This article was downloaded by: 10.2.98.160 On: 26 Sep 2021 Access details: subscription number Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy Kelly Arenson Argumentative Strategies of Pyrrhonian and Academic Skeptics Publication details https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781351168120-3 Renata Ziemiska Published online on: 30 Jun 2020 How to cite :- Renata Ziemiska. 30 Jun 2020, Argumentative Strategies of Pyrrhonian and Academic Skeptics from: The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy Routledge Accessed on: 26 Sep 2021 https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781351168120-3 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT Full terms and conditions of use: https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. 3 ARGUMENTATIVE STRATEGIES OF PYRRHONIAN AND ACADEMIC SKEPTICS Renata Ziemin´ska Hellenistic skeptics developed arguments for the suspension of all judgments [epoche-], with all of these arguments showing the uncertainty of philosophical and common beliefs. Dis- cussion with other schools caused skeptics to develop some defensive arguments: against the apraxia charge, against inconsistency in skeptical philosophy, and concerning the self- refutation charge. The first type of argument (for epoche-) was common to all ancient skeptics; however, the defensive strategies were divided: radical in the case of Pyrrhonians and moderate in the case of Academic skeptics. Presenting the defensive strategies, I will focus on the inconsistency and self-refutation issues. The apraxia issues are discussed in detail in a later chapter. Skeptical Arguments for the Suspension of All Judgments The first declared skeptic known in the European tradition was Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 360–270 BC). He was an enthusiast of Socrates, trained in dialectics, who took part in Alexander the Great’s expedition to India. After returning to Greece he settled in Elis and led his own school of philosophy. His student Timon wrote Pyrrho’s ideas and transferred them to Athens (Hankinson 1995: 52; Bett 2003: 1). Pyrrho constructed an ontological argument for skepticism, showing the discrepancy between the world and the human mind: things in the world are indifferent, unstable, and indeterminate; therefore, our opinions are neither true nor false, and we should be without opinions [adoxastoi] (LS, 1F; Bett 2003:16). In other words, phenomena are fluent and complicated (the ontology of process), and human concepts are too simple to capture them. This discrepancy renders hopeless the successful predication of any property to things/ phenomena. According to Pyrrho, a wise person lives without beliefs, says of every single thing that it “no more is than is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not” (LS, 1F) and achieves peace of mind [ataraxia]. Inspired by his travel to India, Pyrrho applied the Buddhist logic of the quadrilemma: “Everything is real and is not real, both real and not real, neither real nor not real” (Kuzminski 2008: 56). If this is so, then no simple assertion is reasonable, and all judgments should be suspended. Arcesilaus of Pitane (ca. 315–241 BC) and Carneades of Cirene (ca. 214–128 BC) are two skeptics from Plato’s Academy. Arcesilaus was the scholarch of Plato’s Academy when 38 Downloaded By: 10.2.98.160 At: 23:16 26 Sep 2021; For: 9781351168120, chapter3, 10.4324/9781351168120-3 Argumentative Strategies of Skeptics Timon resided in Athens. Timon accused him of repeating Pyrrho’s ideas without men- tioning his name. Arcesilaus referred to skeptical elements in Socrates’ and Plato’s teach- ing. Carneades was also scholarch of Plato’s Academy and a famous orator who delivered in Rome (155 BC) two speeches about justice. On the first day he praised justice, but the next day he refuted all his own arguments. It was a rhetorical show of using arguments pro and contra (Thorsrud 2009: 60). During their argumentative disputes with the Stoics, Arcesilaus and Carneades for- mulated arguments against certainty (we can call them epistemological arguments for skepticism). Arcesilaus argued with Zeno of Citium against the criterion of truth as cata- leptic sense perception (self-evident, certain, grasping reality in the same way a hand grasps things; Acad. 1.41), which is strikingly clear and “draws us into assent” (M 7.257). According to Arcesilaus, this kind of perception could not provide a guarantee of truth and could easily be mistaken for a false appearance (Acad. 2.40; M 7.154). Therefore, we cannot trust our perceptions, even our cataleptic