David L. Snead. The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the . Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999. x + 286 pp. $50.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8142-5005-1.

Reviewed by Richard H. Immerman

Published on H-Diplo (November, 2000)

DUCK and COVER study seemed to uncover another layer of com‐ Examinations of the foreign policies of Presi‐ plexity. The impulse to dig deeper can be irre‐ dent Dwight D. Eisenhower -- revisionist, postrevi‐ sistible, especially for younger scholars. And then sionist, whatever-ist -- have over the past several there is the impetus generated by the implosion of decades consumed an ever-expanding proportion the former . Even if produced by of the available book-shelf space of historians of ahistorical thinking, the disconnect between reve‐ U.S. foreign relations and international history. lations about Soviet feebleness and images of Recently, these examinations have increasingly fo‐ American school children engaged in duck and cused on assessments of national security policy cover exercises begs explication. Can we make writ large, a sub-sub-feld which of course in‐ sense of the 1950s? cludes although is not limited to defense policy No doubt all these considerations infuenced and nuclear strategy.[1] As always, in substantial David Snead's decision to write The Gaither Com‐ part the progressive release of pertinent archives mittee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War. Because explains this greater attention to security ques‐ this study originated as his dissertation, Snead's tions. But I think there is much more to it. Be‐ two initial reasons were almost certainly: 1) not‐ cause examining the formulation of national secu‐ withstanding the signifcance previous scholars rity policy requires assessing the advising and de‐ have attributed to the Gaither Report in terms of cision-making apparatus, this "genre" addresses the nuclear policy and programs of the ambiguous relationship between process and both Eisenhower and Kennedy, an archivally- product in the Eisenhower administration that be‐ based study of its production and consequences devils both historians and political scientists -- remained to be written; and 2) it was now possi‐ and frequently divides them. Likewise, whereas ble to access the archives in order to write this security policy in the 1950s once appeared so in‐ study. Snead makes explicit, however, that he also fexible compared to what followed, each new had more conceptual purposes. First, he hoped to H-Net Reviews provide additional evidence of the intricacies and Gaither report by identifying way stations leading efectiveness of Eisenhower's advisory process, up to the Commission's establishment. This order particularly by underscoring the president's for‐ is too tall to fll. mal inclusion of civilian experts. Secondly, Snead The valuable contribution of this book begins sought to demonstrate that, despite something to emerge with the second chapter. From here on akin to the conventional wisdom, the Gaither Re‐ Snead carefully and systematically presents the port did in fact have a signifcant impact on Eisen‐ immediate antecedents to the establishment of hower's nuclear policy. Snead achieves his initial the Gaither committee, discusses in unparalleled goals more successfully than his conceptual ones. detail its membership and recommendations Snead stumbles a bit at the start by introduc‐ (documentation on its deliberations remain inac‐ ing his subject in a background chapter entitled cessible), and explicitly assesses the consequences "Eisenhower's Core Values and Decision-Making and implications of its report. By doing so, Snead Systems." Not only does this chapter present ma‐ adds an important dimension to the ever-more terial that will be extremely familiar to virtually complete narrative concerning the controversy any reader of a book with this title, the efort to over the "Missile Gap" and the evolution of nucle‐ compress so much time and information into so ar strategy and security policy under Kennedy few pages produces distortions and even misin‐ and Johnson. [2] formation. Precisely what Snead defnes as a "core The basic outlines of the story are readily value" remains obscure, and his tendency to con‐ summarized. By the start of Eisenhower's second fate Eisenhower's "core values" with what the Na‐ term in ofce, his administration's emphasis on tional Security Council (a monolith?) "believed" the role of nuclear weapons as the most efective exacerbates this ambiguity. In this regard Eisen‐ deterrent to Soviet adventurism and, consequent‐ hower's strategic thinking, in fundamental re‐ ly, the world's best hope for avoiding general war spects surely derived from his "core values," re‐ while promoting security had been subject to in‐ ceives short shrift. To continue in this vein, the tense criticism. Members of Congress and the mil‐ signifcant attention Snead pays to the Project So‐ itary, journalists, scholars, and others charged larium juxtaposed with his truncated discussion Eisenhower (or more often than not the presi‐ of the exercise itself and exaggerated estimate of dent's lightning rod, Secretary of State John Foster its role in the formulation of NSC 162/2 distorts Dulles) with an unconscionable failure to appreci‐ both the policy-making and decision-making ate adequately the strategic challenges of the nu‐ process (a distinction that Snead neglects to clear age, thereby exposing the United States to draw). By glossing over the production and adop‐ the risk of both attack and blackmail even as the tion of NSC 149/2 (Basic National Security Policies vulnerability of U.S. allies and neutrals increased. and Programs in Relation to Their Costs), Snead In at least partial response, Eisenhower set up in both sacrifces an opportunity to assess the infu‐ the spring of 1957 a panel of civilian experts to ex‐ ence of Eisenhower's fscal conservatism on secu‐ amine the adequacy of the existing civil defense rity policy (which in my opinion he overstates) programs. James Killian, MIT president and a and neglects a precedent-setting use of civilian ad‐ member of the recently established Science Advi‐ visors, a phenomenon central to this examination. sory Committee, recommended that H. Rowan What Snead attempts to accomplish in this brief Gaither, Jr., a leading at the RAND Corpora‐ chapter, in short, is to encapsulate Eisenhower's tion and Ford Foundation, head up the panel. "core values," describe the administration's poli‐ Gaither apparently received authority to select cy- and decision-making processes, and to provide the soon-to-be-called Gaither committee's mem‐ the historical context necessary to evaluate the

