.iv.148). When Desdemonadiscovers, just beforedying, how wrongshe has been in hersurmises and conclusionsabout Othello's anger,she can still acquit him of the anger and the murder:"Nobody-I myself. Farewell./Commend me to my kind lord. 0, farewell!"(V.ii.125- 126). As the "kind" cannot be ironic(and spoken by Desdemona),it mustbe charitable.Surely, then, it does pass all understanding,and reflectsher great kindness but no exercise of judgment. Yet Desdemonahas made twodistinctions earlier in theplay thatsuggest she is as human and reasonableas she is angelic and loving in her finalwords. After Othello has accused Desdemona ofbeing a whore, Emilia asks, "Good madam, what's the matterwith my lord?"

Desdemona: With who? Emilia: Why,with my lord, madam. Desdemona: Who is thylord? Emilia: He thatis yours,sweet lady. Desdemona: I have none. (IV.ii.98-102)

One is remindedof "She's gone. I am abused,and myrelief/ Must be to loathe her." But thereOthello blamed Desdemona, indeed found herguilty. Here Desdemona,as she does in theplay's conclusion,ac- quits theOthello who is not herlord, the Othello who mistakenlyac- cuses and convictsher, the Othello who is theabsence of her lord; the kind Othello who is her lord she need not acquit, forshe does not chargehim. She sees thetwo Othellos, the one who would,because of reasonablepremises about hernature and theevidence of herlove for him, love her despite "imputationand strongcircumstances," and theone who, fora time,inexplicably cannot. Because she is aware of both,the Othello who is herlord and theone who is not,she, unlike

This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions E. K. WEEDIN, JR. 307

Othello (who forceshimself to seeonly the false Desdemona), can per- sist in believingin the fidelityof her spouse's love forher. She has demonstratedsuch clear and loving reason in remarks made to Othello about Cassio: "If he be not one thattruly loves you,/ That errsin ignorance,and not in cunning,/I have no judgmentin an honestface" (III.iii.48-50). Such judgmentabout love and man's frailtyin offeringit is consistentlymade by Desdemona throughout theplay. It is thecritical distinction that the play makesbetween the errorsof reasoningcommitted by lago and thoseby Othello, forthe action of thisplay does show thatlago, as well as Othello, errsin his reasoningand his actions based-uponthe reasoning. He errsin cunning,Othello in ignorance.lago knowsthe damage and evil thathe is working,yet he is persuaded(by himself)that deliberately causing such evil reflectsno flawin his rationalsoul. On thecontrary, he tells Roderigo (and nothingin the play suggeststhat he is not honestly speakinghis mindwhen he does) thatthe rational soul can rationally decide to carryout evil rationally,that the rational soul (so long as it is not led by passion) can functionproperly, according to itsnature, whetherit directsa man to act out good or evil. lago has, in rejecting theChristian humanist notions of man's natureand theoperation of reason in it, spokenand acted in keepingwith many notions of con- traryRenaissance writers; yet no morethan Desdemona and Othello has he succeededin the world of this play. Granted,he gained the lieutenancyin III.iii, but by thenit was onlya partof what he wanted to relish;he has by theend of theplay destroyedmuch of thebeauty thatmakes him ugly, but he has destroyedhimself, too, forhe will soon be as dead as Desdemona and Othello, and aftera longerand more tortureddying. Machiavellian exercise of reason and will succeedsin some pieces of fictionand history,but not in Othello. It mightwell be argued thatmany of thecharacters who attempt (evenDesdemona, who succeeds)to reasonin a mannerthat they con- sidermorally right are no moresuccessful in livingin thisplay thanis lago, forat its conclusion theyare alreadydead. Perhaps, indeed, Othellodoes finallypresent a bleakestimate of the efficacy of any sort ofreasoning. But surelyin thistragedy, as in manyothers, the success ofa figure'slife is not indicatedby his beingalive at thedrama's conclusion. Both opposing modesof reasoning are intendedand believed to afforda man a lifein whichhe takesa seriousdelight, even if such a life accords him sufferingas well as pleasure. lago's only pleasant momentsare the transitoryones of carryingout his plots: "Pleasure and action make thehours seem short," he saysof thenight in which he dupes Cassio (II.iii.361). In theirworst sufferingOthello and Desdemona still experiencetheir love foreach other.lago's greatest

This content downloaded from 140.233.2.215 on Fri, 22 Mar 2013 13:31:28 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 308 OTHELLO errorand harshestpunishment during the play have been, largely because of his deliberatechoice of a particularway of thoughtand conduct, to be lago; Desdemona and Othello, too, have been themselves,but theirselves have been moreenjoyable and enjoyedby themselvesthan has lago's. Though all three come to the sameness of death, they lead significantlydifferent lives on theway. Othello triesto reason properly, to determineby judicious processwhether he mustjustly accuse, sentence,and executeDesdemona. He persuadeshimself that by kill- ing her he is removingsome evil fromthe world,not introducing more.lago believesthat he can directhimself to evil and succeed;he fails.Othello thinksthat he has directedhimself to good (justice);he is mistaken.It is theprimary misfortune in theplay thatboth errors in reasoningresult in a reliance,despite each character'sconviction to the contrary,upon a will undirectedby reason. lago proclaims the primacyof thewill to Roderigo.And nowherein theplay is therea depictionof a will moreunrelenting, more uncontrolled by reason, than Othello's:

Never,lago. Like to the Pontic sea, Whose icy currentand compulsivecourse Ne'er feelsretiring ebb, but keeps due on To the Proponticand the Hellespont, Even so my bloody thoughts,with violentpace, Shall ne'er look back, ne'er ebb to humble love, Till thata capable and wide revenge Swallow themup. (III.iii.453-460)

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