Daf Ditty Eruvin 68: the Jerusalem of Andalusia

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Daf Ditty Eruvin 68: The Jerusalem of Andalusia

Castillo del Moral y Museo Arqueológico-Etnológico de Lucena

2 תבש :– הה ו א אקוני אד פתשי ו ך tells two additional stories of babies whose hot water spilled on ארמג The ,When a baby’s hot water spilled out, Rava said that if the mother says she needs hot water מח י מ י הימימ Let the non-Jew heat םיחנ היל ירכנ בגא הימיא - ,even if she is so healthy that she is eating cold dates up water for her, and add some extra water for the baby.

Just as sprinkling the water of purification is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat, even for the purpose of a mitzva, so too, telling a gentile to perform a prohibited labor Shabbat is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat. How, then, could Rabba suggest that they instruct a gentile and thus transgress a rabbinic decree?

Rav Yosef said to him: But do you not differentiate between a rabbinic decree that involves an action and a rabbinic decree that does not involve an action? As the Master, Rabba, did not say to the gentile: Go and heat water on Shabbat, but only told him to transfer something from one domain to another, which does not involve an action and is therefore less severe.

The Gemara relates another story about a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rava said to those who had brought the matter to his attention: Let us ask the baby’s mother. If the warm water is necessary for her health, let a gentile heat water for the baby indirectly, through his mother. In other words, the water may be heated for the mother, as a woman after childbirth is regarded as being in a life-threatening situation.

Rav Mesharshiya said to Rava: The baby’s mother is healthy enough that she is eating dates. Certainly, her condition is not precarious enough to necessitate the heating of water. Rava said to him: It is possible to say that it was merely a ravenous hunger that had seized her, and she is unaware of what she is eating, but in fact she is still dangerously ill.

where one of the houses רצח who lived in a neighboring, אבר ,At another time a baby’s water spilled in an inner room of his house, so that he will not לכ םי had hot water, suggested to put all his so that, רצח in the שר ו ת his own לטבמ and he will then be, רצח forgetfully carry anything out to the . רצח the parents of the child can carry the water through the

The Gemara relates yet another similar incident: There was once a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rava, who had water in his courtyard but had not established a joint eiruv with the adjacent courtyard where the baby was located, said to those who asked him about the matter: Clear away my belongings from the men’s chamber, which opens directly into my courtyard, to the inner women’s chamber, which does not. Rava was concerned that he would come to carry his belongings into the courtyard, which would be prohibited once he had renounced his rights to it. And I will go and sit there, in the

4 women’s chamber, and I will renounce my rights to this courtyard in favor of the residents of the baby’s courtyard, so that they will be able to transfer the warm water from one courtyard to the other.

Ravina said to Rava: Didn’t Shmuel say: There is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. How, then, can you renounce your rights to your courtyard in this manner? Rava said to him: I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: There is renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another.

' ןנחוי and מש ו א ל follows the following opinions: -1- In the Machlokes of אבר explains that ארמג The to רצח from one שר ו ת of opinion ר ' ןנחוי that שי לוטיב רצחמ רצחל – be can one לטבמ he follows the ,ר שר ו ת ,that other the מש ו א ל he follows the opinion of , מש ו א ל and בר another. -2- In the Machlokes of it back to him. That is why he לטבמ party cannot be יא ן לטבמ י ן וחו ירז ן ילטבמו ן - is he once לטבמ his רצח moved all his utensils to an inner room, knowing that he would not be able to carry in the

5 אלד והיל י אתלמ נברד ן חכ ו אכ אלולטאו – holds this way is מש ו א ל The reason . תבש anymore this entire to look like a joke that people will mock. It seems strange to people that הכלה We do not want the may not carry while the other can, and a short while later it is in the רצח at first one person in the reverse.

The concern that the words of the Sages might be the target of ridicule appears in several contexts, usually when they rule in a manner that directly contradicts a previous ruling. Such an obvious retraction makes it seem that the original ruling was not sufficiently established and renders the whole process laughable.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:1

1 http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Eiruvin_68.pdf

6 The Gemora relates: There was once a certain child (who was to be circumcised on the Shabbos) whose hot water (that had been prepared before the Shabbos and kept warm for the circumcision) was spilled out. Rava said: Let us ask his mother and if she requires any, a gentile may warm some for him indirectly through his mother. Rav Mesharshiya told Rava: His mother is already eating (cold) dates (and obviously has no need for cold water). Rava replied: It is quite possible that it was merely a stupor that had seized her (and she does not realize what she is doing). [Therefore, if she expressed a desire for hot water, it is permitted to request a gentile to warm some for her, and so, indirectly, for the child as well.]

