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The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement Marisa Cochrane Iraq Report 12: The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement Marisa Cochrane All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2009 by the Institute for the Study of War Published in 2009 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War, 1401 K Street NW, 11th Floor, Washington, DC 20005. Front cover: KUFA, IRAQ - MAY 20: Firebrand Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr delivers a speech to his supporters during Friday prayers at the Kufa Mosque May 21, 2004 in Kufa, Iraq. The sounds of sporadic rpg fire and machine gun bursts outside the mosque frequently punctuated the clerics speech as nearby militiamen loyal to him clashed with U.S. troops less than a kilometer away. (Photo by Scott Nelson/Getty Images) Iraq Report 12 The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement Marisa Cochrane January 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 5 Introduction 8 Part One A Brief History of the Sadrist Movement 9 The Sadrist Movement Splits 14 The Iranian Qods Force Trains JAM Special Groups 18 The Turning Point 22 Part Two The Sadrist During the Surge 23 Sadr Orders a Stand-Down and Departs for Iran 23 The Arrest of Qais Khazali 27 The Attack on the Karbala Shrine and Sadr’s Ceasefire 29 The Government of Iraq Takes on the Shi’a Militias 31 The Sadrist Movement Restructures 36 Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Iranian-Backed Groups Continue Armed 39 Resistance Provincial Elections 42 Conclusion 44 Notes 47 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Marisa Cochrane holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International Studies from Boston College, where she held a Presidential Scholarship and won the prestigious McCarthy Award for her scholarship in the Social Sciences. She has also studied at the London School of Economics. Cochrane is currently studying Arabic, and will be spending two months in Iraq as the resident historian for Multi-National Force - Iraq. At ISW, her areas of focus are Shi’a political movements and militia groups. The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement Marisa Cochrane EXECUTIVE SUMMARY If Maliki succeeds in building a Parliamentary coalition with leaders from Overview either Sadrist faction, he will most likely cement his hold on power in the 2009 THE SADRIST MOVEMENT has steadily elections and dramatically reshape the fragmented as a result of the Surge, political environment in Iraq. competition among internal factions, and Prime Minister Maliki’s consolidation of Part One power. Deliberate Coalition and Iraqi Following the failed Shi’a uprising in military operations, and Iraqi political Iraq, Saddam Hussein sought to reestablish maneuvers, have severed the political, strict control over the Shi’a population by military, and social strands of the Sadr co-opting specific Shi’a tribes and clerics. Movement, which no longer co-exist in the same entity and likely will not recombine in The Sadrist Movement (or Sadrist 2009. Trend), under the leadership of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, rose to While the political and military prominence in the 1990s as part of the state- power of the movement has declined, its sponsored initiative. The movement was at traditional constituency — the urban Shi’a once populist, nationalist, and religious. poor and rural Shi’a tribes — remains a large and politically-valuable electorate. As Sadeq al-Sadr’s influence grew, he adopted a more aggressive tone with respect Two main factions within the to the regime and other political issues. In movement now compete for control of the response, regime-affiliated gunmen traditional Sadr constituency: the clerics assassinated Sadeq al-Sadr and two of his and politicians (including al-Sadr) who sons in 1999. emphasize a return to social, religious and educational programs; and an armed Following the assassination, many movement, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which seeks members of the Sadrist Movement fled or to continue resistance against Coalition went underground. Muqtada al-Sadr, Forces. Both groups seek to operate in the Sadeq’s other son, was placed under house political process. arrest. The movement was held together underground by a group of young clerics Existing frictions between Muqtada who had been close deputies and students al-Sadr and the leaders of the military wing of Sadeq al-Sadr: Riyad al-Nouri, make it unlikely that the groups will Mohammed Tabatabai, Mustafa al-Yacoubi, combine assets in the near future. Qais Khazali, and Jaber al-Khafaji. In light of these ongoing tensions, Following the 2003 invasion, the rival political groups such as Prime Minister Sadrist movement reemerged with the Maliki’s Dawa Party and the Islamic support of Iranian-based Iraqi cleric Supreme Council of Iraq, have sought to co- Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri. Haeri appointed opt the Sadr Movement’s key constituency Muqtada al-Sadr as his