The Philippines: Religious Conflict Resolution on Mindanao

Religion and Conflict Case Study Series The Philippines: Religious Conflict Resolution on Mindanao

August 2013

© Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/classroom 4 Abstract 5 This case study explores the over 40-year conflict between Muslim separatists and the government of the Christian-majority Philippines on the country’s southern island of Mindanao, placing particular focus on the peacebuilding efforts of domestic and international faith-inspired groups. The core text of 10 the case study addresses five primary questions: What are the historical origins of the conflict in Mindanao? How did domestic forces drive the conflict and efforts toward its resolution? How important were international religious and political forces? What role did socioeconomic factors play? What are the broader lessons of the Mindanao case? This case study also includes a time- line of key events, a guide to religious and nongovernmental organizations involved with peacebuilding in Mindanao, and a list of readings for further study. 13 14 About this Case Study This case study was crafted under the editorial direction of Eric Patterson, visiting assistant professor in the Department of Government and associate di- rector of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at George- town University.

This case study was made possible through the support of the Henry Luce Founda- tion and the Luce/SFS Program on Religion and International Affairs.

2 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES Contents

Introduction 4 Historical Background 5 Domestic Religious Factors 7 International Factors 10 Religion and Socioeconomic Factors 11

Resources

Key Events 13 Religious and Nongovernmental Organizations 14 Further Reading 15 Discussion Questions 16

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES 3 Introduction

The Philippines, the only Christian-majority nation in the government. This case study explores religiously Southeast Asia, has experienced ethnoreligious conflict inspired peace efforts, particularly by Catholic peace- for decades in Mindanao. The island, the Philippines’ builders engaging the Armed Forces of the Philippines second largest, is home to three major groups: Mus- (AFP) as well as interfaith forums, demonstrating that lims, Christians, and Lumads. Since 1969, fighting faith-inspired peacebuilding can promote positive rela- between Muslim separatists and the government has tionships across ethnic and religious divides due to the killed approximately 160,000 people and displaced credibility of some religious leaders and institutions, two million more. After a decade-long peace process their moral warrants to oppose injustice, their willing- collapsed in 2008, fighting once again resumed be- ness to persevere over long periods of time, and other tween the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and factors.

IHH Qurbani campaign, Philippines-Moro, 2007

4 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES Historical Background

The Philippines is composed of 7,100 islands and islets. ippine government.4 Full-scale civil war broke out when Of these, Mindanao makes up one-third of the landmass President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law fol- of the Philippines, and its 21 million residents represent lowing increased violence by the MNLF in 1972. At the a quarter of the Filipino population. At the southern end time, Manila strategically divided Mindanao into three of the Philippines, Mindanao is close to Indonesia—the regions for the purpose of governance and security: West- most populous Muslim nation in the world—and some ern, Northern, and Southern Mindanao. Over the ensu- distance from the national capital in Manila. ing decades, over 160,000 fatalities and untold destruction characterized the Mindanao conflict. Only in 1996 With Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century, colonial did the Philippine government and the MNLF negotiate rule influenced the ethnic and religious composition of a substantive agreement. The agreement recognized an the Philippines, in part by introducing Catholicism. (Is- Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, granting self- lam had previously been introduced in some regions by governance, but not independence, to some Moro areas.5 Muslim traders.) Colonial policies, including land titles This did not prove to be an enduring settlement, however, and patronage, created deep-seated prejudices among the as much of the promised aid failed to materialize, corrup- different ethnolinguistic groups, particularly those who tion and violence persisted on both sides, and the treaty resisted conversion to Catholicism. was never fully implemented.6