The Gemora relates: There was once a child whose hot water was spilled out (and there was some in a neighboring courtyard). [No joint eiruv for the two courtyards had been prepared, but they had a common door between them.] Rava instructed: Remove my things from the men’s quarters (who had a supply of hot water in his own courtyard, which was adjacent to that in which the child was kept) to the women’s quarters (which, for the sake of privacy, were behind the men’s quarters, and consequently inaccessible from the courtyard except by way of the men’s quarters) and I will go and sit there, so that I may renounce my rights in this courtyard in favor of the tenants of the child’s courtyard.

Ravina said to Rava: But didn’t Shmuel say that no renunciation of one’s right in a courtyard is permitted where two courtyards are involved? Rava replied: I hold the same view as Rabbi Yochanan who ruled that it is permitted to renounce one’s right in a courtyard even where two courtyards are involved.

Ravina asked: If the master doesn’t hold the same view as Shmuel, let him remain in his usual quarters and renounce his right in his courtyard in their favor and then let them renounce their right in the master’s favor, for didn’t Rav rule: Relinquishing may be followed by relinquishing? Rava answered: On this point I am of the same opinion as Shmuel, who ruled that relinquishing may not be followed by relinquishing.

The Gemora asks: But aren’t both rulings based on the same principle, since why indeed shouldn’t relinquishing be allowed to follow relinquishing? Is it not because a person, as soon as he relinquishes his right, he completely eliminates himself from that place and assumes the status of a tenant of a different courtyard and no relinquishing is valid between two courtyards? How then could the master renounce his right? Rava responds: There, the reason is because a Rabbinical enactment shall not assume the character of a mockery and jest.

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes2 Writes:

As we learned in yesterday's daf, Abaye was surprised to find that his teacher, Rabba, permitted a non-Jew to be asked to bring hot water to facilitate a brit mila on Shabbat in a place where there was no eiruv. Abaye asked why completing the ritual to purify someone who had become tame which is forbidden on Shabbat by the Sages - cannot be performed even if it is necessary to perform a mitzva (e.g. to sacrifice and eat the Passover sacrifice), yet in our case, asking a non-

2 https://www.steinsaltz-center.org/home/doc.aspx?mCatID=68446

7 Jew to bring water for the brit is permitted? The Gemara's response to Abaye's question is that we distinguish between an "active" Rabbinic prohibition and a "passive" one. How to understand this distinction depends on different girsa'ot – variant readings – in the Gemara. The standard text of the Gemara argues that the case of the brit is passive because Rabba did not ask the non-Jew to heat the water, only to bring the water. According to this reading, our case is passive because the activity that was done was just moving something from one place to another, rather than being a creative activity. Rabbenu Chananel has a different text of the Gemara, which does not have the explanation that focused on whether the non-Jew needed to heat the water up. According to this version, the difference is between the Rabbinic decree of Amira la-Akum (asking a non-Jew to perform a forbidden act on Shabbat) and other Rabbinic ordinances, which involve direct activity, not merely speech, which is not considered an active behavior. The Ra'avad argues that this case is unique because it involves two Rabbinic ordinances – a shvut d'shvut. First of all, there is no action, only a request made by speaking. Secondly, the activity performed by the non-Jew – transferring water from the house to the courtyard - is, itself, not forbidden by the Torah, but only by the Rabbis. In this case, where it is necessary in order to perform the brit mila, the Rabbis never would have applied their restrictions.

Our Daf relates an incident of a baby who was scheduled to have his bris milah on Shabbos and the hot water that was heated in preparation of the bris spilled. Rava told those involved to ask the mother if she needed some water and if she does require hot water, they could ask a gentile to heat up some water for the mother and then have him add additional water into the pot for the baby. Commentators wonder why it was necessary to have a gentile heat the water for the mother, when performing a melachah on Shabbos for a woman who gave birth the last week may be done even by a Jewish person.

Rashi:

Rashi answers that it had actually been more than seven days since the mother gave birth and as such it is only permitted to ask a gentile to heat the water for the mother.

8 Ran maintains that doing a melachah in a greater quantity than needed (marbeh b’shiurim) is Biblically prohibited. In other words, even when it is permitted to perform a melachah for one who is ill one may not do that melachah in a quantity greater than what is needed to address the needs of the ill patient. If one performs the melachah in a greater quantity, he has violated the Biblical prohibition against performing melachah on Shabbos.

