A New Era for Myanmar – Trouble Ahead for Ethnic Minorities

05 2016 What can the new government do to to do can government the new What and reconciliation national enhance peace? For the first time in over half a century, halfcentury, the firstover a in time For with a a government has Myanmar the National by led popular mandate, (NLD). Democracy League for ethnic Myanmar’s Concurrently, a face now minority organisations militarily marginalisation, as double politically. as well this mean does marginalisation What the ethnic of the bargaining power for can what and minority organisations strengthen to theirthey position? do PRIO POLICY BRIEF • • • • Brief Points Marte Nilsen Research (PRIO) Institute Oslo Peace Stein Tønnesson Research (PRIO) Institute Oslo Peace A New Era for Myanmar – – Myanmar for Era A New Ethnic for Ahead Trouble Minorities For the first time in over halfover the first in time For a has Myanmar a century, with a popular government Although the Myanmar mandate. extensive still have armed forces the 2008 under powers political seriously may and constitution, action curtail the independent the government, the new of U Htin President of inauguration increase a radical represents Kyaw international in the and internal State. the Myanmar of legitimacy with this coincides Paradoxically, ethnic the country’s for a setback their struggle and minorities status within autonomous for be negotiated to state, a federal political part a national as of dialogue.

Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) www.prio.org ISBN: 978-82-7288-674-4 (print) PO Box 9229 Grønland, NO-0134 Oslo, Norway Facebook: PRIO.org 978-82-7288-675-1 (online) Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 3 Twitter: PRIOUpdates www.prio.org The Peace ResearchInstitute Oslo (PRIO) is a non-profit peace research institute(estab- lished whose overarching in 1959) purpose is to conduct research on the conditions for peaceful relations between states, groups and independent, institute is people. The interna- is- explores and interdisciplinary, and tional sues related to all facets of peace and conflict. PRIO Organising the national political dialogue in a way that ensures both consultation, broad and the initiation step-by-step of reforms in the direction federal a complex of solution. Building the on human resources and experiences accumulated by the previous administration. Engaging with the Commander-in-Chief to findplatform common a for the peace negotiations that will allow the NCA to be signed by all armed groups can so it be applied nationwide. Promoting and financinglocal autonomy in the smaller ethnic minority areas, both within the Bamar-dominated regions and the seven ethnic states. Including representatives ethnic of minority parties in all committees and political decision-making bodies. Selecting ethnic minority people with high local credibility as Chief Ministers in the seven ethnic states, and ensuring that they in turn appoint people representing all the main ethnic minorities their of state in the localgovernments. This Policy Brief was produced as part of the “Democracy in project Peacebuilding and Myanmar” funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. • • • • • • THE PROJECT President U Htin Kyaw, Aung and Kyi SanPresident Suu U Htin Kyaw, the new NLD-led government would be well advised to ease the marginalisation double theof ethnic minorities, include them systematically in political decision-making, and secure progress in the negotiations between the andTatmadaw the ethnic armed organisations. The government may consider:

infrastructure. build schools, medical services and basic from a peace dividend in terms aid of to conditions, and all ethnic areas can benefit dialogue can be conducted under peaceful monitoring it, so that the national political become parties to the NCA and take part in promises. All ethnic armed organisations will need to areas. theand hold government accountable to its economic developmenteconomic in ethnic minority ina place the national political dialogue instruction, cultural rights, and social and Civil society organisations may demand the system governance, of minority language their parties’ policies, including reforms of reconciliation, power sharing and peace in and the USDP couldand advocate the national USDP issues across the country. Ethnic minority members the of NLD the Chief Ministers in promoting minority to influence the NLD-ledgovernment and findplatform common a for future elections. Ethnic minority parties together may work may reach to unrepresented out parties to takingseats in the State legislatures or Union Ethnic minority parties that succeeded in

Email: [email protected] Email: Asian Peace Program at Uppsala University. Professor at PRIO and leader of the East Stein Tønnesson is a historian, Research Email: [email protected] Senior Researcher at PRIO. Marte Nilsen is a historian of religions and What can be done?

