Ukraine, Romania, and Romanians in Ukraine

Home , Government of Romania, Hertsa, Snake Island (Black Sea)

Südosteuropa 62 (2014), no. 3, 373-384

DoSSieR: PeRSPectiveS on the ukRainian cRiSiS, ii

JULIEN DANERO IGLESIAS

Abstract. Romanian authorities kept a low profile with respect to the turmoil in ukraine until new pro-European leaders took power in Kyiv . Since then, Romania has tried to assume the role of a regional leader by supporting the new Ukrainian authorities against Russia . But relations between Romania and Ukraine have been tense for a long time, mainly because of border and minorities issues. Examining these two intermingled questions, the present article assesses the current state of the relationship by showing what issues still remain to be tackled by both sides . Particular emphasis is given to issues raised by the Romanian minority in Ukraine, which is in the spotlight at the moment .

Julien Danero Iglesias is Research Associate in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow .

Recent events in ukraine have been watched with great attention in neighbouring Romania . Romania sees these events as crucial for national security and of geopolitical significance. The Romanian media have covered the ukrainian events intensively since the first demonstrations in Kyiv. Romanian journalists have emphasized a connection between what they view as a “revolution” in the ukrainian capital and the previous 2004 “orange revolution”. They have adopted a strongly anti-Russian tone and have focused particularly on the fate of the local Romanian minority in the northern Bucovina region of southern Ukraine . Meanwhile, the Romanian authorities maintained a low profile.1 However, as soon as Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted and new pro- Western authorities took charge in Kyiv, the Romanian authorities demonstrated that they have opted for what a Romanian editorialist has called the “Polish variant”, meaning a firm reaction towards Russia. 2 The Romanian authorities

1 Horia-Victor Lefter, La crise ukrainienne vue de Roumanie, Regard sur l’Est, 5 February 2014, available at . All internet sources were accessed on 7 october 2014. 2 Sabina Fati, Ce poate face Băsescu pentru ucraina sau cum să le punem ruşilor piciorul în uşă, România liberă, 29 january 2014, available at . 374 Julien Danero Iglesias were among the first to support and recognise the new government in ukraine. President Traian Băsescu described the presence of Russian troops in ukraine as an “aggression”.3 Minister of Foreign affairs Titus Corlăţean, who visited Ukraine in March, showed full support to the new authorities in Kyiv, stating that “Romanians have sympathised with the ukrainian people in their aspira- tion for democratic life, a free and European life” 4. Currently, Romanian and Ukrainian authorities seem to be developing new partnerships as new agreements are signed . Romania shows a willingness to serve as an advocate for a western-oriented Ukraine . However, much as the Republic of Moldova has benefited from the events in ukraine in its effort to strengthen its relationship with the European Union,5 Romania has benefited in its desire to position itself as an important actor for regional stability . Romania seems to have earned the attention of both the united States and NaTo. according to Mark Gitenstein, a former US ambassador to Romania, the country has become “the most trustworthy ally in the region”, both as “a bulkhead against any fur - ther (Russian) expansion” and as “the anchor in southeast Europe for NaTo”. 6 The Romanian authorities and the new Ukrainian authorities share common anti-Russian positions, as was demonstrated in last May when, like Ukraine, Romania closed its airspace to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitryi Rogozin, who was returning to Moscow after visiting Transnistria .7 Rogozin reacted by saying that he would return in a Tu-160 bomber the next time.8 Russia is perceived in Romania as acting “irrationally”, and events in ukraine are presented as a threat to Romania’s national security.9 Representing the “eastern border of