Therefore, even if they were permitted to heat up water for the mother who is within seven days postpartum it would not be permitted to heat up more water for the baby and thus they had to have a gentile heat up the water for the mother and then have him add additional water for the baby- .

Mishnah Berurah cites the dispute whether performing a melachah in a greater quantity is Biblically prohibited or not and concludes that there is proof that it is Biblically prohibited.

The Gemara here distinguishes between a shevus — a Shabbos prohibition of Rabbinic origin — which involves an act and a shevus that does not involve an act. Both in the Gemara here and in Pesachim 65b we see that a Jew may never violate a shevus that involves an act, even if in so doing he will fulfill a mitzvah. However, the Gemara in Pesachim 66b makes it clear that under certain circumstances, for the purpose of fulfilling a mitzvah, a person may violate a shevus that involves an act if he performs the act with a shinui — i.e., in a manner that differs from the normal manner in which this act is performed.

Accordingly, writes Teshuvos Tzitz Eliezer (2:3.4), the case in Gittin 8b, in which it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to write a bill of sale on land in Eretz Yisroel on Shabbos — even though asking a nonJew to violate the Shabbos is in itself a shevus — must only be permitted because the act that the non-Jew does (in writing the bill of sale) is not attributed back to the Jew, so that vis-à-vis the Jew the shevus is one that does not involve an act.

On the basis of this principle, the Tzitz Eliezer forbids a Jew to milk a cow on Shabbos, even though the prohibition of milking is a shevus, and even though the animal is in anguish when it is not milked (tza'ar ba'alei chaim — removing tza'ar ba'alei chaim is the equivalent of fulfilling a mitzvah), unless the milking is done with a shinui.3

3 https://dafdigest.org/masechtos/Eruvin/Eruvin%20068.pdf

9 The Order of Priority When One Must Violate Shabbat R. Moshe Lichtenstein writes:4

ASKING A NON-JEW TO PERFORM A MELAKHA

Thus far we have analyzed the law of performing a melakha on Shabbat with a shinui or ki- le'achar yad, that is to say, in an unusual manner. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that if we wish to establish an order of preferences regarding the "best" way to desecrate Shabbat, we must consider the various alternatives and their meaning with respect to Shabbat desecration. As for the possibility of utilizing someone who is not Jewish, asking a non-Jew to perform a melakha on Shabbat (amira le-akkum) is forbidden by rabbinic decree.

The Rishonim explain this prohibition in various ways. Generally speaking, these explanations split into two main groups:

1) The non-Jew is regarded as acting as an extension of the Jew who asked him to do so. This appears to be the position of Rashi (Shabbat 153a, s.v. Mai), who writes that the non-Jew is regarded as the Jew's agent.

2) The non-Jew is not regarded as acting as an extension of the Jew, but nevertheless asking him to perform a melakha is forbidden for some side reason, e.g., lest a Jew come to perform the melakha.

There is a fundamental difference between these two explanations: is the prohibition to ask a non-Jew to perform a melakha on Shabbat regarded as a prohibition that involves an action, as follows from Rashi, or not? This question is explicitly discussed by the Gemara inEruvin (68a), which permits amira le-akkum for things that are required for circumcision and justifies this by distinguishing between "a rabbinic prohibition that involves an action and a rabbinic prohibition that does not involve an action." According to many Rishonim, this means that amira le-akkum is regarded as a prohibition that does not involve an action, and therefore more lenient. The Rif (Shabbat 56a in Alfasi), however, implies just the

4 https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-05-order-priority-when-one-must-violate-shabbat-part-ii

10 opposite, that fundamentally amira le-akkum is regarded as a rabbinic prohibition that involves an action.

We find in several Talmudic passages that amira le-akkum is permitted for the sake of certain specific needs: the settlement of Eretz Yisrael (Gittin 8b); circumcision (Eruvin 68a); a sick person who is not in any danger (Shabbat 129a); and burial on Yom Tov (Beitza 6a). Halakhic authorities discuss at length the scope and force of these allowances, but this is not the forum to expand upon the matter. For the purposes of the present discussion, let us merely state that the more we diminish the severity of the prohibition and see it as a peripheral prohibition, the easier it becomes to extend the allowances to other areas, e.g., for the sake of a mitzva or to apply it in the case of rabbinic prohibitions. On the other hand, the more we see it as an essential prohibition, the more reason there is to restrict the allowance to cases of exceedingly great need. The Rema (Orach Chayyim 276:2 and 307:5) recognizes that there is a widespread custom to follow the view of the Ittur that amira le-akkum is permitted for the sake of a mitzva, but he himself notes that most of halakhic authorities disagree with the Ittur. The accepted Halakha follows the position of most Rishonim, who restrict the allowance to the mitzvot of settling Eretz Yisrael and circumcision and do not extend it to other mitzvot.

