A New US National Security Team Confronts Difficult Choices with Iran and North Korea Sha'ban, 1439 - May 2018

36 Dirasat A New US National Security Team Confronts Difficult Choices with Iran and North Korea Sha'ban, 1439 - May 2018 Author: Dr. Jack Caravelli Co-Author: Sebastian Maier A New US National Security Team Confronts Difficult Choices with Iran and North Korea Author: Dr. Jack Caravelli Co-Author: Sebastian Maier 4 Dirasat No. 36 Sha'ban, 1439 - May 2018 © King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 2018 King Fahd National Library Cataloging-In-Publication Data Caravelli, Jack A New US national security team confronts difficult choices with Iran and North Korea. / Jack Caravelli ; Sebastian Maier. - Riyadh, 2018 30 p ; 16.5 x 23 cm ISBN: 978-603-8206-68-3 1 - National security - United States 2- United States - Foreign relations - Iran I-Sebastian Maier (co. Author) II - Title 355.033073 dc 1439/8184 L.D. no. 1439/8184 ISBN: 978-603-8206-68-3 Table of Contents Abstract 6 Introduction 7 North Korea and Iran—Strange Bedfellows 7 Trump Inherits Dangers in the Middle East and Asia 9 After the Reshuffling—Trump Assembles a New National Security Team 19 Options for Dealing with Iran 23 Implications for North Korea 26 5 6 Dirasat No. 36 Sha'ban, 1439 - May 2018 Abstract US President Donald Trump came to office having inherited a pair of seemingly intractable problems in regard to Iran and North Korea. Events over the past several years are forcing the Trump administration to simultaneously confront these two major political problems with nuclear weapons issues at their core. Iran maintains nuclear weapons options resulting from the flawed 2015 multilateral nuclear deal. In Asia, the unexpected and rapid progress of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities, as well as the challenge of navigating Kim Jong-un’s latest diplomatic moves, demand equally momentous decisions from the administration. This paper addresses the issues and choices available to the Trump administration in responding to the nuclear ambitions of Iran and further contextualizes the recent developments surrounding American nuclear diplomacy vis-à-vis North Korea. Introduction Events over the past several years are forcing the Trump administration to simultaneously confront two major political problems with nuclear weapons issues at their core. Iran maintains nuclear weapons options resulting from the flawed 2015 multilateral nuclear deal, and on May 8, 2018, President Trump announced he was ending US support for the deal and imposing new sanctions on Iran, setting in motion a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe and the Middle East. In Asia, the unexpected and rapid progress of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities, as well as the challenge of navigating supreme leader Kim Jong-un’s latest diplomatic moves, demand equally momentous decisions from the administration. Its approach has been to pursue negotiations aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. A bilateral summit is scheduled to begin on June 12 in Singapore. There are unique elements and capabilities in Iran and North Korea’s respective programs—the DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability is more advanced than Iran’s, for example—but at the same time, it is certain that both nations will be watching how President Trump and his new national security team deal with the other to identify signs of weakness and areas of possible exploitation. North Korea and Iran—Strange Bedfellows While Iran’s military posture and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are embedded in two separate regional settings, over the years, the operational alliance between the two countries has become more intricately intertwined. Iran and North Korea, of course, both have struggling, but very different, economies and political goals. Some have seen this as suggesting their bilateral relationship is little more than one of pragmatic convenience. Events suggest otherwise. During the August 2017 inauguration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to a second term, the North Korean delegation was 7 8 Dirasat No. 36 Sha'ban, 1439 - May 2018 headed by Kim Yong-nam, North Korea’s head of parliament and arguably one of the most powerful man in the country, albeit a distant second to Kim Jong-un. Nam reportedly had a lengthy, personal meeting with Rouhani as well as with Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Parliament of Iran, according to Iran’s IRNA news agency. Nam also remained in the country for 10 days, reportedly to sign a series of technical agreements although few details have been revealed.1 In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the ensuing Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, North Korea has been an indispensable partner in supporting Iran’s military objectives. During that period, North Korea was a critical conduit via which Iran could receive large amounts of military equipment, including the Scud B ballistic