3 Călin Marchievici, ucraina: În sfârșit, România își joacă activ cărțile, Cotidianul, 10 March 2014, available at . 4 Romanian Ministry of Foreign affairs, Foreign Minister Titus Corlatean Lays Wreath in Kiev’s Independence Square, press release, 10 March 2014, available at . 5 Julien Danero Iglesias, La crise ukrainienne vue de Moldavie, Regard sur l’Est, 5 February 2014, available at . 6 Paul Singer, Romania, Wary of Russia, Seeks Embrace of West, USA Today, 3 June 2014, available at . 7 Lally Weymouth, “The Russian Threat Is a Reality”. an Interview with Romanian Foreign Minister Titus Corlatean, Slate, 30 april 2014, available at . 8 Reuters, Russian Deputy PM Sends Bomber Tweet after Romania Airspace Ban, The Guardian, 10 May 2014, available at . 9 Traian Băsescu, Declaraţia de presă a preşedintelui României, domnul Traian Băsescu, 7 September 2014, available at . Ukraine, Romania and Romanians in Ukraine 375 both NATO and the European Union”, Romania increased defence spending10 and called on NATO during the recent NATO summit in Wales to reinforce its presence in the country . Bucharest noted with unease that a Ukrainian separa- tist leader said he would be happy only when the army of New Russia reaches the border of Romania . At the same time, Ukrainian President Poroshenko told the BBC that Russia could occupy not only Kyiv but also Warsaw, Tallinn, Riga or Bucharest 11. The situation in Ukraine was now so tense that the Romanian government considers it “extremely, extremely grave”,12 and 67 .3% of the population in Romania declared recently that they were frightened by the events 13. For the Romanian authorities, the only alternative would have been to become part of a “cordon sanitaire” made up of countries such as Bulgaria or Hungary, which depend on Russia for energy 14. Romania, in contrast, can afford to take an anti-Russian position, as it produces approximately 11 billion cubic meters of natural gas while consuming 12.5 billion cubic meters, and only the shortfall is imported from Russia . Storage capacities have been raised, and Romania is the only state in the region now able to meet its own needs 15. In this context, according to Prime Minister Victor Ponta, sanctions imposed on Russia and Russian countersanctions “have an economic effect” but “it is a price that- de serves to be paid” 16. Despite these recent developments, it must be said that the relationship between Romania and ukraine has not been “cordial” in recent years.17 The

10 Romania to Boost Defence Spending this Year, Reuters, 28 april 2014, available at . 11 Antonio Glodeanu / ana Stan, violenţele se reiau în ucraina după 30 de ore de pace: separatiştii vor să ajungă până la graniţa cu România, Adevărul, 7 September 2014, available at . 12 Romania, Moldova, Georgia “alarmed” about ukraine, Associated Press, 29 august 2014, available at . 13 Mădălina Mihalache, Sondaj: Românii şi spaima de Rusia, Adevărul, 22 September 2014, available at . 14 Fati, Ce poate face Băsescu pentru ucraina. 15 Adina vlad, Gazprom a dat drumul robinetului de gaze pentru România. După reducerile de vineri, livrările se fac la parametri normali sâmbătă şi duminică, Adevărul, 13 September 2014, available at . 16 Idem . 17 Marian Chiriac, Romania Risks Russian Ire with Ukraine Military Deal, Balkan Insight, 11 March 2014, available at . 376 Julien Danero Iglesias

“troublesome neighbourhood”18 has long been “captive to common misun- derstandings”, and “negative stereotypes, wrong perceptions and historical background disputes” have prevented both countries from cooperating, despite their common interests in the region .19