Now, if we accept the prevalent view among the halakhic authorities that amira le-akkum is forbidden even in the case of a mitzva and compare it to the law governing ki-le'achar yad in the case of a mitzva, we can reach an answer to our question. It would seem that the Gemara i Pesachim (66b) states explicitly that performing a melakha in an unusual manner for the sake of a mitzva is not forbidden. There, the Gemara relates the story of Hillel and the elders, who were confronted with the dilemma of Erev Pesach that falls out on Shabbat; the slaughter of the paschal offering is permitted, but how can one transport the knife to the Temple? The Gemara explains the issue as follows:

"Something that is permitted by Torah law, and a rabbinic prohibition stands in his way that can be performed ki-le'achar yad – what is the law in the case of a mitzva?"

He said to them: "I heard this law, but I have forgotten it. Nevertheless, leave it to the Jews; if they are not prophets, they are the children of prophets."

Assuming that this passage follows the common leniency, it explicitly follows that doing a melakha ki-le'achar yad for the sake of a mitzva is permitted. Now, if we rule that amira le- akkum is forbidden even for the sake of a mitzva, but doing the melakha ki-le'achar yad for the sake of a mitzva is permitted, this proves that ki-le'achar yad is less serious than amira le-akkum; therefore, it should be preferable to do the melakha in an unusual manner, rather than by way of non-Jew. There is, however, room to suggest that perhaps the allowance in Pesachim is restricted to the case of a paschal offering, similar to amira le-akkum in the case of circumcision. In that case, nothing can be inferred from the passage.

The Ran cited above (Shabbat 61a in Alfasi) discusses our very question regarding a case of financial loss. He maintains that the allowance of ki-le'achar yad is indeed preferable to amira le-akkum, and therefore only doing the melakha ki-le'achar yad is permitted in the case of financial loss. What follows then is that in a case where it is necessary to desecrate Shabbat, it is preferable to do so ki-le'achar yad than by way of a non-Jew. As clarified above, however, this only applies in the case of a shinui which removes the action from the category of a melakha and redefines it as a non-melakha act. However, doing the act with a shinui that serves merely to exempt a person from liability might be regarded as a more serious infraction than amira le-akkum. It should be noted that, practically speaking, it is often very difficult to determine whether a particular shinui is merely shinui that exempts a person from liability or ki-le'achar yad; in such a case, it is preferable to ask a non-Jew.

With respect to our original question regarding Shabbat desecration to prevent the suffering of an animal, Rav Yosef Karo (OC 305:20) states explicitly that amira le-akkum is permitted.5 The Magen Avraham notes there that if a non-Jew is unavailable, it may be done by a Jew. The implication is that if a non-Jew is available, it is preferable to use a non-Jew. It is not clear whether he means to say that it is always preferable to use a non-Jew, even if it is possible to perform the melakha in such a manner that puts it into the category of ki-le'achar yad; perhaps he is talking about a case where it is impossible to do the action with a shinui that removes it from the category

5 Bei'ur Ha-Gra (ad loc.) who understands that the "yesh omerim" cited there disputes the allowance in principle and not merely for the reason of appearances (marit ayin).

12 of melakha, and only then it is preferable to do it by way of a non-Jew than to perform the rabbinic prohibition in the usual manner.

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, as is the case with many other issues relating to Shabbat, this question is hardly discussed at all in the early sources. To the best of my knowledge, except for the Ran cited above, none of the classical halakhic authorities set the various allowances against each other; thus, there is no unequivocal resolution of the matter in the Shulchan Arukh or its commentaries. Among the contemporary decisors, we can discern different approaches. Rav Yehoshua Neuwirth, in his Shemirat Shabbat Ke-hilkhatah (Chap. 18, Note 218) is inclined to rule that amira le-akkum is less serious than ki-le'achar yad. In contrast, Rav Sha'ul Yisraeli, in his Chavvot Binyamin (No. 27), disagrees and says that ki-le'achar yad is preferable to amira le- akkum. The common denominator in these two rulings is seeing ki-le'achar yad as a single category. In light of what we stated above, however, there is room to distinguish between different levels of shinui. If the alternative is a simple shinui, e.g., writing with the left hand, using a non- Jew is to be preferred whenever possible; if the alternative is performing the action ki-le'achar yad, which removes the act from the category of melakha, this is to be preferred over amira le- akkum.

