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What goes around comes around A critical geopolitical analysis of contemporary western European terrorism as a process of tit-for-tat By Mark Nijland A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Human Geography with a specialization in Conflicts, Territories and Identities Under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Henk van Houtum July 2017 [II] What goes around comes around A critical geopolitical analysis of contemporary western European terrorism as a process of tit-for-tat Figure 1 with special thanks to Ruben L. Oppenheimer (2017) NRC Handelsblad Author: Mark Nijland Student number: s4220781 Contact: [email protected] Supervisor: Prof. dr. Henk van Houtum Second reader: Rodrigo Bueno Lacy, MSc Amount of words: 29.695 [III] [IV] ABSTRACT “France is at war”. These words, accompanied with a fierce military response, by then French president François Hollande heavily impacted western European counter-terrorism efforts. The response by France to the Paris attacks of November 13, 2015 paved the way for a Europe that engages in wars abroad in order to fight terrorism at home. This thesis analyses the extent to which contemporary western European terrorism could be perceived as a process of tit-for-tat. The dominant understanding of terrorism contains pervasive misrepresentations. Terrorist attacks are too often understood as isolated events that are happening only to states. Throughout this thesis, terrorism is understood as a process employed by both state and non-state actors. The ongoing and unsuccessful quest for a universally accepted definition of terrorism is exemplary for the complexity of the phenomenon. This thesis aims to put contemporary terrorism into context. By applying a critical geopolitical approach and process-tracing to the attacks that targeted Paris, Brussels and Berlin this thesis reveals the causality of terrorism. Terror attacks and following state responses are interconnected and mutually reinforce one another. Throughout this thesis I argue that a strategy of retaliation, a process of tit-for-tat, is present in contemporary western European terrorism. However, this causality is absent from the discourses states uphold in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. Attacks are framed as assaults on ‘our’ values and ‘our’ way of living. Yet, terrorist attacks appear to be violent manifestations of structural problems within European societies. In order to better understand the phenomenon we all so desperately try to defeat, self-reflection is needed. [V] PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS While writing this thesis, numerous terrorist attacks took place all across the globe. Istanbul, Baghdad, Gao, Mogadishu, Lahore, London, Saint Petersburg, Stockholm, Alexandria, Aleppo, Manchester, Jakarta, Kabul, again London and Tehran, to name only a few. This list is far from complete, many events probably never came to my attention in Nijmegen. Moreover, there are countless civilians, with unknown names, who died in the name of counter-terrorism. On March 17, 2017 105 civilians were killed in a US-led airstrike near Mosul. The day before, a ‘precision strike’ killed 42 people who took shelter in a school in Mansoura. A week earlier 49 people died after American warplanes fired at a mosque in Al Jinah. These events, in the name of terror and counter-terror, made me even more determined to finish this thesis. It has been a journey driven by the need to better understand the phenomenon we all so desperately try to defeat. Whether I succeeded in this quest is for others to decide. Yet, it has been a valuable and challenging journey. This thesis forms the closure of my Master’s in Human Geography with a specialization in Conflicts, Territories and Identities. In the past two years, numerous opportunities unfolded to further discover the world around me. As an intern at the Embassy of the Netherlands in New Zealand I had the pleasure to work and live in Wellington, the ‘coolest little capital in the world’. Thereafter, I gained valuable insights while being an intern at the Civil and Military Interaction Command of the Dutch Ministry of Defence. Finally, Bureau Wijland offered me the opportunity to further hone my skills by being a coordinator for Shelter City Nijmegen. Although I conducted this research independently, it would not have been possible without the support and guidance from others along the way. First and foremost to Henk van Houtum, whose critical remarks and cups of coffee in the Cultuurcafé kept me focused. His questions and remarks in the initial stage arranged my thoughts and ideas. He made sure that this thesis is built on a critical geopolitical way of thinking and triggered me to question the taken-for-granted assumptions of [VI] contemporary terrorism. He taught me that words are not just words and helped me to find the hidden message and morality behind them. To Rodrigo Bueno Lacy, who is willing to dedicate some of his time to assess this thesis. But foremost for the article Recycling violence: How maps about terrorism fail to round up the argument he wrote with Henk van Houtum and Kevin Raaphorst. This article provoked me to think beyond the dominant understanding of terrorism. It placed me on the right track to question the pervasive misrepresentations present in how ‘we’ perceive, present and respond to terrorism. Their final sentence, what goes around comes around, so eloquently covers what is written in this research and therefore serves as the title of this thesis. [VII] LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 Cartoon by Ruben L. Oppenheimer as printed in NRC Handelsblad on April 10, 2017 at page 19 Figure 2 People killed by terrorism per year in western Europe 1970-2015 Figure 3 Living with terrorism Figure 4 The geography of terrorism Figure 5 The purposes of process-tracing Figure 6 A conflict resolution terrorism typology Figure 7 Map of the Paris attacks Figure 8 Contemporary street life in Brussels Figure 9 Coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria ABBREVIATIONS CTC Counter-Terrorism Committee CTS Critical Terrorism Studies DAESH al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham DOS Department of State ETA Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna EU European Union GA General Assembly GTD Global Terrorism Database HRW Human Rights Watch IRA Irish Republican Army IS Islamic State ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria / Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OCAD Orgaan voor de Coördinatie en de Analyse van de Dreiging / Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis PCS Peace and Conflict Studies PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization RAF Rote Armee Fraktion SOHR Syrian Observatory for Human Rights UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council USA United States of America [VIII] TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................................. V PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... VI LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................................. VIII ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................................................. VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................................................................................................... IX CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................- 1 - 1.1 Research objective and questions ........................................................................................................- 2 - 1.2 Scientific relevance .................................................................................................................................- 4 - 1.3 Societal relevance ...................................................................................................................................- 5 - 1.4 Structure of this thesis ...........................................................................................................................- 6 - CHAPTER 2 FROM THEORIES TO RESEARCH PARADIGM ......................................................- 7 - 2.1 The definitional problem of terrorism ................................................................................................- 8 - 2.1.1 The figures..........................................................................................................................................- 8 - 2.1.2 What are we talking about ............................................................................................................ - 12 - 2.1.3 A critical turn .................................................................................................................................. - 14 - 2.1.4 Attempts by the international community ................................................................................. - 15 - 2.1.5 Why we cannot agree upon a definition ..................................................................................... - 17 - 2.1.6 Do we really need a definition? .................................................................................................... - 18 - 2.1.7 Terrorism throughout this thesis ................................................................................................
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