perceptions, and “the wise person suspends judgment about everything” (M 7.155). The suspension of judgment, or epoche-, was recommended by the Stoics themselves with regard to noncataleptic perceptions. The term epoche- was coined in the heat of Arcesilaus’ dispute with the Stoics (later it will be a technical term and a sign of recognition for ancient skeptics). Arcesilaus invokes this term to say that epoche- should be applied to all judgments (PH 1.232) and “thought that we shouldn’t assert or affirm anything, or approve it with assent: we should always curb our rashness and restrain ourselves from any slip” (Acad. 1.45). Carneades continued to argue against the Stoic criterion of truth as cataleptic perception (during his dispute with Chrysippus). He pointed to objects that are difficult to distinguish (eggs, twins, pillars), dreams and madness. Cicero reports, “I recognize, after all, that my impressions misrepresent the oar and show several colours on the pigeon’s neck, though there isn’t more than one” (Acad. 2.79). The sun seems to be smaller than Earth, and a large ship seems very little when viewed from a distance (Acad. 2.82). Later, Sextus Empiricus gave a similar report: The same boat appears from a distance small and stationary, but close at hand large and in motion. […] The same oar appears bent in water but straight when out of it. […] Doves’ necks appear different in colour depending on the different ways they turn them. (PH 1.118–1.120) Carneades concluded that infallible cataleptic perception is impossible to find. Even under the best conditions for observation, we have no guarantee that we assent to appearance “that cannot be false” (Acad. 2.58). Thus, a wise person suspends judgment about everything. Aenesidemus of Knossos (1st century BC), probably a member of the skeptical Academy who founded the Neo-Pyrrhonian school at Alexandria, is likely the author of the Ten Modes, the list of skeptical arguments against the credibility of perceptual beliefs (M 7.345; DL 9.78). These arguments were presented by Sextus Empiricus (PH 1.36–1.163), Diogenes Laertius (DL 9.78–88), Philo of Alexandria (On Drunkenness 169–202) and others. Aenesidemus assumes that the same thing cannot both have and not have the same property at the same time. The argumentative strategy is simple: to show many examples of conflicting impressions (a situation when the same thing appears to have a property and appears to not have the property, for instance, in different circumstances). Two contra- dictory impressions cannot be veridical; at least one is false, but we have the problem of judging them. 39 Downloaded By: 10.2.98.160 At: 23:16 26 Sep 2021; For: 9781351168120, chapter3, 10.4324/9781351168120-3 R. Ziemin´ska The first mode, following Sextus’ Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Outlines of Pyrrhonism) concerns the problem of how to judge between human and animal impressions. The second mode is related to similar differences among humans. The third mode notes the differences between particular senses (an example: the same painting can present recesses to the eye while presenting smoothness to touch; Bailey 2002: 132). The problem also arises that objects can have qualities that are inaccessible to any of our senses. The fourth mode indicates that our perception depends on circumstances; for instance, “the same honey appears sweet to me, but bitter to people with jaundice” (PH 1.101), or the same wine appears sour to people who have just eaten dates or figs, but it seems to be sweet to people who have consumed nuts or chickpeas. And the bathhouse vestibule warms people entering from outside but chills people leaving if they spend any time there. (PH 1.110) The fifth mode is related to distance, which influences the way we see objects. “The same tower appears from a distance round, but from close at hand square” (PH 1.118). The sixth mode concerns different “admixtures” that impact the reception of stimuli (“the same sound appears different in open places and in narrow winding places”; PH 1.126). The seventh mode notes the dependence of the qualities of things on their quantities; for example, “grains of sand scattered apart from one another appear rough, but when combined in a heap affect our senses smoothly” (PH 1.130). These modes show that conflicting impres- sions exist and that we have no criterion by which to judge between them when we try to fix our beliefs about external objects. The eighth mode is slightly more general and is concerned with the relativity of observed objects to the subject judging and to other objects.