The Mitzvah to Make an Eiruv

Shlomo HaMelech and his Beis Din decreed that even if a public courtyard is surrounded by walls, and is technically a reshus hayachid according to Torah law, carrying there is still restricted miderabanan. In order to carry from a private house into the public courtyard, one must set an eiruv chatzeiros. Various aspects of this enactment have been discussed in previous issues of Meoros HaDaf HaYomi. This article will examine a question that was posed to several Poskim throughout the generations. Namely, is the eiruv an undesirable leniency that was permitted in order that the community not be unduly inconvenienced? If so, pious individuals should not rely on this leniency.

The Tashbatz (Teshuvos II, 37) eplied quite to the contrary. Shlomo HaMelech’s original enactment was not to forbid carrying in a courtyard, but rather to make carrying there contingent on an eiruv. There was never any sort of prohibition decreed or implied against carrying in a courtyard where an eiruv chatzeiros had been set. If a person sets an eiruv chatzeiros, he fulfills this enactment to its fullest.

As a proof to this, he cites our daf, in which we find that Rabbah bar R’ Chanan asked Abaye why no eiruv chatzeiros had been set in the courtyard where Abaye and Rabbah lived. Abaye answered that Rabbah could not personally attend to the eiruv, since he was limited by the protocol associated with his high social standing.

It would diminish the honor of the Torah if he would go around the houses of the courtyard to collect bread for the eiruv. Abaye himself was also unable, since he was preoccupied with his studies. The other neighbors of the courtyard did not care to take the initiative, and as such the courtyard was left without an eiruv. If Rabbah bar R’ Chanan posed this question, and Abaye felt forced to find excuse, clearly an eiruv is not a bedi’eved solution, but the le’chatchilah fulfillment of Shlomo’s enactment.

Teshuva to Olisano: From a teshuva of the Gaonim (Gaoni Mizrach V’Maarav, Yemen: 26) written to the city of Olisano, we see that it is better to rely on an eiruv to carry, than to refrain from carrying altogether. The Gaonim criticized the people of Olisano, “We were astounded that great scholars such as yourselves, masters of Torah, and scrupulous observers of the mitzvos, do not set eiruv chatzeiros…. There are no gentiles in your city who would render the eiruv invalid. Why do you not set eiruv chatzeiros, as Rabba bar R’ Chanan challenged Abaye?”

The Mordechai (515) and Hagahos Maimones ,1:1 citing Tosefos write that it is commendable to set an eiruv, to prevent people from accidentally transgressing an issur derabanan of carrying without an eiruv. The Tur (O.C. 395) and Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 366:13) rule accordingly: “It is a mitzva to set an eiruv chatzeiros.” Although the Levush (ibid) understood this literally to mean that there is mitzva miderabanan to set an eiruv, the Tosefos Shabbos (369:1) understood it as a borrowed expression. Not that one fulfills a mitzvah by setting an eiruv, but that it is wise to do so to prevent forbidden carrying. He proves this from our Gemara. If there was truly a mitzvahh to set an eiruv, Abaye and Rabbah would not have failed to do so.

“Reason demands an eiruv”:

The Chasam Sofer (O.C. 99) writes that he was once asked to find a proof from Chazal that it is proper for each city to built tzuros hapesach- wires and set an eiruv chatzeiros to permit carrying. He declined to search the Talmud for a proof, explaining that, “This thing has no need to be proven from Chazal, since it logical … any intelligent person will realize that it is impossible to prevent children from unwittingly carrying even the smallest object out of the house on Shabbos… furthermore, how much pain and inconvenience is caused even to the adults [without an eiruv], especially in regard to carrying siddurim to shul… simple reason demands that an eiruv must be set to permit carrying. This obligation is incumbent upon the rabbis and Torah scholars of each city, and if they shirk this responsibility, they will carry the sins of the community upon their shoulders.”

The Chasam Sofer continues by citing the Gemara which states that when Shlomo HaMelech developed the rabbinic enactments of eiruvin and netilas yadayim, a Heavenly voice declared, “My son, if your heart is wise, My heart will also rejoice” (Mishlei 23:15). He explains that Hashem did not so much rejoice over the prohibition against carrying, as He rejoiced over the solution of

14 eiruv chatzeiros that Shlomo developed. Our Sages formulated a beracha over eiruvin, “Blessed are You, Hashem… Who has sanctified us with His commandments, and commanded us concerning the mitzvah of eiruv.” The Chasam Sofer notes that we do not recite berachos over rabbinic prohibitions. Rather, this beracha refers to “this great mitzvah, which protects us from the prohibition against carrying, which would otherwise be impossible to avoid.

