Stephen Thomas Mergner______, Hereby Submit This Work As Part of the Requirements for the Degree Of

Date: May 22nd, 2006__

I, __Stephen Thomas Mergner______, hereby submit this work as part of the requirements for the degree of:

Doctorate of Philosophy, PhD in:

Political Science, American Political Theory

It is entitled:

“The Implementation of the ‘Conciliated’ Model of Municipal Governance. Testing the Effectiveness Of ‘Hybrid’ Mayor Charter Reforms in Cincinnati, Ohio.”

This work and its defense approved by:

Chair: _Dr. Michael Margolis, PhD_____

_Dr. Alfred Tuchfarber, PhD____

_Dr. Barbara Bardes, PhD __

“The Implementation of the ‘Conciliated Model’ of Municipal Governance in Cincinnati, Ohio. Testing the Consequences of the ‘Hybrid Mayor’ Charter Reforms.”

A dissertation submitted to the Division of Research and Advanced Studies of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D.)

in the Department of Political Science of the College of Arts and Sciences

May 2006

Stephen Thomas Mergner B.A., University of Cincinnati, 1997 M.A., University of Cincinnati, 2003

Committee Chair: Dr. Michael Margolis

2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I cannot begin to express my thanks to all those who have offered their support

over the years to complete this dream. Unquestionably, my wife Michele deserves all the

accolades and praises for this achievement. Had it not been for her unwavering belief in

my potential, this work would never have been completed. Far too many mortgage, car,

and preschool payments have come down the line carrying with them a multitude of

reasons to end this academic quest. For you Michele, I am eternally indebted.

I would like to thank Stephanie Walls for all of her support and solidarity

throughout graduate school. We shared virtually every class together, experienced the

excitement of each other’s marriages and childbirths. Stephanie is a true friend and an

academic comrade. Another constant supporter of my academic endeavors is Murphy

Mergner, my beloved companion, who also happens to be my dog. Throughout all those

nights of studying in graduate school, Murphy sat under the desk keeping my feet warm.

Murphy never complained of another late night studying or writing and always offered

her love freely.

I thank my parents, Arthur and Barbara Mergner, Jr., who supported my

decision to leave corporate America in search of a doctorate. I know that you hid your

doubts deep inside, yet always believed that I would succeed. Once upon my academic

path, you provided invaluable assistance that was both intellectually stimulating and

emotionally comforting. I am so very proud to now be able to share this victory with you.

The Department of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati is a wonderful

place to attend graduate school. Department administrator Joe Waddle and accountant

Cheryl Lindsey provided countless hours of support in helping graduate students get

their paychecks and access to the raw materials that make our academic work possible.

3 Dr. Richard Harknett and the Taft Fund’s Broadcast Group was the only reason my

dissertation was financially possible. His constant advocacy for my urban studies

research resulted in an extremely generous grant of $12,000 over three years. Without

this funding I would have had virtually no income.

James Robert Masterson provided invaluable research advice as he assisted in

bringing my SPSS skills back up to speed. Jim spent two long nights rowing through my

datasets and tests with me to make sure they were all set up correctly. Jim’s advice

shaved at least a year off my dissertation completion time.

My dissertation chair, Dr. Michael Margolis, was incredibly supportive of my

topic. He constantly encouraged my investigations and he challenged me to produce a

level of work higher than I believed myself capable of producing. Dr. Margolis provided

extremely swift and detailed reviews of my drafts and I always felt as if I was his only

concern. Dr. Alfred Tuchfarber and Dr. Barbara Bardes both provided invaluable assistance in gathering background history and in setting up my datasets. They both believed in my research and made my work feel attainable and valuable. I could not have hoped for a better dissertation committee.

4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Abstract 8

II. Review of the Literature

a. Corruption and the Rise of Progressive Reform 10

b. Weaknesses of the Strong Council Model 13

c. The Adapted City and the Adapted Mayor Model 14 III. Research Design

a. Empirical Test of the Hybrid Governmental Model 18

b. The Cincinnati Experience; 20 Strong Mayor Rule in a Hierarchical City

c. The At-Large, Nine-X Reforms; 20 The Beginning of Adapted-Strong Council Reforms

d. The Top-Vote-Getter Reform; 24 Continued Adapted-Strong Council Reforms

e. The Hybrid Mayor Reform Movement; 25 Cincinnati as a Hybrid City

f. Development of the Null Hypotheses 29

5 g. Quantifiable Testing; Research Procedures, Data and Methods 34

i. Legislative Leadership and Party Unity 36

ii. Committee Assignments 38

iii. Political Participation 39

iv. Media Perception 41

h. Implications of Research 45

IV. Results of Testing

a. Statistical Analysis of Each Hypothesis

i. Hypothesis # 1: Legislative Leadership 46

ii. Hypothesis # 2: Party Unity 53

iii. Hypothesis # 3: Committee Chair Assignments 66

iv. Hypothesis # 4: Political Participation 69

v. Sub- Hypothesis to #4: Issue 4 Support 72

5a. Party Affiliation 78

5b. Race 83

5c. Level of Education 89

5d. Median Family Income 93

vi. Hypothesis # 5: Media Perception 99

b. Conclusions: Judging Luken’s First Term 103

c. Implications for Future Research 121

V. Attachments

a. Bibliography 125

b. #1 Sample Newspaper Coding Sheets 131

c. #2 IOC Source Sheet 6 Years 133

d. #3 Party Affiliation of Chairmanships 12 Years 134

#4 Box Plot for Median Family Income 135

7 I. ABSTRACT

The City of Cincinnati has experienced a wave of governmental reform of a magnitude that has not been felt since the 1920s. Frustrated with racial unrest, a lack of accountability and legislative inefficiencies, local political leaders and public activists called for greater accountability and decisiveness from their urban government. Blame for these failures landed squarely upon the backs of the City Council and the weak Mayor system. As a consequence of this pressure, Cincinnati reformed its city charter to incorporate a ‘Hybrid’ Model of municipal governance. This is not just a specific modification of the current charter, rather it is an attempt at a full governmental reform in order to change the very seat of legislative and leadership power.

Within the field of political science, urban governance literature is founded solidly upon qualitative case study research. Because of the time consuming nature of gathering, encoding and statistically analyzing large volumes of data, the study of the impact of charter reform measures has remained relatively devoid of quantitative research. This dissertation offers a quantitative based analysis that reveals that there are certain statistically significant consequences that have resulted from this governmental reform. My research analyzes five critical hypotheses that the qualitative scholarly literature and political reformers determined would change as the result of a city adopting this governing model. Hypotheses tested involve Legislative Leadership, Party Unity,

Committee Assignments, Media Perception and Political Participation.

This dissertation illustrates that the primary consequences of reform have occurred within three areas; First, an increase in party unity within the (minority)

Republican Party. Secondly, an increase in negative attitude towards the Hybrid Mayor

8 post-reform in the city’s newspaper reports. Third, a small increase in the percentage of ordinances the mayor proposed before Council. The results of this analysis argue that the expectation of broad changes within municipal governance has not occurred. These findings suggest that more drastic shifts in the structure of power are necessary if major changes are desired.

9 II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE: CORRUPTION AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM

Before the municipal reforms of the Progressive era were enacted, the Mayor-

Council Model dominated America’s municipal landscape. Versions of this form of government were found throughout all local, state and national governments and represented what was believed to be the natural distribution of power in a republic. It was generally understood that in order to have a successful republican form of government one must have separate political institutions sharing power within a structure of checks and balances. Also know as the “Strong Mayor” Model, the Mayor-Council system represents the hierarchical structure of government in its purest form. (Frederickson, et al., 2003). The system’s core source of motivation is within the competition of political parties for the control of legislative and administrative power. By winning seats in political posts, a party takes the reins of government and will be accountable to the voters at the next election.

One key weakness within this model is its assumptions of both fair, competitive elections and a lack of corruption. The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries witnessed what is arguably municipal democracy at its worst. The era is best described with terms such as corruption, bossism, favoritism, and patronage (Hansel, p.1, 2003).

The party boss was the central figure and he carefully dispensed city jobs to his “trustees” in exchange for their loyal service and votes. City contracts and construction permits were dispensed as political patronage (Patton, p.18, 1981). It was commonly believed that there was little, if any, hope of the creation of an honest municipal government.

10 How widespread was the problem of corruption? It is not clear as to a percentage

but it is generally accepted that the “perception” of universal corruption was accepted.

The trend to reform government began at the federal level with the 1883 Pendleton Act that established the Civil Service Commission and brought about merit-based reforms.

The natural extension of this effort was reform at the state and local level. Following the

Federal Act was the 1897 creation of the National Civic League, which is dedicated to the implementation of “good governance” in municipalities. Bolstered by the new science of public administration and the works of men such as Herbert Croly, Theodore Roosevelt,

Woodrow Wilson, John Dewey and Walter Rauschenbusch, the National Civic League and other “progressives” sought to bring honesty, morality, and efficiency back into politics (Protasel, p.21, 1995). The creation of the Council-Manager Model of municipal governance was a complete reshuffling of the political power structure and created a wholly new form of government. Also known as the “Strong Council” Model, the

Council-Manager form seeks a unity-of-powers structure that limits political influence.

Its goal is to create a power structure that is similar to a business or corporate model. This results in a city more aptly described as egalitarian rather than hierarchical in nature

(Frederickson, et al., 2003).1

1 It must be noted that technically Frederickson, et al., use different terms to identify the two traditional types of governmental structures. They refer to the “Strong Mayor Model” as the “Presidential Model” and declare that it is the most aptly described as “political” in nature. They refer to the “Strong Council Model” as the “Parliamentary Model” and declare that it is most aptly described as “administrative” in nature. Specifically, I believe that their terminology is too flowery and fails to concentrate the mind on exactly what is the focus of our research efforts, clearly identifying the seat of political power. To declare that the Council-Manager Model is not “political,” but “administrative,” is confusing to say the least. It is understood that their terminology is an attempt to link local governmental models to state and national ones. This terminology is still evolving and can be improved upon. In place of their use of the descriptive term “political,” I have used “hierarchical.” In place of the descriptive term “administrative,” I have used “egalitarian.” This clearly identifies a) who is holding the political power, and b) how the power relationship is structured between these two groups. Please see my presentation of their characterization chart on page 17 for further clarification.

11 The Council-Manager Model was constructed with the specific intent of

bifurcating politics and the business of municipal administration (Kaufman, p.1060,

1956). The role of the Mayor was entirely transformed into a “weak Mayor” post. Serving

alongside and selected within the City Council, the weak Mayor had few formal powers,

save ceremonial ones. The role of the mayor was often described as “first amongst

equals” in his relationship with Council. The new Strong City Council dominated the

newly shaped political field. Another goal of the progressive movement was to create

expert administrative heads that would be insulated from the political realm and would

serve as a non-partisan advisors to a City Council. These new administrators, who

received the apolitical title “City Managers”, would be hired, fired and would directly

report to the City Council. If the City Managers wished to remain effective unbiased

initiators of policies, it was imperative that they maintain their independence from the

political process (Lockhard, p.233, 1962). Once this independence had been achieved, the

City Managers could go about the task of identifying and eliminating sources of

inefficiency and corruption. These issues would be dealt with in a completely non-

partisan manner and the cultivation of a purely professional civil service would begin to develop.

The Council-Manager Model of city government took the nation by storm as upwards of 50% of cities adopted this new charter model (Frederickson, et al., p. 6). The reform measures made enormous strides towards eliminating corruption and establishing a legitimate civil service. For the most part, party bosses disappeared and were replaced by City Council governments. These representatives competed for political seats that offered modest wages for a part-time job with civic virtue as the primary motivating

12 factor. Success was achieved as the character of partisan politics was dramatically

changed (Protasel, p.22, 1995).

WEAKNESSES OF THE STRONG COUNCIL MODEL

The first 40 to 50 years of progressive rule were quite successful at largely eliminating corruption and the negative pressures of political influence. Despite its successes, many perceived that its reliance upon egalitarian power sharing contained significant flaws. Specifically, with municipal leadership shared between Council, a

Weak Mayor and the City Manager, clear accountability and issue decisiveness went out the door. This diffused leadership led directly to fragmentation of blame (Lockhard, p.235, 1962). The change from a highly visible centralized Mayor, to a Council of fragmented community representatives, opened the door for great difficulties. The highly bureaucratic system was plagued with the dual problems of identifying new bureaucratic inefficiencies and the Council’s general inability to temper its members’ conflicts. At its worst, weak Council-Manager governments lead to irresponsibility. It was often argued that “no one quite knew what could be done to alter it, each segment of the fragmented government became a self-directed unit, the impact of elections on the conduct of government was minimized. No one seemed to be steering the governmental machinery, though everyone had a hand in it” (Kaufman, p.1063, 1956). Under this charter structure, a City Council’s fundamental composition and internal operating procedures was its own enemy rendering it incapable of providing the needed integration. Regardless of the cause, the public began to perceive the Council-Manager Model as “generally too slow and too fragmented to perform this function effectively”(Kaufman, p.1063, 1956).

13 THE ADAPTED CITY AND THE ADAPTED MAYOR MODEL

By the 1950’s and 60’s, the perception of dysfunction was further multiplied by the new problems of white flight, suburban sprawl, street drugs and social change. When faced with these pressures, the public and many within the government structure itself began to seek greater decisiveness from municipal governments. They called for reform and specifically a degree of accountability that the diffused Council-Manager plan could not provide. Instead of a wholesale abandoning of the Council-Manager Model as a solution to this weakness, city governments sought to reform their charters by modifying the role of the chief executive.

Greg Protasel suggests that cities have integrated the position of a weaker form of the original Strong Mayor back into their charters in order to eliminate pressures for abandonment (Protasel, p.203, 1995). He argues that the goals of adapting the Office of the Mayor are “to curb and occasionally stimulate the bureaucracy, to persuade warring factions that concessions are necessary, to rise enough above the fray to acquire visibility convertible into political influence.” Protasel argues that these may well be the one thing the chief executive can supply that no other political agent can” (Lockhard, p.232, 1962).

This renewed position places a single individual directly in the public eye and provides a source of accountability for mismanagement. It is argued that without integration of a stronger chief executive, the Council-Manager Model of government could very well be a model of declining relevance for larger cities (Lockhard, p.232, 1962). According to Bill

Hansel, Executive Director for the International City/County Management Association or

ICMA, upwards of 62% of the nation’s Council-Manager cities now utilize the direct

14 election of the Mayor (Hansel, p.1, 2003).2 It is important to understand that by adapting

the role of the Mayor it does not, in itself, signify the creation of an entirely new form of

governmental structure; rather it is just one of a potential myriad hybrid creations of the

two dominant municipal models.

George Frederickson, Gary Johnson and Curtis Wood suggest in their 2003 book,

The Adapted City. Institutional Dynamics and Structural Change, that the municipal

change noticed by authors, such as Protasel, is but one example of the greater

evolutionary trend. They suggest that the primary challenge to municipal studies is that

the core descriptive terminology upon which we are so dependent has limited our ability

to accurately describe the widespread evolution that has occurred in modern municipal

charters. The authors argue that the traditional characterization of cities, as either Mayor-

Council “Executive” cities or Council-Manager “Strong Council” cities, simply ignores

the modern reality with which we are presented. They offer substantial statistical data to

back up a new five level characterization chart that accurately reflects the diversity

existing in current city charters.

Traditional ←------ADAPTED------CITIES------→ Traditional Mayor-Council Council-Manager TYPE I TYPE II TYPE III TYPE IV TYPE V Strong → Adapted → Hybrid3 ←Adapted ←Strong Mayor Strong Strong Council Mayor Council

2 It is also of interest to note that as a consequence of this ‘in the field reform’ the National Civic League, which has for decades promoted its “Model City Charter,” has finally adopted and endorsed the option of electing a direct Mayor to supervise council governments. Albeit decades behind the evolutionary curve, the adoption of this measure places the pure ideologues within the camp of the Council-Manager Mayoral reformists and suffices as a de facto endorsement of the need for this reform. 3 It should be noted that I have changed the authors’ term “Conciliated” to “Hybrid” simply because conciliated is a horrible word that requires constant explanation. Hybrid clearly and concisely explains that it favors neither of the traditional models.

15 Using city survey data from the 1990’s, Frederickson, et al., argue that under the traditional definitions of cities, approximately 43% utilize the Mayor-Council Model,

49% utilize the Council-Manager Model and 8% utilize other models such as commission, town meeting or representative town meetings. The principal weakness of this traditional classification system is that it fails to appropriately illustrate the numerous adjustments that cities continually make in order to encourage a more effective municipal government. The authors suggest that starting in the 1950s, with the effects of corruption and bossism waning, cities with populations over 50,000 began the process of adaptation in response to problems such as size, serious social issues and fiscal crisis (Frederickson, et al., p.6). “The most prominent features of the Council-

Manager government, such as a professional executive and a merit civil service, were being widely adopted in Mayor-Council cities.” “The most prominent features of the

Mayor-Council governments, such as a directly elected Mayor and some council elected by districts, were being widely adopted in Council-Manager governments”

(Frederickson, et al., p.6-7). After 50 years of continued adaptations, the data now illustrates very clearly that the adapted forms of city government now dominate the political landscape.

Utilizing their expanded adapted city definition, Frederickson et al., state that

16.3% of cities utilize a Mayor-Council governmental form, 14.7% utilize Council-

Manager form, and 69% of cities utilized some form of the adapted city model. Their research has determined that “the detailed features of these [two] traditional models have been so mingled as to all but eliminate the importance of the formal designation of a city as either a Mayor-Council or Council-Manager city” (Frederickson, et al., p.7). “Cities

16 with Mayor-Council statutory platforms have become more efficient, honest, and

equitable” with a call for greater focus on the core administrative values of efficiency

and good public management. Correspondingly, Council-Manager cities have become

more politically responsive with calls for a greater focus upon the core political powers

of greater inclusiveness, representation of diverse political interests and specific

neighborhood representation (Frederickson, et al., p.11).

With this research, it is clear that almost all cities are now adapted cities in one

form or another. Most cities fall within the modest classification of either Adapted-

Strong Mayor or Adapted-Strong Council. Despite their municipal reforms, these two

types of adapted cities can still be traced back to the traditional platform that they favor.

However, within the classification of an Adapted city, the authors state that

approximately 13% of American cities have achieved the status of the complete “Hybrid”

or “Conciliated” city. The hybrid city is a member of the adapted grouping but its

reforms have so significantly changed its constitutional structure that it is not readily

identifiable which traditional platform it originally favored. Frederickson, et al., state that there are many characteristics that suggest a city is a complete “Hybrid” city. This classification system is by no means lock-tight and many cities can have these seven characteristics to a varying degree.

1. Directly Elected Mayor - for centralized political leadership, accountability

and city-wide representation.

2. District Elected Council – either all members or most; purpose is to facilitate

neighborhood responsiveness.

17 3. Activist City Council – Council tends toward more direct representation.

4. Comparatively Weak Council Powers – when compared to the Council’s

powers under either the egalitarian or hierarchical models.

5. Full-Time City Manager or Chief Administrative Officer – professional,

centralized administrative leadership.

6. Shared Executive Authority – Mayor and Manager share the executive

power split into two roles – political executive and administrative executive.