missiles that it used in its war with Iraq. Each side benefited; Iran had cash and oil—both badly needed by North Korea— and Pyongyang had sophisticated military hardware that helped Iran increase its regional assertiveness. In the 1990s, both countries created “friendship farms” for cultural and diplomatic exchanges, and in the large Iranian embassy compound in Pyongyang there stands a mosque, one of only a handful of houses of worship in the entire country. These symbolic gestures mask a much deeper, and dangerous, relationship. Iran deploys by far the largest ballistic missile force in the Middle East, but it remains dependent on outside assistance, beginning with the expertise North Korea has acquired over decades of scientific effort and in the past has shared, involving critical research and missile development and production. 2 It is well documented that for decades North Korea and Iran have carried out extensive scientific and technical exchanges. One result has (1) Jeff Daniels, “North Korea’s ‘No. 2’ Official Strengthens Ties with Iran as UN hits Pyongyang with New Sanctions,” CNBC, August 4, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/04/north-korea- officials-visit-to-iran-could-signal-wider-military-ties.html. (2) Samuel Ramani, “A Closer Look at Iran and North Korea’s Missile Cooperation,” The Diplomat, May 13, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/a-closer-look-at-iran-and-north- koreas-missile-cooperation/. been the Iran’s deployment of the Shahab series of long-range missiles, which are derived from the North Korean–designed No Dong missiles.3 Trump Inherits Dangers in the Middle East and Asia Donald Trump came to office having inherited a pair of seemingly intractable problems in regard to Iran and North Korea. The two countries’ peculiar historic relationship only adds to the complexity of the situation. In Iran, the multilateral signing of the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)4 was touted by the Barack Obama administration as a major breakthrough that would not only mitigate much of the threat from Iran’s nuclear program5 but also induce that nation to engage in more moderate behavior in the Middle East and beyond. The other signatories to the agreement—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China— were eager to follow Obama’s lead and set aside an issue that had undermined Middle East stability for several decades. Obama’s unrealistic hopes, which almost certainly were driven by political considerations involving the benefits of scoring a major foreign policy success before he left office, were dashed quickly.6 Albeit grudgingly and to keep once frozen financial assets flowing to the regime as part of the JCPOA agreement, Iran has complied with its obligations under the JCPOA according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the nuclear watchdog of the United Nations. That judgment is debatable given that Iran continues to limit the IAEA’s access to military sites where critical nuclear weapons–related activity is (3) “North Korea’s Proliferation of Missiles,” in Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 68–70. (4) For a recent comprehensive assessment on the JCPOA and American strategic options, see Anthony H. Cordesman, “U.S. Strategy, the JCPOA Iranian Nuclear Arms Agreement, and the Gulf: Playing the Long Game,” Center for Strategic & International Studies Report, March 28, 2018. (5) A meticulously researched analysis on the evolution of Iran’s nuclear ambitions is provided in David Patrikarakos’ Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State,(London: I.B. Tauris, 2012). (6) One of the most authoritative overviews of US policy on Iran’s nuclear program during the Obama administration is contained in David E. Sanger’s Confront and Conceal (New York: Crown Publishers, 2013). 9 10 Dirasat No. 36 Sha'ban, 1439 - May 2018 likely to have taken place. At the same time, and setting aside whether Iran has upheld its commitments or not, there are ample reasons to conclude that the JCPOA is fundamentally flawed. For example, the deal does not address or place any restrictions on Iran’s missile program, which has been operating for decades, benefiting in significant areas such as guidance and propulsion from Russian and North Korean assistance. This is a major failing of the JCPOA and largely attributable to former secretary of state John Kerry and his negotiating team, who failed to push hard enough on the issue. This is a critical shortfall because every current nuclear weapons state has developed the capability to deliver nuclear weapons to distant targets, primarily by ballistic missiles. While there is a set of existing UN Security Council sanctions on the Iranian missile program, they are due to be lifted in about six years. Iran continues to follow an aggressive path of missile development despite UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which explicitly calls for it to cease work on ballistic missile development.

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