David L. Snead. The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999. x + 286 pp. $50.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8142-5005-1. Reviewed by Richard H. Immerman Published on H-Diplo (November, 2000) DUCK and COVER study seemed to uncover another layer of com‐ Examinations of the foreign policies of Presi‐ plexity. The impulse to dig deeper can be irre‐ dent Dwight D. Eisenhower -- revisionist, postrevi‐ sistible, especially for younger scholars. And then sionist, whatever-ist -- have over the past several there is the impetus generated by the implosion of decades consumed an ever-expanding proportion the former Soviet Union. Even if produced by of the available book-shelf space of historians of ahistorical thinking, the disconnect between reve‐ U.S. foreign relations and international history. lations about Soviet feebleness and images of Recently, these examinations have increasingly fo‐ American school children engaged in duck and cused on assessments of national security policy cover exercises begs explication. Can we make writ large, a sub-sub-field which of course in‐ sense of the 1950s? cludes although is not limited to defense policy No doubt all these considerations influenced and nuclear strategy.[1] As always, in substantial David Snead's decision to write The Gaither Com‐ part the progressive release of pertinent archives mittee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War. Because explains this greater attention to security ques‐ this study originated as his dissertation, Snead's tions. But I think there is much more to it. Be‐ two initial reasons were almost certainly: 1) not‐ cause examining the formulation of national secu‐ withstanding the significance previous scholars rity policy requires assessing the advising and de‐ have attributed to the Gaither Report in terms of cision-making apparatus, this "genre" addresses the nuclear policy and civil defense programs of the ambiguous relationship between process and both Eisenhower and Kennedy, an archivally- product in the Eisenhower administration that be‐ based study of its production and consequences devils both historians and political scientists -- remained to be written; and 2) it was now possi‐ and frequently divides them. Likewise, whereas ble to access the archives in order to write this security policy in the 1950s once appeared so in‐ study. Snead makes explicit, however, that he also flexible compared to what followed, each new had more conceptual purposes. First, he hoped to H-Net Reviews provide additional evidence of the intricacies and Gaither report by identifying way stations leading effectiveness of Eisenhower's advisory process, up to the Commission's establishment. This order particularly by underscoring the president's for‐ is too tall to fill. mal inclusion of civilian experts. Secondly, Snead The valuable contribution of this book begins sought to demonstrate that, despite something to emerge with the second chapter. From here on akin to the conventional wisdom, the Gaither Re‐ Snead carefully and systematically presents the port did in fact have a significant impact on Eisen‐ immediate antecedents to the establishment of hower's nuclear policy. Snead achieves his initial the Gaither committee, discusses in unparalleled goals more successfully than his conceptual ones. detail its membership and recommendations Snead stumbles a bit at the start by introduc‐ (documentation on its deliberations remain inac‐ ing his subject in a background chapter entitled cessible), and explicitly assesses the consequences "Eisenhower's Core Values and Decision-Making and implications of its report. By doing so, Snead Systems." Not only does this chapter present ma‐ adds an important dimension to the ever-more terial that will be extremely familiar to virtually complete narrative concerning the controversy any reader of a book with this title, the effort to over the "Missile Gap" and the evolution of nucle‐ compress so much time and information into so ar strategy and security policy under Kennedy few pages produces distortions and even misin‐ and Johnson. [2] formation. Precisely what Snead defines as a "core The basic outlines of the story are readily value" remains obscure, and his tendency to con‐ summarized. By the start of Eisenhower's second flate Eisenhower's "core values" with what the Na‐ term in office, his administration's emphasis on tional Security Council (a monolith?) "believed" the role of nuclear weapons as the most effective exacerbates this ambiguity. In this regard Eisen‐ deterrent to Soviet adventurism and, consequent‐ hower's strategic thinking, in fundamental re‐ ly, the world's best hope for avoiding general war spects surely derived from his "core values," re‐ while promoting security had been subject to in‐ ceives short shrift. To continue in this vein, the tense criticism. Members of Congress and the mil‐ significant attention Snead pays to the Project So‐ itary, journalists, scholars, and others charged larium juxtaposed with