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• THE AUTHORS political processes all at levels: minorities to findnew ways to engage in organisations, is it importantthe for ethnic minority parties and ethnic armed With the marginalisation both of ethnic PRIO POLICY BRIEF 05 2016 A two-tiered peace process process. There are two problems, however. main reasons. The foremost is the extraordinary With 57 percent of the votes, the NLD got current peace process to succeed, there must At this point in the peace process, ethnic armed First, the Tatmadaw is unlikely to allow the new nature of this particular election, which most 79 percent of the elected seats in the Union be channels through which ethnic minority groups have little confidence in substantial There are two main tiers in Myanmar’s government to make any further concessions to people viewed as a referendum for or against Parliament – which equals 57 percent of the organisations can express their grievances and improvements. The months prior to and peace process. The first is the process of the ethnic armed groups. The second problem military rule. Voters saw the election first elected and appointed seats combined. With work for reforms. This is important in order immediately after the partial signing of the negotiations between the government and is that the process so far has left these groups and foremost as a chance to end fifty years of the NLD’s landslide victory, it will now be to build trust between the Bamar majority NCA in October 2015 were marked by active the ethnic armed groups, initiated by former with little sense of achievement, and they may military dictatorship and provide the military’s difficult to introduce a system of proportional and the ethnic minorities, and also to show warfare between the Myanmar armed forces President U Thein Sein and led by Minister not see much gain from a ceasefire. Local main opponent since 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi, representation or a hybrid system, like the the ethnic armed groups that there is space and the Kokang Myanmar National Democratic U Aung Min, with the aim of first signing a distrust of the armed forces has grown instead with a mandate to generate change. one in Germany. The NLD benefits strongly for ethnic minorities to contribute politically Alliance Army (MNDAA). Fighting also nationwide ceasefire accord (NCA), and then of diminished in the areas where fighting has from the current system and now controls and have an impact on decisions. Any further continued in Kachin State with the Kachin starting a national political dialogue about continued, and a rift has emerged between Second, the rivalry between several political Myanmar’s legislative process. Under the 2008 marginalisation of ethnic minorities at the Independence Army (KIA). The MNDAA, power sharing, decentralisation and political signatory and non-signatory groups. In some parties seeking to represent the same ethnic constitution, however, the military selects political level is likely to be detrimental to the the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA/ reforms. The second tier is a wider process of areas, notably in Kayin State, the ceasefire group also contributed, although the combined 25 percent of the members in all assemblies, peace process. Palaung) and the Arakan Army (AA) were not including ethnic minorities in political decision- agreement signed by the KNU in 2012, which votes for the various parties would in most and these military representatives are likely to allowed by the Tatmadaw to take part in the making at the Union, state and regional levels, formed part of the basis for the 2015 NCA, places not have been enough to beat the NLD sympathise with Thein Sein’s Union Solidarity The marginalisation of ethnic armed ceasefire negotiations, causing protests from transforming the existing political structure has benefitted local populations by allowing candidates. Only seven more seats in the Union and Development Party (USDP), which received groups the alliance of ethnic armed organisations in from within, and arriving at a situation where internally displaced persons to return to their Parliament and nine in the State parliaments 28 percent of the votes, but only 8 percent of exile, the United Nationalities Federal Council the ethnic minorities are treated as equals to villages and resume economic activities and would most likely have gone to ethnic minority the elected seats in the Union Parliament. The Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have (UNFC), and splits between signatory and non- the Bamar majority in an ethnically inclusive communications with other areas. Yet the NCA parties if they had managed to unite. Yet it is USDP and the military appointees (who together declared that the peace process will be signatory groups. And while talks continued national Union. The success of the first tier is has not thus far brought much of substance to clear that the pre-election merger of the two control 31 percent of the members of the prioritised by the new government. Yet, few between signatory groups and representatives tremendously important for the second. the ethnic armed organisations themselves. main Rakhine parties in the Arakan National Union Parliament) have an obvious interest in concrete plans have emerged. The NLD will of the outgoing government in the first two Party contributed to its success. Similar changing the electoral system. Perhaps the only want to put its own stamp on the process, but months of 2016, the peace process was in fact As for the first tier, after five years of This division and marginalisation of the ethnic mergers in other states could perhaps have imaginable way that the system might change it cannot make moves without the Tatmadaw. deadlocked during the period of transition. In negotiations and attempts to build trust armed groups has coincided with a devastating led to more support, and if several ethnic in the foreseeable future is through a bargain, The question then is how NLD-Tatmadaw February, there was also severe fighting between between the ethnic armed groups and the political defeat for the ethnic minority parties minorities had been able to establish electoral where the NLD agrees to a more proportional cooperation will be met by the ethnic armed the TNLA and one of the signatory groups – the Union government, a general agreement in the November 2015 elections, leaving many alliances, backing each other’s candidates, this system and the military agrees to give up its organisations. Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) – further was reached on the content of a NCA. The ethnic minorities with little or no representation might have further enhanced ethnic minority right to appoint the 25 percent. A key aim of the weakening ethnic minority unity. agreement signed on 15 October 2015 was in the country’s political institutions, severely representation. It cannot be ruled out that NLD is to revise the constitution in a democratic While articulating confidence in Aung San meant to be applied nationwide, and most of affecting the second tier of the peace process. ethnic minority people in many constituencies direction, reducing military prerogatives. To Suu Kyi as a national leader, ethnic armed With rivalries and splits between the various the country’s ethnic armed groups, which Ethnic armed groups might gain from signing opted for the NLD instead of minority parties, accept a proportional electoral system might be organisations have expressed doubts as ethnic groups, and a likely power struggle number upwards of 20, took part in its the NCA if they can be sure that representatives because of the rivalries between the various an appropriate concession to make in return. In to whether the Bamar-dominated NLD at the Union level between the NLD and the negotiation. Due to disagreement between of their ethnic group will be listened to in a ethnic parties. The divide between those who this way, Myanmar would take a significant step understands the grievances and demands of military, the peace process will be difficult. The the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw) and meaningful national political dialogue, but the had participated in and those who had boycotted towards genuine democracy, and one could hope the ethnic minorities. President U Htin Kyaw’s Myanmar armed forces have made it clear in some of the ethnic armed organisations over general weakening of the ethnic minorities in the 2010 elections in Shan and Mon States that it would also enhance the chance of ethnic partly Mon ethnic background, Vice-President negotiations with the NLD prior to the transition the inclusion of additional armed groups, only the 2015 elections has reduced the prospects proved particularly damaging. Other ethnic minority representation. Henry Van Thio’s Chin background and the that they are unwilling to make constitutional eight of them decided to sign. These included of this being the case. Many people in the minorities also suffered. In states and regions appointment of Mon National Party’s Naing amendments at this stage, and any amendments the Karen National Union (KNU), which had ethnic minority areas question the Tatmadaw’s with a heterogeneous population, the best Electoral reform could become a matter for Thet Lwin as Minister for Ethnic Affairs may can be blocked by their appointed MPs since fought the central government continuously willingness to respect a ceasefire and cooperate chance for ethnic minority leaders to mobilise national political dialogue. In that case, it would be conciliatory factors. However, the Mon and constitutional revision requires a 3/4 majority. for 63 years. The Kachin Independence Army with the new civilian government in providing a substantial following would probably be to also be reasonable to discuss the number and the Chin are the least problematic of the large Military MPs have also openly expressed their (KIA), however, did not sign. It had played a for a meaningful political dialogue, and ethnic form a multi-ethnic party, emphasising local boundaries of the electoral constituencies in ethnic minorities from the government’s point discontent with NLD MPs who have criticised prominent role in the negotiations, and held minorities fear being sidelined by the Bamar- issues of concern to all inhabitants. The Kachin order to strike a balance between the need to of view, and it is the actual political outcome of the Tatmadaw. The NLD may find that its sway over several smaller armed groups, who oriented infighting between the NLD and the State Democracy Party tried this, but failed to have a reasonably equal number of votes behind government policies that will be decisive for the chance to revise the constitution increases if it also did not sign. Fighting continued in Kachin military. convince others to join and ended up competing each elected MP, and the need to ensure good ethnic minority leaders. Expectations for what cooperates with ethnic minority organisations State afterwards, and intense fighting flared against no less than seven ethnic minority representation for peripheral areas, which are Aung San Suu Kyi is going to achieve are high. who also want to change the constitution. While up in northern Shan State, partly between the The political marginalisation of minority parties in Kachin State, thus winning only one often the abode of the ethnic minorities. However, if the new government appears too the national political dialogue will be a lengthy Tatmadaw and local non-signatory groups, and groups seat in the Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw) and weak and pliable vis-a-vis the Tatmadaw, this and demanding process, it could be good news partly between signatory and non-signatory three seats in the Kachin State Hluttaw. Ethnic A consequence of the electoral defeat of may discourage the ethnic armed organisations for the ethnic minorities if the NLD should groups. The ethnic minority parties secured only 55 of minority parties need to realise that ethnic the ethnic minority parties is that already from taking part in the peace process. The seek their support. They could then conceivably the 498 elected seats in the Union Parliament minority votes do not come for free. There is marginalised ethnic minorities are now constitution gives the Commander-in-Chief a form a common ground for building a more An unintended outcome of the failure to (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) and most of these were an urgent need for cooperation between them, underrepresented politically at a critical decisive role in matters of national security and democratic and federal union. However, the implement the ceasefire nationwide is that the won by the Arakan National Party (ANP) and within as well as across ethnic groups, and to juncture in Myanmar’s democratic transition. the president and his peace negotiating team Tatmadaw is likely to resist the calls for change NLD-led government may now get a chance to the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy mobilise the electorate on issues and policies of Underrepresentation was already a problem will have little choice but to listen to what he and guard its decision-making autonomy. put its own stamp on the negotiations and gain (SNLD). With the exception of Rakhine and cross-ethnic concern, not just on ethnic loyalty. in the democratic post-independence years says. The ethnic armed organisations cannot After the landslide victory of the NLD in the ownership to the process. The outgoing and Shan State, the ethnic minority parties also (1948–1962) when ethnic civil wars broke out on their side trust any agreement that does general elections, the Tatmadaw is likely to be incoming government would then share the performed poorly in the State Parliament Third, the (British) first-past-the-post electoral in many frontier areas, in turn providing a not have the support of both the NLD and the even more vigilant than before in guarding its credit for having managed a successful peace elections. Why did they fail? There are three system favoured the NLD as the largest party. rationale for the army to seize power. For the Tatmadaw. constitutional prerogatives.

PRIO POLICY BRIEF 05 2016 www.prio.org www.prio.org PRIO POLICY BRIEF 05 2016 A two-tiered peace process process. There are two problems, however. main reasons. The foremost is the extraordinary With 57 percent of the votes, the NLD got current peace process to succeed, there must At this point in the peace process, ethnic armed First, the Tatmadaw is unlikely to allow the new nature of this particular election, which most 79 percent of the elected seats in the Union be channels through which ethnic minority groups have little confidence in substantial There are two main tiers in Myanmar’s government to make any further concessions to people viewed as a referendum for or against Parliament – which equals 57 percent of the organisations can express their grievances and improvements. The months prior to and peace process. The first is the process of the ethnic armed groups. The second problem military rule. Voters saw the election first elected and appointed seats combined. With work for reforms. This is important in order immediately after the partial signing of the negotiations between the government and is that the process so far has left these groups and foremost as a chance to end fifty years of the NLD’s landslide victory, it will now be to build trust between the Bamar majority NCA in October 2015 were marked by active the ethnic armed groups, initiated by former with little sense of achievement, and they may military dictatorship and provide the military’s difficult to introduce a system of proportional and the ethnic minorities, and also to show warfare between the Myanmar armed forces President U Thein Sein and led by Minister not see much gain from a ceasefire. Local main opponent since 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi, representation or a hybrid system, like the the ethnic armed groups that there is space and the Kokang Myanmar National Democratic U Aung Min, with the aim of first signing a distrust of the armed forces has grown instead with a mandate to generate change. one in Germany. The NLD benefits strongly for ethnic minorities to contribute politically Alliance Army (MNDAA). Fighting also nationwide ceasefire accord (NCA), and then of diminished in the areas where fighting has from the current system and now controls and have an impact on decisions. Any further continued in Kachin State with the Kachin starting a national political dialogue about continued, and a rift has emerged between Second, the rivalry between several political Myanmar’s legislative process. Under the 2008 marginalisation of ethnic minorities at the Independence Army (KIA). The MNDAA, power sharing, decentralisation and political signatory and non-signatory groups. In some parties seeking to represent the same ethnic constitution, however, the military selects political level is likely to be detrimental to the the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA/ reforms. The second tier is a wider process of areas, notably in Kayin State, the ceasefire group also contributed, although the combined 25 percent of the members in all assemblies, peace process. Palaung) and the Arakan Army (AA) were not including ethnic minorities in political decision- agreement signed by the KNU in 2012, which votes for the various parties would in most and these military representatives are likely to allowed by the Tatmadaw to take part in the making at the Union, state and regional levels, formed part of the basis for the 2015 NCA, places not have been enough to beat the NLD sympathise with Thein Sein’s Union Solidarity The marginalisation of ethnic armed ceasefire negotiations, causing protests from transforming the