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A New Era for Myanmar – Trouble Ahead for Ethnic Minorities

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A New Era for Myanmar – Trouble Ahead for Ethnic Minorities PRIO POLICY BRIEF 05 2016 Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 3 Address: Visiting Norway NO-0134 Oslo, 9229 Grønland, PO Box Institute Oslo (PRIO) Research Peace What can be done? President U Htin Kyaw, Aung San Suu Kyi and the new NLD-led government would be well With the marginalisation of both ethnic advised to ease the double marginalisation A New Era for Myanmar – minority parties and ethnic armed of the ethnic minorities, include them organisations, it is important for the ethnic systematically in political decision-making, and minorities to find new ways to engage in secure progress in the negotiations between the political processes at all levels: Tatmadaw and the ethnic armed organisations. Trouble Ahead for Ethnic The government may consider: • Ethnic minority parties that succeeded in taking seats in the Union or State legislatures • Selecting ethnic minority people with high Minorities may reach out to unrepresented parties to local credibility as Chief Ministers in the find a common platform for future elections. seven ethnic states, and ensuring that they in turn appoint people representing all the • Ethnic minority parties may work together main ethnic minorities of their state in the For the first time in over half to influence the NLD-led government and local governments. Brief Points the Chief Ministers in promoting minority PRIOUpdates Twitter: PRIO.org Facebook: www.prio.org a century, Myanmar has a issues across the country. • Promoting and financing local autonomy • For the first time in over half a century, in the smaller ethnic minority areas, both government with a popular Myanmar has a government with a • Ethnic minority members of the NLD within the Bamar-dominated regions and the and the USDP could advocate national seven ethnic states. mandate. Although the Myanmar popular mandate, led by the National reconciliation, power sharing and peace in armed forces still have extensive League for Democracy (NLD). their parties’ policies, including reforms of • Including representatives of ethnic minority the system of governance, minority language parties in all committees and political political powers under the 2008 • Concurrently, Myanmar’s ethnic instruction, cultural rights, and social and decision-making bodies. minority organisations now face a economic development in ethnic minority constitution, and may seriously double marginalisation, militarily as areas. • Organising the national political dialogue in a way that ensures both broad consultation, curtail the independent action well as politically. • Civil society organisations may demand and the initiation of step-by-step reforms in of the new government, the a place in the national political dialogue the direction of a complex federal solution. • What does this marginalisation mean and hold the government accountable to its for the bargaining power of the ethnic promises. Building on the human resources and inauguration of President U Htin • ISBN: minority organisations and what can experiences accumulated by the previous Kyaw represents a radical increase All ethnic armed organisations will need to administration. they do to strengthen their position? • 978-82-7288-675-1 (online) 978-82-7288-674-4 (print) become parties to the NCA and take part in in the internal and international monitoring it, so that the national political • Engaging with the Commander-in-Chief • What can the new government do to dialogue can be conducted under peaceful to find a common platform for the peace legitimacy of the Myanmar State. enhance national reconciliation and conditions, and all ethnic areas can benefit negotiations that will allow the NCA to be from a peace dividend in terms of aid to signed by all armed groups so it can be peace? build schools, medical services and basic applied nationwide. infrastructure. Paradoxically, this coincides with a setback for the country’s ethnic minorities and their struggle for autonomous status within THE AUTHORS THE PROJECT PRIO a federal state, to be negotiated Marte Nilsen Marte Nilsen is a historian of religions and This Policy Brief was produced as part of the The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) is a Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Senior Researcher at PRIO. project “Democracy and Peacebuilding in non-profit peace research institute (estab- as part of a national political Email: [email protected] Myanmar” funded by the Norwegian Ministry lished in 1959) whose overarching purpose Stein Tønnesson of Foreign Affairs. is to conduct research on the conditions for dialogue. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Stein Tønnesson is a historian, Research peaceful relations between states, groups and Professor at PRIO and leader of the East people. The institute is independent, interna- Asian Peace Program at Uppsala University. tional and interdisciplinary, and explores is- Email: [email protected] sues related to all facets of peace and conflict. PRIO POLICY BRIEF 05 2016 www.prio.org A two-tiered peace process process. There are two problems, however. main reasons. The foremost is the extraordinary With 57 percent of the votes, the NLD got current peace process to succeed, there must At this point in the peace process, ethnic armed First, the Tatmadaw is unlikely to allow the new nature of this particular election, which most 79 percent of the elected seats in the Union be channels through which ethnic minority groups have little confidence in substantial There are two main tiers in Myanmar’s government to make any further concessions to people viewed as a referendum for or against Parliament – which equals 57 percent of the organisations can express their grievances and improvements. The months prior to and peace process. The first is the process of the ethnic armed groups. The second problem military rule. Voters saw the election first elected and appointed seats combined. With work for reforms. This is important in order immediately after the partial signing of the negotiations between the government and is that the process so far has left these groups and foremost as a chance to end fifty years of the NLD’s landslide victory, it will now be to build trust between the Bamar majority NCA in October 2015 were marked by active the ethnic armed groups, initiated by former with little sense of achievement, and they may military dictatorship and provide the military’s difficult to introduce a system of proportional and the ethnic minorities, and also to show warfare between the Myanmar armed forces President U Thein Sein and led by Minister not see much gain from a ceasefire. Local main opponent since 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi, representation or a hybrid system, like the the ethnic armed groups that there is space and the Kokang Myanmar National Democratic U Aung Min, with the aim of first signing a distrust of the armed forces has grown instead with a mandate to generate change. one in Germany. The NLD benefits strongly for ethnic minorities to contribute politically Alliance Army (MNDAA). Fighting also nationwide ceasefire accord (NCA), and then of diminished in the areas where fighting has from the current system and now controls and have an impact on decisions. Any further continued in Kachin State with the Kachin starting a national political dialogue about continued, and a rift has emerged between Second, the rivalry between several political Myanmar’s legislative process. Under the 2008 marginalisation of ethnic minorities at the Independence Army (KIA). The MNDAA, power sharing, decentralisation and political signatory and non-signatory groups. In some parties seeking to represent the same ethnic constitution, however, the military selects political level is likely to be detrimental to the the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA/ reforms. The second tier is a wider process of areas, notably in Kayin State, the ceasefire group also contributed, although the combined 25 percent of the members in all assemblies, peace process. Palaung) and the Arakan Army (AA) were not including ethnic minorities in political decision- agreement signed by the KNU in 2012, which votes for the various parties would in most and these military representatives are likely to allowed by the Tatmadaw to take part in the making at the Union, state and regional levels, formed part of the basis for the 2015 NCA, places not have been enough to beat the NLD sympathise with Thein Sein’s Union Solidarity The marginalisation of ethnic armed ceasefire negotiations, causing protests from transforming the existing political structure has benefitted local populations by allowing candidates. Only seven more seats in the Union and Development Party (USDP), which received groups the alliance of ethnic armed organisations in from within, and arriving at a situation where internally displaced persons to return to their Parliament and nine in the State parliaments 28 percent of the votes, but only 8 percent of exile, the United Nationalities Federal Council the ethnic minorities are treated as equals to villages and resume economic activities and would most likely have gone to ethnic minority the elected seats in the Union Parliament. The Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have (UNFC), and splits between signatory and non- the Bamar majority in an ethnically inclusive communications with other areas. Yet the NCA parties if they had managed to unite. Yet it is USDP and the military appointees (who together declared that the peace process will be signatory groups. And while talks continued national Union. The success of the first tier is has not thus far brought much of substance to clear that the pre-election merger of the two control 31 percent of the members of the prioritised by the new government. Yet, few between signatory groups and representatives tremendously important for the second. the ethnic armed organisations themselves. main Rakhine parties in the Arakan National Union Parliament) have an obvious interest in concrete plans have emerged. The NLD will of the outgoing government in the first two Party contributed to its success.
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