7. The Dual Mayoral Role – on Council the Mayor has a strong political

leadership presence but serves more of a facilitative role for the City Manager.

(Frederickson, et al., p.159)

With these characteristics listed, the authors identify the following six cities as clearly members of the “Hybrid” classification. Cincinnati, Ohio; Evanston, Illinois; Hartford,

Connecticut; Lenexa, Kansas; Oakland, California; and The Unified Government of

Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas (Frederickson, et al., p.189).

III. RESEARCH DESIGN AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE “HYBRID” GOVERNMENTAL MODEL To date, the scholarly literature contains a thorough analysis of the theoretical implications of municipal reform. Specifically, authors such as Frederickson 2003,

Protasel 1995, Sparrow 1984, George 1984, Kaufman 1956, Kotter and Lawrence 1974 and Lockhard 1962 have made a concerted effort to determine what political effects could occur with adaptations away from the Council-Manager Model. Frederickson et al., identify the City of Cincinnati, Ohio as a city that has successfully achieved the status of

18 a Hybrid city. From reviewing the theoretical literature it becomes apparent that few

attempts have been made to determine what tangible change, if any, actually resulted

from the governmental reform.4 With this dissertation project, I propose to conduct such

an analysis to determine what effects have occurred with the adoption of the Hybrid

Model of urban governance.

Stated differently, in 1998 the City of Cincinnati adopted far-reaching municipal

reforms that unquestionably move the charter well beyond the formal definition of a

Council-Manager government. These reforms have now divorced the municipal

government from its Council-Manager roots. Based on the structure of Cincinnati’s

Charter, it is now very difficult, if not impossible, to determine which of the two

traditional models the charter originally favored. The most visible of Cincinnati’s reforms

has been the creation of the city’s first directly elected Mayor since 1926. Urban

governance literature makes several significant predictions as to which factors would be

expected to change as a result of enhancing mayoral powers. This dissertation shall be an empirical test of these hypotheses to determine if the Mayoral reforms had their intended effect, or if there was little or no effect in regards to these specific measures.

More importantly, what these tests will reveal is the limited impact this charter reform has had upon all five of the hypotheses to be presented. This dissertation will illustrate that the primary consequences of reform are seen within the following three areas: First, a drastic increase in party unity within the minority, opposition, Republican Party. Second, an overall increased negative attitude towards the Hybrid Mayor post-reform from the

4 Kotter and Lawrence analyze Mayoral behavior as it relates to “agenda setting, network building, and task accomplishment” but they make no systematic attempt at determining a statistically significant increase in legislative efficiency. Their research is more aptly described as normative conceptualization.

19 city’s newspaper reports. Third, weak support for the mayor increasing his percentage of

ordinances proposed before Council. The results of this analysis argue that the

expectation of broad changes within municipal governance has not occurred. This lack of

change is very significant in that it suggests that if change is desired, more drastic shifts

in the structure of power are necessary.

THE CINCINNATI EXPERIENCE: STRONG MAYOR RULE IN A

HIERARCHICAL CITY

The City of Cincinnati will serve as my experimental example. Cincinnati suffered

under the corrupt regime of Mayor Boss Cox from the 1890’s through 1911 when he was

finally ‘encouraged’ to retire after being the subject of a grand jury investigation for

misappropriation of municipal funds (Besterman-Smalley, p. 35). He was by no means

the only Mayoral Boss in Cincinnati’s history. Cox was simply the most egregious

violator of our democratic principles. In 1925, a municipal election adopted a formal

Council-Manager ‘Strong Council’ form of government and provided for the creation of a

nine-member Council. The election of Council was by proportional representation via the

Australian “Hare” System of balloting and the weak Mayor was chosen from within the

newly elected Council (Besterman-Smalley, p. 35).

THE AT-LARGE, NINE-X REFORM: THE BEGINNING OF ADAPTED- STRONG COUNCIL REFORMS The establishment of the new Council-Manager government ushered in the rise of the

Charter party. It must be noted that the City Council technically operates its elections and the day-to-day operation of Council in a “non-partisan” manner. This stipulation was

20 established in the 1924 charter as one of the efforts to remove partisan politics from the business of running the city government. But it must be clearly understood that the three major parties endorse and support, their candidates. In 2003, “Each [Republican endorsed candidate] received $10,000 from the party and help in organizing campaigns and raising additional money” (Cincinnati Business Courier, 4/28/03).

Despite this non-partisan myth, little doubt remains amongst the knowledgeable voter’s minds which political party each Council member supports and how that will translate into their work on Council. It must be noted that not all Council candidates receive party endorsement and the remainder either run as an “independent” candidate or as an independent with a declared party preference. It must also be understood that although the three major parties endorse and support the candidates, the Charter Party is not a political party in the formal sense. This is the result of the fact that, unlike the

Republican and Democratic parties, it does not operate on a statewide basis. The Charter

Party simply operates as a group of like-minded citizens within Cincinnati’s “non- partisan” political scene. Consequently, it is important to understand that it is not a formal statewide political party as such.

Under the leadership of the new Mayor, Murray Seasongood, this “third” party controlled municipal government from 1926 until the 1960’s when the city changed the manner in which Council members were chosen. Specifically, in 1957 the election of

Council by proportional representation was changed to an at-large, Nine-X method of selection. There are three hypotheses as to what the motivations were for this 9X reform.

The first hypothesis suggests that the motivation for the “at large” reform was a response to the Charter party’s domination of Council elections. Although the Democratic Party

21 held a number of seats on Council, the Republican Party was held to a strict minority

status. In an attempt to increase their presence on Council, the Republican Party

petitioned heavily for a revival of a “competitive party system” via the at-large Nine-X

system. This reform was presented as a solution to complaints about Council’s poor

performance (Cincinnati Enquirer, Nov. 1957). As motivation for the Republican Party,

this reform had its intended effect. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, the

Republicans controlled Council until a coalition between the Charter and Democratic

Parties ended their dominance. Although this coalition operated successfully for over a

decade, it eventually dissolved as the political composition of the city became

overwhelmingly Democratic. From the 1980s to the present, the Democratic Party has maintained its majority status.

The second hypothesis argues that the motivation for this municipal reform was placed entirely upon the confusing manner in which a citizen’s vote was calculated under the proportional representation or the “Hare” system of vote tallying. With its complex method of a voter ranking their candidates by ordered preference, few of the voters actually understood how their vote was calculated and how this translated into the resulting vote tally. An article in the November 8th edition of the Cincinnati Enquirer

argues that the final tally was computed via “a number of arithmetically imponderable

factors” (Cincinnati Enquirer, 11/8/57). This level of confusion plagued the system and

left voters with a far less-than-satisfying connection to the political process. A more

direct method of vote casting was needed.

The final hypothesis suggests that “racist overtones” were the motivation in that this

change in representation was the result of the Charter Party’s plan to nominate Theodore

22 Berry as Cincinnati’s first black Mayor (Goldberg and Wilkinson, Cincinnati Enquirer,

6/2/98). In the pre-1964 Civil Rights Act environment, many whites found this nomination to be disconcerting. The Cincinnati Post argues that supporters of the 9X reform “distastefully hyped the specter of a black mayor to persuade voters to adopt the

“9X” at-large electoral plan…” (Cincinnati Post, 11/4/03). The move to the “at large” system halted Berry’s election. What is clear from newspaper records is that under the PR system Berry was consistently one of the top, if not the top, receiver of votes. “Another first-place finish for Berry in 1957, many felt, could elevate him to the mayor’s post – filled by Council’s majority party and, by informal tradition, usually awarded to the top finisher” (Cincinnati Post, 11/4/03). Under the inaugural run of the new “at-large, Nine-

X” method, Berry fell from first place to 14th of 18 candidates. Berry was quoted in the

Cincinnati Enquirer as stating that what is clear from this election is that “a majority of white people did not want to return a Negro to the office.” He also stated that he received many phone calls from other black voters stating that they were all “dissatisfied with the election returns. [Berry] indicated that they appeared resentful of the [new system]”

(Cincinnati Enquirer, 11/5/57).

An analysis of the time period suggests that although clearly Berry’s drastic

Council loss can be interpreted as an “at-large” discriminatory vote, it is not clear on any level that this factor was an initial motivation for the reform movement. Despite this setback, this change simply delayed black representation as Cincinnati’s black population continued to grow in number and eventually achieved significant Council representation under the new system. Berry himself was later elected back onto Council in 1963 and went on to become Cincinnati’s first black Mayor in 1972. None of these three

23 motivations are mutually exclusive and it is likely that they all played some role in the final passage of this specific charter reform measure.

THE TOP-VOTE-GETTER REFORM: CONTINUED ADAPTED-STRONG COUNCIL REFORM One of the most disruptive features of the City Council’s post-1925 charter was its internally elected weak Mayor. After each general election, the members of Council would elect from within their ranks a member to serve as the weak Mayor. This individual served as the ceremonial and administrative head of the city for most purposes.

Often the selection of this position was at best plagued with gridlock and confusion. At its worst it became a purely ceremonial position as the Charter Party and Democratic

Party simply took turns supporting each other’s candidates for the two-year weak Mayor term. The role as Cincinnati’s Mayor had completely lost its political power function as it descended into a purely administrative assignment. As a consequence of this infighting, lack of accountability and purpose, there were calls again for charter reform in 1987. This reform movement resulted in the “top-vote-getter” model where the Council member who received the most “at-large” votes was designated the weak Mayor.

To a great degree this lifted the election of Mayor to a citywide representation and out of the intra-Council political dealings of the former system. Despite this attempt at unifying Council, the “open” representation of the weak Mayor proved to only serve as a specific solution for a specific problem. The overall accountability of Council was arguably further diminished. This was a result of the fact that under the “top-vote-getter” model, whoever received the most votes was the Mayor. Consequently, during any given campaign season, Council members had a vested interest in intra-Council competition. It

24 can be fairly reasoned that under this system, members of Council had a vested, personal interest in not supporting the weak Mayor. To support the weak Mayor was to in effect strengthen your opposition’s political position when the next election cycle arrived. Tim

Burke, Hamilton County Party chairman suggests that “some Council members have tried to stymie others to increase their own chances of being the top-vote-getter in the next election and become mayor under the [top-vote-getter] system.” (Cincinnati Post,

05/28/99, 11/30/99, and 4/8/99, Cincinnati Enquirer, 11/30/99.)

What is clear is this change to the top-vote-getter model is the point where

Cincinnati voters began the slow process of pooling power in the office of the mayor.

Although this model provides for an indirect election of the Mayor, it was the first step towards a directly elected Mayor. By the late 1990’s, public opinion had again turned against the Council-Manager Model as the lack of political leadership and the general lack of accountability gave way to calls for mayoral reform. Most of the perceived leadership failures during this time period were large-scale, high profile development projects. Problems in regards to planning and financing two sports stadiums, a redevelopment of the city’s convention center and Fountain Square West languished in

Council (CityBeat, 3/4/99).

THE HYBRID MAYOR REFORM MOVEMENT: CINCINNATI AS A HYBRID CITY In 1995, a group of political activists from the Republican Party and an organization called the Cincinnati Business Committee (CBC) made the first attempts ever at a complete overhaul of the municipal charter. This reform measure was best described as an Adapted Strong Mayor Model that placed a city administrator reporting

25 directly to a Strong Mayor. At this same time another group, called Citizens for

Constructive Change, proposed a second reform plan. Best described as an Adapted

Strong Council Model, this reform created a directly elected mayor with some minor power enhancements over the Weak Mayor. As a key provision it kept the City Manager focused upon reporting directly to Council instead of the mayor. The CBC/ Republican

Party plan was presented to voters as Issue 1 in a special election ballot in August 1995

(CityBeat, 3/4/99). Voters widely viewed Issue 1 as an attempt by corporate interests to impose their will on city government and create a governing structure from which they alone would directly benefit. This assumption of manipulation was due to the CBC’s corporate nature and the fact that all of the pro-Yes campaign funds were from corporations. The Issue was soundly defeated in the August ballot by a ‘No’ percentage of 64 to 36 ‘Yes.’ Although the secondary plan by Citizens for Constructive Change did achieve enough signatures for placement on the November ballot, they chose to postpone their proposal because of the crushing defeat of Issue 1 (CityBeat, 4/29/99).

In an effort to regroup and avoid the disaster of Issue 1, members of this organization went to form Cincinnatians for Charter Reform. This organization was created with the desire to have as non-partisan and widespread an ideological base as possible. “After meeting from September of 1995 to May 1996, the forum lost two key groups: the Republican Party, which objected to the forum’s plan to return Council elections to proportional representation, and the League of Women Voters, which objected to its plan for partisan primaries in the mayoral race” (CityBeat, 3/4/99). In

1997, Governing magazine included Cincinnati with four other cities in which it appeared that “nobody was in charge.” The magazine declared that in these cities “it seems to take

26 forever to get anything done.” The city’s general inability to “make quick decisions in an

emerging global market place” makes them incapable of competing with neighboring

cities (CityBeat, 3/4/99). Despite the loss of membership and with the punishing article

by Governing ringing in their ears, Cincinnatians for Charter Reform went on to secure enough signatures for ballot inclusion for March 1998. Best described as another variety of the Adapted Strong Council Model, the plan was routed before the vote by one of its former members. The Republican Party, on the basis of invalid signatures, successfully challenged this measure and kept it off the ballot (CityBeat, 3/4/99).

With this political environment as the background, the organization Build

Cincinnati was formed with the intent of uniting “the city’s key political powerhouses, the Democratic Party, Republican Party and the NAACP.” After a year of testy negotiations and public hearings for the aura of “political inclusiveness”, Build

Cincinnati present Issue 4 to the Cincinnati voters in May 1999 (CityBeat, 3/4/99). Best described as a true Hybrid Model of municipal governance, this charter amendment created a directly elected Mayor with extensive powers. The City Manager was retained and reported to both the mayor and Council. The pro-4 campaign organization, titled

Coming Together for Cincinnati, wildly outspent the opposition, Citizens Against Issue 4

$259,569 to $8,495. Of the $8,459, $1,500 was a personal loan from a City Council candidate who also served as the organization’s treasurer. The overwhelming bulk of donations for the anti-4 group came in the form of 50 donations in the $11 to $100 range.

The overwhelming bulk of funds for the pro-4 group came in large corporate donations ranging from $5,000 to $15,000. Great attempts were made by the pro-4 group to diversify their donations and they did successfully acquire 148 donations under $100 in

27 size (Cincinnati Post, 6/12/99). This effort to appear more politically inclusive and economically diverse was successful at least to the degree that Issue 4 passed with a respectable 53 percent ‘Yes.’ In the fall of 2001, Mayor Charlie Luken was sworn in as the most powerful Mayor the city had since the days of Boss Cox.

The City of Cincinnati Municipal Code now offers the Stronger Mayor a wide array of executive tools with which he may exercise his leadership capabilities. Serving a four year term, the Mayor has been given the power to appoint the vice Mayor and the chairs of all committees, both without the advice and consent of Council. The City Manager is also chosen by the Mayor from a wide pool of qualified applicants and is formally appointed by a simple majority vote of Council. If the political will arises for the removal of a sitting City Manager, a simple majority of Council is all that is needed to remove the

City Manager. This removal is contingent upon the Mayor initiating the removal process as the Mayor alone possesses this power of initiation. The Mayor is also given a strong hand in legislative leadership as he has the power to set the agenda and to propose and introduce legislation for Council consideration. He also serves as the ceremonial head of the city and is recognized as the leader of the city by the Governor of Ohio for military and emergency purposes. The Mayor is also chosen in a separate “at-large” election from the Council and is therefore held responsible for the achievements and failures that occur within his administration. With this newly crafted municipal code, the Mayor has the potential to create a fully functional administration for the first time in over 75 years. Not only is he now in the position of being the chief executive, he has the potential to be the chief legislator and directly works with the City Manager of virtually his choosing.

According to Frederickson, et al., with the adoption of the Stronger Mayor Model of

28 urban governance, the City of Cincinnati crossed over the threshold of an Adapted

Administrative city and became a Hybrid city.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NULL HYPOTHESES

As a result of these newly formulated powers, I propose that the following five (5)

hypotheses shall illustrate to a substantial degree the consequences of this reform. For the

purposes of the development of the null hypotheses, the Council-Manager Model and the

Hybrid Model will be referred to as the ‘two forms.’

The first hypothesis concerns Legislative Leadership. I will test the following null

hypothesis: There is no statistical difference between the two forms in terms of the total

number of legislative proposals (ordinances and resolutions) submitted to the Council by

the Mayor.

Research Hypothesis: This serves as a test of the Mayor’s ability to function as the chief

legislator of Council. It is expected that with the adoption of the Hybrid Model there will

be a significant rise in the number of legislative proposals, (either resolutions or

ordinances) from the Mayor. As proponents of the reform debate and scholars have

suggested, the ability to craft, submit and schedule legislative debate brings with it the

potential for great change. The rationale for the increase in proposals is driven by the idea

that the directly elected mayor campaigns for office with a given agenda. When elected to office the authority of a mandate backs this agenda from the electorate. The Hybrid

Mayor would then use the “office of the mayor” as the formal launching point for

29 legislative proposals. These internally generated proposals would then be scheduled by the mayor and sent to the committee of the mayor’s choosing. The mayor can also be assured of receiving a “fair hearing” as he handpicks each of the committee chairs at the start of the legislative term. This rationale results in the potential of creating a legislative powerhouse in the office of the mayor. The change, if any, will be compared to the relative variation in the introduction of legislation from the other two potential sources, namely Council and the administrative wing of the City Manager’s department. Members of this administrative wing include the City Solicitor, the City Manager, Finance Director and other civil service posts.

The second hypothesis concerns Party Unity. I will test the following null hypothesis:

There is no statistical difference between the two forms of government (compared as legislative cycles) in terms of the total number of instances in which members of a given political party vote in complete unanimity, either all for or all against a proposal before

Council.5

Research Hypothesis: A rise in party unity would be expected to result from the fact that the Mayor is now chosen in a separate election from the remainder of Council. Although there is no guarantee, proponents and scholars argue that he now has the potential to function as the political head of his party within the realm of city politics. Under the previous Council-Manager Model, the Council “elected” the weak Mayor. Consequently,

5 Clearly, votes of a purely apolitical non-partisan nature such as “good will/congratulations” votes or simply a vote to “pay the monthly bills” will not be considered. Further discussion of this filtering process will be provided.

30 during any given campaign season, Council members had a vested interest in intra-

Council competition. It can be fairly reasoned that under the previous system, members of Council had a vested, personal interest in not supporting the weak Mayor. To support the weak Mayor was to in effect strengthen your opposition’s political position when the next election cycle arrived (Cincinnati Post, 05/28/99, 11/30/99, 4/8/99, and Cincinnati

Enquirer, 11/30/99). With the separation of the Mayoral and Council elections, the

Mayor can now function as the true head of his party. This reform attempts to remove some of this personal maneuvering that plagued the top-vote-getter model as a member of

Council can only run for a Council seat or the Mayor’s seat, not both at the same time. It can be reasonably argued that members of Council would now have a vested interest in party discipline and supporting the party leadership in much the same manner as we witness in the U.S. Congress. 6 In the creation of this variable’s dataset, specific attention will be paid to eliminate votes of a non-partisan nature such as “a vote to recognize an individual for their dedicated service upon the occasion of their retirement.”