Historical Tensions over Borders and Minorities

While the normalisation of relations between Romania and Ukraine can be seen mainly as the result of Romania’s accession to the European union and NATO,20 the demarcation of the more than 600 kilometre long border between the countries and the presence of a large ethnically Romanian minority in ukraine are the two most significant problems today. In the Romanian view, the “arbitrary” border came into being after the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty and other protocols and treaties in the years between 1948 and 1961.21 After the end of the Communist regime in Romania and following the independence of ukraine, the settlement of the border was challenged by the june 1991 Declaration of the Romanian Parliament regarding the Ribben- trop-Molotov Pact and Its Consequences for Romania. according to anatolii Kruglashov, the declaration was an appeal to the president, the government and all the political forces in the country to regain the Romanian lands annexed by the Soviet Union during and after World War II . In the same vein, in November 1991, the Romanian Parliament, followed by the government, spoke against the participation of the “Romanian territories” of northern Bucovina and southern Bessarabia in the ukraine’s referendum on independence and called on neigh - bouring parliaments and governments not to extend their recognition of Ukraine to include those territories . For its part, the Ukrainian government demanded that Romania condemned the occupation of Ukrainian territories by Romanian troops in 1918, as well as the agreement between antonescu and Hitler and the subsequent occupation of ukrainian territories during World War II. Nevertheless, Romania recognised the independence of ukraine in early 1992 and diplomatic relations between the countries were established . The territorial

18 Anatolii Kruglashov, Troublesome Neighborhood: Romania and Ukraine Relationship, New Ukraine, 2011, no. 11, 114–124, 114, available at . 19 Tudor Cojocariu / Bianca Toma, Eastern Partnership: Narrowing the Perceptions Gap – Views From Bucharest and Kyiv, Romanian Center for European Policies Policy Memo no. 31, 4 December 2011, available at . 20 Kruglashov, Troublesome Neighborhood, 123. 21 Frédéric Beaumont, La frontière roumano-ukrainienne et le poids réel de la question des minorités, Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography 303 (2005), 16, available at . Ukraine, Romania and Romanians in Ukraine 377 disputes, not settled, now centred mainly round Snake Island. Evolving from a territorial question to a geopolitical one, these disputes focused on economic and energy-related issues. But Romania’s entry into NaTo and its participation in the European Stability Pact required the signing of basic treaties with Ukraine as well as Hungary . Negotiations for a Ukrainian-Romanian Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation began, and led to signing and ratification in 1997. The treaty did not address the exact demarcation of the border, and the issue was solved only in the 2000s, after international arbitration regarding the division of water and underwater resources around Snake Island, under Ukrainian sovereignty 22. In 2009, the International Court of Justice ruled in favour of Romania 23. Like the border question, the presence of an ethnically Romanian minority in Ukraine, and, to a lesser extent, an ethnically Ukrainian minority in Romania, is linked to the history of the region . Borders have shifted during past centu- ries, notably after the dissolution of the great empires at the beginning of the twentieth century and the fall of communism and multinational states such as the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia at the end of the century 24. Romanian speakers in Ukraine are a mainly rural population whose members would constitute the third-largest ethnic group in the country, were they not divided amongst themselves . Indeed, whilst most speakers of Romanian in the regions of northern Bucovina and Transcarpathia declare themselves to be “Romanians”, those in southern Bessarabia and other parts such as Nikolaev, Cherson or areas of Bucovina at the border with the Republic of Moldova de- scribe themselves as “Moldovans”. This division into two distinct minorities has historical explanations, such as the Soviet creation of a specific Moldovan identity after 1924.25 Romanians in Ukraine were taught to be Moldovans during the existence of the uSSR, and they benefited from education in the “Moldovan” language at the time. They could receive their higher education in universities in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic . During the initial period of relations between Romania and Ukraine, when Ukraine could neither support the Ukrainians in Romania nor monitor their development owing to its deep economic and political crisis, Romanian elites were calling for the redrawing of the border with Ukraine . This situation led to mutual distrust and a general

22 Ibid., 118–122. 23 Chiriac, Romania Risks Russian Ire . 24 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed . Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge 1996. 25 See for example Charles King, The Moldovans . Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture. Stanford/Ca 1999; Wim van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography: Nationalist and Communist Politics and History-Writing. Boulder/Co 1994; Igor Caşu, “Politica naţională” în Moldova Sovietică, 1944–1989. Chisinau 2000; or julien Danero Iglesias, Nationalisme et pouvoir politique en République de Moldavie. Brussels 2014. 378 Julien Danero Iglesias understanding in Ukraine that the Romanian authorities had irredentist claims, which ethnic Romanians in Ukraine were supporting 26.