In 1565, Spaniards created the term Moro (Moor) to The accord and its aftermath furthered divisions within describe the Muslim population of the southern Philip- the MNLF between moderates and hardliners. The more pines.1 This region was never fully controlled by Manila or radical Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) formally integrated into the larger country.2 As a result, economic split from the MNLF in 1977, claiming that it wanted “an and political integration of Mindanao was slow and un- Islamic political system and way of life.” They put greater successful both during the centuries of Spanish rule and emphasis on autonomy and on Islamic governance, and later during US rule after the Spanish-American War. Af- placed the struggle against the central government under ter the Philippines achieved independence in 1946, the the banner of jihad.7 Muslim population became progressively more marginal- ized by the central government. Settlement of Mindanao In 1997, the government brokered a ceasefire with the by northern Christians, supported by what many south- MILF. However, by 1999, a new government in Manila, erners viewed as unjust property laws, contributed to the led by former film star Joseph Estrada, opposed further political alienation of the Moros.3 concessions to the MILF.8 In fact, President Estrada launched an all-out war against the group in 2000. An- In the 1950s and 1960s, Salamat Hashim led the seces- other splinter group from the MNLF called Abu Sayyaf, sionist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). This led by Muslim scholar Abdurajak Janjalani, emerged at organization sought to unite the South’s disparate Muslim about the same time with the goal of complete indepen- tribes and forge a new identity separate from the Phil- dence and establishment of an Islamic state in Mindanao.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES 5 Among the tactics of this extreme, Al-Qaeda-affiliated Over the last decade, efforts have been further compli- group were kidnappings and bombings.9 cated by the emergence of even more radical Al-Qaeda- affiliated groups like Abu Sayyaf. Simultaneously, how- A return to fighting displaced more than 900,000 civil- ever, religious actors have increasingly partnered with the ians.10 Following protests against government corruption, government and the military in peacebuilding efforts, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the with some notable successes. Those successes have not led presidency in 2001. Over time, she began to implement to outright peace in Mindanao, but interfaith efforts like a new policy of negotiations in Mindanao, although find- the Bishops-Ulama Conference—an interfaith council of ing common ground proved complex and difficult. Christian and Muslims leaders—and active peacebuilding by the military and groups like the Mindanao Peacebuild- Arroyo’s successor, President Benigno Aquino III (elected ing Institute have fostered new relationships, dampened 2010), has continued efforts to forge peace in Mindanao. tensions, and improved security in some areas.

Mindanao

6 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES Domestic Religious Factors

The success of religious actors in contributing to peace is due tributing to more friendly relationships between the mili- both to their social legitimacy and to widespread skepticism tary and local populations. Realizing that the military can of the goodwill and competency of the country’s primary greatly benefit from such discussions, General Ferrer ordered peace brokers—the government and the military. Two of other military officers to receive peacebuilding training. To the principle domestic efforts at peacebuilding in Mindan- date, almost 40 officers have completed the workshops, lis- ao are discussed below: the partnership of the armed forces tening to local concerns, learning conflict resolution tech- with the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute and subsequent niques, and trying to clarify roles and issues paving the way changes to the military’s approach in the region; and the for mutual understanding. These efforts have been led, in work of the Bishops-Ulama Conference. part, by conflict resolution experts supported by the global NGO Catholic Relief Services (CRS) through the Mind- Peacebuilding and the Military anao Peacebuilding Institute, and are therefore informed by Catholic social teaching.14 Many residents of the Mindanao region have historically been suspicious of the AFP’s efforts to bring stability to CRS has been working on development in Mindanao for Mindanao due to religious and cultural differences as well more than two decades, but added a focus on peacebuild- as past human rights abuses.11 Such anger was intensified by ing and reconciliation to support the 1996 peace agreement a 2007 UN report that found the AFP responsible for the between the government and the MNLF. Since then, efforts systematic killing of leftist activists and journalists over the have included building bridges between families, clans, and past decade.12 communities in conflict; advocacy to ensure local government-funded development planning accounts for the most Since 2005, some military leaders have taken steps to im- vulnerable members of the community such as women and prove relationships with the Muslim population. Some lead- indigenous persons; and forums and training in the form of ers of the AFP have abandoned traditional military doctrine the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute to train individuals by focusing more on winning hearts and minds. Raymundo in the theory and practice of conflict resolution. The Peace- Ferrer, chief of Eastern Mindanao Command, has been in- building Institute builds on the lessons learned and exper- strumental in engaging the military in the peace process and tise of the global Catholic Peacebuilding Network.15 inspiring other military officers to use a new approach. He has encouraged military officers to participate in classes and To apply this model to the military was not easy. More spe- discussions at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute, setting cifically, efforts to transform the role of the AFP away from a precedent for the military to get more actively involved a narrowly defined security mission toward one of peace with civil society organizations.13 and security have been incremental. As CRS’ Myla Leguro said, “It was very hard to engage the military in the peace Such participation has helped humanize military officers in process in Mindanao…but we had an international peace the eyes of other actors participating in the discussions, con- training program, and in 2005 we invited a military official

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES 7 to attend. Soon, that official became an advocate for the of the military in the region. peace process within the military structure… Our approach is to strategically target individuals…[to] help influence the Since 2006, the military’s Eastern Mindanao Command has system as a whole.”16 Over time, forums have provided an trained its soldiers to be conflict managers. It has targeted opportunity for the military to engage with sympathizers of 150 commanders and executive officers and 300 junior of- the MILF outside of security operations. ficers for training on the complexity of local conflict resolution and peacebuilding.22 Julieto Ando, chief of civil-mili- This engagement to foster more constructive relation- tary operations, stated that the goal of such training was to ships between the military and local population has been facilitate “winning the war by winning the people. A more supported by religious and community leaders as well as in depth understanding of local needs and the factors of sta- grassroots activists. For example, some communities have bility are necessary to advancing the peace process.”23 Ando worked with the military to create “zones of peace” to pro- also suggested that the military’s reward structure needed tect local residents from armed conflict.17 Other military of- to be reformed. In addition to awarding medals based on ficers have worked to build connections and contacts with traditional security activities (e.g. enemy casualties, insur- various peace groups in their areas.18 In another example, gent destruction, and firearms recovered), rewards for mili- religious authorities and NGOs in the city of Zambo- tary service should, according to Ando, also be based on anga have educated officers about the cultural sensitivities human development and nation-building.24 Beyond tradi- in Muslim communities.19 Additionally, Peace Advocates tional security concerns, an incentive system emphasizing Zamboanga (PAZ) hosts interfaith dialogues that allow the wider notions of human security and conflict resolution can military to discuss current issues with the local population work to standardize these new initiatives into military be- in non-threatening forums.20 At one such dialogue, the head havior. Many of the elements of the peacebuilding training, of the local military unit, Darwin Guerra, claimed that the such as emphasis on relationships, listening to the grievanc- military is shifting to a culture of peace in order to build the es of local groups, refocusing on development challenges, trust of communities and local leaders.21 One should not and accountability for the behavior of soldiers has perme- overestimate the impact of such dialogue, but on balance it ated parts of the military. While the impact of actual in- appears to have had a positive impact on public perceptions frastructure projects on resolving ethnic and religious issues is debatable, such activities are highly symbolic in reforming the poor military reputation in the South.25 In support of such missions, military forces are deployed and remain in particular villages during their service. This allows the soldiers to build relationships with local citizens and vice versa, thereby reducing the chance of military abuses, criminal activity, and insurgent violence. 26

The military has also instituted integration programs to break down the barriers between Muslim and Christian soldiers. The AFP have sought to suc- Members of the MILF paddle across the marshy portion of their guerilla base some- where in Maguindanao.