The third hypothesis concerns Committee Assignment. I will test the following null hypothesis: There is no statistical difference between the two forms of government in terms of the Mayor’s Democratic Party affiliation and the number of committee chairmanships assigned to the three political parties.

Research Hypothesis: A rise in the partisan nature of the committee chair assignment process is expected to result from this reform. One of the most influential powers of the

6 Potential increase in party discipline as a result of Issue 4 adoption by Professor and Historian Zane Miller as quoted in 4/27/99 Cincinnati Enquirer.

31 new Mayoral position will be the ability to determine who will chair each committee

within city government. This power does not require the approval of Council and,

following the logic of the party unity discussion presented above, it can be reasonably

expected that the Mayor would reward loyal party members on Council with the most

coveted committee chairmanships. Although this process can be sensitive to

gamesmanship on behalf of the Mayor, it now has the potential to function as a partisan

reward system.7 An analysis of committee assignments and the chair’s party affiliation

will help reveal if there are any significantly increased partisan trends in the assignment

process.

The fourth hypothesis concerns Political Participation. I will test the following null

hypothesis: There is no statistical difference between the two forms of government in

terms of the political participation of the electorate. (The percentage of registered voters

that vote in city elections and the percentage of the city population that is registered to

vote).

Research Hypothesis: The urban politics literature suggests that one of the key

consequences of a switch to a stronger form of Mayoral rule is the expectation of a

significant increase in the political participation of the electorate (Morgan, 1995,

Milbrath, 1965, or Lane, 1965). It is expected that this might only occur in the Mayoral

elections but may well flow over into the more frequent Council elections. Secondly,

7 “Committee chairs on council do not have the clout of congressional committee chairs: They can’t bottle up or expedite legislation, but the jobs are seen as political plums, where individual council members can attract attention and focus public attention on issues they care about” (Cincinnati Enquirer, 12/1/99).

32 when the City of Cincinnati adopted the Stronger Mayoral reform it passed with a tight but healthy pass percentage of 52.8% /47.2%. Yet it must be understood that only an abysmally low turnout of 18% of the electorate showed up to the polls for the vote. This low turnout was likely the result of this reform measure being placed on the May primary ballot. Primary elections have traditionally the lowest voter turnouts when compared to

November elections. Although not cited in the literature, academic or otherwise, it is believed placing this reform measure on a May primary ballot was part of the passage strategy. The number of voters casting ballots would be substantively different that if the measure were voted on in November. Because of this, those that did choose to vote were clearly more motivated on this issue than almost all of their fellow citizens. Of specific interest to this dissertation is to determine if this “reform vote” turnout followed any specific pattern of district voting trends. The goal for the second part of this hypothesis is to determine if race, wealth, education or party identification played any role in support of this issue.

The fifth hypothesis concerns Media Perception. I will test the following null hypothesis: There is no statistical difference between the two forms of government in terms of the positive or negative media perception of Council and the Mayor’s office.

Research Hypothesis: It is expected that this research should reveal a significant shift in the media’s perception of municipal government. This hypothesis shall be composed of a thorough analysis of the five leading newspapers in the Cincinnati area. Specifically, the intent is to conduct a content analysis comparison of the newspaper commentary,

33 opinion, editorial reports of City Council contained in the Cincinnati Enquirer,

Cincinnati Post, City Beat, the Cincinnati Herald and the Cincinnati Business Courier.

The goal of this content analysis is to determine if the perception of Council and the

Mayor’s office has become significantly more positive or negative in the post-reform

environment. Specific attention will be paid to opinions regarding governmental

structure, efficiency and political success.

QUANTIFIABLE TESTING – RESEARCH PROCEDURES, DATA, METHODS

Four methodological issues must be addressed within the following statistical

tests. For each of the null hypotheses tested, data was gathered and input into SPSS

datasets. This data represents the time period of December 1st, 1999 through November

31st, 2005. Unless otherwise noted, the data gathered for each test represents a complete census of the time period. With the exception of unintentional coding errors, the data for these variables are complete and represent the universe of all data within that time period.

Consequently, any percentage change in a variable pre versus post reform is statistically significant. The testing of this data does not rely upon margins of error to determine the likelihood of a relationship. It either has changed or it has not. Despite this fact, I feel that it is useful to present the results of these statistical tests in order to determine the likelihood that this data could simply have been generated at random. Stated differently, I feel that it is important to calculate the likelihood that this six year time period was statistically different than any other time period in Cincinnati’s good government history.

These statistical tests also give a degree of insight into this study’s generalizability.

Specifically, in regards to the extent that Cincinnati is representative of the other five

34 Hybrid Mayoral cities, what is the likelihood that these results could simply be generated at random?

Secondly, it is understood that several different statistical tests can be utilized to determine statistical significance between these variables. In determining which tests were appropriate for the SPSS independent samples t-tests, the text by Schacht, Steven and Steward, titled Social Statistics: A User-Friendly Approach, was utilized. In determining which SPSS Post Hoc tests were most appropriate given the equality of variances, the University of Kentucky Computing Center’s website on advanced statistical techniques was utilized. This information can be viewed at the following website: http://www.uky.edu/ComputingCenter/SSTARS/MultipleComparisons_3.htm.

Third, throughout this research, the .05 level of confidence is utilized as the standard threshold determining statistical significance. At times the .01 level of significance is presented. This is due to the default procedure of SPSS to provide the resulting statistical output in the highest level achieved. If the results exceed the .01 threshold, .01 is presented, and likewise for .05.

Fourth, the research presented in this dissertation is reflective of the six-year time span identified. It must be noted that there are competing theories of what motivates change. The first hypothesizes that change is motivated by shifts in structural powers and this concept is tested within this dissertation. However, it must be noted that it may take longer than the period under analysis for the institutions to begin to reflect the changes in structure. How quickly institutions respond to change is an open debate. Finally, there is a school of thought within the discipline that argues that formal powers mean much less than the person in office. The skills of the officeholder determine the degree of change

35 witnessed, an ineffective leader results in little or no change. Therefore, within the

confines of these competing theories, the results of this analysis are reflective of the time

period and the effects of changing formal powers. A lengthier discussion of this is

presented in the Implication for Future Research portion of the conclusion.

In order to test the first two hypotheses, Legislative Leadership and Party Unity, it

was necessary to develop a database of Council votes pre and post reform. It is important

to note that the city’s legislative cycle runs from December 1st to December 1st and each

Council term is a two-year cycle. With this legislative cycle under consideration, I

decided that an analysis of the first four (4) years of post-reform could be compared with

the last two (2) years of pre-reform. This resulted in a comparison of three full legislative

cycles over two different Mayoral rules (one weak Mayor and one Stronger Mayor). It must be noted that the Mayoral term length doubled from two years to four with the enacted reform. With this change in term lengths, a six-year analysis will cover the last term of a Weak Mayor in an ‘Adapted-Administrative’ city and the first full term of the

Stronger Mayor in a ‘Hybrid’ city. Utilizing a six (6) year total cycle also has the added benefit of capturing any “honeymoon” or “lame duck” effects that could plague the start and finish of a Mayoral term. The first time frame is the ‘Weak Mayor’ or ‘Adapted-

Administrative’ pre-reform period of December 1st 1999 through December 1st 2001,

against the ‘Stronger Mayor’ or ‘Hybrid’ city post-reform period of December 1st 2001 through December 1st 2005. It must also be noted that this time frame was chosen, as the

Mayor in the last ‘Weak Mayor’ term, was Charlie Luken. Mr. Luken went on to win the

seat as Cincinnati’s first ‘Stronger Mayor.’ This permits an analysis of the change in

36 political structure while maintaining the same Mayor in office. This to a degree limits

many of the risks of research error associated with differing leadership styles.

With the time periods identified, I retrieved and viewed each ordinance and

resolution passed by Council during this six-year time frame via the “Council Online”

portion of its web site. (http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/council/pages/-3665-/) For the six years under consideration, City Council voted a total of 2,697 times. Whenever a vote is taken during a session of Council, the clerk of Council records the vote of each member of Council along with the official description of the proposal under consideration. I created a very large SPSS database that recorded the following four pieces of information about each of the 2,697 votes taken:

1. The official recorded number of the “Council item” or vote. 2. If it was a unanimous vote or contested by at least one Council member. 3. If there was a Mayoral veto (post-reform). 4. Who introduced the ordinance or resolution.

The purpose of this initial filtering is to remove the unanimous votes of Council. Clearly,

if a vote received unanimous support, then it was not a serious issue of contention. This

process removes the apolitical votes that are dedicated to simply running the day to day

operations of the city. There is a potential for error with this filtering process. Technically

there could be an issue of great ideological or political debate that passes unanimously.

The likelihood of this occurrence is very low and it is reasonable to believe that this filtering method is not overly blunt. Over the six years under consideration, the dataset identified a total of 244 votes that were not unanimous and were in need of further consideration. Each of these votes was analyzed in detail and the following data was recorded for each:

37 1. Identification as an ordinance or resolution. 2. A numerical categorization of the item’s topic/ description.8 3. The vote of each Council member (Yea, Nay, Abstain, Excused).

This form of analysis testing will provide data that can be tested via a series of one-way,

directional, independent samples t-tests to determine significance. This will allow for a

comparison of the pre and post time periods, particularly with respect to direction of

change. Statistical significance will be determined at the .05 level of confidence and the

resulting data is composed primarily of the Levene statistic, the t-critical, t-obtained, N,

and the degrees of freedom.

The third hypothesis, Committee Assignment, was tested from a separately created

SPSS database. At the start of each legislative cycle, the Mayor formally announces his

committee appointments. These announcements are then recorded in the directory portion

of the city’s official minutes of Council. I retrieved these minutes from the Cincinnati

Public Library’s archives and recorded the chair of each committee during the time

period of December 1991 to November 2005. The analysis continued by identifying the

party affiliation of the Mayor and comparing it to the affiliation of the committee chair

assignments. The null hypothesis is that “there has been no significant change” in these

variables since the reform was implemented. The research hypothesis states that “there

has been a significant change.” This form of analysis testing will provide data that can be

tested via a one-way, directional, ANOVA to determine significance. This will allow for

8 The topic of each item was categorized in the most efficient, yet detailed manner, possible and resulted in a category list of 5 major categories. The initial goal of this categorization process was to see if the ordinance topics followed any identifiable patterns pre or post-reform. However, due to the very low number of Ns, this statistical analysis was not possible. For replication purposes, a codebook with univariate distributions is available upon request.

38 a comparison of the pre and post time periods, particularly with respect to direction of

change. Statistical significance will be determined at the .05 level of confidence and the

resulting data is composed primarily of the ANOVA, the Levene Statistic, and the

appropriate Post Hoc test.

The fourth hypothesis, Political Participation, will be tested by utilizing the

records of the Hamilton County Board of Elections. A full record of the election results,

voter turnout and a breakdown by city voting district is readily available in Excel format

via the “Archived Results” portion of their website (http://www.hamilton-

co.org/BOE/archiveresults.asp). US Census data was combined with the Board’s data for

the first two tests which will determine changes in either a) the percentage of registered

voters of the city population over the age of 18, or b) the percentage of registered voters casting ballots. The population data for the City of Cincinnati was obtained at the US

Department of Census, www.census.gov. Complete Cincinnati census data (population over the age of 18) is available on three occasions 1990, 2000 and 2004. 9 This form of

analysis testing will provide data that can be tested via a series of one-way, directional,

independent samples t-tests to determine significance. This will allow for a comparison

of the pre and post time periods, particularly with respect to direction of change.

Statistical significance will be determined at the .05 level of confidence and the resulting data is composed primarily of the Levene statistic, the t-critical, t-obtained, N, and the degrees of freedom.

9 In 2004, the City of Cincinnati was included in the US Census’ “American Community Survey” which gathered information on a wide variety of economic, social, demographic and housing topics for most areas of the country with a population of 250,000 or more and some areas over 65,000. Please see www.census.gov for more information.

39 For the next set of Political Participation tests (Sub-hypothesis #4), Ward results from the May 4, 1999 election was compared with the US Census demographic characteristics of the Wards. It will be determined which characteristics were statistically significant predictors of a Ward’s percentage of YES vote for the Issue 4 charter reform measure. Demographic variables such as race, median family income, level of education and majority party affiliation will all be analyzed to determine if there was a potential connection. An analysis of every Ward within the city will be conducted. In order to obtain these characteristics for the May 1999 vote, 2000 US Census data was analyzed by census tract. This data is all readily available at the following website:

(http://factfinder.census.gov).

The City of Cincinnati records election data by Wards. This is contrasted with the

US Census data that is recorded by zip code or at an even finer level of census tract.

Depending upon population, census tracts result in geographic areas ranging in size from a few blocks to a couple of streets. Ward boundaries were easily matched with these census tracts to accurately identify which tracts lie within which Wards. The code for this census tract was then used to obtain the demographic data from U.S. Census. In most cases a Ward is composed of multiple tracts. In these situations the demographic data for the tracts were combined. It must be noted that in eleven cases the census tract overlapped with Hamilton county property. These are “shared” census tracts that are denoted with their 200 level numbering. For these eleven tracts I chose to eliminate the entire tract from consideration. The resulting population of the dataset is best described as the following:

40 City Cincinnati Population Over 18; 2000 Census 250,141

City Cincinnati Population Over 18; Captured in Dataset 232,431

Population Difference (11 Shared City/County Census Tracts) 17,709

Resulting Percentage of City Population Captured in Dataset 93%

This dataset provides data that can be tested via an ANOVA, Levene and an appropriate

Post Hoc test. The null hypothesis is that “there has been no significant change” in these variables since the reform was implemented. The research hypothesis states that “there has been a significant change” in these variables since the reform was implemented. This will allow for a comparison of the pre and post time periods, particularly with respect to a one-way direction of change. Statistical significance will be determined at the .05 level of confidence and the resulting data is composed primarily of the ANOVA, the Levene

Statistic, and the appropriate Post Hoc test.

As mentioned previously, the fifth hypothesis, Media Perception, is composed of a search of the newspaper archives of the five leading city newspapers. Through the use of the Cincinnati Public Library’s NEWSDEX, the local newspaper index, I constructed a list of relevant articles from the Cincinnati Enquirer, Cincinnati Post, Cincinnati

Business Courier and Cincinnati Herald. (http://newsdex.cincinnatilibrary.org). At the

time I conducted my research CityBeat was not included in the NEWSDEX index of local

newspapers. This is likely due to the fact that despite having a decisively political edge to

its news columns, CityBeat is classified as an “Entertainment Weekly” and as such it

primarily serves the public by providing local arts and entertainment information. In

order to include their reporting with the traditional newspapers I simply utilized the same

41 search criteria via the “Archives” section of their individual website

(http://www.citybeat.com/archives/index.shtml).

The ability to search and identify articles from the four-year, post-reform period was relatively straightforward and revealed an enormous amount about how the print media perceives the city government. My use of NEWSDEX utilized a very broad search framework to identify all articles even remotely related to the Mayor and City Council. I created two lists for each individual newspaper from the search results for “Cincinnati

Mayor” and “Cincinnati Council.” Multiple search phrases were experimented with, this being the most generalized and productive. These search criteria netted approximately

150 articles. Through the use of the University of Cincinnati’s Microfiche collection and the Cincinnati Public Library’s archives, I acquired hard copies of each article. After an initial reading of all 150, approximately 90 articles were consequently removed from consideration as their content was clearly not relevant. This filtering method required that, in order to be included in the final analysis, the article must address the charter reform change in some manner, directly or indirectly.10 Sixty-three articles were then identified as directly addressing the Mayor, his activities and his work with Council, and charter reforms. A SPSS database was then constructed to begin the process of recording these articles. The following seven pieces of information were collected from each article.

10 The filtering method employed and the rating system used in this media perception variable make it the only test that could have be influenced by a potential degree of bias. Content analysis by its nature is threatened by this possibility. Every attempt was made to ensure that filtering methods and ranking systems were employed consistently and fairly. Pre-tests on randomly selected articles with volunteer subjects were always conducted to ensure this.

42 1. The article’s number (references which folder I keep it in). 2. Date of publication. 3. Publishing newspaper. 4. Type of article (traditional news, opinion piece, question and answer). 5. A brief description of 4-5 words. 6. A numerical categorization of the article’s topic. 7. The article’s positive or negative rating.

In order to categorize the topic of each article the following codebook was constructed and utilized.

Newspaper Article Code Book Charter Power Debates 1.1 Power Clarification 1.2 Power Enhancement 1.3 Reform 1.4 Expectations of Reform

Post-Reform Hybrid Mayoral Leadership 2.1 Mayor’s Council Leadership (agenda/vision, cooperation/effectiveness) 2.2 Mayor’s Legislative Leadership (specific legislation, vetoes, coalition building)

Pre-Reform Council Leadership 3.1 Strong Council’s Leadership (agenda/vision, cooperation/effectiveness) 3.2 Weak Mayor’s Leadership (agenda/vision, cooperation/effectiveness)

The goal of this content analysis is to determine if the perception of Council and the

Mayor’s office is significantly positive or negative in the post-reform environment. A

43 five point rank scale was developed with 1 being the most negative, 5 the most positive, with 3 identifying a neutral reporting of opinion. The ranking system utilized was as follows:

Positive/ Negative Article Ranking System

1. Very Negative 2. Somewhat Negative 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat Positive 5. Very Positive These coding processes were then tested by a set of four voluntary subjects who utilized the codebook and accurately categorized a random selection of twenty articles at an approximately 90% accuracy rate.11 For each sample article the volunteers were given, they were asked to first categorize the central issue of each article in regards to the

Newspaper Article Codebook. Second, volunteers were asked to determine the positive/ neutral/ negative rating of each article in regards to this central issue. (Please see attachment #1 for a sample categorization sheet, volunteer instructions and the attached

Newspaper Article Codebook and Positive/ Negative Article Ranking System.) This form of content analysis testing will provide interval data that can be tested via a series of two-way, independent samples t-tests. This will allow for a comparison of the pre and post time periods, particularly with respect to direction of change as no direction is being predicted. Statistical significance will be determined at the .05 level of confidence and

11 Each article was numbered and input into a SPSS dataset. By utilizing the RANDBETWEEN function of Microsoft Excel, a random selection of article numbers was generated for this analysis.

44 the resulting data is composed primarily of the Levene statistic, the t-critical, t-obtained,

N, and the degrees of freedom.

IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH

The opportunity to test a modification of an American progressive model is a truly unique experience. The urban governance literature is largely untouched in regards to testing the quantifiable results of charter reform measures and yet, it is the realm that offers a wide variety of political experiences. This dissertation offers detailed insights into the base reasons why a city politic chooses to reform its governing institutions. This research provides a deeper understanding of the effects of political change as expressed by these specific hypotheses. The result of this analysis offers researchers and administrators alike a greater understanding of the potential consequences that this reform truly brings. Many middle to large urban cities are considering these reforms in an attempt to add leadership and accountability without returning to the Strong Mayor

Model. These cities are looking to Cincinnati’s experience as a guide. The empirical results of Cincinnati’s reform can apply to all cities of this size. Secondly, many of those considering charter reforms are forced to make their decisions and inform voters based on theoretical predictions and theoretical expectations. This analysis changes all of that and offers hard data that will either support or will invalidate the theories that are dominating urban politics literature.

