Abstract Economics of Network, Gender, and Ceo
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ABSTRACT ECONOMICS OF NETWORK, GENDER, AND CEO COMPENSATION Herman Sahni, Ph.D. Department of Economics Northern Illinois University, 2016 Virginia Wilcox-G¨ok,Director One of the most perplexing phenomenons in economics is the existence of differences in average wages between the sexes for the same job, despite far less gender dispersion in educa- tional investments, credentials, career commitment, motivation, and training. The pay gap explanations till date are too restrictive in their approach and application, which prompts the following question: Are we missing something here? This collection of works irrefutably show that under some circumstances, social capital, which is defined as the reciprocal obli- gations that result from business relationships, becomes a viable candidate in explaining differential earnings between men and women. Social capital is an important component of worker productivity and, therefore, has earnings implications. Further, it is also challeng- ing for women to acquire. Not having time due to the demands of home production and male-centric design of the networking process are to blame for this. The first essay uses a multidimensional signaling model of wages showing this assertion. The next two essays empirically test the key model predictions using a sample of CEOs of US publicly traded firms. First, essay two empirically validates that a sample of CEOs is an appropriate choice to test the model's predictions. Panel data techniques are used to show that social capital is both priced and productive. Next, essay three shows that only male CEOs receive rewards from having a large social capital. On the contrary, female CEOs are penalized for having a large social capital. Additionally, two surprising findings were revealed. One, female CEOs significantly out earn male CEOs, despite facing penalty on social capital. Two, female CEOs are substantially rewarded for their performance in comparison to male CEOs. All of these results pass several endogeneity and robustness tests. NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY DE KALB, ILLINOIS MAY 2016 ECONOMICS OF NETWORK, GENDER, AND CEO COMPENSATION BY HERMAN SAHNI c 2016 Herman Sahni A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Dissertation Director: Virginia Wilcox-G¨ok ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Producing this dissertation was not an individual feat; rather a great many people have directly or indirectly contributed to its development to whom I owe my deepest gratitude. It is impossible to list everyone involved in this study's production, but the few below require special mention for their continued support. First of all, I wish to extend my sincerest thanks to my advisor, Professor Virginia Wilcox- G¨ok. She is the best supervisor a PhD student can hope for. Her knowledge is matched only by her genuine good nature and down-to-earth humility, and I am truly fortunate to have had the opportunity to work under her. I have learned a lot from her, professionally and personally. I hope that one day I would become as good an advisor and a teacher to my students as she has been to me! Second, I am greatly indebted for the guidance of my other dissertation committee mem- bers, Professors Eliakim Katz and Maria Ponomareva. Professor Katz has always been there for me, motivated me, and offered valuable advice. Professor Ponomareva has enthu- siastically supported me in my research and helped me sort out some of the econometric roadblocks that I faced throughout this dissertation. On the whole, this dissertation committee has been truly above and beyond my expec- tations, in terms of guidance, enrichment, generosity, and support. I am thankful to all my previous teachers: Professors Khan Mohabbat, Stephen Karlson, Carl Campbell III, Jeremy Groves, Evan Anderson, Wei Zhang, and George Slotsve, for preparing me well for the challenge of doctoral studies, research, and teaching, and for the general collegiality that each of them offered me over the years. I am also grateful to the NIU's economics department research support system. I am particularly grateful in receiving NIU's doctoral completion fellowship, the economics de- iii partment's La Tourette scholarship, and NIU's graduate scholarship for funding my doctoral studies. All three essays in this dissertation have received valuable comments from one or more conferences where they have been presented: the NIU's ECONference 2014 meeting, the Southern Economic Association 2013 meeting, the Western Economic Association 2014 and 2015 meetings, and the Financial Management Association 2015 meeting, for which I am thankful. Thanks to Kim Likier, editor at NIU's writing center, for proofreading several versions of this dissertation, to Frances Mitchell and Debra Woolbright, who have been a great personal comfort during my study and have always made bad days cheerful, and to my peers, who have been great to hang out with. DEDICATION For Suresh TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES............................................... viii LIST OF FIGURES...............................................x LIST OF APPENDICES........................................... xi Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION.............................................1 1.1 Motivation...............................................1 1.2 The Plan for the Dissertation..................................3 2 SOCIABILITY CAPITAL AND THE GENDER WAGE GAP..............5 2.1 Introduction..............................................5 2.2 The Model...............................................6 2.3 The Extended Model with Societal Frictions in Socializing.............8 2.4 Analysis.................................................8 2.4.1 The Baseline Case: Non-Binding Time Constraint.............. 10 2.4.2 The Case of Binding Time Constraints...................... 11 2.4.3 The Case of Societal Frictions in Socializing.................. 15 2.5 The Gender Wage Gap...................................... 16 2.6 Discussion............................................... 18 2.7 Conclusion............................................... 19 3 NETWORK WAGE PREMIUMS IN THE CEO LABOR MARKET......... 21 3.1 Introduction.............................................. 21 vi Chapter Page 3.2 Background.............................................. 23 3.2.1 Pricing of CEO Networks............................... 23 3.2.2 Productivity of CEO Networks........................... 23 3.3 Theory.................................................. 24 3.3.1 The Model.......................................... 24 3.3.2 Equilibrium......................................... 25 3.4 Data and Summary Statistics.................................. 26 3.4.1 CEO Educational Records............................... 27 3.4.2 CEO Network........................................ 33 3.4.3 Summary Statistics.................................... 37 3.5 Determinants of CEO Pay.................................... 40 3.5.1 How do Control Variables Influence CEO Pay?................ 40 3.5.2 Broad and Narrow as a Network Proxy..................... 41 3.5.3 Network by Degree as a Network Proxy..................... 41 3.5.4 Network Dummies as a Network Proxy...................... 44 3.5.5 Alternate Fixed Effects Specifications....................... 44 3.6 Governance and CEO Networks................................ 47 3.7 Tobin's Q and CEO Networks................................. 49 3.7.1 How do Control Variables Influence Tobin's Q?................ 49 3.7.2 Are Tobin's Q and CEO Networks Related?.................. 51 3.8 Conclusion............................................... 55 4 BOYS AND GIRLS HAVE DIFFERENT FRIENDS: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN CEO NETWORK AND WAGE PREMIUMS........................ 56 4.1 Introduction.............................................. 56 vii Chapter Page 4.2 Background.............................................. 59 4.2.1 Pricing of CEO Networks............................... 59 4.2.2 Are Networks Cheap?.................................. 59 4.2.3 Women and Networks.................................. 60 4.3 Theory and Implications..................................... 61 4.3.1 The Model.......................................... 61 4.3.2 Extended Model with Societal Frictions in Socializing........... 62 4.3.3 Equilibrium......................................... 63 4.3.4 The Case of Heterogeneous Network Groups.................. 64 4.4 Data and Summary Statistics.................................. 65 4.5 Results.................................................. 69 4.6 Conclusion............................................... 79 5 CONCLUSION................................................ 83 REFERENCES.................................................. 86 APPENDICES.................................................. 92 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 2.1 Equilibrium Characterization.................................. 17 2.2 O*NET Analysis: Proportion of Jobs that Rate Sociability Highly....... 20 3.1 Sample Construction........................................ 27 3.2 University Dropouts and Company Founders....................... 28 3.3 Degree Count by Top Thirty US institutions....................... 31 3.4 Descriptive Statistics........................................ 38 3.5 CEO Pay Regressions....................................... 42 3.6 CEO Pay Regressions: Network by Degrees........................ 43 3.7 CEO Pay Regressions: Network Dummies......................... 45 3.8 CEO Pay Regressions: Fixed Effects............................. 46