JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY CONTENTS Volume 1.2 July 2004 Notes on Contributors 133 Articles Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy 135 ALISON STONE Neither Generalism nor Particularism: Ethical Correctness is Located in General Ethical Theories 155 JANE SINGLETON Politics and the Economist-King: Is Rational Choice Theory the Science of Choice? 177 HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap 197 STEPHEN R. BROWN Review Article Ethical Pluralism and Common Decency 211 JONATHAN RILEY Reviews Constantine Sandis on Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action by G.F. Schueler 223 Stefan Andreasson on Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas edited by J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane 226 132 JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1.2 (2004) Kimberley Brownlee on The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law edited by Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro 229 Robin Celikates on Unsichtbarkeit. Stationen einer Theorie der Intersubjektivität by Axel Honneth 231 Stan van Hooft on Humanism of the Other by Emmanuel Levinas 234 Elizabeth Telfer on Children, Family and the State by David William Archard 237 William A. Galston on Identity in Democracy by Amy Gutmann 239 Christian Miller on Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet 242 Stamatoula Panagakou on Republicanism: Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, Vols. I and II, edited by Martin Van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner 245 John Maynor on Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post Enlightenment Project by Gerald F. Gaus 248 Books Received 251 Guidelines for Contributors 254 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS STEPHEN R. BROWN received his PhD from the University of Oklahoma. He is currently Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Briar Cliff University in Sioux City, Iowa. He has presented papers at meetings of the American Philosophical Association, the North Texas Philosophical Association, the Northwest Philosophy Conference and the Wesleyan Philosophical Society. His present research interests are virtue ethics, ethical naturalism, and philosophical naturalism generally. HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE is currently a PhD student in Political Theory in the Department of Government at Harvard University. She is interested in the epistemology of the social sciences, the role of probability in moral and politi- cal judgments, and questions of global justice. She has written her Diplôme d’Etudes Approfondies on ‘Hume: Probability and Reasonable Choice’ which appears in July 2004 in the Presses Universitaires de France. JONATHAN RILEY is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Tulane University. His recent articles include ‘Interpreting Berlin’s Liberalism’ (American Political Science Review, June 2001) and ‘J.S. Mill’s Liberal Utilitar- ian Doctrine of Freedom of Expression’ (Utilitas, forthcoming). His most recent book is Mill’s Radical Liberalism, forthcoming from Routledge. He is currently working on another book manuscript, Pluralistic Liberalisms: A Per- spective on Anglo-American Liberalism Since Mill. JANE SINGLETON is Principal Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire, UK. Her research interests centre on contemporary moral phi- losophy, the philosophy of Kant and applied moral philosophy. She is the co-author, with Professor Susan McLaren, of Ethical Foundations of Health Care (Mosby, 1995). ALISON STONE is a Lecturer in Philosophy at Lancaster University, UK. She works primarily in post-Kantian European philosophy, feminist philosophy and political philosophy. She has published articles on Hölderlin, Hegel, Irigaray and Judith Butler. Her book, Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel’s Philosophy, is forthcoming from SUNY Press in late 2004. She is completing a book on Luce Irigaray’s philosophy of sexual difference. [JMP 1.2 (2004) 135-153] ISSN 1740-4681 Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy ALISON STONE* Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy Lancaster University Lancaster LA1 4YG, UK [email protected] This article revisits the ethical and political questions raised by feminist debates over essentialism, the belief that there are properties essential to women and which all women share. Feminists’ widespread rejection of essentialism has threatened to undermine feminist politics. Re-evaluating two responses to this problem—‘strategic’ essentialism and Iris Marion Young’s idea that women are an internally diverse ‘series’—I argue that both unsatisfactorily retain essentialism as a descriptive claim about the social reality of women’s lives. I argue instead that women have a ‘gene- alogy’: women always acquire femininity by appropriating and reworking existing cultural interpretations of femininity, so that all women become situated within a history of overlapping chains of interpretation. Because all women are located within this complex history, they are identifiable as belonging to a determinate social group, despite sharing no common understanding or experience of femininity. The idea that women have a genealogy thus reconciles anti-essentialism with feminist politics. he heated feminist debates over ‘essentialism’ of the 1980s and early T1990s have largely died away, yet they raised fundamental questions for feminist moral and political philosophy which have still to be fully explored. The central issue in feminist controversies over essentialism was whether there are any shared characteristics common to all women, which unify them as a group. Many leading feminist thinkers of the 1970s and 1980s rejected essentialism, particularly on the grounds that universal claims about women are invariably false and effectively normalize and privilege specific forms of femininity. However, by the 1990s it had become apparent that the rejection of essentialism problematically undercut feminist politics, by denying that * This article is a substantially revised version of my essay, ‘On the Genealogy of Women: Against Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy’, in Stacy Gillis, Gillian Howie and Becky Munford (eds.), Third Wave Feminism: A Critical Assessment (London: Palgrave, 2004). I thank Gillian Howie, Vrinda Dalmiya, and the anonymous referee for the Journal of Moral Philosophy for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. © The Continuum Publishing Group Ltd 2004, The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX and 15 East 26th Street, Suite 1703, New York, NY 10010, USA. 136 JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1.2 (2004) women have any shared characteristics that could motivate them to act together as a collectivity. An ‘anti-anti-essentialist’ current therefore crystallized, which sought to resuscitate some form of essentialism as a political necessity for feminism.1 One particularly influential strand within this current has been ‘strategic’ essentialism, which defends essentialist claims just because they are politically useful. In this article, I aim to challenge stra- tegic essentialism, arguing that feminist philosophy cannot avoid enquiring into whether essentialism is true as a descriptive claim about social reality. I will argue that, in fact, essentialism is descriptively false, but that this need not undermine the possibility of feminist activism. This is because we can derive an alternative basis for feminist politics from the concept of ‘genealogy’ which features importantly within some recent theoretical understandings of gender, most notably Judith Butler’s ‘performative’ theory of gender. To anticipate, I will develop my argument for a ‘genealogical’ and anti- essentialist recasting of feminist politics in the following stages. I begin by reviewing the history of feminist debates surrounding essentialism, identifying in these apparently highly disparate debates a coherent history of engagement with an ‘essentialism’ that carries a relatively unified sense. My overview of these debates will trace how anti-essentialism came to threaten feminism both as a critique of existing society and as a politics of change. I shall then assess two attempts by feminist thinkers to surmount the problems posed by anti-essentialism without reverting to the idea that all women share a com- mon social position and form of experience. These attempts are, first, strategic essentialism and, second, Iris Marion Young’s idea that women comprise not a unified group but an internally diverse ‘series’. Both these attempts, I shall argue, are unsatisfactory, because they continue tacitly to rely on a descrip- tive form of essentialism, even as they explicitly repudiate it. Nonetheless, Young’s rethinking of women as a series is important in indicating that we need to overcome the problems generated by anti-essentialism by recon- ceiving women as a specifically non-unified type of social group. Building on this point, I shall argue that feminists could fruitfully reconceive women as a particular type of non-unified group: a group that exists in virtue of having a genealogy. The concept of genealogy, as I understand it, provides a way to reject essentialism (and so to deny that women have any necessary or com- mon characteristics), while preserving the idea that women form a distinctive social group. My project of reconceiving women as having a genealogy is loosely derived from Judith Butler, whose declared aim in Gender Trouble is to outline a ‘feminist genealogy of the category of women’.2 By briefly tracing out the Nietzschean background to recent feminist