2 H-Net Reviews bership. Among those he chose were Killian, nental defense programs as inadequate. Their in‐ Robert Sprague, William Foster, James Doolittle, adequacy placed America's population in grave George Lincoln, and Paul Nitze. Lincoln and Nitze danger of annihilation. No less imperiled were ultimately did most of the report's writing. America's strategic forces, and thus the second While none of the above committee members strike capability on which efective deterrence de‐ will be strangers to most readers of Snead's book, pended. Accordingly, the report urged that the ad‐ the short biographies of each that he provides are ministration immediately undertake programs to nevertheless useful. What he does not provide, strengthen America's defensive and ofensive ca‐ however, is an evaluation of the process and crite‐ pabilities. Specifcally, the United States must en‐ ria used to select them. This oversight is unfortu‐ large its nuclear missile and delivery systems, en‐ nate, because it bears directly on the outcome. hance its ability to wage "limited war," reorganize Snead may be right, although frankly I have my its defense establishment, and fnance the con‐ suspicions, that "As a group they [members of the struction of a comprehensive network of civilian committee] did not enter the Gaither study with a fall-out shelters. No expense should be spared. set agenda. . . ." He is certainly right when he The estimated cost of implementing the report's writes in his next sentence that they ". . . did share recommendations between 1959 and 1963 was a concern for U.S. national security that went be‐ close to $45 billion. This was a price America yond their support for Eisenhower or his poli‐ could and should pay; its very survival hung in cies." (p.11) In fact, phrased less euphemistically, the balance. the Gaither committee was composed overwhelm‐ The report became public a little more than a ingly of alarmist critics of the Eisenhower admin‐ month later. The headline of Chalmers Robert's istration who considered his policies and pro‐ front-page story in the Washington Post on De‐ grams complacent and penurious to the point of cember 20, 1958 read, "SECRET REPORT SEES U.S. folly. Within this environment they could operate IN GRAVE PERIL." (p.139). Snead, who underplays in the absence of virtually any bufers. politics throughout this study, neglects to mention Hence, at least in hindsight it was highly pre‐ that it was Roberts who received during the Dien‐ dictable not only that the committee would ex‐ bienphu crisis of 1954 the "leak" that credited the ceed its mandate, but also that its conclusions and Democrats for "The Day We Didn't go to War." recommendations would rapidly leak to the pub‐ Still, it takes little efort to connect the Gaither Re‐ lic. Nitze, the primary author of the report, ar‐ port to allegations of a Missile Gap during the gued from the inception that the ". . . Gaither com‐ 1960 campaign to the victorious Democrats' mili‐ mittee [should] view its report as a unique oppor‐ tary programs which provided substance to tunity to ofer an alternative national security Kennedy's promise to "bear any burden." strategy to the president's policies." (p.113) As fate Snead's evident perseverance in locating would have it in light of its members' predisposi‐ archival material is impressive. He tells the story tion toward Armageddon-type scenarios, the like no one has before him. His analysis of this Gaither committee submitted its report to the NSC story, however, sufers from serious problems. To in November 1957, only days after the second of begin with, his efort to use the Gaither committee the infamous Sputnik launches and weeks before and report to enhance our evaluations of Eisen‐ the humiliating on take-of of a Van‐ hower's advisory system is fawed. Snead's prima‐ guard missile. For Nitze and the others, this tim‐ ry emphasis is on the value Eisenhower placed in ing could not have been more appropriate. The soliciting the input of civilian experts. Eisenhower report lambasted the Eisenhower civil and conti‐ unquestionably valued civilian input. But why he