Romanians in Ukraine: In the Crossfire

When Romania was created as a country in 1859 and 1877–1878, ethnic Ro- manians could be found outside its borders, mainly in the regions of northern Bucovina, Transylvania and Banat, which belonged to the Habsburg Empire, and in the region of Bessarabia, which was part of the Russian Empire . After World War I, Transylvania, the eastern Banat, northern Bucovina and Bessarabia were annexed to what became known as Greater Romania . Between the two world wars, the territory of the Romanian state was at its greatest reach . Romania in its current borders emerged after World War II, after the loss of Bessarabia, northern Bucovina and Hertsa to the Soviet Union and southern Dobruja to Bulgaria . Romanians outside Romania can nowadays be found mainly along the current borders of the country, and they represent minorities in various countries of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Ukraine 27. The main issue for Romanians in Ukraine has long been assimilation, or “ukrainisation”, in the context of a general “degradation” of Romanian-language education in the country .28 The reaction of Romanians in Ukraine to recent events is linked to their being a minority in what they regard as a nationalising state29 that limits their right to be Romanian . Thanks to developments in Ro- mania since 2007, ethnic Romanians in Ukraine have shown strong enthusiasm for the European Union and the strengthening of the relationship between Ukraine and the EU . Nevertheless, they were placed in an awkward position when President Yanukovych refused to sign the Ukraine-European Union As- sociation agreement in late 2014. Ethnic Romanians in ukraine had long been supporters of Yanukovych and the Party of the Regions, after they had ensured that Romanian would be considered a regional language under the 2012 Law on the Principles of the State Language Policy 30. The law was adopted by the parliament amidst fistfights between government and opposition members of

26 Anatolii Kruglashov, Interethnic Relations Stability on the Ukraine-Romania Border: A Case of Chernivtsi Region, Eurolimes 6 (2011) supplement, 297–319. 27 The exception is the Republic of Moldova, where the question of the identity of the majority of the population – Moldovan or Romanian – has long been and still is a major political issue . 28 Alexandrina Cernov, Statutul limbilor minorităţilor naţionale în şcolile din regiunea Cernăuţi. Predarea limbii române, Glasul Bucovinei, 1-4 (2013) 130–140, available at . 29 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. 30 Julia Beurq, ukraine: Pourquoi la minorité roumaine ne croit guère à la “révolution”, Le Courrier des Balkans, 1 august 2014, available at . Ukraine, Romania and Romanians in Ukraine 379 parliament in 2012. It gives Russian, Romanian and other national minority languages the status of regional language in regions where the speakers of a national minority language account for more than 10% of the population. Regional languages can be used in courts and other government institutions, although ukrainian remains the country’s only official federal language.31 Nevertheless, since 2012, Romanian has been made an official regional language only in the Hertsa district, where more than 95% of the population is ethnically Romanian, and in some villages in other districts 32. The law has not changed much of the situation in Ukraine, in schools or newspapers, for example, and it has served mainly to politicise the debate on language issues whilst deflecting attention from issues of effective governance. It has also been used by politicians, including those representing the Romanian minority, for electoral mobilisation 33. During the time that Kyiv was in turmoil, protesters in Bucovina began on 24 january 2014 to occupy the central administration. In general, observers have noted that Romanians have not been very active during the anti-government protests, because of their links with the Party of Regions . Ethnic Romanians usually voted for Yanukovych, mainly in southern Bessarabia but elsewhere as well, as in Bucovina, where around 66% of Romanians supported the Party of Regions . According to a statement by Ion Popescu, a Romanian Ukrainian politician and member of the Party of Regions, when he was elected for parliament in 2012, “organisations representing Romanian-speakers […] were forced to support [Ya - nukovych] . Unfortunately, it has not been the most appropriate option, because Romanians have had to ally with a pro-Russian force to protect against ‘denation- alisation’ of their schools and ‘ukrainisation’ of their communities.” 34 Right after Yanukovych was ousted, on 23 February 2014, proposals were made for revision and repeal of the 2012 law. They were vetoed, however, by acting President Oleksandr Turchynov . Earlier, on 29 January, the National Broad- casting Company suspended its programmes in Romanian for the channel Ukraine-International . These programmes had been broadcast for two hours