A further proof to this is that the bread used for an eiruv is considered, “an object used for a mitzvah” (Mishna Berura 394:2). For this reason, the Rema writes that it is proper to use the eiruv bread for the Shabbos seudos, in order to use the same object for many mitzvos (see Meoros journal, 337).

T’shuva to Olisano/Lucena, The Jerusalem of Andalusia

15 Jews in Lucena

Regarded as the” Jerusalem of Andalusia” and known as “The Pearl of Sepharad,” Lucena was the only town in Medieval Muslim Spain in which only Jews lived within the strong walls and wide moats. Eleventh-century Muslim geographer, Mohamed al-Edrisi visited Lucena, and recorded that the Jews of Lucena were richer than those of any other city. Lucena, 60 km southeast of Cordoba, was one of the most important centers of Jewish scholarship in Spain during the 11th and 12th centuries. Lucena’s rabbinical academy introduced a new curriculum that served as the model of Sephardic learning for generations. The entire community selected the Chief Rabbi, who was granted special privileges and acted as judge in the civil and criminal cases arising in the community. Rabbi Isaac ben Jehuda ibn Giat headed this esteemed Yeshiva. His successor was Isaac Alfasi, whose disciple was Joseph Ibn Migash, who taught Maimonides at that very same location. Today, Lucena is a small city with few traces of its Jewish past.

Heinrich Graetz describes the Golden Age of Spain in Volume III of his classic History of the Jews.

"The Andalusian Jews were equally active in Bible exegesis and grammar, in the study of the Talmud, in philosophy and in poetry. But the students in any one of these departments were not narrow specialists. Those who studied the Talmud were indifferent neither to Biblical lore nor to poetry, and if not poets themselves, they found pleasure in the rhythmic compositions of the new Hebrew poesy. The philosophers strove to become thoroughly versed in the Talmud, and in many instances, rabbis were at the same time teachers of philosophy. Nor were science and art looked upon by the Spanish Jews as mere ornaments, but they exalted and ennobled their lives. Many of them were filled with that enthusiasm and ideality which does not allow the approach of any kind of meanness. The prominent men, who, either through their political position or their merits stood at the head of Jewish affairs in Spain, were for the most part noble characters imbued with the highest sentiments. They were as chivalrous as the Andalusian Arabs, and excelled them in magnanimity, a characteristic which they retained long after the Arabs had become degenerate. Like their neighbors, they had a keen appreciation of their own value, which showed itself in a long string of names, but this self-consciousness rested on a firm moral basis, they took great pride in their ancestry, and certain families, as those of Ibn-Ezra, Alfachar, Alnakvah, Ibn-Falyaj, Ibn- Giat, Benveniste, Ibn-Migash, Abulafia, and others formed the nobility. They did not use their birth as a means to obtain privileges, but saw therein an obligation to excel in knowledge and nobility, so as to be worthy of their ancestors. The height of culture which the nations of modern times are striving to attain, was reached by the Jews of Spain in their most flourishing period. Their religious life was elevated and idealized through this higher culture. They loved their religion with all the fervor of conviction and enthusiasm." 6

6 Graetz, Heinrich, History of the Jews, Volume III, P 235, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1894

In 2006, the construction of the ring road in the southern area of Lucena uncovered a cemetery from the Andalusian era. Some 346 tombs appeared that were adapted to the topography of the land in which the burial ritual used was inhumation, in a simple or double pit, sometimes with a niche or a lateral coffer covered with slabs or Roman tegulas (roof tiles).

The skeletal remains that determined an early medieval period between the years 1000 and 1050 coincided with the dates of greatest splendour of the Jewish Lucena and allowed to extract relevant data about the way of life and funerary ritual of the Jewish community at this time.

During these works also took place the appearance of the only Jewish gravestone appeared in a funerary structure in Andalusia and the second one found in Lucena.

The gravestone contained Hebrew characters, and its chronology could be dated between the eighth and ninth centuries by the typeface, analysed by the doctor in Semitic Philology Jordi Casonotas.

The enhancement of the Jewish Necropolis has meant the perimeter fencing of the site, as well as the installation of various information panels on the Jewish community in Spain, the Jewish Lucena and its Talmudic School or the re-incarnations carried out in the place.