8 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES cessfully integrate former MNLF members following the has worked with the government toward peace and develop- 1997 peace accord, with some success.27 The military has ment in Mindanao. It meets two or three times a year and tried to enforce tolerance and respect with new policies such serves as a venue for upper-level religious leaders to dialogue as additional accommodations for soldiers observing Mus- and set an example of interfaith tolerance for their commu- lim holidays or participating in religious traditions like fast- nities. It is partnered with other faith-based organizations, ing. All such efforts have required new thinking in military such as CRS and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the commands as well as engaging religious and cultural experts Philippines in promoting interfaith activities with com- to consult on such reforms. The program’s objective is to munity religious leaders and grassroots organizations.31 The create a more unified army while simultaneously promoting Bishops-Ulama Conference also sponsors or participates a more secure country. However, it is not only peace activists in numerous events, from local peacebuilding seminars to and the military who have worked for peace in Mindanao; marches for peace. Some of the issues discussed at ongoing senior religious leaders have as well. meetings of the Bishops-Ulama Conference include: ensur- ing security for Muslims in Christian areas and Christians The Bishops-Ulama Conference in Muslim areas; minimizing crime; eliminating marijuana plantations; integrating former MNLF insurgents into civil- During the 1990s, a movement toward a peaceful resolu- ian life; maintaining the momentum of peacebuilding and tion to the conflict began to emerge among local religious establishing a culture of peace; changing deeply-held preju- authorities in Mindanao. The best-known such initiative, dices; incorporating education to foster peace in younger founded in 1996 as the Bishops-Ulama Conference, was de- generations; outreach to the MILF; countering the media’s signed to support the national peace agreement. negative portrayals of Muslims; and sharing common beliefs, values, practices, doctrines, and traditions.32 The Bishops-Ulama Conference—a collection of Christian and Muslim churches, mosques, schools and sociocultur- In August 2008, President Arroyo asked the Bishops-Ula- al institutions in Mindanao—was established as a forum ma Conference to be the leader for developing a civil soci- to discuss sources of conflict and a peaceful resolution. It ety framework for peace in Mindanao. Efforts such as the works toward a moral conclusion to the conflict and stresses Bishops-Ulama Conference demonstrate the effectiveness of the need for reforms to overcome divisions between local local religious actors as agents of peace capable of transpos- and national leaders that contribute to the conflict in Min- ing conflict resolution efforts to the national level. In sum, danao.28 be it through the work of religiously-inspired peacebuild- ers like CRS or clerics via the Bishops-Ulama Conference, The conference has had to respond repeatedly to conten- faith-inspired peace efforts have reached across social and tious issues associated with the 1997 peace between the cultural divides, engaged and influenced government actors, MNLF and the government. The agreement was considered and been a critical lever for local peace in many communi- at the time to be a breakthrough, giving MNLF leaders the ties in Mindanao. opportunity to govern some Moro-majority provinces in an autonomous region. However, subsequent legislation passed by the national legislature weakened many provisions of the agreement. Furthermore, the MNLF leadership failed to be an effective governing force and had limited positive impact on Moro lives in Mindanao.29 The national government also created the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and De- velopment. Most Christians decried the agreement as favor- ing the Moro community, as it pushed religious leaders to calm their respective communities during times of violence in order to prevent the situation from escalating.30 In view of the halting peace process, the Bishops-Ulama Conference