31 Miriam Elder, Ukrainians Protest against Russian Language Law, The Guardian, 4 July 2012, available at . 32 Cernov, Statutul limbilor minorităţilor naţionale în şcolile din regiunea Cernăuţi, 136f. 33 Dragoş Dinu / octavian Milevski, Strengthening Cooperation on the Romanian Minority Issue in Post-Euromaidan ukraine, Romanian Center for European Policies Policy Memo no. 38, 19 March 2014, available at . 34 Beurq, ukraine: Pourquoi la minorité roumaine ne croit guère à la “révolution”. 380 Julien Danero Iglesias and 25 minutes a day 35. Both events were perceived by ethnic Romanians in ukraine as attacks against their rights as a minority by the more radical and nationalist elements of the new government . Suspicions and doubts concerning their loyalty towards the state they live in, Ukraine, have been raised . Whilst ethnic Romanians voted overwhelmingly for Petro Poroshenko during the May presidential elections,36 the state of war in Eastern Ukraine and the calls for Romanians to enlist in the ukrainian army to fight against Russian-backed separatists have given rise to huge protests in Bucovina . Romanians have been blocking roads and demonstrating against fighting in a war that most of them do not consider “theirs”. according to George Damian, the fact that Romanians in Ukraine have decided not to respect the enlistment law shows their lack of attachment to the ukrainian state.37 The governor of Bucovina reacted strongly to the demonstrations and warned that enlistment would not be influenced by the pressure from the streets . He added that if the ethnic Romanians of Ukraine do not want to go to war, they can go home . The governor has also stated the following on a social network: “Today, the fate of the entire country […] is being decided in an area where terrorism takes place, and not on the streets of Bucovina . I have a message for those who rely on the despair of wives and mothers to feed anti-Ukrainian sentiments in the region . If you campaign against the territorial integrity of the state, you have the option to go to Russia or any other country in which you will live better than in ukraine.” 38 Even though enlistment has been finally suspended in Bucovina,39 the reaction of the local authorities seems to demonstrate that the Romanian national minority is not perceived as a part of the Ukrainian national body . Romanians are rather seen as “strangers”. For Romanians, the comparison between the cur - rent war and the Soviet war in Afghanistan seems obvious, as some remember

35 Iulia Modiga, Românii din ucraina au rămas fără emisiuni în limba română, InfoPrut, 31 january 2014, available at . 36 The fact that Petro Poroshenko’s mother is of Romanian ethnicity raised hopes that, as a president, he would be more sensitive to the fate of Ukrainian Romanians . 37 This lack of loyalty towards the state would be shared by many ethnic Ukrainians who have also refused to enlist . See GeorgeDamian, Românii de la Cernăuţi si războiul civil din Ucraina, Timpul, 1 august 2014, available at . 38 Mihai Somanescu, autorităţile din Cernăuţi către românii din ucraina: Dacă nu vă convine, PLECaŢI din ţară! ucrainenii s-au dezlănţuit: Românii? Nişte ŢIGaNI care nu ştiu carte, Active News, 28 july 2014, available at . 39 Julia Beurq, ukraine: la minorité roumaine refuse d’aller faire la guerre dans le Donbass, Le Courrier des Balkans, 1 august 2014, available at . Ukraine, Romania and Romanians in Ukraine 381 that in that war, soldiers belonging to ethnic minorities were sent in first to die on the front lines, while Russians were protected and stationed far away to the rear .40 The supposed lack of loyalty of the ethnic Romanians in Ukraine rests upon a long-lasting depiction of Romanians as agents of an irredentist Roma- nian state. Since the beginning of the demonstrations in Kyiv, many different rumours have been spread, mainly in the Russian media, against the Romani- ans in Ukraine . For example, the head of the Christian Orthodox authorities of Bucovina, who now heads the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate), said at a meeting in February with the then Acting President of Ukraine, Oleksander Turchynov, that ethnic Romanian citizens of ukraine would ask Romania to protect them. Consequently, the Romanian state would prepare to send its military to Ukraine to occupy parts of the territory .41 Similar examples can be found in various media .