his truncated discussion Eisenhower (or more often than not the presi‐ of the exercise itself and exaggerated estimate of dent's lightning rod, Secretary of State John Foster its role in the formulation of NSC 162/2 distorts Dulles) with an unconscionable failure to appreci‐ both the policy-making and decision-making ate adequately the strategic challenges of the nu‐ process (a distinction that Snead neglects to clear age, thereby exposing the United States to draw). By glossing over the production and adop‐ the risk of both attack and blackmail even as the tion of NSC 149/2 (Basic National Security Policies vulnerability of U.S. allies and neutrals increased. and Programs in Relation to Their Costs), Snead In at least partial response, Eisenhower set up in both sacrifices an opportunity to assess the influ‐ the spring of 1957 a panel of civilian experts to ex‐ ence of Eisenhower's fscal conservatism on secu‐ amine the adequacy of the existing civil defense rity policy (which in my opinion he overstates) programs. James Killian, MIT president and a and neglects a precedent-setting use of civilian ad‐ member of the recently established Science Advi‐ visors, a phenomenon central to this examination. sory Committee, recommended that H. Rowan What Snead attempts to accomplish in this brief Gaither, Jr., a leading light at the RAND Corpora‐ chapter, in short, is to encapsulate Eisenhower's tion and Ford Foundation, head up the panel. "core values," describe the administration's poli‐ Gaither apparently received authority to select cy- and decision-making processes, and to provide the soon-to-be-called Gaither committee's mem‐ the historical context necessary to evaluate the 2 H-Net Reviews bership. Among those he chose were Killian, nental defense programs as inadequate. Their in‐ Robert Sprague, William Foster, James Doolittle, adequacy placed America's population in grave George Lincoln, and Paul Nitze. Lincoln and Nitze danger of annihilation. No less imperiled were ultimately did most of the report's writing. America's strategic forces, and thus the second While none of the above committee members strike capability on which effective deterrence de‐ will be strangers to most readers of Snead's book, pended. Accordingly, the report urged that the ad‐ the short biographies of each that he provides are ministration immediately undertake programs to nevertheless useful. What he does not provide, strengthen America's defensive and offensive ca‐ however, is an evaluation of the process and crite‐ pabilities. Specifically, the United States must en‐ ria used to select them. This oversight is unfortu‐ large its nuclear missile and delivery systems, en‐ nate, because it bears directly on the outcome. hance its ability to wage "limited war," reorganize Snead may be right, although frankly I have my its defense establishment, and fnance the con‐ suspicions, that "As a group they [members of the struction of a comprehensive network of civilian committee] did not enter the Gaither study with a fall-out shelters. No expense should be spared. set agenda. ." He is certainly right when he The estimated cost of implementing the report's writes in his next sentence that they ". did share recommendations between 1959 and 1963 was a concern for U.S. national security that went be‐ close to $45 billion. This was a price America yond their support for Eisenhower or his poli‐ could and should pay; its very survival hung in cies." (p.11) In fact, phrased less euphemistically, the balance. the Gaither committee was composed overwhelm‐ The report became public a little more than a ingly of alarmist critics of the Eisenhower admin‐ month later. The headline of Chalmers Robert's istration who considered his policies and pro‐ front-page story in the Washington Post on De‐ grams complacent and penurious to the point of cember 20, 1958 read, "SECRET REPORT SEES U.S. folly. Within this environment they could operate IN GRAVE PERIL." (p.139). Snead, who underplays in the absence of virtually any buffers. politics throughout this study, neglects to mention Hence, at least in hindsight it was highly pre‐ that it was Roberts who received during the Dien‐ dictable not only that the committee would ex‐ bienphu crisis of 1954 the "leak" that credited the ceed its mandate, but also that its conclusions and Democrats for "The Day We Didn't go to War." recommendations would rapidly leak to the pub‐ Still, it takes little effort to connect the Gaither Re‐ lic. Nitze, the primary author of the report, ar‐ port to allegations of a Missile Gap during the gued from the inception that the ". Gaither com‐ 1960 campaign to the victorious Democrats' mili‐ mittee [should] view its report as a unique oppor‐ tary programs which provided substance to tunity to offer an alternative national security Kennedy's promise to "bear any burden." strategy to the president's policies." (p.113) As fate Snead's evident perseverance in locating would have it in light of its members' predisposi‐ archival material is impressive.