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES 9 International Factors

Although violence, harassment, and kidnappings have oc- assistance against groups like Abu Sayyaf to closed-door curred in Mindanao for decades, the international commu- diplomacy on issues of human rights and military profes- nity did not get involved until the 1990s, and then only sionalization.36 due to links between some Filipino groups and religiously inspired terrorism. In contrast, Catholic organizations— At the request of the State Department, and with Congres- often led by laity—have worked for peace in Mindanao for sional funding, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) years, often reaching outside the country for assistance and worked from 2003 to 2007 to facilitate a lasting ceasefire.37 funding via CRS and the Catholic Peacebuilding Network. USIP worked to not only address the underlying causes of Religious organizations have tried to fight two enduring, the conflict, but also to educate the non-Muslim popula- interrelated problems in Mindanao: poverty and conflict. tion on the underlying issues surrounding the conflict. In- deed, for many citizens in the North, the conditions on CRS, for example, provides loans to help the poor start the ground in Mindanao are poorly understood. The USIP small businesses and expands healthcare and sanitation to project, named the Philippines Facilitation Project (PFP), rural areas.33 In tandem with the Catholic Peacebuilding simultaneously worked with members of the Philippine Network, CRS was also instrumental in providing critical military. Mid-ranked officers were offered six workshops on resources in support of the Mindanao Peace Institute, which conflict management and negotiations.38 The officers who facilitates conflict resolution and peacebuilding training for were selected to participate were deployed to high-conflict diverse sectors of society.34 The goal is to empower differ- zones in Mindanao but had little previous exposure to the ent actors to bring change to their local communities and region and its culture. One senior military leader noted thereby contribute to the national peace process. that, “the training broadened soldiers’ and officers’ perspec- tives on means other than force for resolving conflict.”39 As noted previously, the Philippine insurgency developed ties to terrorist organizations during the 1990s. Evidence In short, the international significance of conflict in Min- demonstrated that Al-Qaeda tried on numerous occasions danao has changed with the global rise of Islamist terror- to establish a base in the Philippines and pursued plots to ism, and thus a variety of competing trends make efforts assassinate Pope John Paul II on a visit to Manila and bomb for peace challenging. However, outside assistance, from airliners heading to the United States.35 The United States USIP funding to technical expertise in peacebuilding from began increasing military assistance to the Philippines and the Catholic Peacebuilding Network, undergirds efforts for its military in an effort to pursue Al-Qaeda and other ter- peace. Nonetheless, for these efforts to be successful, they rorist organizations exploiting the conflict in Mindanao. must also take into consideration the longstanding differences of culture, economic status, and ethnicity in Mind- Because the MILF is considered a domestic insurgency and anao. not labeled as a terrorist organization by the US government, the United States has taken a complicated, nuanced approach to working with Manila. US policy ranges from

10 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES Religion and Socioeconomic Factors

The religious heritage of the Philippines corresponds Apo Mamalo. When Islamic missionaries arrived in the with many of the divisions of the Filipino population thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Tabunaway (Moro) today. First, the Muslim faith came to the southern is- embraced Islam while Mamalo (Lumads) continued lands, like Mindanao, replacing or supplementing indig- with the traditional religious beliefs of their forefathers. enous religions in many communities in the fourteenth While the brothers lived in separate communities, they century. Later came the spread of Roman Catholicism pledged support, cooperation, coexistence, and mutual with Spanish colonization beginning in the seventeenth assistance to one another in the case of aggression or ad- century. Today, the overwhelming majority of Filipinos versity. Over time, however, these groups developed in are Catholic Christians, particularly in the middle and parallel, distinct ways in Mindanao. This came to a head northern regions of the country.40 with the outbreak of insurgency between the Moros and the Philippine government in the 1970s, during which These processes of conversion were often conflict-rid- the national military recruited the Lumads. Moros and den. Jeffrey M. Bale, associate professor of International Lumads found themselves fighting against each other, Policy and Management at the Monterey Institute of causing resentment between the two groups.43 International Studies, explains, “The historical process by which the Christians came to dominate the Moros The indigenous population identifies themselves cultur- politically, demographically, socially, economically, and ally as Bangsamoro, indicating a separate nationality to some extent culturally has created a legacy of bitter- from the majority Filipinos. For this reason, “both the ness that persists to this very day.”41 MNLF and the MILF apply the term Bangsamoro to all native inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu, whether The population of present-day Mindanao consists of Muslim, Christian, or Lumad, who accept the distinc- three groups. Muslims (Moro or Bangsamoro) consti- tiveness of the Moro as a separate nationality from that tute about 20 percent of the population of Mindanao of the Filipinos in Luzon and Visayas.”44 Particularly, and neighboring Sulu (Muslims only make up 5 per- the MILF has promoted the concept of Moro (Islamic) cent of the national population). The Lumads are more identity rather than Bangsamoro (cultural). The lead- diverse, consisting of various ethnlinguistic groups and ers, following the older MNLF, promoted Moro as an kinship affiliations, most of whom are Christian. -Lu expression of distinction as a people that had resisted mads make up approximately five percent of the total foreign dominion.45 Mindanao population. Over the decades, settlers from other parts of the Philippines, nearly all of whom are Religious, cultural, and ethnic divides in the Philippines Christian, have settled in Mindanao and now comprise tend to mirror—or reinforce—social and economic dif- seventy percent of the population.42 ferences. Mindanao has long been the least developed of the major areas of the Philippines. This is due to at least Historically, Lumads and Moros originated from the two major trends: the historic resistance of the Moro same family—two brothers named Apo Tabunaway and to integration into the Catholic, Manila-based social or-