Romania and Romanians in Ukraine: Border Crossing and Citizenship

Although Romanian authorities have emphasised that the rights of the Ro- manian minority, and of minorities in general, need to be respected, they have not addressed the rumours that have been interpreted as Russian provocations, according to which Romania has territorial pretentions concerning Bucovina and aims at dividing Ukraine .42 Romanian authorities have been very cautious about the fate of the Romanian minority in Ukraine, and they have asked Kyiv to adopt “European” measures with regard to minorities. They welcomed the decision by acting President oleksandr Turchynov not to abrogate the 2012 law on languages 43. At present, the main issue between the countries is linked to border crossing and citizenship . Ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine generally need a visa to travel to Romania, an EU member state . But events in Ukraine and the new relations between the Romanian and Ukrainian authorities have led to the signing of a local border traffic agreement. The agreement regulates the conditions of small border traffic, namely the frequent crossing of the Romanian-ukrainian border by residents of the border areas who plan to remain in the border area of the other state, mainly for social, cultural, family or economic reasons, for a pe-

40 Damian, Românii de la Cernăuţi și războiul civil din ucraina. 41 Iulia Modiga, Mitropolitul Cernăuţilor și Bucovinei vorbește despre intrarea armatei române în Ucraina, InfoPrut, 26 February 2014, available at . 42 Beurq, ukraine: Pourquoi la minorité roumaine ne croit guère à la “révolution”. 43 Marchievici, ucraina: În sfârșit, România își joacă activ cărțile. 382 Julien Danero Iglesias riod not exceeding three months of uninterrupted stay .44 Whilst such an agreement already existed between Romania and Moldova, the agreement between Romania and Ukraine applies to the inhabitants of an area of 30 kilometres on both sides of the common border, an area that can be extended to a maximum of 50 kilometres from the border in the case of administrative-territorial units located beyond the 30 kilometre limit 45. Beyond the signing of the agreement, Romanian authorities have promised to call for a general lifting of the visa re- quirement for ukrainian citizens wishing to enter Romania and the European union “as soon as possible”.46 The Romanian policy of restoration of citizenship has long been seen in ukraine as an “unfriendly” policy47 of “distributing” Romanian passports48 to citizens who are able to prove that one of their ancestors was a citizen of Greater Romania between the two world wars . Although formulated in general terms, the policy mainly concerns people living in neighbouring territories, such as northern Bucovina in Ukraine or Bessarabia, which previously belonged to the Romanian state . For this reason, Ukraine and Moldova have accused Romania of revisionism . Ukraine has described the Romanian policy of restoration of citizenship as “a soft realisation of the idea of ‘Greater Romania’”.49 Ukrainian citizens cannot hold dual citizenship, and those who take Romanian passports risk losing their citizenship. a draft proposal was submitted for discussion in Parliament in February 2014 with the intention to amend the Penal Code and criminalise dual citizenship. The proposed penalty would be 3 to 10 years of imprisonment .50 At the same time, in Romania, a legislative proposal to amend and supplement the law on Romanian citizenship was initiated at the end of 2013 to further ease the acquisition of Romanian citizenship by Romanian ethnic minorities in other countries. Such acquisition is based not on the principle of