3 H-Net Reviews did so is less clear. A closer examination than er's "hidden-hand" approach, not "hands-of," as Snead provides of Eisenhower's prior use of civil‐ Snead suggests. (191) The connotations of "hands- ian advisors reveals that the president tended to of" and "hidden-hand" are very diferent conno‐ select civilians with whom he disagreed to partici‐ tations.[3] pate formally in the advisory process, and then Snead also comes up short in his efort to reject their advice. It is very possible, therefore, challenge conventional wisdom by demonstrating and I would argue very probable, that Eisenhow‐ that the Gaither report did infuence Eisenhower's er invited this input as much to co-opt his critics security policy. The basis of the argument is that as to beneft from their recommendations. He Eisenhower to a greater or lesser extent -- mostly could claim publicly that his mind was not closed greater --adopted all of the recommendations ex‐ to informed suggestions, that he solicited diferent cept for those concerning the construction of fall- points of view -- bipartisan points of view -- but out shelters and the expansion of limited war- their arguments proved unpersuasive. By allow‐ fghting capabilities. He did increase defense ing critics to contribute to his decision making spending, he did more rapidly bring on line the process, Eisenhower made them complicit in the various missile systems that were in varying decisions that he eventually made. stages of development (Thor and Jupiter IRBMs; Given that Eisenhower's strategic thinking Atlas and Titan ICBMs; Polaris SLBMs); he did ap‐ was so much at odds with the essentials of the prove initiatives intended to safeguard the U.S. Gaither report, and given that one could be quite second-strike capability by building early warning confdent that because of the biases of the com‐ radar systems and dispersing missile sites. Thus, mittee's membership the report would be at odds Snead concludes, the Gaither committee signif‐ with Eisenhower's thinking, it is difcult to imag‐ cantly afected Eisenhower's policies as well as ine that Eisenhower's decision to establish the Kennedy's. committee was not at a minimum somewhat in‐ I am not convinced, and not simply because fuenced by this tactic. If this was the case, several the gaps in the available archival record prevent critical questions need to be addressed. Did Eisen‐ Snead from directly connecting the Gaither rec‐ hower really believe that an explosive report like ommendations to Eisenhower's decisions. Of the one the Gaither committee was sure to pro‐ more consequence, those aspects of the Gaither duce could be kept a secret? Was he naive, or was report that Eisehower "accepted" all concerned he misled by the Solarium precedent? Or, either deterrence -- the heart of his existing policy. To because of his health or other demands on his Eisenhower, nothing was more vital than the se‐ time and attention, did Eisenhower and his close curity of the second strike capability. Perhaps the advisors drop the ball by failing to monitor the se‐ report to a small degree intensifed the adminis‐ lection of the committee members? Whatever the tration's urgency in implementing some pro‐ cause, from Eisenhower's perspective the Gaither grams, but Eisenhower's policy and strategy re‐ "process" seemed to have spun out of his control. mained unchanged. Unlike Kennedy, he continued That it did should give pause to some of the Eisen‐ to believe that measures designed to provide for a hower revisionists, like myself, who applaud "fexible response" were an invitation to aggres‐ Eisenhower's process. Snead appears to recognize sion and general war. And to build fall-out shel‐ this by cryptically referring in his conclusion to ters to survive a general war betrayed a woeful the Eisenhower model of leadership praised by misunderstanding of the nuclear predicament. Fred Greenstein. Yet not only does Snead leave his The Gaither report was an irritant to Eisenhower argument undeveloped, but he also mischaracter‐ as opposed to a variable in his strategic equation. izes Greenstein's. Greenstein wrote of Eisenhow‐

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Shortcomings aside, The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War demands a wide readership. It is a book that had to be written. Snead warrants our gratitude for writing it. Notes [1]. For example, see Saki Dockrill, Eisenhow‐ er's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961 (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisen‐ hower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (NY: Oxford University Press, 1998); Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (NY: Columbia University Press, 1998). [2]. Recent contributions to this narrative in‐ clude Peter J. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); An‐ dreas Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons (NY: Rowman and Littlefeld, 1997; Meena Bose, Shaping and Signal‐ ing Presidential Policy: The National Security De‐ cision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy (Col‐ lege Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1998). [3]. Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Pres‐ idency: Eisenhower as Leader (NY: Basic Books, 1982. Copyright (c) 2000 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ tact [email protected] or H-Diplo@h- net.msu.edu.

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Citation: Richard H. Immerman. Review of Snead, David L. The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. November, 2000.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4712

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