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES 11 der, and a policy of neglect by the federal government. of war and peace. In this way, there are similarities with Not only is Mindanao among the poorest regions within other conflicts, such as in Sri Lanka and Lebanon. In the the Philippines, but the indigenous Lumads and Moros Philippines, religious factors for peace compete with re- tend to be the poorest on the island, with Catholic set- ligious justifications for violence, and religious individ- tlers from other parts of the Philippines often ranking uals claim religious authority to prescribe or proscribe higher socioeconomically and in possession of govern- violence and exclusion. However, a relatively new factor ment jobs and access to government programming. in the conflict is the recent alliances for peace across different sectors: Catholic bishops with Muslim ulama and In conclusion, the ethnoreligious conflict in Mindanao the Philippine military learning from Catholic peace- fuses grievances about political access, economic de- builders. In a highly religious society like the Philip- velopment, and autonomy with religious and cultural pines, religious factors must be part of the solution if narratives about individual and collective identity, the enduring peace is to take root. role of religion in public life, and transnational trends

Christmas sculpture in Naawan.

12 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES Key Events

Late 1960s The MNLF is created in response to the kill- April 30, 2000 The MILF suspends talks with the gov- ings of Muslim soldiers. ernment. President Estrada declares “all-out war” with the MILF. September 23, 1972 Marshal law is declared in response to unrest. Civil war breaks out. August 4, 2008 Philippine Supreme Court issues re- straining order, preventing the government and the 1977 The MILF separates from the MNLF. MILF from officially signing an agreement that would begin formal talks between the two groups. 1990 Episcopal Commission for Interreligious Dia- logue is created. June, 2009 Army says it has captured a major MILF base on Mindanao, killing 30 rebels. 1991 Abdurahak Janjalani forms splinter group Abu Sayyaf from MNLF. September, 2009 Army says it has captured a leading fig- ure in the MILF, Camarudin Hadji Ali, as the yearlong July 1992 National Unification Commission is created campaign against the rebels continues in the South. to provide amnesty and help with reconciliation. December, 2009 Peace talks resume between the govern- September 2, 1996 Peace agreement is signed between ment and the MILF in Malaysia. Philippine government and the MNLF. March, 2010 Peace monitors return to Mindanao to November 29, 1996 Bishops-Ulama Conference begins. oversee MILF-government talks.

January 7, 1997 Government signs ceasefire with MILF; peace talks begin.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES 13 Religious and Non-governmental organizations

Bishop-Ulama Conference Catholic Relief Services http://bishop-ulma.page.tl http://crs.org/philippines/

Their respective networks of churches, mosques, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) sees the problems of schools, and sociocultural institutions being the largest Mindanao as being twofold: conflict and poverty. and most widespread in the region of Mindanao, the Their work addresses both through running pro- Christian and Muslim religious leaders, at the sugges- grams in both peacebuilding and microfinance. The tion of the Philippine government and the MNLF, or- importance of grassroots support led CRS to join ganized a loose association initially called the Bishops- with a network of faith-based partners, nongovern- Ulama Forum on November 29, 1996, two months mental organizations, and government agencies to after both parties signed their peace agreement. The implement various conflict resolution programs. organization later became the Bishops-Ulama Confer- ence. The creation of the Bishops-Ulama Conference was inspired by the belief that the peace pact could only be satisfactorily implemented with the help of Muslims and Christians of moral integrity who would come under the influence of religious leaders demonstrating a united front in favor of peace.

