Security Sector Reform in Ukraine
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Security Sector Reform in Ukraine Olga Oliker, Lynn E. Davis, Keith Crane, Andrew Radin, Celeste Ward Gventer, Susanne Sondergaard, James T. Quinlivan, Stephan B. Seabrook, Jacopo Bellasio, Bryan Frederick, Andriy Bega, Jakub Hlavka C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1475-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9597-8 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: Ukrainian soldiers march on Independence Square in downtown Kiev (photo by Danil Shamkin/NurPhoto via AP Images). Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report provides a series of recommendations for the reform of Ukraine’s security and defense institutions. This research was under- taken in response to a request by the presidential administration of Ukraine and in participation with the National Security and Defense Council and sponsored by Ukraine Investment Alliance, a 501(c)(4) foundation. Research for this report was completed in the fall of 2015. Although some minor updates have been made, the analysis predomi- nantly reflects the situation as of that time. This report should be of interest to those in Ukraine who are engaged in security sector reform and those in the international com- munity supporting such reform in Ukraine. This report can also be useful to those interested in assisting with security sector reform in other countries. The research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis on defense and national security topics for the U.S. and allied defense, foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and founda- tions and other nongovernmental organizations that support defense and national security analysis. For more information on the International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...............................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Approach ............................................................................ 2 CHAPTER TWO Reforming the Security Sector—Overall Architecture .................... 5 Clarify Roles and Responsibilities ............................................... 7 Strengthen Coordination Among Ministries and Agencies .................. 9 Improve Intelligence Coordination .............................................11 Align Roles and Functions of Internal Security Organizations .............13 CHAPTER THREE Organizing for Defense .........................................................21 Structure of Defense Institutions................................................21 Implementation of Defense Structural Recommendations ................. 38 CHAPTER FOUR Defense Reforms to Improve Warfighting and Efficient Use of Resources .....................................................................41 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence ................... 42 Personnel, Recruiting, and Training ............................................47 Procurement .......................................................................57 Logistics ........................................................................... 64 v vi Security Sector Reform in Ukraine CHAPTER FIVE Cybersecurity .....................................................................71 National Cybersecurity Strategy and Concept ................................71 Cybersecurity and Defense Organizational Structure ........................73 Critical National Infrastructure Protection ....................................75 Incident Response .................................................................78 Military Cyber Defense and Cybersecurity ................................... 80 CHAPTER SIX Defense-Technical Cooperation with Global Partners ...................85 Addressing Source Country Concerns ........................................ 86 Impediments to Defense-Technical Cooperation in Ukraine ............... 88 Recommendations to Address the Challenges to Defense-Technical Cooperation ..................................................................95 CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusions ..................................................................... 103 Acknowledgments ............................................................. 107 Abbreviations ................................................................... 109 Bibliography .................................................................... 111 Figures and Tables Figures 3.1. Current Structure of Ukraine Ministry of Defense and General Staff ........................................................ 23 3.2. Proposed Organizational Structure for the Ukraine Ministry of Defense ................................................ 26 4.1. Proposed Operational Chain of Command .................... 44 4.2. Proposed Chain of Command for Personnel .....................51 4.3. Proposed Chain of Command for Procurement .................61 5.1. National Cybersecurity and Defense Organizational Structure ..............................................................83 Tables S.1. Recommended Structural Reforms ...............................xii S.2. Recommendations to Improve Warfighting ..................... xiv 4.1. Two Potential Force Structures for Ukraine ......................52 4.2. Potential Compensation Structure for Ukrainian Military Personnel ..................................................55 vii Summary The Maidan Revolution in Ukraine created an opportunity for change and reforms in a system that had resisted them for a quarter of a century. The war in the eastern region of Donbass that began in 2014 and con- tinues to this day has highlighted the desperate need for reforms both within Ukraine’s armed forces and in the security sector more broadly. In this report, we look at several aspects of Ukraine’s security sector. We assess what different institutions need to do and where gaps exist that preclude these institutions from being effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable. We then provide recommendations for changes Ukraine could make that would improve existing practices, in line with Euro-Atlantic standards and approaches. We provide rec- ommendations that do not require constitutional changes, due to the political challenges inherent in such reforms. However, we note that constitutional changes may prove advisable to ensure that Ukraine can build the security architecture that will serve it best. Clarify Roles and Responsibilities The roles and responsibilities of the President and Cabinet of Minis- ters (CoM) are ambiguous and the CoM is unwieldy. There are gaps and overlaps in the functions performed by the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the General Staff (GS). Civilian control remains weak below the President and CoM. The Chief of Defense Force (CHoD) reports directly to the President, thereby disempowering the Minister ix x Security Sector Reform in Ukraine of Defense.1 Regulations and organizational culture tend to push rou- tine decisions upward to at least the Deputy Minister level, contribut- ing to a culture of avoiding responsibility. In the absence of substantial constitutional reform, which could prove politically infeasible, we recommend clarifying the roles and responsibilities of Ukraine’s leadership through legislation and policy documents. In particular, we recommend these declared roles and responsibilities: President: The President as the commander-in-chief would assume responsibility for the security and defense of Ukraine against threats to its sovereignty and independence. This description of the President’s role reflects the Constitution’s requirement that the Presi- dent “administer the national security and defence of the State.”2 The President would have responsibility for the command and control of military operations and policy control over the MoD and, through the Minister of Defense, over the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Prime Minister/Cabinet of Ministers: