Governance Data: Who Uses It and Why?

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Governance Data: Who Uses It and Why? GOVERNANCE DATA: WHO USES IT AND WHY? $ 118 # 30% Acknowledgements This report was prepared by Samantha Custer, Dr. Takaaki Masaki, Tanya Sethi, Rebecca Latourell, Zachary Rice, and Dr. Bradley Parks from AidData. The authors express our appreciation to those who were willing to be interviewed or advise on the preparation of this report, including: Hazel Feigenblatt (Global Integrity); Alejandro Ponce and Joel Martinez (World Justice Project); Elena Mondo (International Budget Partnership); Finn Heinrich and Coralie Pring (Transparency International); Jim Cust and Jason McMann (Natural Resource Governance Institute); Melissa Johns (World Bank); Toby Mendel (Centre for Law and Democracy); Preston Whitt (Open Government Partnership); Chris Maloney and Andria Hayes-Birchler (Millennium Challenge Corporation); Jesse Worker (World Resources Institute); and Nathaniel Heller and Caroline Poirrier (Results for Development). Llanco Talamantes and Galina Kalvatcheva were extremely helpful in the design of this publication. This study was commissioned by the Governance Data Alliance with financial support from the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation and Omidyar Network. NORC at the University of Chicago assisted in fielding the survey upon which this report is based. This report represents the views of the authors alone and does not speak for the organizations or individuals who have contributed their insights or finances to its production. The Governance Data Alliance is a consortium of governance data producers, users, and funders that is working together to strengthen the production, use, and impact of governance data. The Alliance’s secretariat is currently hosted by the Results for Development Institute, and the Alliance’s work is supported by Omidyar Network, the Hewlett Foundation, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 1. Introduction If institutions are the formal and informal “rules Who are the users of governance data? of the game” that shape how citizens and Which attributes of governance assessments the state interact, then governance includes make them more (or less) influential the “politics over rules” that determine among development policymakers and which policies are adopted, how they are practitioners? Why are some countries more implemented, and the degree to which they interested in using governance assessments advance public versus parochial interests than others? To answer these questions, this (North, 1990; Hyden, 2011). Poorly governed report draws upon the experience of nearly countries often suffer from high levels of 6,750 policymakers and practitioners from political instability, inefficient distribution 126 low- and middle-income countries who of public resources and inequitable access participated in the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey, to basic services (World Bank, 1989; Nanda, as well as interviews with representatives 2006). They also tend to produce inferior from several international organizations that development outcomes (World Bank, 2004). produce governance data. Their insights speak to ongoing debates about how to make In response, various initiatives have emerged governance data “fit-for-purpose” and help that purport to assess and promote “good to identify which types of information can governance” (UNDP, 2007; OECD, 2009a). most effectively spark dialogue and mobilize Research institutions produce cross-country coalitions for policy change. datasets to better understand the causes and consequences of different types of The remainder of this report is organized in governance. Multilateral development banks seven sections. In Section 2, we discuss the and bilateral aid agencies sponsor and use perspectives of governance data producers. governance assessments to inform resource In Section 3, we provide an overview of our allocation decisions and promote reforms in methodology, including the creation of our the countries where they work. Civil society sampling frame and survey implementation. groups administer “naming and shaming” Sections 4 and 5 discuss key findings regarding exercises in order to highlight governance familiarity with (and use of) governance leaders and laggards in the hopes that the data among our stakeholder groups and forces of inter-jurisdictional competition will the influence of governance assessments set in motion a “race to the top” dynamic. on reform implementation. In Section 6, we examine which countries are more Yet, the influence of governance data influenced by governance assessments and on intermediate policy decisions and what characteristics enable or constrain downstream governance outcomes is such influence. Section 7 concludes with uncertain. Previous research suggests that a synthesis of broad lessons learned, and governance assessments are among the directions for some near-term policy research least likely diagnostic and advisory tools to to delve deeper into the insights that this influence public sector decision-makers, as report has generated. they often threaten existing power structures (Parks et al, 2015; Cruz and Keefer, 2015). We also know that the organizations responsible for producing governance assessments often have little knowledge about “who their users are and why they [do or do not] use governance data” (Reboot, 2015; Governance Data Alliance, 2015). 1 2. The Producers: Who produces governance data and why? Governments and international organizations heads, the office of the chief executive) of the identify a range of different reasons why they countries that they assess. Some producers produce governance data – from internal also identified members of the legislature imperatives to manage risk and efficiently and judiciary, journalists, civil society allocate resources to external aspirations organizations, development partners, and to transform or otherwise inform “partner academics as secondary targets of interest. country processes” (OECD, 2009b; Wilde, 2011). While this study seeks to understand There are three primary ways in which the the uptake and influence of governance underlying data for governance assessments assessments among development are collected. These data collection methods policymakers and practitioners who make include: (1) aggregation of data from or shape policy decisions, it is important to secondary sources; (2) desk research carried bear in mind these are not the only audiences out by country experts or international being targeted.1 experts with local validation (e.g., review of draft laws or published budget documents); Governance data producers typically adopt and (3) participatory feedback via surveys, one of three approaches to influence policy interviews or focus groups with a subset change within partner countries. Some of domestic stakeholders. Producers of producers see themselves as strictly objective assessments wrestle with difficult questions providers of governance data and limit their and face trade-offs regarding the relative engagement in domestic policymaking timeliness, mix and efficacy of these data processes to confirming the accuracy collection methods. of their assessments. A second group of producers indirectly raise awareness about Public sector institutions in the countries or advocate for reform through partnerships that governance data producers assess are with domestic civil society and private sector only rarely involved in the data collection groups, which in turn place pressure on their process, and producers generally agree that governments. Only a few producers directly dissemination of assessment results is a engage with host government counterparts to major impediment to policy change. Most encourage reform based upon the content of producers rely on civil society organizations, their assessments.2 Various factors influence development partners, and the media to a governance data producer’s approach, bring assessment results to the attention of including: resource constraints, proximity to government officials. in-country stakeholders, organizational by- laws, and underlying theories of change. Yet, interaction with these constituencies is often episodic, and limited to short- Governance data producers are more term outreach around the publication consistent in whom they consider to be their of an assessment. Few governance data primary “targets”: senior public sector officials producers have a proactive strategy to in the executive branches (e.g., ministry conduct outreach to either domestic or 1.International journalists, advocates, investors, and the producer organizations themselves were also mentioned as governance data users. On this point, see UNDP 2008 and Kelley and Simmons 2014. 2. In order to maintain the objectivity of their assessments, when producers do engage with government actors they often employ a division of labor that insulates technical staff from interactions with officials, who often advocate for changes to their “scores”. Producers also vary in terms of whether, how and when they will allow government counterparts to have access to assessment results before publication. Some producers have clearly delineated policies for how they will engage with governments, but more often this interaction is largely “ad hoc”. 2 2. The Producers international media outlets. While a select to how organizations produce, use, and group of governance data producers are able disseminate assessments, including: brand to leverage networks of local partners or field recognition, whether they identify actionable offices to communicate assessment results, solutions, the
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