Likewise, the recreation of four tombs has been undertaken to make known didactically the four types of burials found in the cemetery. The installation of a fountain, given the need of water for the purification process that the Sephardic community requires in this type of space, and the recreation of a Wailing Wall. * Visit included in the tourist activity "Perla de Sefarad" (Perl of Sefarad),

18 A responsum given by Rabbi Natronai ben Hilai, gaon of Sura, in the year 853, states that although the Arabs did not permit the growth of the Jewish community in Cordoba at the time, many Jews lived in the neighboring town of Lucena:

There is not a gentile among you. 1013 － 1103 Isaac Al-Fasi

Al-Fasi was born and lived for nearly 40 years in Al Qalʼa of Beni Hammad, near Fes. In 1088, aged seventy-five, two informers denounced him to the government upon some unknown charge. He left Fes for Cordoba, eventually becoming head of the yeshiva in Lucena in 1089.

Sefer ha-Halachot extracts all the pertinent legal decisions from the three Talmudic orders Moed, Nashim and Nezikin as well as the tractates of Berachot and Chulin - 24 tractates in all. Al Fasi transcribed the Talmudʼs halakhic conclusions verbatim, without the surrounding deliberations. Maimonides wrote that Al-Fasi's work

Has superseded all the geonic codes… for it contains all the decisions and laws which we need in our day….

Alfasi brought the geonic period to a close, the last of the Babylonian geonim, Rav Hai Gaon, died when Alfasi was 25 years old. Al-Fasi himself was called Gaon by several early halachic authorities. When Alfasi was himself on the point of death, he recommended as his successor in the Lucena rabbinate, not his own son, but his pupil Rabbi Joseph ibn Migash.

Rabbi Judah ben Isaac ibn Giat

"Amongst poets worthy of record, who also occupied themselves with matters other than poetry, were Judah Ibn-Giat, Judah Ibn-Abbas, Solomon Ibn-Sakbel, and the brothers Ibn-Ezra."

Graetz, Heinrich, History of the Jews, Volume III, P. 318

"Son of Rabbi Isaac ibn Giat, Rabbi Judah was also a Talmudist and Hebrew poet. “Moses ibn Ezra says that Judah ("original in poetry, and a very cultivated person," Kitab 42b) was born in Lucena and lived in Granada. He was there among the intimate friends of the Ibn Ezra family and of Judah Halevi, and became one of the prominent members of Granada's community. Halevi corresponded with him even before he went to Granada, and sent him no fewer than nine poems (published in Judah Halevi's Diwan by H. Brody, 1 (1901): 43, 53, 60, 151, 174; 2:191, 263 and, very likely, 2:58–59); Judah ibn Ghayyat is also mentioned in two letters found in the Genizah related to Judah Halevi and his friend Halfon ben Nethanel. Among the few of Judah's extant poems, five secular and nine liturgical compositions, his songs of friendship to Judah Halevi, and his secular girdle poems are noteworthy; his panegyrics, following closely the classical Arabic models, show that he attained a deep knowledge of Arabic poetry. According to Al-Ḥarizi, "the poetry of Judah ben Ghayyat is by Wisdom upon Piety begot; lo, his brother's praise is Judah's lot." Shem Tov ibn Falaqera, Abraham Bedersi, and Menahem de Lonzano mention him among the good poets of their epoch.“

Rabbi Isaac ben Judah ibn Giat – His Life

One of the earliest sources of information about our illustrious ancestor appears in The Book of Tradition (Sefer ha-Qabbalah) written by the Spanish Jewish historian and philosopher Abraham ibn Daud in 1160. "R. Isaac b. R. Judah b. Giat, one of the leaders of the city of Lucena, also displayed passion for secular knowledge and Torah from childhood. The two Nagids, R. Samuel and his son R. Joseph honored him and provided for him. When fate overtook R. Joseph the Nagid, the latter’s son Azriah fled to this R. Isaac.

The Rabbi, remembering the kindnesses which Azariah’s elders had shown him, he in turn honored and provided for Azariah; indeed, he even wanted to set him up as the head of the community of Lucena and the other communities of Spain, despite the fact that Azariah was still but a lad. However, “except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it,” for R. Azariah [soon] passed away. So, R. Isaac b. R. Judah was appointed as rabbi [and served in that capacity] until 4849 [1089]. When he fell seriously ill, his slaves brought him to Cordoba for medical attention, but he soon passed away there on a Sabbath. Accordingly, his slaves removed his body from Cordoba, carried him all night and reached Lucena at dawn, where they buried him with his fathers. In addition to his secular learning and his knowledge of the Torah, he was also a great poet and learned in Greek wisdom. He spread the knowledge of the Torah and raised many disciples.” 7

7 Cohen, Gerson D., A Critical Edition with A Translation and Notes, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1967, PP. 81-82.

