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Urgent Action UA: 31/14 Index: ASA 21/005/2014 Indonesia Date: 14 February 2014 URGENT ACTION MAN TAKEN BY MILITARY MISSING AND AT RISK The whereabouts of Dedek Khairudin, an Indonesian man taken by military personnel in November 2013, are still unknown. The Indonesia Army Military Police refused to accept his family’s formal complaint into the matter on 13 February. He is at risk of torture and other ill-treatment. Dedek Khairudin was taken from his home in North Sumatra, Indonesia in the early morning of 28 November by a military intelligence officer from Army Resort Military Command (Korem 011/LW) accompanied by at least eight marines from the Pangkalan Brandan region in North Sumatra. According to his family, the military personnel had been searching for another man, who was accused of stabbing a soldier and believed Dedek Khairudin knew where he was hiding. On 29 November Dedek Khairudin’s family visited the district police and the marine headquarters in Pangkalan Brandan to inquire about his whereabouts, but on both occasions were told he was not in their custody. On 30 January the family filed a complaint with the Military Police at the Bukit Barisan regional military command, which the police officially accepted. On 13 February the family travelled to the Indonesian Army Military Police headquarters in Jakarta to report the case at the national level. However, this time the Military Police refused to accept their complaint even though the family provided the name of the military intelligence officer and units alleged to have abducted Dedek Khairudin. Khairudin’s family has not received any further information about his fate or whereabouts since he was taken by military personnel in November 2013. Please write immediately in English, Indonesian or your own language: Expressing concern that Dedek Khairudin was subjected to an enforced disappearance by Indonesian military forces on 28 November 2013, and calling on the authorities to reveal his whereabouts and ensure his safety; Urging the Indonesian authorities to carry out a prompt, full and impartial investigation into his abduction by members of the military forces, publish its findings and ensure all those responsible for this enforced disappearance are brought to justice before a civilian court according to international human rights standards; Calling on the Indonesian government to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance at the earliest opportunity, incorporate its provisions into domestic law and implement it in policy and practice. PLEASE SEND APPEALS BEFORE 28 MARCH 2014 TO: Indonesian Military Commander Minister of Defence Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law General Moeldoko Purnomo Yusgiantoro and Security Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Ministry of Defence Djoko Suyanto Indonesia Jl. Merdeka Barat No. 13-14 Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law Jl. Hankam, Cilangkap, Cipayung Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia 10110 and Security Jakarta Timur, Indonesia 13870 Fax: +62 21 344 0023 / +62 21 382 8292 Jl. Medan Merdeka Barat No. 15 Fax: +62 21 845 91193 Salutation: Dear Minister Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia 10110 Salutation: Dear General Fax: +62 21 345 0918 Salutation: Dear Minister Also send copies to diplomatic representatives accredited to your country. Please insert local diplomatic addresses below: Name Address 1 Address 2 Address 3 Fax Fax number Email Email address Salutation Salutation Please check with your section office if sending appeals after the above date. URGENT ACTION MAN TAKEN BY MILITARY MISSING AND AT RISK ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Enforced disappearance is a serious human rights violation and a crime under international law which violates the rights of the persons who were disappeared and of their loved ones. The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1992, provides that an investigation “should be conducted for as long as the fate of the victim of enforced disappearance remains unclarified” (Article 13(6)). It also states that “enforced disappearance shall be considered a continuing offence as long as the perpetrators continue to conceal the fate and the whereabouts of persons who have disappeared and these facts remain unclarified” (Article 17(1)). The Indonesian military has a long history of perpetrating enforced disappearances. Yet the Indonesian government has done little to establish the fate and whereabouts of those who were disappeared or went “missing” during the rule of Suharto or the subsequent political reform period (from 1998), including during the conflicts in Timor-Leste and Aceh. According to its 2012 Annual report, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) holds information on 162 outstanding cases of disappearances in Indonesia, while there are a further 428 outstanding cases in Timor-Leste which mostly occurred during the period of Indonesian occupation (1975-1999). Further, the Indonesian government has yet to accept a request from the WGEID, pending since 2006, to visit the country. Families of the disappeared and missing have for years called on the Indonesian authorities to establish the fate and whereabouts of their loved ones; however, to date little progress has been made, prolonging their suffering. A national truth commission could undertake such a role but there has been lack of political will by the central government to enact a new national truth commission law after it was struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2006. Following an inquiry by the Indonesian Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) in 2009, the Indonesian House of Representatives recommended that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. In September 2010 the Indonesian government signed the Convention. Currently Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives is discussing a bill to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Name: Dedek Khairudin Gender m/f: m UA: 31/14 Index: ASA 21/005/2014 Issue Date: 14 February 2014.
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