representative in of urban Shi’a poor and rural Shi’a tribes. Iraq. Page| 5 The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement Marisa Cochrane The Sadrists quickly reopened network adopted its own name, Asaib Ahl mosques, established Friday prayers, al-Haq (League of the Righteous). created a militia to provide security, assumed control of local political The Sadrists’ political and military institutions, and provided social services for decline began in December 2006. their communities. Sadr sought to build the movement into a Hezbollah like Prior to that time, the Sadr Trend organization with a political arm, a social served as an essential faction in the Prime services and religious arm, and a military Minister Maliki’s coalition government. arm. This support won them a degree of autonomy from Coalition Forces, as The Sadrist Movement sought to evidenced by the prohibition of Coalition capitalize on the anger and resentment of Forces operating in Sadr City. the Shi’a poor by opposing the Coalition. However, as the Sadr Movement Two failed uprisings against the grew in strength and power, it became more Coalition in 2004, both launched from unwieldy and began to seriously challenge position in close proximity to holy shrines, the efforts of the government. In late 2006, diminished Sadr’s stature among the Shi’a. Prime Minister Maliki decided to Following the failed conflicts, Ayatollah marginalize the Sadrists and to tackle the Kazem al-Haeri broke with Muqtada and problems of Shi’a militias thereby deprived the Sadr Movement of its principle source of funding. Part Two Disputes arising from the two failed The Sadrist Movement’s remarkable uprisings, exacerbated by the financial reversal of fortunes from early 2007 to late shortfall, resulted in increased 2008 stemmed from the deep divide fragmentation among the leaders of the between the political, religious and military Movement. One faction, led by Qais Khazali factions that were exacerbated by external split from Sadr. pressures. In 2005, the Movement joined the Several important developments political process and secured 30 during the Surge split Muqtada al-Sadr, parliamentary seats in the January 2006 other leaders of his movement, and militia election. Engagement in the political groups. The most important changes in the system provided the clerical and political Sadrist Movement occurred as a result of leadership of the Sadrist Trend with a new Sadr’s stand-down and departure for Iran in source of income and expanded their January 2007; the arrest of Qais Khazali in patronage network. March 2007; the Karbala incident of August 2007; and the Iraqi campaigns in Basra, Sadr In 2006, the Iranian Revolutionary City, and Amarah in the spring of 2008. Guards Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) reorganized their support of militia groups within Iraq. Qais Khazali was chosen to From January 2007 to mid-2008, lead a network known as Special Groups to Coalition and Iraqi offensive operations not other members the Jaysh al Mahdi militia only targeted JAM’s military strength in (JAM) and Coalition Forces. But Khazali’s Baghdad and southern Iraq, but they also Page| 6 The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement Marisa Cochrane empowered political rivals to isolate the Sadrist clerical and parliamentary Sadrist movement. leadership sought to consolidate their fractured movement in the wake of their There were at least five major political and military losses, and embarked divisions within the militia: the ‘Golden on a dramatic restructuring of the JAM’ that sought to purge criminal elements movement to improve its image and political and Iranian influence; the ‘Noble JAM’ that prospects in the summer of 2008. Notably, exposed the criminal gangs and favored Sadr emphasized a return to the social Coalition assistance; the Kadhimiyah wing services model and sought to transition which advanced the interests of cleric JAM into a non-violent organization. Hazem al-Araji and his brother Bahaa al- Araji, a Sadrist parliamentarian; Asaib Ahl al-Haq/Special Groups led by Qais Khazali and later, Akram al-Kabi; and the criminal gangs that depended upon the money generated from extortion. After a series of additional political and military setbacks, it had become evident that Sadr had lost his ability to use the militia to strengthen his political position. Accordingly, Sadr sought to strengthen his control over the movement by enhancing his religious credentials. In late 2007, Sadr announced that he would be pursuing religious studies in Iran with the hope of becoming an ayatollah. Prompted by security concerns and political calculations, Prime Minister Maliki launched an offensive in Basra against Shi’a militias. The Sadrists’ rivals in the Iraqi government sought to capitalize on the weakened Sadrist Movement by pushing for legislation that would ban any political party that maintained a militia. This move resulted in a fierce debate among Sadrist leadership between the political, religious and military camps.
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