21 LUCENA, town in Andalusia, in S. Spain, S. of Córdoba; important Jewish community in the 11th century. 8

During the period of Muslim rule Lucena was famous as "the entirely Jewish city," and a tradition states that it was founded by Jews.

Several prominent families, including that of the historian Abraham *Ibn Daud, claimed that their settlement in Lucena dated from the time of Nebuchadnezzar. Isaac *Abrabanel linked the derivation of the name of the town with the biblical town of Luz. Until the 12th century Lucena was a cultural center of Andalusian Jewry.

In 853 Natronai Gaon wrote "that Alisana (Arabic for Lucena) was a Jewish place with no gentiles at all." In another responsum the gaon asked, "Is there a gentile who prohibits your activities? Why do you not establish an *eruv ḥaẓerot?" (Teshuvot Ge'onei Mizraḥ u-Ma'arav (1888), para. 26).

The 12th-century Arab geographer Idrīsī also commented on the Jewish character of Lucena and stated that while Muslims lived outside the city walls, Jews generally lived in the fortified part within the walls.

Menahem b. Aaron ibn Zerah reports the same information at the end of the 14th century (Ẓeidah la-Derekh (Ferrara, 1554), 150). The Jews earned their living from olive groves, vineyards, agriculture, commerce, and crafts. Lucena was distinguished by its scholars. In the mid-ninth century *Amram Gaon sent his prayer book in response to a question by a scholar of Lucena.

His contemporary Eleazar b. Samuel Ḥurga of Lucena received the titles alluf (demin Ispania) and rosh kallah, and became famous in the Babylonian academies9

In the 11th century Isaac b. Judah *Ibn Ghayyat taught in the yeshivah of Lucena. He was succeeded by Isaac *Alfasi who was followed by Joseph *Ibn Migash. In 1066 the widow of *Joseph b. Samuel ha-Nagid and her son Azariah were among the refugees who came to Lucena in the wake of the anti-Jewish outburst in Granada.10

8 https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/lucena 9(see A. Harkavy, Teshuvot ha-Ge'onim, Berlin, 1887, para. 386, p. 201, pp. 376–7 10 Abraham ibn Daud, Sefer ha-Qabbalah – The Book of Tradition, ed. G. Cohen (1967), 77

The last king of the Zirid dynasty, Abdallah, reported an uprising of the Jews of Lucena during his reign – at the time of the expedition against the Almoravides (c. 1090).

At the turn of the century a contemporary of Ibn Migash, the *Almoravide ruler, Yusuf ibn Tāshfin (1061–1106), demanded that the Jews convert to Islam. While the community was saved in exchange for a heavy bribe, many Jews of Lucena moved northward to Navarre and settled near Tudela.

They called their settlement Lucena and continued to live in accordance with the customs and ordinances of their original community, Lucena. The grammarian Jonah ibn Janāh and the poets Moses and Abraham *Ibn Ezra, *Judah Halevi, and Joseph *Ibn Sahl were active in Lucena at some time during their lives.

The 11th-century Hebrew poet Abu-ar-Rabia b. Baruch, known throughout Andalusia, lived in Lucena. In 1146 during the Almohad wars, the Jews were persecuted, and many were forced to convert to Islam. The community, like many other Andalusian communities, totally disappeared. Lucena was conquered by Castile in 1240.

The fate of its Jewish community during the riots of 1391 resembles that of the other Andalusian communities, total destruction. Many were killed, many were forcibly converted, some escaped.11

11 M. Maimonides, Iggeret Teiman, ed. by A.S. Halkin (1952), xxix, 100f.; Neuman, Spain, index; Ibn Daud, Tradition, index; Baer, Spain, index; Ashtor, Korot, 1 (19662), 202f.; 2 (1966), 88–91; H. Schirmann, in: Sefer Assaf (1953), 496–514; E. Lévi- Provençal, in: Al-Andalus, 4 (1936), 113–6 (Fr.); Cantera Burgos, in: Sefarad, 13 (1953), 112–4; 19 (1959), 137–47; Cantera- Millás, Inscripciones, 168–70; Torres-Balbas, in: Al-Andalus, 19 (1954), 190. ADD. BIBLIOGRAPHY: A. Arjona Castro, in: Lucena; nuevos estudios históricos (1983), 65–88; J.L. Lacave, in: Sefarad, 47 (1987), 181–82; F. Díaz Esteban, in: J. Peláez

del Rosal (ed.), The Jews in Cordoba (X–XII Centuries) (1987), 123–37; J. Peláez del Rosal (ed.), Los judíos de y Lucena; historia, pensamiento y poesía (1988).