existing political structure has benefitted local populations by allowing candidates. Only seven more seats in the Union and Development Party (USDP), which received groups the alliance of ethnic armed organisations in from within, and arriving at a situation where internally displaced persons to return to their Parliament and nine in the State parliaments 28 percent of the votes, but only 8 percent of exile, the United Nationalities Federal Council the ethnic minorities are treated as equals to villages and resume economic activities and would most likely have gone to ethnic minority the elected seats in the Union Parliament. The Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have (UNFC), and splits between signatory and non- the Bamar majority in an ethnically inclusive communications with other areas. Yet the NCA parties if they had managed to unite. Yet it is USDP and the military appointees (who together declared that the peace process will be signatory groups. And while talks continued national Union. The success of the first tier is has not thus far brought much of substance to clear that the pre-election merger of the two control 31 percent of the members of the prioritised by the new government. Yet, few between signatory groups and representatives tremendously important for the second. the ethnic armed organisations themselves. main Rakhine parties in the Arakan National Union Parliament) have an obvious interest in concrete plans have emerged. The NLD will of the outgoing government in the first two Party contributed to its success. Similar changing the electoral system. Perhaps the only want to put its own stamp on the process, but months of 2016, the peace process was in fact As for the first tier, after five years of This division and marginalisation of the ethnic mergers in other states could perhaps have imaginable way that the system might change it cannot make moves without the Tatmadaw. deadlocked during the period of transition. In negotiations and attempts to build trust armed groups has coincided with a devastating led to more support, and if several ethnic in the foreseeable future is through a bargain, The question then is how NLD-Tatmadaw February, there was also severe fighting between between the ethnic armed groups and the political defeat for the ethnic minority parties minorities had been able to establish electoral where the NLD agrees to a more proportional cooperation will be met by the ethnic armed the TNLA and one of the signatory groups – the Union government, a general agreement in the November 2015 elections, leaving many alliances, backing each other’s candidates, this system and the military agrees to give up its organisations. Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) – further was reached on the content of a NCA. The ethnic minorities with little or no representation might have further enhanced ethnic minority right to appoint the 25 percent. A key aim of the weakening ethnic minority unity. agreement signed on 15 October 2015 was in the country’s political institutions, severely representation. It cannot be ruled out that NLD is to revise the constitution in a democratic While articulating confidence in Aung San meant to be applied nationwide, and most of affecting the second tier of the peace process. ethnic minority people in many constituencies direction, reducing military prerogatives. To Suu Kyi as a national leader, ethnic armed With rivalries and splits between the various the country’s ethnic armed groups, which Ethnic armed groups might gain from signing opted for the NLD instead of minority parties, accept a proportional electoral system might be organisations have expressed doubts as ethnic groups, and a likely power struggle number upwards of 20, took part in its the NCA if they can be sure that representatives because of the rivalries between the various an appropriate concession to make in return. In to whether the Bamar-dominated NLD at the Union level between the NLD and the negotiation. Due to disagreement between of their ethnic group will be listened to in a ethnic parties. The divide between those who this way, Myanmar would take a significant step understands the grievances and demands of military, the peace process will be difficult. The the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw) and meaningful national political dialogue, but the had participated in and those who had boycotted towards genuine democracy, and one could hope the ethnic minorities. President U Htin Kyaw’s Myanmar armed forces have made it clear in some of the ethnic armed organisations over general weakening of the ethnic minorities in the 2010 elections in Shan and Mon States that it would also enhance the chance of ethnic partly Mon ethnic background, Vice-President negotiations with the NLD prior to the transition the inclusion of additional armed groups, only the 2015 elections has reduced the prospects proved particularly damaging. Other ethnic minority representation. Henry Van Thio’s Chin background and the that they are unwilling to make constitutional eight of them decided to sign. These included of this being the case. Many people in the minorities also suffered. In states and regions appointment of Mon National Party’s Naing amendments at this stage, and any amendments the Karen National Union (KNU), which had ethnic minority areas question the Tatmadaw’s with a heterogeneous population, the best Electoral reform could become a matter for Thet Lwin as Minister for Ethnic Affairs may can be blocked by their appointed MPs since fought the central government continuously willingness to respect a ceasefire and cooperate chance for ethnic minority leaders to mobilise national political dialogue. In that case, it would be conciliatory factors. However, the Mon and constitutional revision requires a 3/4 majority. for 63 years. The Kachin Independence Army with the new civilian government in providing a substantial following would probably be to