The greatest challenge to validity that this research design faces is its generalizability. Considering the current state of urban political literature, it is necessary to simply begin somewhere. The dissertation presented here attempts to achieve a rather

45 unique synthesis, that of testing the results of political theory reform with the tools of the empiricist. Beyond this goal, this research will offer another opportunity to test the leading theoretical models that are dominating our discipline at this present time.

IV. RESULTS OF TESTING STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF EACH VARIABLE

Hypothesis #1, Legislative Leadership Null Research Hypothesis: There is no statistical difference between the two forms in terms of the total number of legislative proposals (ordinances and resolutions) submitted to the Council by the Mayor.

The following are two crosstabs that help to illustrate the sources of legislation pre and post reform.12 The first crosstab illustrates the source of ALL legislation and the second crosstab illustrates only Issues of Conflict (IOC). IOCs are the 10 % of Council items that DID NOT receive unanimous passage. Stated differently, these are ordinances or resolutions on which at least one Council member of any party dissented during their passage and voted NO. This Legislative Leadership variable is the only variable that uses the full list of item votes.13 All other statistical tests are based upon the IOC votes.

12 Originally the coding for this data separated the city manager from the administrative personnel into two groups. I later determined that it was most appropriate to combine this data as any bills, regardless of where they originate within the administrative branch, are the responsibility of the city manager. Differences in the number of legislative proposals in the pre and post reform period are most likely due to changes in the city managers leadership styles. It is believed that the manager under the Hybrid Mayor wished all legislation to originate from her office with her name on it. The manager under the council-manager model did not feel the administrative need for this centralization. 13 Although it is not going to be tested within this dissertation, Attachment #4 is a cross tab listing of the IOC votes and their content classification. With the city council averaging in the low 90s for their percent unanimous vote average, it is interesting to look at the remaining 10 percent of issues that cause conflict. This is presented for general interest only and offers some insight into which issues are causing dissent to occur. Attempts were made to determine if there was a statistically significant change in what issues drove conflict on council, but with very low Ns and the myriad sources of influence were simply too vast to provide acceptable confidence in the results.

46 Full legislative source analysis: mayor council City mmg Total Ordinance Pre 5 27 588 620 Reform .8% 4.4% 94.8% 100.0% Post 67 241 1763 2071 Reform 3.2% 11.6% 85.1% 100.0%

Resolution Pre 41 244 53 338 Reform 12.1% 72.2% 15.7% 100.0% Post 26 293 114 433 Reform 6.0% 67.7% 26.3% 100.0%

IOC legislative source analysis: mayor council City mmg Total Ordinance Pre 2 7 37 46 Reform 4.3% 15.2% 80.4% 100.0% Post 9 58 65 132 Reform 6.8% 43.9% 49.3% 100.0%

Resolution Pre 3 15 3 21 Reform 14.3% 71.4% 14.3% 100.0% Post 1 39 5 45 Reform 2.2% 86.7% 11.1% 100.0%

Test #1: Full list of ALL legislation proposed pre versus post reform, specifically,

RESOLUTIONS. Independent samples t-test of the weak Mayor pre-reform versus the

Hybrid Mayor post-reform.

47 RESOLUTIONS N Mayor’s Mean Mayor’s Number Pre-reform 338 12 % 41 Post-reform 433 6 % 26

Independent Samples T-Test – One-Tailed, Directional Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 39.755 1 770 .000

Results: .000 is LESS than the .05 confidence level and is therefore significant.

Equality of Variances is NOT assumed for the independent samples t-test.

N = 772

Df = 770 t-critical @ .01 = 2.326 t-Obtained = - 2.886

Results: Because the t-obtained is GREATER than the t-critical at the .01 level:

In this case the Hybrid Mayor is proposing FEWER resolutions than the Weak Mayor.

The result of this test contradicts the proposed hypothesis that the Hybrid Mayor would be proposing more resolutions than the Weak Mayor. Stated differently, there has been a statistically significant change in the number of mayoral resolutions but in the opposite direction of the research hypothesis.

48 This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is positively directed significant difference between the two forms in terms of the total number of legislative resolutions submitted to the Council by the Mayor.

The Null hypothesis cannot be rejected, that there is no statistical difference between the two forms in terms of the total number of legislative resolutions submitted to the Council by the Mayor.

Test #2: Full list of ALL legislation proposed pre versus post reform, specifically,

ORDINANCES. Independent samples t-test of the Weak Mayor pre-reform versus the

Hybrid Mayor post-reform.

ORDINANCES N Mayor’s Mean Mayor’s Number Pre-reform 620 1 % 5 Post-reform 2073 3 % 67

Independent Samples T-Test– One-Tailed, Directional Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 45.238 1 2691 .000

Results: .000 is LESS than the .05 confidence level and is therefore significant.

Equality of Variances is NOT assumed for the independent samples t-test.

49 N = 2693

Df = 2691 t-critical @ .01 = 2.326 t-Obtained = 4.582

Results: Because the t-obtained is GREATER than the t-critical at the .01 level:

In this case the Hybrid Mayor is proposing more ordinances than the Weak Mayor. The results of this test support the proposed hypothesis that the mayor would be proposing more ordinances. It must be noted that the total number of ordinances proposed by the mayor is still so low that although the change in the mayor’s numbers do reach statistical significance, it remain comparatively small when contrasted with other sources of legislation totaling 97% post-reform.

This evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a positively directed significant difference between the two forms in terms of the total number of legislative ordinances submitted to the Council by the Mayor.

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of Null hypothesis that there is no statistical difference between the two forms in terms of the total number of legislative ordinances submitted to the Council by the Mayor.

The next two tests will look within the full list of all legislation proposed and specifically will isolate only the Issues of Conflict.

50 Test # 3: IOC – Issue of Conflict legislation proposed pre versus post reform, specifically

RESOLUTIONS. Independent samples t-test of the Weak Mayor pre-reform versus the

Hybrid Mayor post-reform.

RESOLUTIONS N Mayor’s Mean Mayor’s Number Pre-reform 21 14 % 2 Post-reform 45 2 % 9

Independent Samples T-Test– One-Tailed, Directional Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 16.866 1 64 .000

Results: .000 is LESS than the .05 confidence level and is therefore significant.

Equality of Variances is NOT assumed for the independent samples t-test.

N = 66

Df = 64 t-critical @ .05 = 2.326 t-Obtained = 1.483

Results: Because the t-obtained is LESS to the t-critical at the .05 level:

When compared to the Weak Mayor, in this case, it must be noted that although the

Hybrid Mayor is proposing a larger number of resolutions, he is proposing a lower percentage of IOC resolutions overall. This reveals that although he is producing more resolutions, there are fewer that have controversial votes.

51 This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is a positively directed significant difference between the two forms in terms of the total number of legislative IOC resolutions submitted to the Council by the Mayor.

The Null hypothesis cannot be rejected, that there is no statistical difference between the two forms in terms of the total number of legislative IOC resolutions submitted to the

Council by the Mayor.

Test # 4: IOC – Issue of Conflict legislation proposed pre versus post reform, specifically

ORDINANCES. Independent samples t-test of the Weak Mayor pre-reform versus the

Hybrid Mayor post-reform.

ORDINANCES N Mayor’s Mean Mayor’s Number Pre-reform 46 4 % 2 Post-reform 132 7 % 9

Independent Samples T-Test– One-Tailed, Directional Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 1.473 1 176 .226

Results: .226 is GREATER than the .05 confidence level and is therefore NOT significant. Equality of Variances is assumed for the independent samples t-test.

52 N = 178

Df = 176 t-critical @ .05 = 1.645 t-Obtained = .658

Results: Because the t-obtained is LESS than the t-critical at the .05 level:

Although the number and percentage has risen, the change in the number of IOC ordinances proposed by the mayor has not increased to a statistically significant level.

This contradicts the proposed hypothesis that the Hybrid Mayor would be proposing more ordinances than the Weak Mayor.

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is a positively directed significant difference between the two forms in terms of the total number of legislative IOC ordinances submitted to the Council by the Mayor.

The Null hypothesis cannot be rejected, that there is no statistical difference between the two forms in terms of the total number of legislative IOC ordinances submitted to the

Council by the Mayor.

Hypothesis #2, Party Unity

Null Research Hypothesis: There is no statistical difference between the two forms of government in terms of the total number of instances in which members of a given political party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before

Council.

Cincinnati City Council Party Unity on Issues of Conflict Dec. 1999 – Nov. 2005 Pre-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform PARTY LEG CYC 1 LEG CYC 2 LEG CYC 3 Average 2 & 3 DEMOCRAT 67 % 39 % 59 % 49 % REPUBLICAN 58 % 76 % 81 % 79 % CHARTER* N/A* N/A* 43 %* 43 %* * The Charter Party’s unity was not compared pre/post reform as there was only one member of the party on Council in legislative cycles one and two making unity with oneself a rather easy thing to achieve. In cycle three there were two Charterite members on Council and it is recorded here as an item of general interest.

Test #1: Republican Party Unity – This test will analyze Republican Party unity between two time periods. First is Legislative Cycle 1, which was the weak-mayor pre-reform period, versus the Combined Cycles 2 and 3, which was the Hybrid Mayor post-reform period.

Legislative Cycle 1 (pre-reform) vs. Combined Legislative Cycles 2 and 3 (post-reform) Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 25.783 1 242 .000

Results: .000 is LESS than the .05 confidence level and is therefore significant.

Equality of Variances is NOT assumed for the independent samples t-test.

54 Independent Samples T-Test – One-Tailed, Directional

N = 244

Df = 242

t-critical @ .01 = 2.326

t-Obtained = 3.076

Results: Because the t-obtained is GREATER than the t-critical at the .01 level:

The results of this test support the research hypothesis that a strengthening of party unity

will occur. The Republican Party members of Council, although having decreased from

three members pre-reform to two members post-reform, have experienced a drastic

increase of unity to the level of 79 percent.14

This evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is

a positively directed significance between the two forms of government (two legislative

cycles) in terms of the total number of instances in which members of the Republican

Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before Council.

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is no

statistical difference between the two forms of government (two legislative cycles) in

14 The losing of a seat makes unity significantly easier to achieve. The Republican Party has three seats in cycle 1, two in cycle 2 and two in cycle 3. In a completely random, binomial environment, three people have a 25% chance of unity, either all for or against a proposal. With the drop to two people, this random likelihood rises to 50%. In the pre-reform cycle, Republicans were unified 58% of the time. This is 2.32 times their random value of 25%. If we were to predict that their unity should remain at least at the same level post-reform, we would expect a post-reform unity of 2.32 times a two person random value of 50%, or 116%. This is clearly not possible. The change in size of party membership plays a factor and in the post-reform environment. Unlike the Democratic Party, the Republicans do not achieve their pre-reform membership levels post-reform and further insight from a cycle 1 versus 3, independent samples t-test, is not appropriate.

55 terms of the total number of instances in which members of the Republican Party vote in

complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before Council.

Test #2: Republican Party Unity - This test will analyze Republican Party unity between two time periods. First is Legislative Cycle 1, which was the weak-mayor pre-reform period, versus the Legislative Cycle 2, which was the first Hybrid Mayor post-reform cycle.

Legislative Cycle 1 (pre-reform) vs. Legislative Cycle 2 (post-reform) Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 17.752 1 136 .000

Results: .000 is LESS than the .05 confidence level and is therefore significant.

Equality of Variances is NOT assumed for the independent samples t-test.

Independent Samples T-Test– One-Tailed, Directional

N = 138

Df = 136

t-critical @ .05 = 1.645

t-Obtained = 2.251

Results: Because the t-obtained is GREATER than the t-critical at the .05 level:

This test illustrates that the increase in Republican Party unity occurred with the change

between cycles one and two. This supports the research hypothesis that increased unity

56 would be witnessed with the reform. It must also be noted that the Republicans also lost a seat on Council and decreased to two members at this time making unity more achievable.

This evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a positively directed significant difference between the two forms of government (two legislative cycles) in terms of the total number of instances in which members of the

Republican Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before

Council.

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is no statistical difference between the two forms of government (two legislative cycles) in terms of the total number of instances in which members of the Republican Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before Council.

Test #3: Republican Party Unity - This test will analyze Republican Party unity between two time periods. First is Legislative Cycle 2, which was the first Hybrid Mayor post- reform period, versus the Legislative Cycle 3, which was the second Hybrid Mayor post- reform cycle.

Legislative Cycle 2 (post-reform) vs. Legislative Cycle 3 (post-reform) Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 2.559 1 175 .112

57 Results: .112 is GREATER than the .05 confidence level and is therefore NOT significant. Equality of Variances is assumed for the independent samples t-test.

Independent Samples T-Test– One-Tailed, Directional

N = 177

Df = 175 t-critical @ .05 = 2.326 t-Obtained = .811

Results: Because the t-obtained is LESS than the t-critical at the .05 level:

This test illustrates that Republican Party unity has leveled off in the post-reform environment at an impressive 79 percent average. Between Cycles two and three the

Republican Party maintained two seats on Council.

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is a positively directed significant difference between the two legislative cycles in terms of the total number of instances in which members of the Republican Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before Council. (Post-Reform cycles; no change in governmental form).

The Null hypothesis cannot be rejected, that there is no statistical difference between the two legislative cycles in terms of the total number of instances in which members of the

Republican Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before

Council. (Post-Reform cycles; no change in governmental form).

58 Test #4: Democratic Party Unity – This test will analyze Democratic Party unity between two time periods. First is Legislative Cycle 1, which was the weak-mayor pre-reform period, versus the Combined Cycles 2 and 3, which was the Hybrid Mayor post-reform period.

Legislative Cycle 1 (pre-reform) vs. Combined Cycles 2 and 3 (post-reform) Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 21.273 1 242 .000

Results: .000 is LESS than the .05 confidence level and is therefore significant.

Equality of Variances is NOT assumed for the independent samples t-test.

Independent Samples T-Test– One-Tailed, Directional

N = 244

Df = 242 t-critical @ .05 = 1.645 t-Obtained = -2.264

Results: Because the t-obtained is GREATER than the t-critical at the .05 level:

Although this test determines that there is a statistically significant difference, it is identifying that the change has moved towards less unity. Democratic Party unity plummets from 67 percent pre-reform to 49 percent post-reform. This directly contradicts the research hypothesis that there will be an increase in unity. Between these three legislative cycles the Democrats experienced a shift in the number of seats on Council. In

59 pre-reform cycle one they possessed five seats. They gained a sixth seat for cycle two and lost this seat for cycle three.15

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is a positively directed significant difference between the two forms of government (two legislative cycles) in terms of the total number of instances in which members of the

Democratic Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before

Council.

The Null hypothesis cannot be rejected, that there is no statistical difference between the two forms of government (two legislative cycles) in terms of the total number of instances in which members of the Democratic Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before Council.

Test #5: Democratic Party Unity - This test will analyze Democratic Party unity between two time periods. First is Legislative Cycle 1, which was the weak-mayor pre-reform period, versus the Legislative Cycle 2, which was the first Hybrid Mayor post-reform cycle.

15 Please see Footnotes 16 and 17 for a further explanation of the function of party size and party unity.

60 Legislative Cycle 1 (pre-reform) vs. Legislative Cycle 2 (post-reform) Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic .115 1 136 .115

Results: .115 is GREATER than the .05 confidence level and is therefore NOT significant. Equality of Variances is assumed for the independent samples t-test.

Independent Samples T-Test– One-Tailed, Directional

N = 138

Df = 136 t-critical @ .01 = 2.326 t-Obtained = -3.370

Results: Because the t-obtained is LESS than the t-critical at the .01 level:

Democratic Party unity plummets from 67 percent pre-reform to 39 percent post-reform.

This directly contradicts the research hypothesis that there will be an increase in unity.

The opposite occurred as a statistically significant decrease in unity occurs between these two cycles. This statistically significant change occurred in the opposite direction of the proposed research hypothesis. Between these two cycles the Democratic Party gained a

61 seat on Council making unity more difficult to achieve. 16

Democratic Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before

Council.

Test #6: Democratic Party Unity - This test will analyze Democratic Party unity between two time periods. First is Legislative Cycle 2, which was the first Hybrid Mayor post- reform period, versus the Legislative Cycle 3, which was the second Hybrid Mayor post- reform cycle.

16 Similar to the Republican Party loss of a seat, the gaining of a seat makes unity significantly harder to achieve. In a completely random, binomial environment, five people have a 6.24% chance of unity, either all for or against a proposal. With the rise to six people, this random likelihood drops to 3.12%. In the pre- reform cycle, Democrats were unified 67% of the time. This is 10.74 times their random value of 6.24%. If we were to predict that their unity should remain at least at the same level post-reform, we would expect a post-reform unity of 10.74 times a six person random value of 3.12%, or 33.51%. This is exactly what we see in cycle two with Democrats achieving 39% unity with six council members. Therefore, it can be reasonably argued that their decrease in unity in the first post-reform cycle was simply a function of the change in membership size. More importantly, as an absolute number, the party’s unity increases to 12.50 times their random value with six members. In order to further illustrate this point please see Test #7 of Democratic unity which compares cycles 1 versus 3, each having five Democratic members.

62 Legislative Cycle 2 (post-reform) vs. Legislative Cycle 3 (post-reform) Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic .091 1 175 .763

Results: .763 is GREATER than the .05 confidence level and is therefore NOT significant. Equality of Variances is assumed for the independent samples t-test.

Independent Samples T-Test– One-Tailed, Directional

N = 177

Df = 175 t-critical @ .01 = 2.326 t-Obtained = 2.646

Results: Because the t-obtained is GREATER than the t-critical at the .01 level:

This illustrates that the Democratic Party has experienced a recovery of unity to a significant degree. The party rises from 39 percent in cycle 2 to 59 percent in cycle 3.

Although they have not yet reached the level of unity they maintained pre-reform, if the trend can be continued they are potentially closing in on that level. Between these two cycles the Democratic Party lost a seat on Council making unity easier to achieve.

This evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a positively directed significant difference between the two legislative cycles in terms of the total number of instances in which members of the Democratic Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before Council. (Post-Reform cycles; no change in governmental form)

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is no statistical difference between the two legislative cycles in terms of the total number of instances in which members of the Democratic Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before Council. (Post-Reform cycles; no change in governmental form)

Test #7: Democratic Party Unity - This test will analyze Democratic Party unity between two time periods. First is Legislative Cycle 1, which was the weak-mayor pre-reform period, versus the Legislative Cycle 3, which was the second Hybrid Mayor post-reform cycle. The purpose of presenting this test is to address the question posed in Footnote 16, namely, what function did the change in party membership have on the Democratic

Party’s post-reform unity.

Legislative Cycle 1 (pre-reform) vs. Legislative Cycle 3 (post-reform) Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 4.478 1 173 .036

Results: .036 is LESS than the .05 confidence level and is therefore significant. Equality of Variances is NOT assumed for the independent samples t-test.