14 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES Further Readings

Abubakar A. (2007). “The Philippines: Challenges to Peace- torical Perspective in The Muslim Filipinos, ed. Peter G. building in the GRP-MILF process.” In Islam and Violent Sep- Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, Solidaridad, Manila. aratism: New Democracies in Southeast Asia. Ed. Ashok Swain with Joop De Haan and Jonathan Hall, London: Kegan Paul. Martin, E. and Tuminez, A. Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP. Philip- Buazon K. (1991). Liberalism and the Quest for Islamic Iden- pine Facilitation Project, 2003–2007, United States Institute tity in the Philippines, Manila University Press, Manila. of Peace, Special Report. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/ resources/toward-peace-southern-philippines-summary-and- Cilliers, J. (2007). “Building Bridges for Interfaith Dia- assessment-usip-philippine-facilitation-proj logue.” In Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding. Ed. Da- vid R. Smock, Washington DC.: United States Institute McKenna T. (1998). Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Poli- of Peace Press. tics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Univer- sity of California, Berkeley. Che Man W. K. (1990). Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Pa- Philippine Youth Leadership Program Report (2008). tani. Oxford University Press, New York. Engaging A New Generation in the Southern Philippines in Inter-Ethnic Dialogue and Conflict Resolution: A Train- George T. J. S. (1980). Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise ing Manual for Critical Thinking and Writing, Partici- of Islam in the Philippines Politics. Oxford University patory Learning for Grassroots Empowerment and Social Press, Kuala Lumpur. Transformation. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University International Training Office & Center for Southeast Gopin, M. (2000). Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future Asian Studies. of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking. Oxford Univer- sity Press, New York and London. Rebollos, G. (2005). Shared Steps Towards the Peace Agenda in Mindanao. Available: http://cpn.nd.edu/as- LaRousse, W. (2001). Walking Together Seeking Peace: The sets/14514/rebollos_article.doc Local Church of Mindanao-Sulu Journeying in Dialogue with the Muslim Community (1965–2000). Quezon City: Rood, S. (2005). “Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: Claretian Publications. the Role of Civil Society.” Policy Studies No. 17. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center. Layson, R. (2003). Reflections on Public Participation in Peace Processes in Mindanao. Paper presented in a panel discussion Russel, S., Davide-Ong, L., Gonzalez A.R., Ty, R., Madale, during the seminar workshop on “Learning from Public Par- N., and Medina, N. (2004). Mindanao: A Perspective on Youth, ticipation in Peacemaking” held at Sydney Hotel, General Inter-Ethnic Dialogue and Conflict Resolution in the Southern Santos City on September 18, 2003. Philippines. Center for Southeast Asian Studies and Interna- tional Training Office, Northern Illinois University. Layson, R. (2003). Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Mindanao Amidst Uncertainties. Paper presented to the Interreligious Sattar, Alzad T. The Contributions of Interfaith Organiza- Dialogue Conference in Bali, Indonesia on May 5. tions to Coexistence and their possible role in the Peace Pro- cess between the GRP and the MILF in Mindanao, Philip- Majul, C. (1974). The Muslims in the Philippines: A His- pines. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES 15 Discussion Questions