also be reasonable to discuss the number and the Chin are the least problematic of the large Military MPs have also openly expressed their (KIA), however, did not sign. It had played a for a meaningful political dialogue, and ethnic form a multi-ethnic party, emphasising local boundaries of the electoral constituencies in ethnic minorities from the government’s point discontent with NLD MPs who have criticised prominent role in the negotiations, and held minorities fear being sidelined by the Bamar- issues of concern to all inhabitants. The Kachin order to strike a balance between the need to of view, and it is the actual political outcome of the Tatmadaw. The NLD may find that its sway over several smaller armed groups, who oriented infighting between the NLD and the State Democracy Party tried this, but failed to have a reasonably equal number of votes behind government policies that will be decisive for the chance to revise the constitution increases if it also did not sign. Fighting continued in Kachin military. convince others to join and ended up competing each elected MP, and the need to ensure good ethnic minority leaders. Expectations for what cooperates with ethnic minority organisations State afterwards, and intense fighting flared against no less than seven ethnic minority representation for peripheral areas, which are Aung San Suu Kyi is going to achieve are high. who also want to change the constitution. While up in northern Shan State, partly between the The political marginalisation of minority parties in Kachin State, thus winning only one often the abode of the ethnic minorities. However, if the new government appears too the national political dialogue will be a lengthy Tatmadaw and local non-signatory groups, and groups seat in the Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw) and weak and pliable vis-a-vis the Tatmadaw, this and demanding process, it could be good news partly between signatory and non-signatory three seats in the Kachin State Hluttaw. Ethnic A consequence of the electoral defeat of may discourage the ethnic armed organisations for the ethnic minorities if the NLD should groups. The ethnic minority parties secured only 55 of minority parties need to realise that ethnic the ethnic minority parties is that already from taking part in the peace process. The seek their support. They could then conceivably the 498 elected seats in the Union Parliament minority votes do not come for free. There is marginalised ethnic minorities are now constitution gives the Commander-in-Chief a form a common ground for building a more An unintended outcome of the failure to (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) and most of these were an urgent need for cooperation between them, underrepresented politically at a critical decisive role in matters of national security and democratic and federal union. However, the implement the ceasefire nationwide is that the won by the Arakan National Party (ANP) and within as well as across ethnic groups, and to juncture in Myanmar’s democratic transition. the president and his peace negotiating team Tatmadaw is likely to resist the calls for change NLD-led government may now get a chance to the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy mobilise the electorate on issues and policies of Underrepresentation was already a problem will have little choice but to listen to what he and guard its decision-making autonomy. put its own stamp on the negotiations and gain (SNLD). With the exception of Rakhine and cross-ethnic concern, not just on ethnic loyalty. in the democratic post-independence years says. The ethnic armed organisations cannot After the landslide victory of the NLD in the ownership to the process. The outgoing and Shan State, the ethnic minority parties also (1948–1962) when ethnic civil wars broke out on their side trust any agreement that does general elections, the Tatmadaw is likely to be incoming government would then share the performed poorly in the State Parliament Third, the (British) first-past-the-post electoral in many frontier areas, in turn providing a not have the support of both the NLD and the even more vigilant than before in guarding its credit for having managed a successful peace elections. Why did they fail? There are three system favoured the NLD as the largest party. rationale for the army to seize power. For the Tatmadaw. constitutional prerogatives.

PRIO POLICY BRIEF 05 2016 www.prio.org www.prio.org PRIO POLICY BRIEF 05 2016 05 2016 What can the new government do to to do can government the new What and reconciliation national enhance peace? For the first time in over half a century, halfcentury, the firstover a in time For with a a government has Myanmar the National by led popular mandate, (NLD). Democracy League for ethnic Myanmar’s Concurrently, a face now minority organisations militarily marginalisation, as double politically. as well this mean does marginalisation What the ethnic of the bargaining power for can what and minority organisations strengthen to theirthey position? do PRIO POLICY BRIEF • • • • Brief Points Marte Nilsen Research (PRIO) Institute Oslo Peace Stein Tønnesson Research (PRIO) Institute Oslo Peace A New Era for Myanmar – – Myanmar for Era A New Ethnic for Ahead Trouble Minorities For the first time in over halfover the first in time For a has Myanmar a century, with a popular government Although the Myanmar mandate. extensive still have armed forces the 2008 under powers political seriously may and constitution, action curtail the independent the government, the new of U Htin President of inauguration increase a radical represents Kyaw international in the and internal State. the Myanmar of legitimacy with this coincides Paradoxically, ethnic the country’s for a setback their struggle and minorities status within autonomous for be negotiated to state, a federal political part a national as of dialogue.

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