64 Independent Samples T-Test– One-Tailed, Directional

N = 173

Df = 171

t-critical @ .05 = 1.645

t-Obtained = 1.030

Results: Because the t-obtained is LESS than the t-critical;

The results of this test illustrate that when compared to the pre-reform, cycle 1,

Democrats do not experience a statistically significant decrease in party unity. Although

they do experience a decrease of 8 percentage points it is not a statistically significant

decrease. This contradicts the proposed research hypothesis that a statistically significant increase in party unity would occur post-reform.17

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is a

positively directed significant difference between the two forms of government (two

legislative cycles) in terms of the total number of instances in which members of the

Democratic Party vote in complete unison, either all for or all against a proposal before

Council.

17 The purpose of this test is to help reveal if the change in party size effected party unity for the Democrats. This comparison of 1 versus 3 is important in that in both of these cycles the party has five members on council. As noted in footnote #16, it is likely that the change in party size between cycles 1 and 2 resulted in the “lower” percentage of unity for cycle 2. In regards to this Test #7, although it is important to recognize that the Democrats do experience an 8-point drop, it is not a statistically significant change. This suggests that party unity remains relatively stable for the Democrats throughout all pre and post-reform cycles and that the function of membership change is a dominant factor. They did not, however, validate the proposed research hypothesis that a statistically significant increase in party unity would occur post-reform.

65 The Null hypothesis cannot be rejected, that there is no statistical difference between the

two forms of government (two legislative cycles) in terms of the total number of

instances in which members of the Democratic Party vote in complete unison, either all

for or all against a proposal before Council.

Hypothesis #3, Committee Chair Assignment

Null Research Hypothesis: There is no statistical difference between the two forms of

government in terms of the Mayor’s Democratic Party affiliation and the number of

committee chairmanships assigned to the three political parties.

Party Affiliation of Chairmanships 1 pre-reform assignment 1999 versus 2 post-reform 2001-2003 assignments.18 Democratic Republican Charterite Total Chairs Chairman Chairman Chairman Available Pre-Reform Cycle 1 4 1 0 5 % Chairs 80% 20% 0% % Council 55.6% 33.3% 11.1% Post-Reform Cycle 2 4 1 1 6 % Chairs 66.7% 16.7% 16.7% % Council 66.6% 22.2% 11.1% Post-Reform Cycle 3 5 0 1 6 % Chairs 83.3% 0% 16.7% % Council 55.5% 22.2% 22.2% Post-Reform Total 2,3 9 1 2 12

18 Because the data was easily available, tests were conducted on committee assignments dating back to 1991. This resulted in 5 pre-reform assignments versus 2 post-reform assignments. For purposes of uniformity with the six-year time frame of this dissertation that data is not presented here. Statistical testing was conducted with this data included and it did not change the results. Attachment #3 illustrates the additional data.

66 % Chairs 75% 8.3% 16.6% % Council 61.1% 22.2% 16.6% * The change in Charter Party Chairmanships must be understood as follows; In 2001,

Council created the Arts Committee and choose the sole Charterite to chair this

committee.

Test #1: One-Way ANOVA (analysis of variance) test ANOVA

Sum of Mean df F Sig. Squares Square Between .260 2 .130 .557 .585 Groups Within 3.269 14 .234 Groups Total 3.529 16

N = 17

Df Between Groups = 2

Df Within Groups = 14

F-critical @ .05 = 3.74

F-Obtained = .557

Result: Because the F-obtained is LESS than the F-critical at .05 level it is therefore NOT

significant. The results of this test illustrate that there is NOT a statistically significant

difference between the political parties and committee assignments pre versus post

reform.

Although neither of the changes reaches the level of statistical significance, it can be noted that the Republican Party lost its only chairmanship in the third cycle under

67 consideration. This chairmanship was on the relatively powerful Finance Committee and has since been filled with a Democratic Council member. This reduced the Republican’s to zero chairmanships. Secondly, the Charterite Party did gain a seat in the post-reform period and rose from zero pre to one post-reform chairmanship. Of particular note with this Charterite assignment is that it is the Arts and Culture Committee that is by no means a powerful committee to chair. What this test is a clear illustration of is the continued overwhelming dominance of chairmanships by the Democratic Party. It would be difficult to achieve any statistically significant increase in their dominance as it is currently controlling all but one.

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research Hypothesis that there is a positively directed, statistically significant difference between the two forms of government in terms of the Mayor’s Democratic Party affiliation and the number of committee chairmanships assigned to the Democratic Party. A negatively directed, statistically significant difference would consequently be expected for the opposition parties’ chairmanship assignments.

The Null Hypothesis cannot be rejected, that there is no statistical difference between the two forms of government in terms of the Mayor’s Democratic Party affiliation and the number of committee chairmanships assigned to the three political parties.

68 Hypothesis #4, Political Participation

Null Research Hypothesis: There is no statistical difference between the two forms of

government in terms of the political participation of the electorate. (Defined as: The percentage of registered voters that vote in city elections and the percentage of the city population over 18 that is registered to vote).

Six years (city elections) are considered for these tests, one pre-reform and two post-reform. This analysis was limited as US Census data of the city’s population over the age of 18. This data only exists for 1990, 2000 and 2004. Therefore, the 1990 Census data was used to determine the registration percentages for 1991 and 1993. The 2000

Census data was used to determine the registration percentages for 1999 and 2001.

Finally, the 2004 Census data was used to determine the registration percentages for 2003 and 2005.

Test #1: The change in the percentage of registered voters of the City of Cincinnati population over 18, pre versus post reform. Two Cycles Compared: Pre 1991, 1993, 1999 versus Post 2001, 2003, 2005.

Pre 1991 Pre 1993 Pre 1999 Post 2001 Post 2003 Post 2005 %City Pop 69% 69% 83% 88% 78% 85%

Levene Statistic to determine Equality of Variances, Pre versus Post reform.

Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 1.471 1 4 .292

69 Results: .292 is GREATER than the .05 confidence level and is therefore NOT significant. Equality of Variances is assumed for the independent samples t-test.

Independent Samples T-Test; One-Tailed Directional

N = 6

Df = 4 t-critical @ .05 = 2.132 t-Obtained = 1.809

Result: Because the t-obtained is LESS than the t-critical;

This test illustrates that there has been no statistically significant change in the percentage of Cincinnatians who are registered to vote. Although the percentage of registered voters has increased, this increase has not reached the level of statistical significance. The results of this test contradict the research hypothesis that a statistically significant increase would occur in the post-reform environment.

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is a positively directed significant difference between the two forms of government in terms of the political participation of the electorate.

The Null hypothesis cannot be rejected, that there is no statistical difference between the two forms of government in terms of the political participation of the electorate.

70 Test #2: The change in the percentage of registered voters casting ballots, pre versus post reform. Eight years (city elections) are considered for these tests, five pre-reform and three post-reform. Two cycles compared, Pre 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999 versus Post

2001, 2003, 2005.

Pre Pre Pre Pre Pre Post Post Post Election 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 % Casting 52.86 52.36 51.14 39.49 32.97 41.96 34.91 35.23

Levene Statistic to determine Equality of Variances, Pre versus Post reform.

Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 6.088 1 6 .049

Results: .049 is LESS than the .05 confidence level and is therefore significant.

Equality of Variances is NOT assumed for the independent samples t-test.

Independent Samples T-Test; One-Tailed Directional

N = 8

Df = 6

t-critical @ .05 = 1.943

t-Obtained = -1.808

71 Result: Because the t-obtained is LESS than the t-critical;

This test contradicts the proposed research hypothesis that a positively directed,

statistically significant rise would occur in the percentage of registered voters casting

ballots. The data illustrates that this percentage has been in decline since the 1991 high of

52.86, to the 2005 low of 35.23.

The Null hypothesis cannot be rejected, that there is no statistical difference between the two forms of government in terms of the political participation of the electorate.

Sub-Hypothesis of #4 Political Participation: Issue 4 Charter Reform Support:

An analysis of various Ward’s demographic characteristics in an effort to determine if there are any statistically significant relationships to a Ward’s percentage YES vote for

Issue 4.

The following describes how each of the Wards was classified for demographic characteristics. Following each of the classification descriptions below is the classification’s average turnout in the May 1999 election.

72 The classification of Wards for Majority Party Affiliation: 19

Majority Republican Wards: if over 66% or 2/3rds of voters in a given Ward requested

Republican ballots at the March 2000 Primary (Avg. 20.20% Turnout).

Majority Democratic Wards: if over 66% or 2/3rds of voters in a given Ward requested

Democratic ballots at the March 2000 Primary (Avg. 16.11% Turnout).

Swing Wards: if neither party achieved 66% or 2/3rds of voters requesting their ballots

at the March 2000 Primary (Avg. 16.08% Turnout).

The classification of Wards for Majority Race: 20

Majority White Wards: if over 66% or 2/3rds of a Ward is white. (Avg 19.17%

Turnout)

Majority Black Wards: if over 66% or 2/3rds of a Ward is black. (Avg 17.57%

Turnout)

Racially Mixed Wards: if neither race achieves 66% or 2/3rds. (Avg 15.46% Turnout)

19 Coding for Party Affiliation. Majority party affiliation was determined by referencing the March 2000 Primary Election. This was a partisan election primary that required voters to request their Party’s ballot. It must be understood that only 29% of registered voters took part in this primary election, but this is far above the 18% that participated in the May 1999 election upon which Issue 4 was voted. 20 In the 2000 US Census Cincinnatians of Latino/Hispanic origin over 18 account for only 3,086 or about 1% of the population. At this point Latinos do not account for a large enough portion of the population to justify a separate racial ward classification. At some future point this will likely change.

73 The classification of Wards for Level of Education:21

Less than Average: If a Ward had less than 20 percent bachelor’s educated residents.

(Avg 15.87% Turnout)

Average: If the Ward possessed between 20 – 29 percent bachelor’s educated residents.

(Avg 19.88% Turnout)

Higher than Average: If the Ward possesses 30 percent or greater bachelor’s educated residents. (Avg 14.00% Turnout)

21 It is understood that multiple methods could be employed to define a Ward’s level of education. In their 1999 article, Smith and Rademacker suggest that the most accurate measures of education are best determined with measures of standardized testing scores or an analysis of a state’s education expenditures. Clearly an analysis of the combined public school test scores within each ward was beyond the scope of this project but could be reasonably accomplished with future projects. On another note, with 26% of Cincinnatians having obtained their bachelors degree or higher, the vast majority of residents fall into the opposite category. In future research projects it would be reasonable to define level of education as the percentage of a Ward’s residents having graduated high school. This may offer a clearer demarcation amongst the remaining 74% of the non-bachelors educated population of the city. This High School Ward percentage is not currently within my datasets and, although time consuming, it would be gathered by compiling the percentages from the various census tracts that make each Ward percentage.

74 The classification of Wards for Wealth:22

Poor: Defined as a median family income of $24,999 and below. (Avg 13.33% Turnout)

Middle: Defined as a median family income of $25,000 - $49,999. (Avg 19.58%

Turnout)

Wealthy: Defined as a median family income of $50,000 and above. (Avg 22.00%

Turnout)

22 Any classification system of wealth or income class is difficult to undertake. Within political science, and particularly survey research, most classification methods involve the combination of multiple characteristics such as income, level of education, net worth and a measure of the perceived social status of respondent’s employment. Please see the article by Stonecash, et al., for further explanation of this history within political science. For the theoretical sociology discussions of class and the various socio-economic components, please see the work by Pakulski. In regards to a wealth classification for this dissertation, my first goal was to identify what the federal government has identified as the poverty level. The website of the US Department of Health and Human Services determines that in 2000 a family of four income of $17,050 is the federal poverty line. This number rises about $600 each year to account for inflation. In 2006, this number is exactly $20,000 for a family of four. Determining the poverty level (which is conversely the bottom threshold of the middle class) is relatively easy compared to determining the upper threshold of the “middle class.” Because of the politically charged nature of this determination very few attempt to do this. Political Science survey research typically relies upon respondent self-identification that avoids this unpleasant issue and potentially captures ideas of class-consciousness. Writing in the New York Times, Economics Professor Edward Wolfe from New York University utilized the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances by the Federal Reserve Board to determine a middle class upper threshold of approximately $60,000. It is clear that there is no uniform measure of class income. These two thresholds of 20 and 60 thousand are reasonably close to my chosen, Cincinnati specific, thresholds of 25 and 50 thousand. For further analysis of the distribution of the Wards based on Median Family Income and their relationship to the 25/50 thresholds, please see the box plot presented in Attachment #4.

75 1999 Ward Election Results for Issue 4 “Hybrid Mayor” Charter Reform

2000 U.S. Census Demographics by Wards calculated via combined Census Tracts 2000 Party Identification via March 2000 Presidential Primary Election College Voter Ward Name # Race Wealth Party Education Turnout Mix Middle Swing Average City Cincinnati 26 53 W / 18% $37,543 43 R / 57 D 27 % 43 B Mt. Middle Republican Washington/ 1 White Average 22% Class Ward California Madisonville/ Middle 2 Mix Swing Average 20% Oakley Class Middle Democratic Less than Evanston 3 Black 24% Class Ward Average Hyde Park Republican 4 White Wealthy Average 20% Ward Mount Lookout Republican 5 White Wealthy Average 24% Ward Over-the-Rhine Less than 6 Mix Poor Swing 11% Average Roselawn/ Bond Democratic Less than 7 Black Poor 25% Hill Combo Ward Average Mt. Adams/ Middle 8 Mix Swing Average 17% Walnut Hills Class Walnut Hills/ Democratic Less than 9 Black Poor 18% Avondale Ward Average Mount Auburn/ Democratic Higher than 10 Mix Poor 10% OTR Ward Average Mohawk/ Higher than 11 Mix Poor Swing 9% Clifton Heights Average University Heights/ 12 Mix Poor Swing Average 9% Corryville Avondale/ Democratic Less than 13 Black Poor 22% Paddock Hills Ward Average

Pleasant Ridge/ Middle Kennedy 14 Mix Swing Average 26% Class Heights Clifton/ Middle 15 Mix Swing Average 21% Northside Class Queensgate/ Democratic Less than 16 Black Poor 12% West End Ward Average Democratic Less than West End/ OTR 17 Black Poor 7% Ward Average Democratic Less than West End 18 Black Poor 15% Ward Average Sayler Park/ Middle Republican Less than Lower Price 19 White 16% Class Ward Average Hill Price Hill/ East Middle Less than 20 White Swing 14% Price Hill Class Average North/ South Less than 21 Mix Poor Swing 10% Fairmount Average Camp Democratic Less than 22 Mix Poor 12% Washington Ward Average College Hill/ Middle Higher than Mt. Airy/ 23 Mix Swing 23% Class Average Northside Hartwell/ Middle Less than Carthage/ 24 Mix Swing 16% Class Average Winton Place West Price Hill/ Middle Republican Less than 25 White 19% Westwood Class Ward Average Middle Less than Westwood 26 Mix Swing 17% Class Average

77 Because this test of significance for Issue 4 always involves more than two

means, it is important to guard against the commission of a Type I Error: rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true. For each of the tests, a one-way ANOVA test is initially presented to determine if there is statistical significance. Once this has been determined, a Test of Homogeneity of Variances is presented which calculates the

Levene Statistic. If the Levene Statistic is NOT significant at the .05 level, then Equal

Variances are assumed. In this case the Post Hoc test Tukey HSD is most appropriate for three reasons; a control is not required, it provides confidence intervals, and is more powerful than available alternatives within equal variance testing. However, if the

Levene Statistic IS significant at the .05 level, then Equal Variances are NOT Assumed.

In this case the Post Hoc test Dunnett’s T3 as the sample sizes in groups are small.

Regardless if the initial ANOVA finds significance, these Post Hoc tests follow the

ANOVA and Levene to even further illustrate the specific relationships that may or may not exist between the variables. Finally, a Bivariate Correlation is presented to give insight into the potential explanatory power of each variable and percent yes for issue 4.

Variable #1: Party Affiliation and likelihood to Vote YES on Issue 4 Test #1: One-Way ANOVA (analysis of variance) test Ward Party N Mean YES Std. Deviation Affiliation Issue 4 Republican 5 70 % 6.1 Democratic 9 36 % 9.0 Swing 12 54 % 6.5

78 ANOVA Party Affiliation and Percent YES Issue 4 Sum of df Mean F Sig. Squares Square Between 4051.470 2 2025.735 36.700 .000 Groups Within 1269.543 23 55.198 Groups Total 5321.014 25

N = 26

Df Between Groups = 2

Df Within Groups = 23

F-critical @ .05 = 5.66 @ .01

F-Obtained = 36.7

Result: Because the F-obtained is GREATER than the F-critical at .01 level it is therefore significant. The results of this test illustrate that there is a statistically significant difference between the groups and their percent Yes on Issue 4.

A Levene statistic must now be generated to determine which Post Hoc test is most appropriate.

TEST #2: Test of Homogeneity of Variances: The Levene Statistic to determine equality of variances

Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic .660 2 23 .527

79 Results:

.527 is GREATER than the .05 confidence level and is therefore NOT significant.

Equality of Variances is Assumed and the Post Hoc test Tukey HSD will be run to determine what statistically significant relationships might exist between the groups.

TEST #3: Post Hoc Test: Tukey HSD to examine the statistical relationships between the groups.

Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: Percent YES Issue 4 Tukey HSD

Mean 95% Confidence Difference Std. Error Sig. Interval (I-J) (I) Majority (J) Majority Party Party Lower Bound Upper Bound Affiliation Affiliation Democratic Swing -18.7028 3.27610 .000* -26.9072 -10.4983 Democratic Republican -34.3044 4.14398 .000* -44.6824 -23.9265 Swing Democratic 18.7028 3.27610 .000* 10.4983 26.9072 Swing Republican -15.6017 3.95466 .002* -25.5055 -5.6979 Republican Democratic 34.3044 4.14398 .000* 23.9265 44.6824 Republican Swing 15.6017 3.95466 .002* 5.6979 25.5055 * The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

80 Results:

Majority Republican vs. Majority Democratic Wards: With a significance of .000, this clearly achieves our .01 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrate that there is a statistically significant difference between the majority

Republican and majority Democratic Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4.

Republican Wards voted YES 2 to 1 over the Democratic Wards. Therefore, this evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue

4. This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is

NOT a significant difference between the two groups.

Majority Republican vs. Majority Swing Wards: With a significance of .002, this clearly achieves our .01 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrate that there is was a statistically significant difference between the majority Republican and majority Swing Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4. Republican Wards voted YES at just over 1.5 to 1 over the Swing Wards. Therefore, this evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is NOT a significant difference between the two groups.

Majority Democratic vs. Majority Swing Wards: With a significance of .000, this clearly achieves our .01 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrate that there is was a statistically significant difference between the majority Democratic

81 and majority Swing Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4. Swing Wards voted YES at just over 1.5 to 1 over the Democratic Wards. Therefore, this evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is NOT a significant difference between the two groups.

Test #4: Bivariate Correlation

Majority Party Affiliation vs. % YES Issue 4

Coding of Variable for Bivariate comparison:

0 = democratic 1 = mix 2 = republican

Correlations Percent YES Majority Party

Issue 4 Affiliation Percent Pearson YES Issue 1 .871** Correlation 4 Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 N 27 26 Majority Pearson Party .871 1 Correlation Affiliation Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . N 26 26 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

82 Results:

Of the four variables tested, Major Party Affiliation is the most powerful variable. A

Ward’s Majority Party Affiliation explains 76% of its % YES Issue 4 vote. Republican

Wards voted YES, Democratic Wards voted NO, and Swing Wards split their vote with a slight YES percentage break.