1. What are the historical origins of the conflict in Mindanao?

2. How did domestic forces drive the conflict and its negotiated resolution?

3. How important were international religious and political forces?

4. What role did socioeconomic factors play?

5. What are the broader lessons of the Mindanao case?

______1“Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” ICG Asia Report N°80 The International Crisis Group (2004), http:// bit.ly/bFKan3, p. 3. 2“Wild Dreams of Peace,” Catholic Peacebuilding Network (2005), p. 10 access at http://bit.ly/923j32. 3Ibid. 4“Southern Philippines Backgrounder,” p. 3. 5“The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao,” ICG Asia Report N°152, http://bit.ly/cCPSCs, p. 3. 6“Southern Philippines Backgrounder, p. 5. 7Ibid., p. 14. 8Ibid., p. 6. 9Ibid. 10Eric Olsen, “The Mindanao Model: A Response to Religious and Ethnic Conflict in the Philippines,” World Youth Federation. http://bit. ly/9TtDQV. 11D. Wee, “Military Shifting Tack in Mindanao Armed Conflict,” Business World, 1 January 2008. 12UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston : addendum : Follow-up to country recommendations - Philippines, 29 April 2009, A/HRC/11/2/Add.8. Available online at: http://bit.ly/cn57hb, Accessed November 24, 2009.

16 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — PHILIPPINES 13M. Leguro, “Engaging the Military in Building Peace in Mindanao,” Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. 9 April 2010, http://bit.ly/c3YBwF. 14For a practitioner’s viewpoint, see “Peace From the Ground Up: An Interview with Myla Leguro” at The Immanent Frame (October 12, 2010). Available at http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/10/12/peace-from-the-ground-up/ 15For more on the Catholic Peacebuilding Network, see its homepage at the University of Notre Dame, http://cpn.nd.edu/. 16Ibid. 17Leguro, “Engaging the Military in Building Peace in Mindanao.” 18Ibid. 19D. Russell, “Examining the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Civil-Military Operations.” Small Wars Journal Vol. 6, No. 1, 4 February 2010, 19. Available online at: http://bit.ly/d4dZ0F. 20Russell, “Examining the Armed Forces,” 20. 21Wee, “Military Shifting Tack.” 22R. Rosauro, “Soldiers Learn Ways of Waging Peace,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 January 2010, http://bit.ly/ckHveQ. 23Ibid. 24Ibid. 25Ibid. 26B. Timonera, “Peace building gaining headway among Mindanao’s military officers,” Minda News, 18 February 2010, http://philippines.usaid.gov/news- room/peace-building-gaining-headway-among-mindanao%E2%80%99s-military-officers 27“The Philippine Army: A Model for Religious Respect and Tolerance,” Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1 October 2008, http://afp.mil.ph/www/index.php/ news/719-the-philippine-army-a-model-for-religious-respect-and-tolerance 28S. Digal, “Bishops and ulema to meet again for peace, President Arroyo to attend event,” Asia News, 7 May 2009, http://bit.ly/bQVntq 29Ibid. 30G. Rebollos, “Shared Steps Towards the Peace Agenda in Mindanao,” Catholic Peacebuilding Network, http://cpn.nd.edu/assets/14514/rebollos_article.doc 31Sattar, “Interfaith Organizations,” 37. 32Ibid., 38. 33“CRS Work in the Philippines,” Catholic Relief Services, http://crs.org/philippines/ 34“Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute & Grassroots Peace Learning Center,” Peacebuilding Network, http://bit.ly/bImTHy 35E. Martin and A. Tuminez, “Towards Peace in the Southern Philippines,” February 2008, http://bit.ly/boRkq7, p. 3. 36Russell, “Examining Armed Forces,” p. 20. 37Martin and Tuminez, “Towards Peace.” P. 1. 38Ibid., p. 9. 39Ibid. 40Sattar, “Interfaith Organizations,” p. 9-10. 41Ibid. 42Rudy Rodil, Workshop on Conflict Transformation and Biodiversity Conservation, A Paper presented at the Seminar Cagayan de Oro City, July 11-13, 2003, quoted in Sattar, “Interfaith Organizations,” p. 9-10. 43Sattar, “Interfaith Organizations,” p. 9. 44Ibid., 9-10. 45Ibid., 10-11.

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