44 PMs Ponta, Yatsenyuk Sign Romania-ukraine Small Border Traffic agreement,Agerpres , 2 october 2014, available at . 45 Ibid . 46 PM Ponta: Romania to Call for Visa Lifting for Ukraine as Soon as Possible, Agerpres, 2october 2014, available at . 47 Mihaila Iordache, Ucraina: le preoccupazioni della Romania, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, 21 February 2014, available at . 48 Costin Dumbrava, Rolling Back History: The Romanian Policy of Restoration of Citizen- ship to Former Citizens, Citizenship in Southeast Europe, 15 april 2013, available at . 49 Ibid . 50 Dinu / Milevski, Strengthening Cooperation on the Romanian Minority Issue, 13. Ukraine, Romania and Romanians in Ukraine 383 historical retribution and reparation of what is seen as a historic injustice, but on ethnicity . The revised law states that “Ethnic Romanians that belong to minority groups like linguistic minorities or ethnic groups existing in other states, regardless of the ethnonym used, who speak Romanian, may be granted Romanian citizenship upon request, with the possibil - ity of keeping foreign citizenship and establishing their residence in the country or keeping it abroad” .51 This particular issue still needs to be settled and has not yet been tackled by the authorities of either country .

Conclusion: New Collaboration in Times of War

Despite these unresolved issues and their potential negative effects, diplomatic relations are flourishing at the moment. The border agreement was signed at the beginning of October in the framework of a bilateral meeting .52 But discussions were also held with Iurie Leancă, the prime minister of the Republic of Moldova, in two trilateral meetings, the first including arseniy Yatsenyuk, the prime minister of Ukraine, and the second, Petro Poroshenko . The message was that Romania supports Ukraine and Moldova on the road to democracy and to the European Union . Discussions addressed common issues such as energy independence and interconnection . The parties also exchanged views on the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.53 Whilst some, such as the political analyst Dan Dungaciu, claim that the trilateral format is inappropriate,54 it is another indication that Romania wants to position itself as a regional leader . The Republic of Moldova has long figured on the Romanian authorities’ foreign policy agenda. Former Romanian President Traian Băsescu has made the Republic of Moldova the current national priority for Romanian diplomacy, and as a result the president has been very popular among Moldovan voters holding Romanian citizenship. In the context of the 2014 presidential election

51 Ibid . 52 Government of Romania, Signing of the Small Border Traffic agreement between the Government of Romania and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, press release, 2 october 2014, available at . 53 Radu Pătrașcu, Trilaterala ucraina–Rep. Moldova–România: Mize şi capcane, InfoPrut, 7 october 2014, available at . 54 Dan Dungaciu, Capcanele trilateralei România–Ucraina–Republica Moldova, Adevărul, 3 october 2014, available at . 384 Julien Danero Iglesias in Romania, putting Romania on the regional security map and demonstrating its support for the Europeanisation and the democratisation of Ukraine against Russian pressure has helped the political leaders in their electoral campaigns . They have also found it beneficial to emphasise the protection of the rights of the Romanian minority in ukraine. as Dragoş Dinu and octavian Milevski note, “on the practical and social level, the issue of the Romanian (speaking) minority pertains more to the capacity to implement the legal norms both internally and internationally, than to the alleged lack of will to meet each country’s concerns. What is striking in this respect, is the reality on the ground in Ukraine wherein the minority language often becomes an issue around election time, when various political actors try to broker on the language marker for the sake of acquiring more votes, while the population continues to live in the same multi-linguistic reality for decades without many (if any) fears of assimilation or cultural extinction .”55 Therefore, some time is needed to see whether the renewed relationship between Romanian and ukrainian authorities will lead to the settlement of all the issues that they still need to tackle .

55 Dinu / Milevski, Strengthening Cooperation on the Romanian Minority Issue, 4 .