Variable #2: Race and likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4

Test # 1: One-Way ANOVA (analysis of variance) test

Ward Majority N Mean YES Std. Deviation Racial Classification Issue 4 Majority White 6 69 % 6.3 Majority Black 7 35 % 9.7 Mixed White / Black 13 51 % 8.2

ANOVA Majority Race and Percent YES Issue 4 Sum of df Mean F Sig. Squares Square Between 3754.261 2 1877.131 27.556 .000 Groups Within 1566.753 23 68.120 Groups Total 5321.014 25

83 N = 26

Df Between Groups = 2

Df Within Groups = 23

F-critical @ .01 = 5.66

F-Obtained = 27.556

Results: The F-obtained is GREATER than F-critical at the .01 confidence level and is therefore significant. There is a statistically significant difference between the groups and their percent Yes on Issue 4.

A Levene statistic must now be generated to determine which Post Hoc test is most appropriate.

TEST #2: Test of Homogeneity of Variances:

The Levene Statistic to determine equality of variances

Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic .191 2 23 .827

Results:

.827 is GREATER than the .05 confidence level and is therefore NOT significant.

Equality of Variances is assumed and the Post Hoc test Tukey HSD will be run to determine what statistically significant relationships might exist between the groups.

84 TEST #3: Post Hoc Test: Tukey HSD to examine the statistical relationships between the groups.

Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: Percent YES Issue 4 Tukey HSD

Mean Std. 95% Confidence Sig. Difference (I-J) Error Interval (I) Majority (J) Majority Upper Racial Racial Lower Bound Bound Classification Classification Black Mix -16.8242 3.86928 .001* -26.5142 -7.1342 Black White -34.0524 4.59180 .000* -45.5518 -22.5530 Mix Black 16.8242 3.86928 .001* 7.1342 26.5142 Mix White -17.2282 4.07348 .001* -27.4296 -7.0268 White Black 34.0524 4.59180 .000* 22.5530 45.5518 White Mix 17.2282 4.07348 .001* 7.0268 27.4296 * The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

Results:

Majority White vs. Majority Black Wards: With a significance of .000, this clearly achieves our .01 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrate that there is was a statistically significant difference between the majority White and majority

Black Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4. White Wards voted YES 2 to 1 over the Black Wards. Therefore, This evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is NOT a significant difference between the two groups.

85 Mixed Wards vs. Majority Black Wards: With a significance of .001, this clearly achieves our .01 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrate that there is was a statistically significant difference between the majority Mix and majority Black

Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4. Mixed Wards voted YES over 1.5 to 1 over the Black Wards. Therefore, This evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is NOT a significant difference between the two groups.

Mixed Wards vs. Majority White Wards: With a significance of .001, this clearly achieves our .01 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrate that there is was not a statistically significant difference between the majority Mix and majority

White Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4. White Wards voted YES over

1.5 to 1 over the Mixed Wards. Therefore, this evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is NOT a significant difference between the two groups.

Test #4: Bivariate Correlation:

Majority Racial Classification vs. % YES Issue 4.

86 Coding of Variable for Bivariate comparison:

0 = Black 1= Mix 2 = White

Correlations Majority Percent YES Racial Issue 4 Classification Majority Pearson Racial 1 .840** Correlation Classification Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 N 26 26 Percent YES Pearson .840 1 Issue 4 Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . N 26 27 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Results:

Of the four variables tested, Majority Racial Classification was the second most powerful variable. A Ward’s Majority Racial Classification explains 71% of its % YES Issue 4 vote.

87 Test #5: Bivariate Correlations:

Majority Racial Classification vs. Majority Party Affiliation.

Correlations Majority Majority Party Racial Affiliation Classification Majority Pearson Racial 1 .899** Correlation Classification Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 N 26 26 Majority Party Pearson .899 1 Affiliation Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . N 26 26 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Results:

When explaining a Ward’s % YES Issue 4, both Majority Racial Classification and

Majority Party Affiliation explain quite a large amount. In order to more clearly understand these variables I have presented a correlation between the two. As this test illustrates, a Ward’s Racial Classification explains its Party Affiliation by upwards of

81%. If a Ward is Majority Black there is a 81% chance that it is also a Majority

Democratic Ward. If a Ward is Majority White there is a 81% chance that it is also a

Majority Republican Ward. Finally, if a Ward is Mixed there is a 81% chance that it is also a Swing Ward. Whites tend to be Republican, Blacks tend to be Democrats, and

Racially Mixed Wards result in a Swing Ward. In other words, a Ward’s Racial

Classification explains its Party Affiliation and vice versa. The two variables virtually go hand in hand and because Issue 4 ended up being a partisan vote, either party or race can easily explain a Ward’s % YES Issue 4.

88 Variable #3: Level of Education and likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4

According to the 2000 US Census, 26 percent of Cincinnatians have their bachelor’s degree. In order to determine what role level of education played in determining a voter’s likelihood to support the charter reform measure, the following educational scale was created.

Test #1: One-Way ANOVA (analysis of variance) test Ward N Mean YES Std. Deviation Issue 4 Higher Average 3 51 % 5.4 Average 8 60 % 11.7 Less than Average 15 46 % 15.2

ANOVA Level of Education and Percent YES Issue 4 Sum of df Mean F Sig. Squares Square Between 1061.928 2 530.964 2.867 .077 Groups Within 4259.086 23 185.178 Groups Total 5321.014 25

N = 26

Df Between Groups = 2

Df Within Groups = 23

F-critical @ .05 = 3.42

F-Obtained = 2.867

89 Results:

The F-obtained is LESS than the F-critical at the .05 confidence level and is therefore

NOT significant. There is NOT a statistically significant difference between the groups and their percent Yes on Issue 4.

A Levene statistic must now be generated to determine which Post Hoc test is most appropriate.

TEST #2: Test of Homogeneity of Variances:

The Levene Statistic to determine equality of variances

Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 3.992 2 23 .032

Results:

.032 is LESS than the .05 confidence level and is therefore significant.

Equality of Variances is NOT Assumed and the Post Hoc test Dunnett T3 will be run to determine what statistically significant relationships might exist between the groups.

90 TEST #3: Post Hoc Test:

Dennett T3 to examine the statistical relationships between the groups.

Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: Percent YES Issue 4 Dunnett T3

Mean 95% Confidence Difference (I- Std. Error Sig. Interval J) (I) (J) Education Upper Education Lower Bound Level Bound Level Less than Higher than -4.7533 5.00372 .722 -18.9317 9.4250 Average Average Less than Average -14.2658 5.71278 .064 -29.2302 .6985 Average Higher than Less than 4.7533 5.00372 .722 -9.4250 18.9317 Average Average Higher than Average -9.5125 5.18124 .259 -24.7848 5.7598 Average Less than Average 14.2658 5.71278 .064 -.6985 29.2302 Average Higher than Average 9.5125 5.18124 .259 -5.7598 24.7848 Average * No test achieved statistical significance at the .05 level.

Results:

Higher Educated Wards vs. Less Educated Wards: With a significance of .722, this clearly fails to achieve our .05 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrates that there was NOT statistically significant difference between the Higher

Educated and Less Educated Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4. Although

Higher Educated Wards did vote at a higher percentage when compared to Less Educated

Wards, it is not statistically significant at the .05 level. Therefore, this evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference

91 between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. The Null hypothesis

that there is NOT a significant difference between the two groups cannot be rejected.

Average Educated Wards vs. Less Educated Wards: With a significance of .064, this

clearly fails to achieve our .05 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis

illustrates that there was NOT a statistically significant difference between the Average

Educated and Less Educated Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4. Although

Average Wards did vote at a higher percentage YES, this is not enough of a difference to

be considered significant. Therefore, this evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. The Null hypothesis that there is NOT a significant difference between the two groups cannot be rejected.

Average Educated Wards vs. Higher Educated Wards: With a significance of .259, this clearly fails to achieve our .05 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrate that there was NOT a statistically significant difference between the Average

Educated and Higher Educated Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4.

Although Higher Wards did vote at a lower percentage YES, this is not enough of a difference to be considered significant. Therefore, this evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. The Null hypothesis that there is

NOT a significant difference between the two groups cannot be rejected.

92 Test #4: Bivariate Correlation:

Level of Education vs. % YES Issue 4.

Coding of Variable for Bivariate comparison:

0 = Less than average 1 = Average 2 = Higher than average

Correlations Percent YES Education Level Issue 4 Percent Pearson YES Issue 1 .444* Correlation 4 Sig. (2-tailed) . .023 N 27 26 Education Pearson .444 1 Level Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .023 . N 26 26 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Results:

Of the four variables tested, Level of Education is the least powerful. A Ward’s Level of

Education explains 19% of their % YES Issue 4 vote.

Variable #4: Median Family Income and likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4

For this variable three tests of significance were analyzed. Continuing with our independent samples t-test pattern for these variables, a three-part classification system was developed for determining a Wards “wealth classification.” The following system below was utilized. Secondly, it is clearly understood that median family income functions as an Interval-Ratio variable. Therefore, following the Bivariate Correlation of

93 Wealth Classification vs. % YES Issue 4, there will be a Bivariate Correlation of Median

Family Income (Interval-Ratio) vs. % YES Issue 4. This will help illustrate if we witness any greater explanatory power with the Interval-Ratio analysis.

Test #1: One-Way ANOVA (analysis of variance) test Ward N Mean YES Std. Deviation Issue 4 Poor 12 42 % 13.1 Middle 12 56 % 9.9 Wealthy 2 74 % 14.6

ANOVA Median Family Income Classification and Percent YES Issue 4 Sum of df Mean F Sig. Squares Square Between 2371.506 2 1185.753 9.246 .001* Groups Within 2949.507 23 128.239 Groups Total 5321.014 25

N = 26

Df Between Groups = 2

Df Within Groups = 23

F-critical @ .01 = 5.66

F-Obtained = 9.246

94 Results:

The F-obtained is GREATER than F-critical at the .01 confidence level and is therefore significant. There is a statistically significant difference between the groups and their percent Yes on Issue 4.

A Levene statistic must now be generated to determine which Post Hoc test is most appropriate.

TEST #2: Test of Homogeneity of Variances:

The Levene Statistic to determine equality of variances

Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic 1.595 2 23 .225

Results:

Since .225 is GREATER than the .05 confidence level and is therefore NOT significant.

Equality of Variances is Assumed and the Post Hoc test Tukey HSD will be run to determine what statistically significant relationships might exist between the groups.

95 TEST #3: Post Hoc Test:

Tukey HSD to examine the statistical relationships between the groups.

Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: Percent YES Issue 4 Tukey HSD

Mean 95% Confidence Difference Std. Error Sig. Interval (I-J) (I) Wealth (J) Wealth Upper Lower Bound Classification Classification Bound Poor Middle Class -14.0750 4.62312 .015* -25.6528 -2.4972 Poor Wealthy -32.3500 8.64907 .003* -54.0102 -10.6898 Middle Class Poor 14.0750 4.62312 .015* 2.4972 25.6528 Middle Class Wealthy -18.2750 8.64907 .109 -39.9352 3.3852 Wealthy Poor 32.3500 8.64907 .003* 10.6898 54.0102 Wealthy Middle Class 18.2750 8.64907 .109 -3.3852 39.9352 * The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

Results:

Wealthy Wards vs. Poor Wards: With a significance of .003, this clearly achieves our

.05 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrate that there was a statistically significant difference between the Wealthy and Poor Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4. Wealthy Wards voted 2 to 1 over the Poor Wards.

Therefore, this evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote

YES on Issue 4. This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is NOT a significant difference between the two groups.

96 Wealthy Wards vs. Middle Class Wards: With a significance of .109, this clearly fails

to achieve our .05 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrate that

there was NOT a statistically significant difference between the Wealthy and Middle

Class Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4. Although Wealthy Wards voted

YES at a higher percentage compared to Middle Class Wards, this difference was not

significant. Therefore, this evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research

hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. The Null hypothesis that there is NOT a significant difference between the two groups cannot be rejected.

Middle Class Wards vs. Poor Wards: With a significance of .015, this clearly achieves our .05 threshold for significance. The results of this analysis illustrate that there was a statistically significant difference between the Middle Class and Poor Wards and their percentage YES vote for Issue 4. Middle Class Wards voted YES at much higher rate when compared to Poor Wards. Therefore, this evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two groups and their likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. This evidence supports the

provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is NOT a significant difference

between the two groups.

97 Test #4: Bivariate Correlation

Wealth Classification vs. % YES Issue 4

Coding of Variable for Bivariate comparison:

0 = Poor 1 = Middle 2 = Wealthy

Correlations Percent YES Wealth

Issue 4 Classification Percent YES Pearson 1 .665** Issue 4 Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 N 27 26 Wealth Pearson .665 1 Classification Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . N 26 26 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Results:

Of the four variables tested, the Wealth Classification variable is the third most powerful.

A Ward’s Wealth Classification explains 44% of their % YES Issue 4 vote.

98 Test #5: Bivariate Correlation

Median Family Income (Interval-Ratio) vs. % YES Issue 4.

Correlations Percent YES Median Family

Issue 4 Income Percent YES Pearson 1 .624** Issue 4 Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) . .001 N 27 27 Median Pearson Family .624 1 Correlation Income Sig. (2-tailed) .001 . N 27 27 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Results:

When tested as an Interval-Ratio variable Median Family Income, it is statistically significant. When compared to the Wealth Classification System, its Bivariate

Correlation has dropped just slightly from .665 to .624. The test explains that the three- part classification system for MFI is functioning correctly, and is not overly blunt or inducing significant error as their correlations are so similar.

Hypothesis #5, Media Perception

Null Research Hypothesis: There is no statistical difference between the two forms of government in terms of the positive or negative media perception of Council and the

Mayor’s office.

Pre-Reform Media Ratings Out of 5 Strong Council 2.0 Weak Mayor 3.6 Combined Pre Leadership 2.9

Post-Reform Out of 5 Hybrid Mayor 2.6

*The post-reform weak Council is not presented in this analysis as discussion of the

Council was virtually absent from the post-reform environment. This must be understood correctly as a condition of the article selection process was that the article’s content must have some relation to the Hybrid Mayor. In all articles in which the Hybrid Mayor was discussed, Council always took a distant back seat in the discussion. In the post-reform environment (up to November 2005) Council performance is always directly linked to the

Hybrid Mayor’s performance or as a function of it. All articles were therefore categorized as the Hybrid Mayor.

The data for tests of Media Perception compares interval level data (newspaper rankings) and nominal level data (pre/post reform). For the following tests, two-tailed non- directional independent samples t-tests were used to determine statistical significance at the 95% or .05 level of confidence.

100 TEST #1: Post-Reform Hybrid Mayor vs. Pre-Reform Weak Mayor

Independent Samples T-Test – Two-Tailed, Non-Directional

Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic .470 1 53 .496

Results: .496 is GREATER than the .05 confidence level and is therefore NOT significant. Equality of Variances is assumed for the independent samples t-test.

N = 53

Df = 52 t-critical @ .05 = -2.000 t-Obtained = -2.237

Results: Because the t-obtained is negatively GREATER than the t-critical value at the

.05 level:

This evidence supports the provisional acceptance of the Research hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the two forms of government in terms of the positive or negative media perception of the Mayor’s office.

This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Null hypothesis that there is no statistical difference between the two forms of government in terms of the positive or negative media perception of the Mayor’s office.

101 The results of this analysis support the research hypothesis that there would be a

statistically significant difference between the media’s rating of the Hybrid Mayor

compared to the former Weak Mayor. In this case the Hybrid Mayor is receiving a

significantly lower media rating than the pre-reform Weak Mayor. This is likely due to

the perception that the Hybrid Mayor has increased accountability and higher

expectations of performance. As a result of this, the Hybrid Mayor now receives the brunt of the scrutiny.

TEST #2: Post-Reform Hybrid Mayor vs. Pre-Reform Strong Council

Independent Samples T-Test – Two-Tailed, Non-Directional

Levene Df1 Df2 Sig. Statistic .106 1 48 .747

Results: .747 is GREATER than the .05 confidence level and is therefore NOT

significant. Equality of Variances is assumed for the independent samples t-test.

N = 50

Df = 48

t-critical @ .05 = 2.021

t-Obtained = 1.631

Results: Because the t-obtained is LESS than the t-critical value at the .05 level:

102 This evidence supports the provisional rejection of the Research hypothesis that there is a

significant difference between the two forms of government in terms of the positive or

negative media perception of Council and the Mayor’s office.

The Null hypothesis office cannot be rejected, that there is no statistical difference

between the two forms of government in terms of the positive or negative media

perception of Council and the Mayor’s.

The results of this analysis contradict the research hypothesis that there would be a

statistically significant difference between the media’s rating of the Hybrid Mayor when

compared to the former Strong Council government. Although the Hybrid Mayor does

receive a higher average ranking of 2.6, over the Strong Council’s 2.0, this is not enough

of a rise to reach statistical significance.

Conclusions: Judging Luken’s Term as Cincinnati’s First Hybrid Mayor.

“The [hybrid] system, bluntly, stinks.” – Mayor Charlie Luken, Cincinnati Enquirer, 2/3/2005.

Mayor Charlie Luken finished out his term as Cincinnati’s first Hybrid Mayor on

December 1st, 2005. Luken now holds the distinction of being the city’s longest serving mayor and has governed as both the Weak and Hybrid Mayor. Despite this record of success, Luken bowed out of the race for re-election a full sixteen months early. His announcement not to seek another term was not particularly shocking as his tenure as the

Hybrid Mayor was plagued with mediocrity. The Cincinnati Business Courier conducted

103 their 2003 non-scientific “business sentiment survey” and declared that 54% of their

respondents disapproved of Luken’s performance on the job. Within this survey,

complaints ranged from “a general lack of vision to integrate corporate, political and

community interests”, to a lack of a guiding coalition that communicates a cohesive

message (Cincinnati Business Courier, 8/22/03). Although this survey is not conducted in

a scientific manner, it cannot be discounted or ignored as the Cincinnati Business Courier

has substantial readership from amongst Cincinnati’s corporate and business community.

During the interview with the Cincinnati Business Courier and throughout his term,

Luken challenged the validity of these numbers and quoted his own polling numbers that

showed an approval rating in the mid-60 percent range (Cincinnati Enquirer, 8/7/04).

Luken’s optimistic polling numbers never convinced the newspaper columnists who

consistently referred to him as “confused” and “apathetic.” The main theme emanating

from his office in the last twelve months was the complaint that Cincinnatians were

locked in a glass-half-empty mindset of constant whining and complaining (CityBeat,

3/8/06).

The Mayor never hid the fact that he blamed the Hybrid Mayor structure for many of his perceived failures. After announcing his withdrawal from the race, he told the

Cincinnati Post “The [hybrid] system, bluntly, stinks.” He cited the “bad government structure” as the single greatest reason the he was not seeking re-election. He argued that it is a system that seeks to keep the mayor accountable but does not give him the necessary powers to effect crucial areas of city services. He suggested that the hybrid system only gave him the power to begin the process to hire or fire the City Manager, appoint committee chairs and review the budget “I will not seek election to the office so

104 long as the system does not allow the mayor to be the real boss—the person who hires and fires department heads, and is permitted to bring in his or her own team—top to bottom. We need to change this system in the next couple of years” (Cincinnati Post,

2/3/05). The only solution for Luken is the adoption of an Adapted Strong Mayor Model as illustrated in Chicago or New York. He declared that Cincinnatians need to make the decision that the city is either going to grow up and act like a large urban municipality, or stagnate under the Hybrid Model. Only by demoting the City Manager to the status of city administrator and allowing the mayor to act as the CEO can true change occur.

(Cincinnati Post, 2/3/05). Luken added that we must “Make the mayor really strong, pay the Council members less, put them in districts so they don’t have this quasi-City

Manager power that they currently have in Cincinnati” (Cincinnati Gentlemen,

Nov/Dec/05).

Luken’s call for continued reform of the city charter has received traction from reform activists but has not received the same from the public at-large. As of February

2004, polling numbers suggest that as little as 24% of Cincinnatians support a move to both the traditional Strong Mayor Model and district representation for Council members

(Cincinnati Enquirer, 2/20/04). When asked if they would support a Strong Mayor reform alone, 59% of respondents say “No” (CityBeat, 6/23/04).

At of the end of Luken’s term there was a sense of discontent with the results of the Hybrid reform. Perhaps if this well of discontent festers long enough these reform numbers could change. In the poll cited above, 65% of the respondents declared that they felt the city was falling behind other cities (Cincinnati Enquirer, 2/20/04). Another poll cited by the Cincinnati Post showed that the public, “by a 57-38 percent margin, agrees

105 that the city’s current system of government is ineffective. Similarly, another poll question found that Cincinnatians, by a 49-43 percent margin, cannot believe that the current system provides effective leadership to address the city’s problems” (Cincinnati

Post, 1/31/04).

The arguments presented for continued reform are eerily similar to the calls for the hybrid reforms. “ ‘There’s a feeling that right now, authority at City Hall is so diffuse that it seems like everybody is in charge, so nobody is really in charge,’ said local labor leader John Marrone, a member of the election reform panel. ‘There needs to be a single individual, who people can look to for responsibility and accountability.’” Jeff Berding, a member of the 1995 Strong Mayor movement, the 1999 Hybrid Mayor reform, and current City Council member stated that, “There’s a feeling that having the city manger report to both the mayor and the City Council isn’t working” (Cincinnati Post, 1/31/04).

Luken echoed this argument that, “People expect accountability from their elected leadership. They don’t accept answers like, ‘Well, that’s the City Manager’s decision.’”

(CityBeat, 6/23/04).

Despite these calls for continued reform of the mayor’s powers from several activists and politicians, the political will is simply not there amongst the electorate. The focus of more recent reform efforts has been upon changing the way Council elections operate. Echoing Luken’s calls for removing the quasi-City Manager role of at-large

Council members, reformers have advocated district elections (Cincinnati Enquirer,

11/4/03). Arguments for the district Model are primarily for placing the central focus of

Council members within their specific district. It is hoped that this smaller geographic accountability will remove the at-large, citywide oversight that is often exercised when

106 criticizing or micro-managing the city administration. Districts also provide the secondary goal of achieving Council membership from a wider variety of Cincinnati neighborhoods. Because of the residency requirement of district elections, it was suggested that this reform would change the long tradition of Council members residing in a handful of primarily white, relatively wealthy neighborhoods. Potentially this requirement would encourage non-traditional candidates to compete for Council seats and would result in a more ethnically and economically diverse Council.

This diversity goal was also seen within the recent movement to bring back the proportional representation system that was replaced by the 9X system. With these options in place, the electorate has remained quite evenly split and unlikely to support any change of the current system. “A poll of Cincinnati voters by Public Opinion

Strategies, which has polled Cincinnatians since 1996, indicated less support for districts than the current at-large system. While 20 percent of voters polled said they’d prefer the district system, 19 percent preferred proportional representation, 23 percent leaned toward a mixed at-large and district system and 33 percent favored retaining the at-large election of council” (CityBeat, 6/16/04). For now it appears that Cincinnati voters are content to retain the current Hybrid Model with at-large elections for an indefinite period of time.

With Hybrid institutional arrangements being only four years old it is fair to say reformists are prematurely saturating the market with ideas. More time is simply needed to observe the maturation of potential effects and unintended consequences this hybrid reform may have. Beyond anecdotal evidence and generalized goals of greater diversity, none of the current advocacy groups offer any hard data supporting the consequences of

107 their intended goals. Within the confines of the five variables tested, this dissertation illustrates the wholesale lack of change that has occurred in the post-reform environment.

This data can be combined with future research from the current mayor to help illustrate if there is a need for further consolidation of power.

The move to an Adapted Strong Mayor Model of municipal governance as expressed by former Mayor Luken is the likely next step in the process. Clearly, the limited impact the Hybrid reforms have had upon these five variables suggests that if change is desired, then more drastic shifts in the power structure are necessary. Although a Hybrid Model does exist within the paradigm established by Fredrickson, et al., this study suggests, and it is the opinion of this author, that the Hybrid Model represents an ineffective middle ground between the two preferred models, Adapted Strong Council and Adapted Strong Mayor. For larger cities with big budgets and big problems, the

Adapted Strong Mayor Model quite possibly provides the only degree of leadership and accountability that will act decisively enough to satisfy voters. In smaller cities with smaller budgets and relatively timid problems, the economic and political safety provided by the Adapted Strong Council Model is quite beneficial.

With the statistical analysis of these five hypotheses completed, it is clear that they do not reveal the broad sweeping impact that supporters envisioned. What follows is a discussion of the conclusions from each.

Summation of Hypothesis #1: Legislative Leadership Results Test #1 Full List Resolutions No, significant in opposite direction/ fewer proposals. Test #2 Full List Ordinances Yes, significant at .01, but only accounts for 3%. Test #3 IOC Resolutions No, no significant change. Test #4 IOC Ordinances No, no significant change.

108 The results of these independent samples t-tests solidly reject the research

hypothesis that there would be a statistically significant increase in the amount of

legislation proposed by the Hybrid Mayor post-reform. When looking at the results of

Test #1 Full List Resolutions, the Hybrid Mayor is proposing less at a statistically

significant level. With Test #3 IOC Resolutions, the Hybrid Mayor is producing a

numerically higher number of resolutions but this number still accounts for only 2

percent of IOC post-reform resolutions. This percentage is down from 14 percent pre-

reform and is not a statistically significant change. When looking at Test #2 Full List

Ordinances, the Hybrid Mayor does achieve a statistically significant rise in his numbers,

but still only amounts to 3 percent of all ordinances. In no way could this be interpreted

as a commanding percentage. Finally, when looking at Test #4 IOC Ordinances, the

Hybrid Mayor does not produce a statistically significant change in the post-reform

environment.23

Luken’s former position as the Weak Mayor, in which he acted as ‘first amongst equals,’ may have played a factor in his continuing rate of legislative proposals post-

reform. It is quite possible that as new mayors fill the posts, an across the board increase

in proposals may be witnessed as they lack the Weak Mayor experience. Luken’s continued production at pre-reform levels may just be an artifact of his former role and experiences.

The results of these tests illustrate that there has been little if any change in the number of mayoral legislative proposals pre versus post-reform. It can be reasoned that

23 It can be argued that in the post-reform environment the Hybrid Mayor can reduce the number of IOC resolutions and ordinances by eliminating pre-floor vote dissent via his elevated position and status. It is understood that this is possible but investigation of this is beyond the scope of this study. An analysis of this should be included in any future Qualitative case study research.

109 with the transition to a directly elected mayor, the role is now one of more generalized

Council leadership when it comes to legislative proposals. A sign of this transition is depicted with the debate over access to the Mayor’s yearly State of the City Address.

Starting in 1985, the then Weak-Mayor Luken began the tradition of giving a State of the

City Address. This speech was given before the Cincinnati Rotarians as they expressed an interest in hosting the event. With his election as a directly elected Mayor, he received considerable criticism from City Council for not addressing them directly. Democratic

Council Member Booth even went so far as to introduce legislation that requires future

addresses to be given directly to City Council. Luken said he’s agreed to give the speech

to City Council in 2003, but he had already committed to allow the Rotarians to host it

that year. “No one gave it much significance at that time, he said. ‘At that time, it was

kind of scoffed at,’ [Mayor] Luken said. ‘It was considered pretentious of me. But it’s

grown and evolved’” (Cincinnati Enquirer, 1/10/02). Clearly this move by Council

illustrates the perception that the Mayor now serves a function as a facilitator for

legislative goals and that the council looks to the position for a degree of direction and

leadership.

110 Summation of Variable #2, Party Unity Results:

Test #1 Republican Party Yes, significant at .01, the party jumps 21% in unity Pre vs. Post Combo with the reform, but loses one council seat. Test #2 Republican Party Yes, significant at .05, between cycles 1 and 2 the Cycles 1 vs. 2 party experienced a drastic 18 % increase in unity, but loses one council seat making unity easier. Test #3 Republican Party No, no significant change in unity between cycles 2 Cycles 2 vs. 3 and 3. Unity is at an impressive 79% average. Number of seats remains stable. Test #4 Democratic Party Yes, significant at .05, the post-reform environment Pre vs. Post Combo has brought about significantly less party unity, fluctuation in seats from 5 to 6 to 5. Test #5 Democratic Party Yes, significant at .01, but a drastic loss of unity Cycles 1 vs. 2 which occurs at the same time as reform, but gained a seat making unity harder to achieve. Test #6 Democratic Party Yes, significant at .01, a recovery of party unity but Cycles 2 vs. 3 still remains below pre-reform level, but lost a seat making unity easier to achieve.

The results of this variable offer the most support for the expectations of this charter reform. As suggested by UC Emeritus Professor and Cincinnati historian Zane

Miller, one goal of the reform measures was to achieve increased party discipline. The

Republicans, acting in the capacity of minority, opposition party, have experienced extreme increases in unity. In the post-reform environment, Republican unity is riding at an impressive 79%. It is unknown if their unity even could rise any higher as there would be diminishing returns with even more increased unity. On the other side of the aisle, the

Democrats have experienced the opposite. After suffering a drastic collapse in the first

111 cycle of post-reform unity, the party has climbed back to near pre-reform levels.24 As the majority party they have yet to achieve the levels possessed pre-reform but with the most recent cycle 3 they came within 9 percent of this level. It can be reasoned that this loss of unity could be due to the shock of having one of their own, “first among equals,” become their directly elected leader. The first cycle could be interpreted as a breaking in period of adjustment to the new power structure within the party. It is also understood that they did gain a seat in this first post-reform cycle making unity harder to achieve. Potentially, if this recovery continues, unity could rise above pre-reform levels. If this occurred the research hypothesis would be validated. At this point, however, the tests of Democratic

Party unity soundly reject the proposed research hypothesis that an increase in unity would occur with the charter reform. The clearest test of this unity measure will occur with the election of either a Republican or Charterite mayor that would place the

Democrats in the opposition party status.

Beyond the realm of this specific variable, there are several signs that the political parties are making administrative attempts at increased party unification. In the summer following the May 1999 adoption of Issue 4, the Democratic Party established a party platform and required its candidates to sign a loyalty pledge to work together in unity.

Hamilton County Democratic Party Chairman Tim Burke, citing a “notorious lack of political discipline among its elected officials,” stated that this pledge and platform were given in exchange for financial support and the Party’s formal endorsement (Cincinnati

24 As described in footnotes 15, 16 and 17, the change in the size of the Democratic Party’s membership is a potential explanation for the fluctuations in their Party’s unity. With membership size taken into account, it suggests that the Party, at best, succeeded at maintaining their pre-reform levels of unity. They did not, however, validate the proposed research hypothesis that a statistically significant increase in party unity would occur post-reform.

112 Enquirer, 10/18/99). “Local Democrats hope to shore up the party and get better organized before a new system calling for the direct election of the mayor takes effect in

2001.” (Cincinnati Post, 5/28/99) Although they did not establish an official party platform, the Republican Party has begun exerting greater control over their candidates as well. Hamilton County GOP Chairman Michael Barrett, who introduced their 2003 council slate, stated, “I’m really proud of the Republican party this time. They’re not just letting candidates do things on their own. We’re really working as a team.” “They’ll each receive $10,000 from the party and help in organizing campaigns and raising additional money” (Cincinnati Business Courier, 4/28/03). The administrative attempt of increased party unification is therefore present post-reform and, in the case of Democrats, it is the direct result of the adoption of the Hybrid Model.

Summation of Variable #3: Committee Chair Assignments Results

Test #1 Democratic Party No significant change, stable. Test #2 Republican Party No significant change, although decrease percentage. Test #3 Charter Party No significant change, but increased percentage.

The results of these tests contradict the research hypothesis. The hypothesis reasoned that with the adoption of a directly elected mayor, a partisan rewards system would develop. The mayor’s party on council would be rewarded with a statistically significant increase in committee chairmanships. Despite the fact that post-reform the

Republicans lost a seat and the Charterites gained one, it is important to recognize that the Democratic Party has persisted in its overwhelming domination of chairmanships.

The party is currently holding a commanding 75 percent of all positions available, or 9 of

113 12 seats, post-reform. Short of a completed sweep of all chairmanships, it is going to be

difficult to achieve a statistically significant change25. The true test of this variable will

come with the election of either a Republican or a Charterite as a Hybrid Mayor.

The Cincinnati Herald determined that in regards to his first chair nominations post-reform, Luken’s choices were determined with an apolitical tilt. “…the committee heads chosen reflect those individuals who will not be term-limited within the next four years.” (Cincinnati Herald, 11/01) While true, this apolitical decision making is not reported to have occurred with the second post-reform cycle nominations. These nominations occurred a year before his potential future campaign for reelection and his decision making appears to have been effected by a degree of political gamesmanship.

“Now [in the second post-reform cycle], Luken is carefully mulling whom he will appoint as vice mayor and as chairs of powerful Council committees that control proposed legislation, with an eye toward blocking one of his likely rivals for the mayor’s office. That means the clout of Republican Pat DeWine may diminish in the next council and leaves the roles of Democrats David Pepper and Alicia Reece in doubt.” (Cincinnati Post, 11/4/03, see also 11/11/03).

Clearly the degree of political gamesmanship involved in this decision making process is unknown and may effect the chair assignments greatly. With Cincinnati’s use of a non- partisan mayoral primary, the sitting mayor must be prepared to run against all potential

25 Because the data was easily available, tests were conducted on committee assignments dating back to 1991. This resulted in 5 pre-reform assignment cycles versus 2 post-reform assignment cycles. For purposes of uniformity, within the six-year time frame of this dissertation, that data is not presented here. Statistical testing was conducted with this data included, and it did not change the results. Attachment #3 illustrates the additional data.

114 rivals. If the city were to adopt a partisan mayoral primary this competition could be lessened.

Despite the potential effect of gamesmanship, who chairs the committees is clearly of importance to the mayor according to the Cincinnati Enquirer.

“Luken said, ‘I don’t sit around thinking about which legislation goes to which committee.’ But this week, the mayor sent two recommendations of his Economic Development Task Force to the Finance Committee, even though they more properly belonged in the Community Development Committee. ‘I thought it would get a fair hearing in the Finance Committee.’ Luken said. ‘Fair as defined by me.’ ” (Cincinnati Enquirer, 5/7/03).

In this case both of the committee chairs were Democrats and Luken preferred one to the other, given this specific issue. Of particular note is that this finance committee was the only committee that retained Republican chairmanship up until the second post-reform cycle. At this time Luken stripped the Republicans of their only chairmanship and hand picked a Democrat to take their place.

Summation of Variable #4: Political Participation Results

Test #1 % of Cincinnatians No significant change, percentage continues to Registered to Vote rise and is currently at a high of 85%. Test #2 % of Registered Voters No significant change, percentage continues to Casting Ballots decline.

In each of these two independent samples t-tests the research hypothesis is contradicted. The Test #1 results determine that the city continues to maintain its impressive climb of registration. The percentage has been rising steadily over the past fifteen years and multiple explanations could exist for this trend. It is clear that in 2005

115 the percent registered is very high at 85 percent and it is unknown exactly how much higher it could be expected to rise. It is also understood that the registration of residents is not solely due to city elections, regardless how politically sexy a directly elected mayoralty can be. The contentious national presidential elections between either Bush versus Gore or Bush versus Kerry no doubt played significant roles in increased registration percentages. The state of Ohio was a central focus of both political parties and was a state of extreme importance leading up to the last presidential election between

Bush versus Kerry. Major efforts were implemented by both parties to not only register but to “get out the vote” on Election Day. It is unknown if the effects of these national elections could be controlled to any degree, if at all.

In regards to Test #2, the city continues to experience a decline in participation.

This is particularly perplexing when compared to the continued increase in registration. If anything, this helps illustrate that achieving a one-time registration of a voter is easier than motivating them to vote on Election Day. In the first post-reform election of 2001, an approximately 10 percent bump in participation did occur. This may have been the result of the first direct election of the mayor. It may also have been a temporary bump motivated by the 2001 race riots. Regardless of the cause, the decline continues and the city has nearly returned to its pre-reform low.

Beyond the variables tested for Political Participation is the change that has occurred with the perceived desirability of the mayor’s job. The quality and number of candidates have increased and they now campaign on platforms that focus on their ideas about what they can politically deliver for the city. In 2003, on the heels of having a very strong fellow Democrat announce his candidacy to challenge Luken for the 2005 post,

116 many were questioning if it was good for the Democratic Party to have two strong candidates competing for the same job. In effect, out of Party discipline, shouldn’t the challenger have deferred his candidacy until after Luken determined his lack of desire to run again? The Cincinnati Business Courier argues in an editorial, that the increase in the number of candidates proves that the job is worth having. “When Cincinnati’s mayor was just the top-vote-getter in the City Council race, nobody – especially fellow council members – gave the winner much respect.” The Editorial continues, by arguing that the

Hybrid Model permits the directly elected winner to emerge as a leader, “with some ability to guide and make changes, rather than a figurehead with other council members nipping at his or her heels” (Cincinnati Business Courier, 7/25/04). Although political participation levels by the electorate are low, the switch to a directly elected mayor has brought about a wider variety of qualified candidates. This increased candidate participation should benefit the city in the long run.

Summation of Variables and likelihood of YES for Issue 4

The following is a summation of the tests identifying the likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4. Majority Party Affiliation, Majority Racial Classification and to a degree

Wealth Classification were determined to rise to the level of statistical significance. It is important to note that at the .05 level of confidence, there is a 95 percent chance that the relationship does exist. It is important to note that on average only 18% of the registered electorate chose to show up at the polls and vote. Therefore this data could be, but not necessarily is, affected by the low turnout.

117 Variable #1: Party Affiliation and the likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4

There is a statistically significant difference between all three groups at the .05 level.

Variable # 2: Race and the likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4

There is a statistically significant difference between all three groups at the .05 level.

Variable# 3: Median Family Income and the likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4

There is a statistically significant difference between the following groups at the .05

level: Poor vs. Wealthy and Poor vs. Middle Class.

There is NOT a statistically significant difference between the Wealthy and the

Middle Class and their percentage YES on Issue 4.

Variable #4: Level of Education and the likelihood to vote YES on Issue 4

There is NOT a statistically significant difference between any of the groups at

the .05 level.

These tests indicate with a 95 to 99 percent confidence level that the Wards fall into three general categories regarding their likelihood to vote “Yes” on Issue 4. These three general categories are Yes, No, and Split. “Yes” Wards are characterized by one or more of the following characteristics: majority white, majority Republican, or a high median family income. “No” Wards are characterized by one or more of the following characteristics: majority black, majority Democratic, or a low median family income.

Finally, “Split” Wards are characterized by mixed race and/or swing Ward.

118 What these tests illustrate is that there are clear lines of demarcation that exist within the City of Cincinnati in regards to race, party identification and to a certain extent wealth. Shortly after the passage of Issue 4 the Cincinnati Post ran an headline titled

“Issue 4 Victory Credited to Big Republican Wards. Black Community Rallied

Opposition” (Cincinnati Post, 5/5/99). This statement was correct, but it doesn’t reveal enough of the story. The reality is that within the city’s system of Wards, the majority racial classification is directly correlated with its majority party identification. Majority black Wards are also majority Democratic Wards and majority white Wards are also majority Republican Wards. Finally, to a lesser degree, wealth is a factor in that majority

Poor Wards were much more likely to vote ‘No’ for the reform measure. The more correct newspaper headline for the results of Ward support of Issue 4 would be as follows: “Issue 4 Victory Credited to White Republican Wards. Black Democratic Wards and the Poor Voted Soundly No.”

Summation of Variable #5: Media Perception Results

Test #1 Hybrid vs. Weak Mayor Yes, significant change, Hybrid Mayor much more negative rating than Weak Mayor. Test #2 Hybrid vs. Strong No significant change, Hybrid Mayor a half point Council more positive than Strong Council. Test #3 Hybrid vs. Combo Govt. No significant change, Hybrid Mayor a half point more negative than combo government.

These independent sample t-tests offer a split support for the proposed research hypothesis that there would be a statistically significant change in the media rating of the post-reform Hybrid Mayor. In Test #1, the Hybrid Mayor significantly drops nearly a full

119 point when compared to the Weak Mayor post of the pre-reform period. The pre-reform rating of a slightly positive, rating 3.6 drops to a slightly negative rating of 2.6. Test #2 illustrates that the Hybrid Mayor is viewed more positively than the pre-reform Strong

Council, but that this does not reach the level of statistical significance. The Hybrid

Mayor’s slightly negative rating of 2.6 is better than the solidly negative rating of 2.0 given to the Strong Council.

When compared to the Weak Mayor the Hybrid Mayor experiences increased negativity. This is most likely due to the fact that the Hybrid Mayor is now seen as the person most directly responsible for the successes and failures of city government. The pre-reform Weak Mayor’s much higher rating is likely the result as the weak-mayor was viewed as the victim of a hostile and childish Strong Council. Now that the Hybrid

Mayor is permanently separated from council, the criticism is intensifying.

It can also be reasoned that when the Hybrid Mayor did not live up to the media’s expectations of leadership, they transferred their hostility from the Strong Council to the

Hybrid Mayor. This negative rating might be viewed as unfair as the expectations for leadership are disproportionate compared to the powers provided for leadership. If Mayor

Luken’s claims were correct, the expectations were too great given the modest powers provided. In order for a fairer appraisal, it would be most appropriate to test the media’s rating between a charter transfer between Adapted Strong Council to the Adapted Strong

Mayor Models. Further testing would greatly add to this hypothesis.

120 Implications for Future Research

When analyzing the effects of charter reform measures, much more work needs to be completed within the urban governance division that provides deep, city specific, empirical analysis. For the most part our discipline has relied upon either qualitative case studies or empirical studies that focus upon aggregated, national level analysis. Too often arguments for the difficulties in generalizability and the uniqueness of local political situations are permitted to dominate the direction of our research. This is particularly interesting in that the theories of potential charter reforms are virtually always presented to election reform panels as viable options for any city. The theories are presented in an abstract, non-city specific format. In essence, all five models of governance are presented as being able to be implemented in any given city for a desired result. But, critics argue, any given city is far too unique, with too many variables in play, to actually test to see if these theories had their intended impacts. With the continued production of works such as this, broader analysis on the measurable effects of reform can be achieved.

The first goal of future research would be to simply replicate this work and then expand the analysis. Not only would it be important to develop additional variables that I have not considered, it would be important to expand the era under consideration. On

December 1st, 2009, Cincinnati’s current mayor, Mark Mallory will complete his first term in office. At a minimum, these same five tests can then be compared in a 16-year pre/post analysis. This would not only capture 3 different weak/ Hybrid Mayoral governing styles, it would permit the position to mature to the extent that precedent can be set in regards to the extent of the Hybrid Mayor’s powers.

121 Another important aspect of testing Mallory’s governance is the opportunity to test the shift in governing styles. The research presented in this dissertation is unique in that the officeholder, Charlie Luken, was held constant, while the governmental forms changed. This permitted the testing of effects occurring as a result of the change in charter forms. An analysis of Luken’s term against Mallory’s term would be the opposite, holding the governmental form constant, while changing the officeholder. A test of this type would then illustrate to a significant degree the effects that occur with differing governing styles.

This future research is critical because it addresses a significant split in the urban governance literature, namely, what drives change, formal charter powers or the officeholder? In his 2003 dissertation, J.T. Spence suggests that a majority of elites believe that Luken significantly lacked fundamental leadership skills. Spence argues that

“What has been missing at Cincinnati city hall, say many elites, is a vision of the city’s future and the strong leadership to develop and implement policies necessary to make that vision a reality…”(Spence, p. 161). The illustration of significant change between these two mayors would also lend credence to leadership models such as the Facilitative

Leadership approach present by James Svara. In his model, Svara argues that an individual leader’s skills are essential in creating a clear vision for the city and positive interaction with municipal personnel and elected officials are essential in raising the level of performance. A Luken/ Mallory analysis would only further reveal support for these alternative hypotheses.

The second area for future research expansion would be to conduct these same tests upon data from another hybrid city as identified by Frederickson, et al. The

122 completion of similar work for another city would only further the debate over the

successful ability to generalize the testing of charter reform measures. With the exception

of one newspaper, virtually all of the raw empirical data used in this dissertation is

available via governmental and local websites. The City of Cincinnati provides 24/ 7, 365 day access to every council ordinance, resolution, vote and even individual council minutes that have occurred before the full council, dating back to the mid-nineties.

Virtually every newspaper offers online, searchable archives. The Hamilton County

Board of Elections provides full Excel format files of all election results for this time period as well. There is no longer a viable excuse of geographic distance to dismiss any city from consideration as a research topic.

Third, I believe that it is important to move beyond just the testing of the Hybrid

Model of municipal governance. Any reform measure, which moves a charter along the five-point spectrum of governance, should be tested for its intended consequences. Any municipality considering moving from a traditional Strong Council Model to an adapted form is in need of solid evidence supporting the effects of that modification. Without that evidence it is left relying upon theory and general social assumptions of how accountability and structure interact.

Finally, it would be unreasonable to declare that there is no need or benefit for qualitative case study research. Although well beyond the scope of this dissertation, the knowledge gained from the tests presented here would be further enhanced with a qualitative research study of like size and proportion. Provided they are willing to cooperate, interviews with former Mayors, Council members and City Managers could

123 provide answers to the potential impacts of individual decisions, leadership styles and gamesmanship.

124 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Besterman-Smalley, Victoria. The Governmental Development of Two North American Cities. Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A. and Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. A Comparative Study. Master of Arts Thesis, University of Cincinnati, 1969.

Cincinnati Business Courier Newspaper 8/22/03, May, Lucky. (staff reporter), “Mayor gets low approval in survey. ‘Lack of vision’ cited by some residents.”

8/25/03, Monk, Dan. (staff reporter), “GOP forwards nine names for council.”

7/23/04, Opinion Piece, “Add more ‘horses to Mayor’s race.”

Cincinnati Enquirer Newspaper 1/10/02, Korte, Greg. “Luken to speak on city’s state. Focus on jobs, cops, housing.”

5/7/03, Korte, Greg. “Committee system not getting the job done for City Council.”

2/20/04, Korte, Greg. “Sweep of City Hall advised. Elect Council by district, strengthen Mayor’s job.”

11/4/99, unknown. “Council: Some surprises in election.”

12/1/99, Wilkinson, Howard. “Democrats lay out council plan.”

8/7/04, Horstman, Barry. “Luken on Luken. Cincinnati’s longest-serving mayor makes his toughest call. ‘A standard’s been set’ for city’s mayors.”

125

11/4/03, Horstman, Barry. “Petition pushes district election.”

Cincinnati Gentlemen Magazine, Hoard, Greg. “Luken Uncensored. Charlie Luken speaks candidly about his tenure as mayor and the future of Cincinnati.” November/ December, 2005.

Cincinnati Herald Newspaper 11/01, Carter, Andria. “Luken chooses council’s committee heads.”

Cincinnati Post Newspaper 5/5/99, Moloney, Sharon. “Issue 4 victory credited to big Republican Wards. Black community rallied opposition.”

11/30/99, Osborne, Kevin. “Qualls’ legacy: ‘Governance, not politics’

5/5/99, Maloney, Sharon. “Issue 4 victory credited to big Republican wards.”

8/7/04, Horstman, Berry. “Standard’s been set’ for city’s Mayors.”

11/4/03, Osborne, Kevin. “Political Chess Game on Council. Luken Weighs post- election strategy.”

11/11/03, Osborne, Kevin. “Luken taps Democrats to chair city committees.”

11/4/03, Horstman, Berry. “Petition pushes district election.”

05/28/99, Osborne, Kevin. “Dems demand loyalty. Council candidates must sign oath.”

126 1/31/04, Horstman, Barry. “Strong Mayor: Round 2. Committee members leaning toward bolstering the office.”

2/3/05, Osborne, Kevin. “Luken: No new goals for city.”

2/4/05, Eigelbach, Kevin. “Mallory: Let Mayor run school.”

4/8/99, Moloney, Sharon. “Political Notebook. Law of unintended consequences II.”

6/12/99, Osborne, Kevin. “Heavy hitters backed Issue 4.”

CityBeat, Entertainment Weekly 6/16/04, Dunlap, Stephanie. “Splitting the Vote. Council districts: real reform or clever backlash?”

3/8/06, Fox, John. “Editorial: Fill ‘Er Up, Charlie.”

6/23/04, Dunlap, Stephanie. “Strong, Stronger, Strongest. City might change the Mayor’s role again.”

3/4/99, Fox, John. “The Politics of Politics. Citizen Groups, political leaders and city council members have debated six plans since 1995 for changing how Cincinnati elects its mayor; can’t we all just get along?” Volume 5, Issue 15.

4/29/99, Fox, John. “The Politics of Politics. Tuesday’s tiny little election offers compelling choices on Issue 4; can you spare a few minutes to help decide the future of our city?” Volume 5, Issue 23.

127 City of Cincinnati Website. www.rcc.org for council minutes post-1998. City archives were utilized for the acquisition of earlier dates.

Frederickson, H. George, Johnson, Gary A., and Wood, Curtis H. The Adapted City; Institutional Dynamics and Structural Change. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 2003.

George, Billy. “The Emergence of the Strong-Mayor, Council-Manager City: A Response to the Times.” Urban Resources, 2:a1-a2.

Hansell, Bill. “Is it Time to “Reform” the Reform?” International City/County Management Association (ICMA). Opinion Memo of the ICMA Executive Director. http://www.icma.org/go.cfm?cid=3&gid=13&sid=163&did=319.

Kaufman, Herbert. “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration.” The American Political Science Review, Volume 50, Issue 4 (Dec., 1956), 1057-1073.

Kotter, John P. & Lawrence, Paul R. Mayors in Action. Wiley Publishers, New York, 1974.

Lockard, Duane. “The City Manager, Administrative Theory and Political Power.” Political Science Quarterly, Volume 77, Issue 2 (Jun., 1962), 224-236.

Miller, Zane. Boss Cox’s Cincinnati. Urban Politics in the Progressive Era. Oxford University Press, New York, 1958.

Miller, Zane and Tucker, Bruce. Changing Plans For American’s Inner Cities; Cincinnati’s Over-the-Rhine and Twentieth-Century Urbanism. The Ohio State University Press, 1998.

128 Morgan, David & Watson, Sheilah. “Policy Leadership in Council-Manager Cities. Comparing Mayor and Manager.” 68-83. Contributing Chapter from Frederickson, H. George. 1995. Ideal & Practice in Council-Manager Government. Second Edition. ICMA Publishing, Washington, D.C.

National Civic League. “Model City Charter Revision Project – Eighth Edition. Option Memo.” http://www.ncl.org/npp/charter/memos/Mayorelection.html

Patton, Clifford W. The Battle for Municipal Reform. Mobilization and Attack, 1875-1900. Greenwood Press, Publishers, Westport, Conn. 1981.

Protasel, Greg. “Leadership in Council-Manager Cities. The Institutional Implications.” 20-28. Contributing Chapter from Frederickson, H. George. 1995. Ideal & Practice in Council-Manager Government. Second Edition. ICMA Publishing, Washington, D.C.

Protasel, Greg. “Abandonments of the Council-Manager Plan. An Institutionalist Perspective.” 199-209. Contributing Chapter from Frederickson, H. George. 1995. Ideal & Practice in Council-Manager Government. Second Edition. ICMA Publishing, Washington, D.C.

Pakulski, Jan, “Foundations of post-class analysis.” Article within the compilation of works by Wright, Erik Olin (editor), Approaches to Class Analysis. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005.

Schacht, Steven and Steward, Brad. Social Statistics: A User-Friendly Approach. Allyn & Bacon, A Simon & Schuster Company, Needham Heights, Mass., 1995.

Smith, Kevin B. and J. Scott Rademacker, “Expensive Lessons: Education and the Political Economy of the American State.” Political Research Quarterly,

129 Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp. 709-727

Sparrow, Glen. “The Emerging Chief Executive: The San Diego Experience.” Urban Resources, 2:3-8.

Spence, J.T. “Council-Manager Government in Transition. The Change to the ‘Stronger Mayor’ in Cincinnati.” Dissertation from the University of Cincinnati, 2003.

Stonecash, Jeffery M.; Mark D. Brewer; R. Eric Petersen; Mary P. McGuire; Lori Beth Way, “Class and Party: Secular Realignment and the Survival of Democrats outside the South.” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Dec., 2000), pp. 731-752.

Svara, James. Facilitative leadership in local government : lessons from successful mayors and chairpersons. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Fransisco, CA, 1994.

United States Department of Health and Human Services. Website for Poverty Guidelines; http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/99poverty.htm

University of Kentucky Computing Center’s website for advanced statistical techniques. Titled “Pairwise Comparisons in SAS and SPSS.” 4.1 http://www.uky.edu/ComputingCenter/SSTARS/MultipleComparisons_3. htm.

Wolfe, Edward. New York Times, Online Edition, “Class Matters. Social Class in the United States. A Special Section.” http://www.nytimes.com/pages/national/class/index.html

130 ATTACHMENT #1: Newspaper Article Codebook and Positive/ Negative Article Ranking System

Directions: In order to classify and rank each of the following newspaper articles, please utilize the provided codebook titled Newspaper Article Codebook and the Positive/ Negative Article Ranking System. (Page 132 of this dissertation). For each of the articles given, you are asked to classify and rank each article individually. Please complete the classification and ranking of each article completely before you proceed to the next article.

Article Classification: Please read your first article in its entirety. Once completed, please identify which central issue the article focuses upon by referencing the PART 1: Newspaper Article Codebook. After you have identified the central issue, please write the corresponding classification number on the top of the article.

Article Ranking: After you have determined the article’s central issue, please determine its rating by utilizing the PART 2: Positive/ Negative Article Ranking System. Specifically, you are asked to determine how the newspaper presented the central issue of the article. Once you have determined its rating, please write this corresponding number at the top of the article.

Please repeat this two-step process for each article. Thank you very much for your help.

131 PART 1: Newspaper Article Code Book Charter Power Debates 1.1 Power Clarification 1.2 Future Power Enhancement 1.3 Reform Consequences 1.4 Expectations of Reform

Post-Reform Hybrid Mayor Leadership 2.1 Mayor’s Council Leadership (agenda/vision, cooperation/effectiveness) 2.2 Mayor’s Legislative Leadership (specific legislation, vetoes, coalition building)

Pre-Reform Strong Council Leadership 3.1 Strong Council’s Leadership (agenda/vision, cooperation/effectiveness) 3.2 Weak Mayor’s Leadership (agenda/vision, cooperation/effectiveness)

PART 2: Positive/ Negative Article Ranking System 1. Very Negative 2. Somewhat Negative 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat Positive 5. Very Positive

132 ATTACHMENT #2: Issues of Conflict (IOC) in Six-Year Period Item Classification Category IOC Weak Mayor Hybrid Mayor Total Votes Pre-Reform Post-Reform Pre/Post Resolution Support 13 21 34 19.4% 11.9% 13.9% Resolution Oppose 2 17 19 3.0% 9.6% 7.8% Amend Budges/Reports 4 10 14 6.0% 5.6% 5.7% Waive Residency 1 1 2 1.5% .6% .8% Rule Changes 5 24 29 7.5% 13.6% 11.9% Report Requests From 3rd Parties 1 4 5 1.5% 2.3% 2.0% Rezoning Issues 0 4 4 0.0% 2.3% 1.6% Street Issues 2 0 2 3.0% 0.0% .8% Contractor Payments 1 2 3 1.5% 1.1% 1.2% Property/ Community Development 17 40 57 25.4% 22.6% 23.4% Corporate Enticements 1 17 18 1.5% 9.6% 7.4% Capital Investment 2 9 11 3.0% 5.1% 4.5% Apply/Accept Grants/Gifts 0 2 2 0.0% 1.1% .8% Call for funding continue services 4 4 8 6.0% 2.3% 3.3% Funding Transfer 4 9 13 6.0% 5.1% 5.3% Tax/Spend Reductions/Increases 0 8 8 0.0% 4.5% 3.3% Community Events 7 3 10 10.4% 1.7% 4.1% Curfews/ Crime Compensation 3 2 5 4.5% 1.1% 2.0% 67 177 244 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

133 ATTACHMENT #3: Party Affiliation of Chairmanships totaling 12 years (5 pre-reform assignments; 1991-1999 versus 2 post-reform; 2001-2003).

Democratic Republican Charterite Total Chairs Chairman Chairman Chairman Available Pre-Reform 21 5 3 29 72 % 17% 10 % Post-Reform 9 1 2 12 75 % 8 % 17 %

134 ATTACHMENT #4: BOXPLOT FOR MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME

70000

65000

60000

55000

50000

45000

40000

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000 0 N = 26 Median Family Income

As this box plot of MFI illustrates, there are two outliers within our distribution, namely Wards 4 and 5. These are Hyde Park and Mount Lookout that represent the cities most prestigious and wealthy communities. Their MFI’s in 2000 each sat just above $59,500 and because their MFI’s are almost identical, their outlier mark appears as a unified circle.

135